バンコク都市圏軽・中量交通システム整備に係る調査 · 2007. 9. 26. · 送力が小さく、バンコクに brtを導入する効果は疑問視されている。

日本自転車振興会補助事業

平成 1７年度民活インフラ事業発掘形成調査支援事業

バンコク都市圏

軽・中量交通システム整備に係る調査

調査報告書

（和文要約）

平成 18 年 2月

社団法人海外コンサルティング企業協会日本工営株式会社

この事業は、競輪の補助金を受けて実施したものです。

目次

1. 序文

1.1 背景 1-1

1.2 目的と範囲 1-1

1.3 調査団 1-2

1.4 調査日程 1-2

1.5 タイ側担当機関との討議内容 1-2

2. 既存スタディと進行中のプロジェクトの見直し

2.1 バンコク大量交通マスタープランの起源 2-1

2.2 バンコク大量交通マスタープラン(1994 年) 2-1

2.3 バンコク大量交通マスタープランの変更 2-2

2.4 バンコク副都心庁副都心計画 2-2

2.5 バンコク首都圏庁の都市交通プロジェクト 2-3

3. 軽量、中量、重量交通システムの比較

3.1 システムの種類と技術的特徴 3-1

3.2 輸送力及び最適路線延長 3-3

3.3 プロジェクトコスト – 土木、車両、制御システム 3-4

3.4 運行・維持管理費 – 電力消費、労務費（運転手、駅員）、 3-5

メンテナンス費（軌道、駅、車両、制御システム）

3.5 システム選定基準 3-6

4. バンコク中量交通システムの評価

4.1 路線選定 4-1

4.2 路線選定のための需要予測 4-2

4.3 路線ごとのシステム選定

4.3.1 システム選定の考え方 4-3

4.3.2 最終選定のための要因検討 4-3

4.3.3 システム最終選定 4-12

4.4 施工及びスケジュール

4.4.1 モノレール施工時の特徴 4-12

4.4.2 モノレールの施工手順 4-13

4.4.3 モノレール開業までのスケジュール 4-14

4.5 経済評価

4.5.1 プロジェクトコストの試算（資本コスト及び O&M コスト） 4-14

4.5.2 経済便益の算定 4-24

4.5.3 経済便益の分析 4-25

4.6 料金設定 4-30

4.7 資金調達

4.7.1 料金収入 4-30

4.7.2 税収からの支出 4-30

4.7.3 大量交通整備計画 4-30

4.7.4 信託投資 4-31

4.7.5 国庫借入金 4-31

4.8 経営 4-31

5. 結論と提案

5.1 オレンジライン 5-1

5.2 イエローライン 5-1

Appendix

A: オレンジライン、イエローライン完成予想図

B: オレンジライン計画路線現状写真

C: イエローライン計画路線現状写真

図表リスト表 3.1 都市交通システムの特徴 3-2

表 3.2 システム輸送力の比較 3-3

表 3.3 検討対象システムにおける路線延長の分布 3-4

表 3.4 建設概算コスト 3-4

表 3.5 システム別運営費原単位比較（バスを除く） 3-5

表 3.6 一次選定結果 3-7

表 4.1 オレンジライン、イエローライン需要予測 4-2

表 4.2 利用客数予測(人) 4-3

表 4.3 最大路線容量 4-3

表 4.4 資本コスト比較 4-7

表 4.5 O&Mコスト比較 4-7

表 4.6 EIRR 比較 4-8

表 4.7 モノレール開業までの概略スケジュール 4-14

表 4.8 オレンジライン：MRT の場合のプロジェクトコスト 4-17

表 4.9 オレンジライン：モノレールの場合のプロジェクトコスト 4-18

表 4.10 イエローライン：MRT の場合のプロジェクトコスト 4-19

表 4.11 イエローライン：モノレールの場合のプロジェクトコスト 4-20

表 4.12 オレンジライン：モノレールの O&M コスト 4-22

表 4.13 イエローライン：モノレールの O&M コスト 4-23

表 4.14 オレンジライン、イエローライン経済便益の算定 4-24

表 4.15 オレンジライン：経済評価（MRT のケース） 4-26

表 4.16 オレンジライン：経済評価（モノレールのケース） 4-27

表 4.17 イエローライン：経済評価（MRT のケース） 4-28

表 4.18 イエローライン：経済評価（モノレールのケース） 4-29

図 2.1 1994 年のマスタープランによる路線図 2-2

図 2.2 BRT 路線図 2-3

図 3.1 都市交通システムの適用範囲 3-1

図 4.1 都市鉄道ネットワーク 4-1

図 4.2 オレンジライン、イエローライン路線図 4-4

図 4.3 オレンジライン概略平面図 4-5

図 4.4 イエローライン概略平面図 4-6

図 4.5 MRT とモノレールの構造物の差異 4-9

図 4.6 緊急時の避難方法（日本の例） 4-10

図 4.7 避難用通路を設けた例（ラスベガスモノレール） 4-11

図 4.8 モノレール施工手順 4-13

略語

AGT 案内軌条式鉄道（Automated Guideway Transit）

BCR 費用便益比率（Benefit/Cost Ratio）

BMA バンコク首都圏庁（Bangkok Metropolitan Administration）

BRT バス高速輸送システム（Bus Rapid Transit）

EIRR 経済的内部収益率（Economic Internal Rate of Return）

ENPV 経済的純現在価値（Economic Net Present Value）

JBIC 国際協力銀行（Japan Bank for International Cooperation）

LRT 軽快電車（Light Rail Transit）

MRT 大量高速交通（Mass Rapid Transit）

MRTA 地下鉄公社（Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand）

MTDF 大量交通整備計画（Mass Transit Development Fund）

MTMP 大量交通マスタープラン（Mass Transit Master Plan）

OCMLT 陸上輸送管理委員会（Office of the Commission for Management of Land

Transport）

ODA 政府開発援助（Official Development Assistance）

OTP 運輸省交通政策局（Office of Transportation and Traffic Policy and

Planning, Ministry of Transportation）

PHPDT Peak Hour Peak Direction Trips

SPURT 第 7 次都市・地方輸送計画（The Seventh Plan Urban and Regional

Transport Study）

SRT タイ国鉄（The State Railway of Thailand）

THB タイバーツ（Thai Baht）

URMAP 大量都市鉄道輸送マスタープラン（ Mass Transit Urban Rail

Transportation Master Plan in Bangkok and Surround Area）

参考文献

都市交通研究会. 1997 年. 新しい都市交通システム, 山海堂

佐藤信之. 2004 年. モノレールと新交通システムグランプリ出版

PCI. 2000. URMAP Mass Transit Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan (BMA and

Surrounding Areas) Interim Report Vol. 1, Report prepared for Office of the Commission for the

Management of Land Traffic (OCMLT), Pacific Consultants International in association with

Japan Railway Technical Service, Asian Engineering Consultants Corp., Ltd., TESCO Ltd., and

Transconsult CO., Ltd, July 2000

Team Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd. 2004. Bangkok Mass Transit

Implementation Plan (1 stage) Final Report, Report prepared for Office of Transport and Traffic

Policy and Planning, May 2004

1-1

1. 序文

1.1 背景

1994 年に作成された大量交通マスタープラン(Mass Transit Master Plan: MTMP) は、

2001 年に大量都市鉄道輸送マスタープラン (Mass Transit Urban Rail Transportation

Master Plan in Bangkok and Surround Area: URMAP)によって見直された。実施について

は、 2004 年にバンコク大量輸送実施計画第一ステージ(Bangkok Mass Transit

Implementation Plan 1st Stage)の中で策定された。

上記計画は、次の３つに分類できる。１）BTS による高架 MRT のスカイトレイン、２）地下鉄

公社(MRTA)による地下鉄、及び３）タイ国鉄による通勤列車（レッドライン）。2009 年までに

上記 3 つの総計で291km を建設する計画である。（スカイトレインは2 路線 23km、地下鉄

は 1 路線 20.8km が完了している。）

地価高騰の沈静化、渋滞解消、効率的な首都機能の構築のため、バンコク首都圏庁

(Bangkok Metropolitan Administration: BMA)は、過剰に集中した首都機能を郊外の副都

心に移す計画を策定している。副都心はバンコク中心から20～30km の範囲に7 箇所計画

されており、大量（中量）輸送システムもしくは幹線道路でバンコク中心部と結ばれる。

バンコク副都心計画はまだ計画段階であり、具体的な実施方針などはない。副都市圏計

画の１つとして、バンコクの東約25km に位置するLat Krabangがある。面積は2,000ha で、

20 万人の人口が見込まれている。しかし、この数字は副都心計画の対象地域に限ったも

のであり、周辺地域の開発を考慮すると、人口は 40～50 万人になると見込まれている。

1.2 目的と範囲

鉄道ベースの上記計画は、大量輸送システム、あるいは重軌条システムに分類できる。こ

こで、全長291km の重軌条ネットワークの必要性を見直す価値はある。

BMA は、専用レーンを使ったバス高速輸送システム(Bus Rapid Transit: BRT)をMRT がカ

バーしていない地域で導入することを計画している。しかし、BRT は導入空間に比して輸

送力が小さく、バンコクに BRT を導入する効果は疑問視されている。

本調査の目的は、MRTとBRT の中間程度輸送力を持つ中量輸送システムを紹介し、その

バンコクへの導入可能性について検討することである。中量輸送システムは、日本の諸都

市で既に導入されている。例えば、モノレール、案内軌条式鉄道(AGT)、LRT などがこれ

にあたる。

現状の大量輸送計画は、バンコク中心部での運行、あるいは中心部と副都心を結ぶ運行

を念頭においているが、各副都心の人口は 40～50 万人とされているので、フィーダーサ

ービスを提供する中量輸送システムの検討が必要である。

1-2

1.3 調査団

役割名前(担当)/会社名

団長奥津明男(鉄道計画)/日本工営株式会社

団員高田知幸(鉄道建設)/株式会社トーニチコンサルタント

団員増沢達也(輸送計画)/日本工営株式会社

団員ピーターホジキンソン(交通経済)/日本工営株式会社

現地支援ピニットセト/日本工営株式会社

1.4 調査日程

日付件名行動

8 月 21 日ﾊﾞﾝｺｸへ移動奥津、高田、増沢

8 月 22 日午前ｷｯｸｵﾌﾐｰﾃｨﾝｸﾞ日本工営ﾊﾞﾝｺｸ事務所

(奥津、高田、増沢、ﾎｼﾞｷﾝｿﾝ、ﾋﾟﾆｯﾄ )

8 月 22 日午後 JBIC ﾊﾞﾝｺｸ事務所宮尾様、合田様

8 月 23 日午前ﾊﾞﾝｺｸ首都圏庁(BMA) Mr. Chitchanok

(Director General, Dept. of Traffic & Transportation)

8 月 23 日午後地下鉄公社(MRTA) Dr. Rithika Suprat (Director of Planning Division)

Mr. Chaisat Gururatana (Director of Technical Dept.)

8 月 24 日午前 TEAM Consultant 社 Mr. Amnat Prommasutra (Senior Executive Director)

Mr. Kittpol Bunninm (Executive Director)

Dr. Boonchai Sangpetngam

8 月 24 日午後在ﾀｲ日本国大使館奥田二等書記官

8 月 25 日現場踏査 Yellow / Pink Lines

8 月 26 日現場踏査 Orange Line

8 月 27 日現場踏査 Blue Line (Bangkae ? Bangkok Yai section)

増沢帰国

8 月 28 日現場踏査 Yellow Line

8 月 29 日現場踏査 Orange Line

8 月 30 日運輸省交通政策局(OTP) Dr. Kumropluk Suraswadi

8 月 31 日帰国奥津、高田

1.5 タイ側担当機関との討議内容

(1) バンコク首都圏庁(Bangkok Metropolitan Administration: BMA)

Mr. Chitchanok (Director General, Department of Traffic and Transportation) より、BMA

による BRT への取組みについての説明があった。BMA としては、初の BRT の運行を

North Bangkok Area の Mo Chit～Lad Phrao～Bangkhen 間で計画している。同氏は、コロ

ンビアのボゴタ市での BRT の成功を強調した。

1-3

調査団から同氏に、ジャカルタの BRT の現状について説明した。ジャカルタの BRT は、鉄

道ベースの MRT が整備されるまでの暫定的な渋滞解決策であり、道路事情や市内走行

車両数の違いのため、ボゴタ市のレベルでは機能していない。

(2) 地下鉄公社(Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand: MRTA)

調査団は、日本で運行中の東京モノレール、多摩モノレール、金沢シーサイドラインを例

に、中量交通システムのプレゼンテーションを実施し、バンコクに導入することの優位性に

ついて説明した。

MRTA は、将来のイエローラインとピンクラインに中量交通システムを導入することを念頭

に置いた調査団の説明に、大きな関心を示した。また、MRTA は緊急の課題としてブルー

ラインの運営・維持費が予想以上に高いことを説明し、日本の中量交通システムの O&M

費用について調査団に質問した。

これに対し、調査団は O&M 費用に関する一般情報を説明した。また、重軌条で概念設計

がなされているオレンジラインに中量交通システムを導入する可能性について質問したが、

MTRA からは、政策とOTP の方針変更が必要となるため、現段階での中量交通への変更

は困難との説明を受けた。しかし、明確な根拠が示されれば、変更の可能性もあるとのこと

であった。

2-1

2. 既存スタディと進行中のプロジェクトの見直し

2.1 バンコク大量交通マスタープランの起源

バンコク都市部における大量交通システムの整備に向けた戦略的な計画は、1970 年から

の長い歴史がある。1990 年には、第 7 次都市・地方輸送計画(the Seventh Plan Urban and

Regional Transport Study: SPURT)が策定された。この計画は、バンコクへの大量交通シス

テムの導入と車両規制の強化を含む交通戦略計画であったという点で注目に値する。現

在でも、大量交通システムと車両規制が渋滞解消の実質的な解決策であると広く受け入

れられている。

このSPURT 以降、将来の成長を見越した都市鉄道整備は、グリーンラインとレッドライン建

設計画の閣議承認以外、ほとんど実施されなかった。グリーンラインはバンコク首都圏庁

(BMA)の支援のもと2000 年の完成を目指して着工されたが、タイ国鉄(SRT)の支援による

レッドラインは、1997/98 年のアジア通貨危機の直前に中断された。具体的な動きが少なか

ったとはいえ、SPURTは、1992年の地下鉄公社(MRTA)と、運輸省交通政策局(OTP)の前

身である陸上輸送管理委員会(Office of Commission for Management of Land Transport:

OCMLT)の設立を正当化した点で重要である。なぜならば、これら機関によって、大バンコ

ク圏の大量交通システムの整備・運営の調整と都市交通政策の企画・立案の協調が可能

になったからである。

2.2 バンコク大量交通マスタープラン(1994 年)

過去に実施されたバンコクの交通に関する調査・計画の中で注目に値するのは、1994 年

に閣議承認されたバンコク大量交通マスタープランである。このマスタープランは、バンコ

ク首都圏で大量交通の整備と実現に向けての総合的な枠組みを決めた最初の試みであ

った。

このマスタープランで計画された路線は、レッド、グリーン、ブルー、オレンジ、パープルの

5 路線あり、総延長は 238km であった。そのうちの103km はレッド、グリーン、ブルーライン

の基幹部分の建設で、残りの 135km は、その3 路線の延伸とオレンジ、パープルラインの

新設からなっていた。

延伸部分の大半は、既存道路の中央分離帯を利用した高架方式で計画されていたが、オ

レンジラインの重要区間は地下方式で計画されていた。また実施スケジュールは 2 段階と

し、第一期は 1995 年～2001 年、第二期は 2001 年～2011 年としていた。図 2.1 に路線図

を示す。

2-2

図 2.1 1994 年のマスタープランによる路線図

2.3 バンコク大量交通マスタープランの変更

2002 年には、運輸省交通政策局(Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning:

OTP)が、都市鉄道輸送マスタープラン(Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan: URMAP)を

