Features - Ministry of Defence...LCP Jeria Kua LCP Macalino Minjoot contents IssN 2017-3956 Vol. 42 No. 4 [2016] iii EdItorIal FEaturEs 01 The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary

pointer

Vol. 42 No. 4 [2016]

THE JOU

RNAL OF TH

E SINGA

PORE ARM

ED FORCESVol. 42 N

o. 4 [2016]

POINTERThe Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces

Features The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary Assessment by MAJ Pek Wee Kian

Cyber Power – An Age of Perpetual Disruption by ME5 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

Information Technology Advances: Friend or Foe by ME4 Su Juncun

The Role of the Military in Cyber Space: Civil - Military Relations and International Military Co-operation by Ms Caitríona Heinl

Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses by Dr Thomas X. Hammes

Pointer cover_Vol42No4.indd 1 8/12/16 5:00 PM

Editorial Board

The opinions and views expressed in this journal do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Ministry of Defence. The Editorial Board reserves the right to edit and publish selected articles according to its editorial requirements. Copyright© 2016 by the Government of the Republic of Singapore. All rights reserved. The articles in this journal are not to be reproduced in part or in whole without the consent of the Ministry of Defence.

Advisor RADM Giam Hock Koon

Chairman COL Ng Wai Kit

Deputy Chairman COL(NS) Irvin Lim

Members COL(NS) Tan Swee Bock COL(NS) Benedict Ang Kheng Leong COL Victor HuangCOL Simon Lee Wee Chek SLTC Goh Tiong ChengME6 Colin TeoMAJ Charles Phua Chao RongMS Deanne Tan Ling HuiMR Kuldip SinghMR Daryl Lee Chin Siong CWO Ng Siak Ping MR Eddie Lim Editorial Team

EditorMS Helen Cheng

Assistant EditorMR Bille Tan

Research SpecialistsCFC Delson OngCPL Oliver CheokLCP Jeria KuaLCP Macalino Minjoot

c o n t e n t s

Vol. 42 No. 4 [2016]IssN 2017-3956

iii EdItorIal

FEaturEs

01 The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary Assessment by MAJ Pek Wee Kian

11 Cyber Power – An Age of Perpetual Disruption by ME5 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

25 Information Technology Advances: Friend or Foe by ME5 Su Juncun

37 The Role of the Military in Cyber Space: Civil - Military Relations and International Military Co-operation by Ms Caitríona Heinl

47 Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses by Dr Thomas X. Hammes

c o n t e n t s

Book rEVIEw

67 Romen Bose, Singapore At War: Secrets From The Fall, Liberation and Aftermath of World War Two by Joshua Foo

PErsoNalIty ProFIlE

72 Richard Marcinko by Delson Ong

QuotaBlE QuotEs

CHIEF oF dEFENCE ForCE Essay CoMPEtItIoN 2015/2016 PrIZE wINNErs

editorial iii

POINTER, JOuRNal Of ThE sINgaPORE aRmEd fORcEs VOl.42 NO.4

Editorial

We mark the end of 2016 with our final issue of the year, Pointer Vol. 42, No. 4. As we reflect on all that has happened this year, one thing is very clear to us – the need to be vigilant and alert, always ready to protect our country and defend our sovereignty. As our Minister for Defence, Dr Eng Eng Hen said: “But one constant remains, whether in 1966, 50 years ago, today, and I suspect 50 years hence. Threats will remain, because this is the nature of geo-politics as history teaches us. Today, it is the threat of extreme terrorists.”1

The topics in the essays published in this issue cover a discussion on the evolution and development of The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) as well as a discourse on the rise of cyber power and the impact of information technology.

The essay entitled, ‘The Five Power Arrangements: A Contemporary Assessment.’ is by MAJ Pek Wee Kian. According to MAJ Pek, the FPDA came into being in 1971 as the third security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore. In his essay, MAJ Pek attempts to trace the evolution of the FPDA over the past forty five years. He examines the contemporary interests of each member state as well as the potential pitfalls and opportunities in the future. Finally, he assesses whether the FPDA will survive the next forty five years.

In the essay, ‘Cyber Power – An Age of Perpetual Disruption’, ME5 Calvin Seah Ser Thong makes an analysis of the importance and impact of cyber power. ME5 Seah highlights that since the introduction of the internet in the 1990s, the internet has been rapidly growing in terms of usage and that countries have to use the internet to their advantage as the world is moving to towards the cyber age. In his essay, ME5 Seah first defines the meaning of cyber power and explains why it is important in this day and age. Next, he briefly describes what perpetual disruption through cyber power is and how these attacks would affect the defence force of any country. Lastly, using examples of cyber threats that had happened in the

last decade, ME5 Seah describes how the examples would result in perpetual disruption by cyber power. According to ME5 Seah, cyber threats are wide-spanning, accessible and boundary-less. In the final analysis, ME5 Seah feels that cyber threats have become the norm and will continue in an age of perpetual disruption.

ME5 Su Juncun’s essay is entitled, ‘Information Technology: Friend or Foe.’ According to ME5 Su, Information Technology (IT) has advanced by leaps and bounds over the past few decades. ME5 Su examines the implications of the advancement of IT on Singapore and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). He begins by tracing the rapid growth of IT and along with it, the evolution of cyber warfare, which has opened up a new battlefield in the realm of cyber space and shown the capability to facilitate psychological operations and perception management. On the other hand, ME5 Su contends that IT has presented many new opportunities for the SAF to exploit, especially in the areas of learning and training, safety and administration and raising public awareness via social media platforms. By employing a combination of ‘Quality’ and ‘Quantity’ safety nets, ME5 Su feels that the SAF will be better able to counter cyber attacks, also reaping the many benefits of IT advancements to further enhance its effectiveness in defending the nation.

In this issue, we are also pleased to feature two papers which were presented at the Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC) Seminar 2015. Held at the SAFTI Military Institute from 8th to 9th October 2015, the GKS CSC Seminar was entitled ‘The Role of Technology in the 21st Century Battle-Space’ and jointly organised by GKS CSC, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the SAF-NTU Academy (SNA).

The first of these essays is entitled, ‘The Role of the Military in Cyber Space: Civil-Military Relations and International Military Co-operation’ and is by Ms Caitríona Heinl. In her essay, Ms Heinl highlights the significance of co-ordination that is key at both the national level within

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a state and between countries from a strategic and policy

perspective for cyber-related issues. She considers several

significant matters that arise in terms of the role of the

military and civil-military co-ordination for cyber security.

She also highlights a number of challenges in finding the

right roles and responsibilities for the military in national

cyber security and then focuses on military co-operation

and dialogue. Finally, she analyses how to ensure that

there are mechanisms to prevent further escalation when

militaries are involved in managing these threats.

Dr Thomas X. Hammes’ essay is entitled, ‘Technologies

Converge and Power Diffuses.’ According to Dr Hammes,

the convergence of dramatic improvements in the fields

of robotics, artificial intelligence, materials, additive

manufacturing and nano-energetics are dramatically

changing the character of conflict in all domains. These

developments will provide smaller powers —and even some

individuals—with capabilities that used to be the preserve

of major powers. According to Dr Hammes, this diffusion

of power has major implications on the conduct of warfare

and national strategy. This is because while massive

investment in mature technology leads to only incremental

improvement in capabilities, the proliferation of many

small and smart weapons may simply overwhelm a few

exceptionally capable and complex systems. Strategically,

small nations will be able to afford effective anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) defences that can defend not only

their territories, but also reach out to strike an invader’s

intermediate and home bases. They can generate many of

the capabilities of the most expensive current systems at a fraction of the cost, which will drastically change the calculus of intervention. However, the critical military functions will remain—but how they will be accomplished will change. Dr Hammes feels that rather than investing everything in few, exquisite and very expensive systems, it makes more sense to explore augmenting them and, in time, replacing them with systems that conform to small, smart, and many.

We are pleased to announce that the Chief of Defence Force Essay Competition 2016/2017 is now open for participation. We would like to invite all our readers to take part in the competition. Details can be found on the POINTER website: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer.

At this juncture, POINTER would like to bid farewell to our Chairman of the POINTER Editorial Board, COL Ng Wai Kit as he retires from service. We wish to thank COL Ng for his support, advice and encouragement. POINTER has benefitted much from his insightful observations and on a wide variety of military subjects. We wish you all the very best in the next stage of your career as you hang up your uniform, Sir.

