TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIESTO INCREASE THE

PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF GLOBAL CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS (TOPS)

REPORT BY THE TOPS TASK FORCE OF THE NUCLEARENERGY RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NERAC)

JANUARY 2001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE .............................................................................................................iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................ES-1

I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................1

A. Scope and Purpose ..................................................................................................1B. The Potential Role of Nuclear Power ......................................................................2C. The Relation of Civil Nuclear Technology to the Acquisition of Nuclear

Weapons ..................................................................................................................2

II. THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF PAST ASSESSMENTS ..........................................4

III. CURRENT AND NEAR-TERM STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER ...............................5

IV. LIKELY NEARER-TERM DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................7

V. PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES ANDTHEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION ...............................................................................8

A. The Need for Improved Assessment Methods ........................................................8B. Initial Application of the Assessment Methodology ...............................................9

VI. RECOMMENDED R&D AREAS ....................................................................................11

A. Overall Strategy......................................................................................................11B R&D Opportunities for the Nearer-Term ..............................................................12C. R&D Opportunities for the Intermediate Term .....................................................15D. R&D Opportunities for the Longer-Term .............................................................17E. International Collaboration ...................................................................................17

VII. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................18

APPENDICES: APPENDIX 1: Task Force Charge and Membership ............................................................... A1-1APPENDIX 2: Proliferation Resistance Assessment Methodologies ...................................... A2-1APPENDIX 3: Recommended R&D To Strengthen Extrinsic Barriers to Proliferation ......... A3-1APPENDIX 4: Glossary ........................................................................................................... A4-1

REFERENCES

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office ofNuclear Energy, Science, and Technology and DOE’sNuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee(NERAC), established a special Task Force in 1999 toidentify near and long-term technical opportunities toincrease the proliferation resistance of global civiliannuclear power systems (TOPS) and to recommendspecific areas of research that should be pursued tofurther these goals. The Task Force was alsoencouraged to recommend areas where internationalcollaboration can be most productive.

This special report reflects the results of the Task Forcestudies. It consists of:

• An Executive Summary that contains the majorfindings and conclusions of the group.

• A more detailed report, plus attachments, thataddresses various specific questions and issues inmore detail.

The membership of the TOPS Task Force was designedto represent a broad spectrum of backgrounds andviewpoints and includes the following individuals:

John J. Taylor, Chair, EPRIRobert N. Schock, Vice Chair, Lawrence Livermore National LaboratoryJohn F. Ahearne, Sigma Xi, Duke UniversityEdward D. Arthur, Los Alamos National LaboratoryHarold Bengelsdorf, Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLCMatthew Bunn, Harvard UniversityThomas Cochran, Natural Resources Defense CouncilMichael Golay, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyDavid Hill, Argonne National LaboratoryKazuaki Matsui, Institute of Applied Energy, JapanJean Louis Nigon, COGEMA, FranceWolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Stanford UniversityPer Peterson, University of California, BerkeleyMark Strauch, Lawrence Livermore National LaboratoryMasao Suzuki, JNC, JapanJames Tape, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Since the subject of enhancing proliferation resistancethrough advances in technology has broad internationalimplications and can only succeed with internationalsupport, the Task Force included knowledgeableinternational representatives. Beyond this, major effortswere undertaken to factor the views of various researchgroups, industry, and technical organizations into thedeliberations through the sponsorship of workshops andmeetings with interested individuals and organizations.

The Task Force believes that there are a number ofpromising areas of research and development (R&D)that can be, and should be, pursued by the United Statesin collaboration with other countries that are likely toenhance the proliferation resistance of existing andpotential advanced nuclear power systems. It isrecognized that proliferation resistance is only one ofthe important components of complete nuclear powersystems that are in need of further research anddevelopment; others are steps that will advanceeconomy, safety and waste disposal. Continued U.S.participation in strengthening the globalnonproliferation regime will depend, in part, on thepreservation of U.S. technological capabilities in thecivil nuclear sector, including a strong U.S. capability tocarry out realistic and well-focused nuclear energysupply research and development. In turn, achievingand preserving this capability will require both greatlyincreased government investment in forward lookingR&D and the application of effective selectivity indeciding which of the several competing approachesshould receive priority. This is a matter of compellingsignificance from the perspective of achieving vital U.S.foreign policy, arms control and energy security.

DOE recently has been attempting to revive R&Dcapabilities in this very important area. The amountsnow being spent on civilian nuclear energy R&D,including proliferation resistance, are far smaller thanthose being directed toward other areas of energy R&D,and are substantially smaller than would be needed tomake substantial progress in nuclear energy technology.As the 1997 report of the President’s Committee ofAdvisors on Science and Technology concluded, it isimportant to establish nuclear energy as a broadlyacceptable and viable energy option to help respond tofuture greenhouse challenges, if possible, and to do soadditional R&D investment is needed to addressconcerns over waste management, safety, weaponsproliferation, and cost.

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Accordingly, in the view of the Task Force, a larger,more proactive and more directed research anddevelopment program in these areas would significantlystrengthen U.S. influence in shaping proliferation-resistant approaches to nuclear energy around the world. While the Task Force’s principal charter was to reviewR&D opportunities to develop new technologies toenhance proliferation resistance, we felt compelled alsoto point out that a wide range of policy opportunitiesexists to improve proliferation resistance usingtechnologies that already exist. In particular, it is urgentto: • Reduce the risk of theft of potential weapons

material (particularly in the former Soviet Union,where the risk of such theft has been described by

the National Academy of Sciences as a clear andpresent danger, by applying available technologiesto ensure that all such material is secured andaccounted for to the most stringent practicablestandards;

• Strengthen the international safeguards systems,

including increasing the resources available to theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), toallow it to effectively implement both traditionaland newly developed safeguards measures; and

• Strengthen efforts to control the export oftechnologies that could significantly contribute tonuclear weapons programs.

___________________________________ ___________________________________ John Taylor, Chairman Robert Schock, Vice Chairman TOPS Task Force

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose

In 1999 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) formed aspecial task force, called the TOPS Task Force, from theNuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee(NERAC) to identify near- and long-term technicalopportunities to further increase the proliferationresistance of global civilian nuclear power systems.Recommendations on specific areas of research werecalled for, as well as on areas where internationalcollaboration could be most productive. This report isthe response to this ambitious charge and is essentially awork in progress, suggesting directions of effort for thecognizant organizations.

The membership of the TOPS Task Force was chosen torepresent a broad spectrum of backgrounds andviewpoints. Since the subject has broad internationalimplications, knowledgeable representatives fromoverseas were included. Beyond this, major effortswere undertaken to factor in the views of variousresearch groups, industry, and technical organizationsthrough the sponsorship of workshops and meetingswith interested individuals and organizations. The taskforce operated on a consensus basis: While there weredifferences of opinion on the merits and relativepromise of some of the opportunities for development ofadvanced reactor and fuel cycle systems, all membersfully support the basic recommendations.

The report covers four major topics: (a) the overallcontext in which nuclear power is being pursued at thepresent time, (b) the need and challenge to developmore systematic comparative nonproliferationassessments of different nuclear systems and theirpotential applications, (c) the technologicalopportunities meriting exploration that have thepotential to increase the proliferation resistance offuture civilian nuclear power systems, and (d) theprincipal research and development (R&D) objectivesthat the U.S., working in a spirit of collaboration withother countries, should pursue to enhance the globalnonproliferation regime.

The Context of the Study

Two working premises guided this study:

• Nuclear power has the potential to continue makingimportant contributions in helping meet futureglobal energy needs under terms that arecompatible with safety, economic, nonproliferation,

and environmental objectives, including the desireto abate air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

• Unless the U.S. pursues a much more proactiveR&D program in the civil nuclear field, itstechnical influence in advancing those aspects ofthe non-proliferation regime that relate to civilnuclear energy could seriously erode as could itsability to help shape and influence proliferationresistance choices in other countries.

After an in-depth review based on these premises, wehave concluded that there are promising technicalapproaches that might well increase the proliferationresistance of civilian nuclear systems. Furthermore, asignificant investment in R&D is warranted to evaluatethese approaches and pursue those identified as mostpromising. The international community has developed a widerange of measures collectively known as the“international nonproliferation regime” under which themajority of nations have agreed to forego themanufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Thecenterpiece for this regime has been the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whichwas extended indefinitely in 1995 and now has 187signatory nations. After the Gulf War of 1990-91 andthe discovery of clandestine nuclear weapons activitiesin Iraq, new safeguards measures were developed togive the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)additional capability to investigate undeclared activities.In addition to new measures using existing legalauthorities, a new Model Protocol for the IAEA wasagreed to which provides authority for additionalmeasures expanding their safeguards capabilities.These new provisions comprise the most significantimprovement in international safeguards in recent times.More broadly, the institutional features of the globalnonproliferation regime, including safeguards,constitute an essential, if not dominant, element of theefforts to abate the spread of nuclear weapons. It is inthis context that the recommendations of this reporthave been formulated. The Task Force recognizes that technology can play avery important role in strengthening the overallnonproliferation regime along the following lines: • Improving the effectiveness of surveillance,

monitoring, inspection, accountancy, and physical

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security measures that are embedded in institutionalcontrols;

• Devising new inherent technical features whichpromise to make nuclear power systems moreresistant to proliferation;

• Reducing opportunities for the misuse of, or thediversion and theft from, civilian nuclear activities;

• Increasing the complexity, transparency, and costof diverting nuclear materials for use in nuclearweapons, as well as the time it would take for astate to divert nuclear materials so as to give theinternational community sufficient time to detectsuch activity and take appropriate action;

• Reducing the accessibility of weapons-usablenuclear materials; and

• Reducing the degree to which civilian nuclear

energy programs may provide opportunities forStates or groups to build up expertise for potentialproliferation and to acquire (overtly or covertly)technologies that could be employed for nuclearweapons programs.

• Specific technologies employed in the civiliannuclear sector are likely to have only a modestimpact on the overall rate of nuclear proliferation.Historically, the preferred approach for nationsseeking nuclear weapons generally has been toestablish a dedicated military program to producethe nuclear material rather than attempting to divertmaterial from internationally safeguarded nuclearfacilities. Nevertheless, civilian nuclear activitiescan make direct or indirect contributions to thespread of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, the continued exploration of newtechnical ways in which nuclear power systems can bemade more resistant to proliferation should constitute animportant ongoing feature in the improvement of theglobal nonproliferation regime. This will occur moreeffectively when institutional schemes are devised so asto reward technical increases in proliferation resistance.Further, within this context and as an organizing theme,the Task Force believes that U.S. R&D planners shouldpursue the following important objectives: • Systematically evaluate the nonproliferation

implications of existing and new technologies

• Support the exploration, and as appropriate thefurther development, of systems that:

- increase the effectiveness and efficiency ofinstitutional non-proliferation measures (e.g.,safeguards measures);

- make weapons-usable materials highlyinaccessible, including the evaluation ofadvanced open and closed fuel cycle systemsthat avoid direct access to these materials;

- reduce the attractiveness of nuclear materials

for potential weapons purposes;

- reduce the quantities of weapons-usablematerial utilized and produced per unit ofenergy output; and

- limit the spread of highly specializedknowledge and skills that can be directly usedto design and fabricate nuclear weapons.

• Evaluate, in cooperation with other interestedcountries, a range of reactor and fuel cycle optionsthat could potentially meet the above objectives.(This effort should be appropriately integrated withother efforts designed to assure that future systemswill be economical, safe, and environmentallyfriendly.)

Comprehensive assessments have been performedwithin the United States and with other countries, on thecomparative inherent nonproliferation characteristics ofdifferent nuclear power systems. Two key assessmentefforts in the 1970s were the NonproliferationAlternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP)review carried out by the U.S. followed shortlythereafter by the major International Nuclear Fuel CycleEvaluation (INFCE) convened under the auspices of theIAEA that involved the participation of more than 60nations and international organizations. The Task Forcehas drawn and benefited from these reviews as well asmore recent assessments and has employed them as abeginning basis for assessing the proliferation resistanceof different nuclear power systems. Current and Near Term Status of Nuclear Power At the present time, 434 nuclear power stations arelocated and in operation in 34 countries around theworld and the clear preponderant reactor of choice is thelight water reactor, with 344 plants. In the nearer term,there are limited prospects for constructing new nuclearpower plants in Europe or in the Americas although newplants are being built or are planned in some Asiancountries.

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While several developing countries have long expressedan interest in nuclear power, it has not yet figuredsignificantly in the energy plans of many less-advancednations, due to several considerations. Most notably,many developing countries lack the sophisticatedtechnical infrastructures and grid sizes to absorb anddeploy currently available large-sized nuclear reactorsin their electricity systems. Yet, at the same time theneeds and demands for electricity in some developingcountries are expected to grow substantially and thequestion arises as to whether nuclear power can helpmeet these needs. In this regard, some attention is being devoted toevaluating the merits of smaller, modular, simpler, andmore passively safe reactor systems that might be bettersuited for introduction in less advanced countries. Inaddition, in the interest of enhancing proliferationresistance, attention also is being given to the merits offueling some of these concepts with materials thatwould markedly reduce the frequency of refueling or theproduction of materials attractive for nuclear weapons. Enrichment facilities, primarily using diffusion andcentrifuge processes, have been constructed in tencountries. Worldwide installed enrichment capacity iscurrently on the order of 50 million separative workunits (SWU) annually, against a demand on the order of36 million SWU. The situation is more complex thanthese bare figures suggest as, on the one hand, asignificant part of the demand is being filled withenriched material blended from dismantled weapons andcivilian recycled plutonium, while on the other handenrichment plants are most profitable when operated atmaximum capacity. However, the basic point remainsthat world enrichment capacity is more than sufficient tomeet near-term demands. Given this over-capacity andthe high cost of building and operating enrichmentplants, if new facilities are built in the near term it willbe most likely for reasons of energy autonomy ornational pride, not because of the financial attraction ofsuch facilities. Yet, in the longer term, if nuclear powerexpands greatly, more enrichment facilities wouldneeded and could become more widespread. The basic technology of reprocessing has beendeclassified and widely available for many years, butonly a few industrialized countries are now engaged inreprocessing programs on a commercial scale.Nevertheless, the inventories of separated plutoniumsubstantially exceed current demand and as a resultmore than 200 tons of separated plutonium is now incivilian stockpiles around the world, a figure that iscontinuing to grow. Beyond this, much larger amountsof plutonium in spent fuel are dispersed in numerouslocations around the world. Since spent fuel has an

ongoing sensitivity from a proliferation perspective,there has been a growing interest in exploring ways thatthe inventories of these materials can be aggregatedunder IAEA safeguards in a limited number of stablecountries with strong nonproliferation credentials,independent of the question as to whether the plutoniumin the spent fuel should be directly utilized in reactors.Studies are also underway to evaluate the merits oftransmuting spent nuclear fuel to forms of lessproliferation concern. In carrying out this study, no attempt has been made bythe Task Force to perform an exhaustive assessment ofthe likelihood of different scenarios for the potentialgrowth and use of nuclear power. Projections preparedby various groups range from a modest decline in globalcapacity to a substantial growth in nuclear energy by theyear 2050. A middle ground has been chosen by theTask Force that postulates a civilian nuclear world inthe next few decades with the following major features: • The light water reactor is likely to be the reactor of

choice in the nearer term, although some nationswill continue to have an interest in heavy waterreactors. Most nations now employing light waterreactors of Western design will be successful intheir efforts to obtain regulatory approvals and/orimplement effective aging management programsto extend the operating lives of their reactors.Some older, more poorly performing plants, orplants of more controversial design may be shutdown.

• It seems likely that most nations will opt to storetheir spent fuel on an interim basis, pendingdecisions on later disposition, processing, ortransmutation of these materials. However, alimited number of nations will continue toreprocess some of their spent fuel and recycle someof their separated plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX)fuel in thermal reactors, pending possible later usein more advanced reactors.

• While Germany and Sweden have adopted laws

requiring eventual shut-down of all their nuclearpower plants, it is unlikely that most nuclear powerprograms will be phased out entirely. Even if thiswere to occur, the nations involved as well as theinternational nuclear community will face anongoing responsibility for managing the inventoriesof separated plutonium and other weapons-usablematerials in their possession as well as the vastlygreater inventories of plutonium that exist in spentfuel.