策定し、バンコク及びその近郊地域における基本的な鉄道大量輸送システムを定めた。こ

の URMAP 及び URMAP に関するコメントをもとに、地下鉄公社(MRTA)は下記の提案を

行った。

• ブルーラインのHua Lampong~Thaphra 間（地下 6.5km）、Thaphra~Bangkae（高架

7.6km）、Bangsue~Pharanagklao 橋間（11.6km）及び Bangsue~Thapra 間(13.1km)を

延伸し、環状線とする。

• Bangkapi~Wangburapa~Mahaisawan間地下 29km とMahaisawan~Rajburana 間高架

5km からなる、オレンジライン 34km を新線建設する。

2.4 バンコク首都圏庁副都心計画

バンコク首都圏庁の管轄区域の人口は 740 万人あまりとされている。ここから首都圏への

人口集中が進行していることが分かる。個人の都市化と無計画な土地開発、そしてそれに

続くインフラ整備がバンコク首都圏を肥大化させた。都市化は民間主導で進められたが、

これが慢性的な渋滞の原因である貧弱な道路網の原因となっている。

都市中央部の再開発と郊外の開発による都市構造の再編成は、バンコク首都圏庁管轄区

域の秩序ある成長に向けての緊急の課題である。ラットクラバン(Lat Krabang)の副都心開

2-3

発が、BMA 管轄区域での複数の中心を持った都市構造を指向したモデルケースになるこ

とを期待されている。

鉄道と道路網の密接な連携があって初めて、副都心へのアクセスが確保される。バンコク

中心部から新空港までの通勤線（レッドライン）上の新駅は、副都心の道路網と連携されな

ければならない。都市計画セクター（BMA、DPT）と交通セクター（OTP、SRT）に関連する

省庁が、副都心計画の中の交通計画を議論すべきである。

2.5 バンコク首都圏庁の都市交通プロジェクト

バンコク首都圏庁はバス高速輸送システム(Bus Rapid Transit: BRT)の導入を計画してい

る。計画中の2 路線の概要は以下の通り。

• 北線：Nawamin – Kaset – Mochit（19.4km、停留所 18 箇所）

• 南線：Chong Nontri – Chong Nonchi – Kurung Thep 橋（15.5km、停留所 15 箇所）

このシステムの輸送力は、3 分間隔の運行で 3,000~3,500passnger/direction/hr と見込まれ

ている。しかし、計画ルート上には渋滞の激しい区間が複数箇所あり、上記輸送力が現実

的なものか疑問がある。

図 2.2 の破線部分がBRT ネットワークの計画ルートである。

図 2.2 BRT 路線図

3-1

3. 軽量、中量、重量交通システムの比較

3.1 システムの種類と技術的特徴

(1) 本調査で検討するシステム

本調査では、下記システムの特徴について比較を行う。

a) MRT(地下)

b) MRT(高架)

c) LRT(地上)

d) モノレール(跨座式)

e) モノレール(懸垂式)

f) AGT

g) バス(高架専用軌道)

h) バス(専用レーン)

(2) 都市輸送システムの特徴

上で示した各システムの輸送力と表定速度の関係は図 3.1 に示す通りである。それぞれの

システムが適用範囲を持っており、その範囲をはずれることは、非効率や導入効果の減殺

を意味する。また各システムの特徴をまとめると、表 3.1 の通りとなる。

図 3.1 都市交通システムの適用範囲

Scheduled SpeedScheduled Speed

Km/hKm/hUrban Railway

Tramcar

Bus

AGT

Monorail

Transit Capacity in thousand persons per hour per direction



Tramcar

Bus

AGT

Monorail


3-2

表 3.1 都市交通システムの特徴

3-3

3.2 輸送力及び最適路線延長

(1) 各システムの輸送力

対象システムの最大輸送力は下表の通りである。

表 3.2 システム輸送力の比較

システム最大輸送力

(PHPDT) *1

算定方法

(A x B x C x 60/D) *2

a) MRT(地下) 20,250 ? 67,500 (3 to 10) x 150 x 150% x 60/2

= 20, 250 to 67,500

b) MRT(高架) 同上同上

c) LRT 10,800 2 x 120 x 150% x 60/2 = 10.800

d) モノレール(跨座式) 27,000 6 x 100 x 150% x 60/2 = 27,000

e) モノレール(懸垂式) 18,000 4 x 100 x 150% x 60/2 = 18,000

f) AGT 10,800 ? 21,600 (3 to 6) x 80 x 150% x 60/2

= 10,800 to 21,600

g) バス(高架) 2,700 1 x 75 x 120% x 60/2 = 2,700

h) バス(専用レーン) 同上同上

Note *1 PHPDT: ピーク時間ピーク方向交通量

*2 A: 編成両数, B: 車両定員(人/両), C: ピーク時混雑率, D: 運行間隔(分)

(2) 各システムの最適路線延長

最適路線延長を分析するに当たっては、以下の点に留意する必要がある。

a) 乗客の増加によって、最混雑区間において輸送力不足とならないこと

b) 交通渋滞等の影響で定時性が損なわれ、その結果ダイヤの大幅な乱れが生じないこと

都市中心部から、もしくは都心に向かう放射状路線の場合には、システムの輸送力が小さ

く、路線延長が長い場合、上記 a)の通り、都心部の最混雑区間で輸送力が不足する可能

性がある。このため、輸送力の小さいシステムは、放射状路線の場合、最適路線延長が制

限される可能性がある。一方、環状路線の場合は、最適路線延長の制限はない。また、平

面走行の場合は、専用レーンがあったとしても、運行では交通渋滞の影響を受けるので、

具体的に何 km が最適路線延長であるかとの判断は困難である。

表 3.3 は日本におけるMRT、モノレール、AGT の路線延長の分布を示したものである。こ

の表より輸送力の大きさに応じて路線延長が長くなっていることが分かる。

3-4

表 3.3 検討対象システムにおける路線延長の分布(LRT、バスを除く)

システム最大路線延長

(km)

最小路線延長

(km)

平均路線延長

(km)

a), b) MRT (地下/高架) (実質的に路線延長の制限はない)

d), e) モノレール *1

(跨座式/懸垂式)

23.8

(大阪)

6.6

(湘南)

14.4

f) AGT *2 12.6

(大宮)

4.1

(山万)

9.3

Note

:*1 東京、多摩、千葉、湘南、大阪、北九州、沖縄の7 社

:*2 埼玉、山万、ゆりかもめ、横浜、桃花台、大阪、神戸(2 路線)、広島の8 社(9 路線)

なお、モノレール、AGT とも複数の路線で延伸計画がある。

3.3 プロジェクトコスト – 土木、車両、制御システム

表 3.4 は、検討対象システムの概算建設コストを整理したものである。本調査では、中程度

の輸送量を想定しているが、輸送力を適正化するなかでコストを最小に抑えることが重要と

いえる。

表 3.4 建設概算コスト

項目

システム

コスト

(百万 US$) 概略評価

a) MRT(地下) 180-240 最大

b) MRT(高架) 80-120 大～中

c) LRT 15-25 小

d) モノレール(跨座式) 60-100 大～中

e) モノレール(懸垂式) 80-120 大～中

f) AGT 60-90 中

g) バス(高架) 40 中～小

h) バス(専用レーン) 2-5 最小

Note

本表は内外の実績に基づき概略的に設定したものであり、詳細な積算等

に基づくものではない。

土木、建築、電気、車両等全ての工種を含む合計値。

3-5

3.4 運行・維持管理費 – 電力消費、労務費（運転手、駅員）、メンテナンス費（軌道、

駅、車両、制御システム）

表 3.5 は、検討対象システム（バスを除く）の日本における運営費原単位の実績を整理した

ものである。原単位は下記３点に関して整理した。

• 営業キロ当たり

• 車両キロ当たり

• 輸送人キロ当たり

上記 3 点それぞれで、原単位の大きい順に並べると以下の通りになる。（「>>」は大きな差

があることを示す。)

• 営業キロ当たり：地下鉄 >> 高架鉄道 > 跨座式モノレール > AGT > 懸垂式モノ

レール > LRT

• 車両キロ当たり：地下鉄 > 懸垂式モノレール > 跨座式モノレール > 高架鉄道 >

LRT > AGT

• 輸送人キロ当たり：懸垂式モノレール > AGT > LRT > 跨座式モノレール > 地下鉄

> 高架鉄道

営業キロ当たりでは、輸送力の大きいシステムほど固定費が大きくなっていることが分かる。

特に地下鉄の運営コストは群を抜いて大きい。

車両キロ当たり、輸送人キロ当たりでは、作業量や利用状況が反映されているため、並び

順だけでは判断できないものの、輸送人キロ当たりで見た場合に地下鉄や高架鉄道の順

位が低いことから見て、輸送状況に見合った効率化がなされていると想定される。

表 3.5 システム別運営費原単位比較（バスを除く） a) MRT(地下)

b) MRT(高架)

c) LRTd) Monorail

(跨座式)e) Monorail

(懸垂式)f) AGT

要員数 48.3 18.8 17.2 13.3 13.3 11.8人件費 612,503 200,749 110,590 100,684 92,763 84,547

経費 439,814 177,285 35,362 128,251 55,046 97,522合計 1,052,317 378,034 145,952 228,935 147,809 182,069要員数 0.0347 0.0211 0.0467 0.0536 0.0603 0.0231

人件費 440.2 224.4 300.4 257.9 414.5 152.5経費 316.1 198.2 96.1 294.1 259.7 161.2

合計 756.3 422.6 396.5 552.0 674.2 313.7

消費電力量 2.045 2.443 1.625 2.587 3.251 1.652要員数 0.000541 0.000362 0.002893 0.001888 0.002799 0.002545

人件費 6.86 3.86 18.62 8.97 19.43 15.86経費 4.93 3.41 5.96 10.14 11.81 14.80合計 11.79 7.27 24.58 19.11 31.24 30.66

Note:1. 平成15年度鉄道統計年報実績2. 地下鉄：営団(現東京メトロ）、高架鉄道：首都圏大手8社平均、LRT：広電、跨座式モノレール：羽田、多摩、大阪、北九州、沖縄平均　懸垂式モノレール：千葉、湘南平均、AGT：ゆりかもめ、横浜、桃花台、神戸新交通、広島平均3. 参考：乗合バス車両キロ当たり原単位（平成16年度国土交通省資料）　人件費：275.9円/km、経費：157.1円/km、合計：433.0円/km

項目/システム

営業キロ当たり原単位

車両キロ当たり原単位

輸送人キロ当たり原単位

3-6

3.5 システム選定基準

(1) 評価基準

システム選定基準を重要度の順に並べると、以下の通りとなる。

a) 想定輸送量と輸送力のバランス

• 導入を想定する路線の輸送量に対し、輸送力が不足、過剰となっていないか。

b) 建設・運営コスト

• 適正な輸送力を供給できるシステムの中で最小か

c) 安全性・信頼性

• 災害や異常時における安全性は問題ないか

• 定時性の信頼性は高いか

• 十分な導入実績があるか

d) 利便性

• 利用者の利便性（運行間隔、駅へのアクセス）はどうか

• 既存システムとの接続利便性（直通運転の可能性等）はどうか

e) 施工性

• 導入空間の大きさは適切か

• ルート選定の自由度はどうか

• 施行時に現地の資材や労働力を十分活用できるか

f) 環境への影響

• 大気汚染、騒音、振動、日照、景観

g) 他の交通への影響

• 施工時や完成時に、他の交通に及ぼす影響はどうか

(2) 一次選定

4.1 及び 4.2 にて詳述するが、本調査では導入ルートとしてオレンジラインとイエローライン

を選定した。両線のピーク時最大断面輸送量は以下の通りである。

• オレンジライン：27,000 人/時・一方向（2021 年）

• イエローライン：22,000 人/時・一方向（2021 年）

全 8 システムの一次選定結果は表 3.6 の通りである。

3-7

表 3.6 一次選定結果

Item

System

① 需要

ﾊﾞﾗﾝｽ

②建設･

運営ｺｽﾄ

③ 安全

性･信頼

性

④ 利便

性

⑤ 施工

性

⑥ 環境

への影

響

⑦ 他交

通への

影響

一次選

定結果

①MRT

(地下)

△ やや

過剰

× ｺｽﾄ

最大

○ ○ △ 線形

条件

○ ○

×

②MRT

(高架)

△ やや

過剰

△ 中間的

○ ○ △ 線形

条件

△ 構造物

やや大

○

○

③LRT × 決定的

不足

○ △ 定時性

やや難

○ ○ ○ △ 道路

走行

×

④

ﾓﾉﾚｰﾙ

(跨座式)

○

△ 中間的

○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○

⑤

ﾓﾉﾚｰﾙ

(懸垂式)

× 不足

△ 中間的

△ 実績少

○ △ 全金属

構造

△ 構造物

やや大

○

×

⑥AGT × 不足

△ 中間的

○ ○ ○ △ 構造物

やや大

○

×

⑦バス

(高架)

× 決定的

不足

○ ○ △ 速度低

○ △ 大気汚染

あり

○

×

⑧バス

(BRT)

× 決定的

不足

○ △ 定時性

やや難

△ 速度低

○ △ 大気汚染

あり

△ 道路

走行

×

4-1

4. バンコク中量交通システムの評価

4.1 路線選定

ルート選定は、システム一次選定の結果と既存計画の現状をもとに行った。

レッド、ブルー、グリーンラインは、全て既存線の延伸計画であるため、高架 MRT やモノレ

ールとの接続に困難が生じる。

パープルラインは、新線建設で、モノレールには適さない程の需要が見込まれている。ま

た、一部区間では道路が狭く、高架は適さない。

ピンクラインは郊外の環状線で、モノレールでも適応可能だが、優先順位が低いため、ここ

では取り上げない。

オレンジラインも新線建設である。都心を通過する区間は地下鉄として計画されており、コ

ストが高い。したがって、建設コストが安く、需要も満たせるモノレールが適している。

イエローラインは環状線である。オレンジラインより需要は小さいが、幅員が十分にある道

路上に計画されているため、モノレールが適している。

以上より、本調査では、オレンジラインとイエローラインを対象路線とする。

図 4.1 都市鉄道ネットワーク

4-2

4.2 路線選定のための需要予測

オレンジラインに関しては最新の需要予測がなく、イエローラインには需要予測が全くない

ため、調査団は、Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan1の需要予測をベースに、両

路線の将来需要を検討した。この計画にはオレンジラインの 1 日当たりの乗客数予測は含

まれているが、イエローラインの情報は含まれていない。

調査団はオレンジラインの予測データをもとに、イエローラインの需要予測を導き出した。

その方法は、オレンジライン沿線の人口予測からトリップレートを算出し、そのレートをイエ

ローライン沿線の人口予測に適用した。需要予測の結果は表4.1の通りである。また、利用

客数の予測を表 4.2、最大路線容量を表 4.3 に示す。

表 4.1 オレンジライン、イエローライン需要予測

人口/1 日あたり乗客数予測路線サービス提供エリア 2000

(実数) 2010 2020 2021

AARG % 2010-2021

ｵﾚﾝｼ゙ Talingchan 161,090 237,730 312,366 321,012 2.8% Bangkok Noi 190,015 196,551 198,334 198,513 0.1% Pranakhon 98,247 96,594 97,378 97,457 0.1% Payathai 228,669 236,572 238,761 238,981 0.1% Huaykwang 310,262 369,554 380,507 381,620 0.3% Bangkapi 376,602 462,433 624,813 643,903 3.1% Buengkum 294,672 473,293 639,434 658,965 3.1% Minburi 137,426 176,073 234,464 241,276 2.9%

合計 1,798,983 2,250,810 2,728,077 2,783,748 2.0% 1 日あたり乗客数 319,107 585,292 5.7% ﾋﾟｰｸ時ﾋﾟｰｸ方向ﾄﾘｯﾌﾟﾚｰﾄ 0.14177 0.21025

ｲｴﾛｰ Chatuchak 226,221 253,350 260,935 261,706 0.3% Lat Phrao 190,803 294,396 397,752 409,902 3.1% Bangkapi 376,602 462,433 624,813 643,903 3.1% Suan Luang 175,000 206,490 270,000 2.5% Prawet 336,174 488,891 660,519 680,695 3.1%

合計 1,304,800 1,705,560 1,944,019 2,266,206 2.6% 1 日あたり乗客数

(オレンジ線と同じﾄﾘｯﾌﾟﾚｰﾄとして) 241,805 476,477 6.4% オレンジ線に対する％

(利用客率)

75.8% 81.4% Sources: 1. 人口予測: Conceptual Mass Rapid Transit Implementation Master Plan 1996、Urban Rail Transportation Master

Plan 2000. これらは 2020 年までの予測であるため、調整の上 2021 年の乗客予測とした。 2. オレンジライン利用客数予測 : Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004.

