Eyewitness Identification: Retrospective Self-Awareness ...EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY AND CONFIDENC879 E course, rests on the assumption that eyewit-nesses do not have direct,

journal of Penonality and Social PsychologyIMS, Vol. 49, No. 4,878-893

Copyright 1985 by the Americas Psychological Association, Inc.0022.35I4/85/S00.7S

Eyewitness Identification: Retrospective Self-Awareness and theAccuracy-Confidence Correlation

Saul M. KassinWilliams College

Research has shown that despite people's intuitive beliefs to the contrary, there isonly a weak and inconsistent correlation between eyewitness identification accuracyand confidence. Four experiments were conducted in order to test the hypothesisthat retrospective self-awareness (RSA) would increase this correlation. In all studies,subjects watched a staged crime; immediately afterwards, they were asked to identifythe culprit from a photospread and to indicate their confidence in that judgment.In an RSA condition, subjects also viewed a videotape of their performance beforerating their confidence. Collectively, the results showed an average correlation of.04 in the control groups and .48 in the RSA condition. In addition, the data ten-tatively supported a self-perception hypothesis that this manipulation is effectivebecause it alerts subjects to valid but previously unobserved aspects of their ownovert behavior (e.g., response latency). These findings are discussed for both theirtheoretical and forensic implications.

One of the most intriguing issues in the psy-chology of eyewitness testimony concerns thecorrelation between identification accuracyand self-confidence. To date, various reviewersof the empirical literature have consistentlyreached the same fundamental conclusion:that although there are exceptions, the corre-lation is weak and nonsignificant. Put anotherway, it appears that as a general rule, eyewit-nesses who accurately and inaccurately iden-tify a suspect from a photospread or lineupexpress equivalent levels of certainty in theirrespective judgments (Deffenbacher, 1980;Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 1983, 1984).

This phenomenon is theoretically quite in-teresting, as it appears to represent a specialinstance of the generally tenuous relation be-tween subjective self-reports and behavior, asnoted by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). From aforensic standpoint, its importance is under-scored by the facts that (a) the U.S. Supreme

This research was supported in part by funds madeavailable through the Bronfman Science Center at WilliamsCollege. I thank Dorinda Dewar, Leila Worth, and ElizabethPeay for their role as experimenters, and Jessie Lenagh,Jim Hyzy. and Dean Morris for their productions of thevideotaped events used in these experiments.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Saul M. Kassin,who is currently on leave at the Department of Psychology,Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305.

Court has cited self-confidence as one of fivefactors to be considered in assessing the com-petence and hence the admissibility of eyewit-ness identifiction evidence (Neil v. Biggers,1972), and (b) the citizenry from which jurorsare selected commonly believes that eyewitnessconfidence is a valid sign of credibility(Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Deffenbacher &Loftus, 1982; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson,1979; Yarmey& Jones, 1983).

Why are eyewitness accuracy and confi-dence not positively correlated? Several expla-nations have been offered (for a review, seeWells & Murray, 1984). One interesting pos-sibility was suggested by Leippe (1980), whoviewed eyewitness confidence estimates withinthe framework of Bern's (1972) self-perceptiontheory. Specifically, Leippe argued that eye-witnesses must often infer their own levels ofcertainty by observing their identification andthe context within which it was made. As heput it, "Eyewitnesses should report a positivesense of confidence in memory after they makean identification, as if they were saying tothemselves, 'I really must be sure that was theperson, since I was willing to choose that per-son' " (p. 269). Moreover, because the overtact of choosing a suspect and the circumstancessurrounding it are the same for accurate andinaccurate witnesses, no differences in confi-dence are expected. This explanation, of

878

EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY AND CONFIDENCE 879

course, rests on the assumption that eyewit-nesses do not have direct, intimate knowledgeabout their own memory processes.1

Following Leippe's (1980) suggestion, thepresent research was guided by the suppositionthat the accuracy-confidence correlation ineyewitness testimony is a problem in self-per-ception and subjective self-report. Nisbett andWilson (1977) examined the implications ofindirect self-knowledge for the accuracy of self-reports concerning mental processes in general.They reviewed and conducted several experi-ments that collectively demonstrated that peo-ple often cannot report the actual causes oftheir own behavior. As such, Nisbett and Wil-son concluded that "any introspective accessthat may exist is not sufficient to produce gen-erally reliable reports" (p. 233). One possiblereason for this inaccuracy of self-report is sug-gested by self-awareness theory (Duval &Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975): that peopleare characteristically nonintrospective, direct-ing their attention primarily to the environ-ment. In testing this theory, Pryor, Gibbons,Wicklund, Fazio, and Hood (1977) thus foundthat the correspondence between self-ratingsof sociability and actual social behavior wasincreased when subjects' degree of concurrentself-focus was enhanced by the presence of amirror. From an individual-differences per-spective, Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) andTurner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978) re-ported higher correlations between self-reportsand behavior among subjects who were highrather than low in their dispositional levels ofself-consciousness. Indeed, Carver and Scheier(1981) argued that as a general rule, focusingattention on the self produces more valid re-ports about mental states. Gibbons and Gaed-dert (1984) extended this argument by spec-ulating that it might also produce a greatercognizance of the thought processes accom-panying behavior.

One interesting technique that can be usedto encourage self-observation (and hence theaccuracy of self-report) is videotape feedback;that is, subjects may be videotaped while en-gaging in a problem-related behavior, and thenshown the tapes before evaluating their ownperformance. According to Pryor (1980), sucha procedure induces a state of retrospective self-awareness that has been shown to promote inpeople a realistic understanding of their own

behavior in both psychotherapy and classroomsettings. Walz and Johnston (1963), for ex-ample, found that after they viewed videotapesof their own counselor training sessions, coun-selor candidates' self-evaluations correspondedmore closely with their supervisors' appraisalsof their performance than without such self-exposure. The effectiveness of this manipula-tion makes conceptual sense for a variety ofinterrelated reasons: It forces subjects to be-come introspective and self-focused, perhapsserving as a cue with which they can remembertheir task-related thoughts, and it providesthem with an opportunity to observe the raw.material (i.e., their own overt behavior) for theself-perception processes suggested by Bern(1972).

The program of research reported in thisarticle was designed to test the hypothesis thatself-focused attention, primarily the state ofretrospective self-awareness (RSA), increasesthe accuracy-confidence correlation amongeyewitnesses. In all of the present studies, sub-jects watched a staged crime, immediately afterwhich they were asked to identify the suspectfrom a photospread and to indicate their de-gree of confidence in the accuracy of thatjudgment. In an RSA condition, subjects wererecorded as they made their identifications.They then viewed the videotape of their per-formance before rating their self-confidence.In the standard (control) condition, the lattermanipulation was not included in the proce-dure.