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• There are different views within the internationalcommunity as to how the “back-end” of the nuclearfuel cycle can best be managed or whether thisquestion simply should be deferred. The UnitedStates, for its part, does not now “encourage thecivil use of plutonium and accordingly, does notitself engage in plutonium processing.” However,while the U.S. actively seeks to limit reprocessingin regions of proliferation concern, it hasemphasized that it will “honor its existingcommitments regarding the use of plutonium incivil nuclear programs in Western Europe andJapan.”1

• Although most fast reactor demonstration programs

have been curtailed and the economiccommercialization of fast reactors has not beenachieved, a limited number of nations remaininterested in the development of this technology.This relates to the fact that fast spectrum reactorsuse dramatically more of the energy content ofuranium and may reduce long-lived wasteproduction over currently deployed reactor systems.Several of these countries are assessing newtechnical approaches that could be moreproliferation-resistant through processes that wouldavoid the presence of separated plutonium.

• In the current climate, only a limited number ofnations have deployed uranium enrichmenttechnologies, and key enrichment technologiesremain tightly controlled. Nevertheless, someStates have succeeded in overtly or covertlyacquiring enrichment technologies that have beenused in their nuclear weapons programs. Takingthese factors into account, one must assess theproliferation implications of different approachesto the future of nuclear energy. In the process, allpotential technical routes to the acquisition ofnuclear weapons must be considered, includingthose involving access to highly enriched uranium(HEU) (U-235 and U-233), Pu-239, and otherfissionable isotopes.

In the foregoing overall context, the Task Force believesthat different fuel cycles and reactor choices maycontinue to be followed by different nations. However,in all practicable cases, it will be desirable for theUnited States to be involved in cooperative R&D effortswith other nations and to have the technical ability toinfluence these programs so that they advance in waysthat enhance proliferation resistance while alsoadvancing economic and safety objectives. To this end, 1 White House National Policy Statement of September1993.

a new U.S. effort to pursue R&D at least initially at theconceptual level (and involving the conduct ofanalytical and experimental studies) that would evaluateand explore advances in proliferation resistance indifferent nuclear systems could strengthen the U.S.ability to exert a constructive technical influence onfuture developments. More broadly and for the longerterm, for nuclear power to provide a significant fractionof the carbon-free energy the world is likely to need inthe 21st Century, the utilization of nuclear power wouldhave to expand many fold. The realization of this goalmay be dependent, in part, on broad confidence ingovernments and publics that such an expansion will notsignificantly aggravate the proliferation problem. Thus,continued improvements in proliferation resistance, likecontinued improvements in nuclear safety, wastemanagement, and economics are important to the futuregrowth of nuclear power. Proliferation Resistance Assessment Initiatives andTheir Potential Application A wide range of significant factors will determinewhether additional nations will acquire nuclearweapons. Specific technologies employed in thecivilian nuclear sector are likely to have only a modestimpact on the overall rate of nuclear proliferation.Historically, the preferred approach for nations seekingnuclear weapons generally has been to establish adedicated military program to produce the nuclearmaterial rather than attempting to divert material frominternationally safeguarded nuclear facilities.Nevertheless, civilian nuclear activities can make director indirect contributions to the spread of nuclearweapons. Some nations have employed nominallycivilian nuclear programs as a pretext to acquiretechnologies for military programs or they haveacquired materials, equipment, technologies, ortechnical personnel from the civil sector for theirnuclear weapons programs. Consequently, the UnitedStates and many other countries have had a strongincentive for many years to develop a series of measuresto assure that the utilization of nuclear power and civilnuclear cooperation will take place only under termsdesigned to seriously inhibit the misuse of thetechnology to acquire nuclear weapons. These possibilities of misuse, however, cannot beeliminated entirely. Accordingly, the “proliferationresistance” of a given system is a matter of degree, notan absolute attribute. Developing an acceptablemethodology is difficult, since both quantitative andqualitative factors contribute, and weights assigned todifferent factors are inherently a matter of judgment.Factors inherent to the particular reactor and fuel cyclesystem design under consideration, as well as

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institutional factors, must be considered and balanced.Moreover, the proliferation risk posed by a particularsystem depends on the character of the threat, whether itbe a sophisticated or unsophisticated state seekingnuclear weapons, or even a terrorist group. In view of the need to advance the evaluation processand in spite of the difficulties, efforts should beundertaken to improve and, where practicable,standardize the proliferation assessment of differentreactors and fuel cycle approaches for use in planningfuture R&D programs. These methodologies should notbe considered to yield definitive, quantitativeassessments, but should be viewed as a useful means tohelp the peer review process evaluate the merit ofspecific proposals and proposed courses of action. It isof key importance that such methodologies provide anintegrated assessment that includes the effectiveness ofboth the technical features (“intrinsic barriers”) and thenecessary institutional measures (“extrinsic barriers”). A number of such methodologies have been consideredand are under development. Two such efforts,described in Appendix 2 of this report, have beenexamined by the Task Force to help illuminate thediscussion. The first is an integrated safeguardsevaluation methodology (ISEM) being developed underthe U.S. support program for the IAEA safeguardssystem. The second, called an “attributes methodology”identifies the intrinsic, or material/technical barriersagainst proliferation in a given nuclear system, attemptsto evaluate their effectiveness against the challengesimposed by different types of potential proliferators, andseeks to identify the needed extrinsic barriers tocomplement the intrinsic barriers. Other assessmentmethods are also under consideration. An initial effort to apply the attributes methodology todefining the comparative features of several specificnuclear power systems was made by the TOPS TaskForce. This was only done in a preliminary fashion, andthe cases covered were not complete in themselves nordo they cover the full scope of systems today or underdevelopment. The primary purpose of the exercise wasto help identify the major characteristics of variousnuclear systems and potential R&D needs. The systemscovered in this preliminary analysis included: • A light water reactor (LWR) operating on a “once

through” fuel cycle where the resultant spent fuel isstored for a protracted period or disposed ofgeologically in a nominal permanent geologicrepository. This included concepts such as usingnon-fertile fuel and thorium-uranium fuels.

• An LWR system operating on a so-called closedfuel cycle where the fuel is reprocessed through a

classic aqueous (or PUREX) system with theplutonium either recycled as MOX fuel in LWRs orkept in protracted storage pending decisions onlater disposition—which might include use in fastspectrum reactors.

• A fast spectrum reactor operating in a burner or

breeding mode employing an advanced recyclingtechnology that does not involve at any stage theseparation of pure plutonium.

• A postulated small modular reactor system

employing a long-lived core for possible use inboth advanced and developing countries.

• Two types of modular high temperature gas-cooled

reactors (HTGR): a pebble bed fueled system and afixed prismatic configuration fuel system.

In general, some of these systems would incorporatesubstantial intrinsic barriers to theft or diversion ofnuclear material for use in nuclear weapons, whileothers rely more on extrinsic, institutional barriers. Inthe course of the discussions, some weaknesses in thesebarriers were identified and some R&D programs wererecommended to evaluate or address them. It would appear that the intrinsic barriers in somesystems could be strengthened by successful completionof R&D, but the ongoing need to preserve the strengthof extrinsic barriers has been strongly reinforced in theanalysis of the Task Force to date. In addition, as animportant matter, the application of extrinsic barriers tospecific reactor and fuel cycle systems can be mademore effective if proliferation resistance assessments,including trade-off studies between intrinsic andextrinsic measures, become an integral part of theoverall design and engineering process. Recommended Areas for Research and Development– Proposed Strategy As a result of its deliberations, the Task Forcerecommends that, in collaboration with other countries,the United States should initiate a new R&D program inthree major areas. The primary goal of this R&D effortwould be to assure that the utilization of civil nuclearpower remains a comparatively unattractive route forthose nations or groups interested in acquiring nuclearweapons and to limit the degree to which the civiliannuclear energy system contributes to dedicated militaryprograms. Achieving this goal will require a moreexplicit definition of the goal itself and a systemsperspective. This will require an emphasis on thecomparative evaluation of various potential pathways to

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acquiring nuclear weapons including pathways otherthan civilian nuclear power. The recommended R&D programs that should beexplored and pursued by the U.S., working asappropriate in close collaboration with other countries,are grouped under three major headings:

• Development of improved methodologies forassessing the proliferation resistance of differentsystems, including those that further theunderstanding of the trade-offs between intrinsicand extrinsic measures;

• Development and adaptation of technologies tofurther strengthen the application of extrinsic orinstitutional barriers to proliferation with majoremphasis on safeguards and material protection,control, and accountability (MPC&A); and

• Exploration and further pursuit as appropriate of thedevelopment of new technologies to enhance theintrinsic barriers of various systems againstproliferation thereby upgrading the globalnonproliferation regime and reducing the burdensplaced on the extrinsic or institutional systems.

Since research and development will be critical inhelping to make subsequent decisions on the appropriatepaths to actually follow, the effective implementation ofthis proposed new R&D initiative will require astrategic planning approach that provides a basis forprioritization and subsequent selection of the desiredlonger-term R&D portfolio. It is recognized that at eachsignificant step of R&D the evaluation of thebenefits/risks of new technical approaches and advancedsystems has to take into account other significantobjectives including safety, environmental impact,economics, and waste management as well asproliferation resistance. Framing and implementing the desired new R&Dagenda also will require a systems perspective and anemphasis on comparative evaluation. The pursuit ofmost of the individual projects designed to improvebarriers to proliferation should be carried out in thecontext of the overall development of the reactor or fuelcycle concept to which they are intended to apply andshould address all the facilities of an integrated systemso as to significantly reduce proliferation and nationalsecurity concerns. Since several of the advancedconcepts that one might choose from will take manyyears to commercialize, proliferation-resistantimprovements should be given significant attention inthe early stages of development.

Establishing appropriate and realistic time frames forR&D is important. In concept, R&D programs shouldbe established with three distinct time frames in termsof completion of the development and implementationof the technologies. The initiation of related R&D to bepursued in all three time frames would ideally start now,but selections will need to be made on the desiredstarting times based on the amount of available fundingand, following further screening, the priorities given tovarious programs. The time phases should include:

• Shorter-term projects likely to produce tangibleresults in about five years’ time.

• Intermediate projects likely to produce tangibleresults up to about 15 years from now.

• Longer-term projects. A commitment is critical tothe longer-term exploration and, as appropriate andfeasible, further development of advanced reactorsand fuel cycles. However, nearer-term concreteneeds should not be ignored in this process.

There is likely to be a high level of synergy amongactivities in each of these three time frames. To provide tangible results that can affect proliferationresistance in the nearer-term period of up to five years’time, emphasis should be devoted to such areas as:

• Developing improved and standardizedmethodologies, including quantitative ones, forperforming comparative assessments of theproliferation attributes and merits of differentreactor and fuel cycle systems;

• Pursuing various nearer-term and concrete ways tostrengthen the application of the extrinsic (orinstitutional) nonproliferation regime withemphasis on supporting international safeguardsand national MPC&A programs; and

• Performing analytic studies and experimentsdesigned to evaluate potential improvements in theintrinsic proliferation barriers for existing nuclearsystems as well as potential advances inproliferation resistance in several advanced nuclearreactors and fuel cycle systems.

With regard to extrinsic factors, it was recognized bythe Task Force that new technical efforts to strengtheninternational safeguards have to build on and be well-coordinated with the national support programs for theIAEA safeguards systems that already are underway, aswell as U.S. R&D programs that directly and indirectly

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address these problems. In addition, and as a veryimportant objective, there has to be a closer exchangeand integration of ideas and plans between designers ofpossible new nuclear systems or applications andsafeguards specialists.

While the Task Force has not reviewed the extensiveongoing safeguards R&D supported by the UnitedStates and other governments, at the TOPS InternationalWorkshop held in Washington, DC in March 2000, aworking group that included safeguards expertsdeveloped a list of potential areas where additionalR&D in support of international safeguards and nationalMPC&A systems would be useful. These included waysto improve: (a) information technologies for safeguards;(b) safeguards system integration and studies (includingintegrating and balancing traditional and new safeguardsmeasures); (c) material accounting and facilitymonitoring; (d) wide-area environmental monitoring;(e) material and item tagging; (f) safeguards cost-effectiveness; and (g) the integration of technologicaldevelopments from a wide range of areas, includingareas outside traditional nuclear science, to advancesafeguards. Approaches in each of these areas andothers should be evaluated and the most promisingshould be pursued, in close coordination with othersafeguards R&D.

Also, in the nearer-term, it will be important to pursuethe evaluation of the adverse as well as positiveimplications that certain technological advances ordeployments (such as those permitting production ofweapons-usable material in smaller and more readilyconcealed facilities) might have for the global“extrinsic” nonproliferation regime. In addition,international efforts should be supported that will serveto improve the tracking and resultant transparency ofmovements of nuclear materials in internationalcommerce as well as in national programs. New R&Dapproaches also should be pursued that will facilitate theaggregation of spent fuel and provide for improvedsafeguards at geologic repositories. The initial emphasis in developing improvements inintrinsic barriers in the nearer-term should be onexamining ways to improve proliferation resistance inexisting systems and assessing through analytic studiesand experiments the potential inherent barriers thatmight be associated and pursued with the developmentof more advanced systems. For the first five years ofresearch, the primary focus on intrinsic barrierimprovement would be on LWR “once through”systems — e.g., incrementally higher fuel burnup.While not urgent, transient testing and the enhancementof fabrication capabilities for higher burnup fuel couldbe feasible in the nearer-term. In addition, it is assumed

that in the nearer-term DOE will continue to support thedevelopment of research reactor fuels that would permitthe remaining research reactors using HEU to convert tolower enrichments. To provide tangible results that could affectproliferation resistance in the intermediate period (fromabout 6 to 15 years in the future), R&D themes shouldbe explored or pursued that ultimately could lead toadvances in the introduction of greater intrinsicproliferation resistance in existing or future nuclearsystems. The R&D that has shown particular promise inmeeting the nearer term goals should continue to bepursued to seek further improvements.

Among the specific technical options for reactor andfuel cycle systems that have been proposed to improveproliferation resistance are:•

• LWR fuel systems designed to produce smalleramounts of less attractive nuclear material intheir spent fuel (such as higher burnup, thorium-uranium [Th/U] fuels, and non-fertile fuels);

•

• LWR systems designed to allow recycle withoutseparating weapons-usable material or providingfacilities and processes that could not be readilymodified for such separation (such as drychemical reprocessing or recycle withoutreprocessing);

•

• High-temperature gas-cooled systems designedso that the material in their spent fuel would behighly unattractive for weapons use;

•

• Liquid metal reactor and fuel cycle systemsdesigned to avoid the production and separationof weapons-usable material, or the provision offacilities and processes that could be readilymodified for such separation;

•

• Options for faster and more proliferation-resistant reductions in the world stockpiles ofseparated plutonium;

• Small modular reactor systems, designed to offer anuclear energy option with little potential for thehost state to have access to weapons-usablematerials and only very limited requirements for

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transfer of knowledge and technologies that couldcontribute to nuclear weapons programs;

• Transmutation technologies for spent fuel andnuclear wastes, which could reduce long termsafeguards requirements; and

• Dual-use advanced monitoring and analyticalsystems that can handle both safeguards needsand efficient plant operations, seekingimprovements on systems already in place incountries like the United Kingdom and France.

