IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUITIN AND FOR LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CLARK L. DURPO, JR. and

CLARK L, DURPO,

Plaintiffs,

BELLA LAGO CONDOMINIUM AT BAYBEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,INC., et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 13-CA-001057

(Consolidated withCase No. 14-CA-000083 for Pretrial

Purposes)

PLAINTIFFS CLARK L. DURPO AND CLARK L. DURPO, JR.'SMOTION TO DISSOLVE LIS PENDENS AND ALTERNATIVE

MOTION TO REOUIRE BOND FOR LISPENDENS'Corrected)

Plaintiffs, CLARK L. DURPO, and CLARK L. DURPO, JR. (collectively,

"Plaintiffs" or "Durpos"), by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby file this Motion and

Incorporated Memorandum to Dissolve Lis Pendens and Alternative Motion to Require Bond for

Lis Pendens with respect to the lis pendens filed and recorded by BELLA LAGO

CONDOMINIUM AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., CASA

MARINA ASSOCIATION, INC., CASA MARINA II CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,

INC., CASA MARINA III CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., MANATEE BAY AT

BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., VALENCIA VILLAS AT BAY

BEACH ASSOCIATION, INC,, WATERSIDE I AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATION, INC., WATERSIDE II AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,

INC., WATERSIDE III AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,

WATERSIDE IV AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., and

Plaintiffs file this corrected Motion to Dissolve Lis Pendens and Alternative Motion to Require Bond for Lis

Pendens to correct the order of paragraphs 26 through 31. No substantive revisions have been made to the

motion.

Filing # 15895132 Electronically Filed 07/14/2014 05:32:01 PM

WATERSIDE V AT BAY BEACH CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., (collectively

"Associations" ), and in support thereof, state as follows:

1. The Durpos own real property, commonly known as the Ft. Myers Beach Golf

Club Course, ("Golf Course Property" ) in Lee County, Florida, In 2013, the Durpos filed suit

against the Associations concerning the Golf Course Property for trespass (Count I), nuisance

(Count II), unjust enrichment (Count III), quantum meruit (Count IV), and declaratory relief as

to the unlawful diversion of water onto Golf Course Property (Count V).

2. In November 2013, the Associations counterclaimed seeking declaratory relief

against the Durpos that the Associations have the legal right to use the Golf Course Property for

water management based on the reasonable use doctrine (Count I); irrevocable licenses (Count

II); express easements (Count III); easements by necessity (Count IV); easements by implication

(Count V); and mutual drain (Count VI).

Relevant Facts

1. The Golf Course Property was originally owned and developed by Stardial

Investments Company ("Stardial"). The Golf Course Property is in a planned community

commonly known as Bay Beach. The Bay Beach community was developed within the Bay

Beach Development of Regional Impact ("DRI").

2, Under a master concept plan (the "Master Plan" ) for Bay Beach, the natural flow

of water from residential areas currently existing within the DRI was altered such that these

surface waters were diverted onto the Golf Course Property though a unified surface water

management system ("System" ).

Undersigned counsel has entered a limited appearance to represent the Durpos'efense of Counts II, III, IV, and

V.

In 1985, Stardial received a South Florida Water Management District

("SFWMD") Permit (the "Permit" ) that conceptually approved the Master Plan. The Permit was

expressly conditioned, in pertinent 0art, on Stardial; (i) submitting documentation of a binding

legal agreement between all owners within the confines of the Master Plan outlining the

responsibilities of operation and maintenance of the surface water management system; and (ii)

recording this agreement in the public records of Lee County, Florida.

4. Estero Bay Improvement Association, Inc, ("EBIA") was formed to act as a

master association and to perform administrative functions concerning the shared amenities

between certain associations in Bay Beach, including ownership and management of common

roadways. The Durpos are not members of EBIA, and Stardial expressly excluded the Golf

Course Property from governance by EBIA.

5. Over time, the Permit was modified to address development of several

condominiums, each of which is controlled by an Association that is a party to this lawsuit.