Experiment 1

A close look at the RSA procedure just de-scribed suggested that it differs from the controlgroup along three potentially meaningful di-mensions: exposure to the videotape feedback,the presence of a camera during the identifi-cation, and the intrusion of a brief temporaldelay between identification and reports of self-confidence. In order to isolate the possible ef-fects of each of these variables, two additionalgroups were incorporated into the design ofan initial experiment. In one, a camera wasdirected at the subjects throughout the iden-

1 This position has a distinguished history of advocacyfrom such notable theorists as James (1890), Ryle (1949),and Neisser( 1967).

880 SAUL M. KASSIN

tification phase of the session, but no videotapefeedback was provided. Because the camera isa stimulus that induces a state of self-awarenessthat, in turn, is sufficient to increase the be-havior-self-report correspondence (e.g., Pryoret al., 1977), it was expected that eyewitnessaccuracy and confidence might be significantlycorrelated in this no-feedback condition. Inthe second group, subjects performed in theabsence of either a camera or videotape feed-back; as was necessary in the RSA procedure,however, a 5-min delay was interposed betweenthe identifications and confidence ratings. Be-cause it has been suggested that the accuracy-confidence relation might somehow be me-diated by the mere passage of time (Leippe,1980; Wells & Murray, 1984), this variationwas included, though no specific hypothesison the matter was advanced.

Method

Subjects

Forty-eight college freshmen (24 male, 24 female) wererecruited on a volunteer basis to participate individually

in the experiment. They were randomly assigned by twofemale experimenters to one of four conditions (n = 12).

Stimulus Event

The criminal event to which subjects were witness wasan act of vandalism and burglary that was staged and pre-sented on videotape. The scene opened with a survey ofthe physical setting, the entrance hall of a campus dor-

mitory. Two college-aged women and a man entered theroom, purchased a soft drink from a vending machine

located adjacent to a doorway, and walked away. Two dif-ferent men then entered the room, one of whom kicked

open the machine and pilfered the coin box from it. Theoriginal group returned to intervene, a scuffle ensued, andthe thief and his partner fled. The entire event lasted forapproximately 2 min and was shown on a 19-in. colormonitor. In preliminary testing with the tape and a pho-tospread, 14 out of 35 observers (40%) accurately identifiedthe individual who stole the coin box.

Procedure

Subjects were run individually through the sessions,which lasted for about 15 min. In all cases, they watchedthe videotape and were then seated on the witness standin a mock courtroom. After answering some preliminaryquestions ("Could you tell me your name, please," "Did

you just witness a crime?", "Briefly, could you tell mewhat actually happened?", and "Is there anything else?"),subjects were presented with the pretested photospreadthat consisted of six black-and-white portrait photographslabeled a through/and mounted on an I I X 14 in. sheet

of cardboard. In all cases, a picture of the culprit appearedin slot/ Subjects were then instructed as follows:

What I would like you to do now is try to identify thethief, the one who actually broke into the machine andstole the money, in the videotape you just saw. The thiefmay or may not be in this group of pictures. Lookthrough them. If you think he is in there, point to thepicture and state the letter [from a through/] that cor-responds to it. Okay?

Subjects were thus requested to decide whether the culpritwas present and, if so, to make an identification. Theirresponse latencies (from presentation of the photospreadto the decision) were recorded with a stopwatch that wasconcealed by the experimenter.2 Subjects then rated theirconfidence in the accuracy of their identifications on a 10-point scale (1 = not at all confident, 10 = very confident).

Lastly, subjects were partly debriefed, having been informedabout all aspects of their experience except our interest in

the relation between accuracy and confidence.

Four variations of the foregoing procedure were used:1. In the standard group, as described earlier, no vid-

eotape equipment was present in the courtroom, no feed-back was provided, and confidence estimates were elicitedimmediately after the identifications.

2. In a time-delay group, the procedure was the sameexcept that subjects provided confidence estimates 5 minafter making their identifications, as the experimenter ex-cused herself in order to "run off some copies of a ques-tionnaire."

3. In a camera-presence group, a video camera was sta-tioned on a tripod and directed at the witness stand. Sub-jects were told that their testimony would be recorded forsubsequent analysis. The confidence measure was elicited

from them immediately after identification and withoutvideotaped feedback.

4. In the RSA group, subjects made their identificationsin front of a camera. They were then told that they couldwatch themselves on the TV monitor before continuing inthe session. The experimenter then rewound and playedthe tape for subjects, after which the confidence data werecollected.

Results and Discussion

A total of 43 of the 48 subjects (89.6%) madean identification, right or wrong, from thephotospread. The four groups did not signifi-cantly differ in their rates of choosing (p >.50). Among all subjects in the sample, 26 ac-curately selected the culprit, yielding an ac-curacy rate of 54.2% overall and 60.1% withinthe subsample of subjects who made an iden-tification. The standard, time-delay, camera-present, and RSA groups did not significantly

2 These data were collected in order to investigate thepossibility, suggested by self-awareness theory, that subjectsin the two camera conditions might be motivated to escapethe experimental situation by making a hasty identification.


differ in the accuracy of their identifications(ps = .50, .33, .58, and .75, respectively), x2

(3, N = 48) = 4.01, p < .30, their self-confi-dence ratings (A/s = 6.42, 5.83, 5.50, and 7.92,respectively), F(3, 44) < 1, or response laten-cies (Ms = 13.43, 13.45, 9.30, and 15.58 s,respectively), F(l, 44) = 1.46, p < .25.

However, a clear pattern emerged from thecorrelational results. Across groups, identifi-cation accuracy and confidence ratings weresignificantly correlated (r = .58, p < .001; n -48).3 When broken down by condition, the ac-curacy-confidence correlation was highly sig-nificant in the RSA group (r = .84, p < .001)but not in the standard, time-delay, and cam-era-present groups (rs = .10, .16, and -.04,respectively). In short, subjects who actuallywatched a videotape of themselves makingtheir identification decisions provided morepredictive confidence estimates than did all theothers.

Two possible explanations for this effectcome to mind. One is that retrospective ex-posure to one's own actions serves to alert thesubject to informative but previously unob-served mannerisms or variations in his or herown overt behavior (e.g., response latency,comments made to the experimenter, facialexpression). This view thus implies that vid-eotape feedback provides the acting individualwith information otherwise available to anoutside observer.4 A second possibility is thatvideotape feedback enables subjects to accessor retrieve the thought processes that accom-panied their original performance. This viewimplies that actors are privileged with privateself-knowledge that, although typically inac-cessible to awareness, can be "primed" by theexperience of retrospective self-exposure.