The potential proliferation resistance of these varioustechnological options should be evaluated and R&Dshould continue to be pursued on those determined to bemost promising and that would also meet other basicnuclear criteria (such as improved economics andenhanced safety) central to the DOE nuclear R&Dprogram. The R&D on intrinsic barriers for particularsystems that may be selected for support should beconducted from the outset as part of the overalldevelopment of such systems. To provide tangible results that can improveproliferation resistance later than 16 years out,projects/programs should focus on the furtherevaluation, and, as appropriate, more activedevelopment, possibly through pilot plant ordemonstration projects, of selected advanced systemsand concepts. These efforts should consider and assessadvanced light water reactors, liquid metal reactors,liquid-fuel reactors, and gas cooled reactors. Varioussize reactor concepts should be investigated that do notrequire refueling for 10 to 15 years, with a realisticemphasis upon reducing dependence on high qualityhuman support. Advanced closed fuel cycle options alsoshould be investigated when they offer potentialopportunities for improving proliferation resistance andinternational security. This should include theexamination of systems that would avoid the presenceof separated plutonium and HEU and of facilities andprocesses that could readily be adapted to produce suchmaterials. Systems also should be explored that avoidthe transfer of technologies or expertise that couldreadily be employed in either the covert or overt designand manufacture of nuclear weapons. The incorporationof advanced control systems for performance,reliability, and economics offers the opportunity tobring greater transparency to reactor operations throughremote monitoring and other means. Concluding Recommendations

Taking into account these findings, the Task Forcestrongly recommends that the subject of proliferationresistance R&D should be allocated at least anadditional $25 million in the DOE budget for fiscal year2002, potentially increasing subsequently if particularlypromising opportunities requiring increased R&D fundsare identified. A significant portion of these funds, inthe range of $5-$8 million annually, should be devotedto adding to ongoing efforts in international safeguardsand MPC&A technologies that could improve theextrinsic barriers to proliferation in existing reactor andfuel cycle systems. These new funds should be targetedtoward improving the understanding of the interfacesand trade-offs between intrinsic and extrinsic barriers,supporting the development of technologies required tosafeguard new fuel cycles (e.g., Th/U in which there islittle safeguards experience or technology formeasurements, etc.), and improving the transfer oftechnologies from other fields to internationalsafeguards enhancement programs. A small portion,perhaps $2 million in the first year, should be devoted toimproving methodologies for assessing and comparingthe proliferation resistance of different proposedsystems. The remaining $15-18 million would bedevoted to the evaluation, analysis, and experimentalwork on approaches that could improve the intrinsicproliferation resistance of current and future reactor andfuel cycle systems. A program such as outlined above would allow theUnited States to maintain an influential position in theinternational non-proliferation arena as it relates to civilnuclear technology. It would also provide a base uponwhich to build a strong proliferation resistancecomponent into the future generation of reactor and fuelcycle designs. DOE will not be able to pursue thesegoals in anything like a credible fashion unless it isgiven far greater resources to pursue these R&D goalsand unless the nuclear R&D program is reoriented tobecome more “results-oriented.” International collaboration in proliferation resistanceR&D is of prime importance to generate an internationalconsensus on proliferation-resistant technologies asways to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.It will also be vital to the preservation of U.S. influenceand credibility in these areas. Collaborative R&D among international partners shouldfocus on the major theme categories identified in thisreport. Prospects for increased collaboration couldinclude cooperative efforts to improve the methods forassessing proliferation resistance, measures tostrengthen international safeguards, R&D related tohigh burnup fuels, and collaboration in Th/U fuels, non-fertile fuels, and advanced fuel cycle concepts. Given

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prospective limitations on resources, a careful screeningof the merits of different options will have to take placebefore any major commitments are made to scale up theprograms in support of any particular choices.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope and Purpose

At the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy(DOE) and its Nuclear Energy Research AdvisoryCouncil (NERAC), a special task force was establishedin 1999. This group, called the TOPS Task Force, wasdirected to identify near and long-term technicalopportunities to further increase the proliferationresistance of global civilian nuclear power systems andto recommend specific areas of research that should bepursued. The Task Force was also encouraged torecommend areas where international collaboration canbe most productive.

The charge to, and the membership of, the TOPS TaskForce is given in Appendix 1. The membership of theTOPS Task Force was designed to represent a broadspectrum of backgrounds and viewpoints. Since thesubject of enhancing proliferation resistance throughadvances in technology has broad internationalimplications and can only succeed with internationalsupport, the Task Force includes knowledgeablerepresentatives from overseas. Beyond this, majorefforts were undertaken to factor in the views of variousresearch groups, industry, and interested technicalorganizations into the deliberations through thesponsorship of workshops and meetings. Most notablyan international workshop on this subject was held inWashington, DC on March 29 and 30, 2000. Anothermeeting was held in Chicago on June 15-16 to gaininsights from various reactor system developers aboutthe proliferation-resistant features of some of theiradvanced designs as well as their views about relatedresearch and development requirements. In addition,the members of the Task Force actively participated inseveral major international meetings that have been heldunder the sponsorship of DOE to help developguidelines for possible use by DOE and otherorganizations on the desired characteristics of futureadvanced nuclear power systems (otherwise known as“Generation IV Reactor Systems”), including featuresfor enhancing proliferation resistance that might meritsupport.

This special report reflects the results of these TaskForce studies. The Sections that follow cover thefollowing major topics:

• The context of the study: the potential role ofcivilian nuclear power, the non-proliferation regimeand past non-proliferation assessment efforts;

• Some new nonproliferation assessment initiativesthat have been pursued as well as their potentialapplications;

• A definition of the principal barriers and theireffectiveness against proliferation threats that mustbe considered in evaluating new approaches toproliferation resistance;

• The feasibility and practicability of developing newtechnical approaches and assessmentmethodologies to enhance proliferation resistancein the civil nuclear sector, as well as a preliminarycomparative description and assessment of thedistinguishing nonproliferation attributes of someillustrative nuclear power systems;

• Technological opportunities to increase theproliferation resistance of future civilian nuclearpower systems, including potential new areas forinternational cooperative R&D; and

• The principal R&D objectives and directions thatthe United States government should pursue inendeavoring to enhance the proliferation resistanceof existing and advanced nuclear power systems.

This report is essentially a work in progress. Thecharge given to the Task Force was extremely ambitiousand all that could be done in the time allotted was tosuggest directions of effort and hope that the responsibleorganizations will take on the challenging tasks that thereport identifies. The Task Force operated on aconsensus basis: While there were some differences ofopinion on the merits and relative promise of some ofthe opportunities for development of advanced reactorand fuel cycle systems, all members fully support thebasic recommendations in this report.

Two working premises guided this study:

• Nuclear power has the potential to continue tomake important contributions in helping to meetfuture global energy needs under terms that arecompatible with economic, nonproliferation, andenvironmental objectives, including the desire toabate air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

• Unless the U.S. pursues a much more proactiveR&D program in the civil nuclear field, itstechnical influence in advancing those aspects ofthe non-proliferation regime that relate to civil

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nuclear energy could seriously erode as could itsability to help shape and influence proliferationresistance choices in other countries.

After an in-depth review based on these premises, wehave concluded that there are promising technicalapproaches that might well increase the proliferationresistance of civilian nuclear systems and that asignificant investment in R&D is warranted to evaluatethese approaches and then subsequently pursue thoseidentified as most promising.

B. The Potential Role of Nuclear Power

Given the very sizeable increases in populationexpected to occur over the next few decades, almost allscenarios foresee a large increase in demand forelectrical energy. Various projections show globalelectricity consumption growing from about 1500gigawatts electric (GWe) at present to between 4000and 6500 GWe by 2050 (Ref. 1,2). By any standard,this amount of electricity will be difficult to bring to themarket in this short time, which may be made evenmore difficult because the growth rates are not likely tobe linear.

There have been differing estimates as to how much ofthis electricity can and will be provided by nuclearpower. As an example, six International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis/ World Energy Council(IIASA/WEC) scenarios project increases in nuclearelectricity generation from 10 and 485% by the year2050, with the lower number associated with a scenariothat phases out nuclear power by 2100. The other fivescenarios project increases that range from 135% to485% by 2050, depending on differing assumptionsabout economic growth and other electricity sources.Most significant is that two-thirds of any forecastedincrease is projected to be in the developing world. TheNuclear Energy Agency takes one of these scenariosand devolves three variants; continued nuclear growthwith a 205% increase in capacity by 2050, phase out by2050 (100% decrease) and stagnation followed byrevival between 2030 and 2050, resulting in a 215%increase by 2050 (Ref. 3).

The Task Force does not know how much electricitywill be generated in the future from nuclear sources orwhere it will be generated. We do know that nuclearpower, which currently supplies about 17% of theworld's electricity, will be with us in some form for along time to come and that the nuclear materials fromcivilian nuclear power will be with us for an even longertime. Some of us believe that it is essential to establishfission power as an acceptable and viable option to both

industrialize developing countries and to stabilizegreenhouse gas emissions, a conclusion also reached bythe President's Committee of Advisors on Science andTechnology (PCAST) (Ref. 4).

There are growing pressures in the developed nations todevise approaches that could alleviate the “greenhouse”problem (that is, to come up with the installation of newenergy sources that greatly reduce net carbon dioxideemissions). On the other hand, the pressures on thedeveloping and under-developed nations are primarilyeconomic and are a cause of political instability and insome cases international conflict. If nuclear powerhopes to help in meeting these needs of the environmentand world stability, its utilization will have to growmany times over current levels. From a resourceperspective this should be achievable since the resourcebase of nuclear fuels, if effectively utilized, is severaltimes greater than the resource base of fossil fuels. Onepercent or less of natural uranium provides fissionenergy in the case of the once-through fuel cycle; 60 to80% of natural uranium contributes energy in a closedfuel cycle.

The Task Force recognizes that the optimal contributionof nuclear power in meeting these global needs will becontingent upon the realization of a number ofimportant goals, including the ability of the technologyto be competitive with all major energy alternatives,successful adherence to rigorous safety standards,achievement of timely and acceptable solutions to thedisposition of nuclear wastes, and continued ability toassure that the utilization of civil nuclear power remainsa comparatively unattractive route for those nations orgroups interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. Inaddition to preserving economic competitiveness,nuclear energy will have to achieve greater publicacceptance. This can be influenced positively bysuccess in addressing these problems, includingalleviating public concerns about the associationbetween nuclear power and nuclear weapons.

C. The Relation of Civil Nuclear Technology to theAcquisition of Nuclear Weapons

A wide range of significant factors will determinewhether additional nations will acquire nuclearweapons. Specific technologies employed in thecivilian nuclear sector are likely to have only a modestimpact on the overall rate of nuclear proliferation.Historically, the preferred approach for nations seekingnuclear weapons generally has been to establish adedicated military program to produce the nuclearmaterial rather than attempting to divert material frominternationally safeguarded nuclear facilities.

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Nevertheless, civilian nuclear activities can make director indirect contributions to the spread of nuclearweapons. Some nations have employed nominallycivilian nuclear programs as a pretext to acquiretechnologies for military programs or they haveacquired materials, equipment, technologies, ortechnical personnel from the civil sector for theirnuclear weapons programs. Consequently, the UnitedStates and many other countries have had a strongincentive for many years to develop a series of measuresto assure that the utilization of nuclear power and civilnuclear cooperation will take place only under termsdesigned to seriously inhibit the misuse of thetechnology to acquire nuclear weapons.

To this end, the international community has developeda wide range of measures, many of an institutionalcharacter, that have collectively become known as the“international nonproliferation regime.” These haveincluded the successful promotion of a broadpolitical/societal norm or “ethic” under which the greatmajority of nations have openly agreed to forego themanufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and thecodification and integration of these political positionsin a variety of legal instruments. The centerpiece forthis regime has been the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was extendedindefinitely in 1995 and now has 187 signatory nations.The NPT regime seals a complex bargain. It definedfive nations as Nuclear Weapons States because theypossessed nuclear weapons before signature of thetreaty, while assigning the status of Non-NuclearWeapons States to all other signatories of the treaty.While the treaty explicitly enjoins Nuclear WeaponsStates from transferring nuclear weapons and nuclearweapons know-how from Nuclear Weapons States toNon- Nuclear Weapons States, it provides a number ofimportant measures to ameliorate what may beperceived as discriminatory features. In particular,recognizing the “dual-use” nature of nuclear energytechnology, it provides that Nuclear Weapons Statesshould assist Non- Nuclear Weapons States in thepeaceful exploitation of nuclear power, provided thatthe resultant civilian nuclear energy developments inNon-Nuclear Weapons States signatory to the NPT arecarried out under a full scope and comprehensiveinternational safeguards and inspection systemadministered by the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA). Furthermore, the NPT provides thatthe Nuclear Weapons States should in good faith de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in theirinternational policies and strive for the eventualelimination of nuclear weapons.

The regime also has involved continued efforts to assurethat the principal nuclear supplier states support prudent

and commonly agreed conditions governing nuclearexports, including appropriate restraints on the transferof “sensitive” nuclear technologies like reprocessingand enrichment. Finally, in adverse circumstances,national laws, bilateral agreements, and internationaltreaties call for the application of sanctions in the eventnations misuse nuclear materials or violate theirnonproliferation obligations.

Initially the IAEA devoted most of its energies tosafeguarding and inspecting civil nuclear facilities thatwere openly declared by the signatory Non-NuclearWeapons States under the NPT. But, after the Gulf Warand the discovery of clandestine activities by Iraq, newmeasures were developed to give the IAEA additionalcapability (beyond the powers it already possessed toperform special inspections) to detect and investigateundeclared activities. In addition, new measures havebeen agreed to, in an Additional Model Protocol (Ref.5), that provide authority to IAEA for expansion of itscapability in this area. These new provisions comprisethe most significant improvement in internationalsafeguards in recent times. They extend IAEA’s scopeof safeguards actions to the entire nuclear fuel cycle.The Additional Protocol is a culmination of decades ofevolution of the safeguards system. The detection bythe IAEA of any undeclared illicit operations is the limitof the IAEA’s authority, but such detection is designedto trigger responsive actions by the United NationsSecurity Council, as well as by all nations that arecommitted to advancing nonproliferation objectives.The institutional features of global nonproliferation,including safeguards, constitute an essential, if notdominant, element of the efforts to abate the spread ofnuclear weapons. It is in that context that therecommendations of this report have been formulated.

Taking these factors into account, the Task Forcerecognizes that:

• A combination of political, institutional andinherent technical factors is required to avert thespread of nuclear weapons. The dominant factorremains the creation of political and economicconditions to reduce the desire to acquire suchweapons by those nations not now possessing them.However, the nonproliferation regime can bestrengthened by a combination of advances intechnology as well as in institutional mechanisms.It is the sum of the institutional and inherenttechnological factors that will determine thetechnical proliferation resistance of nuclear powerfacilities.

• The potential proliferation risk posed by differentnuclear fuel cycles and technologies varies

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depending on the specific circumstances in theState in which the fuel cycle is being pursued.

• Some nuclear technologies may be inappropriatefor certain State environments (States of concern,States with little technological expertise orinfrastructure, or States in areas of regionalinstability), but their energy needs could be servedby commercial supply and regional facilities.

The Task Force also recognizes that technology canplay a very important role in strengthening thenonproliferation regime along the following lines:

• Improving the effectiveness of the varioussurveillance, monitoring, inspection, accountancy,and physical security measures that are embeddedin institutional controls;

• Devising new inherent technical features that makenuclear power systems more resistant toproliferation;

• Reducing opportunities for the misuse of, or thediversion and theft from, civilian nuclear activities;

• Increasing the complexity, transparency, and costof diverting nuclear materials for use in nuclearweapons, and the time it would take for a state todivert nuclear materials for the purpose of acquiringnuclear weapons so as to give the internationalcommunity sufficient time to detect such adiversion and take appropriate action

• Reducing the accessibility of weapons- usablenuclear materials

• Reducing the degree to which civilian nuclearenergy programs may provide opportunities tobuild up expertise for potential or likelyproliferation and to acquire, overtly or covertly,technologies, for nuclear weapons programs.

Consequently, the continued exploration of newtechnical ways in which nuclear power systems can bemade more resistant to proliferation should constitute an

important ongoing feature of the global nonproliferationregime. This will occur more effectively wheninstitutional schemes are derived that reward suchresistance features. Further, within this context and asan organizing theme, the Task Force believes that U.S.R&D planners should pursue the following importantobjectives:

• Systematically evaluate the non-proliferationimplications of existing and new technologies.

• Support the exploration, and as appropriate thefurther development, of systems that:

- increase the effectiveness and efficiency ofinstitutional nonproliferation measures, e.g.,safeguards measures);

- make weapons-usable materials highlyinaccessible, including the evaluation ofadvanced open and closed fuel cycle systemsthat avoid direct access to these materials;

- reduce the attractiveness of nuclear materialsfor potential weapons purposes;

- reduce the quantities of weapons-usablematerial utilized and produced per unit ofenergy output;

- limit the spread of highly specializedknowledge and skills that can be directly usedto design and fabricate nuclear weapons.

• Evaluate, in cooperation with other interestedcountries, a range of interesting reactor and fuelcycle options that could potentially meet the aboveobjectives, including the evaluation of advancedclosed fuel cycle systems that avoid direct access tothese materials. This effort should be appropriatelyintegrated with other efforts designed to assure thatfuture systems will be economical, safe, andenvironmentally friendly.