We also bit a fond farewell to CFC Delson Ong. We thank him for all his contributions and wish him the very best in his future endeavours. Finally, we would like to wish all our readers a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! Happy Holidays!

The POINTER Editorial Team

ENDNOTES

1. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/details.html?name=27oct16_speech&date=2016-10-27#.WEYlk9J97IU

INTRODUCTIONPredecessors of the FDPA: The ANzAm and AmDA

The genesis of the FPDA can be traced from the

heritage of the British Commonwealth military

presence during the colonial era. The Australia,

New Zealand and Anglo-Malaya (ANZAM), the first

of such security arrangements, saw the defence of

Malaya through the period of communist insurgency

often referred to as the ‘Malayan Emergency (1948-

1960)’.1 With Malaya and Singapore seriously lacking

indigenous defence capabilities, the presence of

ANZAM provided an insurance against potential

external aggression and internal security threats.

Following Malaya’s independence in 1957, the

Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) replaced

the ANZAM as a formal treaty underpinning the

alliance. The AMDA was renamed Anglo-Malaysian

Defence Agreement in 1963, when Malaysia was formed

from the merger between the federated states,

crown colony and North Borneo. Unhappy with the

formation of Malaysia, then-Indonesian President

Sukarno launched a series of low-level military

confrontations against Malaysia (mainly Sarawak and

Sabah) and Singapore. The period of ‘Konfrontasi’

(Confrontation) lasted from 1963 to 1966 and saw the

infiltration of armed Indonesian soldiers into Malaysia

and Singapore to conduct skirmishes. In Singapore,

multiple incidences of bomb blasts occurred, with

the most serious occurring outside MacDonald House

along Orchard Road. Over a hundred Commonwealth

forces lost their lives for the defence of Malaysia.

Britain's ‘East Of Suez’ Policy

Shortly after the Confrontation, Britain’s Labour

Government rationalised its involvement in the Far

East, and announced in January 1968 that it would

withdraw its military forces from east of Suez by

1971. These took place in the backdrop of uncertainty

and tensions in the region. Apart from the continued

paranoia over Indonesia’s desires on the region after

its unsuccessful Confrontation attempts, there was

tension between the newly separated Malaysia and

Singapore. Not far from home, Vietnam was suspected

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The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary Assessment

by mAJ Pek Wee Kian

Abstract:

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) came into being in 1971 as the third security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore. This essay will attempt to trace the evolution of the FPDA over the past forty five years. The author then examines the contemporary interests by each member state as well as potential pitfalls and opportunities in the future. He assesses whether the FPDA will survive the next forty five years. Keywords: Evolution; Potential Pitfall; Opportunities; Survive; Agreement

of harbouring ambitions on the region. While not

intentional, the withdrawal of the British would

create a vacuum in the region, which then-Prime

Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew believed could be

“filled by Russia, China or anyone else”.2 Furthermore,

with the air forces and navies of both the Singapore

and Malaysian armed forces in the nascent stages of

development, a huge gap in air defence capabilities

was imminent.3

Formalising the Five Power Defence Arrangements

A series of Five Power Talks were conducted

between the members to seek the best arrangements

replacing the AMDA. The new British Conservative

Government which took power in 1969 merely delayed

the inevitable withdrawal. When Malaysia tried to

cut a separate bilateral security arrangement with

Australia, then-Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan

Yew reasoned that Singapore was a small country

without strategic depth, and that any attack on

Malaysia would also threaten Singapore.4 It was later

agreed that the FPDA should be predicated on the

‘indivisibility’ of defence of Malaysia and Singapore.

Finally, under the terms of its founding Communiqué

declared on 16th April, 1971, Australia, New Zealand,

the United Kingdom (ANZUK), together with Malaysia

and Singapore pledged:

“… in relation to the external defence of Malaysia

and Singapore, that in the event of any form of

armed attack externally organised or supported,

or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or

Singapore, their Governments would immediately

consult together for the purpose of deciding what

measures should be taken or separately in relation

to such an attack or threat.”5

The communiqué was strategically worded to be a

consultative forum. The FPDA was later formalised with

a collection of bilateral Status of Forces Agreements

(SOFAs), separately established by Malaysia and

Singapore with each of the ANZUK countries. This

was important, as a treaty would likely have provoked

negative reactions from countries in the region.

Nevertheless, sceptics doubted that the arrangements

would survive on a consultative nature, and dismissed

it as merely a temporary transitional arrangement to

allow the British to relinquish their commitments

east of Suez. 7

The communiqué was strategically worded to be a consultative forum. The FPDA was later formalised with a collection of bilateral Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), separately established by Malaysia and Singapore with each of the ANZUK countries.

FPDA GOVERNANCE AND EXERCISES

As part of the agreement, the ministers agreed to

set up a Joint Consultative Council (JCC) and an Air

Defence Council (ADC). The JCC would ‘provide a forum

for regular consultation at the senior official level

on matters relating to defence arrangements’, and

was attended by Permanent Secretaries or Secretary

Generals of Malaysia and Singapore and the British,

New Zealand and Australian High Commissioners.8

The ADC comprises one senior representative from

each of the signatories and is in charge of the

Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) located in

Butterworth, Malaysia, for the air defence of Malaysia

and Singapore. In the first decade however, the FPDA

only conducted a few exercises, and only four JCC

meetings took place.9 It was only in the 1980s that

the FPDA was re-invigorated, when the notion of

regular FPDA exercises was raised and instituted by

then-Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, with

support from the other nations.

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The annual Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs) was

gradually expanded to incorporate regular land and

maritime exercises. In 1981, the FPDA’s first annual

land and maritime exercises, Exercise Platypus and

Exercise Starfish were conducted. The FPDA continued

to upgrade its regular exercises to incorporate

submarine and electronic warfare elements.10 Due to

Singapore’s lack of training space, land exercises were

alternately hosted by Australia and New Zealand. This

continued till Malaysia and Singapore hosted Exercise

Kris Sakti and Exercise Lion Spirit respectively, on

their own grounds in 1987 and 1989. In 1990, the land

exercises were renamed Exercise Suman Warrior and

held in rotation between the five countries.

The 15-year absence of the Royal Air Force was

vindicated with its appearance for Exercise Lima

Bersatu held in 1988, where the British made its

largest contribution with an aircraft carrier. In that

same year, the FPDA Defence Ministers agreed that a

FPDA Defence Chief Conference (FDCC) should be held

every two years and a FPDA Defence Ministers Meeting

(FDMM) every three years.11

In 1990, the first FDMM was held in Kuala Lumpur,

where the Ministers agreed to shift the focus of

FPDA exercises from purely air defence to combined

exercises. This resulted in the back to back conduct

of the ADEXs and Exercise Starfish starting from 1991,

before the exercises were combined into a single

Exercise Flying Fish in 1997. In the second FDMM in

1994, the FPDA was restructured with the merger of

the JCC and ADC into the single FPDA Consultative

Council (FCC). The FCC was given the mandate to set

policy guidelines and provide oversight and approval

for FPDA activities including the scope and range of

the exercises. The third FDMM In 1997 agreed that

the FDCC should play a greater role in guiding the

professional development of the FPDA exercises.12

The fourth FDMM in 2000 laid the foundation

to what was said to be the greatest transformation

in the history of the FPDA: the designation of the

Integrated Air Defence System to the Integrated Area

Defence System (IADS), to give greater emphasis on

jointness.13 As a result, long term plans for joint

exercises were adopted and land exercises were

integrated with Exercise Bersama Lima. In 2003,

with the rising trend of asymmetric threats, the

fifth FDMM agreed for FPDA exercises to incorporate

serials to deal with terrorism, maritime security and

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).14

This signalled a shift of FPDA exercises towards

more non-conventionalism. The sixth FDMM in 2006

gathered in the shadow of the 2004 Boxing Day

tsunami, which signaled a need for FPDA forces to take

on greater roles in building capacity and enhancing

inter-operability in HADR operations.15 The inaugural

Exercise Bersama Padu and Suman Warrior in that

year involved maritime security and HADR elements

following the Ministerial direction.