1 TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd., for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning: Bangkok Mass

Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004

4-3

表 4.2 利用客数予測(人) 年平均成長率 (%)

路線 2010 2021 2036 2010-2021

2021-2036

ｸﾞﾘｰﾝﾗｲﾝ東西 680,470 1,098,200 1,477,763 4.4% 2.0% ｸﾞﾘｰﾝﾗｲﾝ南北 606,023 1,193,590 1,606,967 6.4% 2.0% ﾌﾞﾙｰﾗｲﾝ環状線 934,479 1,834,264 6.3% ﾌﾞﾙｰﾗｲﾝ Bangkae-Thaphra 112,662 220,922 6.3% ﾌﾞﾙｰﾗｲﾝ合計 1,047,141 2,055,186 2,765,759 6.3% 2.0% ﾊﾟｰﾌﾟﾙﾗｲﾝ 462,895 909,924 1,224,740 6.3% 2.0% ｵﾚﾝｼﾞﾗｲﾝ 319,107 585,292 787,333 5.7% 2.0% ﾚｯﾄﾞﾗｲﾝ南北 797,107 1,393,638 1,876,140 5.2% 2.0% ﾚｯﾄﾞﾗｲﾝ東西 682,225 1,385,709 1,865,374 6.7% 2.0% ｲｴﾛｰﾗｲﾝ 241,105 476,477 640,889 6.4% 2.0% ﾊﾞﾝｺｸ大量交通合計 4,836,073 9,098,016 12,244,965 5.9% 2.0% Source: 調査団作成

表 4.3 最大路線容量オレンジラインイエローライン

2010 2021 2010 2021

最大路線容量/1方向/日 (no.pax) 88,000 181,000 67,000 147,000

最大路線容量/1方向/ﾋﾟｰｸ時 (no.pax) 9,000 18,000 7,000 15,000

Source: ｵﾚﾝｼﾞﾗｲﾝは”Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004”より算出。ｲｴﾛｰﾗｲﾝは、両線の将来の 1日あたり乗客数の割合より算出。

4.3 路線ごとのシステム選定

4.3.1 システム選定の考え方

第 3 章において 8 種のシステムを比較評価し、一次選定結果として下記の2 種システムを

選定した。

• MRT(高架)

• モノレール(跨座式)

ここでは、上記 2 種のシステムについて、具体的なコスト評価や導入空間の可能性等を現

地事情に即して比較し、最終選定を行うものとする。

4.3.2 最終選定のための要因検討

(1) 選定ルートの概略構造

a) オレンジライン

オレンジラインは、バンコク都心部を貫通し、ほぼ東西にタイ国鉄(SRT)の Bang Bamru 駅

から Bang Kapi 地区までを結ぶ路線である。延長は約 22km で、そのうち王宮付近の約

4-4

2km は地下構造となる。また、終点のBang Kapi 付近の Ramkhamhaeng 通りは高架道路

の区間が続くため、モノレールでは橋脚を細くできるという特性を活かし、同通りに並行す

る約 5km の区間を運河(Khlong Saen Sab)上に計画した。

b) イエローライン

イエローラインは、バンコク都心部の東側を半環状に結ぶ約 29km のルートであり、

Srinakarin 通り～Lat Phrao 通りと比較的幅員の広い道路上空を活用するルートである。

Bang Kapi 地区においてオレンジラインと交差する付近は、密集市街地で、高架道路区間

もあるが、それ以外はオレンジラインと比べるとルート上の問題箇所は少ない。路線図を図

4.2、両線の概略平面図を図 4.3、4.4 に示す。

図 4.2 オレンジライン、イエローライン路線図

4-5

図 4.3 オレンジライン概略平面図

4-6

図 4.4 イエローライン概略平面図

4-7

(2) コスト評価

コスト評価の内容は 4.5.1 に詳述するが、その結果は以下の通りである。

表 4.4 資本コスト比較

MRT

(百万タイバーツ)

モノレール


オレンジライン 50,598 49,532

イエローライン 58,491 54,675

表 4.5 O&M コスト比較

MRT


モノレール


オレンジライン 53.32 48.99

イエローライン 44.66 33.12

a) 資本コスト

表 4.4 に示すとおり、2 種のシステムの間で大きな差はないが、いずれもモノレールのほう

が安くなっている。路線で見ると、オレンジラインの方がシステム間のコスト差が小さくなっ

ている。これは、モノレール車両の1両当たりの輸送力がMRT よりも小さいため、必要車両

数がおおくなること、王宮付近に約 2km の地下区間があることによる。（モノレールは、地

下区間ではトンネル断面が MRT より大きくなる。）

イエローラインには、地下区間が無いため、コスト面ではモノレールがより優位になってい

る。

b) O&M コスト

資本コスト比較の場合より、モノレールの優位性がより高くなっている。これは、モノレール

の構造物がシンプルなため保守費が少なくてすむこと、消費電力も少なく、ホームドア等の

安全対策を講じることでワンマン運転等省力化が可能で要員数の削減が可能なことによ

る。

(3) 経済評価

経済評価の内容は 4.5.2 で詳述するが、システムごとの EIRR（経済的内部収益率：

economic internal rate of return）は以下の通りである。

4-8

表 4.6 EIRR 比較

MRT モノレール

オレンジライン 16.9％ 17.6％

イエローライン 12.7％ 14.1％

一般に、タイにおける同種プロジェクトの長期資本調達コストは 12%程度なので、ここでは

EIRR の判断基準として 12%を使う。両システムの EIRRはどのケースの場合も12%を上回

っているが、オレンジライン、イエローラインともモノレールの EIRR の方が高くなっている。

以上より、経済評価においてはモノレールが優位となる。

(4) 構造物の特徴と差異

図 4.5は MRT、モノレールの構造物の特徴・差異のイメージ図を高架構造、地下構造物そ

れぞれについて示す。

モノレール構造物の最大の特徴は、高架化した場合に MRT がスラブ構造となるのに対し、

モノレールはビーム構造で上部・下部構造物ともにスリムになることである。これにより、導

入空間の縮小化、平面・縦断線形の自由度の向上を図ることができ、構造物の建設コスト

にも反映される。

また、図に示すとおり、日照、景観、大気汚染等の環境面においてもモノレールのほうが優

れている。

ただし、モノレールは建築限界高さが MRT よりも大きいため、地下構造とした場合にトンネ

ル断面が大きくなり、建設コストが高くなってしまう欠点がある。

4-9

MRT モノレール

高架

地下

図 4.5 MRT とモノレールの構造物の差異

4-10

(5) 緊急時の避難等への対応

車両火災等緊急時の乗客の避難に関しては、MRT ではドアを開けて車両外に脱出し、軌

道上を歩いて避難することが可能であるが、モノレールはビーム構造のため車両外に自由

に出て避難することはできない。日本では以下の対策を採用している。(図 4.6 参照)

• 貫通車両とし、他の車両に移動できるようにしている

• 車両扉から地上に降りるロープ設置器具を設けている

• 救援車両を横付けし、扉から救援車両に移動させる

• 車両を不燃構造にしている

Figure 4.6 Evacuation Plan of Monorail in Emergencies in Japan

図 4.6 緊急時の避難方法（日本の例）

対向軌道を利用した列車間の避難

: 乗客避難フロー

: 貫通扉、横扉

救援車両

事故車両

車両から地上への避難

降下ロープ

4-11

また、海外のモノレールでは、桁の横や上下線の間にスペースを設け、避難用通路を設

置している例がある。（図 4.7 参照）避難用通路を設けた場合、導入空間の幅が避難用通

路の分だけ拡がってしまう欠点があるが、その場合においても、前述のモノレールのコスト

面や環境上の優位性が大きく損なわれるものではない。

(上下線それぞれに設けられた避難用通路)

(上下線間に避難用通路があり導入空間が広くなっている)

図 4.7 避難用通路を設けた例（ラスベガスモノレール）

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4.3.3 システム最終選定

以上の検討結果より、以下の 3 点を理由として、モノレールを最終選定する。

• コスト評価、経済評価においてモノレールが優位である

• 高架構造を基本とした場合、構造物がスリムで導入空間や線形の自由度、環境への

影響面でモノレールが優位である

• モノレールは緊急時の避難にも対応可能である。

4.4 施工及びスケジュール

4.4.1 モノレール施工時の特徴

モノレール軌道桁は架設が容易であり、工期の短縮も可能であるため、周辺環境に与える

影響を最小限にとどめることができる。また、交通への阻害は、以下の点で最小化できる。

• 橋脚の導入空間の削減

• 施工地点から離れた場所での橋脚、梁のプレキャスト化

• 夜間だけの橋脚、梁の搬入・据付

4-13

4.4.2 モノレールの施工手順

図 4.8 に、モノレールの施工手順のイメージを示す。

図 4.8 モノレール施工手順

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4.4.3 モノレール開業までのスケジュール

オレンジライン、イエローラインの開業までのスケジュールは表 4.7 の通りで、2012 年に開

業すると想定した。

表 4.7 モノレール開業までの概略スケジュール

動き 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

FS 準備

ローン手続き

概略設計及び入札

入札評価及びネゴ

詳細設計

建設

試運転

4.5 経済評価

オレンジライン、イエローライン建設による経済便益は、同じ路線をMRT で建設した場合と

比べて評価した。評価の基準となる路線は、4.1 の通りである。オレンジラインは、当初の

地下構造から高架構造に変更した。２つのシステム間のコストは差があるが、同質の経済

便益を生むものと想定した。

4.5.1 プロジェクトコストの試算(資本コスト及び O&M コスト)

(1) 建設の想定規模と時期

プロジェクトの規模と建設・運営の費用は駅間距離に左右される。本調査では、駅間距離

を1kmとした。建設コスト試算のため、工期は2007年～2011 年の5年間とし、開業は2012

年とした。

(2) プロジェクトコスト

プロジェクトコストには以下を含む。

• 用地取得費

• 公共施設移設費

• 建設費

• 電気機器・機械設備費

• 車両取得費

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a) コスト試算の基準と基礎的前提

オレンジラインでは、用地取得費は、王室御料地からそれる区間と運河に沿っていない区

間で必要になる。一方、イエローラインでは、全線が中央分離帯に沿っているので、用地

取得費は発生しない。しかし、デポの建設用地の取得費は必要となる。本調査では、以下

の 2 つの理由より、イエローラインのデポ建設用地取得費を経済分析から除外する。

• イエローラインのデポに適した場所の土地補償費についての情報がない。

• 用地取得費を分析に含めても、２つのシステム間のコスト比較で差は出ないであろう。

理由は、MRT デポの1台当たりの必要面積はモノレールより大きいが、モノレールは

MRT より多くの車両を必要とするので、差は相殺されるからである。

MRT の建設コストには、高架構造物、駅舎及び軌道の費用が含まれ、モノレールの場合

は、高架軌道桁と駅舎の費用が含まれる。モノレールの建設単価は沖縄モノレールの実

際の建設単価をベースに、タイの安価な労務費と資材費を反映させ、調査時点の為替レ

ートでタイバーツに換算した。また、モノレールの単価は、MRT の建設単価算定の基準と

しても使用した。構造物の場合、MRT は重い構造物を必要とするため、モノレールの単価

より40%高いと想定した。一方、モノレールのトンネル断面はMRT より大きいため、MRT の

トンネルコストはモノレールより20%低いと想定した。駅舎の建設コストには、エスカレータ

ーやエレベーター等の電気機器・機械設備を含むが、自動改札システムは含まれない。

MRT の高架駅のコストは、モノレールより20%高いと想定したが、MRT 地下駅のコスト10%

低いと想定した。

電気機器・機械設備費は、配電システム、信号・制御システム及び自動改札システムの費

用を含む。MRT の電気機器・機械設備費は「バンコク大量交通実施計画」の単価に基づ

いているが、幾分モノレールの単価より低い。（モノレールの3 億 63 百万タイバーツ/km に

対し、2 億 8 千万タイバーツ/km）

車両取得費は、モノレール、MRT とも、ピーク時の乗客をさばけるだけの車両数が必要と

して算定した。混雑率は、1 両当たり１㎡に７人とした。この混雑率より、MRT の最大旅客輸

送力は約 350 人、モノレールでは 200 人と算出した。しかし、モノレールの車両 1 台あたり

の取得費用は MRT のそれよりも、若干低い。（モノレール：54 百万タイバーツ、MTR：57

百万タイバーツ）必要量数の算定に当たっては、必要量数の 10%を予備車両とし、耐用年

数は 15 年とした。予測期間の最終年(2041 年)における必要車両数は以下の通りである。

MRT 131 輌オレンジライン

モノレール 231 輌

MRT 137 輌イエローライン

モノレール 248 輌

4-16

b) 潜在価格の想定

潜在価格は Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan2に基づき、以下の通りとした。

• 設計・施工監理費： 0.92

• 建設及び電気機器・機械設備費： 0.88

• 車両取得費： 0.84

• 運営・維持管理費： 0.92

c) プロジェクトコスト試算

オレンジラインのMRT、モノレールのプロジェクトコストをそれぞれ表4.8及び 4.9、イエロー

ラインの MRT、モノレールのプロジェクトコストをそれぞれ表4.10 及び 4.11 に示す。

オレンジラインでは両システム間のコストの差は大きくない。その理由は、主にモノレール

の車両取得費が大きいことと、地下区間が2.2km あることによる。

イエローラインでは、モノレールのコストが低いことが顕著に現れている。

2 TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd., for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning:

Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004, Chapter 7, Section 7.2.

4-17

表 4.8 オレンジライン: MRT の場合のプロジェクトコスト

4-18

表 4.9 オレンジライン: モノレールの場合のプロジェクトコスト

4-19

表 4.10 イエローライン: MRT の場合のプロジェクトコスト

4-20

表 4.11 イエローライン: モノレールの場合のプロジェクトコスト

4-21

(3) 運行・維持管理コスト

a) 運行の想定

1 日の運行時間は 19 時間とし、そのうち 6 時間がピーク時、13 時間がオフピーク時と想定

する。ピーク時の運転間隔は 3~4分間隔とし、オフピーク時には 6~8 分間隔の運行とする。

MRT の車両編成は、当初は3輌で、その後11年の間に6輌にまで増えていくものとする。

一方、モノレールでは、オレンジラインは予測期間を通して 6 輌編成とし、イエローラインは

4 輌でスタートし、その後11 年の間に6 輌編成にする。要員計画では、MRT は 2 名（運転

手と車掌）での運行とし、モノレールは運転手 1 名での運行とする。

b) 運行・維持管理コスト原単位

MRT、モノレールの運行・維持管理コストには大きな差がある。例えば、重量のある MRT

は車両－キロ当たり7.5Kwh の電力を消費するが、比較的軽いモノレールは 2.7Kwh であ

る。さらに、モノレールの車両とインフラのメンテナンスコストは、それぞれ車両－キロ、路線

－キロもしくは駅ごとの比率で計算するが、MRT では、プロジェクトコストに対する比率で

算定する。したがって、MRT のメンテコストは高くなる。

c) 運行・維持管理費用の算定

表 4.12 及び 4.13 にモノレールの運行・維持管理費を示す。

4-22

表 4.12 オレンジライン：モノレールの O&M コスト

4-23

表 4.13 イエローライン：モノレールの O&M コスト

4-24

4.5.2 経済便益の算定

路線ごと、システムごとの経済便益を表 4.14 に示す。

表 4.14 オレンジライン、イエローライン経済便益の算定

4-25

4.5.3 経済便益の分析

経済便益の分析結果は下記の３つの指標で表した。

• 経済的純現在価値(Economic Net Present Value: ENPV)

• 経済的内部収益率(Economic Internal Rate of Return: EIRR)

• 費用便益比率(Benefit/Cost Ratio : BCR)