The results of this study do not clearly favoreither of these explanations. The first possi-bility did receive anecdotal support in the ut-terances of several RSA subjects who quitespontaneously conveyed their reactions to theexperimenter during their self-observation pe-riod. For example, one apparently surprisedsubject commented, "Look at the way I hesi-tated. It took me forever to choose." Similarly,another subject observed that "I took no timeat all to point him out. I'm positive that it washim." Might these comments suggest that vid-eotaped self-exposure was successful becauseit provided subjects with an informative but

previously nonsalient cue in the form of re-sponse latency? The correlational results pro-vided tentative, though only weak, support forthis hypothesis. Specifically, for subjects in theRSA group, response latency was negatively,though nonsignificantly, correlated to bothidentification accuracy (r = -.46, p < .15;across all groups, r ~ — .37, p < .01) and self-confidence (r = -.31, p < .20; across all groups,r = -.20, p < . 10). To some extent, then, thelonger it took subjects to make an identifica-tion, the less confident they were, and the lesslikely they were to have been accurate.

Experiment 2

Experiment 1 provided a preliminary dem-onstration of a provocative phenomenon: thatthe state of retrospective self-awareness in-creases the correlation between eyewitnessidentification accuracy and self-confidence. Atthis point, however, the stability of this resulthas not been established and the processthrough which it was obtained is not well un-derstood. A follow-up experiment was there-fore conducted in an attempt to achieve theseobjectives.

At the very least, this study was designed toreplicate the retrospective self-awareness effectwith a larger sample of subjects and a differentcriminal event. In addition, two aspects of theprocess-related question were addressed. First,what specific component of the RSA manip-ulation was responsible for its apparent effec-tiveness? The absence of a comparable effectin the camera-present condition suggests thatthe RSA finding is attributable to videotapedfeedback per se and not to the fact that self-awareness might have been induced during theidentification task. Still, it is theoretically pos-sible that although the mere presence of acamera is not sufficient, it is a necessary com-ponent of the RSA effect. In order to addressthis issue, all subject-witnesses, RSA and con-trol group alike, were videotaped unobtrusively

3 All rs involving identification accuracy were calculated

as point-biserial correlations.* This hypothesis does not necessarily mean an increase

in the accuracy of self-report. If the behavioral cues ob-served on the videotape are truly diagnostic of performance,then actors who are retrospectively self-aware, like observ-ers, should be more accurate than actors who are not self-aware. If not, then no such prediction would follow.

882 SAUL M. KASSIN

through a camera that was built into the ceilingof the mock courtroom. In this way, RSA wasmanipulated without the threat of a previouslyinduced state of self-awareness.

The second process question toward whichthis next experiment was directed is the oneintroduced earlier. Does retrospective self-ex-posure work because it serves to alert the sub-ject to informative but previously unobservednuances of his or her overt behavior (a self-perception hypothesis), or does it work becauseit enables the subject, perhaps by reliving theexperience, to access and retrieve the thoughtprocesses that accompanied his or her originalperformance (a retrieval-cue hypothesis)? Oneinteresting and operationally definable way todistinguish these alternatives is to look at ob-servers' perceptions of subject-witnesses' self-confidence. The self-perception hypothesissuggests that videotaped feedback provides theacting individual with behavioral informationalready available to an observer; accordingly,it would lead to the prediction that an inde-pendent group of subjects who watch the vid-eotaped identifications would view the accu-rate eyewitnesses as more self-confident thantheir inaccurate counterparts. In contrast, theretrieval-cue hypothesis, because it is based onthe idea that the RSA manipulation providesthe subject-witness with a reminder or cue thatfacilitates access to privileged information (i.e.,his or her own mental processes), would predictthat independent observers would be unableto make such differential judgments of self-confidence. In order to test these contrastingpredictions, a yoked actor-observer paradigmwas employed.

Method

Subjects

Thirty-three introductory psychology students, partic-ipating as eyewitnesses, were randomly assigned to eitherthe RSA condition or the control group (ns = 16 and 17,respectively). After their data were collected, an additional

30 subjects were recruited as observers, and each was ran-domly assigned to watch the videotaped identification ofa single witness (ns = 16 and 14, respectively).5

Stimulus Event

As before, a videotape of a staged crime was used in thisresearch. This scene opened in a small, private library,where three college students, one male and two female,were sitting around a circular table, exchanging conver-

sation over open books. After approximately 20 s, twoyoung men entered the room and surveyed the situationwhile pretending to select and read through books on theshelf. One of the culprits then menacingly poked throughthe books placed on the table, knocked over a desk lamp,and pushed the male student. At that point, a fight brokeout, the two men assaulted the student, the one who ini-tiated the attack stole his wallet, and the culprits fled. Theentire event lasted for approximately 1 min. Previous useof this event and a corresponding photospread yielded a53% rate of accurate identification (Kassin, Hyzy, & Morris,

1984).

Procedure

Actors. On arriving at the mock courtroom,subjects watched the staged crime, after whichthey were seated on the witness stand andbriefly questioned about their observations. Atthat point, the experimenter, a female student,excused herself and went to a control room,where she turned on a videotape recorder anda camera that was hidden in the courtroomceiling and focused on the witness stand. Theexperimenter returned with a photospreadconsisting of six black-and-white photographslabeled a through /and mounted on an 11 X14 in. sheet of cardboard (a picture of the cul-prit appeared in Position b). As in Experiment1, subjects were told that the assailant, the onewho physically attacked the male victim andstole his wallet, might or might not be repre-sented in the array of pictures. If they believedhe was, they were to indicate their selection bypointing to the picture and stating the letterthat corresponded to it. Because all sessionswere videotaped, response latencies were re-corded at a later time.

Once an identification decision was made,the experimenter excused herself again, saidshe would return shortly to ask a couple ofmore questions, and went to the control roomto turn off the power on the video camera andrecorder. When she returned, subjects in thecontrol group were asked to provide their con-fidence ratings on the 10-point scale describedearlier. With subjects in the RSA condition,

' In three eyewitness sessions, the audio portion of thevideotape malfunctioned. As such, although their data wereavailable for analysis, yielding the n of 33 actors, they couldnot be assigned to observers; this yielded the smaller n of30. Also, after each of the observer sessions, subjects wereasked if they knew the witness appearing on tape. Four ofthem did, and so were excluded from the analysis and re-placed by other subjects.


the experimenter returned with the tape oftheir identification, told them they could watchthemselves before continuing in the session,and played the tape for them before elicitingtheir self-confidence ratings.

Observers. When all the eyewitness datawere collected, a sample of students was re-cruited to participate as observers. These ses-sions were conducted on an individual basis.On arriving at the laboratory, subject-observerswere told that the experimenters had shown agroup of students a videotape of a crime inwhich one individual assaulted another, pre-sented them with a set of six photographs, in-structed them that a picture of the assailantmay or may not have been among them, andasked for an identification. Observers were thentold that "What I would like you to do is watcha videotape of a witness looking through thephotographs and making an identification.Then I will ask you some questions." The tapewas then shown and subjects were immediatelyasked to "tell me how confident you think thewitness was about his or her own identification.Specifically, on a 10-point scale, where 1 means'not at all confident' and a 10 means 'veryconfident,' I want you to try to judge how con-fident the witness would say he or she was.Okay?" After making these ratings, subjectswere then asked to predict whether their wit-ness was correct (yes or no) in his or her iden-tification decision. This measure was obtainedin order to assess, via correlational evidence,observers' intuitive beliefs about the relationbetween identification accuracy and confi-dence.


