Facilitating Chemistry Teachers’ Understanding of Alternative Interpretations of Conceptual Change

Interchange, Vol. 37/1-2, 129-150, 2006. © Springer 2006

Facilitating Chemistry Teachers’Understanding of Alternative Interpretations

of Conceptual Change

MANSOOR NIAZUniversidad de Oriente, Venezuela

ABSTRACT: Historians and philosophers of science haverecognized the importance of controversies in the progress ofscience. The objective of this study was to facilitate in-servicechemistry teachers’ understanding of conceptual change basedon alternative philosophical interpretations (controversies).Selected controversies formed part of the chemistry curriculumboth at secondary and university freshman level. The study isbased on 17 in-service teachers who had registered for a 11 weekcourse on “Investigation in the Teaching of Chemistry” as partof their Master’s degree program. The course is based on 17readings drawing on a history and philosophy of scienceperspective with special reference to controversial episodes.Course activities included written reports, class roomdiscussions based on participants’ presentations, and writtenexams. A major finding of this study is that most teachers wentthrough an experience that involved: inconsistencies, conflicts,contradictions, and finally some degree of conceptual change. Afew of the participants resisted any change, but still raisedimportant issues with respect to conceptual change. Some of theeducational implications are: a) Similar to a scientist, a studentcan live with two rival theories simultaneously and as thestudent enriches his cognitive repertoire the conflict canperhaps be resolved; b) Resolution of a conflict may not follow alogical pattern of reasoning but rather a slow process (based onmotivational, intuitive, and affective factors) in which the hard-core of beliefs slowly crumbles; c) In science there is no absolutetruth, nor a scientific method and consequently there cannot berules, methods, algorithms, or pre-determined steps forintroducing conceptual change; d) Teachers’ epistemologicaloutlook is crucial in order to facilitate conceptual change.

KEYWORDS: History and philosophy of science, scientificcontroversies, conceptual change, chemistry teachers’alternative conceptions.

DOI: 10.1007/s10780-006-8404-2

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IntroductionResearch in science education has recognized the importance ofconceptual change based on different philosophical models (Chi,1992; Clement, Brown & Zietsman, 1989; Dori & Hameiri, 2003;Dykstra, Boyle, & Monarch, 1992; Gunstone, Gray, & Searle, 1992;Neressian, 1989; Niaz, 1995; Niaz & Chacón, 2003; Posner, Strike,Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Taber, 2001; Vosniadou, 1994; White,1993; Zoller & Tsaparlis, 1997). It is important to note that most ofthese models have drawn inspiration from various philosophical andhistorical sources (Giere, 1988; 1999; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970;Laudan, 1977; Toulmin, 1961). Posner et al. (1982, p. 214) suggestedthe following necessary conditions for accommodation of cognitivestructures leading to conceptual change as a rational sequence: a)Dissatisfaction with existing conceptions; b) A new conception mustbe intelligible; c) A new conception must appear initially plausible;d) A new concept should suggest the possibility of a fruitful researchprogram. In contrast, recent research has also emphasized the roleof extra-logical, affective, motivational, intuitive and contradictoryfactors in conceptual change (Cobern, 1996; Demastes, Good, &Peebles, 1995; Lee, Kwon, Park, Kim, Kwon, & Park, 2003; Niaz,Aguilera, Maza, & Liendo, 2002; Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993;Strike & Posner, 1992).

The model proposed by Posner et al. (1982) and the revised model(Strike & Posner, 1992) draw heavily on the Kuhnianconceptualization of change in scientific development. For Kuhn(1970) scientific progress is based on the displacement of oneparadigm by another and different paradigms are incommensurable,namely core beliefs of scientists do not permit rational debate amongdifferent research programs. On the contrary, the Lakatosianframework considers competing research programs as essential forprogress and at the same time commensurable. Students’ alternativeconceptions (misconceptions) if interpreted as paradigms in theKuhnian sense lead to situations that are not conducive to debate asKuhn’s incommensurability thesis implies that any one science canaccommodate only one paradigm. A Lakatosian conceptual changeteaching strategy, on the contrary would consider students’alternative conceptions and scientific theories as competing researchprograms.