ENPV とBCR の算出に際しての割引率は、長期資本コストの 12%とした。

(1) オレンジラインの純経済便益

オレンジラインでは、MRT とモノレールの経済便益に大きな差は見られなかった（MRT の

EIRRは16.91%、モノレールは17.56%）。この理由は、１つには、プロジェクトコストにほとん

ど差が無かったこと、もう１つは、同程度の経済便益を生み出したからである。しかしながら、

両システムとも、長期資本コストを上回る収益率を出した。

(2) イエローラインの純経済便益

イエローラインの EIRR は、オレンジラインのそれよりもいくぶん低い数字となった（MRT：

12.50%、モノレール：13.97%）。これは、オレンジラインと比べて、利用客数が少なく、路線

延長が長いためにプロジェクトコストが高くなったことが原因である。モノレールの数字が

MRT よりよかったのは、プロジェクトコストと運行費が低かったことによる。

4-26

表 4.15 オレンジライン：経済評価（MRT のケース）

4-27

表 4.16 オレンジライン：経済評価（モノレールのケース）

4-28

表 4.17 イエローライン：経済評価（MRT のケース）

4-29

表 4.18 イエローライン：経済評価（モノレールのケース）

4-30

4.6 料金設定

バンコクの大量交通システムの料金レベルは、利用者予測に基づく料金と、運輸省交通

政策局(OTP)が定めた料金の漸増に関するガイドラインに制約されている。

バンコク大量交通実施計画の予測に基づく料金構成としては、初乗り料金10バーツと1キ

ロあたり1.8 バーツからなっている。これをオレンジラインの平均利用距離に当てはめると、

24 バーツ程になる。

OTP は料金を5 年ごとに引き上げることを決定した。2010 年に 5%引き上げ、それ以降 5

年ごとに 10%ずつ引き上げるものとした。これに基づいて毎年平均 1~2%ずつ引き上げて

いくということになるが、この数値は年 3%というインフレ率の見込みよりも低く、実質的な料

金収入が毎年 1~2%ずつ目減りしていくことになると、バンコク大量交通実施計画では注記

されている。さらに、O&M コストもインフレ率に従って上昇していくので、営業利益率は減

少していくことになり、持続的な経営、営業を脅かすことになりかねない。実施計画では、

財務的健全性を維持するため、毎年インフレ率に従って料金を引き上げるべきだと提案し

ている。

4.7 資金調達

4.7.1 料金収入

料金収入は、平均料金に日々の乗客数を乗じることで算出される。収入源として、料金は

上述の通り政府の規制下にあるという点で不利であり、政府が課す料金引き上げルールの

もと、インフレ率と足並みをそろえていくことはありそうにない。

4.7.2 税収からの支出

実施計画では、バンコク大量交通プロジェクトに政府予算から支出できたとして、6 年間で

最大 1,200~1,750 億バーツ（年 200~470 億バーツ）であると予測している。同計画では、ま

た、現在の価格で今後6年間の総投資額は 5,217億バーツにものぼり、政府予算から支出

できるのは総投資額の 23~34%に過ぎないとしている。しかし、それでも、教育、公衆衛生

など他のセクターと比べると、大量交通プロジェクトは、政府予算のかなりの部分を占める

ことになる。

4.7.3 大量交通整備計画

大量交通整備基金（The Mass Transit Development Fund: MTDF)はまだ導入されていな

いが、道路ユーザーへの課税、課徴金による資金調達を含んでいる。特に、Bangkok

Mass Transit Implementation Plan では、次の施策を行うとされている。

• ベンゼン1 リットルあたり1 バーツの物品税を追加課税

• ディーゼルガソリン1 リットルあたり0.75 バーツの物品税を追加課税

• 新車登録手数料を1 台あたり10,000 バーツに引き上げ

4-31

• 更新手数料を50%引き上げ

実施計画では、上記施策により最初の6 年間で 1,429 億バーツ（総投資額 5,217 億バーツ

の 27%）調達できると見込んでいる。

MTDF の利点は、大量交通システムの潜在的ユーザーが、道路使用に係る税金や課貯

金を支払うことで、資金調達に貢献することである。一方、不便な点としては、燃料費の高

騰時には、更なる負担に強いることになるので、民衆の強い抵抗にあう可能性があることで

ある。

4.7.4 信託投資

このオプションは、大量交通機関整備のために政府が 10 年の資本額固定式の投資信託

を設立することである。既に他の公的セクターで導入されているワユパックファンド

(Vayupak Fund)に似た資金調達方法である。

この方法では、マスタープランに定められた大量交通機関整備の第一段階で、一般から

投資を募る。償還期間でも資金が必要な場合は、政府は新たな投資信託を設立する。こ

の仕組みでは、年 4%以上の配当金が支払われ、営業利益が十分でないときは、政府が

配当金の支払いを保証する。

ワユパックファンドと違って、この投資信託は大量交通システムのプロジェクトだけに投資を

し、リターンは投資したプロジェクトだけによるものであり、それゆえにリスクは高い。

Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Planでは、この方式では 180 億バーツしか調達でき

ないと算定している。

4.7.5 国庫借入金

大量交通機関の整備には巨額の資金が必要であるため、国庫借入金でプロジェクトコスト

を調達すると、政府の借入金は借入れ可能な額の上限近くにまでなり、政府はその後のプ

ロジェクトは借入金なしで進めていく決断をしなければならい。こうなると、国債の発行や長

期借入金、さらには、JBIC ローンのような低利の融資も、利用できなくなる。

4.8 経営

現在まで、バンコクの大量交通ネットワークは、下記 2 社によって整備され、運営されてき

た。

• Bangkok Transit System Public company Limited (BTSC)：バンコクのスカイトレイン

（グリーンライン）を建設、運営

• Bangkok Metro Company Limited (BMCL)：地下鉄（ブルーライン）を運営

現政権は、大量輸送ネットワークを単一のチケットシステムで整備し、経営と運行を単一の

経営組織にまとめる意向を有している。Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan では、

4-32

次のような将来案を取り上げている。

a) システムオペレーターとして MRTA がネットワークを運営する、あるいは新たな国営企業が

運営する。例としては、東京、大阪、パリ、ニューヨーク。

b) 100%政府保有の企業を設立し、ネットワークを運営する。例としては、シンガポール、香港、

ソウル、ロンドン、トロント。

c) 民間投資家に運営権を譲渡し、MRTA が運営を監督する。

上記 2 案では、政府がインフラや車両に必要な投資を100%実施し、営業利益の30%を法

人税として徴収する。C)案では、政府がインフラの投資を行い、投資家が車両への投資を

行う。そして、政府は、システムレンタル料として収入を得る。

政府は、バンコクの統合された大量交通運営のための事業体について、形態、構造、機

能など、まだ決定を下していない。

^

5-1

5. 結論と提案

5.1 オレンジライン

一次選定の結果、LRT、懸垂式モノレール、AGT、バス（高架専用軌道）及びバス（専用レ

ーン）が容量不足で不適合となった。また、MRT（地下）も建設費が非常に高いため、不適

合となった。従って、MRT（高架）及び跨座式モノレールがオレンジラインに適したシステム

と判断した。（しかし、タイ政府は依然としてオレンジラインに地下鉄 MRT を建設する考え

を捨てていない。）

需要予測によると、2021 年のオレンジラインのピーク時間ピーク方向交通量は 27,000 人と、

モノレールよりも MRT が適しているといえる。しかし、路線が計画されている道路の上空は

狭いため、高架の MRT を建設するのは非常に困難である。地下式のMRT を選択した場

合は、高架と比べて建設コストが非常に高くなる。また、跨座式モノレールを採用した場合

は、軽い構造体と線路設計の柔軟性から、他のシステムと比べて最も建設費は安くなる。

特に、運河上にモノレールを建設すると、建設費の低減だけでなく、道路交通への影響も

最小にできる。

最新の情報によると、タイ政府は、2 月 15 日からブルーラインの延伸、パープルライン新設

及びオレンジラインの新設を含む地下鉄方式での入札準備を開始した。入札の詳細はア

明らかになっていないが、日本、カナダ、マレーシアといった世界のモノレールメーカーが

ショートリストされているため、モノレール方式も建設方式の対象となっていると思われる。

バンコクで最初のモノレールが具体化する可能性がある。

5.2 イエローライン

イエローラインの線形は半環状で、Lat Phtao Road、Srinakan Road及びThepharak Roadを

つないでいる。円形の線形であるがゆえ、ピーク時でも能力超過状態になることはほとんど

ない。

需要予測によると、2021 年のイエローラインのピーク時間ピーク方向交通量は 22,000 人と、

MRT にはいくぶん小さい数字であるが、跨座式モノレールには最適である。従って、イエ

ローラインには跨座式モノレールを選定した。

イエローライン建設の優先度は高くない。ブルーライン、パープルライン、オレンジラインが

終わってからとの位置づけである。中量交通システムが上記 3 路線のどれかで採択された

場合は、容量、建設コスト、美観の点から、イエローラインでも同じシステムを採用するのが

よい。また中量交通システムが採用されなかった場合は、バンコクにそのシステムを導入す

る戦略的なアプローチが必要になる。

多くの国で説明されているが、一つの都市で、単一の MRT システムを導入すると、メンテ

^

5-2

ナンス施設や機器を共有できるため、最も経済的である。これは、都市の規模が比較的小

さい場合にはあてはまる。しかし、東京やバンコクといった大都市では、必要な輸送力、用

地、環境への影響など路線ごとに条件が異なるため、あてはまらない。また、旅客の需要

が小さい場合には、MRT は過剰なシステムとなる。

ブルーラインの運行、維持管理経験より、バンコク地下鉄公社は単一のシステムのデメリッ

トを理解し、複数のシステムを模索している。しかし、ここ10 年余りにバンコクの MRT 計画

について数多くの調査がなされてきたが、MRT 以外のシステムは提案されていない。

最近、バンコク首都圏庁(BMA)は BRT システムをいくつかの地域で導入する計画を進め

ている。これは、MRT 以外の最初のシステムである。しかし、政治的な動向とBRT システム

の限られた輸送力が理由で、BRT が導入されるかどうかは明らかでない。

日本のタイ向けODAが再開されると、バンコクで中量交通システムを推進するためにJBIC

のプロジェクト形成スキームを利用するもの 1 つの手段である。

添付資料

Appendix A: オレンジライン、イエローライン完成予想図

Appendix A-1

オレンジライン

Appendix A-2

イエローライン

Appendix B: オレンジライン計画路線現状写真

オレンジライン計画路線

Appendix B

Appendix C: イエローライン計画路線現状写真

イエローライン計画路線

Appendix C

Project Formulation Study on

Medium Transit System

for Bangkok Metropolitan Area and Surrounding Areas

Study Report

February 2006

Engineering and Consulting Firms Association, Japan

Nippon Koei Co., Ltd.

This work was subsidized by the Japan Keirin Association through its

Promotion funds from KEIRIN RACE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

1. Introduction 1.1 Background 1-1 1.2 Project Objectives and Scope 1-1 1.3 Organization of Study Team 1-2 1.4 Schedule of the Study 1-3 1.5 Discussions with Thai Government Officials 1-4

2. Review of Previous Studies and On-going Projects 2.1 Origins of the Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan 2-1 2.2 Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan (1994) 2-1 2.3 Modifications of the Original Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan 2-3 2.4 BMA Sub-Center Program 2-4 2.5 BMA Urban Transport Projects 2-4

3. Comparison of Light, Medium and Heavy mass Transit Systems 3.1 Types and Technical Characteristics 3-1 3.2 Capacities and Optimum Route Lengths 3-3 3.3 Capital Costs – Civil Works, Rolling Stock, Control Systems 3-5 3.4 Operating and Maintenance Costs – Electric Power 3-5

Consumption, Operating Labour (Drivers, Station Staff), Maintenance (Track, Stations, Rolling Stock, Control Systems)

3.5 Criteria Governing System Choice 3-7

4. Evaluation of a Medium Transit System for Bangkok 4.1 Route Selection 4-1 4.2 Traffic Demand Forecast for Selected Routes 4-2 4.3 Selection of System Types (by selected route)

4.3.1 Concept of the Selection of System 4-5 4.3.2 Factors for the Selection of System 4-5 4.3.3 Determination of System 4-14

4.4 Construction Methodology and Schedule 4.4.1 Features of the Construction of Monorail 4-15

4.4.2 Construction Methodology 4-15 4.4.3 Schedule of the Commencement of the Operation 4-17

4.5 Broad Economic Evaluation 4.5.1 Estimation of Project Economic Cost 4-17

(capital and O&M) 4.5.2 Estimation of Project Economic benefits 4-28 4.5.3 Analysis of Net Economic Benefits 4-29

4.6 Pricing and Fare-setting Options 4-35 4.7 Financing Options

4.7.1 Farebox Revenue 4-35 4.7.2 Tax Revenue Disbursement 4-35 4.7.3 Mass Transit Development Fund 4-36 4.7.4 Mutual Funds 4-36 4.7.5 Public Debt 4-37

4.8 Management Options 4-37

5. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 5.1 Orange Line 5-1 5.2 Yellow Line 5-1

Appendix A: Rendu of Orange and Yellow Lines B: Photo of the planned route of Orange Line C: Photo of the planned route of Yellow Line

List of Tables Table 3.1 Features of Urban Transit Systems 3-2 Table 3.2 Comparison of Transit Capacity 3-3 Table 3.3 Distribution of Route Length of the Systems 3-4

(excluding LRT and Bus) Table 3.4 Rough Estimation of Construction Cost 3-5 Table 3.5 Comparison of the Basic Unit of Operational Cost 3-6 (excluding bus) Table 3.6 Result of the First Screening 3-8 Table 4.1 Orange and Yellow Line Traffic Demand Forecast 4-4 Table 4.2 Bangkok Mass Transit – Daily Boarding Forecast 4-4 (passenger no.) Table 4.3 Orange and Yellow Lien Maximum Line Loading 4-5 Table 4.4 Comparison of Capital Cost 4-9 Table 4.5 Comparison of O&M Cost 4-9 Table 4.6 Comparison of EIRR 4-10 Table 4.7 Schedule to the Commencement of the Operation 4-17 Table 4.8 Orange Line: capital cost estimates for MRT 4-21 Table 4.9 Orange Line: capital cost estimates for monorail 4-22 Table 4.10 Yellow Line: capital cost estimates for MRT 4-23 Table 4.11 Yellow Line: capital cost estimates for monorail 4-24 Table 4.12 Monorail O&M costs for Orange Line 4-26 Table 4.13 Monorail O&M costs for Yellow Line 4-27 Table 4.14 Estimation of Project Economic Benefits, 4-30 Orange & Yellow Line Table 4.15 Economic Evaluation of Orange Line MRT 4-31 Table 4.16 Economic Evaluation of Orange Line monorail 4-32 Table 4.17 Economic Evaluation of Yellow Line MRT 4-33 Table 4.18 Economic Evaluation of Yellow Line monorail 4-34

List of Figures Figure 2.1 Network in the 1994 Master Plan 2-2 Figure 2.2 Network of BRT 2-5 Figure 3.1 The Range of the application of urban transit systems 3-1 Figure 4.1 Network of Urban Railway 4-2 Figure 4.2 Layout Plan of Orange & Yellow Line 4-6 Figure 4.3 Schematic Profile of the Orange Line 4-7 Figure 4.4 Schematic Profile of the Yellow Line 4-8 Figure 4.5 Image of the Difference between MRT Structures and 4-11 Monorail Structures Figure 4.6 Evacuation Plan of Monorail in Emergencies in Japan 4-13 Figure 4.7 Samples of Evacuation Passage 4-14 Figure 4.8 The Image of Monorail Construction 4-16

ACRONYM AGT Automated Guideway Transit BCR Benefit/Cost Ratio BMA Bangkok Metropolitan Administration BMCL Bangkok Metro Company Limited BRT Bus Rapid Transit BTS Bangkok Mass Transit System BTSC Bangkok Transit System Public Company Limited CBD Central Business District EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return ENPV Economic Net Present Value JBIC Japan Bank for International Cooperation LRT Light Rail Transit MRT Mass Rapid Transit MRTA Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand MTDF Mass Transit Development Fund MTMP Mass Transit Master Plan NESDB National Economic and Social Development Board OCMLT Office of the Commission for Management of Land Transport ODA Official Development Assistance OTP Office of Transportation and Traffic Policy and Planning, Ministry of Transportation PHPDT Peak Hour Peak Direction Trips SPURT The Seventh Plan Urban and Regional Transport Study SRT The State Railway of Thailand THB Thai Baht URMAP Mass Transit Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan in Bangkok and

Surround Area

List of References Toshi Kotsu Kenkyuukai. 1997. Atarashii Toshi Kotsu System, Sankai Do, Japan Nobuyuki Sato. 2004. Monorail and New Urban Transit System, Grand-prix, Japan PCI. 2000. URMAP Mass Transit Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan (BMA and Surrounding Areas) Interim Report Vol. 1, Report prepared for Office of the Commission for the Management of Land Traffic (OCMLT), Pacific Consultants International in association with Japan Railway Technical Service, Asian Engineering Consultants Corp., Ltd., TESCO Ltd., and Transconsult CO., Ltd, July 2000 Team Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd. 2004. Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1 stage) Final Report, Report prepared for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning, May 2004

Executive Summary

S-1

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

According to plans established by Thai authorities, it is scheduled to construct 291 km of mass rapid transit (MRT) systems such as an elevated MRT system of Skytrain, an underground MRT system of Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) and commuter train operation planned by the State Railways of Thailand (Red Line). At the same time, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) is now planning to disperse its over-concentrated function to subcenters in order to solve traffic problems and to develop surrounding areas of Bangkok. In addition, BMA is now planning to adopt Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in the area not covered by MRT system.

The purpose of the Study is to review previous and ongoing plans or projects, to introduce a medium transit system such as Monorail, Automated Guideway Transit (AGT), Light Rail Transit (LRT), etc and to study the possibility to adopt the system for Bangkok.

2. Review of Previous Studies and On-going Projects

Strategic framework plans for the development of urban mass transit systems in Bangkok has a long history since the early 1970’s. Among past studies on the transport in Bangkok, the Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan is the most remarkable study. This master plan was approved by the Cabinet in 1994 and was the first attempt to provide an integrated planning framework for the development and realization of mass transit schemes within the Bangkok metropolis.

The initial network in the master plan consisted of five lines with a combined length of 238 km such as Red, Green, Blue, Orange and Purple Lines. And the master plan identified a two-phase programme scheduled from 1995 to 2001 as the first phase and from 2001 to 2011 as second phase.