Specifically, the Permit was modified to address stormwater discharge during the construction

phase of their respective condominium developments. Each permit modification was expressly

conditioned upon: (i) each Association obtaining a legally binding agreement with the Golf

Course Property to divert stormwater onto the Golf Course Property; and (ii) each Association

recording the agreement in the public records of Lee County, Florida.

6. All Associations failed to satisfy the conditions of their respective permit

modifications because no legal agreement with the owner of the Golf Course Property was ever

obtained, and consequently, no such agreement was ever recorded in the public records of Lee

County, Florida. In addition, all of these permit modifications expired prior to construction

certification. Consequently, the Associations failed to convert them to operational permits as

required by SFWMD pursuant to the express terms of the initially issued Permit, as modified.

In 1999, Stardial sought to collect a portion of the operating expenses associated

with the System from EBIA and the Associations because EBIA and the Associations refused to

pay their fair share of management and maintenance costs associated with the System. In 2003,

Stardial and EBIA submitted to arbitration concerning the costs of the System, resulting in the

entry of a Decree allocating past liability for the cost of the System in proportion to the acreage

of land controlled by EBIA and the Golf Course Property.

8. Prior to the entry of the Decree, on January 17, 2003, Stardial sold the Golf

Course Property to Bay Beach Golf Club, Inc. ("BBGC").

9. To allocate the costs of the System during BBGC's ownership, BBGC and EBIA,

on behalf of itself and the Associations, entered into a Cost Share Agreement effective February

22, 2005 (the "Cost Share Agreement" ). The Cost Share Agreement was not recorded in the

public records of Lee County, Florida, and therefore, did not run with the land.

10. On October 31, 2005, BBGC sold the Golf Course Property to the Durpos. At the

time of this sale, the Durpos were not aware of the existence of the Cost Share Agreement. The

Durpos are not parties to or bound by the Cost Share Agreement.

11. To date, no written agreement has been created or recorded in the public records

of Lee County, Florida, or otherwise, granting the Associations a legal right to use the Golf

Course Property for their water drainage. As a result, the Associations have no record interest in

the Golf Course Property. The Associations have no valid agreement, easement, or legal right to

use the Golf Course Property for any purpose.

12. However, since the time that the Durpos purchased the Golf Course Property in

2005, the Associations have repeatedly and continually used the System to drain surface and

storm water from their property onto the Golf Course Property without a binding legal agreement

from the Durpos authorizing such discharge, in violation of the Permit and Florida law. In

addition, the Associations have been notified by SFWMD on numerous occasions that they are

draining into the Golf Course Property without an operational permit. See Exhibit "A" attached

hereto.

13. Despite having no basis to support their claims, the Associations filed a Notice of

Lis Pendens against the Golf Course Property on November 27, 2013, recorded in Instrument

Number 2013000268921 of the Public Records of Lee County, Florida (the "lis pendens"). See

Exhibit "B".For the following reasons, the lis pendens filed by the Associations with respect to

the Golf Course Property must be dissolved as a matter of law, or, alternatively, the Associations

must post a bond to maintain the efficacy of the lis pendens.

Legal Argument

14. As a matter of Florida law, this Court is required to control and discharge the lis

pendens because it is not founded on a duly recorded instrument or a lien claimed under Chapter

713, Florida Statutes. See Blue Star Palms, LLC v. LED Trust LLC, 128 So. 3d 36, 38-39 (Fla.

3d DCA 2012) (granting writ of certiorari and quashing trial court's order denying dissolution of

lis pendens that was based on unrecorded instrument). Section 48.23, Florida Statutes, provides,

in pertinent part:

(3) When the pending pleading does not show that the action isfounded on a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimedunder part I of chapter 713 or when the action no longeraffects the subject property, the court shall control anddischarge the recorded notice of lis pendens as the courtwould erant and dissolve iniunctions.

(emphasis added).