Of the 33 witnesses, 26 (78.8%) made anidentification, right or wrong, from the pho-tospread. Of these, 18 selected the assailant,yielding a 54.5% accuracy rate overall (69.2%among subjects who made a selection). TheRSA and control groups did not differ on eithermeasure (both ps > .50). Likewise, t tests re-vealed no differences in either their mean levelsof confidence (4.25 and 4.00, respectively) ortheir response latency (27.75 and 24.65, re-spectively; both ps > .50).

Overall, identification accuracy and wit-nesses' confidence scores were not significantlycorrelated (r = .25, p < .10; n = 33). Table 1shows, however, that when the scores were

Table 1Correlations for Actors and Observers in the RSA

and Control Groups of Experiment 2

Correlations

Subject category

RSA conditionActorsObservers

Control condition

ActorsObservers

A-C

.47*

.24

.05

.20

A-L

-.17

—

-.14

—

C-L

.06-.55*

-.69**-.57*

Note. RSA = retrospective self-awareness; A = identifi-cation accuracy, L = response latency, and C = confidenceratings.

broken down by condition, a significant cor-relation appeared under RSA (r = .47, p <.05; n = 16) but not in the control group (r =.05, p < .50; n = 17). This finding thus repli-cated the main result of Experiment 1. In orderto test the relative merits of the self-perceptionand retrieval-cue explanations described ear-lier, a parallel analysis was conducted betweenactors' identification performance and theiryoked observers' estimates of their confidence.As it turned out, the correlation was nearlyidentical to that obtained for the eyewitnessesthemselves (r = .24, p < .10; n = 30). Thisweak but positive relation held regardless ofwhether the observers had been assigned toRSA or control subjects (rs = .24 and .20, re-spectively, both ps < .25).

Response latency played an interesting rolein these data. As in the first experiment, iden-tification accuracy and response time weresomewhat negatively correlated (r = -. 16, p <.20; n = 33). It can be seen in Table 1 that thiswas true in both the RSA and control groups.In looking.at the extent to which this cue waspredictive of confidence ratings, it was foundthat these variables were highly correlatedamong control-group witnesses (r = — .55, p <.02) and all observers (control r = —.57, p <.05; RSA r = -.69, p < .01). Only the RSAwitnesses appeared hot to use latency infor-mation in their confidence judgments (r = .06,p < .50). Lastly, the relation between observers'predictions about eyewitness identification ac-curacy and their perceptions of self-confidencewas highly significant (r = .72, p < .001). This

884 SAUL M. KASSIN

finding suggests that people naturally operateon the assumption that eyewitness confidenceis a valid predictor of identification accuracy(see also Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; Deffen-bacher & Loftus, 1982; Wells et al, 1979; Yar-mey & Jones, 1983).

This study replicated the major result ob-tained in Experiment 1, as subject-witnesseswho watched a videotape of their own perfor-mance during the identification task exhibiteda significant correlation between accuracy andself-confidence. This relation was not as strongas it was previously, perhaps because of theincrease in sample size, the absence of a cam-era during the identification task, or the useof a more violent event than in the first study,a condition that could attenuate the link be-tween accuracy and confidence (Clifford &Hollin, 1981). These results also provide aclearer and somewhat surprising picture of therole played by response latency cues in theconfidence judgment process. As before, thetendency for accurate identifications to be as-sociated with shorter response times was sta-tistically nonsignificant. And yet, control-group actors and all observers relied heavilyon this cue in their confidence ratings. OnlyRSA witnesses were apparently not misled assuch.

Why, then, does retrospective self-awarenessproduce an increase in the correspondence be-tween accuracy and confidence? On the basisof the first study, a self-perception hypothesiswas suggested—that perhaps videotaped self-exposure alerted witnesses to previouslyunobserved aspects of their own overt behavior.The results of Experiment 2, however, providetentative evidence against this explanation.First, with specific regard to response time, itturned out that, if anything, the RSA manip-ulation succeeded in diverting actors awayfrom this nondiagnostic piece of information.Second, and more generally, independent ob-servers should, according to the self-perceptionhypothesis, be able to show the RSA effect. Infact, they did not.

Experiment 3

An important phenomenon in the absenceof an adequate explanation having thus beenestablished, a third study was conducted withtwo specific goals in mind. First, it was de-

signed to investigate the role of individual dif-ferences in the degree to which subjects' con-fidence estimates are predictive of their per-formance. Brown, Deffenbacher, and Sturgill(1977) showed subjects several pictures offaces, measured identification accuracy andconfidence for each, and found high within-subject correlations. This result suggests thatexpressions of high and low confidence mayreflect a stable characteristic of eyewitnesses.To this point, however, the literature has notidentified any person variables that are signif-icantly related to tendencies toward accuracy,overconfidence (which appears to be the mostcommon response; see Koriat, Lichtenstein,& Fischoff, 1980), or underconfidence. In arecent study, for example, Hosch, Leippe,Marchioni, and Cooper (1984) administeredSnyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale to theirsubject-witnesses and found that it did notmoderate the accuracy-confidence relation.Yet the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggestthat perhaps a measure of dispositional self-focus would be worth pursuing. Accordingly,Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss's (1975) Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) was used. This 23-itern questionnaire is composed of three fac-tors: private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety (for extensivedescriptions and supporting psychometricdata, see Buss, 1980; Carver & Glass, 1976;Turner etal., 1978).

Interestingly, the private and public dimen-sions of self-awareness are closely analogousto the retrieval-cue and self-perception expla-nations of the RSA effect, respectively. Peoplewho score high in private self-consciousnesstend to be cognizant of their own innerthoughts, motives, and feelings, and charac-teristically, even in the absence of retrospectiveself-exposure, they attempt to decipher theirown cognitive processes (e.g., "I'm aware ofthe way my mind works when I work througha problem"). In contrast, people who are highon the public aspect of self-consciousness aremore cognizant of themselves as social objectsand how they appear to others, and they ha-bitually monitor their own overt behavior (e.g.,"I'm usually aware of my appearance"). Inshort, it might be suggested that individual dif-ferences along these dimensions in the accu-racy-confidence relation could shed light on


the relative merits of the two proposed expla-nations of the RSA effect.

The second objective of the following ex-periment was to test more directly the retrieval-cue hypothesis. Specifically, a group of subjectswas asked to reconstruct and describe thethoughts that accompanied their decision-making process before answering the confi-dence question. Some of these subjects werealso placed in the RSA situation, so they nar-rated as they viewed the videotape of their per-formance. If it turns out that the retrospectiveself-awareness experience is effective because(a) it facilitates the retrieval of this raw ma-terial, increasing its salience and availabilityfor recall, and (b) this information providesvalid insight into the certainty with which adecision was made, then we would expect thatthis narration, or "retrospective verbalization,"procedure (see Ericsson & Simon, 1980) wouldincrease even further the correlation betweenaccuracy and confidence.

