TORTS AND DAMAGESPCGPINEDA,RN,MAN 2014EMPLOYERSArt. 102.Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.Art. 103.Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.184 Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA and Kapunan| FernanG.R. No. 75112, October 16, 1990 |190 SCRA 485FACTS Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan was hospitalized for a total of twenty days. Evidence showed that at the time of the accident, the jeep had only one headlight functioning and that Funtecha only had a student drivers permit, having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. Kapunan instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. He then commenced a civil case for damages naming as defendants Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, director and president of Filamer Christian Institute. Allan Masa was not impleaded as co-defendant. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial courts decision in totoISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N FILAMER IS LIABLE AS FUNTECHAS EMPLOYER?Petitioner: It cannot be held responsible for the 201ortuous act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO, FILAMER IS NOT LIABLE Art. 2180 provides that xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In disclaiming responsibility, Filamer has invoked Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code which reads:o Sec. 14 Working scholars. There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand, and schoolson the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge Under the just-quoted provision of law, Filamer cannot be considered as Funtechas employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4-6am with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 am classes. He was not included in the company payroll. Even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, it has been satisfactorily shown that at the time of the accident, he was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep was not within the ambit of the janitorial services for which he was employed.

185 Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC| GutierrezG.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992 |FACTS Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. The place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute. Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advice to swerve to the right. At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioningheadlight. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Filamer is liable as Funtechas employer.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYes, Filamer is liable There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver. The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. As far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.

Valenzuela vs. CA| KapunanG.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996 | 362 SCRA 56FACTS At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed she had a flat tire and stopped at a lighted place to solicit help if needed. She parked along the sidewalk, about 1. feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee). She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He said he was travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights.Temporarily blinded, he swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it was then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Alexander Commercial Inc. can be held solidarily liable with LiHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo Although the Li was an employee of American, no proof was adduced as Li claimed, that he was out late that night on a social call in the exercise of his functions as assistant manager

Castilex v. Vazquez| KapunanG.R. No. 132266. December 21, 1999FACTS Between 1:30 to 2:00 am , Romeo Vazquez was driving a motorcycle while Benjamin Abad was driving a pick-up owned by CAstilex. Instead of going around the Rotunda, he made a shortcut. He traversed against the flow of traffic. As a result thereof, the pick-up collided with the motorcycle resulting in the severe injuries of Vazquez. While in the hospital, Vazquez died.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N as employer of Abad, Castilex should be held liable for the damage caused by its employee

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDICastilex is not Liable. Under Article 2180, Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In order for this paragraph to apply, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. Here it was not sufficiently proven that such was the case. It is the obligation of the plaintiff to prove that the employee is not acting within the scope of its duty. Jurisprudence provides that, an employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. In this case, Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, and after he went out to grab some dinner. It was when he left the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident.

Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA| MakalintalG.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16 SCRA 448FACTS A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).ISSUES:W/N Caltex is solidarily liableHELD AND RATIO:Yes, based on the contract between Boquiren and Caltex, the latter had an extensive control over Boquiren, the control was such that Boquiren was virtually and employee.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP VS CAGR NO 104658FACTS:Clarita Camacho (private respondent) was the operator of a gasoline station in Baguio City where she sells Shell products.To determine if the sales losses she incurred in the past months were due to pipeline leakages, she requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks. Certain Jesus Feliciano came to the private respondents station with a job order from the petitioner to perform the test.Due to the negligence of contractor Feliciano, the water from the tank where they are conducting the test was transferred to the tank where gasoline is sold, this occurrence led to complaints being filed against the private respondent. ISSUES:W/N PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE CAUSED BY MR. FELICIANOHELD AND RATIO:NO, for an employer to be liable ER-EE relation must be proved, certain factors must be determined 1. The manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee 2. The mode of payment of wages 3. The presence or absence of power to control the putative employees conduct.Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence.

Cerezo vs. Tuazon| CarpioG.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004 | 426 SCRA 167FACTS A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for Damages against Foronda, the bus driver, Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus line, and Atty. Cerezo her husband. Summons was never served against Foronda, and thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Tuazon failed to show that the business benefitted the family pursuant to Art. 121(3) of the Family Code, hence Atty. Cerezo was not held liable and Mrs. Cerezo was held to be the only one liable. Instead of an appeal, Mrs. Cerezo filed an action for relief of judgment. When such was denied, the Cerezo spouses filed certiorari before the CA. And subsequently, certiorari before the SC. One of Mrs. Cerezos contentions is that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Foronda whose negligence was the main issue and that he was an indispensible party whose presence was compulsory.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Mrs. Cerezo may be held to be solely liable as the employer with the negligent employee impleaded in the case.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIYes, Mrs. Cerezos liability is not only solidary but also primary and direct, as an employer The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. Tuazon chose to file an action based on quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses, hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Forondas recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence, aggravated by Mrs. Cerezos lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda. Art. 2180 states that Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. An employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES VS. PHIL. AMERICAN FORWARDERS

FACTS Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders. PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment as contemplated in NCC 2180.