15. Here, no duly recorded instrument or lien underlies the Associations'is pendens.

As such, this Court is required to control and discharge the lis pendens in accordance with the

legal requirements for dissolving injunctions.

16, "A court must dissolve a lis pendens that is based on an unrecorded document

unless the proponent 'establish[esj a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable

ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the lawsuit,'" Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614

So, 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1993) (emphasis added). "In so doing, the proponent must show a good

faith, viable claim." See Conseco Servs., LLC v. Cuneo, 904 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)

(affirming order dissolving lis pendens where plaintiff had not shown a good faith viable

equitable lien claim that would call into question the legal or equitable ownership of the

homestead property),

17. "A complaint which will not support a claim against the specific property at issue

cannot provide a basis for tying it up by a filing of notice of lis pendens." Lake Placid Holding

Co. v. Paparone, 414 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). In the instant case, the Associations

fail to allege facts to state a cause of action for each of their claims and cannot, as a matter of

Florida law, support their declaratory relief claims against the Durpos concerning the Golf

Course Property.

18. To be entitled to declaratory relief under Florida law, a party must show: (1) there

is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the declaration; (2) the declaration deals with a

present, ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present controversy as to a state of facts; (3)

some immunity, power, privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon the facts or

the law applicable to the facts; (4) there is some person or persons who have, or reasonably may

have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter, either in fact or

law; (5) the antagonistic and adverse interests are all before the court by proper process or class

representation; and (6) the relief sought is not merely giving of legal advice by the courts or the

answer to questions propounded from curiosity. Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School

Funding, Inc, v, Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. 1996). As set forth below, the Associations

cannot meet this burden under Florida law.

A. The Associations do not have an Irrevocable License to use the Golf CoursePropertv for their Surface and Stormwater Drainage.

19. A license by definition is not an interest in real property and therefore, cannot

form the basis for a lis pendens. "A license is distinguished from an easement in that a license is

merely a personal right to use the property of another for a specific purpose, is not an interest in

the land and, therefore, may not be assigned or conveyed." Tatum v. Dance, 605 So. 2d 110, 112

(Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

20. Further, the Associations cannot establish their right to an irrevocable license as a

matter of law. "The law is well established in Florida that a license is generally revocable at the

pleasure of the licensor/grantor." Eeane v. President Condo. Ass'n, Inc., No. 3D13—746, 2014

WL 626710, at ~1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). "Florida has recognized a narrow exception to this

revocability rule when (i) permission is granted to use the property for a particular purpose, and

(ii) in the execution of that use the permittee has expended large sums or incurred heavy

obligations for its permanent improvement." Id. at *2 n.l. An irrevocable license "only arises

under certain very narrow circumstances and should be applied only to the extent required to

prevent inequity." Tatum, 605 So. 2d at 113.

21. The Associations have not pled and cannot meet this narrow exception to the

rule, There is no written document acknowledging the issuance of a license granted by the

owner of the Golf Course Property to the Associations. The Associations have not expended

large sums of money to improve the System, nor have they incurred any obligations for the

System. To the contrary, the Associations have historically either refused to pay (or attempted to

inequitably minimize their obligation to pay) for any maintenance, liability or operational

expenses associated with the System. Further, the Durpos purchased the Golf Course Property

without notice of any alleged license and are therefore not bound by any claims of a license that

purportedly existed prior to the Durpos'urchase. The Associations do not have irrevocable

licenses with respect to the System.

B. The Associations do not have an Exnress Easement to use the Golf CoursePronertv for their Surface and Stormwater Drainage.

22. No express easement exists to allow the Associations to use the System. An

express easement requires a showing that the parties intended to create an easement on a

sufficiently identifiable estate. Am. Quick Sign, Inc. v. ReinharCh, 899 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2005). If the language is clear, concise, and unambiguous in the documents creating an

easement, the court must give effect to the terms as stated without resort to other rules of

construction to ascertain their meaning. Id, However, where no such language exists, an express

easement cannot exist.