II. THE ROLE AND RELEVANCE OF PAST ASSESSMENTS

It has been a characteristic of the development of theglobal nonproliferation regime to analyze periodicallythe proliferation risks associated with the spread ofnuclear technology and utilization of nuclear power andto try to develop constraints, barriers, and disincentivesthat will serve to discourage the misuse of nuclearreactors and nuclear fuel cycle facilities.Comprehensive assessments have been performed in the

past, both within the United States and with othercountries on the comparative non-proliferation attributesof different nuclear power systems as well as on thespecific non-proliferation characteristics of specificsystems or technological approaches. In the late 1970s,during the Administration of President Carter, theUnited States undertook the domestic NonproliferationAlternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP)

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review (Ref. 6) as to how the U.S. once-through LWRfuel cycle compared to other options. This wasfollowed shortly thereafter by the major InternationalNuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) (Ref. 7)convened under the auspices of the IAEA that involvedthe participation of more than 60 nations andinternational organizations. INFCE was intended to bea comprehensive comparative assessment of thenonproliferation characteristics of different nuclear fuelcycles and nuclear systems that would lead torecommendations on steps that nations could take tohelp strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

The NASAP review reached several conclusions,including the judgment that “the LWR fuel cycle withspent fuel discharged to interim storage . . . is a moreproliferation-resistant nuclear power fuel cycle thanother fuel cycles which involve work with highlyenriched uranium (HEU) or pure plutonium.” TheINFCE study concluded that institutional factors werelikely to be more determinative than technologicalfactors in determining whether civil nuclear fuel cycleswill be misused by potential proliferators. In contrast toNASAP, the INFCE review did not conclude that oneparticular nuclear power or fuel cycle approach wasinherently more resistant to proliferation than thealternatives.

In the interval since these major reviews wereconducted, the U.S., from time to time, has performedmore specialized and focused non-proliferationassessments of specific technological options. Thisincluded evaluations of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)concept, as well as assessments of the implications ofdifferent options for disposing of excess weaponsplutonium, including an assessment of variousapproaches for “immobilizing” excess weaponsmaterials, such as the use of the so-called “can-in-canister” approach. The Task Force has drawn fromand benefited from all of these past assessments andused them as a starting point for assessing theproliferation resistance of global nuclear power systemsand how they may evolve in the next few decades.

While using results and experience from pastassessments, the Task Force derived particular benefitfrom the methodologies used by the National Academyof Sciences to evaluate different options for thedisposition of excess weapons materials in the UnitedStates and Russia. The Task Force has drawn andbenefited from these reviews (Ref. 8) and more recentassessments (Ref. 9) and has employed them as abeginning basis for assessing the proliferation resistanceof different nuclear systems. An effort was also made todefine a useful analytical framework for identifying andcomparing the non-proliferation attributes andimplications of different reactor and fuel cycleapproaches.

While several of the past assessments, such as theINFCE exercise, were exhaustive and very time-consuming, they were prepared in a different era morethan twenty years ago. At that time it was expected thatthere would be much more rapid growth in the use ofnuclear power leading to optimistic expectations, forexample, as to the time when fast spectrum reactors—and their supporting fuel cycle systems—might be fullydeveloped and deployed on a commercial scale. In theinterim, there has been a notable reduction in the growthrates for nuclear power programs in most countries andin national budgets in support of advanced reactorsystems. However, several nations continue to look tonuclear power to play a major role in meeting theirfuture requirements. Concurrently, some sentimentshave surfaced recently that if nuclear power is to play adesirable and enhanced role in helping to meet futureenergy demands and in countering the threat of globalwarming, the technological options that are available forfuture nuclear power programs may have to bereconfigured. Such actions are seen as necessary tomake sure they are suitable for introduction into agreater number of nations and especially to nations inthe developing world.

III. CURRENT AND NEAR TERM STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER

At the present time, 434 nuclear power stations arelocated and in operation in 34 countries around theworld and the clear preponderant reactor of choice is thelight water reactor, with 344 plants (ref. 10). In thenearer term, there are limited prospects for theconstruction of new nuclear power plants in Europe orin the Americas although new plants are being built orare planned in some Asian countries.

While several developing countries have long expressedan interest in nuclear power, and while there may be agrowing interest in the application of this technology inthe developing world, nuclear power has not yet figuredsignificantly in the energy plans of many less advancednations, due to several considerations. Most notably,many developing countries lack the sophisticatedtechnical infrastructures and grid sizes to be able toabsorb and deploy currently available large-sized

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nuclear reactors in their electricity systems. Yet, at thesame time, given anticipated burgeoning demands forenergy, they conceivably could benefit considerably ifnuclear power options could be fashioned that wouldmeet their growing needs in an economicallycompetitive, safe and secure fashion. This has raisedsubstantial questions of late as to whether moreemphasis should be devoted to planning the nextgeneration of reactors or to designing new systems thatcould be more amenable to introduction in developingcountries.

In this regard, some attention is being devoted toevaluating the merits of smaller, modular, simpler, andmore passively safe reactor systems that might be bettersuited for introduction in less advanced countries. Inthe interest of abating the growth in inventories ofseparated plutonium, as well as enhancing proliferationresistance, attention also is being given to the merits offueling some advanced concepts with materials thatwould markedly reduce the frequency of refueling or theproduction of materials attractive for nuclear weapons.As yet, no modular and fully licensed small reactor hasbeen built in an industrialized state that is now ready forexport. However, a few countries like South Africa andArgentina are initiating programs aimed at developingand producing such reactors with an eye to their exportpotential. A few industrialized nations also continue tohave an ongoing interest in developing advancedreactors including water-cooled and gas-cooled thermalreactors, and liquid-metal-cooled fast spectrum reactorsfor indigenous use.

Enrichment facilities, primarily using diffusion andcentrifuge processes, have been constructed in tencountries. Worldwide installed current enrichmentcapacity is on the order of 50 million SWU annually,against a demand on the order of 36 MSWU (Ref. 11).The situation is more complex than these bare figuressuggest as, on the one hand, a significant part of thedemand is being filled with enriched material blendedfrom dismantled weapons and civilian recycledplutonium, while on the other hand, enrichment plantsare most profitable when operated at maximumcapacity. However, the basic point remains that worldenrichment capacity is more than sufficient to meetnear-term demands. Given this over-capacity and thehigh cost of building and operating enrichment plants, ifnew facilities are built in the near term, it will be mostlikely for reasons of energy autonomy or national pride,not because of the financial attraction of such facilities.

Yet, in the longer term, if nuclear power expandsgreatly, more enrichment facilities would be needed andcould become more widespread

Gaseous diffusion technology provides relatively lowseparation coefficients, and must be cascaded toproduce high enrichments. An enrichment cascadedesigned and constructed for particular levels of outputenrichment and tails assay would require majormodifications in order to achieve a significant increasein the output enrichment beyond the design limit.Centrifuge technology has much higher separationcoefficients and may be re-arranged relatively moreeasily. Both technologies rely on special materials.These materials are subject to various nuclear exportlaws and nuclear supplier agreements, the primaryvehicle for controlling the spread of enrichmenttechnology. One of the major proliferation threatsassociated with enrichment facilities has been thediversion of technology and expertise.

The basic technology of reprocessing has beendeclassified and widely available for many years, butonly a few industrialized countries are now engaged inreprocessing programs on a commercial scale.Nevertheless, the inventories of separated plutonium aresubstantially exceeding current demand. As a result,more than 200 tons of separated plutonium is now incivilian stockpiles around the world, a figure thatcontinues to grow (Ref. 12). Beyond this, much largeramounts of plutonium in spent fuel form are dispersedin numerous locations around the world

While much of the plutonium in spent fuel formcurrently is subject to high radiation barriers and henceis a relatively unattractive material for diversion bypotential proliferators (and, particularly, by potentialsub-national adversaries)—the effectiveness of theseradiation barriers will diminish over a period ofdecades. This is one of the basic reasons why thesafeguarding and disposition of spent fuel itself poses asignificant nonproliferation challenge. There has been agrowing interest in exploring ways the inventories ofthese materials can be aggregated under IAEAsafeguards in a limited number of stable countries withstrong nonproliferation credentials, independent of thequestion as to whether the plutonium in the spent fuelshould be directly utilized in reactors. Studies are alsounderway to evaluate the merits of transmutation of thespent fuel to forms of less proliferation concern.

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IV. LIKELY NEARER-TERM DEVELOPMENTS

In carrying out this study, the Task Force has notattempted to perform any exhaustive assessment of thelikelihood of different scenarios for the potential growthand use of nuclear power, although we believe nuclearpower has the potential to make a significantcontribution to meeting future energy demands. While itis possible to describe widely different cases rangingfrom a major renaissance of nuclear power to a drasticphase-out in the utilization of the technology, a middleground has been chosen by the Task Force thatpostulates a civilian nuclear world in the next fewdecades with the following major features:

• The light water reactor is likely to be the reactor ofchoice in the nearer-term, although some nationswill continue to have an interest in heavy waterreactors. Most nations now employing light waterreactors of Western design will be successful intheir efforts to obtain regulatory approvals and/orimplement effective aging management programsto extend the operating lives of their reactors. Thisis the direction being taken in the United Stateswhere most of the operating nuclear plants areachieving cost competitiveness and record highavailability (Ref. 13.) Some older or more poorlyperforming plants, or plants of controversial design,may be shut down.

• It seems likely that most nations will opt to storetheir spent fuel on an interim basis, pendingdecisions on later disposition, processing, ortransmutation of these materials. However, alimited number of nations will continue toreprocess some of their spent fuel and recycle someof their separated plutonium as MOX fuel inthermal reactors, pending possible later use in moreadvanced reactors.

• While Germany and Sweden have adopted lawsrequiring eventual shut-down of all their nuclearpower plants, many believe that it is unlikely thatmost nuclear power programs will be phased outentirely. Even if this were to occur, the nationsinvolved, as well as the international nuclearcommunity, will face an ongoing responsibility formanaging the inventories of separated plutoniumand other weapons-usable materials in theirpossession as well as the vastly greater inventoriesof plutonium that exist in spent fuel.

• There are different views within the internationalcommunity as to how the so- called “back-end” ofthe nuclear fuel cycle can best be managed andwhether plutonium should be recycled either now

or in the future or whether this question shouldsimply be deferred. The United States, for its part,does not now “encourage the civil use of plutoniumand accordingly, does not itself engage inplutonium processing.” However, while the U.S.actively seeks to limit reprocessing in regions ofproliferation concern, it has emphasized that it will“honor its existing commitments regarding the useof plutonium in civil nuclear programs in WesternEurope and Japan.” (Ref. 14)

• Although most fast reactor demonstration programshave been curtailed and competitivecommercialization of fast reactors has not beenachieved, a limited number of nations remaininterested in the development of this technology.This interest relates to the fact that fast spectrumreactors use dramatically more of the energycontent of uranium and reduce long-lived wasteproduction over currently deployed reactor systems.Several of these countries are assessing whethersuch systems can be developed in ways that couldbe more proliferation-resistant through processesthat would avoid the presence of separatedplutonium.

In the current climate, only a limited number of nationshave deployed uranium enrichment technologies, andkey enrichment technologies remain tightly controlled.Nevertheless, some states have succeeded in overtly orcovertly acquiring enrichment technologies that havebeen used in their nuclear weapons programs. Takingthese factors into account, one must assess theproliferation implications of different approaches to thefuture of nuclear energy. In the process, all potentialtechnical routes to the acquisition of nuclear weaponsmust be considered including those involving access tohighly enriched uranium (U-235 and U-233), Pu-239,and other fissionable isotopes.

In the foregoing overall context, the Task Force is of theview that different fuel cycles and reactor choices maycontinue to be followed by different nations but that inall cases it will be desirable for the U.S. to have theability to influence these programs so that they advancein ways that enhance proliferation resistance while alsoadvancing economic and safety objectives. A U.S.effort to pursue R&D involving the conduct ofanalytical and experimental studies that would evaluateand explore advances in proliferation resistance for avariety of fuel cycle approaches could strengthen theU.S. ability to exert constructive technical influence onthese issues. Where appropriate, these studies should becarried out in collaboration with other countries. More

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broadly and for the longer term, for nuclear power toprovide a significant fraction of the carbon-free energythe world is likely to need in the 21st Century, theutilization of nuclear power would have to expand manyfold. The realization of this goal may be dependent, inpart, on broad confidence in governments and publicsthat such an expansion will not significantly aggravatethe proliferation problem. Thus, continuedimprovements in proliferation resistance, like continuedimprovements in nuclear safety, waste management andeconomics may be very important to the future growthof nuclear power.

In addition, all of these situations strongly suggest thatif the U.S. aspires to have a significant role indeveloping technologies that may help to enhanceproliferation resistance on a global scale, it should adopta flexible orientation in pursuing R&D that will enablethe international community to better cope with avariety of situations that may evolve as various nationschart different fuel cycle courses.

In addition, the Task Force has been guided in itsanalysis by two other key assumptions. First, one of themajor U.S. objectives should be to preserve aninternational regime where misuse of the civiliannuclear fuel cycle will be the least attractive technicalroute open to potential proliferators. Secondly, it mustbe recognized that all nuclear systems involve some riskand opportunities for misuse. There is no reactor or fuelcycle system that is foolproof from a proliferationperspective although diversion from some systems maybe substantially less attractive than separate dedicatedmilitary production. In the interest of promotingnonproliferation objectives, all nuclear power programswill have to remain subject to an array ofnonproliferation measures of a basically institutionalcharacter.

The severity of proliferation risks depends very muchon a wide variety of technical, institutional, and politicalfactors. These range from the political incentives ordisincentives that could lead a nation or sub-nationalgroup to divert or steal materials capable for use in

nuclear weapons, the institutional disincentives that mayapply in a given case to discourage misuse, and thenature of the threat itself. In addition, other relevantfactors will include the degree of technicalsophistication of the parties, the nature of the nuclearprogram in the country involved, and the degree ofaccess and availability of directly usable nuclearmaterials.

It also is important in mapping out nuclear deploymentand export strategies to consider the prospective rolethat the transfer of a given peaceful nuclear technologycan play in proliferation—either by enhancing theability or incentive of a recipient State or dissidentgroup to acquire nuclear weapons.

Finally, political realities in some circumstances maysimply call for withholding the transfer of nuclearreactor technologies to certain nations if there areserious doubts whether they can fulfill theirnonproliferation obligations, are seriously lacking inpolitical or institutional stability, or if there are groundsfor serious concerns that the introduction of nucleartechnologies will have destabilizing effects in certainregions. On the other hand, not having enoughelectrical power to allow sufficient economicdevelopment, particularly in less advanced nations, mayin fact increase the proliferation risk in countriesseeking to increase their influence, by increasing theattractiveness of the military means to do so.

In view of the complexity of all of these factors, it isdifficult to generalize or make rank order judgmentsabout the relative nonproliferation risks associated withdiffering national nuclear programs or nuclear powersystems. One needs to assess the total context in whicha national nuclear program is evolving to form ameaningful and balanced assessment of likely benefitsand risks as well as positive impacts realized throughthe application of technology advances, recognizing thatsuch advances should be taken into account at an earlyphase of the design stage.

V. PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT INITIATIVES ANDTHEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATION

A. The Need for Improved Assessment Methods

All civil nuclear power plants and their associated fuelcycles theoretically can contribute to the risk thatweapons-usable fissionable materials, facilities,technology or expertise might be diverted or misused.

Accordingly, "proliferation resistance" is a matter ofdegree, not an absolute attribute. Developing a generallyacceptable methodology for proliferation riskassessment is difficult since both quantitative andqualitative factors contribute and the weights to beassigned to different factors are inherently a matter of

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judgment. Moreover, proliferation risk depends on thecharacter of each threat, whether it be a sophisticated orunsophisticated state seeking nuclear weapons or even aterrorist group. In addition, such factors are bothinherent to the particular fuel cycle and also areexternal, that is, institutional, in nature.

In view of this need and in spite of these difficulties,efforts should be undertaken to improve and, wherepracticable, standardize the proliferation assessment ofdifferent reactors and fuel cycle approaches for use inplanning future R&D programs. These assessmentmethodologies should not be considered to yielddefinitive, quantitative assessments; rather, they shouldbe viewed as useful means for helping the peer reviewprocess evaluate the merit of specific proposals andproposed courses of action and provide an importantbase for discussion of this topic.

Nevertheless, a desirable long-term goal is to developmore quantitative methods by which reactor designerscan evaluate the relative proliferation worth of variousfuels and materials in order to balance proliferationresistance R&D costs with benefit.

It is of key importance that such methodologies providean integrated assessment that includes the effectivenessof both the technical features (“intrinsic barriers”) andthe necessary institutional measures (“extrinsicbarriers”) that are likely needed to apply to a given case.A number of methodologies have been considered andare under development. Two efforts presently underwayto develop methodologies have been examined by theTOPS Task Force to help illuminate the discussion ofintegrated assessments.

The first is an integrated safeguards evaluationmethodology (ISEM), being developed under the U.S.Support Program to the IAEA safeguards program, thathas as its focus the extrinsic barriers to proliferation.This approach would lead to an optimum combinationof all safeguards measures available to the IAEA so asto achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency withinthe available resources. It would be a potential tool forthe IAEA to evaluate safeguards proposals forcompliance with the goals and objectives of integratedsafeguards. Although developed for a different purpose,elements of the ISEM approach might find applicationin evaluation and comparison of fuel cycle conceptswith respect to their ability to be effectively safeguardedand thus could contribute to the broader analysis ofproliferation resistance of different reactor and fuelcycle approaches.