The eighth FDMM coincided with the 40th

anniversary of the FPDA in 2011. A stock-take of the

FPDA was conducted and the Ministers reaffirmed

the key contributions by the FPDA to regional

security, and committed to improve co-operation in

non-conventional areas and explore capacity

building in counter-proliferation.16 The Ministers also

Established on 1st November, 1971, the FPDA framework covered the formation of the Integrated Air Defence System to be responsible for the air defence of Singapore and Malaysia.

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reaffirmed the strong commitment of their respective

nations to the Arrangements. Most recently at the

9th FDMM in 2014, the Ministers affirmed the mutual

benefits and professional value of FPDA exercises and

agreed to further enhance its professional value.17

CONTEmPORARY ASSESSmENTSOutlook

Some authors have opined that the FPDA had,

against all odds, survived the poor prognosis

by sceptics who doubted the viability of the

arrangements.18 Indeed, sceptics had dismissed the

FPDA as a temporary transitional agreement to provide

for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore until they

are strong enough to defend themselves, and a

sufficiently loose arrangement to allow the British

to relinquish their responsibilities east of Suez.19

Forty five years on, the FPDA has evolved and adapted

well to the new security challenges of the day. To

determine whether the FPDA will remain relevant in

the future, it is pertinent to examine factors for its

longevity and its contemporary relevance.

Psychological Deterrence

Since its inception, the FPDA had provided Malaysia

and Singapore with a certain level of psychological

deterrence.20 Any potential aggressors would have

to hazard a guess as to whether their attack would

trigger the rest of the four nations. Besides, any

attempts on Malaysia or Singapore would also likely

draw the involvement of the United States (US), an

ally of both Australia and the United Kingdom (UK).21

In the earlier days before the Malaysian Armed Forces

and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) were capable

of establishing its own defence, this psychological

deterrence had retrospectively appeared to be

effective. Besides, while not a military alliance,

the robust exercise regime of the FPDA exercises

have helped to hone the interoperability of the five

armed forces over time. An interoperable force was

more likely to pose a greater deterrence than a make-

shift coalition. Furthermore, with UK as a permanent

member of the United Nations Security Council with

veto power, maintaining ties with UK would no doubt

be advantageous in any crisis.22

Since its inception, the FPDA had provided Malaysia and Singapore with a certain level of psychological deterrence. Any potential aggressors would have to hazard a guess as to whether their attack would trigger the rest of the four nations.Enhancing Bilateral Relations

Besides the intended outcome of security, the five

nations were able to reap both political and economic

benefits from the FPDA. The enhancement of defence

relations brought about by the FPDA inadvertently

contributed to the warming of bilateral ties between

the member states. One important outcome was

The Defence Ministers being briefed on Exercise Bersama Lima, a major FPDA joint exercise involving air, maritime and land forces, which Singapore hosted in 2011.

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that the FPDA acted as an additional channel for

confidence building between Malaysia and Singapore,

two countries with fractious moments in their

history.23 The FPDA also allowed both countries to take

a multi-pronged approach to their bilateral relations

with the other ANZUK states. The close defence ties

between the member states also facilitated military

to military co-operation, as evidenced by the support

rendered by FPDA armed forces during the search for

the missing Malaysian Airlines MH370 in March 2014.24

The FPDA had also notably provided the foundation

for co-operation between member states to respond

to natural disasters as well as in United Nations

peacekeeping operations such as in Timor-Leste and

Bamiyan, Afghanistan.25

Complementing multilateral Instruments

Many academics have also concluded that the

FPDA complements multilateral instruments such as

the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in supporting

regional peace and security.26 The ASEAN Defence

Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) focuses on confidence

building, enhancing dialogue and practical

co-operation between ASEAN militaries and defence

establishments. The ADMM focuses on non-traditional

security issues and lacks the defence component.27

This is complemented by the FPDA, which retains

its focus of conventional warfighting despite the

inclusion of non-conventional elements.

SAFEGUARDING ThE INTEGRITY OF ARRANGEmENTS

The FPDA’s resistance to expansion had served to

safeguard the integrity of the arrangements. Even

though the issue of introducing new regional members

such as Brunei or Thailand into the arrangements

had been raised on various occasions, it had not

been realised.28 The addition of a new state into

the FPDA would invariably bring along its historical

baggage and disputes with other regional states,

leading to new sets of potential complications to

the consultative arrangements. With the successes of

the FPDA so far, the five nations are likely to adopt

the ‘if it ain't broke’ mentality, where such potential

complications were unwelcomed.29 As Malaysia’s Prime

Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak said in 2004 when

he was Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister,

the including of other countries ”would mean a major

departure from the concept of the FPDA … and we are

not ready for that.”30

EXTRACTING PROFESSIONAL VALUE

The FPDA exercises have evolved and adapted to

remain relevant. In the early days, the training and

professional guidance provided by the more established

ANZUK forces had helped sharpen the nascent

conventional capabilities of the Royal Malaysian Air

Force (RMAF) and the Republic of Singapore Air Force

(RSAF).31 As the military capabilities of the Southeast

Asian members improved, the five nations gradually

exercise as contemporaries and the ANZUK forces

are able to extract more considerable professional

training value.32 In the current construct, the five

nations continue to share their expertise in both

conventional and non-conventional elements of

security through regular exercises, courses and

seminars. Exercises in recent years had also taken

on the civil-military dimension, where the armed

forces co-operate with civilian agencies such as

Singapore’s Immigration & Checkpoints Authority,

Singapore Police Coast Guard, Maritime Port

Authority, Customs, and the International Red

Cross.33 The introduction of counter-piracy, maritime

security and HADR also allows the development of

capacity to address non-traditional security threats

that the FPDA nations face.

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The introduction of counter-piracy, maritime security and HADR also allows the development of capacity to address non-traditional security threats that the FPDA nations face.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Strategically, the five powers continue to see the

importance of the FPDA. The ANZUK countries, like

their Southeast Asian members, have strong interests

in the freedom of Sea Lines of Communications

(SLOCs) in the region.34 For the UK, the FPDA has

allowed it to maintain a legitimate presence in the

Southeast Asian region, where it has both political

and economic interests.35 Its commitment to the FPDA

had recently been demonstrated by the deployment

of a destroyer and six Eurofighter Typhoons halfway

across the globe to participate in Exercise Bersama

Lima 2014.36 The UK Defence Doctrine also continues

to articulate the importance of FPDA in UK’s collective

security.37 For Australia, the FPDA provided it with a

forward presence at Butterworth Air Base where its

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P3 Orion aircraft

conduct surveillance of the maritime approaches to

Australia.38 It also continues to staff the appointment

of Commander IADS with a two-star Air Vice Marshall

from the RAAF. For New Zealand, apart from the

SLOCs, the FPDA and ADMM-Plus provided multilateral

exercises for the New Zealand Defence Force.39 The

defence white papers of both Australia (2013) and

New Zealand (2010) outline that the FPDA allows

their strategic presence in Southeast Asia, and is a

proven security architecture which help addresses

contemporary security challenges.40

POTENTIAL PITFALLSPresident Jokowi, For Or Against?

In the face of positive developments, the future

of FPDA is possibly clouded by several uncertainties.

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen (fourth from right) taking part in the ASEAN Wave at the opening of the 9th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting.

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Firstly, as the FPDA was formed only shortly after the

Confrontation with Indonesia, it had been viewed

with varying degrees of suspicion by Indonesia.

The Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusuma-

Atmadja had once suggested in 1990 to ‘disband’

the FPDA and replace it with a new three power

defence arrangement between Indonesia, Malaysia

and Singapore.41 The new President Joko Widodo has

yet to make any strong statements against the FPDA;

whether he would adopt a peaceful, neutral or hostile

stance towards the FPDA, remains an unknown. Given

Indonesia’s recent actions to assert its sovereignty,

coupled with Jokowi’s vision to establish Indonesia

as a maritime power, it remains uncertain if the

FPDA, especially with the retention of a conventional

angle in its exercises, would sit well with the new

Indonesian administration.42

Inclusion Of East malaysia

Secondly, FPDA exercises had traditionally been

held in the South China Sea near to Peninsula Malaysia

and Singapore. The absence of the FPDA in East Malaysia

remained apparent and it was not unconceivable that

member states may start suggesting the conduct of

exercises there for a fresh start. This move however,

is fraught with potential complications. The IADS

traditionally does not cover East Malaysia and

extending FPDA exercises there would likely increase

the amount of Malaysian airspace available to the

other FPDA partners, something which Malaysia may

not be agreeable to.43 Extending the coverage to East

Malaysia could also potentially implicate the FPDA in

an unwanted Southeast Asian conflict should it arise.44

The Philippines retains dormant claims over Sabah in

East Malaysia, and Malaysia is also a claimant state in

the Spratly Island disputes. Conducting conventional

exercises in East Malaysia would invariably incur the

sensitivities of Philippines, China, Indonesia (who

shares the long border of Kalimantan with Malaysia)

and even Brunei.