ISSUE AND HOLDING WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose.

NO. RATIO Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of NCC 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.

JAYME vs APOSTOLG.R. No. 163609 November 27, 2008FACTS:Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck owned by Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor Miguel of Koronadal to Buayan Airport. The pick-up accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C. Jayme, who was crossing the National Highway. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin 50 meters away from point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Despite medical treatment, Marvin died six days after the accident. Marvins parents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the driver, the mayor, the owner of the pick-up, Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal (now City), pointing out that the proximate cause was Lozanos negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. And that applying the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability, Mayor Miguel should be liable for his employees negligent acts. On the other hand, Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up without their consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano pointed that Marvins sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident.The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvins parents, absolving Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal from liability. Fidel, Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Marvins parents damages. In his appeal, Mayor Miguel claims that the real employer of Lozano was the Municipality of Koronadal and not him. The CA granted his appeal and dismissed the case. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an employee of the municipality, loaned Lozano to drive him to the airport, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer.Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.

Sps. Mamaril vs The Boys Scoutof the Philippines GR No. 179382

Principle:Vicarious liability lies withthe true employer andnot the employersclient.Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches tothe employer agency, and notto the clients or customers of such agency.

Facts: Spouses BenjaminMamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril are jeepney operators. They would park their six passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines compound for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. However, one of thevehicles went missing and was never recovered. BSP hadcontracted with AIB for its security and protection. Cesario Pea andVicente Gaddi were assigned by AIB Security to secure the BSP compound. One night a male person who has the key of the vehicle took the lostjeepney out of thecompound and wasnever recovered. The Sps. Mamaril filed acomplaint for damages against BSP, AIB andthe two security guards.Issue: Whether or not the Boy Scout of the Philippines is not liable for the lost vehicle owned by the Spouses due to thenegligence of the security guards assigned by AIB to BSP underthe Guard Service Contract?Ruling: It is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of the Sps. Mamarils vehicle was the negligent act of the security guards in allowing unidentified person to take the vehicle but there is nothing that point negligence on the part of BSP for it to beliable. The two security guards are employees of AIB and where thus assigned by AIB to BSP in pursuant of the Guard Service Contract between them. There is noemployer-employee relationship between the security guard andBSP. The negligence of thesecurity guard cannot be attributed to BSP but rather to its true employer AIB. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches tothe employer agency, and notto the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in ordinary course of events, be demanded from a client company whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The factthat a client company may giveinstruction or direction to the security guards assigned to it, does not, byitself render the client responsible asan employer of thesecurity guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omission.

Partnership Partnership or every partner is liable for torts committed by one of the partners acting within the scope of the firm business, though they do not participate in, ratify, or have knowledge of such torts. Partners are liable as joint tort-feasors. Vicarious liability is similar to the common law rule on respondeat superior. Liability is entirely imputed and the partnership cannot obviously invoke diligence in the selection and supervision of the partner.SpousesAbsolute community of property The absolute community property shall be for liabilities incurred by either spouses by reason of crime or quasi-delict in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse. (Article 94 Family Code) Payments shall be considered advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor spouse upon liquidation of the community.Conjugal partnership of gains GENERAL RULE: Pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or wife are not chargeable against the conjugal partnership but against the separate properties of the wrongdoer.EXCEPTION: Conjugal partnership should be made liable: When the profits have inured to the benefit of the partnership, or If one of the spouses committed the tort while performing a business or if the act was supposed to benefit the partnership.Regime of separation of property Each spouse is responsible for his/her separate obligation.REGISTERED OWNER RULEThe rule in this jurisdiction is that the person who is the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any damages caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle although the same was already sold or conveyed to another person at the time of the accident. The registered owner is liable to the injured party subject to his right of recourse against the transferee or the buyer.Although the rule is usually applied to common carriers, the rule had already been extended by the Supreme Court to quasi-delict cases involving private vehicles. The registered owner rule had been applied to cases involving enforcement of liability against an employer under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code even if the employer is not engaged in business.Although the rule is usually applied to common carriers, the rule had already been extended by the Supreme Court to quasi-delict cases involving private vehicles. The registered owner rule had been applied to cases involving enforcement of liability against an employer under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code even if the employer is not engaged in business.DUAVITv COURT OF APPEALSMay 18, 1989FACTS:The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep, which had then 2passengers on it. As a result of the collision the passengers of theother jeep suffered injury and the automobile itself had to be repaired because of the extensive damage.A case was filed against Sabiniano as driver and againstDuavitas owner of thejeep.Duavitadmitted ownership of the jeep but denied that Sabiniano was his employee.Sabiniano himself admitted that he tookDuavits jeep from the garage without consent or authority ofthe owner. He testified further thatDuaviteven filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavitdid not push through as the parents ofSabiniano apologized toDuaviton his behalf.TC found Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but absolvedDuaviton the ground that there wasno employer-employee relationship between them, and that formertook the vehicle without consentorauthority of the latter.CA held the two of them jointly and severally liable.ISSUE:Won the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article2180 of the CC when the said vehicle wasneither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.HELD:NOIn Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot beheld liable for an accident involving a vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and bya person note mployed by him. This ruling is still relevant and applicable, and hence, must be upheld.CAs reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and cannot be sustained. InErezo v Jepte case ,defendant Jepte was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not really the owner of the truck that killed the latter because herepresented himself as its owner to the MotorVehicles Office and had it registered under his name; he was thus estopped from later ondenying such representation. In Vargas, Vargas sold her jeepney to a 3rdperson, but she did not surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney later on figured in an accident, she was held liable by the court. Holding that the operator of record continues to bethe operator of vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and 3rd persons.The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Here in petitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle but denies having employed or authorized the driverSabiniano. The jeep was virtually stolen fromthe petitioners garage.Decision and resolution annulled and set aside.

