-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
1/6
PREVENTING PROCESS
INCIDENTS CAUSED BY
VEHICULAR IMPACT
Through the OSHA and Process Safety Alliance, the Process Safety
signatories developedthis Best Practice Guide for informational
purposes only. It does not necessarily reflectthe official views of
OSHA or the US Dept. of Labor. 08/2009
-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
2/6
It is sincerely hoped that the information presented in this
document will lead to an even more
impressive safety record for the entire industry; however, none
of the members of the OSHA andProcess Safety Alliance warrant or
represent, expressly or by implication, the correctness or
accuracy of the content of the information presented in this
document. The user of this documentaccepts any legal liability or
responsibility whatsoever for the consequence of its use or
misuse.
-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
3/6
Preventing Process Incidents Caused by
Vehicular Impact
Incident Description
AhydrocarbonreleaseandsubsequentfireandexplosionsoccurredattheOlefinsllunitattheFormosaPlasticsCorporation,USA,PortComfort,TX,complex.Atrailerbeingtowedbyaforkliftsnaggedandpulledasmalldrainvalveoutofastrainerinaliquidpropylenesystem,formingalargeflammablevaporcloudthatsubsequentlyignited.Operatorsimmediatelybegantoshuttheplantdownandattemptedtoisolatetheleak.Theytriedtoreachandclosemanualvalvesthatcouldstoptherelease;however,theadvancingvaporcloudforcedthemtoretreat.Atthesametime,controlroomoperatorsshutoffpumps,closedvalves,andventedequipmenttotheflarestacktodirectflammablesgasesawayfromthefire.
Immediatelyaftertherelease,thevaporignitedcreatinganexplosion.Theexplosionknockeddownseveraloperatorsandburnedtwoothersexitingtheunit,oneseriously.Flamesfromthefirereachedmorethan500feetintheair.Becauseofthesizeofthefire,Formosainitiatedasitewideevacuation.Atotalofsixteenemployeeswereinjured,oneseriously.TheextensivedamageshutdownOlefinsllunitfor5months.[1]
Lesson Learned:
Theneedforguidanceonprotectingchemicalprocessesfromvehicularimpactdamageisclear.
Protecting the Process from Vehicular
Impact.Theprocessshouldbeprotectedfromimpactbyvehiculartrafficbylocation/spacing,impactprotectionandadministrativecontrols.Allthreeapproachesshouldbeconsideredtoadequatelyprotecttheprocessfromvehiculardamage.
Location/Spacing
Whendesigningnewplantsormodifyingexistingplants,hightrafficareassuchastankcarloadingandunloadingfacilities,officebuildingsandparkinglotsshouldbelocatedawayfromhazardousprocessareas.
Pipingsystemsshouldbelaidoutsuchthatthelikelihoodofthembeingimpactedbyvehiculartrafficisminimized.Recommendationstoaccomplishthisinclude:
o
Providingspacingfrompipingtotheedgeofamajorplantroad15ft.(4.4m).o
Providingspacingfrompipingtotheedgeofasecondaryplantroad10ft.(3m).o
Providingspacingfrompipingtotheedgeofaplantaccessway5ft.(1.5m).
-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
4/6
o
Providingspacingfrompipingtotheedgeofthepathprovidedforeitheraccesstoequipmentformaintenance,ortofacilitatetheremovalofsuchequipmentformaintenance,e.g.,heatexchangerbundles,largemotors,pumps,compressors.5ft.(1.5m).[2]
o
Locatingpipelinescarryingflammable(hazardous)fluidunderground.[3]
Impact Protection
Whendesigningnewequipmentandpipingsystems,considerthepossibilityforimpactbyvehiclesandotherequipmentinthestructuraldesign.Forexample,somecompaniesrequireprocesslinestobeaminimumof1inchschedule40forrobustness,becauseofthevulnerabilityofsmallerlinesizestobedamagedbymechanicalimpact.