23. Further, an express easement must comply with specific legal requirements in

order to be deemed valid under the Statute of Frauds. See Fla. Stat. 689.01 (requiring any

conveyance of an interest in real property to be in writing and signed in the presence of two

subscribing witnesses by the party creating, making, granting, conveying, transferring or

releasing such interest). There is no agreement between the owner of the Golf Course Property

that is in writing, signed by the party granting the interest or properly witnessed. The

Associations have failed to reference or attach any such document to their counterclaim.

24. In fact, nothing within the four corners of the Associations'laim supports the

existence of an express easement to use the water management system, The Associations assert

that the Cost Share Agreement conveys and defines easement rights. However, a plain reading of

the Cost Share Agreement shows that it does not grant any easements to use the System.

Further, the Cost Share Agreement does not comply with the requirements of the Statute of

Frauds and therefore cannot give rise to an express easement.

25. The Cost Share Agreement is nothing more than an agreement between EBIA and

BBGC (not the Durpos) pertaining to the allocation of certain maintenance costs. Due to the

dilatory actions of EBIA and the Associations, the Cost Share Agreement was not recorded in the

Public Records of Lee County, Florida, and the Durpos purchased the Golf Course Property

without notice of its existence. Therefore, the Durpos are not bound by the Cost Share

Agreement even if an express easement in compliance with the Statute of Frauds was granted

within the agreement (which is not the case). As such, the Associations have failed to plead and

cannot state a cause of action supporting the existence of an express easement.

C. The Associations do not have an Implied Easement or an Easement bvNecessitv to use the Golf Course Pronertv for their Surface and StormwaterDrainage.

26. Nor do the Associations have a claim for an easement by implication or easement

by necessity. The Florida Supreme Court has only recognized an easement by implication in two

situations; (1) through ambiguity within a document of conveyance; and (2) from a factual

situation giving rise to the creation of a way of necessity as a matter of public policy. One

Harbour Fin. Ltd. Co, v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So. 2d 1039, 1044-45 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)

(citing Tortoise Island Cmtys., Inc. v. Moorings Ass'n, Inc., 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla, 1986)), An

easement by necessity is a form of an easement by implication. See id.

27, The Associations do not allege any ambiguity within a document of conveyance

to give rise to an implied easement. Rather, the Associations generally allege that the terms and

effect of the deeds into the Associations create easements by implication, which allow the

Associations to utilize the water management system and drain water onto the Golf Course

Property. The conveyances are attached to the Associations'ounterclaim as Composite

Exhibits A-Q. However, this general allegation is legally inadequate to form the basis for an

implied easement, See Tortoise Island Cmtys., 1nc. v, Moorings Ass'n, 1nc., 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla.

1986). A plain reading of these deeds shows that no language exists to give rise to an implied

easement. The deeds are completely silent on the issue. Notably, the Associations do not point

to any language in the conveyances to suggest the existence of an implied easement.

28. An easement by way of necessity is an easement to pass over property for the

purpose of ingress and egress to the dominant estate. See Fla. Stat, ) 704.01(1)(2013); Hancock

v. Tipton, 732 So. 2d 369, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("Ways of necessity, both implied under

common law and statutory, are governed by section 704,01, Florida Statutes[.]"). As such, an

easement by necessity is limited to the purpose of ingress and egress. Hewitt v. Menees, 100 So.

2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1958) ("The [way of necessity] statute does not become operative in the

absence of necessity to get to and from the hemmed in lands; this conclusion is inescapable from

both the express words and the plain intent and purpose of the statute."); 8'imberly v. Lake 8'eir

Yacht Club Ass'n, 480 So. 2d 224, 225 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (noting that a way of necessity is

limited to ingress and egress). The Associations'laim for an easement by necessity fails

because the alleged easement is not for access, but is to utilize a water management system.4

29. As such, the Associations, as a matter of law, cannot show that they are entitled to

declaratory relief based on an irrevocable license, express easement, easement by implication, or

easement by necessity.