In 2002, Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) established the Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan (URMAP) to set the essential rail mass transit system in Bangkok and surrounding areas. Based on URMAP and comments on URMAP, MRTA prepared following proposal;

• The extension of Blue Line from Hua Lampong to Thaphra (underground 6.5

Executive Summary

S-2

km) and from Thaphra to Bangkae (elevated 7.6 km), from Bangsue to Pharanagklao bridge (11.6 km) and Bangsue to Thapra (13.1 km) to create a circle route.

• The new line construction of Orange Line (34 km), consisting 29 km underground section (Bangkapi – Wangburapa – Mahaisawan) and 5km of elevated section (Mahaisawan – Rajburana).

The urbanization of individuals and ad-hoc land development causes pertinent congestion and deteriorates living environment in Bangkok metropolis. Therefore, the realignment of the urban structure and the development of sub-center in the suburbs must be an urgent issue for the well-ordered growth of Bangkok metropolis, and the transportation plan of the sub-center development should be discussed with authorities related to the city planning sector (BMA and DPT) and transportation sector (OTP and SRT) because a close linkage of railways and road networks is a primal step to secure the accessibility to the sub-center area.

BMA is planning to introduce BRT system, of which the capacity is estimated as 3,000 to 3,500 passenger/direction/hour at three-minutes frequency. However, since there are come congested parts on BRT routes, it is uncertain whether the estimated capacity is realistic or not.

3. Comparison of Light, Medium and Heavy Transit Systems

The Study Team conducted the first screening to select appropriate urban transit systems out of following eight typical systems, provided that the selected systems are adopted to Orange and Yellow Lines.

• MRT (underground) • MRT (elevated) • LRT (at grade) • Monorail (straddle type) • Monorail (suspension type) • AGT • Bus (elevated guideway bus system) • Bus (at grade BRT system)

The Study Team compared the above eight systems based on following criteria;

• Balance of demand and capacity • Construction and O&M cost • Safety and reliability

Executive Summary

S-3

• Convenience • Construction • Environmental impact • Influence to other transport modes

And the Study Team selected MRT (elevated) and Monorail (straddle) and evaluated those two systems in the light of the detailed cost and benefit in Section 4.

4. Evaluation of a Medium Transit System for Bangkok

First of all, the Study Team selected Orange and Yellow Lines as routes for medium transit system, taking account of technical aspects, demand and priority.

Then, the Study Team conducted the economic evaluation of Orange and Yellow Lines in the case of MRT (elevated) and monorail (straddle), and the comparison of EIRR is as follows;

MRT Monorail

Orange Line 16.9％ 17.6％

Yellow Line 12.7％ 14.1％

Based on the economic evaluation, detailed construction and &M cost, construction method and safety measures, the Study Team selected the monorail (straddle) as a system for the medium transit system for Bangkok.

5. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

The demand forecast indicates that the PHPDT of Orange Line at 2021 is 27,000. This figure is almost maximum capacity of the straddle-type monorail. Therefore, if the route alignment of Orange Line is not changed, i.e. the route of Minburi – Bangkapi – Dindaeng – Bangbamru is kept, it can be said that an elevated-type MRT system will be the most suitable system. However, if the alignment is revised not to go through city center, a straddle-type monorail can be an option.

The demand forecast indicates that the PHPDT of Yellow Line at 2021 is 22,000 at peak hour. This figure is rather small for MRT System but most suitable capacity to the straddle-type monorail. Therefore, as a conclusion, a straddle-type monorail system is recommended to Yellow Line.

1-1

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

“Mass Transit Master Plan (MTMP)” was firstly drawn up as a rail based transportation system plan in Bangkok in 1994. The plan was reviewed by “Mass Transit Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan in Bangkok and Surround Area (URMAP)” in 2001. The actual implementation was worked out in “Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage)” in 2004.

Abovementioned plans can be classified into three categories, namely, an elevated Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system of Bangkok Mass Transit System, so-called Skytrain, (BTS), an underground MRT system of Mass Rapid Transit System of Thailand (MRTA), and commuter train operation planned by The State Railway of Thailand (SRT), so-called Red Line. It is scheduled to construct 291 km of MRT systems in total of above three systems by 2009. (BTS system has been completed 23 km in total of two lines, and MRTA has been completed 20.8 km in one line.)

In order to stabilize land price, to solve traffic congestion, and to create efficient capital, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) is now planning to disperse its over-concentrated function to subcenters. These subcenters (seven locations planned at this moment) are located 20 to 30 km from the center of Bangkok, and planned to connect by Mass (Medium) Transit System or Trunk roads with city center.

Bangkok Metropolitan Subcenter Program, which is to create seven subcenters around Bangkok, is in the planning stage, and there is no shape of actual implementation at this moment. One of the subcenter programs now under study by Nippon Koei is located at Lat Krabang, approximately 25km east side of Bangkok, having area of 2,000 ha. And the estimated future population of Lat Krabang is 200,000. This figure includes the population only inside of the project area. Considering the development of surrounding area, total population of the area will be 400,000 to 500,000.

1.2 Project Objectives and Scope

The abovementioned rail based transportation plans are classified into mass transit system or heavy rail system. It is worth of reviewing the necessity to have 291 km long network of heavy rail system.

BMA is now planning to construct a dedicated lane for the operation of BRT (Bus

1-2

Rapid Transit) system in the area not covered by MRT system. Since the transit capacity of BRT is relatively small with respect to the space requirements, and considering the road traffic condition in Bangkok, the effectiveness of the adoption of BRT is questionable.

The purpose of the Study is to introduce a medium transit system and to study the possibility to adopt the system for Bangkok. The medium transit system has a medium capacity between MRT and BRT. And the system is in operation in many cities in Japan such as Monorail, Automated Guideway Transit (AGT), Light Rail Transit (LRT), etc.

All the existing mass transit plans are to operate inside the CBD or connecting CBD with subcenters. Since each subcenter is planned to have 400,000 to 500,000 population, it is necessary to study having a light to medium capacity transit system to provide feeder services.

1.3 Organization of Study Team

Position Name (assignment)/

Company name

Team Leader Mr. Akio OKUTSU (Railway Planning Expert)


Member Mr. Tomoyuki TAKATA (Railway Construction Expert)

Tonichi Engineering Consultants, Inc.

Member Mr. Tatsuya MASUZAWA (Transportation Planning Expert)


Member Mr. Peter HODGKINSON (Transport Economist)


Site Support Dr. Pinit SETO


1-3

1.4 Schedule of the Study

The site survey was carried out in the following schedule;

Date Subject Activity

Aug. 21 Mobilization to Bangkok Mr. Okutsu, Mr. Takata and

Mr. Masuzawa

Aug. 22 AM Kick-off Meeting Meeting at Nippon Koei office in Bangkok

(Mr. Okutsu, Mr. Tanaka, Mr. Masuzawa, Mr.

Hodgkinson and Dr. Pinit)

Aug. 22 PM Visit JBIC Bangkok Office Meeting with Mr. Miyao and Mr. Aita

Aug. 23 AM Visit BMA Office Meeting with Mr. Chitchanok

(Director General, Dept. of Traffic &

Transportation)

Aug. 23 AM Visit MRTA Office Meeting with Dr. Rithika Suprat

(Director of Planning Division)

and Mr. Chaisat Gururatana

(Director of Technical Dept.)

Aug. 24 AM Visit TEAM Consultant Meeting with Mr. Amnat Prommasutra

(Senior Executive Director)

Mr. Kittpol Bunninm

(Executive Director)

and Dr. Boonchai Sangpetngam

Aug. 24 PM Visit Embassy of Japan in

Thai

Meeting with Mr. Okuda

(Second Secretary)

Aug. 25 Site Visit Whole routes of Yellow and Pink Lines

Aug. 26 Site Visit Whole route of Orange Line

Aug. 27 Site Visit Blue Line (Bangkae – Bangkok Yai

section)

Mr. Masuzawa returned to Tokyo.

Aug. 28 Office work Whole route of Yellow Line

Aug. 29 Office work Whole route of Orange Line

Aug. 30 Visit OTP Meeting with Dr. Kumropluk Suraswadi

Aug. 31 Demobilization Mr. Okutsu and Mr. Takata returned to

Tokyo.

1-4

1.5 Discussions with Thai Government Officials

(1) Bangkok Metropolitan Administration

Mr. Chitchanok (Director General, Department of Traffic and Transportation, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) explained the Study Team about the BMA’s approach of BRT. BMA is now planning to operate the first BRT operation at the North Bangkok Area (Mo Chit – Lad Phrao – Bangkhen). He emphasized the success story of BRT system in Bogota, Colombia.

The Study Team explained to Mr. Chitchanok about the current situation of BRT system in Jakarta, of which the surrounding situation is similar to Bangkok. The BRT system in Jakarta is considered as a tentative solution of traffic congestion until the construction of rail based MRT. The system in Jakarta is not functioning at the level of Bogota because of the difference of road system and number of vehicles in the city.

(2) MRTA: Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand

The study team made a presentation of medium capacity transit system, such as Tokyo Monorail, Tama Monorail, Kanazawa Seaside Line, etc., which are now operating in Japan. The Study Team explained about the advantages of the medium transit system, which is applicable to Bangkok MRT system.

MRTA directors expressed sincere interests in the explanation of medium transit systems, which the Study Team introduced, and explained their intention of the Study to adopt such system for future Yellow and Pink Lines. They explained their urgent issue of unexpected high cost for the maintenance and operation of Blue Line, and asked the Study Team about O&M cost of medium transit system operated in Japan.

The study team explained general information of O&M cost of medium transit system, and asked the possibility of study to introduce a medium transit system for Orange Line, of which the conceptual design as a heavy rail has been completed.

MRTA directors explained the difficulty of the change at this moment because it requires a policy change, and the transportation policy is decided by OTP (Office of Transportation and Traffic Policy and Planning, Ministry of Transportation). However, they also explained if there was clear verification, there was some possibility of the change.

2-1

2. Review of Previous Studies and On-going Projects

2.1 Origins of the Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan

Framework plans setting out a strategy for the development of urban mass transit systems in Bangkok are certainly not a recent phenomenon. Such plans were firstly produced during the early 1970’s. More recently, the Seventh Plan Urban and Regional Transport Study (SPURT) released in 1990 was notable in the fact that the plan advanced a two-part transport strategy for Bangkok including firstly the introduction of a mass transit system and, secondly, the enforcement of complementary car restraint policies. It is widely accepted that only through these joint actions can the level of traffic congestion be reduced substantially and effectively.

After SPURT, very little was done to ensure the development of urban railway within a systematic planning framework linked to the future patterns of urban growth. During this period, BTS (Green Line) and Hopewell elevated rail and toll-way (Red Line) projects were conceived, and the cabinet approved to proceed those projects. However, both were absorbed into the framework of the Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan when this plan was developed in 1994. In the event, only the Green Line project sponsored by BMA proceeded to completion (in 2000). The Red Line project sponsored by the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) was suspended just prior to the Asian economic crisis of 1997/98 when the property market, on which the private promoters depended for their returns collapsed. Nevertheless, SPURT provided the justification for the subsequent establishment in 1992 of the Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA) and the later establishment of the Office of the Commission for Management of Land Transport (OCMLT), later re-named the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP). The creation of these organizations allowed respectively for the coordination of mass transit system development and operation in greater Bangkok and for the co-ordination of urban transport policy formulation and planning.

2.2 Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan (1994)

The Cabinet approved Mass Transit Master Plan in 1994, and this was the first attempt to provide an integrated planning framework for the development and realization of mass transit schemes within the Bangkok metropolis. This framework allowed for the future urban transport needs of Bangkok to be assessed systematically and for urban transport projects to be prioritized and developed in conformity with the long term urban planning goals of the government. In addition,

2-2

and importantly, it allowed the mass transit projects then being developed independently, such as the Hopewell, BTS, and initial MRTA projects, to be integrated into a network.

The network initially proposed in the 1994 Master Plan (and illustrated in Figure 2.1) consisted of five lines or “systems” with a combined length of 238 kilometres, of which 103 km represented a core component of the three mass transit lines then already either under development or in the advanced stages of planning, i.e. the initial Red, Green and Blue Lines. The remaining 135 km represented extensions of these lines and the addition of two new lines, the Orange Line running along an east-west axis from Minburi to Panfah before turning south, then east and northeast, ending at a terminus at Samrong and the Purple Line providing a parallel north-south transit route to the west of the Red Line and linking Pakkred in the north with Samsen in the south.

The majority of the extended network was proposed as elevation on structures using the median strips of existing roads, but a significant part of the Orange Line was proposed at the outset of underground construction.

The master plan identified a two-phase programme for the construction of the extended network, the first phase being scheduled from 1995 to 2001 and the second phase from 2001 to 2011. This initial network is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Network in the 1994 Master Plan

2-3

2.3 Modifications of the Original Bangkok Mass Transit Master Plan

OTP already completed the study on Urban Rail Transportation Master Plan (URMAP) for Bangkok and surround areas in 2002. The purpose was to set the essential Rail Mass Transit System in Bangkok and surrounding areas for 20 years in order to support the changed situation such as declining economic condition. The economic crisis in 1997 affected the amount of transportation demand and investing capacity of both government and private sectors. During this period some railway and elevated highway projects were cancelled.

The cabinet set the BMA Development policy. The policy was aiming;

• To support the formulation of effective mass transit network, • To improve service quality of mass transit system • To coordinate various construction projects to meet the direction of the city

development

National Economics and Social Development Board (NESDB) issued the following comments on the URMAP in October 2002 to the form perfect framework of the mass transit system;

• To expedite the development of the mass transit network to complete before the due date

• To improve the physical form of the project to minimize the environmental impact along the route, and to avoid the duplication of the investment in the development of the routes

• To study the funding strategy to develop the mass transit system, and to study the taxation method to increase the fund for the above.

Based on the abovementioned comments, MRTA prepared the following proposals;

• The extension of Blue Line from Hua Lampong to Thaphra (underground 6.5 km) and from Thaphra to Bangkae (elevated 7.6 km), from Bangsue to Pharanagklao bridge (11.6 km) and Bangsue to Thapra (13.1 km) to create a circle route.

• The new line construction of Orange Line (34 km), consisting 29 km underground section (Bangkapi – Wangburapa – Mahaisawan) and 5km of elevated section (Mahaisawan – Rajburana).

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2.4 BMA Sub-Center Program

The estimated population of the BMA jurisdiction is 7.4 million. This figure indicates the heavy concentration of the population in the capital area. The Bangkok Metropolis has grown to be one of the most populated cities in the world and the most active economic center in South East Asia.

The urbanization of individuals and ad-hoc land development has driven the growth of the Bangkok Metropolis. And the infrastructure also has been developed in time sequence. The urbanization on site is thus generally initiated primarily by the private sector. This is thought to be one of the reasons why the road network is poorly devised in built-up areas, and this situation causes pertinent congestion in town. Unplanned urban sprawl currently in progress causes not only traffic jam, but various problems relating to urban living environment. Various problems include mixing of conflicting functions such as residential and industrial which is potentially hazardous to residents, lack of insufficient provision of public services and resultant deterioration of living environment.

Realignment of the urban structure by the redevelopment in the central part accompanied by development in the suburbs must be an urgent issue for the well-ordered growth of the BMA area. The sub-center development at Lat Krabang is expected to be a model case towards a multi-centric urban structure of the BMA area.

A close linkage of railways and road networks is a primal step to secure the accessibility to the sub-center area. A new railway station of a planned commuter line from the Bangkok city center to the new airport (Red Line) should be properly linked with road networks in the sub-center area. The transportation plan of the sub-center development should be discussed with authorities related to the city planning sector (BMA and DPT) and transportation sector (OTP and SRT).

2.5 BMA Urban Transport Projects

BMA is now planning to introduce BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) System, which utilizes existing roads. The outline of two lines under planning is as follows;

• North Line: Nawamin – Kaset – Mochit (19.4 km, 18 bus stops) • South Line: Chong Nontri – Chong Nonchi – Kurung Thep Bridge (15.5 km,

15 bus stops)

The capacity of the system is estimated as 3,000 to 3,500 passenger/direction/hr at three-minutes frequency. However, since there are heavily congested areas in some parts of the routes, it is uncertain whether the estimated capacity is realistic figure or

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not.

The planned network of BRT is shown in Figure 2.2 in dotted line.

Figure 2.2 Network of BRT

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3. Comparison of Light, Medium and Heavy Mass Transit Systems

3.1 Types and Technical Characteristics

(1) Systems considered in the Study

Characteristics of the following typical systems are compared in this study;

a) MRT (underground) b) MRT (elevated) c) LRT (at grade) d) Monorail (straddle type) e) Monorail (suspension type) f) AGT g) Bus (elevated guideway bus system) h) Bus (at grade BRT system)

(2) Characteristics of urban transit system

Figure 3.1 shows the applicable range of each abovementioned systems in the context of transit capacity and scheduled speed. When the scheduled speed and transit capacity are out of the range, the system will become inefficient or the effects by introduction of the system will be diminished.