Method

Seventy-five undergraduates participated as eyewitnesses;50 were randomly assigned to either the RSA or controlgroup, and the remaining 25 were placed in a narrationcondition and analyzed separately (of these, 12 were ran-domly assigned to a control group, whereas 13 also ex-perienced the RSA manipulation). In addition, after allthe data were collected, subjects were categorized as high

or low on both public and private self-consciousness onthe basis of median splits on their SCS subscores (Mdns =17.5 and 24.5, respectively).

The procedure and materials {i.e., the crime tape andphotospread) used in this study were identical to thoseused in Experiment 2, except for the presession adminis-tration of Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) SCS and the inclusionof a narration manipulation for a separate group of subjects.Specifically, one subgroup was instructed, immediately be-fore the assessment of their confidence, to

try to remember and describe what you were thinkingbefore, when you looked through the photographs andmade your identification decision. Okay? Remember—

try to reconstruct, as best as you can, what you werethinking at the time.

Narration subjects who were also exposed to the RSA ex-perience were similarly told, as part of their prevideotapeinstruction, that

while you are watching the tape, I'd like you to try toremember and describe what you were thinking whenyou looked through the photographs and made yourdecision. Remember—try to reconstruct, as best as youcan, what you were thinking as you watch the tape, notafterwards.6

These verbal protocols were recorded on audiotape forsubsequent analysis.


Thirty-nine of the 50 nonnarration subjects(78%) made an identification from the array;27 correctly identified the assailant, yieldingan accuracy rate of 54% overall and 69.2%within the subsample of subjects who made aselection. No significant differences appearedas a function of condition (RSA p = .60,control p = .48), public self-consciousness(high p = .52, lowp = .57), or private self-con-sciousness (high p = .54, low p = .50; all chi-squares < 1).

In order to assess separately the main effectsfor public and private self-consciousness andtheir respective interactions with the RSA ma-nipulation, all the data were analyzed twice.Results indicated that no significant effectsappeared on either ratings of confidence (M =4.28) or response latency (M = 25.72), thoughthere was a tendency toward higher confidencescores among subjects who were low ratherthan high in public aspects of self-conscious-ness (marginal A/s = 4.83 and 3.77, respec-tively), f\l, 46) = 2.63, p < .12, especially inthe RSA condition (cell Ms = 5.67 and3.69, respectively), interaction f\l, 46) = 1.97,p < .20.

Across groups, identification accuracy wasnot significantly associated with either confi-dence (r - .20, p < .20; n = 50) or responsetime (r = -. 13, w; n = 50). As in ExperimentsI and 2, however, the correlation between con-fidence and latency was significant (r = —.37,p < .02; n = 50). When broken down by con-dition, the results essentially replicated thosepreviously obtained; that is, the accuracy-confidence correlation was significant in theRSA condition (r = .48, p < .02; n = 25) butnot in the control group (r = —.10, ns; n =25). Also, as in Experiment 2, it appeared thatresponse latency, which again was not signif-icantly related to accuracy, was predictive ofsubjects' confidence ratings in the control

6 Three subjects in this situation failed to narrate as thevideotape proceeded. In each of these instances, the ex-perimenter stopped the tape, reminded the subject of theinstruction, and started over again.

886 SAUL M. KASSIN

group (r = -.56, p < .01; n = 25) but not inthe RSA condition (r = -.18, ns; n = 25).

Individual Differences

As reported elsewhere (e.g., Fenigstein et al.,1975), scores on the public and private self-consciousness scales were somewhat positivelycorrelated (r = .28, p < .05; n - 50). Indeedonly 19 of the 50 subjects were classified ashigh on one dimension of self-consciousnessand low on the other. In order to investigatethe eyewitness personality question, the cor-relational data were broken down into two 2 X2 tables and analyzed separately for public andprivate self-consciousness (see Table 2). First,across conditions, the correlation between ac-curacy and confidence was significant amongsubjects who were low in private self-con-sciousness (r = .50, p < .01; n = 26), and itapproached significance among those whowere high in public self-consciousness (r = ,31,p <. \ 2; n = 27). In fact, if these data are com-bined with those collected from subjects in thenarration groups, this pattern holds firm, asr = .43 (p < .01; « = 39} for the low-privatesubjects, and r = .39 (p < .02; n = 38) for the

Table 2Correlations for RSA and Control SubjectsClassified on Private and PublicSelf-Consciousness

Condition A-C

Correlations

A-L C-L

Private self-consciousness

RSAHighLow

ControlHighLow

.02

.78"

-.33.05

-.38-.28

.17

.00

-.09-.23

-.68**-.44

Public self-consciousness

RSAHighLow

ControlHighLow

.52

.41

.13-.38

-.16-.53

-.09.28

-.33.13

-.56*-.58

Note. RSA = retrospective self-awareness; A = identifi-cation accuracy, L - response latency, and C = confidenceratings.*p<.05. **p<.01.

high-public subjects (rs = -.06 and . 11 for thehigh-private and low-public subjects, respec-tively).

The within-cell correlation coefficients con-tribute some interesting and consistent (thoughbecause of the small ns, only suggestive) cor-roborative evidence. First, accuracy and con-fidence were uncorrelated in all personalitysubgroups of the control condition. This re-lation was stronger in all cells of the RSA con-dition except for subjects classified as high inprivate self-consciousness. Second, confidenceand latency were more strongly correlatedwithin all control subgroups than within allRSA subgroups. Thus individual differencesdid not moderate this latter relation.

The Narration Procedure

Fourteen of the 25 narration subjects (56%)made accurate identifications. Likewise, theirconfidence estimates and response times weresimilar to those produced by the main sample(Aft = 4.56 and 29.84, respectively). Overall,identification accuracy was not significantlyrelated to either confidence (r = . 19) or latency(r = —.07), though the latter two variables werehighly correlated with each other (r = - .58,p < .01; n - 25). Separating the RSA and con-trol subjects revealed the same pattern in bothgroups—accuracy was uniformly uncorrelatedwith confidence (corresponding rs = .05 and. 18) and latency (rs = . 13 and -.10), which inturn were correlated with each other (re = .65and .49). Having subjects provide retrospectivenarrative of their thoughts during identifica-tion thus did not enhance control subjects'performance. In fact, it apparently destroyedthe RSA phenomenon.