30. Because the Associations'laims are without a basis for declaratory relief, a lis

pendens is not proper. See Burnette v. Black, 578 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) ("If a

Section 704.01(2), Florida Statutes does not apply to the instant action.Additionally, a party seeking to establish an easement implied by way of necessity as a matter of law must be

able to show an absolute necessity; a reasonable necessity that will contribute the convenient enjoyment ofproperty is insufficient. Tortoise Island Cmtys., Inc.,489 So. 2d at 22. The Associations cannot show that water

drainage rises to a level of "absolute necessity,"

10

complaint will not support a claim against the property described in the lis pendens, there is no

justification for tying up that property until the litigation is terminated."); Lake Placid Holding

Co. v. Paparone, 414 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) ("A complaint which will not support

a claim against the specific property at issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by filing a

notice of lis pendens.").

31. The lis pendens, therefore, acts as an unwarranted and unjustifiable cloud on the

Durpos'itle to the Golf Course Property. Accordingly, the lis pendens should be dissolved. See

Lake Placid Holding Co., 414 So. 2d at 566 (remanding for dissolution of lis pendens where

pleadings failed to allege a legally recognizable claim against the property).

D. The Associations Must Post Bond to Maintain the Lis Pendens

32, Even if this Court were to find the requisite nexus to permit the filing of the lis

pendens, the Court should require the Associations to post a bond to maintain the efficacy of the

lis pendens. A trial court is well within its discretion to require the proponent of a notice of lis

pendens to post a bond when the notice is not based on a duly recorded instrument and where

damage or injury will likely be suffered in the event the notice was unjustified. Med. Facilities

Dev., Inc. v. Little Arch Creek Props., Inc., 675 So. 2d 915, 917 (Fla. 1996).

33. Florida courts have held that a court should require a lis pendens proponent to

post a bond to maintain a lis pendens not founded upon a duly recorded instrument. See Suarez

v. KMD Constr., Inc., 965 So. 2d 184, 188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (reversing trial court's order for

failure to dissolve lis pendens or require bond for lis pendens not founded upon a duly recorded

instrument); Porter Homes, Inc. v. Soda, 540 So. 2d 195, 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (granting

petition to quash and remanding for trial court to require posting of bond for lis pendens not

founded upon a duly recorded instrument),

11

34. At least one jurist has opined that a bond requirement for lis pendens should be

mandatory as a necessary counter-balance to the draconian, and sometimes abusive, effect these

instruments can have on title to property. See Judge David M. Gersten, The Doctrine of Lis

Pendens; The Need for a Balance, 59 FLA. B. J. 83 (June 1995).

35. Here, the Associations should be required to post bond for a lis pendens that will;

(i) cloud the title of the Golf Course Property; (ii) prevent the Durpos from selling or dealing

with the Property; and (iii) result in monetary and non-monetary damages to the Durpos. See

Suarez, 965 So. 2d at 188 ("[T]he imposition of a lis pendens functions as 'a harsh and

oppressive remedy'hat 'operates as a cloud on the title and prevents an owner from selling or

dealing with it.'"); Hotel Europe, Inc. v. Aouate, 766 So, 2d 1149, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)

(requiring bond for lis pendens not founded upon a duly recorded instrument because the lis

pendens caused potential loss and damage by preventing property to be sold).

36. "The amount of the bond should bear a reasonable relationship to the amount of

damages which the property-holder defendant demonstrates will likely result if it is later

determined that the notice of lis pendens was unjustified." Med, Facilities Dev., Inc., 675 So. 2d

at n,2. In addition to monetary and non-monetary damages, the bond should includeattorneys'ees

and costs that the Durpos have incurred and will incur in obtaining a discharge of the notice

of lis pendens. See Suarez, 965 So. 2d at 188 (noting that the court may include monetary and

nonmonetary damages and attorneys'ees and costs in determining the amount of the bond), In

setting a bond, the court may also consider the likelihood that the Durpos will ultimately prevail

at trial. See Longshore Lakes Joint Venture v. Mundy, 616 So. 2d 1047, 1047 (Fla. 2d DCA

1993) (noting that court may consider chances that adverse party will overturn injunction in

setting bond).