Research in science education, psychology, and philosophy ofscience has recognized similarities between the reasoning processes

FACILITATING UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 131

of students and scientists (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Duschl & Gitomer,1991; Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1976; Kitchener, 1986, 1987;Neressian, 1989; Piaget & Garcia, 1989; von Glasersfeld, 1989). It isplausible to suggest that in the case of Thomson-Rutherford, Bohr,Millikan-Ehrenhaft, caloric-kinetic theory controversies (all theseepisodes are discussed in this study) an entirely logical approach didnot help the scientists to achieve consensus as they were all guidedby the hard-core (Lakatos, 1970) of their theoretical frameworks. Itis not far fetched to suggest that conceptual change is difficult toachieve, among other reasons, precisely due to students’ adherenceto the hard-core of their epistemological beliefs. Niaz (2000b) hasshown how even freshman students after having responded correctlyin one context that approximates the kinetic view of heat energy, fallback on the caloric theory of heat (hard-core of beliefs) in a differentcontext. In the light of this framework teaching strategies wouldhave to be anchored not only in students’ formal operationalreasoning ability (Piaget, 1985) but also experiences that can enrichtheir cognitive repertoire and thus loosen the grip of the hard-corebeliefs. Providing students with alternative / conflicting views thatconstitute rival theories for students’ thinking can facilitate such anexperience.

Progress in science itself has been witness to controversies(alternative / conflicting views) and Machamer, Pera, and Baltas(2000) have expressed this cogently:

Many major steps in science, probably all dramatic changes, andmost of the fundamental achievements of what we now take asthe advancement or progress of scientific knowledge have beencontroversial and have involved some dispute or another.Scientific controversies are found throughout the history ofscience. (p. 3)

The same authors, however, point out that paradoxically, “Whilenobody would deny that science in the making has been replete withcontroversies, the same people [scientists and philosophers] oftendepict its essence or end product as free from disputes, as theuncontroversial rational human endeavor par excellence”(Machamer, et al., 2000, p. 3). This clearly shows how the role ofcontroversy between rival / conflicting views has been ignored notonly by science educators but also scientists and philosophers.

The objective of this study was to facilitate in-service chemistryteachers’ understanding of conceptual change based on alternativephilosophical interpretations (controversies / conflicting views).

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Rationale and Design of the Study This study was based on 17 in-service teachers who had enrolled inthe course, “Investigation in the Teaching of Chemistry” as part of aMaster’s degree program in education, at a major university in LatinAmerica. Nine teachers worked in secondary schools and eight at theuniversity level (male = 6, female = 11, age range: 25-45 years), andtheir teaching experience varied from about 5-20 years. In theprevious year all teachers had enrolled in the course, “Methodologyof Investigation in Education,” in which basic philosophical ideas ofPopper, Kuhn, and Lakatos were discussed, in order to provide anoverview of the controversial nature of progress in science (growth ofknowledge) and its implications for research methodology ineducation. Teachers were familiar that basic ideas like the scientificmethod, objectivity, and the empirical nature of science wereconsidered to be controversial and questionable by philosophers ofscience.

Course content (Reading list)The course was based on 17 required readings and was subdividedinto the following sections:

Unit 1: History and philosophy of science in the context of thedevelopment of chemistry.

Readings: 1) Matthews (1994); 2) Adúriz-Bravo, Izquierdo, &Estany (2002); 3) Solbes & Traver (1996, 2001); 4) Leite (2002);5) Niaz (1998); 6) Niaz (2000a). Unit 2: Students’ alternative conceptions. Readings: 7) Furió, Azcona, & Guisasola (2002); 8) Sanger &Greenbowe (1997); 9) De Posada (1999); 10) Kousathana &Tsaparlis (2002); 11) Niaz (2000b); 12) Campanario & Otero(2000).Unit 3: Conceptual change in learning chemistry. Readings: 13) Niaz (1995); 14) Niaz et al. (2002); 15( Niaz (2002);16) García (2000); 17) Marín (1999).

The reading list shows that the course was designed explicitly notonly to incorporate important areas of research in chemistryeducation but also a critical appraisal of the research methodology,based on controversies and conflicting views.