Rising Operational Costs vs Values Of Exercises

Thirdly, with all member states facing rising

operational costs of exercising at large scales, FPDA

exercises must continue to maintain its relevance

and allow the five nations, particularly the extra-

regional ANZUK countries, to derive ‘value for money’

for travelling the distances.45 Should the value of

exercises be depreciated due to any reasons in the

future, it could become challenging for the extra-

regional ANZUK armed forces to justify their continued

involvement in the region. This could potentially

unravel the Arrangements and undo the good works

put in by the five nations over the years.

CONCLUSION

As Mr Peter Ho, Singapore’s former Permanent

Secretary of Defence has articulated, ‘the FPDA is like

a chameleon, constantly adapting to the changing

environment. Its physical avatar — IADS — has

transformed itself from an air defence system to an

area defence system, the only standing multilateral

defence system in the region. This must be a unique

achievement for a loose consultative framework.’46 The

Arrangements had also survived because it has been

responsive to the needs of all members and not just the

powerful.47 The five nations continue to demonstrate

commitment to the FPDA because they understood the

strategic contribution of the Arrangements towards

regional security, and also derive value from their

participation. Indeed, the FPDA remains a unique

security arrangement in the region that is difficult

to replicate in the current context. Moving ahead,

there is a quiet confidence that the ‘chameleon-like’

adaptability and its principles of consensus building,

equity and gradualism would afford it flexibility and

capacity to negotiate its way in the next forty five

years ahead.48

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BIBLIOGRAPhY

Ang Cheng Guan, “Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971,” War & Society, v._30, n._3, (2011): 207-225.

Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. (The Straits Times Press, 2012).

Crowe, Allan. The 5 Power Defence Arrangements. (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Konta Sdn Berhad, 2001).

Ho, Peter. “FPDA at 40: Still Effective and Relevant.” RSIS Commentaries 179 (2011).

Chin, Kin Wah. The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Chin, Kin Wah. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After.” The Pacific Review, v._4, n._3, (1991).

FPDA, Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 1971.

Keating, Gavin. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Case Study in Alliance Longevity,” Australian Defence Journal v._170, (2006), 48-59.

Ang, Wee Han. “Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Singapore Perspective.” Pointer, v._24, n._2, (1998).

Thayer, Carlyle A. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever.” Security Challenges, v._3, n._1, (2007): 79-96.

Thayer, Carlyle A. The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.

Wan, Gail. “Five Powers to cooperate in humanitarian assistance.” Cyberpioneer, 2006. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2006 /June/06jun06_news2.html#.VO3QsvmUfT8.

MINDEF. “Joint Press Statement on the 8th FPDA Defence Ministers’ Meeting (2011).” http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/of f icial_releases/nr/2011/nov/01nov11_nr /01nov11_statement.html#.VOm0UPmUfT8.

Chin, Kin Wah. The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies - Occasional Paper 23, 1974.

Huxley, T. “Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?”(The Pacific Review, 1991), v._4, n._3.

Rahmat, R. “UK prepared to deploy military assets to support FPDA in event of future Asia-Pacific crises, says foreign secretary.” IHS Jane's Navy International. http://www.janes.com/article/48537/uk-prepared-to-deploy-military-assets-to-support-fpda-in-event-of-future-asia-pacific-crises-says-foreign-secretary.

Sinclair, Paul. “Five Power Defence Arrangements: A New Zealand Perspective.” (CSS Strategic Background Paper, 2013), 9.

Bristow, D. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Security Organisation.” (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2005), v._27, n._1.

Emmers, R. “The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture.” (RSIS Working Paper, 2010), n._195.

Ric Casagrande, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements – Are They Still Relevant to Australia in the 1990s?” Working Paper n._17, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy (1993): 3.

Mak, J. N. “Directions for Greater Defence Co-operation.” Institute for Strategic and International Studies (1986).

Ball, D. “Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asia–Pacific Region.” Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence n._83, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (1991): 73-74.

Khoo, H. S. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If it Ain’t Broke…” Pointer, v._26, n._4 (2000): 107-114.

Asmani, A. “Malaysia open to review of its scope.” (The Straits Times, 2004).

MINDEF. “Factsheet: About Exercise Bersama Padu 2006.” 2015. http://www.mindef. gov.sg/imindef/press_room/ official_ releases/nr/2006/sep/07sep06_nr/07sep06_fs.html#.VO3aoPmUfT8.

Royal Navy. “Daring arrives in Singapore ahead of five nations exercise”. 2015. http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2013/october/31/131031-daring-arrives-in-singapore

Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, “Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 UK Defence Doctrine”, London, 2014, 5. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/389755/20141208-JDP_0_01_Ed_5_UK_Defence_Doctrine.pdf

Singh, D. “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Quiet Achiever.” (The Straits Times, 2011).

Ministry of Defence, New Zealand, “Defence White Paper 2010”, Wellington, 2010. http://www.defence.govt.nz/reports-publications/defence-white-paper-2010/contents.html

Department of Defence, Australia, “Defence White Paper 2013”, Canberra, 2013. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/.

“Indnesia sinks Vietnamese boats to stop illegal fishing,” (The Straits Times, 2014).

Kurlantzick, J. “Jokowi’s Maritime Doctrine and What It Means,” (The Diplomat, 2014).

features 8


Brett, N. J. “How Relevant is a “Revitalised” Five Power Defence Arrangement to Regional Security? A Regional Perspective, 1989–1995.” BA Honours Thesis, University College, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1995.

ENDNOTES

1. Ang Cheng Guan, “Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971,” War & Society, v._30, n._3, (2011): 209.

2. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000 (Singapore: The Straits Times Press, 2012), 62.

3. Allan Crowe, The 5 Power Defence Arrangements (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Konta Sdn Berhad, 2001), 9.

4. Peter Ho, “FPDA at 40: Still Effective and Relevant,” RSIS Commentaries 179 (2011): 3.

5. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security System 1957-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 176.

6. Peter Ho, “FPDA at 40: Still Effective and Relevant,” RSIS Commentaries 179 (2011): 1.

7. Chin Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” The Pacific Review, v._4, n._3 (1991): 193.

8. FPDA, Paragraph 6d to Communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on the External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 15-16 April 1971.

9. Gavin Keating, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Case Study in Alliance Longevity,” Australian Defence Journal 170 (2006), 49.

10. Ang Wee Han, “Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Singapore Perspective,” POINTER, v._24, n._2 (1998): 2.

11. Chin Kin Wah, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After,” The Pacific Review, v._4, n._3, (1991): 201.

12. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges, v._3, n._1, (2007): 87.

13. Ibid, 88.

14. Carlyle A. Thayer, The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 52.

15. Gail Wan, “Five Powers to cooperate in humanitarian assistance,” Cyberpioneer, 2006, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/ar t icles/news/2006/June/06jun06_news2.html#.VO3QsvmUfT8.

16. MINDEF, “Joint Press Statement on the 8th FPDA Defence Ministers’ Meeting (01 Nov 11),” http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2011/nov/01nov11_nr/01nov11 _statement.html#.VOm0UPmUfT8.

17. MINDEF, “9th FPDA Defence Ministers’ Meeting,” 2015, ht tp://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2014/jun/01jun14_nr2/01jun14_fs.html#.VO9OLvmUfT8

18. Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies - Occasional Paper 23, 1974), 14–15.

19. Allan Crowe, The 5 Power Defence Arrangements (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Konta Sdn Berhad, 2001), 3.

20. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges, v._3, n._1, (2007): 92.



23. Tim Huxley, “Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?” (The Pacific Review, 1991) v._ 4, n._3, 207.

24. Ridzwan Rahmat, “UK prepared to deploy military assets to support FPDA in event of future Asia-Pacific crises, says foreign secretary,” (IHS Jane's Navy International, 2015), http://www.janes.com/article/ 48537/uk-prepared-to-deploy-militar y-assets-to-support-fpda-in-event-of-future-asia-pacific-crises-says-foreign-secretary.