12

37. In the event that the Court permits the lis pendens to stand, the Durpos request an

evidentiary hearing for the court to determine the amount of the bond. "Issues concerning the

propriety of a bond and the bond amount should be determined at an evidentiary hearing."

Suarez, 965 So. 2d at 188-89 (remanding for trial court to hold evidentiary hearing regarding

bond for lis pendens not founded on duly recorded instrument); see also Betsy Ross Hotel, Inc, v.

A.G. Gladstone Assocs,, Inc., 833 So. 2d 211, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (reversing trial court's

order denying bond hearing for lis pendens not founded on a duly recorded instrument),

WHEREFORE, Durpos respectfully request the Court to enter an Order dissolving the

lis pendens, or, alternatively, requiring the Associations to post a bond to maintain the efficacy of

the lis pendens, and awarding attorneys'ees and costs incurred in seeking to discharge the lis

pendens, and for such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: July f4, 2014.

T s'o M. Carre+, Jr., Esq., FBN: 0090816tcarrei a@shutts.cornSHUTTS 4 BOWEN, LLP4301 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 300Tampa, FL 33607(813) 229-8900Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this f 4. day og JsI, 2014, a true and accurate

(Jcopy of the above and foregoing has been furnished by electronic mail to the individuals who

have registered with the Court's electronic filing system with respect to the above-captioned

action.

John J. Fumero, Esq.Jed R. Schneck, Esq.Nason Yeager Gerson White & Lioce, P.A.7700 Congress Ave., Suite 2201Boca Raton, FL 33487ifumero@nasonveager.corni schneck@nasonveager.cornmwashinpton@nasonveager.cornsi anowitz@nasonveager. corn

R. Gregory Hyden, Esq,Nason Yeager Gerson White & Lioce, P.A.1645 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., Suite 1200West Palm Beach, FL 33401ghvdennasonveager. corn

Waterside Manatee Bay Holdings, LLC Waterside Manatee Bay Holdings, LLC

David C. Potter, Esq.Thomas G. Coleman, Esq.Fowler White Boggs, P.A.P.O. Box 1567Fort Myers, FL 33902david.potterQa,fowlerwhite,corn;cvnthia.hanrahan(Rfowlerwhite.corn

Michael J. Ciccarone, Esq.Corporate HeadquartersSuite 21313180 North Cleveland Ave,North Fort Myers, FL 33903Michael. ciccaronefllandlaw.corn

Bella Lago Condominium at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc,, Casa MarinaAssociation, Inc., Casa Marina II Condominium

Association, Inc., Valencia Villas at Bay BeachAssociation, Inc., Waterside I at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc., Waterside II atBay Beach Condominium Association, Inc.,Waterside III at Bay Beach Condominium

Association, Inc., Waterside IV at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc,, Waterside V atBay Beach Condominium Association, Inc.,Estero Bay Improvement Association, Inc.,Bayside Master Association, Inc., and Waterside

Dock Association, Inc.

Bella Lago Condominium at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc., Casa MarinaAssociation, Inc., Casa Marina II Condominium

Association, Inc., Valencia Villas at Bay BeachAssociation, Inc., Waterside I at Bay BeachCondomint'um Association, Inc., Waterside IIatBay Beach Condominium Association, Inc.,Waterside III at Bay Beach Condominium

Association, Inc,, Waterside IV at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc., Waterside V atBay Beach Condominium Association, Inc. andEstero Bay Improvement Association, Inc.,Bayside Master Association, Inc., andWaterside Dock Association, Inc.