Course Organization and Activities On the first day of class (2 hours) all participants were providedcopies of all the readings and salient features of the course werediscussed. It was emphasized that the course called for activeparticipation. As all teachers worked in nearby schools anduniversities, two types of course activities were programmed: Class discussions were planned on Saturdays of the 4th, 5th, and6th week of the course (3 hours in the morning and 3 in theafternoon). Readings 1-6 were discussed in the first meeting,readings 7-12 in the second meeting, and readings 13-17 in the thirdmeeting. Teachers were supposed to have studied each of thereadings before the meetings. Each meeting started off with variousquestions and comments by the participants. The instructorintervened to facilitate understanding of the issues involved. (Totaltime devoted to class discussions = 18 hours) Class presentations were programmed during the 11th and thefinal week of the course (Mon. to Sat., total time = 44 hours). On thefirst day of class all participants selected (by a draw) one of the 17readings for a presentation. Each participant was assigned 90minutes (30 minutes for the presentation and 60 minutes forinterventions and discussions). Each of the presentations wasmoderated by one of the participants. The instructor intervenedwhen a deadlock was reached on an issue. It was expected that theparticipants would present the important aspects of the readings,with the objective of generating critical discussions. All participantsprepared overheads/video beams for the presentations. During class presentations in the final week participants wereencouraged to ask their questions in writing, which were then readout loud by the moderator. The presenters were given an opportunityto respond and then a general discussion followed. At the end of eachof the sessions all written questions were submitted to the instructor,which provided important feedback with respect to issues, conflictsand interests of the participants. The same procedure was followedin all 17 presentations, generating a considerable amount of data(approx. a pool of about 325 questions). This data facilitated thecorroboration of participants responses to the three researchquestions in this study.

Conceptual Change in the History of Science Discussed in Class.The following episodes from the history of science were discussedexplicitly in order to demonstrate that even scientists face

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considerable difficulty when faced with alternative/conflictinginterpretations that require conceptual change:• J.J. Thomson propounded the hypothesis of compound scattering,according to which the deflection of an alpha particle by a large angleresulted from successive collisions between the alpha particle and thepositive charges distributed throughout the atom. Thomson’sinterpretation was, of course based on the hard-core of his conceptualframework, namely the plum-pudding model of the atom. E.Rutherford, in contrast propounded the hypothesis of singlescattering, according to which a deflection by a large angle resultedfrom a single collision between the alpha particle and the massivepositive charge in the nucleus. Rutherford’s interpretation, in turnwas also based on his conceptual framework, that is, the nuclearatom. The controversy between the two led to a bitter dispute.Interestingly, many textbooks consider the postulation ofRutherford’s model of the nuclear atom as a very logical consequenceof the data, and yet Thomson (an acknowledged world master in thedesign of atomic models, cf. Heilbron & Kuhn, 1969, p. 223) did notfind Rutherford’s interpretation logical. This episode was discussedin Readings number 5 and 14. • In order to explain the paradoxical stability of the Rutherfordmodel of the atom, N. Bohr postulated the quantum of action. Manyleading physicists rejected Bohr’s conceptual framework, that is, theyrefused to give up their own framework and thus did not acceptconceptual change. For example, Otto Stern objected, “If thatnonsense is correct which Bohr has just published [Bohr, 1913], thenI will give up being a physicist” (cited in Holton, 1986, p. 145). Thisepisode was discussed in Readings number 5 and 14.• Acceptance of the elementary electrical charge was preceded bya bitter controversy between R.A. Millikan and F. Ehrenhaft thatlasted for many years (1910-1925). Both Millikan and Ehrenhaftobtained very similar experimental results and yet Millikan was ledto postulate the elementary electrical charge (electrons) andEhrenhaft to fractional charges (sub-electrons). Holton (1978) hasdemonstrated how both Millikan and Ehrenhaft subscribed to twodifferent conceptual frameworks, namely, atomism and anti-atomism, respectively. Resolution of the controversy was notnecessarily a logical process but rather slowly the scientificcommunity found more merit in Millikan’s interpretation. Ehrenhaft(1941), in his last published work still argued for sub-electrons. Thisepisode was based on Reading number 6.


• Differentiation between heat energy and temperature has beenthe subject of considerable research in science education. Accordingto Einstein and Infeld (1938/1971): “The most fundamental conceptsin the description of heat phenomena are temperature and heat. Ittook an unbelievably long time in the history of science for these twoto be distinguished, but once this distinction was made rapidprogress resulted” (p. 36). Similarly, Brush (1976) has emphasizedthat, “the kinetic theory could not flourish until heat as a substance[caloric theory] had been replaced by heat as atomic motion” (p. 8).Niaz (2000b) has shown that an epistemological belief in the calorictheory of heat forms part of the hard-core of students’ framework andconceptual change requires considerable cognitive restructuring. Thisepisode was based on Reading number 11.