25. Paul Sinclair, “Five Power Defence Arrangements: A New Zealand Perspective,” (CSS Strategic Background Paper 9, 2013): 3.

26. Damon Bristow, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia’s Unknown Regional Security Organisation,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, v._27, n._1 (2005): 17.

27. Ralf Emmers, “The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture,” RSIS Working Paper, n._195 (2010): 20.

features 9


mAJ Pek Wee Kian is an Air Warfare Officer (Ground Based Air Defence) by vocation and currently a Staff Officer in Joint Research Department. MAJ Pek is a recipient of the SAF Academic Scholarship and holds a Masters of Chemistry (1st Class Honours) from Durham University, United Kingdom.

28. Ric Casagrande, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements – Are They Still Relevant to Australia in the 1990s?” Working Paper n._17, Australian Defence Stu ealand, “Defence White Paper 2010”, Wellington, November 2010, p. 10., and Department of Defence, Australia, “Defence White Paper 2013”, Canberra, 59.

29. Khoo How San, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If it Ain’t Broke…,” POINTER, v._26, n._4 (2000): 107.

30. Asmani, A., “Malaysia open to review of its scope,” (The Straits Times, 2004).


32. Allan Crowe, The 5 Power Defence Arrangements (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Konta Sdn Berhad, 2001), 54-55.

33. MINDEF, “Factsheet: About Exercise Bersama Padu 2006,” 2015, http://www.mindef. gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2006/sep/07sep06_nr/07sep06_fs.html#.VO3aoPmUfT8.

34. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges, v._3, n._1 (2007): 65.


36. “Daring arrives in Singapore ahead of five nations exercise”, Royal Navy, 2015, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and- l a t e s t-ac t i v i t y/news/2013/october/31/131031-daring-arrives-in-singapore

37. Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 UK Defence Doctrine, London, 2014, 5.

38. Daljit Singh, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Quiet Achiever,” (The Straits Times, 2011).

39. Paul Sinclair, “Five Power Defence Arrangements: A New

Zealand Perspective,” (CSS Strategic Background Paper

9, 2013): 3.

40. Ministry of Defence, New Zealand, “Defence White

Paper 2010”, Wellington, November 2010, p. 10., and

Department of Defence, Australia, “Defence White

Paper 2013”, Canberra, May 2013, p. 59.

41. Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements

and AMDA (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian

Studies - Occasional Paper 23, 1974), 201.

42. “Indonesia sinks Vietnamese boats to stop illegal

fishing,” (The Straits Times, 20140. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Jokowi’s Maritime Doctrine and What It Means,” (The

Diplomat, 2014).

43. Natalie J. Brett, “How Relevant is a “Revitalised” Five

Power Defence Arrangement to Regional Security? A

Regional Perspective, 1989–1995,” (BA Honours Thesis,

University of New South Wales, Canberra, 1995): 42.

44. Gavin Keating, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements:

A Case Study in Alliance Longevity,” Australian Defence

Journal 170 (2006), 53.

45. Carlyle A. Thayer, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements:

The Quiet Achiever,” Security Challenges, v._3, n._1,

(2007): 95.

46. Peter Ho, “FPDA at 40: Still Effective and Relevant,”

RSIS Commentaries 179 (2011): 3.

47. Gavin Keating, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements:

A Case Study in Alliance Longevity,” Australian Defence

Journal 170 (2006), 53.

48. Allan Crowe, The 5 Power Defence Arrangements (Kuala

Lumpur: Percetakan Konta Sdn Berhad, 2001), 14.

features 10


INTRODUCTION“The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.” – United States (US) Department of Defence (DoD)

2010 National Security Strategy1

The internet is a medium that has grown rapidly;

usage has increased from 16 million to 3.035 billion

users presently since it was created to interconnect

laboratories engaged in government research in

the 1960s.2 It has become the universal source of

information for people all over the world and has

inadvertently become a domain for a new kind of

warfare termed cyber war which is war protracted

by cyber means or cyber power. With cyber threats

like the Stuxnet Worm that appeared to target Iran’s

nuclear programme, governments around the world

have been called to arms to deal with this new threat.

Some have even claimed that cyber power is making

the Clausewitzean paradigm of war ‘outdated’ and

‘ever more irrelevant’.3 In 2011, the US DoD even

recognised cyber space as an ‘operational domain’ in

which its forces will be trained to respond to using

traditional military force.4 This is in addition to the

four operational domains of air, land, sea and space.

In the ‘The Rise of Cyber power,’ John Sheldon

mentions that some scholars believe that the ease

of cyber attacks “… heralds an age of perpetual

disruption.”5 This essay thus explores the legitimacy of

this claim. I will first discuss the domain of cyber space

and then define what cyber power means. Next, I will

discuss the possible reasons why cyber power is used

and define what perpetual disruption by cyber power

entails. I will then highlight examples of cyber threats

that have been perpetrated through the use of cyber

power. Following that, I will discuss the potential

reasons and conclude why cyber power will indeed

herald the arrival of an age of perpetual disruption.

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Cyber Power – An Age of Perpetual Disruption

by ME5 Calvin Seah Ser Thong

Abstract:

Since the introduction of the internet in the 1990s, the internet has been rapidly growing in terms of usage. This would also mean that countries have to use the internet to their advantage as the world is moving to towards the cyber age. In this essay, the author first defines the meaning of cyber power and explains why it is important in this day and age. Next, the author briefly describes what perpetual disruption through cyber power is and how these attacks would affect the defence force of any country. Lastly, using examples of cyber threats that happened in the last decade, the author describes how the examples would result in perpetual disruption by cyber power. Based on the author, cyber threats are wide-spanning, accessible and boundary-less, and cyber threats have become the norm and will continue in an age of perpetual disruption. Keywords: Cyber Age; Perpetual Disruption; National Security; Information; Warfare

Figure 1: Internet users’ continual growth6

THE DOMAIN OF CYBER SPACE

So, what is the domain of cyber space that cyber

attacks are perpetrated from? The term was first

coined by William Gibson in a short story in the July

1982 edition of the now-defunct science fiction

magazine, Omni.7 The term has since evolved and

there are a plethora of definitions to define it. One

of the definitions is that, “cyber space is a global

domain within the information environment… framed

by the use of electronics to… exploit information via

interdependent and interconnected networks using

information-communication technologies.”8 Simply

put, cyber space can be thought of as the global

nexus by which individuals and organisations share

information and interact.

While it has experienced phenomenal growth,

cyber space modestly started in 1969 when the US

DoD started a connection of four computers to link

universities and research centres. This was followed

by the creation of transmission protocols in 1972

to enable the exchange of digital information. The

database for the conversion of complex internet

protocol names to human-friendly Domain names

followed in 1983, and the World Wide Web began in

1989. The incessant increase of users has seen the

proliferation of cyber space into everyday products

such as cell phones as well as objects typically

not associated with cyber space, such as home

appliances. The interconnectivity of cyber space has

indeed transcended into one that is connecting all

facades of our life as illustrated in Figure 2. While

connectivity has been advantageous for us, it is

this same connectivity in which much vulnerability

has spewed from.9 Such vulnerabilities have resulted

from weaknesses in technology as well as improper

implementation and oversight of technological

products.10

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DEFINING CYBER POwER

It has been argued that the success of the internet

is what has transformed it into a potential domain for

warfare, and as cyber space becomes more critical to

a nation’s economy, prosperity and national security,

the more appealing to adversaries is the prospect of

incapacitating it.12 Through the use of cyber means,

there have been many kinds of malicious actions

that have been protracted including criminal acts

to espionage as well as cyber attacks which may be

carried out by nations, organisations or individuals.

This wide spectrum of cyber threats and corresponding

level of danger posed is depicted in Figure 3.13

While connectivity has been advantageous for us, it is this same connectivity in which much vulnerability has spewed from. Such vulnerabilities have resulted from weaknesses in technology as well as improper implementation and oversight of technological products.