The second, called an “attributes methodology” (Ref.16), places initial focus on the intrinsic barriers to

proliferation. The basic process is to identify theintrinsic barriers of a given nuclear system, evaluatetheir effectiveness against the challenges imposed bydifferent types of potential proliferators, and thenidentify the features needed in the extrinsic barriers tocomplement the intrinsic barriers such that the sum ofboth the extrinsic barriers and intrinsic barriers achievesthe specified standard. A matrix displaying thequalitative effectiveness of each barrier can bedeveloped for different fuel cycles and reactor systems.This methodology is potentially a tool for the reactorsystem designers and those with oversight of the designprocess. It would be used to help carry out an integratedassessment of the overall proliferation resistance of aproposed reactor system. This approach was used by theTask Force in a very preliminary fashion to addressvarious fuel cycles and elements of fuel cycles. To theextent that the ISEM and attributes approaches may beused to evaluate proliferation risks of different nuclearfuel cycle systems, they could evolve and becomecomplementary to each other because of the differencein their focus. These two methodologies are reviewed inAppendix 2.

The subject of the attributes methodology of assessmentwas the principal topic of a special working group at theTOPS International Workshop on TechnologyOpportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistanceof Global Nuclear Power Systems, held in Washington,DC on March 29-30, 2000. The detailed findings of thatgroup may be found in Reference 17. The Workshopconcluded that continued emphasis needs to be devotedto improving and standardizing the methodologies forperforming comparative assessments of the proliferationattributes of different systems. On the other hand, theWorking Group underscored that it did not wish toimply that informed judgments about future programdirections could not be made as needed given that suchadmittedly new and elaborate methodologies are not yetin place.

B. Initial Application of the AssessmentMethodology

An effort to apply the attributes methodology to severalspecific nuclear power systems also was made at aTechnology Assessment Meeting sponsored by theTOPS Task Force in Chicago on June 15-16, 2000 andreported on in Reference 18. The cases covered wereformulated by reactor developers who volunteered theireffort on short notice at the request of the Task Force.Because of the time limitations, U.S.-based developerswere primarily involved. The cases were not completein themselves nor did they cover the full scope ofsystems operating today or under development. Theirprimary purpose was to identify system characteristics

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and R&D needs. To some extent, these presentationswere, in effect, an initial “field test” of the applicationof the attributes methodology. Experts on specificsystems were requested to apply a process generallyconsisting of the following steps. They were requestedto:

1. Outline the phases of the fuel stream for the givensystem that comprise the focus of diversion threats.

2. Identify the principal potential proliferationpathway(s) in each fuel cycle phase (e.g., covert orovert diversion of material and/or misuse offacilities by an NPT signer state, covert theft ordiversion of materials by a sub-national entity).

3. Specify, for each of its fuel cycle phases, those keyintrinsic materials and technicalattributes of the system which provide the primarybarriers against proliferation.

4. Define the generic characteristics and capabilitiesof the government and non-governmentorganizations that are potential proliferators.

5. Estimate the relative importance of each keyintrinsic and extrinsic barrier in thwartingproliferation by the entities in (4) on the path(s) in(2) which pose a credible threat.

6. In light of the findings from (5), identify theMPC&A and international safeguards measures(“extrinsic barriers”) that are needed to supplementthe intrinsic barriers in each fuel cycle phase.

7. On the basis of the results from (5) and (6),recommend R&D and technology applications thatare needed to verify or strengthen the proliferationresistance of the system.

The systems that were covered in this comparativeanalysis at the Chicago meeting included:

• An LWR operating on a so-called “once- through”fuel cycle where the resultant spent fuel is storedfor a protracted period or disposed of geologicallyin a nominal permanent geologic repository. Thisincluded concepts such as using non-fertile fuel andTh/U fuels.

• An LWR system operating on a so-called closedfuel cycle where the fuel is reprocessed through aclassic aqueous (or PUREX) system with theplutonium either recycled as MOX fuel in the lightwater reactors or kept in protracted storage pending

decisions on later disposition—which might includeuse in fast spectrum reactors.

• A fast spectrum reactor operating in a burner orbreeding mode employing an advanced recyclingtechnology that does not involve at any stage theseparation of pure plutonium.

• Postulated small modular LWR and LMR reactorsystems employing a long-lived core for possibleuse in both advanced and developing countries.

• Two types of modular high temperature gas-cooledreactors: a pebble bed fueled system and a fixedprismatic configuration fuel system.

In addition, papers were prepared by individualmembers of the Task Force on the application of themethodology to aspects of the fuel cycle that manysystems have in common: enrichment, transportation,and the geologic repository for spent fuel.

The results, reported in Reference 18, are not uniform incompleteness nor in the degree of conformity with theguidelines provided. Therefore they are not amenableto comparison as to proliferation resistance. Weaknessesin the intrinsic barriers in some systems were identifiedand R&D programs were recommended either toaddress them or to enhance the evaluation of theconcepts. It was demonstrated that the application ofthe extrinsic barriers to specific reactor systems couldbe more effective if proliferation resistance assessmentbecomes an integral part of the design process. Asimple engineering design example cited was to providein the initial plant layout for locations of video monitorsand their field of vision that would assure full coverageof fuel assembly movements in the plant. It wasacknowledged that, except for some recent technicalprograms such as the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)concept, proliferation resistance has been consideredafter the basic designs were completed with a resultantlimitation on the effectiveness of the application of theextrinsic barriers.

The value of the “attributes” methodology as aproliferation assessment tool was not clearlydemonstrated. In some respects, most of the findingsfrom the analyses were not new and simply reinforcedthe judgments that had arisen over the years. Yet, therewere several indications of the potential constructivevalue of such a methodology if it is further developed.

The evaluations highlighted three areas for increasedR&D attention: (1) the enrichment phase whereclandestine facility modification could circumventstrong intrinsic barriers, (2) the spent fuel repository

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phase where the strong radiological barrier is weakenedby radioactive decay over a period of decades, and (3)the scenarios of undeclared alterations in fuel content orthe undeclared introduction of target material for theexpress purpose of producing weapons-usable material.

An area identified as common to all systems is the needto evaluate the impact of complexity and the cost-benefit of new intrinsic proliferation-resistant barriers, a

capability that does not exist in the present assessmentmethodologies. Such evaluations should search out theoptimum balance between the intrinsic and extrinsicbarriers, safety, economics, and environmental impact.Intrinsic barriers must not add complexity to the extentthat safe operation is negatively impacted.

VI. RECOMMENDED R&D AREAS

A. Overall Strategy

Drawing from the results of the TOPS InternationalWorkshop held in March (Ref. 17), the applications ofthe attributes methodology described above, and theindividual contributions of the Task force members,recommendations have been formulated by the TaskForce for R&D programs to increase proliferationresistance. The primary goal for this R&D is to helpassure that the utilization of the civilian nuclear fuelcycle remains a comparatively unattractive route forthose nations or groups that may be interested inacquiring nuclear weapons, including limiting thedegree to which technologies and expertise from thecivilian nuclear energy system can serve to contribute todedicated military nuclear programs.

The primary technological opportunity areas should bedefined and funded under major “theme categories” thatadvance the following goals:

• Improve the effectiveness of surveillance,monitoring, inspection, and accountancy, andphysical security measures that are embedded ininstitutional controls;

• Devise new inherent technical features whichpromise to make nuclear power systems moreresistant to proliferation;

• Reduce opportunities for the misuse of, or thediversion and theft from, civilian nuclear activities;

• Increase the complexity, transparency, and cost ofdiverting nuclear materials for use in nuclearweapons, as well as the time it would take for astate to divert nuclear materials so as to give theinternational community sufficient time to detectsuch activity and take appropriate action;

• Reduce the accessibility of weapons-usable nuclearmaterials; and

• Reduce the degree to which civilian nuclear energyprograms may provide opportunities for States orgroups to build up expertise for potential or likelyproliferation and to acquire (overtly or covertly)technologies that could be employed for nuclearweapons programs.

As a basic approach towards advancing these themes,the United States and other interested countries shouldbe prepared to evaluate promising major options in anon-doctrinal fashion. This would include, for example,the application of “just-in-time” inventory control ofseparated plutonium as well as the exploration ofadvanced closed fuel cycle systems that serve to reducedirect access to weapons-usable materials. R&D on suchadvanced options will advance the state of the art inproliferation-resistant technologies and will allow theUnited States to collaborate more constructively withother countries.

The recommended programs are grouped under threeprimary purposes or objectives for the R&D:

(1) To develop improved methodologies forassessing proliferation resistance;

(2) To develop technology to strengthen theapplication of extrinsic (institutional) barriersagainst proliferation; and

(3) To develop new technologies to enhance theintrinsic barriers against proliferation, therebyreducing the burdens on the extrinsic system.

Since research and development will be critical inhelping to make subsequent decisions on the appropriatepaths to actually follow, the effective implementation ofthis proposed new R&D initiative will require a

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strategic planning approach that provides a basis forprioritization and selection of the desired longer-termR&D portfolio. A systems perspective will be needed with an emphasison comparative evaluation. The pursuit of most of theindividual projects designed to improve barriers toproliferation should be carried out in the context of theoverall development of the reactor or fuel cycle conceptto which they are intended to apply. In addition, all thefacilities of the integrated system should be addressed inevaluating overall proliferation resistance. Since manyof the advanced concepts will take many years tocommercialize, proliferation- resistant improvementsshould be given significant attention in the early stagesof development. To meet these needs, appropriate and realistic timeframes for implementation of the research anddevelopment should be established. In concept, threedistinct time frames should be defined in terms ofcompletion of the development and implementation ofthe technologies. Initiation of related R&D in all threetime frames would ideally start now, but selections willneed to be made on the starting times dependent on theamount of funding available and priority designations ofthe various programs. The time frames should include:

• Shorter-term projects likely to produce tangibleresults in about five year’s time;

• Intermediate projects likely to produce tangibleresults to about 15 years from now; and

• Longer-term projects. A commitment is critical tothe longer-term exploration and, as appropriate andfeasible, development of advanced fuel cycles, butnearer term concrete needs should not be ignored inthis process.

There is likely to be a high level of synergy amongactivities in each of these three time frames. Forexample, fruitful nearer-term results can contribute tolonger-term projects including their prioritization andselection; evaluation of the longer-term concepts canidentify new needed near-term proliferation resistancestudies.

B. R&D Opportunities for the Nearer-Term

To provide tangible results that can affect proliferationresistance in the nearer-term period of up to five years,emphasis should be devoted to development of theassessment methodologies, to technology that improvesthe effectiveness of the application of institutionalbarriers, and to R&D that can strengthen the intrinsicbarriers of existing systems. It is noted that substantial

detail is provided on the first two areas since the worktherein will have more immediate impact and the moresuccessful elements of it will continue into the later timeframes. The recommended content of the three R&Dareas is given below:

1. R&D Recommended to Develop AssessmentMethodologies

Important emphasis needs to be devoted to improvingand standardizing the methodologies for performingcomparative assessments of the proliferation attributesof different reactor and fuel cycle systems and toevaluate the effectiveness of technologyrecommendations. Although these methodologiesshould not be considered to yield definitive, quantitativeassessments, they can provide a useful means by whichreactor designers can evaluate the relative proliferationworth of various fuels and materials in order to balanceR&D costs with benefit. Specific to the “attributes”methodology referred to earlier, the U.S. (working withother interested countries) should develop the capabilityto complete the application of this methodology to avariety of nuclear systems, including filling in withconfidence the elements in the matrices. The U.S.should also continue to support the development ofISEM for use in developing effective and efficientinternational safeguards systems and other assessmentmethodologies. Ultimately, quantitative assessmentmethods are desirable, provided that they can beformulated in a practical fashion.

Methodologies should be developed to include intrinsicproliferation resistance barriers in the cost analysis oflife cycles. Improved analytical tools for economicevaluation of nuclear systems should be developed forlife cycle cost and cost-benefit analyses so as to extendthe traditional economic evaluation of nuclear facilities(capital, fuel, and O&M cost) to include an evaluationof the entire system that reflects the economicimplications of proliferation features. A costcomponent is the manpower required to performinspections to be applied to different types of reactorand fuel cycle systems. Such manpower requirementsshould be determined by making the composite ofintrinsic and extrinsic barriers cost effective and willprobably be small compared to the overall costs ofenergy production.

An evaluation should be performed of the practicality ofa fault tree approach (Ref. 15) for quantitativelydescribing proliferation resistance, a method thatconceptually utilizes the methods in common use inprobabilistic safety analysis to evaluate the intrinsicproliferation resistance of reactor/fuel cycle systems.

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A major consideration in assessing the proliferationresistance of a given fuel cycle involves the determinationof the type of nuclear materials present and theirquantities. The initial “attributes” basis for a comparativeanalysis set forth in Reference 16 contains a list of fissileisotopes that are of concern and require attention. Sincethe proliferation worth or potential of the various isotopesare not equivalent on a per gram basis, the reactordesigner should have a means to develop a quantitativeassessment of the proliferation worth of various fuels andmaterials in order to balance R&D costs and benefits. Anassessment tool is needed to take into account not only themass of material necessary to be useful for weaponspurposes, but also inherent physical characteristics thatmay make it less attractive for weapons purposes.

Since the goal of proliferation resistance of civiliannuclear power is to assure that it remains acomparatively unattractive route for those nations orgroups interested in acquiring nuclear weapons,appropriate methodologies need to be developed toassess the proliferation resistance of alternate pathways.

2. R&D Recommended to Strengthen Extrinsic(Institutional) Barriers

Given the central importance that extrinsic orinstitutional factors play in defining the entirenonproliferation regime, the Task Force recognizes thatR&D should address three questions that affect theextrinsic regime:

- How may different intrinsic options affectextrinsic factors and what kinds of new R&Dproposals and intrinsic developments mightstrengthen components of the extrinsic regime?

- How might technological advances (includingthose outside the traditional nuclear scienceand engineering fields) serve to strengthen theinternational safeguards regime and nationalMPC&A systems?

- What possible adverse as well as positiveimplications might certain technologicaladvances or deployments have for the extrinsicnon-proliferation regime?

In assessing the implications of different systems, it isimportant to identify the comparative burdens andchallenges that some advances would put on the globalextrinsic or institutional regime in contrast toalternatives. New technologies that would allowproduction of nuclear weapons materials in more readilyconcealed facilities pose particular issues.

The major attributes for an effective internationalsafeguards system should shape the specific goals forR&D on extrinsic barriers. Those attributes are:

- Availability and access to all relevantinformation. This must include effectiveinformation analysis, including a properidentification of credible threats as well as ananalysis of the particular facility where thesafeguards are in place to determine if thesafeguards promise to adequately protectagainst such threats. The identification shouldbe done by both national and internationalagencies.

- Completeness of coverage. Safeguards mustprovide a significant probability of detection ofall credible/plausible diversion scenarios;however, measuring the degree of“completeness” is a challenge.

- Timeliness of detection.

- Material accountability using high qualitymeasurements.

- The application, where feasible, of reliablecontainment and surveillance measures.

- Design review and verification. (An importantmatter to be considered is how well themeasures now actually in place really work.)

- Detection and confirmation of undeclaredactivities. This is an important new area towhich the IAEA now is devoting muchattention.

- The availability of competent staff (whileinstrumentation has an important role insafeguards, there is no substitute for asignificant involvement of human inspectors).

- The presence of effective training andmotivation.

- The availability of reliable/effective non-destructive analysis and other equipment.

A working group at the TOPS International Workshop,that included safeguards experts, developed a list ofpotential areas where additional R&D in support ofinternational safeguards and national MPC&A systemswould be useful (Reference 17). This list included waysto improve (a) information technologies for safeguards;(b) safeguards system integration and studies (includingintegrating and balancing traditional and new safeguardsmeasures); (c) material accounting and facilitymonitoring; (d) wide-area environmental monitoring;(e) material and item tagging; (f) safeguards cost-

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effectiveness; and (g) the integration of technologicaladvances from a wide range of areas, including areasoutside traditional nuclear science, to advancesafeguards. It was recommended that approaches toeach of these areas and others should be evaluated, andthe most promising should be pursued, in closecoordination with other safeguards R&D. Taking the results of the March 2000 Workshop intoaccount, the Task Force recommends specific R&Dareas that should be pursued in the nearer-term. Theseare summarized below and covered in more detail inAppendix 3. They include:

- Ways to improve information technologies −better integration of sensors and datamonitoring systems, expert intelligent systemsfor data analysis, the development of systemsto provide real-time surveillance, thedevelopment of new methods to certifyauthenticity of source data.