Evaluation All participants presented an Initial exam in the first session of the11th week and a final exam during the last session of the 11th week.Both exams were open-book (about three hours each) andparticipants were allowed to consult any material that they felt couldbe helpful. This study specifically deals with three research questionsbased on participants responses to Items 2 and 3 of the Initial examand Item 3 of the Final exam. All three research questions werebased on feedback provided by the participants during differentphases of the course activities.

Research Question One This research question was based on Item 2 of the Initial exam andstated:

According to Campanario & Otero (2000), Reading 12: “Students generally ignore (metacognition) that they have wrongprevious knowledge about the content of the topic under study andthe reasoning processes developed in learning science are notadequate. If a student thinks that scientific knowledge consists offacts, formulae, and data then his disposition to use cognitiveresources in learning and comprehending science would be differentfrom that of a student who has more adequate epistemologicalconceptions” (pp. 165-166). How would you solve this dilemma in yourclass?

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Research Question Two This research question was based on Item 3 of the Initial exam andstated:

According to Marín (1999), Reading 17: “Undoubtedly, the sequence: dissatisfaction – conflict – exposition ofa new idea – conceptual change, is not all that evident in the contextof the students’ cognition” (p. 88). Please respond to the followingquestions:• Do you agree with this critique with respect to conceptual changein learning chemistry? Explain.• What arguments would you provide in favor or against the ideaof conceptual change?

Research Question Three This research question is based on Item 3 of the Final exam andstated:

According to Niaz (2002), Reading 15: “As a prerequisite for conceptual change it is essential that studentsbe provided with opposing views that apparently contradict theirprevious thinking (alternative conceptions), and the two constituterival theories for students’ thinking” (p. 246). Please respond to thefollowing questions:• Do you agree with this thesis? Explain.• What arguments would you provide in favor or against thisthesis?

Triangulation of Data Sources The study was based on two main sources of data: a) Participants’written responses to the three research questions as part of theInitial and Final exams. This data helped to substantiate theresearch questions and consequently the educational implications; b)Participants’ written questions during the 17 class presentations (apool of approximately 325 questions, see Course organization andactivities). This data served to corroborate participants’ responses tothe three research questions and thus facilitated triangulation. Thetwo sets of data represented considerable amount of arguments,controversies, and critical discussions with respect to conceptualchange. Participants felt free to defend a thesis or present argumentsfor the rebuttal of an alternative.


Results and Discussion In this sections results obtained from participants’ responses to thethree research questions are presented.

Students’ Epistemological Conceptions This section is based on participants’ responses to Research Question1. Campanario and Otero (2000), Reading 12, present a critique ofresearch with respect to the alternative conceptions of students indifferent content areas. They suggest that researchers must gobeyond by making students cognizant of these alternativeconceptions and reasoning processes (metacognition) based on anepistemological framework. In a nut-shell, if a student thinks thatchemistry is about data, facts and formulae then his epistemologicalframework would not facilitate conceptual understanding. Hence itis important that both students and teachers be aware of alternativeepistemological frameworks that can facilitate their understandingbeyond that of simple diagnosis of alternative conceptions.Participants showed considerable interest during discussion of thisreading and generally there was consensus with respect to the needfor taking research beyond what is generally reported with respectto alternative conceptions in the literature. The following examplesillustrate participants’ thinking:

“By confrontation of students’ actual epistemologicalconceptions with more adequate conceptions. This task isfacilitated by interactive argumentation, for example in acontext in which a student has to formulate a hypothesis …”

“To understand that science does not signify only formulaeand experiments, we will have to abandon the conductivistlegacy of our teachers. … One way of doing this is that whileteaching a topic the following pertinent question be dealt with:how did we come to have a certain piece of knowledge. Thiswill require a historical reconstruction of the subject andfacilitate greater conceptual understanding.”

“Strategy of metacognition amounts to ‘learning to learn’, viz.,the teacher must know the contradictions between the studentsalternative conceptions and those of the scientists … one wayof doing this is to provide students a whole series of possibleresponses so that they can argue and reason and ultimatelyhave a better conceptual understanding.”