Amidst the confusion amongst the many

catchwords associated with cyber space, what is

cyber power? In this essay, I will subscribe to Daniel

Kuehl’s definition that cyber power is, ”the ability to

use cyber space to create advantages and influence

events in all the operational environments and across

the instruments of power” and is used for achieving

the policy objectives of the perpetrator which could

be an individual, organisation or nation.15 Cyber

power is therefore premised on the creation, control

and communication of digital information via the

internet and other digital means. Information is the

key element in cyber power and it forms a dimension

of the Information instrument of power under the

‘Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic

(DIME)’ model. With the increased wielding of cyber

power militarily, we now bear witness to it becoming

part of the military instrument of power too.

While cyber power is commonly used to pursue

desired outcomes within cyber space, cyber means

could also be employed to pursue desired outcomes

outside the cyber space domain.16 As mentioned, the

US DoD has designated cyber space an ‘operational

domain’ to train and defend as they do in the other

four operational domains to support national security

interests.17 In comparison with these four operational

domains, there is one subtlety that makes cyber space

a problematic domain. It is the first man-made domain

which has continuously evolved since its creation.

Figure 3: Cyber Threat Spectrum of the various threats and level of danger posed14

Figure 2. Interconnectivity of the Cyber Domain11

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An observer has remarked that versus oceans and

mountains that are difficult to move, cyber space can

mutate and be switched on or off.18 While cyber space

has no regard to physical geography, it is intrinsically

connected and cyber power can generate effects in

all the other four operational domains. It is because

of this very interconnectivity that cyber space has

become, as Clausewitz said regarding a Centre of

Gravity (CoG) as, “the hub of all power and movement

of which everything depends.”19

DEFINING PERPETUAL DISRUPTION THROUGH CYBER POwER

While hacking and virus-writing began as hobbyist

activity not meant to cause serious long-term

harm, cyber threats have evolved towards achieving

financial and political objectives and have become

disruptive and destructive in nature.21 So, why do

individuals, nations or organisations opt to use cyber

power? Although cyber attacks are unlikely to be the

direct cause of casualties, they can still function as

effective tools for political coercion. Strategically,

cyber attacks can be employed as an effective coercive

weapon to disrupt networks in major financial hubs

or to incapacitate critical physical infrastructures

Figure 4: Cyber space – The fifth Operational Domain20

(eg. power grids). Tactically, cyber attacks could be

used as a brute force weapon to disable or disrupt the

internet-connected unclassified military and civilian

networks upon which major powers rely to project

conventional military force.22

Strategically, such attacks cause communications paralysis and hamper the communication of the elites between themselves and with the outside world as well as stifle their reaction to events in a timely manner.

This is similar to what has been famously coined by

United States (US) Secretary of Defence Leon panetta

as a ‘Cyber pearl Harbour’ to represent a scenario

in which adversaries launch attacks on critical

infrastructure so as to disable or degrade critical

military systems and communication networks.23

Thus, I would define perpetual disruption through

cyber power as never-ending disruption perpetrated

by cyber power. The disruption caused would include

the following effects defined by the US DoD: theft or

exploitation of data; disruption or denial of access

or service that affects the availability of networks,

information, or network-enabled resources; and

destructive action including corruption, manipulation,

or direct activity that threatens to destroy or degrade

networks or connected systems.24

ExAMPLES OF CYBER THREATS

With the earlier backdrop of why cyber power

is used to perpetrate attacks in cyber space, I will

next highlight examples of cyber threats along the

Cyber Threat Spectrum that could have been employed

by nations or organisations to achieve their policy

objectives. These examples illustrate that the effects

of cyber attacks are wide spanning, the cyber attacks

are highly accessible and the medium of cyber domain

features 14


is ‘boundary-less’, thus increasing their attractiveness

for the pursuit of political objectives.

Cyber-Terrorism – Attacks Amidst Estonia and Russia Disagreement (2007)

This was the wake-up call to cyber power because

it was the first case against an entire nation state.

Known as ’Web War 1‘, a continuous three-week wave

of cyber attacks was made on Estonia in April 2007

and swamped websites of Estonian organisations,

including government agencies, banks and news

agencies.25 These were Distributed Denial of Service

(DDoS) attacks wherein targeted internet sites are

flooded by thousands of concurrent visits which

overload the bandwidth of the sites’ servers. It has

been postulated by the Estonians that this crisis was

precipitated by Estonia’s disagreement with Russia

due to plans to relocate the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn

memorial. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

(NATO) responded by sending some of its best cyber

terrorism experts to perform investigations and to

bolster the Estonian electronic defences. Even though

Estonia is one of the most digitally connected states

in Europe, the Estonia defence minister conceded

that the difficulty in verifying the source of the

attacks made it an uphill task and he acknowledged

the presence of more safe refuge in cyber space than

in the space domain.26 NATO has since established

a ‘centre of excellence’ for cyber-defence in Estonia

to combat such cyber threats.27 Strategically, such

attacks cause communications paralysis and hamper

the communication of the elites between themselves

and with the outside world as well as stifle their

reaction to events in a timely manner.28

Figure 5: Propagation of the Stuxnet worm29

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Cyber-Enabled Kinetic Attack – Delay In Iranian

Nuclear Programme (2010)

In 2010, the Stuxnet computer worm infected the

Iranian nuclear programme systems and apparently

delayed the programme by as much as two years.

Respected experts in the computer security field

reflected that the Stuxnet attacks were unparalleled

and one that nobody hoped to witness again. The

worm was designed to attack industrial programmable

Logic Controllers and it sabotaged the control systems

that powered the plant’s centrifuges.30 Authorship

of the worm remains unknown. The attack is highly

significant, as it burst existing security assumptions

by damaging industrial systems that were outside

the internet and was able to accomplish what five

years of United Nations (UN) Security Resolutions

could not.31 The Stuxnet were reported as efforts

by America and Israeli to undermine the Iranian

pursuit of a nuclear bomb after unnamed officials

linked with the programme leaked the story.32 It is

reported that unlike DDoS attacks that could take a

few days or weeks to clear up, Stuxnet-like attacks

can potentially set back their victims by many years.33

Strategically, such attacks could be carried out as

‘special operations’ against an enemy’s vulnerabilities

and cause disruption by attacking his CoG such as

cyber-infrastructure and networks.

Figure 6: Actual profile of US Admiral James Stavridis.

Cyber-Espionage – Sham Facebook Account Of Nato Commander (2011)

In 2011, British government officials, Defence

Ministry officials and senior military officers were

deceived into befriending someone impersonating as

US Navy Admiral James Stavridis in Facebook.34 This

allowed their information to be compromised. Even

though the fake Facebook account was deleted within

28 hours of being exposed, it was difficult to trace

the creator of the account. A NATO spokesperson

acknowledged that this was not the first occurrence

of someone impersonating an allied commander

in the internet. A Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) executive assistant director correspondingly

admitted that the FBI has witnessed thousands of

breaches monthly due to inherent vulnerabilities in

infrastructure. He further proclaimed that the FBI

knew the capabilities possessed by the foreign states

as well as the information that they were targeting.

Strategically, such sham attempts to illicitly obtain

sensitive information and falsify messages from

persons in positions of command and authority,

mislead, confuse as well as create mistrust within

organisations.35

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Cyber Attack – Ukraine And Russia Cyber Conflict (2014)

The on-going hostilities between Ukraine and

Russia are mirrored by a corresponding cyber war

between the two countries, as evidenced by an

analysis of internet traffic. In one instance, a total

of 22 Ukrainian computer networks were reportedly

infected by the sophisticated ‘Snake’ virus.36 They

included computer networks that were run by the

Kiev government. The number of cyber attacks traded

between them appeared to have risen sharply in

parallel with worsening relations due to the overthrow

of the Yanukovych government and the annexation

of Crimea. The cyber attacks were persecuted by a

combination of state forces, criminal organisations

as well as independent ‘patriotic hackers’. Activists

and experts have suggested that this is a trend that

is likely to recur in future conflicts.37 Greg Day, vice-

president at FireEye, Inc had mentioned that the

spread of information technology had expanded the

boundaries for conflict and meant combatants no

longer had to be armed for conflict.38 Strategically,

these attacks aim to take down the networks and

infrastructure of the opponent without the need to

employ a military response.

wHY PERPETUAL DISRUPTION?