Impactbarriers(pipes)shouldbeinstalledtoprotectfireprotectionsystems,liquefiedpetroleumtanksandotherprocessequipmentcontaininghazardouschemicals.Suchbarriersshouldbedesignedspecificallyforvehicularimpact.Onedesigncallsfor6inchdiameterschedule40pipesetinconcreteandfilledwithconcretethatcanbe
slippedintoasocketpipeofslightlylargerdiameterthatissetinconcreteintheground.[4]
Todesigntheproperimpactbarrier,thefollowingdesignapproachissuggested:
o Pickthelargestexpectedmasstohittheequipment(truck,crane,etc).o
Pickthehighestexpectedvelocity.o
Designanarrayofbollardsandconcreteanchorsthatwillabsorbtheenergyof
thecollision.Thiscanbeaccomplishedwithindividualbollardsorbollardsofequalsizetiedtogether.[5]
Administrative Controls
Administrativecontrolstopreventvehicularimpactdamagetochemicalprocessequipmentareimportant,buttheyrelyonhumanperformancethatcanbeunreliablecomparedtoothertypesofsafeguards.Inthisincident,thenipplethatwasimpactedwasnexttoavacantlotreservedforfutureexpansion.Theareawasnotintendedtohavevehiculartraffic.Administrativecontrolscanhelpguidehumanbehavior.Someexamplesofadministrativecontrolsthatcanbeusedtohelpprotecttheprocessfromvehicularimpactarelistedbelow:
Vehiculartrafficshouldbeappropriatelyrestrictedfromareaswherepedestrianscouldbeinjuredorequipmentdamaged.[6]Suchareasshouldhavesignsthatareclearlyvisibleattheperimeteroftherestrictedprocessareas.
Safeworkpermitsshouldberequiredforoperatingvehiclesintheprocessarea.Forexample,permitsshouldberequiredtooperateforklifts,cranes,backhoes,forktrucksandotherspecializedvehicles.Thetrainingrequiredforoperatingspecializedequipmentandvehiclesshouldemphasizetheneedtobeawareofequipmentcontaininghazardousmaterialswhenoperatingthevehiclesinprocessareas.
Safedrivingpermitsshouldberequiredforinplantdriving.Trainingwouldemphasizetheneedtobeawareofprocessequipmentwhendrivingintheplantandtobeawareofprocessareaswherevehiculartrafficisprohibited.
-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
5/6
References
[1]
FireatFormosaPlasticsCorporation:EvaluatingProcessHazards,U.S.ChemicalSafetyandHazardInvestigationBoard,ReportNo.2006-01-I-TX,June2006.
[2] Communicationfromacompanynotidentified.
[3]
GuidelinesforEngineeringDesignforProcessSafety,page184,CCPS1993.[4]
Communicationfromacompanynotidentified[5]
Communicationfromacompanynotidentified[6]
GuidelinesforHazardEvaluation,2ndEdition,p404,CCPS,1992
Acknowledgements
CCPSwishestothankJohnMurphyforauthoringthisdocument.WearealsogratefultoTim
WagnerandJimVerboonoftheDowChemicalCompany,KelleyKeimofExxonMobilChemicalCompany,KathyKasofRohmandHaas,StanGrossellofProcessSafetyandDesign,HenryFeboofFactoryMutual,JohnBaikofBP,andtheOSHAandProcessSafetyAllianceforprovidinginputandpeerreviewguidance.
-
8/7/2019 Final Vehicular Impact 09 website pdf
6/6
About CCPS
Just after midnight on December 3, 1984, water contamination of
a tank of methyl isocyanate in
Bhopal, India initiated a series of events that led to a
catastrophic toxic release, killing more than
3000 residents and injuring over 100,000.
In February of 1985, leaders from 17 of the leading chemical and
petroleum companies asked the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) to lead a
collaborative global effort to eliminatecatastrophic process
incidents by:
ADVANCING state-of-the-art process safety technology and
management practices SERVING as a premier resource for information
on process safety FOSTERING process safety in engineering and
science education PROMOTING process safety as a key industry
value
On March 25, 1985, AIChE formed the Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS) with 17 chartermember companies. In the years that
followed, CCPS has been the world leader in every area of
process safety information, with over 60 guideline and resource
books in print, and an ever-growing web knowledge base. CCPS
membership now exceeds 100 companies, headquartered in
more than 15 countries in four continents and operating in every
part of the world.
CCPS is on the Web at http://www.aiche.org/ccps
Contact CCPS [email protected] or +1.646-495-1371