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Note: In order to provide reliability (triangulation of data sources) ofthese results, participants’ interventions during the 17 classpresentations (that included written questions, see p. 137 for pool ofquestions) were checked. It was found that similar ideas wereexpressed by 12 of the participants on at least two presentations.

More recently, Campanario (2002) has elaborated cogently withrespect to the resistance offered by both scientists and students tonew scientific ideas:

The history of science can be used with a metacognitivedimension. This implies taking advantage of episodes ofresistance to conceptual change in the history of science in orderto stimulate students intellectual curiosity and make them moreconscientious of their own misconceptions that result inresistance to change. (p. 1107)

Alternative Interpretations of Conceptual Change:Inconsistencies, Conflicts, Resistances and Change Research Questions Two and Three provided considerable source ofconflicts, arguments and discussions for the participants. It isimportant to note that Research Question Two was presented at thefirst session of the final week of the course, whereas ResearchQuestion Three was presented at the last session, and between thetwo the participants devoted almost 40 hours to reflections,discussions, criticisms, arguments, and counter-arguments.

This experience enriched their understanding of the issuesinvolved and Table 1 provides a profile of how participants agreed /disagreed to the propositions in Research Questions Two and Three.Participants’ responses were classified into categories depending onwhether they agreed, partially agreed, or disagreed on ResearchQuestions Two and Three (see Table 2).


Table 1.

Profile of Responses to ResearchQuestions Two and Three (n=17)

Participant ResearchQuestion Two

Research Question Three

1234567891011121314151617

AgreedPartially AgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedPartially AgreedAgreedAgreedPartially AgreedAgreedDisagreedPartially AgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedDisagreed

DisagreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedDisagreedPartially AgreedAgreedAgreedAgreedPartially AgreedAgreed

Table 2.

Classification of Participants’ Responses in CategoriesDepending on Whether they Agreed, Partially Agreed,or Disagreed on Research Questions Two and Three

Category ResearchQuestionTwo

ResearchQuestion Three

No. of Participants

abcdefg

AgreedPartially AgreedDisagreedAgreedPartially AgreedAgreedDisagreed

AgreedAgreedAgreedPartially AgreedPartially AgreedDisagreedDisagreed

9311111

Note: Inconsistent categories a, b, and d (see text for details).

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The results in tables 1 and 2 show that Research Questions Two andThree posed a considerable challenge to the participants and hencethe wide range of responses. For example in category (a) of table 2,the 9 participants showed some degree of inconsistency by agreeingto the two research questions, that is, agreement with ResearchQuestion Two implies that cognitive conflicts do not necessarily leadto conceptual change, whereas an agreement with Research QuestionThree implies that under certain circumstances (presence of rivaltheories) cognitive conflicts can facilitate conceptual change.Similarly, categories (b) and (d) also demonstrated some degree ofinconsistency. It is plausible to suggest that the experience providedby the course facilitated a majority of the participants (13 out of 17,categories a, b & d) to reconsider and thus change (deepen) theirunderstanding of conceptual change. Nevertheless, it is important tonote even those participants who used consistent strategies (forexample category f) also raised important issues with respect to theimplementation of conceptual change.

Of the nine participants in category (a) at least six explicitlyexperienced an inconsistency and recognized extra-logical, novel, andoriginal attempts to resolve contradictions leading to conceptualchange.

Note: In order to provide reliability of these results interventionsof the nine participants during the 17 class presentations (thatincluded written questions, see pool of questions) were checked. Itwas found that those participants expressed similar ideas on at leasttwo (or more) different presentations.

Following are two examples of participants’ responses in category(a), that is, agreement with both Research Questions Two and Three:

First Example Category (a) • Response to Research Question Two:

Agreed in the following terms, “What constitutes a conflict for theteacher may not be perceived as such by the student so as toproduce a cognitive conflict leading to equilibration (assimilation– accommodation) of cognitive structures in the Piagetian sense.”

• Response to Research Question Three: Agreed in the following terms, “It appears that within theLakatosian framework, just like the scientist a student can livewith two theories simultaneously – later as the student acquiressome expertise the conflict can perhaps be resolved. Furthermore,


this coincides with Mischel’s (1971) requirement that the studentmust engender his own conflicts in order to cope with a problem,and this precisely motivates cognitive development.”