Figure 3.1 The Range of the application of urban transit systems

Characteristics of the abovementioned systems are summarized in Table 3.1.



Tramcar

Bus

AGT

Monorail




Tramcar

Bus

AGT

Monorail


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Table 3.1 Features of Urban Transit Systems

System a) MRT b) MRT d) Monorail e) Monorail g) Bus h) BusItem (undergroud) (elevated) (straddle) (suspension) (elevated) (at grade)

SystemAppearance

Transit Capacity Large Large Medium - Small Large - Medium Medium Medium Small Small

Speed High - Medium High - Medium Medium - Low Medium Medium Medium medium - Low Low

Cost for const.& Maintenance

Highest High - Medium Low High - Medium High - Medium Medium Medium - Low Lowest

SpaceSmall

(underground)Large - Medium

(elevated)Large

(on the ground)Medium - Small

(elevated)Medium - Small



(elevated)Large

(on the ground)

EnvironmentalImpact

(air / noise / landscape)

Small / Small /Small

Medium /Medium /

Large

Medium /Medium /

Small

Small / Medium /Small

Small / Medium /Medium

Small / Medium /Large

Large / Medium /Large

Large / Large /Small

Experiences Many Many Many Many A few Many A few Many

Features

- Large capacity- High speed- Highest cost- Small impact onenvironment

- Large capacity- High speed- Many cases ofintroduction

- Medium - Smallcapacity- People-friendly,but affected byroad traffic

- Large - mediumcapacity- Simple trackstructure- Small impact onenvironment

- Mediumcapacity- Morecomplicatedstructure than ofstraddle type

- Mediumcapacity-Unattendedoperation isavailable

- Small capacity- Lower cost thanof AGT- A few cases ofintroduction

- Small capacity- Lowest cost andlimited effect

c) LRT f) AGT

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3.2 Capacity and Optimum Route Lengths

(1) Transit capacity of each system

The maximum transit capacity of each system is shown in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Comparison of Transit Capacity Type of System Max. Capacity

(PHPDT) *1

Calculation basis

(A x B x C x 60/D) *2

a) MRT

(underground)

20,250 – 67,500 (3 to 10) x 150 x 150% x 60/2

= 20, 250 to 67,500

b) MRT (elevated) ditto ditto

c) LRT 10,800 2 x 120 x 150% x 60/2 = 10.800

d) Monorail

(straddle type)

27,000 6 x 100 x 150% x 60/2 = 27,000

e) Monorail

(suspension type)

18,000 4 x 100 x 150% x 60/2 = 18,000

f) AGT 10,800 – 21,600 (3 to 6) x 80 x 150% x 60/2

= 10,800 to 21,600

g) Bus (elevated) 2,700 1 x 75 x 120% x 60/2 = 2,700

h) Bus (BRT at grade) ditto ditto

Note *1 PHPDT: Peak Hour Peak Direction Trips

*2 A: No. of Car, B: Car Capacity, C: Peak Ratio, D: Headway (min.)

From the view point of capacity, the above systems can be classified as follows;

• MRT (underground/elevated): Large capacity • Monorail (straddle/suspension): Large – Medium capacity • AGT: Medium capacity • LRT: Medium – Small capacity • Bus (elevated, at grade): Small capacity

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(2) Optimum route length of each system

When decide the route length, the following points shall be considered;

a) To avoid the case of over-capacity when passenger number is increased at the most congested section

b) To avoid delays in operation caused by traffic congestion

When a transportation system is stretched in radial direction from/to city centre, and if the system has long route length with small capacity, over-capacity section will be observed at the city centre area as mentioned a) above. Due to this reason, the optimum route length of small capacity system will be limited in case the system having radial direction to city centre.

In case of circular or loop line, there is no limitation in the route length.

When a transportation system is running at grade, its operation will be affected by traffic congestion even if the system has a dedicated lane. The optimum route length shall be decided by the site condition.

The following Table 3.3 indicates route lengths of the abovementioned systems in Japan. It can be said that a transportation system having bigger capacity and route length become longer.

Table 3.3 Distribution of Route Length of the Systems (excluding LRT and Bus) Type of System Max. Route

Length (km)

Min. Route

Length (km)

Average Route

Length (km)

a), b) MRT

(Underground/Elevated)

(There is no limitation in length.)

d), e) Monorail *1

(Straddle/Suspension)

23.8

(Osaka)

6.6

(Shonan)

14.4

f) AGT *2 12.6

(Omiya)

4.1

(Yamaman)

9.3

Note

:*1 Seven companies of Tokyo, Tama, Chiba, Shonan, Osaka, Kitakyushu and Okinawa

:*2 Eight companies (nine routes) of Saiamta, Yamaman, Yurikamome, Yokohama,

Toukadai, Osaka, Kobe (two routes), Hiroshima

: There are extension plans for monorail and AGT.

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3.3 Capital Costs – Civil Works, Rolling Stock, Control Systems

Table 3.4 shows the rough estimation of construction cost of each system. In accordance to the transit capacity, construction cost grows larger. Construction cost is an important factor for the selection of system because construction cost is directly linked to the profitability and cost-benefit performance of a route.

Though the Study targets a route expected to have moderate transit capacity, it is important to make transport capacity more appropriate and to minimize construction cost.

Table 3.4 Rough Estimation of Construction Cost Item

System

Cost

(Million US$) Evaluation

a) MRT (underground) 180-240 Highest

b) MRT (elevated) 80-120 High – Medium

c) LRT 15-25 Low

d) Monorail (straddle) 60-100 High – Medium

e) Monorail (suspension) 80-120 High – Medium

f) AGT 60-90 Medium

g) Bus (elevated) 40 Medium – Low

h) Bus (at grade) 2-5 Lowest

Note

This cost is roughly estimated based on both domestic and international

records, not based on detailed calculation.

The cost includes civil, architectural and electrical works and rolling stock.

3.4 Operating and Maintenance Costs – Electric Power Consumption, Operating Labour (Drivers and Station staff), Maintenance (Track, Stations, Rolling Stock and Control Systems)

Table 3.5 shows the basic unit of operational cost of the systems (excluding bus). The basic unit is calculated on the following three bases;

• Railway route length • Car-kilometre • Transported passenger-kilometre.

The basic unit per above three bases set in descending order is as follows; (Note: “>>” means a big difference.)

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• Per railway route length: Metro >> Elevated railway > Straddle monorail > AGT > Suspension monorail > LRT

• Per car-kilometre: Metro > Suspension monorail > Straddle monorail > Elevated railway > LRT > AGT

• Per transported passenger-kilometre: Suspension monorail > AGT > LRT > Straddle monorail > Metro > Elevated railway

In terms of the basic unit per railway route length, the basic unit is in descending order of transit capacity, and it is assumed that fixed cost increase according to the transit capacity. Especially, the fixed cost of MRT is quite high.

It is difficult to assess the basic unit per car-kilometre and per transported passenger-kilometre simply from the order because workload and availability are reflected in the order; however, it is supposed that operation efficiency of metro and elevated railway is improved in accordance to transport condition, judging from the order of those two systems in terms of the basic unit per transported passenger-kilometre.

Judging by these circumstances, the choice of a system according to the transit capacity substantially affects the cost of construction and operation.

Table 3.5 Comparison of the Basic Unit of Operational Cost (excluding bus) a) MRT

(underground)b) MRT

(elevated)c) LRT

d) Monorail(straddle)

e) Monorail(suspension)

f) AGT

Number of Staff 48.3 18.8 17.2 13.3 13.3 11.8Personnel cost 612,503 200,749 110,590 100,684 92,763 84,547Expense 439,814 177,285 35,362 128,251 55,046 97,522Total 1,052,317 378,034 145,952 228,935 147,809 182,069Number of Staff 0.0347 0.0211 0.0467 0.0536 0.0603 0.0231Personnel cost 440.2 224.4 300.4 257.9 414.5 152.5Expense 316.1 198.2 96.1 294.1 259.7 161.2Total 756.3 422.6 396.5 552.0 674.2 313.7Power consumption 2.045 2.443 1.625 2.587 3.251 1.652Number of Staff 0.000541 0.000362 0.002893 0.001888 0.002799 0.002545Personnel cost 6.86 3.86 18.62 8.97 19.43 15.86Expense 4.93 3.41 5.96 10.14 11.81 14.80Total 11.79 7.27 24.58 19.11 31.24 30.66

Note:1. Annual Railway Statistics of the Year 20032. Metro: Tokyo Metro, Elevated railway: average of eight major companies in metropolitan area, LRT: Hiroshima Electric Railway Straddle monorail: average of Haneda, Tama, Osaka, Kitakyushu and Okinawa, Suspension monorail: average of Chiba and Shonan AGT: Yurikamome, Yokohama, Tokadai, Kobe New Tram and Hiroshima3. Refrence: the basic unit of car-kilometer of bus (material from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport of Japan in 2004) Personnel cost: 275.9 Yen, Expense: 157.1 Yen, Total: 433.0 Yen

Basic unitper railwayroutelength

Basic unitper car-kilometer

Basic unitperpassenger-kilometer

Item / System

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3.5 Criteria Governing System Choice

(1) Criteria

The Study Team sorted out criteria for the selection of system in order of importance. The result is as follows.

a) Balance of demand and capacity

• Balance between traffic demand of the planned route and transport capacity of the designed system

b) Construction and O&M cost

• The most economical system shall be selected among the systems which satisfy the traffic demand and requirements.

c) Safety and reliability

• Safety at emergency case • Punctuality • Past experiences of the same system to be verified

d) Convenience

• Convenience for passengers (operating head, accessibility to station, etc.) • Connectivity to other transportation modes (possibility of through operation)

e) Construction

• Space for the system to be introduced • Flexibility of the route selection • Availability of materials and labor force

f) Environmental impact

• Air pollution, noise, vibration, sunlight, landscape, etc g) Influence to other transport modes

• Influence to other transport modes during construction and at the completion

At the time of selection, it is preferable to prepare the evaluation list covering the above all criteria and to conduct comprehensive evaluation including the importance of criteria.

(2) First screening

Stated in Section 4.1 and 4.2 in detail, the Study Team selected Orange-Line and Yellow-Line as routes introduced urban transit system. The maximum section traffic volume at peak time of both two lines is as follows;

• Orange-Line: 27,000 person/hour in one direction (at the year of 2021) • Yellow-Line: 22,000 person/hour in one direction (at the year of 2021)

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Table 3.6 shows the result of the first screening for eight systems based on the above index. As the result of the first screening, five systems such as LRT, Monorail (suspension), AGT, Bus (elevated) and Bus (BRT) lack the transit capacity, and MRT (underground) has an issue with the cost of construction and O&M. Therefore, those six systems are not selected. Evaluating the detailed cost and benefit of remaining two systems such as MRT (elevated) and Monorail (straddle), the Study Team will make a final selection.

Table 3.6 Result of the First Screening

Item

System

a) MRT △ × ○ ○ △ ○ ○(underground) Rather

excessiveHighest cost Line shape

b) MRT △ △ ○ ○ △ △ ○(elevated) Rather

excessiveMedium Line shape Rather large

structure

c) LRT × ○ △ ○ ○ ○ △Absolutelylacking

A bit worsepunctuality

Influence toroad

d) Monorail ○ △ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○(straddle) Medium

e) Monorail × △ △ ○ △ △ ○(suspension) Lacking Medium Few experience All metal

structureRather largestructure

f) AGT × △ ○ ○ ○ △ ○Lacking Medium Rather large

structure

g) Bus × ○ ○ △ ○ △ ○(elevated) Absolutely

lackingLow speed Air pollution

h) Bus × ○ △ △ ○ △ △(BRT) Absolutely

lackingA bit worsepunctuality

Low speed Air pollution Influence toroad

Note: The Study Team did not adopt systems marked "X" in criteria.

ConstructionEnvironmental

impactInfluence to

others

Balance ofdemand &capacity

Construction& OM cost

Safety &reliability

ConvenienceResult ofthe First

Screening

X

X

X

X

○

X

○

X

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4. Evaluation of a Medium Transit System for Bangkok

4.1 Route Selection

The Study Team selected routes for medium transit system based on the result of the first screening (described in 3.5) and the current situation of all planned lines as follows.

The Figure 4.1 shows existing and planned urban railway network.

Red, Blue and Green Lines are the extension of existing lines of SRT, MRT and BTS respectively, therefore, in case elevated MRT or straddle-type monorail will be introduced to those lines, there will be some difficulties of the connection between existing system and proposed system.

Purple Line is a newly constructed line; however, the line has too large demand to adopt the monorail, and there are many places of narrow width of road on the planned route. Therefore, elevated system is not suitable.

Orange Line is also a newly constructed line. This line has a relatively large demand. And in the Master Plan, most of this line is underground MRT because the planned route is passing through Bangkok metropolitan area. However, the underground MRT costs high, therefore, straddle-type monorail has an advantage of construction cost because elevated structure is cheaper than underground. And the monorail is competent to meet the demand.

Yellow Line is a suburban loop line with a bit smaller demand than that of Orange Line and its planned route is passing on roads having enough width to construct elevated structure. Therefore, Yellow Line is the most suitable for the straddle-type monorail.

Pink Line is a loop line located at the outer side of Yellow Line. This line is also suitable for monorail; however, the Study Team did not select this line due to the low priority.

Taking the above situations into consideration, the Study Team selected Orange and Yellow Line as routes for medium transit system.

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Figure 4.1 Network of Urban Railway

4.2 Traffic Demand Forecast for Selected Routes

In the absence of an updated traffic demand forecast for the Orange Line and of any forecast for the Yellow Line, future demand levels for both lines were assessed on the basis of the forecasts provided in the final report of the Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan. 1 This plan contains a forecast of the daily number of boarding passengers for the eight lines then comprising the proposed Bangkok Mass Transit network, including the Orange Line, but excluding the Yellow Line. These forecasts are for two reference years, 2010 (assumed to represent the first year of operation of the new lines) and 2021.

While the forecast for the Orange Line in the Implementation Plan was based on a different alignment2 than the one considered for the monorail in this analysis, this

1 TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd., for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning: Bangkok Mass

Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004

2 The original alignment of the Orange Line addressed in the Implementation Plan would have involved its construction underground for

about 21 km of its total length of 24 km. The alignment considered in our proposal would involve elevation of the line for most of its length,

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was not considered to invalidate the use of this forecast for our analysis, since both alignments would form part of essentially the same network. The Yellow Line, however, was excluded from this network, since it was only added after the release of the Implementation Plan.

Our approach was then to use the boarding forecast for the Orange Line as a basis for generating traffic demand forecasts for the Yellow Line. This was achieved by computing forecast trip rates for the Orange Line based on forecasts of the population in its catchment area, and then applying these rates to the forecast population in the catchment area for the Yellow Line, as demonstrated in Table 4.1.

The resulting ridership forecasts for the Yellow Line and their addition to the total forecasts for the future Bangkok Mass Transit network are shown in Table 4.2.

The maximum passenger demand on each line during the morning peak hour, or the maximum line loading, was determined as a basis for estimating rolling stock requirements. Estimates of the daily maximum line loading for the Orange Line as given in the Implementation Plan were used to derive estimates for the Yellow Line. This was done by applying the ridership ratio between the Orange and Yellow Lines to the maximum line loading of the Orange Line, as shown in Table 4.3. The peak load factor, representing the proportion of daily ridership occurring during the peak hour, was assumed to be 10 per cent, as also assumed in the Implementation Plan.

with the exception of a small section which would pass beneath the area near the Chitralada Palace. Our proposal would involve elevation of

the line above Klong Saen Sab, thereby avoiding the need to construct it beneath Ramkamhaeng Road.

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Table 4.1 Orange and Yellow Line Traffic Demand Forecasts

Population/daily boarding forecast Line Constituent districts in the population catchment area 2000

(act.) 2010 2020 2021

AARG % 2010-2021

Orange Talingchan 161,090 237,730 312,366 321,012 2.8% Bangkok Noi 190,015 196,551 198,334 198,513 0.1% Pranakhon 98,247 96,594 97,378 97,457 0.1% Payathai 228,669 236,572 238,761 238,981 0.1% Huaykwang 310,262 369,554 380,507 381,620 0.3% Bangkapi 376,602 462,433 624,813 643,903 3.1% Buengkum 294,672 473,293 639,434 658,965 3.1% Minburi 137,426 176,073 234,464 241,276 2.9%

Total 1,798,983 2,250,810 2,728,077 2,783,748 2.0% Boardings per day 319,107 585,292 5.7% Trip rate per head per day 0.14177 0.21025

Yellow Chatuchak 226,221 253,350 260,935 261,706 0.3% Lat Phrao 190,803 294,396 397,752 409,902 3.1% Bangkapi 376,602 462,433 624,813 643,903 3.1% Suan Luang 175,000 206,490 270,000 2.5% Prawet 336,174 488,891 660,519 680,695 3.1%

Total 1,304,800 1,705,560 1,944,019 2,266,206 2.6% Boardings per day (assume same

trip rate as for Orange Line) 241,805 476,477 6.4% Yellow Line as % of Orange

Line (Ridership ratio)

75.8% 81.4% Sources: 1. Population forecasts: Conceptual Mass Rapid Transit Implementation Master Plan 1996 and Urban Rail

Transportation Master Plan 2000. These forecasts were prepared for a time-frame in 2020. They were aligned with boarding forecasts to 2021.

