EXPLOSION AND LOSS · MCP Power 7830 kilowatts MCA Power 3 x 650 kilowatts P & I BRITANIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED CAPACITIES OF THE TANKS TANK VOLUME (M3) Cargo tanks

CHEMICAL TANKER “VICUÑA” EXPLOSIONFINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

DIRECTORATE OF PORTS AND COASTS

Brazilian NavyDirectorate of Ports and Coasts

FINAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

CHEMICAL TANKER “VICUÑA”

EXPLOSION AND LOSS

PARANAGUÁ (PR) ON 15/NOV/2004

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SYNOPSIS

On the 15th November, 2004, at 19.42 hours, during the discharge operation, at the

terminal of Cattalini Terminais Marítimos Ltda., located in the city of Paranaguá (PR) Brazil,

the Chilean Flag C.T. “VICUÑA”, IMO number 8100076, exploded causing the death 4

persons, the total loss of the ship and of the remainder of the cargo, serious damage to the quay

besides other installations of the terminal and damage to small craft anchored in the vicinity.

The cargo, totally constituted of methanol, leaked into the environment without

greater consequences due to its evaporation. However, the fuel oil from the ship’s tanks also

leaked into the environment, causing extensive environmental damage in Paranaguá bay.

The removal of the oil from the ship and its containment around the ship, after the

accident, was carried out by Svitzer Wijsmuller.

The removal of the wreckage was carried out by the Dutch company Smit Salvage

B.V.

Oil spillage

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1- GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1.1- DETAILS OF THE VESSEL

The MT “VICUÑA is a tanker, classified in conformity with the “Code for the

Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk” (BCH Code).

The ship was originally built as a chemical tanker and remained as such, no

consistent alteration being observed in its plans.

Profile photo of the MT “VICUÑA”

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Arrangement of MT “VICUÑA”

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SHIP

Name of the ship “VICUÑA”No IMO 8100076Name of Owner SOCIEDAD NAVIERA ULTRAGAS LTDName of operator ADMIMISTRADORA DE NAVES HUMBOLDT LTDABuilder NAKSKOV SHIPYARD, NAKSKOV, DENMARKNo of the hull 231Previous name JO CYPRESSDate of keel-laying 15the APRIL 1982Date of delivery APRIL/1983Type Chemical TankerClassification Society DET NORSKE VERITASClass annotation 1A1 ICE-1A Tanker for Chemicals and Oil ESP EOClassification N o 13149Country of Registry CHILEPort of Registry VALPARAÍSORegistry No 2859Call Sign CBVCLength overall 149.40 mLength between perpendiculars 141.50 mBreadth 22.44 mDepth 11.75 mGross Tonnage 11636Nett Tonnage 6211Loaded draft (summer) 9.11 m

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Superstructure

Heater Room

Motors of the pumps (30 in all)



Loaded Displacement (summer) 23815 tGross Deadweight (summer) 17465 tLight displacement 6350 tMaximum height 41.192 mCargo tanks capacity at 100% 21192 m3

Cargo tanks capacity at 98% 20762 m3

Navigational area

(radio- communication)

A1+A2+A3

MCP Power 7830 kilowattsMCA Power 3 x 650 kilowattsP & I BRITANIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE

ASSOCIATION LIMITED

CAPACITIES OF THE TANKS

TANK VOLUME (M3)Cargo tanks (stainless steel) 16114Cargo tanks (painted) 5078Ballast tanks 4067Fuel oil 1569Diesel oil 324.3Lubricating oil 82.07Sediment 14.40Residue 9.40Water 317.37Other tanks 18.80

1.2- CERTIFICATION

1.2.1- STATUTORY CERTIFICATES

After analysis, the certification of the ship presented was considered in conformity

with the applicable Conventions, also with the carrying out of the surveys prescribed in these

Conventions.

1.2.4 - DET NORSKE VERITAS (DNV) CLASSIFICATION SOCIETY

The ship’s Classification Society is Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and it has

maintained she in class and accompanied she since her keel was laid, in April/82, despite the

changes in ownership.