This example clearly shows a deeper understanding of conceptualchange. In Research Question Two the participant had somereservations with respect to how a conflict would be perceived andlater resolved by the student. Research Question Three provides analternative, that is, the student may not perceive the conflict at thesame time and context as the teacher, but leaves open the possibility(somewhat intuitively) of working simultaneously with two differenttheories which at some later stage may facilitate conceptualunderstanding. This shows that the teacher must be aware thatstudents can respond to conflicting situations in various forms.Chinn and Brewer (1993) provide a series of possible strategies usedby students.

Second Example Category (a) • Response to Research Question Two: Agreed in the following terms, “A supposed cognitive conflict strategymeticulously designed by the teacher may not be construed as such bythe student. … A student after all is not a scientist.”• Response to Research Question Three: Agreed in the following terms: “The ideas of Kuhn and Lakatospermeate this question … A teacher can ‘manipulate’ so as to presentthe scientifically accepted idea as a rival to students’ alternativeconceptions … in this particular context conceptual change does notfollow immediately as a logical solution, but rather the studentexperiences different frameworks at the same time leading to a conflictand perhaps later the construction of a solution, and nor doescognitive theory explain all the situations … this is quite similar towhat happens to scientists before the scientific community decides infavor of one or the other theory. An important aspect of this thesis isthat students take their time to construct the new framework…Nevertheless, teachers’ epistemological outlook is crucial in suchsituations.” This response clearly recognizes the role of different philosophicalinterpretations, that is, straight forward introduction of cognitiveconflict or the possibility of considering two different rival ideas,within an extra-logical situation, that is difficult to explain

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cognitively. Furthermore, in order for the latter to be effective theteachers’ epistemological views are crucial.

Example Category (b)• Response to Research Question Two: Partially agreed in the following terms: “It represents a logicalsequence and is feasible – but perhaps it would deviate from what isexpected as conceptual change is very complex. It is not easy toproduce changes in the ‘hard-core’ epistemological beliefs of students.”• Response to Research Question Three: Agreed in the following terms, “Exposing students to cognitiveconflicts that lead them to entertain rival ideas can facilitateconceptual change as it stimulates comprehension by facilitating adynamic atmosphere based on participation and the strengthening ofa critical attitude.”This response recognizes that it is difficult to change hard-core(Lakatos, 1970) epistemological beliefs. Nevertheless, a dynamicaland critical atmosphere in the classroom can facilitate conceptualchange.

Example Category (e)• Response to Research Question Two:Partially agreed in the following terms: “It is not easy for the students to be aware of their alternativeconceptions and hence they may not feel dissatisfied. On the contrary,students generally are quite convinced that what they have learnt iscorrect … this makes conceptual change difficult.”• Response to Research Question Three: Partially agreed in the following terms: “My concern is that the opposing view presented to the student mustbe the correct scientific idea, so that he/she can decide for himselfwhether it coincides or is contrary to the previous thinking.”(This participant had expressed similar ideas on two differentpresentations, see pool of questions).

This response alludes to the fact that students’ alternativeconceptions offer resistance to change (especially if they form part ofthe hard-core, cf. Chinn & Brewer, 1993) and that somehow studentsmust be aware as to what is the correct scientific idea. This concernis valid as some social constructivists (cf. Tobin & LaMaster, 1995)


have suggested that what the students have learnt (includingalternative conceptions) is much more important than what theyshould have learnt, namely, the correct scientific idea. It is importantto note that this group of teachers had discussed various socialconstructivist perspectives including that of Tobin and LaMaster(1995), in their Methodology course in the previous year. Example Category (f)•Response to Research Question Two:Agreed in the following terms: “The sequence outlined in the research question does not seem to befeasible … in general students are satisfied with their ideas, whetherright or wrong.”• Response to Research Question Three: Disagreed in the following terms: “There cannot be just one way of producing conceptual change. … Itis possible that a student may achieve conceptual change by his owninvestigations, explorations, confrontations and imagination, withoutthe need to introduce an external conflict … in science there is noabsolute truth and consequently there cannot be rules, methods,algorithms, steps for introducing conceptual change.” (This participant had expressed similar ideas on two differentpresentations, see pool of questions).