Based upon the earlier examples, it can be seen

that cyber threats can indeed be a means to aid

nations or organisations in achieving their policy

objectives. But, will cyber power herald an age of

perpetual disruption? I posit that it will, based

upon the following factors that I will elaborate on,

grouped into the following aspects of ‘Effects’, ‘Means’

and ‘Medium’. I will define ‘Effects’ as the result of

cyberattacks, ‘Means’ as the instruments of cyber

power and ‘Medium’ as the cyber domain environment.

EFFECTSLong Range and High Speed

Attacks in cyber space occur at high speeds and

seem almost instantaneous to human observers.

They subject defences to immense pressure, as the

perpetrator has only to be successful once, whereas

the defender has to be successful all of the time.39

Figure 7: Factors resulting in Perpetual Disruption by cyber power

features 17


Unlike the other four domains, range is not an issue in

cyber space and the geographical distance between

the attacker and his target is basically immaterial.

Attackers can literally target anywhere in the world,

regardless of geographical separation.40 In contrast

to the old serial form of war, this parallel process

of war actualises what Clausewitz termed the ideal

form of war: the “striking of blows everywhere at

the same time”.41 Thus, it would appear seemingly

unattainable and resource draining to totally defend

against all cyber threats and it is rightly pointed

out by Frederick the Great that, “he who defends

everything defends nothing.”42

Pre-Emptive In Nature

Typically, cyberattacks are pre-emptive in nature

and not detected till the effects are unleashed.

Malicious software can be embedded in an adversary’s

network and lie dormant till it is triggered and

causes the intended damage. Cyber attacks will

typically favour offence, thus in a crisis situation in

which defence is difficult or impossible, leaders on

both sides may feel pressured to attack before being

attacked, lest their non-cyber forces be rendered

ineffective by the adversary’s first strike. A surprise

cyber strike similar to a ‘Cyber pearl Harbour’ could

disrupt or disable an adversary’s military networks

and be followed by a conventional attack that

permanently takes out the adversary’s physical

weapons and/or networks before it is able to bring

them back online.43 Even for exploits that seemingly

require fewer resources, like the campaign against

Estonia, it is evident that the advantage lies with

those who take the offensive.44

MEANSLow Cost

The cost of entry into the cyber domain is

considerably low. Both the expertise and resources

Typically, cyberattacks are pre-emptive in nature and not detected till the effects are unleashed. Malicious software can be embedded in an adversary’s network and lie dormant till it is triggered and causes the intended damage.

required to exploit the cyber domain are modest as

compared to the other four domains. Due to its low

cost, many argue that it could level the strategic

playing field among nations. The former commander of

Air Force Cyber space Command, General William Lord

had admitted that a laptop computer and an internet

connection was all that was required.45 Colonel

Stephen Korns of the United States Air Force (USAF)

Joint Task Force has also pointed out that many

cyber weapons are now widely available and priced

affordably, such as denial-of-service software that

could be purchased off the internet and subsequently

launched upon the intended target.46 In fact, this is

clearly shown by the cyber attacks against Estonia

and Georgia in which the majority of perpetrators,

while not programming experts, had downloaded

easily available software to carry out their attacks.47

Furthermore, such attacks may allow the projection

of force by the aggressor state without the need

to subject its conventional forces to the perils of

combat and thereby reducing the anticipated costs

of the attack.48

Ubiquitous Nature

Cyber space is critical in the everyday functioning

of not just the industrially-developed nations, but also

the emerging and developing ones. This overwhelming

reliance on cyber space throughout the modern

society presents an attacker with an abundance of

targets, thereby resulting in immense pressure on its

successful defence. Cyber power is thus ubiquitous,

features 18


as it can enable the projection of air, land, sea, and

space power as well as influence the four instruments

of power represented in the DIME model. Our reliance

on cyber space is ever increasing and it would be an

easy means for the use of cyber power to potentially

do damage to critical infrastructure.

Accessibility

Cyber attacks need not be carried out by states;

in fact, the difficulty for non-attribution makes

cyberattacks attractive as non-state actors could be

the pawns for the state in carrying out the attacks. The

proliferation of cyber technologies has ensured that

non-state actors as well as individuals with personal

vendettas can increasingly exploit asymmetrical

means to their advantages vis-à-vis governments.49

Correspondingly, states could also partake in strategic

‘cyber-framing’ by launching attacks through proxies

such as non-state actors.50 Cyber attacks can also be

favoured by terrorists as the weapons are relatively

easy to acquire. The attribution problem would also

make them particularly attractive to terrorists, who are

often not only risk-acceptant but also may not have a

‘mailing address’ or infrastructure against which their

target could eventually launch a retaliatory strike.

Furthermore, many of the cyber attacks have shown

that terrestrial distance is immaterial and much of

the developed world’s critical civilian infrastructure

is relatively vulnerable.51

Psychology Of Domain

The domain of cyber space is a domain in which

would-be penetrators may psychologically feel

uninhibited as there is largely no backlash of physical

effects or trauma. From the results of the Walter Reed

Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) study conducted

on the psychological impact of combat duty on

soldiers, 10 facts were amalgamated in a brochure to

show how the sudden, intense and life threatening

nature of combat could psychologically affect

soldiers.52 The unpleasantries of combat represented

in the brochure could potentially skew the balance of

favour towards non-kinetic conflicts.

MEDIUMDifficulty Of Attribution

The draw of cyber power for many users is the

opportunity to covertly exploit it on a global level

without it being attributed to the culprit. As identities

are easily masked in cyber space, there is a challenge

to attribute attacks to the perpetrators. Even if that is

possible, there is added difficulty in determining if he

is a representative of a state, a state sponsored actor,

a terrorist or just a prankster. As governments cannot

be easily made liable for cyber attacks done by private

hackers working individually, retaliation becomes an

unlikely scenario. Consequently, there is a real danger

of misidentifying an attacker, thus harming innocent

individuals or targeting the wrong place.53 As such,

databases can be probed for classified or proprietary

data, and their owners may be totally oblivious that

their information is being compromised. In addition

to the innate complexities to attribute the identity

and uncover the motivation of attackers, the ability

to surreptitiously exploit cyber power makes it

particularly attractive to governments and other

actors.54

Uncertainty Of Rules Of Engagement

The rules of engagement of conventional warfare

are clearly enshrined by the Geneva Convention and

Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, these rules

do not apply in cyber space which is boundless

and borderless.55 While the pentagon has warned

potential adversaries of the consequence of carrying

cyber attacks against the US, there are uncertainties

on what kind of cyber attacks would constitute a use

of force.56 There is currently no consensus on how

regulations would be used to govern cyber conflicts

as well as the thresholds for when a disrupting cyber

features 19


attack becomes a casus belli for a more traditional

military response.57 Furthermore, there is no effective

international arrangement that performs law

enforcement in cyber space. Given the international

nature of many cyber threats, national enforcement

efforts will be less effective than an integrated

international effort.

Lack Of Boundaries

Cyber space has no boundaries which would

mean that national boundaries are not a sufficient

deterrence as perpetrators can conduct attacks

from anywhere as long as they have access to the

internet. This increased interconnectedness in the

world as well as the speed of proliferation of new

technological products offers more opportunities for

cyber attacks. Furthermore, the internet introduces

an ‘information frontier’ which does not possess

boundaries within it to demarcate the information

borders of individual states from one another. This

gives rise to difficulties for states to act on cyber

threats due to the lack of territorial boundaries in

cyber space.58 Furthermore, the characteristic of

cyber space allows multiple actors to operate in

the domain simultaneously from different locations

and potentially generate strategic effects that are

exponential to that of the other four domains.

Replicability

Cyber space is replicable and can exist in multiple

locations at once. Compared to the physical realm

which is destructible, cyber space is man-made and is

reparable. Every network can hold its own cyber space

which therefore results in a limitless number of quasi-

independent spaces.59

AN AGE OF PERPETUAL DISRUPTION

It is noteworthy that while the frequency of cyber

threats is likely to increase, its net effects still remain

relatively small and ineffectual as a standalone

weapon. However, as there are currently no global

norms of behaviour in cyber space, and because it is

so attractive and cheap to use, smaller countries or

non-state actors can use it to asymmetrically balance

larger states’ power. In fact, even larger states can

use it against smaller states as a proxy to war, to exert

coercive influence. Cyber attacks can therefore only

Figure 8: Factors culminating into Perpetual Disruption

features 20


become increasingly attractive and prevalent. Thus,

based on the aforementioned arguments presented in

the areas of ‘Effects’, ‘Means’ and ‘Medium’, I surmise

that cyber threats have become the norm and will

herald in an age of perpetual disruption as they are

wide spanning, accessible and ‘boundary-less’ as

depicted in Figure 8.