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The Classification Certificate was issued on 12/02/02 and its validity is until

31/03/07.

The Annual Surveys were carried out on 29/03/03 and 29/06/04 and the

Intermediary Survey on 20/08/04, all in the city of Valparaiso, in Chile.

The certificate in question was considered in conformity with the precepts in force.

1.2.5 - LAST INSPECTION OF PORT STATE CONTROL

The last inspection in conformity with the Viña Del Mar Agreement was carried

out by the Peruvian Navy, by its General Directorate and Port Captaincies and Coast Guard on

27/06/04, in the port of Paita, Peru. No deficiencies were registered.

1.3.1 - SAFE MANNING CARD

The details of the safe manning cards are shown below:

QUALIFICATION STCW

RULE

QUANTITY

CREWMEMBERS

CREWMEMBERS

EMBARKED

OBSERVATIONS

Captain 11/2 01 01 -x-1st Officer 11/2 01 01 -x-2nd Officer 11/2 01 01 On the crewmember’s

Certificate Rule 11/1, on the Safe Manning Card Rule 11/2.

3rd Officer 11/2 01 02 On the crewmember’s Certificate Rule 11/1. On the Safe Manning Card Rule 11/2.

Deckhands 11/4 04 07 -x-Radio Officer IV/2 *1 All deck officers

are qualified for

GMDSSChief Engineer III/2 01 01 -x-

1st Engineer III/2 -x- 01 -x-2nd Engineer III/2 01 01 -x-3rd Engineer III/2 01 01 -x-Engine room III4 03 08 -x-

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crewmembers Catering Dept. crewmembers

-x- Note 3 03 -x-

The ship’ Safe Manning Card has the following additional requirements:

1) The Radio Officer may be substituted by two Deck Officers with GOC

Certificates.

2) Health: 01(one) officer should possess a Third Level First Aid Certificate.

3) In the catering dept. the ship should have the personnel necessary to attend all of

the crew.

4) All the deck and engine room officers should possess the course “Chemical

Tanker Familiarization Course”, Rule V/1 of the STCW 78/95; and

5) All the officers and crewmembers that carry out functions directly with the

loading and discharging of a chemical tanker should possess the qualification

“Specialized Training Program on Chemical Tanker Operation”.

The crew of the ship was made up of 28 (twenty-eight) crewmembers and 2 (two)

passengers were being carried.

After analysis of the documentation regarding the qualification of the seamen

embarked, it was verified and considered in conformity with the “International Convention on

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping” (STCW Convention 78/95).

However, the following was observed:

1) Of the deckhands, only 02 (two), among the 07 (seven) deckhands of the ship

possessed the course “Specialized Training program on Chemical Tanker

Operation”.

It should be registered that, at the moment of the events that culminated with the

explosion, the 3rd Officer, who was on duty in the Cargo Control Centre and the crewmember

who was on duty on the main deck (close to the manifold) and who died on the occasion, did

not possess that qualification; and

2) Of the engine-room crewmembers, only 02(two), out of the 08(eight) possessed

the course “Specialized Training Program on Chemical Tanker Operation”.

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3) The Safe Manning Card, issued by the Chilean Maritime Authority, demands in

its Observation 5 that “All the officers and crewmembers that carry out duties

directly with the loading and discharge of a chemical tanker should possess the

qualification “Specialized Training Program on Chemical Tanker Operation”.

1.4 - THE CARGO

The ship’s cargo was exclusively constituted of methanol, except tank CO4P.

Methanol or methyl alcohol is an alcohol, of formula CH3 OH, no ONU 1230, a colourless

liquid, soluble in water, inflammable and toxic. Its inflammability occurs in the presence of a

source of ignition and its combustion generates other dangerous products. It is biodegradable in

water, however may have a serious effect on aquatic life.

1.5 – THE VOYAGE

On this voyage, no 192, the ship was loaded on 06/11/04, in the port of Cabo Negro,

Chile, with 15000.97 tons of methanol.