- Ways to better pursue system studies − theanalysis of the systems for facility securityassessments, integrated data managementsystem development, the relation betweeneconomies of scale and proliferationenhancement.

- Ways to improve material accounting andfacility monitoring − higher accuracy, lower-cost assay technology, improved fissilematerial measurement of spent fuel andresidues, integrated national and IAEA systemsto increase the likelihood of detection ofdiversion of material, new technologies forlong-term, low-cost monitoring of geologicrepositories.

- Ways to improve wide-area environmentalmonitoring − the development of tools andassessments of effectiveness, and robustcapabilities.

- The development of enhanced material taggingmeasures − improved material and plantsurveillance technologies, tracer chemicals orisotopes to track material, remote identificationtechnologies, and the use of more transparenttechnologies.

- The development of lower cost surveillancetechniques − direct event formalisms, directaccess to data methods.

- Technical advances (including those outsidetraditional nuclear science) that would serve toimprove assay technologies, to develop

improved threat definition and analysis, and toimprove the human-automation interface.

The Task Force notes several areas requiring increasedemphasis in the implementation of this R&D program:

- The safeguards and MPC&A systems are nottaking full advantage of cutting edgeinformation technology that is being developedfor e-commerce.

- The U.S. national laboratories should provideappropriate state-of-the-art technology forwider application in safeguards and MPC&A.

- New technical efforts to strengtheninternational safeguards have to build on andbe well coordinated with the extensive nationalsupport programs for the IAEA safeguardsprograms that already are underway.

- There has to be a closer exchange andintegration of ideas and plans betweendesigners of possible new nuclear systems orapplications and safeguards specialists.

- Emphasis should be placed on the engineeringtrade-offs between intrinsic and extrinsicmeasures, designing in safeguards from thebeginning as an integral part of the overallsystem.

- Evaluations should address the adverse as wellas positive implications that certaintechnological advances (such as thosepermitting production of weapons-usablematerial in smaller and more readily concealedfacilities) might have for the global “extrinsic”non-proliferation regime.

- Future fuel cycle facilities should be designedto maximize inherent transparency of processescontained in the facility. It is recognized that,by designing processes and operations suchthat they are more observable (e.g., throughremote sensing, environmental sampling, etc.),the potential for undetected proliferation willbe reduced and international political andpublic confidence in nonproliferationintentions will be enhanced.

- International efforts should be supported thatwill serve to improve the tracking and resultanttransparency of movements of nuclearmaterials in international commerce as well asin national programs.

- As with nuclear materials, nuclear facilitiesshould be evaluated for proliferation resistance

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in context of their use and function in theoverall fuel cycle. Additionally, how a facilityis designed with respect to safeguardabilityshould be an important attribute in assessingproliferation risks.

The Task Force did not perform a detailed review of theexisting and planned safeguards technology R&Dportfolio that is already underway in support of theIAEA safeguards system. Therefore, the R&Drecommendations listed above and in Appendix 3should not be considered a criticism of the R&Dprogram that is already underway. Indeed, the R&D wepropose in these areas should be pursued in fullcoordination with the safeguards R&D supportprograms that are underway elsewhere in the U.S.government and internationally. In the U.S., safeguardsR&D (or technology development) is currentlysupported by the new DOE security organizationprimarily for domestic purposes and by the NationalNuclear Security Administration, Office of ArmsControl and Nonproliferation (NN-44) for internationalsafeguards. In addition, the Office of NonproliferationResearch and Engineering (NN-20) provides basetechnology R&D in nuclear materials detection, tagsand seals, etc. that are all related. The Defense ThreatReduction Agency (DTRA) is supporting thedevelopment of transparency and monitoringtechnologies that can be used for safeguards purposes.There are also related technologies in the emergencysearch and intelligence communities. It is important thatthese efforts continue with improved coordination andcollaboration and be expanded where practicable. TheDOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) should coordinateand integrate any new recommended R&D activities itmay support in these areas with the above activities aswell as with the advanced reactor engineering andresearch programs that NE may support, such as theNuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) and theprograms under the NERAC Long Term Nuclear R&DPlan (LTRDP).

The international safeguards system consists of a blendof detection systems capable of identifying nuances inoperations as well as an intelligent motivated staffcapable of observing, interpreting, and understandingthe information provided. Neither is possible withoutadequate funding. It was the conclusion of the TaskForce that the long-standing policy, shared by the U.S.of only permitting “zero real-growth” funding of IAEAsafeguards is harmful to the non-proliferation regimeand should be abandoned. Furthermore, thedevelopment of international safeguards technology hasbeen greatly advanced by an active program ofvoluntary support by key IAEA member states. Thisprogram of technical support must be continued and

strengthened. There remain, however, areas of technicalpromise that are unlikely to be covered by the existingprogram of formal assistance to the IAEA. The existingsupport program is largely focused on application ofdeveloped technologies and does not fund basic orapplied research in areas of technical promise that couldhave large impacts on IAEA safeguards.

2. R&D Recommended To StrengthenIntrinsic Barriers

The initial emphasis in developing improvements inintrinsic barriers in the nearer-term should be onevolutionary improvements in the proliferationresistance of existing systems and assessments, throughanalytical studies and experiments, of potential inherentbarriers that might be associated and pursued with thedevelopment of more advanced systems. The primaryfocus on evolutionary intrinsic barrier improvementwould be on LWR “once through” systems − e.g.,incrementally higher fuel burnup. Transient testing andthe buildup of fabrication capabilities for higher burnupfuel could be feasible in the nearer term. It is assumedthat in the nearer term DOE will continue to support thedevelopment of research reactor fuels that would permitthe remaining research reactors using HEU to convert tolower enrichments.

C. R&D Opportunities for the Intermediate Term

It is assumed that selected R&D programs onassessment methodology and strengthening extrinsicbarriers will continue in the intermediate and long-termperiods to seek out further improvements, but theemphasis in the intermediate term will shift strongly toobtaining tangible results from intrinsic barrier R&D.The programs recommended are as follows:

1. Light water reactors (LWR) and their fuelcycles:

- Extended fuel burnup. This could reduce thequantity and quality of plutonium produced,the number of re-fuelings, and the number ofspent fuel assemblies, modestly easing thesafeguards task.

- Ultra-long lived fuel for high conversionreactors with ten years or more lifetimes thatgain the energy value of plutonium withouttraditional reprocessing.

- Enrichment process developments that make itimpractical to modify the process to produceweapons-useable enrichments either throughincreased probability for detection or viainherent features that would make the process

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or facility incapable of reaching higherenrichments.

- Spent fuel repository R&D: to address thesecurity and relative proliferation resistance ofrepositories many decades ahead. In theshorter term, R&D is needed to establish thestandards and scientific basis for regional andinternational repositories.

- Thorium-uranium oxide fueled LWRs, whichcould result in reducing the quantity andattractiveness of weapons-usable material inspent fuel. Three variants: homogeneous mixof ThO2-UO2; micro-heterogeneous mix ofThO2-UO2; macro heterogeneous mix with aseed-blanket core. Further evaluation is neededto permit selection of the most promisingvariant.

- LWRs with non-fertile fueled cores: fuelfabrication development, scaling up frombench-scale to full size fuel elements;irradiation testing and post irradiationcharacterization of non-fertile fuel. Economicimpact assessments of such fuels and coreperformance are also needed.

- Methods to accelerate the rate at which LWRirradiation could reduce current stockpiles ofseparated plutonium (e.g., through fuels thatwould increase the amount of plutonium in thecore), and methods to improve the proliferationresistance of this process (through increases inboth intrinsic and extrinsic barriers).

- Methods to recycle fuel in LWRs that wouldhave higher proliferation resistance thancurrent approaches, such as recycling withoutconventional reprocessing (recycling spentfuel pellets without extracting the fissionproducts, maintaining the radiation barrierthroughout the process), or reprocessingapproaches that never separate weapons-usablematerial and do not provide facilities ortechnologies that could be readily adapted todo so.

2. High temperature gas-cooled reactors

General development of both pebble bed and fixedprismatic core variants of these systems should bepursued, including especially development of fuelingapproaches that do not rely on weapons-usable materialin fresh fuel, from which it would be very difficult todivert material, and resulting in production of small

quantities of highly unattractive material in the spentfuel. This would include, but not be limited to:

- Design and development of coatings toincrease burnup.

- Development of thorium-fueled designs.

- Development of sophisticated on line weighingsystems and gamma ray spectrometers to detectabnormal pebbles in the pebble-bed reactorsystems.

- Application of approaches such as AIROX andpyrometallurgical reprocessing, designed so asnot to fully separate fissile materials fromfission products and transuranics.

3. Fast Spectrum Reactors

- Evaluation of concepts that would breed andburn material without reprocessing (such ashigh neutron economy systems in whichplutonium is bred in the blanket and theblanket elements are then moved to the core).

- R&D on processing systems whose extractantscannot be altered to recover weapons-usablematerial.

- Ultra-long lived fuel − near-unity conversionreactors with ten year or more core lifetimesthat gain a greater energy value from recycledPu without traditional reprocessing.

- Operation without breeding blankets, so thatthe reactors do not produce significantquantities of high-grade plutonium.

- Performance data for fast reactor nitride fuels,which enable a low decontamination factor,non- aqueous fuel cycle, and potentiallyhigher proliferation resistance.

- Examine the sensitivity of electro-refining toperturbations to determine the ease ofextraction of uranium and plutonium;determine the gaseous release properties ofelectro-metallurgical treatment operations.

4. Small modular reactor systems

- Evaluate possibilities for factory-manufactured, passively safe systems with verylong core lives, requiring much less buildup ofin-country nuclear expertise − conduct R&Don fuel and core designs for very long corelives.

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- Develop and demonstrate characteristics thatsupport the envisioned autonomous controls.

- Conduct R&D on structural materials andcoolant chemistry control required for long-lifeoperation.

5. Research Reactors

Further develop very high performance LEU fuels forresearch reactors (in cooperation with the RERTRprogram) − fuels designed to make possible theconversion of those research reactors still using HEU, atcompetitive cost.

6. Transmutation technology

Evaluate proliferation resistance advantages anddisadvantages of a variety of proposed systems designedto transmute weapons-usable isotopes in spent fuel tonon-fissionable form, including the entire fuel cycle forsuch systems.

All of these programs cannot be carried to ultimatefruition because of the enormous resources that wouldbe required. But the effective implementation of thisproposed R&D initiative requires a strategic planningapproach that provides a basis for prioritization andtiming of the R&D portfolio effort. The relativeproliferation resistance of possible future individual fuelcycle facilities may not mirror the most effective R&Dagenda for achieving the overall goals outlined above.The pursuit of the individual proliferation barrierprojects should therefore be carried out in the context ofthe overall development of the reactor concept to whichit is intended to apply the barrier. Systems also shouldbe explored that avoid the transfer of technologies orexpertise that could readily be employed in either thecovert or overt design and manufacture of nuclearweapons. D. R&D Opportunities for the Longer- Term To provide tangible results that can improveproliferation resistance in the longer term, that is, fromabout 16 years out, projects/programs should focus onthe evaluation, and, as appropriate, development ofselected advanced systems and concepts. These effortsshould consider and assess advanced light waterreactors, liquid metal reactors, liquid-fuel reactors, andgas cooled reactors. Various reactor concepts should beinvestigated that do not require refueling for 10 to 15years. Advanced closed fuel cycle options also should

be investigated when they offer potential opportunitiesfor improving proliferation resistance and internationalsecurity. This should include the examination ofsystems that would avoid the presence of separatedplutonium. R&D that addresses all the facilities of anintegrated system might better minimize proliferationrisks and national security concerns.

E. International Collaboration

International collaboration in R&D is particularlyimportant in this area of technology as a method ofgenerating international consensus on proliferation-resistant technologies and strengthening the role andcredibility of the U.S. in these areas. Only a technologythat is broadly accepted worldwide can strengthen thenonproliferation regime. It is from R&D results thatstandardization is developed. Such standardization,particularly in proliferation resistance, is meaninglessunless accepted and practiced internationally.Particularly important for international collaboration isR&D that addresses the extrinsic barriers, because aninternational consensus on their validity andeffectiveness is required if they are to be utilized.

International collaboration also has been an importantaspect of successful R&D programs for many years. AsR&D costs continue to rise and the availability ofnuclear research facilities becomes more restricted,international collaboration becomes an increasinglyimportant means of leveraging resources and accessingunique research operations, thus reducing cost andincreasing opportunity. Collaborative R&D amonginternational partners should be expanded, focusing onthe theme categories defined above. Near-termprospects for increased collaboration that should bepursued include R&D related to high burnup fuels,Th/U fuels, non-fertile fuels, and advanced fuel cycleconcepts. The President’s Committee of Advisors onScience and Technology (Ref. 20) recommended as ahigh priority item in the nuclear area “addition of anexplicit international component to DOE’s new NuclearEnergy Research Initiative (NERI) promoting bilateraland multilateral research focused on cost, safety, wastemanagement, and proliferation resistance of nuclearfission energy systems”.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

There are a number of promising areas of research anddevelopment that the U.S. could undertake, preferablyin collaboration with other interested countries, thatcould make a constructive contribution to enhancing theproliferation resistance of nuclear power systems bothin the near and longer-term. These could be pursuedunder terms that are fully compatible with the need toassure that nuclear power continues to adhere torigorous safety and environmental standards. Moreover,many of the options would appear to be compatible withthe objective of assuring that nuclear power iscompetitive with alternate energy sources.

If the United States is to be able to explore, let alonedevelop, some of these options in a serious andsustained manner and as an effective internationalpartner in collaborative R&D, the Federal Governmentwill have to increase significantly its R&D dollarsdevoted to civil nuclear power and to enhancingproliferation resistance. These resources are nowinadequate in view of these needs, and are absurdly lowwhen compared to other energy R&D budgets in DOE.

In our view, the stakes here are high and go beyond theimportant objectives of maintaining the viability ofnuclear power and enhancing the proliferation resistanceof the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Unless the U.S.maintains a very active R&D program in the civilnuclear field, its credibility and leadership in the field ofnonproliferation as it relates to civilian nuclear energywill seriously erode, as will its ability to help shape andinfluence the course and direction of foreign nuclearprograms. The competitive strength of the UnitedStates in participating in the international nuclearmarket will also suffer.

This study identifies three major R&D areas that shouldbe pursued:

• Develop improved methods to evaluate thecomparative proliferation resistance features ofdifferent nuclear systems:

- Improve and standardize the proliferationassessment of different reactors and fuel cycleapproaches to plan R&D programs.

- Provide a useful means to evaluate the worth ofproliferation resistance features of reactordesigns in order to balance R&D costs withbenefit.

• Support R&D designed to enhance the efficacy ofthe extrinsic nonproliferation systems, throughtechnologies that:

- Speed the flow of information;

- Improve the effectiveness of the internationalsafeguards; and

- Improve the effectiveness of national MPC&Aprocesses.

• Support near and longer-term R&D aimed atimproving the intrinsic proliferation resistance ofspecific nuclear power systems.

As a major point, in order to properly focus availableresources, well-defined research and developmentthemes and associated time frames need to be adoptedby the United States, hopefully in a spirit of amicablecooperation with other interested nations. Suggestedmajor themes to guide the program should include: thereduction of the quantity of weapons-useable materialper unit power output; making weapons-useablematerial highly inaccessible; reducing the attractivenessof nuclear materials and facilities for potential use inmaking nuclear weapons; and designing facilities tominimize opportunities for diversion and increasetransparency.

In mapping out its future R&D strategy in theproliferation resistance area, DOE should plan itsprograms in three distinctive time frames: shorter-termprojects likely to produce tangible results in about fiveyears, intermediate term projects producing tangibleresults up to 15 years from now, and longer- termprojects with fruition times beyond 15 years. Acommitment to the longer-term development ofadvanced fuel cycles is critical, but near-term needsshould not be ignored in this process.

While the central role that political and institutionalmeasures play in maintaining the efficacy of the globalnonproliferation regime is recognized, severalpromising ways have been identified by which nuclearpower systems and nuclear fuel cycles conceivably canbe made more “intrinsically” resistant to proliferationand misuse. Such measures may hold the promise ofproviding more durable barriers to proliferation if theyreduce the burdens on external and institutional systemsand if they hold out the promise of being more stablethan institutional measures, which can change in time.