2. Orange Line ridership forecasts: Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004.

Table 4.2 Bangkok Mass Transit – Daily Boarding Forecasts (passenger no.)

Average annual rate of growth (%)

Line 2010 2021 2036 2010-2021

2021-2036

Green Line E-W 680,470 1,098,200 1,477,763 4.4% 2.0% Green Line N-S 606,023 1,193,590 1,606,967 6.4% 2.0% Blue Line - Circular Line 934,479 1,834,264 6.3% Blue Line - Bangkae-Thaphra 112,662 220,922 6.3% Blue Line-Total 1,047,141 2,055,186 2,765,759 6.3% 2.0% Purple Line 462,895 909,924 1,224,740 6.3% 2.0% Orange Line 319,107 585,292 787,333 5.7% 2.0% Red Line N-S 797,107 1,393,638 1,876,140 5.2% 2.0% Red Line E-W 682,225 1,385,709 1,865,374 6.7% 2.0% Yellow Line 241,105 476,477 640,889 6.4% 2.0% Total Bangkok Mass Transit 4,836,073 9,098,016 12,244,965 5.9% 2.0% Source: Study Team

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Table 4.3 Orange and Yellow Line Maximum Line Loading Orange Line Yellow Line

2010 2021 2010 2021

Max.Line Loading/direction/day (no.pax) 88,000 181,000 67,000 147,000

Max.Line Loading/direction/peak hour (no.pax) 9,000 18,000 7,000 15,000

Source: Orange Line forecast derived fromBangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004. Yellow Line forecast based on percentage relationship between future daily boardings of bot lines.

4.3 Selection of System Types (by selected route)

4.3.1 Concept of the Selection of System

In Section 3, the Study Team conducted a comparative review of eight systems and selected following two systems as the result of the first screening.

• MRT (elevated) • Monorail (Straddle type)

The Study Team here compared the cost and right-of-way of the above two systems in the context of the actual situation and determined a system out of the above two as the system adopted for medium transit system for Bangkok.

4.3.2 Factors for the Selection of System

(1) Outline of the selected routes

a) Orange Line

Orange Line is stretching in an east-west direction from Bang Bamru station of SRT to Bang Kapi area through Bangkok metropolitan area. Its length is 22 km including 2 km-length underground section near to the Royal Palace. And an elevated highway is running on Ramkhamhaeng street in the section neat to Bang Kapi. Therefore, the Study Team, taking advantage of the fact that slim piers are applicable for the monorail, planned the route on the canal (Khlong Saen Sab) along the street.

Yellow Line is a semi-loop line running in the eastern part of Bangkok metropolitan, and its length is 29 km. The route of Yellow Line is running on relatively wide streets such as Shrinakarin and Lat Phrao streets. There are crowded city block and an elevated highway at the crossing point with Orange Line in Bang Kapi area. Except this point, Yellow Line has a fewer critical sections than Orange Line

Figure 4.2 shows the layout plan of Orange and Yellow Lines. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the schematic profiles of Orange and Yellow Lines

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Figure 4.2 Layout Plan of Orange & Yellow Line

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Figure 4.3 Schematic Profile of the Orange Line

4-8

Figure 4.4 Schematic Profile of the Yellow Line

4-9

(2) Comparison of cost

The result of cost comparison is as below; (Section 4.5.1 covers the cost assessment in detail.)

Table 4.4 Comparison of Capital Cost

MRT

(THB mill.)

Monorail

(THB mill.)

Orange Line 50,598 49,532

Yellow Line 58,491 54,675

Table 4.5 Comparison of O&M Cost

MRT

(THB mill.)

Monorail

(THB mill.)

Orange Line 53.32 48.99

Yellow Line 44.66 33.12

a) Capital cost

Table 4.4 shows the capital cost of the monorail is cheaper both in Orange and Yellow Lines; however, differences between two systems are small.

The difference in Orange Line is smaller than that in Yellow Line. The reasons are as follows;

• The monorail requires more numbers of vehicles than MRT does due to smaller transit capacity per one vehicle.

• The cross-sectional surface of the monorail in the underground section is larger than that of MRT.

Regarding Yellow Line, the monorail is much more advantageous in cost due to no underground section.

b) O&M cost

Comparing to the capital cost comparison (Table 4.4), the superiority of the monorail is outstanding in O&M cost comparison (Table 4.5). The reasons are as follows;

• The monorail requires smaller maintenance cost due to simple structure.

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• The power consumption of the monorail is smaller. • It is possible to decrease the number of staff by laboursaving measure such as

one-man operation.

(3) Economic evaluation

The detail of the economic evaluation is described in Section 4.5.2. The comparison of EIRR (economic internal rate of return) is as below;

Table 4.6 Comparison of EIRR

MRT Monorail

Orange Line 16.9％ 17.6％

Yellow Line 12.7％ 14.1％

Since the long-term cost of capital procurement is around 12% generally adopted for similar construction projects in Thailand, the Study Team sets 12% as criteria for EIRR comparison. EIRR in all cases is over 12%; however, it should be noted that EIRR of monorail is higher than that of MRT both in Orange Line and Yellow Line.

From the above comparisons, it can be said that the monorail is superior to MRT in economic evaluation.

(4) Characteristics and differences of structure

Figure 4.5 shows the characteristics and differences of elevated and underground structure both of monorail and MRT.

As for the structure of the monorail, the noteworthy character is the beam structure, of which superstructure and sub-structure are slim. On the other hand, the elevated structure of MRT is slab structure.

The beam structure occupies smaller space and has flexibility of layout and cross section. These features are reflected on the construction cost.

In the environmental aspect such as sunshine, landscape and air pollution, the monorail is superior.

However, in the case of underground structure, the cross-sectional surface of the monorail is larger and the construction cost becomes higher because the clearance of the monorail is higher than that of MRT.

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MRT Monorail

Ele

vate

d S

truc

ture

s

Und

ergr

ound

Str

uctu

res

Figure 4.5 Image of the Difference between MRT Structures and Monorail Structures

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(5) Emergency evacuation

In emergency situations like vehicle fire, passengers of MRT can escape out of vehicles through doors and evacuate on tracks by walk. On the other hand, passengers of the monorail can not escape out of vehicles due to beam structure.

As preparedness in emergencies, following measures are taken in Japan in order to ensure the safety; (refer to Figure 4.6)

• It is possible to move to other vehicles through walk-through doors. • There are ropes in vehicles for descending to the ground. • Passenger on disabled train can escape through doors to a rescue train

alongside.

• Unburnable materials are used for vehicle.

Figure 4.7 shows samples of evacuation passage installed to a girder or in between two girders. In those cases, the occupied space becomes larger by just that of evacuation passage; however, the evacuation passage does not spoil the superiority of the monorail in cost and environmental aspect.

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Figure 4.6 Evacuation Plan of Monorail in Emergencies in Japan

TRAIN TO TRAIN evacuation on opposite side of track

: Passenger evacuation flow

: Walkthrough provision, Side sliding door

Rescue Train

Disabled Train

TRAIN TO GROUND evacuation

By slow down rope

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(Evacuation passage installed to a girder)

(Evacuation passage in between two girders)

Figure 4.7 Samples of Evacuation Passage

4.3.3 Determination of System

The Study Team selected the monorail as a system for medium transit system for Bangkok. The reasons are as below;

• The monorail is superior to MRT in cost and economic evaluation. • In the case of elevated structure, the monorail is superior to MRT in slim

structure, flexibility of line shape and less impact to environment.

• The monorail system can cope with emergencies.

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4.4 Construction Methodology and Schedule

4.4.1 Features of the Construction of Monorail

In order to minimize the construction impact on surrounding neighbourhoods, Monorail BEAM TRACK guideway can be constructed and erected with much ease to realise a fast-track schedule requirement. Disruption will be eliminated to a minimum level by；

• reducing the width of the right-of-way required for the column structure. • reducing traffic flow disruption during construction owing to that the columns

and beams are to be precasted at casting yard located away from the installation site and time-consuming activity at the site is only the placement of the foundations below ground level.

• delivering the beams and columns to the site at night and lifting into place by cranes before daylight, thus avoiding the disruptions to the congested traffic flow;

4.4.2 Construction Methodology

Figure 4.8 shows the image of the construction methodology of monorail.

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Figure 4.8 The Image of Monorail Construction

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4.4.3 Schedule to the Commencement of the Operation

The Study Team assumed that the operation of monorail would be commenced in 2012 as an earliest case. Table 4.7 shows the schedule of both Orange and Yellow Line.

Table 4.7 Schedule to the Commencement of the Operation Activities 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Preparation of F/S report

Loan financing procedure

Preliminary design & tender

Evaluation & negotiation

Detailed design

Construction

Commissioning

4.5 Broad Economic Evaluation (for each selected O&M)

The net economic benefits of constructing a monorail along the alignments of the Orange and Yellow Lines were assessed against the alternative of constructing MRT, along the same alignments.

The alignments forming the basis of this assessment are those described in Section 4.1 of this report. In the case of the Orange Line, the assumption of a predominantly underground alignment (as in the Implementation Plan) was changed to a predominantly elevated alignment (as investigated for the monorail system).

While the costs of the two alternative systems will differ, it has been assumed that each will generate an identical form and level of economic benefits.

4.5.1 Estimation of project economic costs (capital and O&M)

(1) Assumed scale and timing of the construction project

The scale of the project and hence the magnitude of its construction and operating (O&M) costs is influenced by the assumed spacing of stations. In this case it has been assumed that stations for both alternatives on both lines would be provided at intervals of one kilometre.

For the purpose of estimating the level and flow of the project construction costs, it was assumed that the construction of both lines would be scheduled over a five year

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period, from 2007-2011, with commencement of services being scheduled for 2012. This was essentially the same project timeframe as considered in the Implementation Plan, but with a readjustment of the construction start year from 2005 to 2007.

(2) Project capital costs

The project capital costs comprise:

• Land acquisition costs; • Utility relocation costs; • Construction (i.e. civil works) costs; • Electrical and mechanical (E&M) equipment costs; and • Rolling stock acquisition costs

a) Basis and underlying assumptions of cost estimates

Land acquisition along the alignment is assumed to be required only in the case of some sections of the Orange Line where it deviates from crown land in the median reservation of roads and is not following the route of Klong Saen Sab. In the case of the Yellow Line, the alignment would follow the median reservation of public roads for its entire length of 28.6 km and would not require land acquisition for the elevated structures. However in the case of land area required for a depot the Yellow Line would need land acquisition because it would not be able to use the existing Blue Line depot in the MRTA compound, unlike the Orange Line which passes by this depot. However, the land acquisition costs for the Yellow Line depot were excluded from this analysis for two reasons:

• no information was available on the likely level of land compensation costs in the areas likely to be suitable for the location of a depot for the Yellow Line; and

• their inclusion would very probably have a neutral effect on the comparative development costs of the two types of transit systems, since the larger unit area requirements per car of an MRT depot would effectively be cancelled out by the larger rolling stock fleet requirements of the monorail system.

In the case of the MRT alternative, the construction costs cover the construction of elevated structures, stations and the track-work. In the case of the monorail the construction costs cover the construction of the elevated guide-way structures and stations. Construction unit cost estimates for the monorail system were based on actual unit costs for the Okinawa monorail project, adjusted to reflect lower Thai labour and materials costs and then converted to Thai baht at the current exchange rate. Different unit costs were estimated for the different types of structures and

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stations3 likely to be required along the alignments of the lines under assessment. While generalized unit construction costs for the MRT system were available from the Implementation Plan, these appeared to be understated in relation to the nature and scale of the construction task and did not allow for any variation based on structure type. Thus, the unit cost estimates for the monorail system were used as a basis for estimating the unit construction costs of the MRT system. In the case of structures, MRT costs were assumed to be 40 per cent higher than those of the monorail costs, owing to the heavier structures required for the MRT system. On the other hand, owing to the larger cross section dimensions of tunnels for the monorail system, the tunneling costs of the MRT were assumed to be 20 per cent lower than those of the monorail. Civil costs for station construction were combined with the cost of E&M equipment installation for stations (which includes the cost of escalator and lift installations, but excludes cost of automatic ticket collection installations). The costs of the MRT elevated stations were assumed to be 20 per cent greater than those of the monorail, while the costs for MRT underground stations were assumed to be 10 per cent lower than those of the monorail.

Electrical and Mechanical (E&M) costs include the costs of the electrical power distribution system, the signaling and control system and the automatic ticket collection system. For the MRT system, these costs were derived from unit costs given in the Implementation Plan. They are somewhat lower than the costs estimated for the monorail system (about THB 280 million per line-km, as compared with THB 363 million per line-km for the monorail), but comprise the same types of component costs.

Rolling stock acquisition costs were estimated for both the monorail and the alternative MRT system on the basis of the number of cars required to satisfy the peak hour passenger boardings, assuming a near crush passenger density per car (about 7 persons, per m2, per car). Using this crush loading factor, the maximum passenger capacity of MRT cars was calculated at about 350 passengers and that of monorail cars at about 200 passengers, or about 60 per cent of the maximum passenger capacity of the MRT cars. However, the acquisition cost per car for the monorail system is slightly cheaper than that of the MRT system (THB 54 million vs. THB 57 million). In estimating the fleet requirement for both systems on both lines, allowance was made for a maintenance reserve (at 10% of the net fleet requirement). The commercial life of cars for both systems was assumed to be 15 years and the

3 Along the Orange Line it is exoected that there would be five different types of structures (Standard Elevated, Special Elevated, Bridge,

Canal, and Underground) and four different types of stations (Standard Elevated, Special Elevated, Canal and Underground) while along the

Yellow Line it is expected that there would be only a single type of structure and station (Standard Elevated).

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flow of economic costs for rolling stock acquisition was adjusted to include an allowance for fleet replacement in accordance with a retirement schedule based on the commercial life assumption. The operating fleet requirements of both systems at the end of the forecast period (the year 2041) were estimated as follows:

MRT 131 cars Orange Line

Monorail 231 cars

MRT 137 cars Yellow Line

Monorail 248 cars

b) Shadow price assumptions for economic cost calculation

Shadow price factors must be applied to the estimated financial costs of the project in order to calculate economic costs for the purposes of the economic evaluation. These factors, which mainly have the effect of excluding government duties, taxes and charges from the cost flows in the economic evaluation, were derived from the Implementation Plan4 and are as follows:

• Design and construction supervision costs: 0.92 • Construction and E&M costs: 0.88 • Rolling stock acquisition costs: 0.84 • Operating and Maintenance costs: 0.92

c) Capital cost estimates

The resulting capital cost estimates for the construction of alternative MRT and monorail systems on the Orange Line are given in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, while the corresponding estimates for the Yellow Line are given in Table 4.10 and 4.11.

In the case of the Orange Line, there is almost no difference between the overall capital costs of both system alternatives (THB 50.6 billion for the MRT and THB 49.9 billion for the monorail). This is mainly due to the higher rolling-stock acquisition costs of the monorail system and to the fact that the Orange Line would contain an underground section of 2.2 km, where the cost of constructing the monorail would exceed the cost of constructing an MRT, because of the larger underground cross section of the former.

In the case of the Yellow Line, there is a more favourable cost comparison for the

4 TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd., for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning:

Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004, Chapter 7, Section 7.2.

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monorail which would have a lower overall capital cost than the MRT (THB 54.7 billion vs. THB 58.5 billion).

Table 4.8 Orange Line: capital cost estimates for MRT

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Table 4.9 Orange Line: capital cost estimates for monorail

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Table 4.10 Yellow Line: capital cost estimates for MRT

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Table 4.11 Yellow Line: capital cost estimates for monorail

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(3) Project Operating & Maintenance (O&M) costs

a) Main operating assumption

The pattern of train operations during peak and off-peak operating periods will have a major influence on the level of O&M costs for both alternative transit systems. For both systems on both lines, the number of operating hours per day would be 19, of which six hours (three hours in the morning and three hours in the evening) will represent peak operating periods and the remaining 13 off-peak operating periods.

Peak period demand will require short operating intervals (headways) of 3-4 minutes, which may be extended to 6-8 minutes during off-peak periods. For the MRT system on both lines train formations during peak periods will comprise three cars initially, increasing to six cars within 11 years. For the monorail system on the Orange Line peak hour train formations will comprise six cars throughout the forecast timeframe, but on the Yellow Line will start at four cars, increasing to 6 cars within 11 years.