Subjects' narrative reports were scored forthe number of discrete thoughts they contained(e.g., "I remember thinking how difficult thiswas," "I definitely didn't recognize three ofthem," "Here I am using the process of elim-ination"). Not surprisingly, subjects conveyedmore thoughts in the presence than in the ab-sence of videotaped self-observation (Afs =3.58 and 2.31, respectively), /(23) = 2.16, p <.05. This measure was not significantly relatedto subjects' confidence estimates (r = —.22,ns) but was correlated with response time, inthat the longer that subjects took to make anidentification, the more thoughts they then re-


called during the narration procedure (r = .39,p < .06; n = 25). In order to address the ques-tion of how helpful these verbal reports were,subjects were grouped according to the numberof discrete thoughts they had provided (Mdn =2.5). As it turned out, the magnitude of theaccuracy-confidence correlation was unrelatedto the amount of narrative report provided(rs = . 17 and . 13 in the high- and low-protocolgroups, respectively).

Experiment 4

Thus far, the self-perception hypothesis ap-pears to be plausible and supported by somedata (i.e., the significant correlation betweenhigh public self-consciousness and the accu-racy-confidence correlation) but not by others(i.e., observers' failure to exhibit the effect; theinconsistent and perhaps even misleading roleplayed by response latency information). Inthe meantime, the alternative retrieval-cue hy-pothesis has fared even worse (i.e., the ineffec-tiveness of the retrospective narration proce-dure, and the negative relation between privateself-consciousness and the accuracy-confi-dence correlation). In Experiment 4, testingconditions were varied somewhat in order toprovide further information about the validityof these proposed explanations.

Three variations in the paradigm were in-troduced in this study. First, a concurrent ver-balization procedure was used, wherein sub-jects were instructed to "think aloud" as theylooked through the photospread and madetheir identification decisions. This process-tracing technique has a long history of usageamong cognitive psychologists as a way to fa-cilitate people's access to otherwise inarticu-lated thought processes and short-term mem-ory contents that are subsequently unavailable(see Ericsson & Simon, 1980, and Newell &Simon, 1972, for reviews and the distinctionbetween this strategy and the earlier methodsof introspection). In the present research, thismethod was used to get subject-witnesses togenerate, or at least make salient, the raw datawith which they could make predictive judg-ments of their own performance. If the re-trieval-cue explanation of the RSA effect iscorrect, then thinking aloud would be expectedto increase the accuracy-confidence correla-

tion, even in the absence of videotaped self-exposure.7

Second, another attempt was made to es-tablish the role of response latency in this re-search. As such, the identification task was al-tered somewhat. In the previous three exper-iments, subjects were handed an array ofphotographs mounted on a single sheet ofcardboard. In Experiment 4, a sequential modeof presentation was used, as the photographsappeared on separate pages of a booklet. Itwas expected that this apparently minor vari-ation would provide eyewitnesses with richerovert-behavioral information for self-percep-tion processes; that is, subjects would observenot only their total decision time but theamount of time they spent specifically consid-ering each of the alternatives, chosen and non-chosen alike.

Third, along similar lines, subjects in thisstudy were asked to estimate their own re-sponse latency. It was thought that perhapstheir confidence estimates were based moreprecisely on these perceptions than on the ac-tual passage of time.

Method

Seventy-two introductory psychology students wererandomly assigned to one of four cells produced by a 2 X2 (RSA vs. Control Condition X Think Aloud vs. StandardProcedure) factorial design (H = 18 per cell).

Subjects were presented with the same stimulus materials

that were used in the previous two experiments. The onlyprocedural modifications that affected all subjects were that

(a) the six photographs appeared in booklet format, with

7 There is always the possibility, of course, that becausethe act of verbalizing detracts subjects' attention from themain task, and that because it is an inherently social (i.e.,vis-a-vis the experimenter) behavior, this technique fun-damentally alters the natural thought process. On the other

hand, when subjects' thoughts are already in a verbal code,not requiring translation (e.g., from perceptual or motor

codes), and in instances in which subjects are likely toproduce that information anyway (i.e., without the in-struction), there is reason to expect that this procedure"will not change the structure and course of task processes,although it may slightly decrease the speed of task perfor-mance" (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, p. 226). Indeed, thistechnique has been used successfully in such disparate do-mains as concept-discrimination learning (Karpf, 1973)and judgments about parole (Carroll & Payne, 1977). Inthe present research, its effects were assessed through acomparison of results obtained in the think-aloud andstandard procedures.

SAUL M. KASSIN

one picture per page, and (b) after the assessment of self-confidence, subjects were asked, "from the moment youwere handed the photographs to the moment you madean identification decision, approximately how much time,in seconds, elapsed?" In addition, subjects assigned to thethink-aloud condition were instructed as follows:

As you go through the photospread, from picture to pic-ture, trying to make an identification, I'd like you to tellme what you're thinking—almost as if you are thinkingaloud or talking to yourself. Okay? Remember—as soonas you begin looking at the first photograph, start todescribe your thoughts. Any questions?8


Only 49 subjects (68.1%) made an identifi-cation. Of these, 24 (49%) correctly chose theculprit. Neither RSA nor the think-aloud con-dition had a significant effect on either of thesemeasures (all chi-squares < 1). Two-way anal-yses of variance revealed no main effects orinteractions on self-confidence (M = 4.93) orresponse-time estimates (M = 79.28; all ps >.20). Although no significant differences ap-peared on the actual latency measure (M =85.86), there was a tendency for subjects totake longer to respond in the think-aloud con-dition than in the standard procedure (Ms =96.33 and 75.39, respectively), jF*l, 68) = 2.47,p<.\2.

Overall, accuracy was significantly corre-lated with both confidence (r = .28, p < .02;n = 75) and latency (r = -.23, p < .06; n =72), which in turn were correlated with eachother (r = -.22, p < .07; n = 72). Althoughsubjective estimates of response time followedclosely from the objective measure of latency(r = .50, p < .001; n = 12), both were unrelatedto accuracy and confidence ratings (corre-sponding rs = -.09 and —.03). The correla-tions within each of the four cells of the 2 X2 design appear in Table 3.

Of these results, three findings in particularare noteworthy. First, the RSA effect obtainedin the three previous experiments emerged inboth the standard and think-aloud groups (rs =.58 and .47); as before, accuracy and confi-dence were not significantly correlated in theabsence of this manipulation. Second, therewas evidence for a significant correlation be-tween identification accuracy and decisiontime. Specifically, this correlation was foundin both the RSA and control groups that were

Table 3Correlations in the Four Cells Produced by the2X2 (RSA vs. Control X Standardvs. Think-Aloud) Design

Correlations

Condition

RSAStandardThink aloud

ControlStandardThink aloud

A-C

.58*

.47*

.26-.03

A-L

-.62**.25

-.50*.03

C-L

-.75**-.04

-.04-.19

Note. RSA = retrospective self-awareness; A = identifi-cation accuracy, L = response latency, and C = confidenceratings.*p<.05. ** p<.0l.

run through the standard (i.e., without thethink-aloud instruction) procedure (rs = —.62and -.50). Thus for the first time since Ex-periment 1, response latency turned out to bea valid predictor of identification performance,as accurate eyewitnesses made their decisionsmore quickly than their inaccurate counter-parts.9 This finding is probably attributable toour use of the sequential photospread that,compared with the same stimuli when simul-taneously presented, elicited a large increasein both mean response time (85.86 s, excludingsubjects in the think-aloud groups, comparedwith 26.58 s, when Experiments 2 and 3 werecombined) and variability between subjects(SD = 57.52 compared with 13.85). Responselatency thus became a more distinguishing be-havioral cue. At the same time, it was not pre-dictive of subjects' performance in the think-aloud condition. Presumably, with the identi-fication and concurrent-verbalization tasksbeing performed simultaneously, response timein this condition was determined by factorsextraneous to the decision itself.