At the same time, institutional measures will remaincentral to the viability of the global nonproliferationregime and significant opportunities remain tostrengthen safeguards and measures of MPC&A throughtechnological advances. Although the civil nuclear fuelcycle has not been the preferred technical avenue for

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acquiring nuclear weapons, it has been the source ofmaterials and technologies that can be used to helpmake nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it is vital that allcivil nuclear power programs be subject to improved,cost-effective nonproliferation controls.

Taking into account these findings, the Task Forcestrongly recommends that the subject of proliferationresistance R&D should be allocated at least anadditional $25 million in the DOE budget for fiscal year2002, potentially increasing subsequently if particularlypromising opportunities requiring increased R&D fundsare identified. A significant portion of these funds, inthe range of $5-$8 million annually, should be devotedto adding to ongoing efforts in international safeguardsand MPC&A technologies that could improve theextrinsic barriers to proliferation in existing reactor andfuel cycle systems. These new funds should be targetedtoward improving the understanding of the interfaceswith and trade-offs between intrinsic and extrinsicbarriers, supporting the development of technologiesrequired to safeguard new fuel cycles (e.g., Th/U inwhich there is little safeguards experience or technologyfor measurements, etc.) and used also to improve thetransfer of technologies from other fields to programs toenhance international safeguards. A small portion,perhaps $2 million in the first year, should be devoted toimproving methodologies for assessing and comparingthe proliferation resistance of different proposedsystems. The remaining $15-18 million would bedevoted to the evaluation, analysis, and experimentalwork on approaches that could improve the intrinsicproliferation resistance of current and future reactor andfuel cycle systems.

An initial program such as outlined above, would allowthe United States to maintain a position in theproliferation arena with respect to the technology. Itwould also provide a base upon which to build a strongproliferation resistance component into the futuregeneration of reactor designs.

International collaboration in R&D is particularlyimportant in this area of technology as a method ofgenerating international consensus on proliferation-resistant technologies and strengthening U.S. technicalleadership, participation and credibility in these areas.Only a technology that is broadly accepted canstrengthen the nonproliferation regime. CollaborativeR&D among international partners should focus on themajor theme categories identified in this report.Prospects for increased collaboration could includecooperative efforts to improve the methods for assessingproliferation resistance, measures to strengtheninternational safeguards R&D related to high burnup

fuels, collaboration in Th/U fuels, non-fertile fuels, andadvanced fuel cycle concepts.

The most appropriate R&D programs for internationalcollaboration are those which address the extrinsicbarriers, because an international consensus on theirvalidity and effectiveness is required if they are to beutilized.

International collaboration has been an important aspectof successful R&D programs for many years. As R&Dcosts continue to rise and the availability of nuclearresearch facilities becomes more restricted, internationalcollaboration becomes an increasingly important meansof leveraging resources and accessing unique researchoperations, thus reducing cost and increasingopportunities.

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APPENDIX 1

TOPS TASK FORCE CHARGE AND MEMBERSHIP

A. Task Force Charge:

The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology (NE) has established a new task force under NERAC to

identify the various technical opportunities for increasing the proliferation resistance of reactor and fuel cycle

technologies for civilian nuclear power application and to recommend specific research areas. This task force will

include two or three individuals recommended by the NN Advisory Committee.

The focus of the subject task force will be to address both near and longer term technology opportunities that can

enhance the proliferation resistance of commercial nuclear power systems. Attributes and associated metrics will be

developed and applied to evaluate proposed systems and subsystems. Third generation light water reactors using a

once-through fuel system will be the reference standard. The task force will call upon experts and apply, as needed,

a series of conferences and small focus workshops to analyze technologies and research issues.

Near-term issues, impediments and implementation, and long-term issues, impediments and implementation, will be

examined in the context of future scenarios. For the near term, fuel and fuel cycle issues in light water reactors are

expected to present the greatest benefits. In the longer term, new nuclear power systems (e.g. Generation IV reactor

technologies), which also address needs such as better management of nuclear waste, enhanced safety, and enhanced

economics are key to this effort.

A task force report, planned for the summer 2000, will identify and prioritize near and long-term technologies and

clarify what research is needed to make these opportunities available to the international community.

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B. Task Force Members:

John Taylor, Chair, EPRI

Robert Schock, Vice Chair, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

John Ahearne, Sigma Xi, Duke University

Edward Arthur, Los Alamos National Laboratory

Harold Bengelsdorf, Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick and Associates, LLC

Matthew Bunn, Harvard University

Thomas Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council

Michael Golay, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Hill, Argonne National Laboratory

Kazuaki Matsui, Institute of Applied Energy, Japan

Jean Louis Nigon, COGEMA, France

Wolfgang Panofsky, Stanford University

Per Peterson, University of California, Berkeley

Mark Strauch, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Masao Suzuki, JNC, Japan

James Tape, Los Alamos National Laboratory

C. Final Report Editorial Board

An Editorial Board was formed to develop the drafts of the final report for the many Task Force reviews. The Board

was comprised of four Task Force members: Hal Bengelsdorf, Dave Hill, Bob Schock, and John Taylor, assisted by

Jim Hassberger (LLNL), John Herczeg (DOE), Rob Versluis (DOE), and Buzz Savage (JUPITER).

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APPENDIX 2

PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES

A. The IAEA Integrated Assessment Methodology

The IAEA has identified the need for an assessment method that would lead to the optimum combination of allsafeguards measures available to the Agency, including those from the Additional Protocol, in order to achievemaximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. As a State-level approach, it takes intoaccount a particular State’s nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear-related activities and will allow the IAEA to providecredible assurance as to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and of the absence of undeclared nuclearmaterial and activities in the State. In addition to providing assurances about both declared and undeclared materialsand activities, it is hoped that these so-called integrated safeguards will result in efficiencies that will allow therelaxation of some traditional nuclear material verification measures and a corresponding reduction in costs for suchverification activities (Ref. 21), although this is a matter still under review. It is in the context of considering meansto optimize safeguards and reduce the risk of proliferation from the civil fuel cycle that proliferation resistance-technology options can be identified.

The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) of the IAEA and others have advised that amethodology be developed by which all integrated safeguards proposals (ISPs) can be evaluated for compliancewith the goals and objectives of integrated safeguards. With this goal in mind, the United States has undertaken thedevelopment of an integrated safeguards evaluation methodology (ISEM) as a major activity in its Member-Statesupport program. (The methodology was utilized recently by the IAEA’s Safeguards Concepts and PlanningDivision to evaluate an IAEA ISP in a trial application that also was an evaluation of the methodology itself. Theexercise demonstrated that ISEM was practical and effective in evaluating integrated safeguards proposals.)

The ISEM is a structured framework consisting of a set of stages for evaluating an ISP (Figure 1). Its central featureis the determination of the completeness, effectiveness, and efficiency of coverage by proposed safeguards measuresof all credible paths to the acquisition of weapons-usable fissionable material that are relevant to the proposal.

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Additional Information

Needed Evaluate

ISP ReviewStage A: Review ISP for completeness of description

Integrated Safeguards Proposal (ISP)

Acquisition PathsStage B: Select relevant generic acquisition paths

ComprehensiveGeneric AcquisitionPath List

Priority and Effectiveness of CoverageStage D: Assign relative priority to the acquisition pathsStage E: Determine coverage of the acquisition pathsStage F: Estimate effectiveness of coverage

CostStage G: Estimate cost of each measure and overall cost of ISP to IAEA

Acquisition-Concealment ScenariosStage C: Identify specific acquisition-concealment scenarios

Evaluation Report

Stage I: Description of ISP strengths, weaknesses, coverage and impacts

Comparison

Stage H: Compare effectiveness and cost of ISP and ofstandard

1991−1995Safeguards

Criteria or otherISP(s)

Figure 1. ISEM Logic Diagram

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The ISEM begins with an ISP, which is first reviewed to ensure it is sufficient in terms of the information providedin the ISP. Once an ISP is judged sufficiently complete for at least an initial or preliminary evaluation, the ISEMaddresses the acquisition paths relevant to its scope. After identification of all covert acquisition paths and theirassociated concealment methods is complete, each of these acquisition/concealment scenarios describes a detailedacquisition path for the purposes of applying the ISEM. Acquisition-path prioritization in ISEM is presently basedon time requirements, cost, and difficulty but could involve a variety of other factors as well.

The ISEM is designed to provide a determination, with respect to each detailed acquisition path, as to whether theproposal includes one or more safeguards measures capable of detecting an attempted use of the path or whether,conversely, no measure is included that is capable of such detection. In addition to coverage, a measure of thedegree of effectiveness of the proposed safeguards is also needed. The ISEM provides decision-makers with areasoned estimate of the effectiveness of each safeguards measure, that is, the likelihood, expressed in qualitativeterms, that the measure in question will detect the event or condition that it is designed to detect. This estimate, incombination with the previous determination of acquisition-path priority, allows a decision-maker to determine ifthe strength of coverage is appropriate.

The ISEM provides aggregated results for acquisition paths and acquisition/concealment scenarios relevant to eithergeneric or State-specific ISPs, for single facilities or entire fuel cycles. Application of the ISEM identifies potentialweaknesses or disadvantages in effectiveness, efficiency, and costs, which might be overcome by modifications tothe measures to be employed. It also allows for sensitivity analyses to be performed and any proposed tradeoffsbetween cost and effectiveness to be examined. Thus, through a process of iterations involving a number ofalternative ISPs, the desired optimization of available measures that is the central feature of integrated safeguards ispractically and effectively approached using the ISEM. Thus the ISEM is intended to show clearly and conciselythe strengths and weaknesses of an ISP, its costs, and the degree to which it would meet the IAEA’s comprehensivesafeguards objective. The ISEM is intended to be neutral with respect to ISPs, i.e., the ISEM should not introduce abias for or against any ISP or type of ISP. As a consequence, the ISEM should involve a minimum of judgments,particularly subjective judgments, by the evaluator.

Elements of the ISEM methodology might find application in evaluation and comparison of fuel cycle concepts withrespect to their ability to be effectively safeguarded and thus could contribute to the analysis of proliferationresistance. It is in the context of considering means to optimize safeguards and reduce the risk of proliferation fromthe civil fuel cycle that proliferation resistance technology options can be identified and evaluated

B. Attributes Methodology

The question of how best to evaluate and assess in some standardized fashion the relative proliferation-resistantattributes of different nuclear fuel cycles occupied a substantial amount of the Task Force effort. A conceptualframework for approaching this subject is outlined in Reference 16, and has been discussed both within the TaskForce as well as with outside groups and critics. The basic approach taken is to evaluate the relative proliferationresistance of specific nuclear systems in terms of a generic set of “attributes.” The attributes are derived by firstdefining the barriers to proliferation inherent in the design of the system, its materials and facilities, and its modes ofoperation. These “intrinsic” barriers are characterized in generic form as follows:

Material barriers—intrinsic, or inherent, qualities of materials that reduce the inherent desirability or attractivenessof the material as an explosive:

IsotopicChemicalRadiologicalMass and BulkDetectability

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Technical Barriers—intrinsic technical elements of the fuel cycle, its facilities, processes, and equipment that serveto make it difficult to gain access to materials and/or to use or misuse facilities to obtain weapons-usable materials:

Facility unattractivenessFacility accessibilityAvailable massDetectability of diversionSkills, expertise, and knowledge that are necessarily involvedThe influence of time factors, including the time that may be required to obtain access to weapons-usable materials.

The relative importance or effectiveness of a barrier applicable to a given system, subsystem or mode of operationdepends on the nature of the proliferant actor posing the threat to the system. Such potential proliferators could behighly industrialized states, developing states, or sub-national groups acting with or without external statesponsorship. Moreover, the actors in question could attempt to divert or misuse materials either clandestinely orthey could carry out such activities overtly after having announced their intent, e.g., through the abrogation ofinternational treaties and supply agreements.

Within this context, the following table provides a broad indication of the variations in importance of differentintrinsic barriers to diversion or theft as they apply to different potential proliferators.

Table 1. Relative importance of Various Barriers to a Selected Type of Threat

SophisticatedState, Overt

SophisticatedState, Covert

UnsophisticatedState, Covert

Sub-nationalGroup

Material Barriers

Isotopic Moderate Low Moderate to High High

Chemical Very low Very Low Moderate to High High

Radiological Very low Low Moderate High

Mass and Bulk Very low Low Low Moderate

Detectability Not applicable Moderate Moderate High

Technical Barriers

Facility Unattractiveness Moderate Moderate High Very low

Facility Accessibility Very low Low Low Moderate

Available Mass Moderate Moderate High High

Diversion Detectability Very low Moderate Moderate Moderate

Skills, Expertise, andKnowledge

Low Low Moderate Moderate

Time Very low Very low Moderate High

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Although strong intrinsic barriers are an inherently desirable feature of a proliferation-resistant system, they areinsufficient in themselves to cope with all clandestine activities or the prospect that a state might elect to abrogate itsnonproliferation obligations. Intrinsic barriers are insufficient alone to prevent clandestine or abrogation decisionsto acquire nuclear materials. Thus, they must be supplemented by institutional or political barriers, including, forexample, the international safeguards system administered by the IAEA, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, andconstraints applied by various nuclear suppliers. The burdens and demands placed on these extrinsic barriers areinfluenced by the characteristics and importance of the intrinsic barriers that apply in a given case. For instance, themore complete the intrinsic barriers are for a given system, the less intensive and costly the extrinsic barriers needbe. Note that for the purposes of this analysis, we have defined institutional barriers somewhat narrowly.Consideration of questions of regional, internationally owned fuel cycle facilities and their impact on proliferationresistance are not considered, although they have the potential of mitigating the threat of misuse of the mostsensitive technologies: enrichment and reprocessing.

It is the sum of the inherent barriers and the institutional barriers that defines, along with the level of threat, theoverall proliferation resistance in a given case. The standards, be they national or international, that overallproliferation resistance must meet are subject to political decisions. Moreover, the institutional barriers can bemodified or even eliminated by political authorities or by the breakdown of institutional or economic systems.Treaties or other international commitments to establish institutional barriers can be abrogated: access to externallyimposed inspections can be denied, funding to pay guards can be interrupted, etc. Thus, intrinsic and institutionalbarriers are of a basically distinct nature and there is virtue in having institutional barriers reinforced, where feasible,by intrinsic ones.

The analytical process to assess intrinsic barriers evaluates the sequence of steps within each particular fuel cycleand reactor systems at which diversion or theft may occur and tabulates in a matrix the material and technicalbarriers that are inherent in each fuel cycle and reactor system. The evaluation would follow a separate pathaddressing a particular proliferant threat or actor to be considered. After completion of these steps, the mostsignificant barriers and threats can be selected and a more in-depth evaluation carried out.

The effectiveness of a barrier can depend on time and more strongly on the interaction of many highly judgmentalvariables, including the sophistication and motivations of a proliferator, the material in question, the context inwhich the facilities are used, and more. The transparency of the nuclear power activities involved in a State isparamount. Clearly the maximum level of openness is desirable to ensure international political and publicconfidence that proliferation is neither intended nor being carried out, thus minimizing the burdens of implementingthe external barriers.

For purposes of this analysis, we have defined institutional barriers or constraints somewhat narrowly focusing onthe key elements of the existing regime—such as implications for international safeguards and ways to improvethem. The evaluation of innovative institutional approaches for the future, such as the merits of establishingregional, internationally owned or controlled fuel cycle facilities and their impact on proliferation resistance havenot been part of this study, although they have the potential of mitigating the threat of misuse of the most sensitivetechnologies; enrichment and reprocessing.

Thus, it is not practicable at this time to obtain a meaningful, quantitative metric by considering technologies in asingular fashion. Further, in keeping with past detailed nonproliferation assessments, (including those carried out inthe INFCE Review), a meaningful assessment of proliferation risks and resistance in a given context must considermore than the intrinsic technical and material barriers. Rather, only through consideration of the total context in agiven case, including political and institutional concerns, can one obtain a balanced evaluation of likely risks andbarriers or impediments to proliferation.

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APPENDIX 3

RECOMMENDED R&D TO STRENGTHEN THE EXTRINSICBARRIERS TO PROLIFERATION

A. Information Technology

• Integration of sensors and data monitoring systems.

• Application of satellite monitoring systems.

• Systems that provide real time surveillance and measurements and store information i.e. remote monitoring.

• Systems that include high fidelity, real-time, high integrity data transmissions.

• Technologies that conduct smarter and faster analysis of information gathered from monitoring systems.

• Creating an information rich management center that integrates information analysis, data mining, andcomputer networking.

• Methods to improve authenticating source data.

• Need to develop instrumentation that works in more universal applications. Need for simplicity and commonsafeguards inspection instrumentation to be applied in a variety of installations.