Similar staffing requirements will be apply to both systems, except that the absence of platform security doors on the MRT may require that trains be crewed by two persons (a driver and a train guard) instead of only a driver as will be the case with the monorail system. Otherwise the same staffing ratios have been assumed for both systems.

b) Unit O&M costs

There are significant variances between the two systems in the case of some of the O&M component costs. The heavier MRT cars consume electrical energy at the rate of 7.5 Kwh per car-km, whereas the lighter monorail cars consume only 2.7 Kwh per car-km. In addition, while rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance costs in the case of the monorail are estimated respectively at rates per car-km and per line-km/per station, the infrastructure and rolling stock maintenance costs of the MRT were estimated as a proportion of capital cost, resulting in significantly higher unit costs.

c) O&M cost estimates

Samples of the costing sheets developed for the purpose of estimating O&M costs for the monorail operation on both lines are given in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. A similar approach was used for the estimation of O&M costs for the MRT.

The unit economic O&M costs per route-km for both project alternatives as at the end of the forecast period (2041) is shown in Table 4.5 of Section 4.3.

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Table 4.12 Monorail O&M costs for Orange Line

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Table 4.13 Monorail O&M costs for Yellow Line

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4.5.2 Estimation of Project Economic Benefits

The Mass Transit Implementation Plan of 2004 contains estimates of five types of economic benefit which were considered likely to result from the diversion of commuter traffic from the urban road network to the Bangkok Mass Transit network.

Benefits were measured across the entire mass transit network, comprising seven individual lines, by comparing estimates of costs in the “With” and “Without” Project cases, over the forecast period of 2010-2039. The five types of benefit measured included:

• Fuel savings – representing the cost of fuel which would be saved as a direct result of removing commuter traffic from the urban roads and carrying it instead by mass transit;

• Vehicle Operating Cost (VOC) savings –representing the savings in other road vehicle operating costs, such as the cost of vehicle maintenance, directly resulting directly from the transfer of commuter traffic from the urban roads to the mass transit network;

• Travel time savings for road users – resulting from a reduction in the total travel time of road users due to the transfer of commuter traffic from urban roads to the mass transit network.5;

• Travel time savings for railway users, or the saving resulting from a transfer of commuter traffic from the urban roads to the mass transit network. In this case, however, such a transfer would result in an increase in passenger travel time on the mass transit network and hence there would be negative travel time savings for users of the mass transit network;

• Reduced air pollution costs, or the reduction in atmospheric pollution and its associated costs resulting directly from a transfer of commuter traffic from the urban roads to the mass transit network.

With the exception of the fourth and fifth-listed items, the above benefits would mostly flow to road users, since development of the mass transit network would result in better utilization of the whole urban road network. Estimates of the savings to road users were prepared with the assistance of the World Bank HDM-4 Highway Cost model, while a generalized model6 was used to calculate the difference in the air pollution costs, by road vehicle type, between the “With” and “Without” Project

5 In this case, travel time was valued for different categories of road users at rates estimated in the URMAP project of 2000.

The Value of Travel Time Saving was estimated as VOTsaying = (VOT x VHTwithout project ) – (VOT x VHT with project), where

VOT = Hourly Value of Travel Time and VHT = Total Travel Hours.

6 McCubbin and Delucchi, Health Costs of Motor Vehicle-Related Air Pollution, 1999.

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cases.

The benefit estimates of the Implementation Plan were used as the basis for estimating the relative economic benefits of constructing a monorail, rather than a mass transit railway, on the alignments of the proposed Orange and Yellow Lines. This was achieved by distributing the base benefit estimates for the Bangkok Mass Transit network to the Orange and Yellow Lines in direct proportion to their estimated shares of the forecast daily passenger boardings for the whole network (see Table 4.1 above). This is considered to be a valid method since passenger boardings will be representative of the commuter traffic removed from the road system in the catchment area of the lines under study, and hence of the level of associated benefit. The MRT and monorail systems were assumed to generate identical levels of benefit on both lines.

The resulting benefit estimates for the Orange and Yellow Lines may be seen in the analysis of project economic returns in Tables 4.14.

4.5.3 Analysis of Net Economic Benefits

Calculations of the net economic benefits for the two project alternatives on the Orange and Yellow Lines are given in Tables 4.15 – 4.18.

The results of the analysis have been given in terms of three indicators of project economic worth:

• ENPV (Economic Net Present Value) • EIRR (Economic Internal Rate of Return) • BCR (Benefit/Cost Ratio)

The economic cost and benefit flows of the project alternatives were discounted at a rate representing the assumed long term cost of capital (12%) to generate the ENPV and BCR estimates.

(1) Net economic benefits of project alternatives for the Orange Line

The results suggest that in the case of the Orange Line there would be little difference between the net economic benefits generated by the two system alternatives (the EIRR in the case of the MRT would be just below 17%, while the EIRR in the case of the monorail would be a little over 17%). The reasons for this are that there is very little difference between the capital costs of both alternatives and both would generate the same level of economic benefit. However, both alternatives would produce economic rates of return in excess of the long term cost of capital.

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(2) Net economic benefits of project alternatives for the Yellow Line

For the Yellow Line, the assessed project economic returns are somewhat lower than for the Orange Line, with likely EIRR’s for the MRT and monorail of 12.50% and 13.97%, respectively. This result is explained by a combination of lower ridership levels (with a lower level of associated economic benefit) and higher capital costs owing to the longer route length of the Yellow Line by comparison with the Orange Line. The better result for the monorail reflects its lower capital and operating costs, as compared with the MRT.

Table 4.14 Estimation of Project Economic Benefits, Orange & Yellow Line

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Table 4.15 Economic Evaluation of Orange Line MRT

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Table 4.16 Economic Evaluation of Orange Line monorail

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Table 4.17 Economic Evaluation of Yellow Line MRT

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Table 4.18 Economic Evaluation of Yellow Line monorail

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4.6 Pricing and Fare-setting Options

The level of fares for mass transit systems in Bangkok will to a major extent be constrained by the fares on which the ridership forecasts have been based, as well as the fare escalation guidelines set by the OTP (Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning).

The mass transit fare structure, on which the forecasts in the Implementation Plan was based, is composed of a flagfall component of 10 Baht plus a distance component of 1.80 Baht per km. Thus the fare paid by commuters travelling an average distance on the Orange Line of 7.68 km (as forecast in the Implementation Plan for 2010, the year initially planned for service commencement) would be approximately 24 Baht.7

The OTP initially determined that mass transit fares would rise every 5 years, starting with a 5% increase in 2010 and a 10% increase every five years thereafter. It was noted in the Implementation Plan that on this basis fares would be increased by an average of 1%-2% per year, which would fall behind the expected inflation rate of 3 % per year, meaning that the real value of farebox revenues would fall by 1%-2% per year. In addition, since it is likely that O&M costs would increase at or about the general inflation rate, system operating margins could fall, threatening the sustainability of some operating concessions. It was suggested in the Implementation Plan that fares should be increased every year at the inflation rate net of the rate of cost reduction in order to maintain financial viability of operating concessions.

4.7 Financing Options

4.7.1 Farebox Revenue

Farebox revenue is calculated by multiplying the average fare by the daily number of boardings. As a source of revenue, fares have the disadvantage that their absolute level is subject to regulation by the government and, as shown above, they are unlikely to keep pace with the rate of inflation under the escalation rules imposed by the government.

4.7.2 Tax Revenue Disbursement

There is an estimate in the Implementation Plan that at best the amount which would be available from the government expenditure budget for funding of mass transit

7 7 TEAM Consulting Engineering and Management Co., Ltd., for Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning:

Bangkok Mass Transit Implementation Plan (1st Stage), May 2004, Ch 8-10.

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projects in Bangkok would be THB 120-175 billion over the next 6 years, or THB 20-47 billion annually. In the same report aggregate mass transit investment costs at current prices for the next 6 years were estimated at THB 521.7 billion, suggesting that at best the government expenditure budget could fund only 23-34% of the total mass transit system investment costs. Even then, the consultants’ estimates assume that mass transit would account for a growing share of the government expenditure budget as compared with other sectors such as education, public health and agriculture.

4.7.3 Mass Transit Development Plan

The Mass Transit Development Fund (MTDF) has not yet been implemented, but would involve raising finance for investment in the mass transit projects of Bangkok through the imposition of taxes and charges on road users. In particular, it was assumed in the Implementation Plan that the scheme would involve:

• Imposition of an additional excise tax of 1 Baht per litre on benzene; • Imposition of an additional excise tax of 0.75 Baht per litre on diesel; • Raising the new vehicle registration charge to 10,000 Baht per vehicle; and • Increasing the current registration renewal fee by 50%

The estimate of the consultants engaged for the Implementation Plan was that THB 142.9 billion would be raised by this means during the first 6 years of project development, out of an estimated total investment requirement of THB 521.7 billion (or 27%).

The advantage of the MDF is that the potential users of the mass transit system would contribute to its funding through their payment of road user taxes and charges, although road users living in rural areas would also be making a contribution to the fund. Its disadvantage would lie in the fact that there would be strong public resistance to further imposts on fuel at a time of rapidly rising fuel prices.

4.7.4 Mutual Funds

This option, which was assessed in the Implementation Plan would involve the government establishing a 10 year closed-end mutual fund with the objective of investing in the development of mass transit system development. This funding method would be similar to the Vayupak Fund which is a new funding mechanism already established by the government for the funding of other public projects. Since a mutual fund is a juristic person, its assets and liabilities are separated from those of the government and its debts are not considered public debt unless the government guarantees payment of the debt.

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Essentially this method would involve the offer of fund units to the public for investment in the Stage 1 development of the mass transit network as specified in the Master Plan. If at the redemption period the project still needs funding, the government would establish a new 10-year closed-end fund to finance the project. The fund would pay a dividend of not less than 4% per annum and the government would guarantee dividend payment in years when the project’s operating profit is not sufficient.

Unlike the existing Vayupak Fund, which has diversified investments in several businesses, the new mutual fund would invest only in mass transit system projects and the return on its investment would depend solely on the success of these projects and would therefore have a higher level of associated risk. Given its riskier nature, the consultants for the Implementation Plan have estimated that this source would generate no more than THB 18 billion, leaving the government to bridge the financing gap with funds from other sources, such as foreign investors, government agencies or the long-term savings of state enterprises.

4.7.5 Public Debt

The funding requirements of the overall mass transit system development are massive. Its Phase 1 investment cost of THB 521.7 billion would represent 4.8% of the GDP forecast for the initially planned opening year of 2010. As funding of this cost through public debt would have driven overall public debt closer to the ceiling, the government made the decision to develop the project without incurring new public debt. Thus the use of alternatives, such as government bond issues, domestic term loans and foreign term loans are precluded as a result of this decision, despite the low interest bearing loans available from some of these sources (such as JBIC).

4.8 Management Options

To date, the Bangkok Mass Transit Network has been developed and managed through operating concessions awarded to two companies:

• the Bangkok Transit System Public company Limited (BTSC), which was awarded a concession contract from the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration to build and operate the Bangkok Sky Train (or Green Line). This system currently has two routes in operation, from Morchit to On Nut, following Sukhumvit Road, and from Saphan Taksin to the National Stadium, following Silom Road; and

• the Bangkok Metro Company Limited (BMCL) which was awarded a concession contract from the Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA) to operate the Blue Line subway route from Bang Sue to Hua Lompong.

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The present government has long expressed a desire to develop the mass transit network under a single ticket system and to consolidate the management and operations of the network components under a single management entity. The Implementation Plan identifies three alternatives for the future integrated development and management of the mass transit network:

a) designate the MRTA as the system operator, or establish a new state enterprise to operate the network, as is the case in several mega-cities of the world, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Paris, New York and Los Angeles;

b) establish a new wholly government-owned company to operate the network as has been done in Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, London, and Toronto; or

c) award an operating concession to a private investor with the MRTA acting as a supervisory authority, which is the alternative chosen for the operation of the Blue Line by BMCL under MRTA supervision.

Under the first two alternatives, the government would provide 100% of the required investment in infrastructure and rolling stock, but would receive about 30 per cent of the operator’s revenue or about 30% of the operating profit through the payment of corporate tax. These alternatives would have the advantage that the required level of government supervision would be low and the required rate of return would be relatively low.

Under the last alternative, the government would commit investment in the rail infrastructure and the E&M system, while the private concessionaire would invest in the rolling stock. The government would receive revenue from the concessionaire in the form of a system rental fee and a share of the profits if the return on equity exceeds a reasonable level. Thus the advantage of this alternative is that it would relieve the financing burden on the government, while its disadvantages would lie in the high level of government oversight and supervision and in the high rate of return required.

The government has yet to make a decision on the form, structure and functions of a new integrated mass transit management entity for Bangkok.

^

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5. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Orange Line

According to the first screening 5 transit systems, such as, LRT, Suspension Type monorail, AGT, Elevated Bus and BRT are judged inadequate because of their insufficient capacity. Underground MRT is also judged inadequate because of the high construction cost. Consequently, Straddle Type Monorail and Elevated MRT systems are considered for Orange Line. (However, it seems that Thai Government is still keeping the scheme of the construction of Underground MRT for Orange Line.)

The demand forecast indicates that the PHPDT of Orange Line at 2021 is 27,000. This figure seems to be more suitable to MRT system than Monorail system. However, it will be very difficult to construct an Elevated MRT system on this corridor because of the narrow space above the road designated for the alignment. If an Underground MRT system is selected, the construction cost will be very high compared to the elevated systems. If a Straddle Type Monorail is adopted, the construction cost will be the lowest among the three alternatives due to the lighter structure and flexibility in the alignment design. Especially, if the monorail is constructed along the canal, not only reducing the construction cost, but also minimizing the affect to the road transportation.

According to the latest information, Thai Government has commenced tender process for MRTA system including Blue Line (extension), Purple Line (new construction) and Orange Line (new construction) from 15 February 2006. Although the details of the tenders are not known, since the world’s monorail manufactures (Japan, Canada and Malaysia) are included in the short-listed contractors, it seems that a monorail system is also an option of the construction. There may be a possibility to materialize the first Monorail line in Bangkok in these contracts.

5.2 Yellow Line

The alignment of Yellow Line is forming semi-loop running through Lat Phrao Road, Srinakarin Road and Thepharak Road. Due to this circular alignment, over capacity situation is hardly occurred even in the peak hour.

The demand forecast indicates that the PHPDT of Yellow Line at 2021 is 22,000 at peak hour. This figure is rather small for MRT System but most suitable capacity to the Straddle Type Monorail. Therefore, as a conclusion, a Straddle Type Monorail System is recommended to Yellow Line.

^

5-2

The priority of the construction of Yellow Line is not high. It will be after the Blue Line extension, Purple Line and Orange Line construction. If a Medium Transit system is selected for any of these lines, an application of the same kind of system to Yellow Line will be easy because Yellow Line is most suitable for such system in the sense of capacity, construction cost and aesthetics. If not, a strategic approach will be required for the introduction to Bangkok.

It has been explained in many countries that the adoption of a single MRT system is more economical than multi system in one city because of the utilization of common maintenance facilities and equipment. This may be true when the size of the city is relatively small. However, it may not be true for big cities, such as Tokyo and Bangkok, because the capacity requirements, land availability, environmental impacts, etc. are different line by line, and where passenger demand is relatively small, MRT system will be an over designed system.

Based on the operation and maintenance experience in the Blue Line, MRTA understands the demerits of a single system (monopoly) and is looking for a multiple system operation. However, although various studies have been made in the past decades for the planning of MRT system in Bangkok, no other option had been provided except MRT system.

Recently, BMA (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration) is planning to introduce BRT (Bus Rapid Transit) in some area. That is the first option other than MRT system. However, it is still uncertain whether the BRT system will be introduced or not because of political circumstances and the limited capacity of the system.

When Japanese ODA to Thailand is resumed, it will be an option to utilize the procedure of JBIC project formation scheme to promote an Medium Transit system to Bangkok.

Appendix A: Rendu of Orange and Yellow Lines

Appendix A-1

Orange Line

Appendix A-2

Yellow Line

Appendix B: Photo of the planned route of Orange Line

Planned Route of Orange Line

Appendix B

Appendix C: Photo of the planned route of Yellow Line

Planned Route of Yellow Line

Appendix C

Documents

バンコク都市圏 軽・中量交通システム整備に係る調査 · 2007. 9. 26. · 送力が小さく、バンコクに brtを導入する効果は疑問視されている。

バンコク都市圏軽・中量交通システム整備に係る調査 · 2007. 9. 26. · 送力が小さく、バンコクに brtを導入する効果は疑問視されている。