On 11/11/04, she arrived at the port of Rio Grande (RS) at 12.42 and started the

discharge at 17.42 on the same day. On 12/11, the ship completed the discharge of 4473.06

tons, and sailed for Paranaguá (PR), where it arrived at 02:00 of the 14/11/04, remaining at

anchor.

In Rio Grande (RS) the tanks discharged were: CIP4, CIS4, WP1 to WP5 and WS1

to WS5. These tanks were located close to the ship’s side and after the discharge were not

washed, remaining with a mixture methanol vapour and air. In Paranaguá, before berthing and

discharging, the ship was supplied with 598.8 tons of fuel oil and 120 tons of diesel oil.

CONSUMABLES

ITEM BEFORE SUPPLY AFTER SUPPLYFUEL OIL 645 t 1240.2 t

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DIESEL OIL 31.5 t 151.5 tPOTABLE WATER 262 t 262 t

The berthing of the ship at the Terminal of Cattalini Terminais Marítimos Ltda took

place at 20:06 on 14/11/04 and the discharge operation commenced at 21:54 the same day. A

listing exists of the consumables such as fuel oil, diesel oil, potable water on board, is

presented to follow:

GROSS DEADWEIGHT

ITEM QUANTITYFuel Oil 1240.2 t

Diesel Oil 151.5 tPotable water 262 t

Methanol 11227.91 tMixture water/gasoline 130 t

Lubricants 30 tGross Deadweight 13041.61 t

Not included above is the quantity of ballast existing on board, as well as the

provisions and the weights of the crew and passengers.

Volume of the tanks =14152.91 cubic metres.

Specific weight of Methanol at 20 o Centigrade = 0.7923 tons/cubic metres.

Weight of Methanol = 1122791 tons.

The maximum flow of the ship’s pumping, agreed between the ship and the terminal,

was 400 cubic metres per hour on the 10 inch line and 300 cubic metres per hour on the 8 inch

line. The maximum pressure agreed was of 5 bar, on each line. The manifested quantity of

methanol onboard the ship was 11226.521 tons and the quantity discharged was 7147.288 tons,

which is equal to approximately 9015.549 cubic metres.

In view of the accident, this measuring was carried out with the volume of 03 tanks

on shore.

After the discharge of 7147.3 tons of methanol an the filling of 90% of the ballast

tanks of the ship during the discharging, reaching a total of ballast of 3751.2 tons, we would

have a Gross Deadweight of 10898.5 tons obtaining a medium draft of 6.8 metres.

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1.6 - THE CONDITION THE SHIP WAS IN

1.6.1 - LIFESAVING MATERIAL

The lifesaving material, not reached by the explosion or the fire, was in good

condition, this being proven by the launching, by the crewmembers, of one of the inflatable

lifesaving rafts, to abandon the ship.

1.6.2 - THE MOORING OF THE SHIP

It may be concluded that the mooring of the ship was in order and did not present

any abnormality during the discharging up to the event of the explosion, this being confirmed

by the terminal operator.

1.6.3 - THE CONDITION OF STRUCTURAL STRAINS

At the moment of the accident, we can approximate the condition of the ship to

Loading Condition n o 2 “Ballast with 100% Fuel”, also not presenting a critical structural

condition. It should be mentioned that the ship was berthed, in conditions of “Tranquil Waters”.

1.7- THE LOCALITY OF THE ACCIDENT

1.7.1 - LOCALIZATION

The accident occurred with the ship alongside the external berth of the terminal of

the company Cattalini Terminais Marítimos Ltda, in Paranguá bay, at the position LAT 25o30’

02’S and LONG 48o37’30. The local depth is approximately 12.0 metres.

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Nautical Chart DHN nr 231

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Terminal region in Paranagua



1.7.2- ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

1.7.2.1 - THE TIDE

At the time of the accident, the tide foreseen was ebbing, with high tide at 19:00

with a height of 1.4 metres and low tide at 22:56 with a height of 0.1 metres.