Equitable Leasing Corp v Lucita Suyom et al | PanganibanGR NO. 143360, September 5, 2002 |FACTS June 4, 1991: Equitable Leasing Corp had a lease agreement with for a Fuso Road Tractor with Ecatine (as the lessee), who according to the agreement will eventually own the tractor, upon full payment by Edwin Lim of Ecatine. December 9, 1992: Lim completed the payment, and thus a Deed of Sale was drawn between Ecatine and Equitable, however the deed was not registered in the LTO. July 17, 1994: the said Tractor, driven by Raul Tutor, employee of Ecatine, rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo in Tondo Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed, 2 died while 4 more were injured. Tutor was charged and convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and multiple physical injuries in the MTC. Upon verification with the LTO, Equitable was found to be the registered owner of the tractor. Equitable then received a complaint for damages, but they denied liability claiming the tractor was already sold to Ecatine back in 1992. RTC and CA held: Equitable is liable, hence this appeal.ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Equitable remains liable based on quasi-delict for the negligent act of a driver who was not the employee of the petitionerHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIEQUITABLE IS LIABLE The negligent employees civil liability is based on Art 2176 (NCC) and/or Art 100 (RPC), while employers liability is based on Art 103 of the RPC: where employers are held subsidiary liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of latters duties. This liability attaches when the convicted employee turns out to be insolvent. Art 2176 in relation to 2180, an action predicated on quasi-delict maybe instituted against the employer for an employees act or omission. This liability for the negligent conduct of a subordinate is direct and primary (meaning SOLIDARY), with the possible defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. In the case at bar, Tutors criminal liability has been established, but since Tutor cannot be found, the victims recourse is to file damage claims against Tutors employer. Unfortunately for Equitable, they are the registered owners of the tractor and jurisprudence provides, the registered owners are deemed to be the employer of the erring driver and thus civilly liable. The sale between Ecatine and Equitable, being unregistered, will not bind/prejudice, a third person, in this case the victim-respondents. Equitable cannot use the defense that Tutor was not his employee. As to a third person, the registered owner is the employer, and Ecatine, although the actual employer of Tutor, is deemed to be merely an agent of Equitable. Non-registration is the fault of the petitioner, thus they cannot escape liability to prejudice the rights (to damages) of the respondents. Side note: (on Moral Damages) The SC also justified that there was causal connection between the factual basis of the respondents claim and Tutors wrongful act. (3 element to sustain a claim on quasi-delict: a)damage suffered by the plaintiff b)fault or negligence of the defendant c)causal connection between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff) This case falls squarely under 2219(2) which provides for payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict. Moral damages are paid to alleviate the moral suffering/mental anguish caused by the act or omission of the defendant. Having established the liability of Tutor and the Equitable as an employer, respondents have successfully shown the existence of the factual basis for the award (injury to plaintiffs) and its causal connection to the tortious acts of Tutor. No proof of pecuniary loss is needed to justify the moral damages. The amount of indemnity will be left to the discretion of the court.