8 Pretesting showed that subjects were able to complywith this instruction. Indeed, all 36 subjects in this con-dition provided verbal protocol data of some sort.

' Partial correlations (accuracy and confidence control-ling for latency) were calculated for all cells in this seriesof experiments. To this point, none of these analyses pro-duced any change in results. In this instance, however, itreduced the correlation from .58 to a nonsignificant .22,thereby corroborating the role of latency as a mediatingvarible in this group.


Lastly, the data in Table 3 show that confi-dence and latency measures were significantlycorrelated only in the RSA-standard procedurecell (r = -.76, p < .001; n = 18). In the presentresearch program this was the strongest cor-relation obtained between these two variables.For some reason, no such correlation appearedin the standard control group, as it had in theprevious two studies. Aside from this anomaly,the pattern is understandable; that is, when asequential photospread that provided subjectswith more distinguishing behavioral infor-mation was used, response latency provided abasis for confidence, but only when it was sa-lient, as both (a) during videotaped self-ex-posure and (b) when it did not compete with

Table 4Summary of Correlations Obtained in

Experiments 1-4

Correlations

Condition

Experiment 1RSA(n = 12)

Control (n = 36)Combined

Experiment 2"RSA (n = 16)Control (n = 17)Combined

Experiment 3b

RSA (17 = 38)

Control (n = 37)Combined

Experiment 4RSA (n = 36)Control (n = 36)Combined

AveragesRSA (n = 102)Control (n = 126)Combined

A-C

.84

.07

.58

.47

.05

.25

.33

.00

.18

.53

.12

.28

.48

.04

.31

A-L

-.46

-.32-.37

-.17-.14

-.16

-.25.03

-.10

-.19-.24

-.23

-.24-.17

-.21

C-L

-.31-.41-.20

.06-.55-.24

-.29-.59-.41

-.40-.11

-.22

-.28-.40

-.25

Note. RSA = retrospective self-awareness. For experimentsinvolving multiple RSA or control groups, rs represent theweighted mean of their within-sample coefficients. "Com-bined" coefficients were derived by means of pooling allsubjects in the experiment for analysis, regardless of con-dition.8 The 30 observers are excluded from this table.

" Subjects in the narration condition of this study wereassigned for analysis to their respective (RSA or control)conditions.

other information, such as concurrent verbal-ization protocol.10

Conclusions and Implications

Collectively, the four studies reported inthis article yielded several unambiguous con-clusions. In order to facilitate a summary andintegration of the data, Table 4 represents acompilation of results for all RSA, control,and combined samples of subject-witnesses(N = 228).

Regarding Table 4, several consistent pat-terns emerge. First, it is strikingly clear that atleast for the eyewitness paradigm used in thisresearch, identification accuracy and confi-dence are indeed unrelated (the average con-trol-group r was .04). This finding thus cor-roborates previous conclusions to that effect(Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells &Murray, 1983,1984). Second, it is equally clearthat the state of retrospective self-awareness,as manipulated via videotaped self-observa-tion, is an effective device for significantly in-creasing that correlation (the average RSAgroup r was .48). This finding thus supportsand extends recent accounts of self-awarenesstheory and research (Carver & Scheier, 1981;Pryor et al., 1977; Scheier et al., 1978; Turneret al., 1978; Wicklund, 1975).

In Table 4, two additional, previously ne-glected effects, both involving the measure ofidentification response time, are highlighted.First, there is a weak but consistent tendencyfor accurate identifications to be made withgreater rapidity than inaccurate identifica-tions (the combined average r = -.21). Al-though this finding appears in 11 of the 12groups summarized in Table 4 and it makesintuitive sense, response time still accountedfor only 4.4% of the variance. Second, it turnedout that the less time it took witnesses to maketheir identifications, the greater was the con-fidence they subsequently asserted in those de-cisions (the combined average r = —.25). This

10 Subjects' think-aloud protocol were supposed to be

content-analyzed. Unfortunately, many of the videotapedsessions were barely audible (in contrast to the postiden-tincation narration procedure of Experiment 3 in whichverbalizations were recorded through separate audiotapeequipment).

890 SAUL M. KASSIN

correlation was especially strong amongsubjects who were not provided with video-taped self-observation (average control groupr = -.40).

Theoretical Implications

On a theoretical level, this research ad-dresses the ongoing debate concerning the ex-tent of people's knowledge about their owncognitive processes (cf. Ericsson & Simon,1980; Kraut & Lewis, 1982; Nisbett & Bellows,1977; Nisbett & Wison, 1977; Rich, 1979;Smith & Miller, 1978; White, 1980). Indeedthe RSA effect obtained in the present researchsupports the argument that people do have ac-cess to such information. Can people tell whatthey know? Perhaps even Nisbett and Wilson'ssubjects would have reported accurately on thecauses of their own behavior had they first hadthe opportunity to watch a videotape of theirown experimental sessions. Certainly the gen-eralizability of the RSA phenomenon fromeyewitness identification to other tasks andcontexts represents an important direction forfurther research.

A closer look at the controversy in this lit-erature, however, suggests that perhaps thecentral question is not whether people canidentify their own mental states and processesbut, in instances when they can, whether thatknowledge is direct (i.e., is based on the per-ception of internal cues and sensations) or in-direct (i.e., is based on inferences derived fromexternal sources of information). Some theo-rists have argued for a form of direct accessmodel (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Zajonc,1980), whereas others have maintained thatsuch knowledge is gained via inferences basedon overt behavioral manifestations (e.g., Bern,1972) or on a priori beliefs (e.g., Nisbett &Bellows, 1977). In that context, the implica-tions of the RSA effect are still not clear. Thefact that retrospective self-observation in-creased the accuracy-confidence relation couldbe interpreted in two ways: Either this manip-ulation forced subjects to introspect, therebypriming their access to previously overlookedinternal cues (the retrieval-cue hypothesis), orit provided them with external informationthat is necessary for indirect, more inferentialprocesses (the self-perception hypothesis).