1.7.2.2 - THE CLIMATIC CONDITIONS

On 15/11 at 19: 00-RF Paranaguá – Ilha do Mel – Sky overcast, with intermittent

light rain on the occasion, light wind, moderate visibility (4-10km), air temperature 20.5 o C and

temperature of the seawater at the surface 21.7oC.

On 16/11 at 00;00 - RF Paranaguá – Ilha do Mel – Sky overcast, with intermittent

light rain on the occasion, light wind, moderate visibility (4-10 km), air temperature 20.4 o C

and temperature of the seawater at the surface of 21.2 o C.

00.00 – Paranaguá – Sky overcast, with continuous drizzle, weak on the occasion,

wind Northeast 3.0 knots, visibility moderate (4-10 km),air temperature 19.9 oC.

It will be observed that the meteorological conditions did not influence the

occurrence of the accident. The direction of the wind on 15/11, at 21:00 was “Northeast” with a

velocity of 1.3 metres/second (2.52 knots), according to the National Institute of Meteorology.

1.8-THE ACCIDENT AND THE SEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCES

1.8.1 - ARRIVAL OF THE SHIP AT PARANAGUÁ

On 14/11/04 the MT “VICUÑA arrived at 02:00 that day, in position LAT 25o

38,89’ S LONG 48o 12,89’ according to information given by Paranaguá Pilotage Services.

1.8.2- THE SUPPLY

On 14/11/04, with the ship anchored in anchorage area number 3, the supply was

made of fuel oil and diesel oil. The supply of diesel oil started at 15:55 and was finished at

17:20 and that of fuel oil started at 13:45 and was finished at 16:25 the same day 14/11/04.

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1.8.3 - BERTHING

The Berthing of the ship at the Terminal of Cattalini Terminais Marítimos Ltda

took place at 20:06 on 14/11/04, at the external pier, starboard side to.

1.8.4 - THE DISCHARGE

The discharge was commenced at 21:54 on 14/11/04, and went normally up to the

moment of the accident. The customary meetings between the ship and the terminal were held,

to coordinate the various procedures between the parties involved.

Around 16:00 on 15/11/04, the ship was discharging the tanks CP7, CS7, CP1 and

CS1. It ceased to pump tanks CP1 and CS1, moving to tanks CS2 and CP2, and at the moment

of the explosion, which occurred at 19:42, it was discharging tanks CS7, CS2 and CP2.

Around 19:20, the operator on duty, on the pier, heard a different noise onboard the

ship, which he attributed to the entry into operation of a pump. According to the testimony of

the officer on duty in the cargo control centre, approximately at the same time, the pump of

tank CP7 was switched off. The nominal flow at the moment of the event, could be varying

from 459 cubic metres per hour (if the pumps CS7, CS2 and CP2 were working with minimum

flow) to700 cubic metres per hour if those pumps were working with maximum flow.

The average flow of the ship’s pumps during the discharge, considering the time

that elapsed between the start of the discharge at 21:54 of 14/11/04 up to the explosion at 19:42

on 15/11/04 and the discharge of 9015.549 cubic metres , was approximately 413,6 cubic

metres per hour (9015.549m 3/ 21.80h). If we discount from the discharge time the 3.5 hours,

that according to testimonies the ship stayed without pumping, we have an average flow of

494.3 cubic metres per hour (9015.549 m 3 /18.30h).

As the 10 inch line went to tanks nos. 111 and 112 and the 8 inch line to tank no122

and the quantity of methanol transferred to each one of these tanks was 2694.021 cubic metres,

3051.028 cubic metres and 3270.5 cubic metres to the tanks nos 111, 112 and 122 respectively,

the average flow for each one of them, in 2l.8 hours of discharge was 123.6 cubic metres per

hour, 140 cubic metres per hour and 150.0 cubic metres per hour, respectively.

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However anomalies, of the type “stoppage of pumps”, were related by the

operators of the terminal in their testimonies.