CONCLUSION

This essay has explored the claims that the rise

of cyber power will herald the arrival of an age of

perpetual disruption. Through studying the various

cyber threats that have occurred, we can see cyber

power exploited to achieve the policy objectives of

individuals, nations or organisations. I have shown

through the factors cited in the areas of ‘Effects’,

‘Means’ and ‘Medium’ that cyber power will indeed

herald the arrival of an age of perpetual disruption.

However, while the frequency of cyber threats is

likely to increase, its net effects still seem small

and ineffectual as a standalone weapon. Even if

cyber threats are unlikely to reach the effects felt by

conventional means, a threat is a threat nonetheless,

and we have fortunately not seen them become a

casus belli for a military response yet. Nevertheless,

with the age of disruption that is dawning upon us,

there is a need to take a defence in depth approach

so as to provide an overall resilience against the use

of cyber power.

ENDNOTES

1. US Department of Defence, “Department of Defence

Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” 2011.

2. Internet World Stats, Internet Growth Statistics,

http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm.

3. James Adams, The next World War (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1998), 93.

4. David Alexander, “pentagon to treat cyberspace as

“operational domain,” Reuters, 2011, http://www.

reuters.com/ar t icle/2011/07/14/us-usa-defense-

cybersecurity-idUSTRE76D5FA20110714.

5. International Telecommunication Union, “Statistics,”

2011, http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/pages/

stat/default.aspx.

6. John B. Sheldon, “The Rise of Cyberpower,” in Strategy

in the Contemporary World, eds. John Baylis, James

J.Wirtz and Colin S.Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013), 311.

7. Thomas Jones, “William Gibson: beyond cyberspace,”

(The Guardian, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/

books/2011/sep/22/william-gibson-beyond-cyberspace.

8. Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower:

Defining the problem,” in Cyber power and National

Security, eds. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart Starr, and

Larry K. Wentz, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence UP,

2009).

9. Martin Libicki, “Cyberpower and Strategy,” Global

Strategic Review 2010 Sixth plenary Session, RAND

Corporation, 2010. http://www.iiss.org/en/events/

gsr/sections/global-strategic-review-2010-946c/sixth-

plenary-session-6e03/martin-libicki-03c2.

10. The White House, “The National Security to secure

Cyberspace”, 2003.

11. Mary Johnston, “High Density power Requirement – Can

Your Data Centre Support It?” http://www.datasitecolo.

com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IoT-Graphic.png.

12. Martin Libicki, Conquest in Cyber space – National

Security and Information Warfare (Cambridge University

Press, 2007).

13. This essay will not be considering Cybercrime or

Cyberattacks that are persecuted without any policy

objectives and for personal gains.

14. T O’Connor, “The Cyberterrorism Threat Spectrum,

”http://www.drtomoconnor.com/3400/3400lect06a.htm.

15. Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyber power:

Defining the problem.” in Cyberpower and National

Security, eds. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart Starr, and Larry

K. Wentz, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence UP, 2009).

16. Joseph S. Nye Jr, Cyber Power. (Cambridge, Belfer Center

for Science and International Affairs, May 2011).

17. U.S. Department of Defence, “Department of Defence

Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,” 2011.

features 21


18. Gregory J. Rattray, “An Environmental Approach

to Understanding Cyberpower,” in Cyber power and

National Security, eds. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart

Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, (Washington, D.C.: National

Defence Up, 2009), 256.

19. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton University

Press, 1976). Edited and translated by Michael Howard

and peter paret.

20. Tyler Thia, “Country-to-country cyberattacks deemed

OK by users,” ZDNet Asia News, 11 Aug 2011, http://

www.zdnetasia.com/country-to-country-cyberattacks-

deemed-ok-by-users-62202005.htm.

21. Source: Chainsoff's Blog, “panetta is critical on the

security level for NATO networks,” https://i2.wp.

com/securityaffairs.co/wordpress/wp-content/

uploads/2013/01/warfareDomains.jpg.

22. Liff, Adam p “Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”?

The proliferation of Cyber warfare Capabilities and

Interstate War,” Journal of Strategic Studies v._ 35 n._ 3

(2012): 401-428

23. Leon E. panetta, “Remarks by Secretary panetta on

Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for National

Security, New York City,” Department of Defence News

Transcript, 2011. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/

transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5136.

24. US Department of Defence, “Department of Defence

Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,”

25. The Economist, “War in the fifth domain,” 2010, http://

www.economist.com/node/16478792.

26. Alan Chong, “Information Warfare? The Case for an

Asian perspective on Information Operations.” Armed

Forces & Society, 2013; 40(4) (2014): 599-624.

27. The Economist, “War in the fifth domain.”

28. Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, “Georgia’s

Cyber Left Hook,” parameters, Winter 2008-2009,

v._38, n._ 4 (2008): 60.

29. paulo Shakarian, “Stuxnet: Cyberwar Revolution in

Military Affairs,” Small Wars Journal, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/734-shakarian3.pdf.

Daniel Dombey, “US says cyberworm aided effort against Iran,” (The Financial Times, 2010).

30. Ibid.

31. Klaus-Gerd Giesen, “Justice in Cyberwar,” Florianópolis,

v._13, n._1, (2014): 27-49, http://dx.doi.

org/10.5007/1677-2954.2014v13n1p27.

32. David E.Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of

Cyberattacks Against Iran,” (The New York Times,

2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/

middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-

against-iran.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

33. peter Bright, “Stuxnet apparently as effective

as a military strike,” ARS Technica, 2010, http://

arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/stuxnet-

apparently-as-effective-as-a-military-strike.ars.

34. Emil protalinski, “Chinese spies used fake Facebook

profile to friend NATO officials,” ZDNet, 11 Mar 2012,

http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/chinese-

spies-used-fake-facebook-profile-to-friend-nato-

officials/10389?tag=content;siu-container.

35. Jeffrey Carr, Inside Cyber Warfare (Sebastopol, CA:

O’Reilly, 2010), 146–50.

36. Tony Morbin, “Russia suspected of Ukraine

cyber attack,” SC Magazine, 2010, http://www.

scmagazineuk.com/russia-suspected-of-ukraine-cyber-

attack/article/337578/.

37. Ben Farmer, “Ukraine cyber war escalates

alongside violence,” (The Telegraph, 2014), http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/

ukraine/10860920/Ukraine-cyber-war-escalates-

alongside-violence.html.

38. FireEye, Inc is a publicly listed enterprise cyber

security company that provides products and services

to protect against advanced cyber threats, such

as advanced persistent threats and spear phishing

39. John B. Sheldon, “Deciphering Cyberpower – Strategic

purpose in peace and War,” Strategic Studies

Quarterly, Summer 2011 (2011).

40. Liff, Adam p, “Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”?

The proliferation Of Cyberwarfare Capabilities And

Interstate War.”

41. Warden III, John A, “The enemy as a system,”

Airpower Journal; Spring 95, v._9 n._1, (1995): 40.

features 22


42. Brainy Quotes, “Fredrick the Great,” http://www.

brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/f/frederickt140989.html

43. Liff, Adam p, “Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”?


Interstate War.”

44. John Arquilla, “Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us,” Foreign

policy, 2012, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/

cyberwar-is-already-upon-us/

45. Glenn Derene, ‘The Coming Cyberwar: Inside the

pentagon’s plan to Fight Back’, popularmechanics.com,

2009, http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/

military/42774634.

46. Col Stephen W. Korns, USAF, “Cyber Operations: The

New Balance,” Joint Force Quarterly v._54, n._3

(2009): 97–98.

47. Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War: The

Next Threat to National Security and What to do about it

(New York: Ecco, 2010), 11-21.



Interstate War.”

49. Joseph S. Nye Jr, Cyber power.



Interstate War.”

51. Ibid.

52. Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, “10 Tough

Facts about Combat Broc

Documents

Features - Ministry of Defence...LCP Jeria Kua LCP Macalino Minjoot contents IssN 2017-3956 Vol. 42 No. 4 [2016] iii EdItorIal FEaturEs 01 The Five Power Defence Arrangements: A Contemporary