As Experiments 2, 3, and 4 have shown, ourefforts to explain the phenomenon in theseterms may have generated more confusionthan insight. Certainly, there was little evidenceto support the retrieval-cue idea. Neither theconcurrent nor retrospective verbalizationprocedures increased the accuracy-confidencecorrelation among control-group subjects. Infact, the latter procedure even appeared todestroy the effects of retrospective self-obser-vation. Moreover, it turned out that subjectswho were high in private self-consciousness (ameasure of the dispositional tendency towardintrospection) appeared to benefit the leastfrom their exposure to the RSA manipulation.Looking at these data, one might even suggestthat introspection, in both trait and stateterms, actually impairs the quality of self-ap-praisal processes. Perhaps it has this negativeeffect because introspective subjects attend tothoughts that are irrelevant to the task at hand(i.e., estimating their own accuracy). If so, thenone would predict that advising subjects thattheir task is to determine their own level ofconfidence, before the use of an introspectiontechnique, would increase their accuracy-confidence relation. Alternatively, it is possiblethat private self-awareness failed because itdistracted subjects from attending to other, ex-ternal sources of information."

The self-perception hypothesis has faredsomewhat better in this research, though theresults are not entirely consistent. On the pos-itive side, high public self-consciousness wasassociated with greater correspondence be-tween accuracy and confidence, as predictedby an indirect, self-perception view. Also, theresults of Experiment 4 suggest that there aretimes when response latency is a valuable cue(i.e., when it is significantly predictive of per-formance and is associated with self-ratings ofconfidence). On the negative side, responsetime, which is a salient cue in this decision-making task, has not played a consistent rolein this research. Also, observers' estimates ofeyewitnesses' confidence were also not signif-

11 Another possible explanation for the RSA effect is amore motivational version of the direct access idea: thatmaybe self-observation causes subjects to exert more effortand care in their attempts to estimate the accuracy of theirown performance (e.g., Wilson, Hull, & Johnson, 1981).


icantly related to identification accuracy, de-spite their exposure to the videotaped ses-sions.12

At this point, we are left with two importantempirical questions concerning the validity ofthis explanation. First, what is the causal re-lation between measures of response time andself-confidence? Although it seems plausible toassume that subjects infer the latter from theformer, these data are merely correlational. Itis possible, for example, that both confidenceand latency reflect the common influence of athird variable. One interesting way to test thecausal assumption could be to provide subjectswith false feedback about their decision timeand to observe its effects on their confidenceratings. The second empirical question thatneeds to be resolved is whether overt behavioralcues other than response latency are mediatingthe RSA effect. The most likely possibility hereis the vast array of nonverbal cues, such aschanges in facial expression, through whichsubjects might unwittingly convey to them-selves accurate information about task diffi-culty, effort expenditure, and, by implication,their own self-confidence.

Practical Implications

Because accurate and inaccurate eyewit-nesses typically do not express differences intheir levels of self-confidence, and becauseconfidence is one of the most important baseson which others evaluate their credibility, twosolutions to the dilemma are possible. The firstis to inform the trial judge and jury about theproblem, leaving them to search for other, per-haps equally misleading cues emanating fromthe witness. Actually, this solution can be ef-fective if the fact finder, through the testimonyof an expert psychological witness (or, in thecase of juries, through a carefully drafted pat-tern instruction), is provided with informationconcerning the objective conditions underwhich eyewitness observation and testimonycan or cannot be considered reliable (for dis-cussions of this alternative, see Loftus, 1983;McCloskey & Egeth, 1983; Wells, 1984). Thepresent research, however, suggests a secondpossible solution: to actually increase the di-agnosticity of eyewitness self-confidence so thatfact finders' intuitions would serve them well.

These results have interesting potential forapplication in the criminal justice system.Specifically, they suggest that perhaps when lawenforcement officials secure identifications vialineups or mugshots, they should videotapetheir eyewitnesses for subsequent playback be-fore probing them about their degree of cer-tainty, their willingness to testify, and so on.Although this procedure may sound radical,videotape technology has, in fact, become in-creasingly acceptable for several evidentiarypurposes in law enforcement and the courts,such as recording undercover operations,confessions, and deposition testimony (Salvan,1975).

On the more cautious side of such a pro-posal, it is important to bear in mind the limitsin the generalizability thus far established forthe RSA phenomenon. These studies all sharedseveral common features, many of which canaffect indexes of eyewitness performance (for

12 In an interesting addendum to this result, the self-

perception hypothesis receives an added measure of sup-port. Malpass and Devine (1984) argued that in the case

of offender-present lineups, two types of possible error, falseidentifications and the failure to make any identification,

could be distinguished. In the present research, both re-sponses had been categorized together as incorrect. Whathappens if subjects who did not make an identification areexcluded, yielding a strict and arguably more appropriatecomparison between those who made a right versus wrongidentification?

The results of this reanalysis proved informative. First,it turned out that excluding the nonidentifiers did not pro-duce any changes in response latency or mean confidenceratings, as reported by Malpass and Devine (1981). Withregard to confidence, the fict that nonidentifiers were noless certain of their decisions than the others resulted inan almost uniform increase in the accuracy-confidencecorrelation (from .31 to .40 overall; from .48 to .54 withinthe RSA groups, combined; from .04 to .19 within thecontrol groups, combined). Of special relevance to the self-perception explanation, the reanalysis of Experiment 2showed that the increase in the accuracy-confidence cor-relation was considerable among RSA actors (from .44,p < .05, to .68, p < .01) and observers (from .24, ns, to.41, p < .05), but not for control group actors (from .05to .11, both ns). In short, when only the subsample of

subjects who made a selection is considered, there is evi-dence of a paradox, consistent with the self-perception view,that observers perform better on behalf of the actors thanthe actors who are not self-aware do for themselves. Furtherresearch in which the presence or absence in the lineup ofthe offender is manipulated, and a signal detection modelis systematically utilized to measure the various compo-nents of accuracy and error, should address this suggestivefinding.

892 SAUL M. KASSIN

a review, see Malpass & Devine, 1984)—(a)subjects knew, while observing the stimulusevent, that they were not experiencing a realcrime, (b) they therefore knew, while lookingat the photospread, that their identificationdecisions were of no consequence, (c) they werepresented with an array of pictures in whichthe culprit was present, and (d) they werereading an unbiased (i.e., the culprit may ormay not be in the lineup) instruction. Finally,perhaps the most serious practical limitationof these results is that because subjects' deci-sions had no personal consequence (e.g., theywould not become involved or excluded in theprosecution of a crime), they were probablyreasonably motivated to provide an accurateappraisal of their feelings of confidence. Assuch, the additional information gained viaself-observation could indeed prove beneficial.Whether the RSA effect applies to real wit-nesses who are motivated by needs for venge-ance, positive self-presentation, public atten-tion, or noninvolvement, however, remains tobe seen.

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Received February 28, 1985Revision received May 13, 1985

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