It follows down illustrative "sketch" of this condition of unloading informing also

the tanks that had been already partially unloaded.

1.8.5 - THE EXPLOSION/FIRE

The explosion was followed by the fire of the methanol existing onboard, which

spilled into the sea. The explosion also caused damages to the fuel tanks which came to cause

the pollution of an extensive area of the bay of Paranaguá.

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1.9 - MEASURES FOR CONTROL OF THE SITUATION

On 15/11, immediately after the explosion of the MT “VICUÑA”, the Parana State

Harbour Master went straight to the Terminal of Cattalini Terminais Marítimos Ltda, where he

started the coordination of the tasks of the rescue of crewmembers and of fighting the fire

which was spreading. The firefighting passed to be carried out by the Fire Brigade of Paraná.

At that moment representatives of the environmental defense organs were also actuated

(IBAMA and IAP). Twenty crewmembers were collected by pilotage boats that approached at

the stern of the vessel and sent on to the local hospital for examinations.

On 16/11, the fire continued with the presence of small outbreaks, from this

moment, under control, and the leakage of diesel oil and fuel oil was being contained by the

launching of containment barriers. The environmental organs established the prohibition of

fishing in Paranaguá bay. Floating barriers for containing oil spill were installed around the

ship and the oil retained inside of these started to be removed.

Fighting to the pollution

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1.10 - PERSONAL ACCIDENTS

The explosion of the ship had 4 fatal victims as consequence. At the moment of the

explosion, there were 24 crewmembers onboard and another 4 crewmembers were on shore

liberty.

1.11 - MATERIAL DAMAGES

Total loss of the ship, after the explosion, there remained no alternative to breaking

it up. The terminal suffered damages, which once repaired, made possible the return of the

terminal to operations. There was also a register of light damages to craft anchored in the inner

part of the terminal and in buildings in the city of Paranaguá.

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The ship after the explosion



1.12 - POLLUTION

1.12.1 - BY THE METHANOL

The methanol being an inflammable compound, highly volatile and explosive. All

the product existing in the ship burnt, volatized or diluted in the seawater in the first hours, or in

the first days, after the accident. Thus, no quantity of this product was recovered during the

breakup of the ship.

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Terminal damages

light damages to craft anchored in the inner part of the terminal



1.12.2 - BY THE FUEL OIL/DIESEL OIL

The ship carried approximately 1416 tons of oil, equivalent to 1467000 litres, with

around 87% of this total represented by bunker oil. In accordance with the report of

Transpetro/Petrobras, of 13/04/05, 1176074 litres of oil and 2996039 litres of oily water,

deposited in the separation tank of the company’ terminal in Paranaguá (PR). Based on this

information, it can be estimated that around 291000 litres of oil were not recovered and,

therefore, leaked to the environment. Considering the predominance of fuel oil of the bunker

type (density = 0.98), it may be estimated that this quantity is equivalent to around 285 tons.

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Pollution in the bay of Paranaguá



1.13 - THE SHIP RIGHT AFTER THE ACCIDENT

Right after the accident and after complete extinction of the fire, it was found that

the ship was touching the bottom, remaining out of the water only the forecastle and the quarter

deck, with the main deck, in the region of the cargo tanks, totally submersed, it being possible

to visualize only remains of the manifold, twisted steel and part of the deck equipment.

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On the stern, on the port side, still were floating the starboard lifesaving raft which

had been launched by the crew to assist in the embarkation onto the launches that came to

rescue them. It was further observed, that the after part of the ship, where the superstructure

is, had a slight list to port.

Part of the main deck to starboard (upper part of the wing tanks) was above the

pier, with the mechanical parts of the cargo pumps (WS3 and CS5), internal suction shafts and

cargo networks of the deep pumps of the respective tanks.

Right below the bridge, where they would be the cabins of the commander and of

the engineer chief, they were totally destroyed by the fire, when only was possible, in the

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engineer chief cabin, to get a briefcase with files containing the register of maintenances in the

bombs of load.