• Application of expert intelligence for rapid automated data analysis.

• Enhanced use of common safeguard systems rather than site specific instrumentation.

B. System Studies

• Development of optimized approaches to combining traditional and new safeguards concepts, and integratingwide range of safeguards, open-source, and other information for safeguards purposes.

• Studies linking economies of scale to proliferation barrier enhancement. If some technologies are best-performed at large facilities, then this could limit smaller similar facilities within a single State.

• Identification of information technologies, information protection, and reliability commonalties so datamanagement systems can be integrated.

• Human factors studies for improving information presentations and other aspects requiring human judgment.The final purpose of all information is to allow human decision making on compliance with safeguards andnonproliferation obligations.

• A series of facility security assessments, taking care that key security features are not disseminated in theinterest of nonproliferation. (For example, the French classify key characteristics of their physical protectionsystems.) Results of the analysis and information learned can then be fed back into facility design to improveproliferation and MPC&A weaknesses.

C. Improved material accounting and facility monitoring

• Develop higher accuracy, lower-cost assay technology to reduce uncertainties in material accounting,particularly for large-scale bulk processing facilities.

• Develop improved technologies for measuring fissile material in spent fuel and in heterogeneous materialssuch as plutonium-bearing scrap and residues.

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• Develop approaches to integrating information from national material control and physical protectionsystems into containment and surveillance systems for international safeguards, increasing likelihood ofdetection of removal of material from a facility.

• Develop new technologies for long-term, low-cost monitoring of geologic repositories to ensure that anyremoval of material would be detected, including measures to detect covert tunneling attempts (e.g., passiveand active seismic, ground-penetrating radar, etc.).

• Develop improved surveillance technology to detect enrichment plant modifications intended to allow HEUproduction.

• Develop new material control regimes to increase transparency of reprocessing operations.

• New techniques to allow for fast, accurate, quantitative fissile material measurements.

D. Wide Area Environmental Monitoring

• Wide area monitoring can be among the most powerful safeguards tools for providing assurances of theabsence of undeclared activities, but assessment is needed of the effectiveness of this measure in detectingactivities employing extensive concealment measures.

• Enhanced capabilities for detection of undeclared power plants, reprocessing facilities, and enrichmentplants, ranging from improved analysis capabilities for samples collected from ground sites and air-basedplatforms to approaches for laser detection of trace effluents.

• More robust monitoring capability to minimize the chances of breakdown of extrinsic organizationmonitoring capabilities.

E. Enhanced Material Tagging Safeguards Measures

• Tracers in material to know its location without interfering with established plantoperations.

• Seals with improved tamper resistance and lower cost.

• Fuel assembly tagging, especially for use with MOX and HEU fuels.

• Technologies that would allow remote identification that a spent fuel assembly is still where it is being storedand intact. The large number of existing assemblies and related operational requirements has long-termproliferation implications.

• Develop new material control regimes to increase transparency of reprocessing operations.

• New techniques to allow for fast, accurate, quantitative fissile material measurements.

F. Application of PRA methodology

• Develop risk assessment capabilities, including needed databases, to identify high risk and high probabilityproliferation pathways or redundancies in detection.

• Examine decision theory and combined PRA methodology to develop metrics uniquely applicable to assessing proliferation resistance

G. Improved, lower cost surveillance and international/regional Safeguards interaction

• Research to determine the most effective report avenues for violations/questions, such as facility datareporting into a multinational center and a means to provide best access to critical data by inspectors ormonitoring efforts.

• Utilization of discrete event formalisms to enhance international safeguards agreements.

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H. Measures to Improve National MPC&A Systems

The following list of major attributes for a durable national MPC&A system are listed below in relative order ofpriority:

• Improve assay technology to reduce uncertainties in materials accounting.

• Evaluate adequacy of administrative steps necessary to obtain access.

• Explore ways to optimize human automation interface.

• Evaluate technologies available in defense programs that may be applicable and available.

• Develop improved threat definition and analysis for optimization of protective measures against both insideillicit activities and outside intrusion.

I. Importance of Aggregating Spent Fuel

Substantially greater attention should be given, over the near and long-terms, to the development of new approachesthat will facilitate the aggregation of spent fuel in politically stable countries or regions with strong nonproliferationcredentials. Achieving this goal is primarily an institutional and political issue but technical contributions can bemade through development of cost effective monitoring capability for geologic repositories, and improved inventorysystems for spent fuel.

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APPENDIX 4

GLOSSARY

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Additional Model ProtocolOfficially the “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between States and the IAEA for the Application ofSafeguards”. Adapted in 1997 after clandestine activities were discovered in Iraq, it gives the IAEA additionalcapability to detect and investigate undeclared activities.

Attributes MethodologyA method to evaluate and assess the relative proliferation-resistant qualities or properties of different nuclear fuelcycles. It is an extension of the methodology used by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in its 1994 report onthe disposition of weapons plutonium. The method was developed initially by Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory and then refined with the help of others during the development of the TOPS Report. The attributes arederived by defining the intrinsic barriers inherent in the design of the system, materials, facilities, and modes ofoperation. The effectiveness of a barrier depends on the threat. The method evaluates the relative effectiveness ofthe intrinsic barriers and aids in identifying those additional extrinsic barriers which, when supplementing theintrinsic barriers, enhance the proliferation resistance of the system. This method is described in Appendix 2.

Back-end of the fuel cycleThe handling, processing and disposition of used nuclear fuel after its discharge from a reactor, in some casesleading to re-fabrication into new fuel elements, and in all cases including the ultimate disposition of the high levelradioactive wastes. Reprocessing, where practiced, is part of the back-end of the fuel cycle.

BurnupThe thermal energy produced in a nuclear reactor by a given mass of uranium, plutonium, uranium-thorium mixture,or other fissile material combination. Generally, burnup is cited in terms of megawatt-days thermal per kilogram ofinitial heavy metal (e.g., uranium and thorium, without regard to its isotopic mix), MW d/kg ihm. Modern lightwater reactors commonly irradiate fuel to burnups of 45,000 MW d/kg ihm. In gas-cooled reactors, burnup issometimes cited as fissions per initial metal atom, FIMA. In the Light Water Breeder Program, burnup is cited infission units, where one fission unit is 1 x 1020 fissions per cm3 of fuel. With an approximate density of 10grams/cm3 and 200 MeV of total energy released per fission, the equivalence among the units is:

1 MW d/kg ihm = 0.001 fissions per initial metal atom = 0.27 fission units

Closed Fuel CycleA nuclear fuel cycle in which the used fuel is recycled following its use in a reactor. Recycling may or may notresult in separated plutonium during one or more steps in the recycling process. One example is separating theplutonium from used fuel, turning it into plutonium oxide, and blending with uranium oxide into mixed-oxide(MOX) fuel for one or more reactor irradiation cycles.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)A Department of Defense (DoD) agency that integrates and focuses the capabilities of the DoD to address the threatfrom weapons of mass destruction. Its mission is to safeguard the United States and its friends from weapons ofmass destruction by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat.

Export ControlsRestrictions placed on the sale or transfer of nuclear technology to a foreign country. Protocols for export controlsare contained in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as amended. Lists of technologies and information subject toexport controls are in the so-called Trigger List. The list contains items that if misused could contribute to a nuclearweapons program, including plutonium, HEU, reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants, and equipment andcomponents for such facilities.

Extrinsic Proliferation BarrierAn institutional or other external barrier that lowers the risk of proliferation of nuclear materials, such as physicalsecurity measures, monitoring techniques, and IAEA inspections. (See also: Intrinsic Proliferation Barrier)

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Fertile nuclideNuclear isotopes that can be converted to fissile isotopes through neutron absorption (and subsequent decay). Th-232 and U-238 are naturally occurring fertile nuclides. Fertile isotopes do not fission efficiently at low neutronenergies (<1 MeV).

Fissile nuclideNuclear isotopes that can be fissioned by low energy neutrons. U-233, U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241 are examples offissile nuclides.

Fissionable nuclideAll nuclear isotopes that can be fissioned, although common usage applies the term to isotopes that can only befissioned by high energy neutrons. Th-232 U-238, Pu-240, and Pu-242 are fissionable nuclides.

FuelFissionable uranium, plutonium, thorium and other actinides (and their chemical compounds) that are placed innuclear reactors for the purpose of producing energy.

Generation IV reactorsThe next generation of advanced fission reactors, expected to be deployed by 2030. They are expected to haverevolutionary improvements that allow them to be deployed worldwide and to yield energy products such aselectricity, hydrogen, process heat, and desalinated water for the civilian market through 2100. The goals ofGeneration IV designs include lower cost, increased levels of safety, reduced waste, sustainable energy generation,and improved proliferation resistance.

Highly enriched uranium (HEU)Uranium mixture containing 20 percent or more of the isotope U-235 or 12 percent or more of U-233.

Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)A liquid metal fast spectrum reactor designed by Argonne National Laboratory and General Electric. It is designedto optimize energy extraction and minimize waste from nuclear fuel through a closed recycle system usingpyroprocessing technology. The design and testing effort was stopped when the DOE program was cancelled in1995.

Integrated Safeguards Evaluation Methodology (ISEM)An assessment method developed from IAEA initiatives that would lead to the optimum combination of safeguardsmeasures in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency with available resources. The ISEM process isdescribed in Appendix 2.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)Serves as the world's central inter-governmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field.Carries the responsibility to deter proliferation through surveillance, monitoring, inspection, and accountancy ofnuclear materials. A specialized agency within the United Nations system, the IAEA maintains its headquarters inVienna, Austria.

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)Non-governmental research organization located in Austria. The institute conducts inter-disciplinary scientificstudies on environmental, economic, technological, and social issues in the context of human dimensions of globalchange. Sponsored by national member organizations in North America, Europe, and Asia.

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE)A major evaluation convened by IAEA in 1978 that attempted to compare the nonproliferation characteristics ofdifferent nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear systems that would lead to recommendations on steps that nations couldtake to help strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

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Intrinsic Proliferation BarrierAn inherent quality of reactor materials or the fuel cycle that is built into the reactor design and operation such ashigh level of radioactivity, chemical processing required to extract, isotopic composition, mass and bulk, sealedsystems, high burnup fuels, etc., that reduces its desirability or attractiveness as an explosive, makes it difficult togain access to the materials, or makes it difficult to misuse facilities and/or technologies for weapons applications.

Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC&A)The set of physical protection, instrumentation, monitoring equipment, and administrative procedures that are placedin effect to improve nuclear material security and accountability in order to preclude or limit the possibility of theftor diversion of nuclear materials for illicit purposes.

Mixed Oxide (MOX) FuelNuclear reactor fuel which is comprised of a mixture of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide. It is manufacturedusing plutonium extracted from used nuclear fuel or from excess weapons stockpile materials.

Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP)A study conducted in 1980 that evaluated how the U.S. light water reactor once-through fuel cycle compared toother options. It concluded that the LWR once-through cycle is more proliferation-resistant than other fuel cycleswhich involve HEU or plutonium.

Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC)A group of independent advisors to the Secretary of Energy and the Director, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science andTechnology (DOE-NE), who provide advice on complex science and technical issues that arise in the planning,managing, and implementation of DOE's nuclear energy programs. It was formed in October 1998 in response to arecommendation in the November 1997 PCAST Report on federal energy R&D for the challenges of the 21st

century. It has chartered a number of subcommittees and task forces on various nuclear energy issues, includinglong term planning for nuclear R&D, the future of currently operating nuclear plants, isotopes for medicine andother applications, nuclear infrastructure, and proliferation resistance.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)Treaty developed by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee starting in 1964 and signed by President Johnsonand 61 other national leaders in 1968; ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1970. The treaty limits nuclear weapons to thefive states that proclaimed possessing them at the time – the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China.All other signers had to promise not to acquire them. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 and now has 187signatory nations. With respect to nuclear energy technology, the treaty provides for: a) assurance, throughinternational safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapons states will not be diverted tomaking nuclear weapons; and b) promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy, to include making available thepotential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosion technology to non-nuclear parties (if conductedunder international observation).

Nuclear ProliferationThe manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons by previously non-weapons states or sub-national groups.

Nuclear Weapons StateA country that has declared itself as possessing and having the capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Declarednuclear weapons states are the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan are statesknown to possess nuclear weapons but have not declared themselves nuclear weapons states . Israel is generallyconsidered to possess nuclear weapons capability but has not so declared. Other countries (e.g.; Japan, Germany,Brazil) certainly have the technical capability to possess nuclear weapons but have publicly forsaken theirdevelopment.

Once-through (or open) fuel cycleA nuclear fuel cycle in which the fuel is not recycled following its use in a reactor. The used fuel may bereconfigured or repackaged before placement in the ultimate repository. Usually the cladding is not breached, butthis may not always be the case.

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Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX)An aqueous reprocessing system that separates plutonium and uranium from used nuclear fuel. Fission products andother wastes are retained in a liquid waste form and stored in large tanks or converted to solid form for finaldisposition. PUREX facilities have been operated by DOE at Hanford and the Savannah River Site. Similaroperations are carried out in other countries, most notably France and Great Britain, which convert wastes from thePUREX process to a solid form through vitrification.

Proliferation resistanceThe degree of difficulty in using, or of diverting material from, a commercial reactor and fuel cycle system for theclandestine production of materials usable in nuclear weapons.

Reprocessing (or Recycling)The practice of extracting enriched uranium and plutonium from used nuclear fuel and reusing it in new fuel foradditional irradiation in a reactor. It is the major element of the closed fuel cycle.

SafeguardsThe set of institutional measures taken to preclude or limit the possibility of theft or diversion of nuclear materialsfor illicit purposes. It includes treaties, IAEA inspections, and monitoring. It consists of a blend of detectionsystems capable of identifying nuances in operations and people who can understand and interpret the informationprovided by the detection systems.

Separative Work Unit (SWU)The standard measure of enrichment services, measuring the effort expended in increasing the U-235 content ofuranium above the natural 0.7 percent. It typically measures the amount of enrichment capacity required to producea given amount of enriched uranium from a particular feed material, while enrichment plant capacities are quoted inSWUs per annum.

TransparencyA measure of the ability to provide confidence between governments that each is abiding by its nonproliferationagreements. Methods include technical and administrative measures such as direct observation and assay.

Weapons-usable nuclear materialNuclear material (uranium, plutonium, or other actinide) that is sufficiently pure and free of contaminants to allowits use in a functional nuclear weapon or explosive.

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REFERENCES

1. “Global Energy Perspectives”, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis / World Energy Council,IIASA Vienna, 1998;

2. “Electricity Technology Roadmap: Powering Progress”, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto,California, 1999.

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4. “Federal Energy Research and Development for the Challenges of the Twenty First Century”, A Report fromthe President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Panel on Energy Research andDevelopment, Washington, DC, November 1997.

5. “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic EnergyAgency for the Application of Safeguards”, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1997.

6. Nonproliferation Alternatives Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) Report, u.s. Department of Energy,1980

7. International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) Report, Vienna: IAEA, 1978

8. “Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor Related Options”, Reactor OptionsPanel of Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy Press, 1995.

9. Final Report of the Panel to Review the Spent Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC,2000.

10. Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Power Reactors Information System (PRIS), www.iaea.org,International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, November 2000.

11 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System (NFCIS), www.nfcis.iaea.org, International Atomic Energy Agency,Vienna, November 2000.

12. Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current and Future Directions, David Albright, Institute for Scienceand International Security (ISIS), Washington, D.C., June 2000

13. “Status and Direction of Nuclear Power in the U.S. and the World”, Marvin S. Fertel, International Workshopon Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems, January 2000.

14. White House National Nuclear Power Policy Statement, September 27. 1993

15. “Measures of Nuclear Reactor Concept/Fuel Cycle Resistance to Nuclear Weapons Proliferation”, MichaelW. Golay, CGSR Workshop, Livermore, CA , 2-4 June 1999.

16. “Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems”, TOPS Task Force ReportAnnex, Various Contributors, October 2000

17. “International Workshop on Technology Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of GlobalNuclear Power Systems”, March 29-30, 2000, Washington, DC.

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18. “Report on Proliferation Resistance Technology Assessment of Nuclear Reactor Systems”, June 15-16, 2000.Chicago, IL.

19. “Long Term Nuclear Technology Research and Development Plan”, NERAC, June 2000, Washington, DC.

20. “Powerful Partnerships: the Federal Role in International Cooperation on Energy Innovation”, A Report fromthe President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Panel on International Cooperation inEnergy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment, Washington, DC, June 1999.

21. Goldschmidt, P. (1999). “The IAEA Safeguards System Moves Into the 21st Century.” IAEA Bulletin 41(4):S1–S20.