This response raises issues that are crucial for a betterunderstanding of conceptual change. The crux of the issue is that ifhistory and philosophy of science have shown to us that the scientificmethod we teach to our students is a caricature of what scientistsactually do (cf. Fuller, 2000, p. 212), then how can we elaborate andaccept a certain sequence, steps, algorithms or rules for introducingconceptual change in the classroom. Based on Readings 5 (Niaz,1998) and 6 (Niaz, 2000a) participants were particularly aware thatmost textbooks schematize progress in chemistry as based on thescientific method, that is, a scientist observes, experiments, and asa result enunciates a theory which is later confirmed repeatedly andfinally the law is enunciated.

Conclusion and Educational Implications According to Marín (1999), Reading 17 (p. 88), the sequence(dissatisfaction – conflict – exposition of a new idea – conceptual

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change) approximates quite closely to the original scheme suggestedby Posner et al. (1982) and furthermore, there is no evidence to showthat this may always lead to conceptual change. This in our opinionis a plausible critique. Marín, in his critique, however, goes beyondby suggesting that students’ reasoning abilities (formal operationalcognitive structure, Piaget, 1985) are perhaps more important forconceptual change (cf. Marín, Benarroch, & Gómez, 2000 for furtherelaboration on this point). This contrasts sharply with somehistorical controversies in the history of science. For example, J.J.Thomson did not find Rutherford’s interpretation of alpha particleexperiments as logical, despite chemistry textbooks’ claim to thecontrary (cf. Niaz, 1998, Reading 5). Similarly, Bohr’s postulation ofthe quantum of action was not accepted as a logical alternative bymany renowned physicists (cf. Holton, 1993). The Millikan-Ehrenhaftcontroversy provides an eloquent case of two scientists who obtainedvery similar experimental data and still stuck to theirpresuppositions (hard-core of beliefs) to provide two entirely differentinterpretations. Interestingly, at one stage in the controversyMillikan stated:

That these same ions have one sort of charge when captured bya big drop and another sort when captured by a little drop isobviously absurd. … Such an assumption is not only toogrotesque for serious consideration but is directly contradictedby my experiments [Italics added]. (Millikan, 1916, p. 617).

A student may wonder as to whether experimental data can beconsidered as absurd and grotesque (Niaz, 2003).

A major finding of this study is that most teachers went throughan experience based on historical controversies that involvedinconsistencies, conflicts, contradictions and finally some degree ofconceptual change. Although a few of the participants resisted anychange, they still raised important issues with respect to conceptualchange.

Based on participants’ responses to the three research questionsthis study has important educational implications:1) Students’ prior and alternative epistemological conceptions playan important role in learning chemistry; 2) Instead of emphasizing formulae and experiments (as end productsof scientific endeavor) it is preferable to make students think about“How did we come to have a certain piece of knowledge;” 3) Students generally are quite convinced that what they have learntis correct and this makes conceptual change difficult;


4) There is a need for going beyond the simple diagnosis ofalternative conceptions, leading to “learning to learn” strategies(metacognition); 5) What constitutes a cognitive conflict for a teacher may not beperceived as such by the student and hence the difficulties associatedwith the introduction of conceptual change; 6) Similar to a scientist a student can live with two rival theories(ideas/concepts) simultaneously and as the student acquiresexpertise or enriches his or her cognitive repertoire the conflict canperhaps be resolved; 7) Under certain circumstances resolution of a conflict may not followa logical pattern of reasoning but rather a slow process (based onmotivational, intuitive, and affective factors) in which the hard-coreof belief slowly crumbles; 8) In contrast to some social constructivists, it is important thatstudents be aware of the expected correct scientific idea – apparentlythis would help them to plan their own cognitive strategies; 9) In science there is no absolute truth, nor a scientific method andconsequently there cannot be rules, methods, algorithms, or pre-determined steps for introducing conceptual change; 10) Teachers’ epistemological outlook is crucial in order to facilitateconceptual change.

Author’s Address:Epistemology of Science GroupDepartment of ChemistryUniversidad de Oriente,Apartado Postal 90Cumana, Estado SucreVENEZUELA 6101AEMAIL: [email protected] or [email protected]

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Facilitating Chemistry Teachers’ Understanding of Alternative Interpretations of Conceptual Change