These files presents the “Informe de Mantencion Y Reparacion” or “Report of

Maintenance and Repairs where was mentioned that, throughout the year 2004, during working,

some pumps presented problems in functioning. The pump of CS7, on 12/05/04, was

dismantled due to defective functioning. The bodies of the rotors were inspected, and remains

of steel cable of actuation of the foot valve were found and which provoked damages in rings of

attrition and in one rotor. Various parts were substituted with reconditioned materials.

On the pump of tank CP7, on 15/04/04, for preventive maintenance, the pump was

dismantled, being found axles, bearing supports and bearings in graphitized Teflon worn,

drivers, rings of attrition, fixation bolts and rotors in a bad state. These parts were substituted

“reconditioned spares (Humboldt System)”.

On 16/08/04 for vibrations in the discharge lines in the process of washing a tank,

this same pump was dismantled and it was found that all the axles with their stainless steel

bushing (Humboldt System) were out of position (displaced). The supports of the bearings with

their bushings of graphitized Teflon were displaced and the remainder were worn. In the set of

rotors, one rotor, six exterior rings of attrition, three central and the axle were substituted for the

bad state provoked by excessive vibration. The whole line was substituted by spares

reconditioned ashore.

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On 12/04/04, the pump of tank CP8 was dismantled for preventive maintenance

where were substituted various parts. On 22/05/04 for abnormal noises, during a discharge, this

pump was dismantled for inspection, the rotors were in a good state, however, in the line of the

axle were found, a bearing support broken and all the axles with stainless steel bushings of

working of the bearings out of their chocks, corroded. These axles were reconditioned and

appear not to have been given an adequate adjustment.

The pumps of tanks WP1,WS1,WS5 and CIS4 also presented problems in 2004.

In a general manner, the documentation quoted above shows that the bad

functioning of the cargo pumps was, many times identified by the crew by the appearance of

abnormal noises. In this document it is mentioned that alterations were made to the cargo

pumps, alterations these entitled (Humboldt System). There is no registry of the scope of this

alteration and if it was approved by the Classification Society or authorized by the manufacturer

of the pumps.

According to the “Class Status Report” of the Classification Society DNV, dated

12/07/04, excepting pumps WS1 and CP3, inspected by DNV on 26/02/03 and 06/05/02,

respectively, the pumps CS7, CP7, CP8, WS5 and CIS4, cited in a previous paragraph, were

inspected on 20/03/01.

In view of the state of the crewmember’s cabins, it was not possible to obtain any

other document.

Continuing the survey of the rest of the compartments of the interior of the

superstructure, it was observed that innumerable other compartments were totally destroyed by

the fire, except some, in the region of aft of the superstructure, in the decks closest to the deck

of the quarter deck.

The front bulkhead of the superstructure was attacked by the fire, but did not

present big damages, except that nearly all the side scuttles were destroyed during the fighting

of the fire.

The Cargo Control Centre was destroyed by the fire, with a large part of this

compartment dirty from residue of the firefighting foam. In this compartment, next to the

controls (buttons) of the cargo pumps, one can see labels indicating the products that were in

the cargo tanks.

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The computer used to control the cargo was burnt and damaged by the firefighting.

As it was not possible to access the engine room, as it was flooded, it was not verified if the

valves that effect the cutting of fuel in the supply networks were really activated.

The forecastle, where was being taken out fuel oil from the deep tanks, also could

not be accessed. It was found that the boatswain’s locker was flooded and with a big quantity of

fuel oil, as was the compartment of the motor of the bow thruster. The compartment on the

main deck where were the condensers of the heating system for the washing of the tanks, was

dislocated aft, wrenched from its original position. This compartment did not have any mark

from the fire on its front part.

On top of the compartment mentioned above, was the ship’s spare propeller which,

in view of the violence of the explosion, was flung into the sea. The ship possessed a main

manifold, amidships, with 30 outlets for each side and another manifold, astern of the

accommodations, with 01 outlet.