14

David Chaiet, Esq.Michele A. Crosa, Esq,Eisinger, Brown, Lewis, Frankel 4 Chaiet, P.A.4000 Hollywood Boulevard, Suite 265 SouthHollywood, FL 33021dchaiet@eisinqerlaw.cornmcrosa@eisingerlaw. cornri acobsen@eisingerlaw. corn

Ron M. Campbell, Esq.Lindsay Lee, Esq.Cole, Scott 2 Kissane, P.A.27300 Riverview Center BoulevardSuite 200Bonita Springs, FL 34134,ron.camnbe11(@csklegal.cornLindsav. lee@&,csklepal.cornAngela.hernandez@csklegal.corn

Casa Marina III Condominium Association,Inc., Manatee Bay at Bay Beach Condominium

Association, Inc. Royal Pelican Association,Inc., Sunset Gulf Condominium Association,Inc., Valencia Villas at Bay Beach Association,Inc., Waterside I at Bay Beach CondominiumAssociation, Inc. and Waterside IIat Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc.

Casa Marina III Condominium Association,Inc., Harbor Pointe Condominium Association,Inc., Hibiscus Pointe CondominiumAssociation, Inc., Manatee Bay at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc., Royal PelicanAssociation, Inc., Sunset Gulf CondominiumAssociation, Inc., The Palms ofBay BeachCondominium Association, Inc., Waterside IIIat Bay Beach Condominium Association, Inc.,Waterside IV at Bay Beach Condominium

Association, Inc.

D. Spencer Mallard, EsqNicholas P. Conto, Esq.Lydecker Diaz1221 Brickell Avenue, 19'" FloorMiami, Florida 33131sm@lvdeckerdiaz.cornnconto(klvdeckerdiaz.corn

Steven G. Koeppel, Esq.Greg Bevillard, Esq.Yeslow & Koeppel, P.A.P.O. Box 9226Fort Myers, FL 33902steve@vklegal.cornkris@vklegal. corn

Casa Marina II Condominium Association The Palms ofBay Beach CondominiumAssociation, Inc.

Jennifer A. Nichols, Esq.Ashley D. Lupo, Esq,Roetzel 4, Andress, L.P.A,850 Park Shore Drive, 3rd FloorNaples, FL 34103inichols(a3ralaw.cornserve. i nicho1sQralaw.cornaluno Qralaw. cornserve.alupoAq,ralaw. corn

Timothy J. Murty, Esq.Murty A Monk, P.A,1633Periwinkle Way, Suite ASanibel Island, FL 33957-4404timmurtvAa,islandattv.corn

Bella Lago Condominium at Bay BeachCondominium Association, Inc. and WatersideIII at Bay Beach Condominium Association, Inc,

Clark L. Durpo,and Clark L. Durpo, Jr.

15

Herbert O. Brock, Jr,, Esq.Thomas J, Code, Esq.Sara Spector, Esq.Becker k Poliakoff, P.A.12140 Carissa Commerce Court, Suite 200Fort Myers, FL 33912hbrock@bple mal. corntcode@bvlepal,cornsspector@bplepal,cornFTM-CNST-ServiceMail@bplegal.corn

Joseph W. Beasley, Esq.Stephanie Demos, Esq.Jennifer Perez Alonso, Esq.Beasley 2 Demos, LLC2950 S.W. 27th Avenue, Suite 100Miami, FL 33133ibeaslev@beaslevdemos.cornimanlev(beaslevdemos.cornialonso@beaslevdemos,cornsdemosI@beaslevdemos.corn

Royal Pelican Association, Inc., Hibiscus PointeCondominium Association, Inc., Harbor PointeCondominium Association, Inc. and Sunset GulfCondominium Association, Inc

ClarkL. Durpo and ClarkL. Durpo, Jr.

T.i.rs'o M, Carreja, Jr., Esq., FBN: 0090816tcarreI a@shutts,cornSHUTTS 2 BOWEN, LLP4301 W. Boy Scout Blvd., Suite 300Tampa, FL 33607(813) 229-8900Co-counsel for Defendants

16