The ship was connected to the terminal by 02 lines composed of 4 hoses connected

two by two. On the 8 inch network, were connected hoses numbers 828 and 816, whilst hose

number 828 was connected to the outlets of tanks CS3 and CP#, by means of a “U” type part.

The connection of the 10 inch network was similar to that cited above and was

composed of hoses numbers 813 and 814, with the latter connected also by a “U” type part to

the outlets of tanks CS5 and CP5. To port, on the lower part of the manifold, various parts

composed of a tube with ramifications, which had been mounted initially for the discharge by

the port side, were prepared to receive the flow of the outlets of the other tanks.

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The Cargo Control Centre



1.14 - THE DISMANTLING OF THE SHIP

The dismantling/removal of the ship from the pier of Cattalini foresaw the cutting

of the wreck in pieces, of a weight that could be lifted by the salvage crane , of Smit Salvage

B.V with a capacity of 1200 tons.

The cutting diagram

The cutting of the parts of the ship was accomplished by means of current supplied

by the salvage crane.

Cutting the bow

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Dismantling the hull

1.15-OBSERVATIONS OF THE BLOCKS OF THE SHIP AFTER THE CUTTING

During the dismantling at the site of Ponta do Poço, detailed examinations were

carried out on each part of the ship that was sent there. In the region of tanks CIP6, COP6 and

COS6, it was found that the transversal and longitudinal bulkheads presented certain integrity

and the corresponding part of the main deck was severely damaged.

Towing parts to dismantling at the site of Ponta do Poço

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The deck, in the region of tanks CPS and CP7 and in the region of tanks CS5, CS4

and CS3, was totally torn off and was not recovered together with the other parts adjacent to

the side and the bottom. Now the deck of tanks CS8, CS7, CP5, CP4 and CP3. torn off by the

explosion, was, although severely damaged, still attached to the side.

The dismantling

When the cargo pumps of tanks WS5, WP5, CS5. Ws2 CP2, CS2, CP7, CS7, CP8,

CS8 and CS1 were dismantled it was observed that:

1)The rotors of these pumps had signs of strong inter-granular corrosion and in

many cases they had some damages filled in with welding;

2) The support bearings, made with synthetic material, presented accentuated

wear; and

3) Strange things were found inside the pumps, such as steel cables, pieces of wire

and screws.

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Remains found inside the pumps

On the occasion of the dismounting of the ship’s manifold, signs of fire were not

observed in the interior of its tubing or its valves. Excepting the valves corresponding to the

tanks that had their respective pumps in operation, all the other valves were closed.

The cargo hoses also were surveyed and sign of fire were not found in their inside.

The P/V valves, dismantled for survey, had damages which can be attributed to the

explosion, no evidence was found of bad functioning that could have contributed to the disaster.

P/V valves

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The electric motors, that were severely damaged, also were dismantled in a

specialized workshop and no indications were found that they had contributed to the explosion.

Eletric motors survey

2 - CONCLUSIONS

Based on the information collected and presented throughout this technical report it

is possible to have an image of the facts that took place and culminated with the accident. In the

analysis of the possible causes of the explosion on the MT “VICUÑA” the following premises

were considered:

a) The explosion occurred in the interior of the ship’s tanks;

b) No sign of the explosion was detected in the lines of the terminal, it being further

possible to affirm that the biggest damages verified on the pier were caused directly by the

explosion, by the fall of the debris of the ship that were thrown after the explosion, by the fire

that followed and by the firefighting operations and removal of the debris;

c) The analysis of the films of the safety cameras indicates that the initial explosion

occurred in the proximities of the superstructure of the ship. Considering observations taken

from this film, the analysis of the debris and information obtained in testimonies , it was

concluded that the explosion started in tank CS7 and, to follow spread to tanks CP7, CP8 and

the adjacent wing tanks, following a wave of explosions in direction of the bow and reaching

the rest of the tanks situated forward of the considered point of origin; and

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d) Once that there was not any alarm signal or any communication of a problem on

the part of the operators of the ship and of the terminal, it is reasonable to assume that the events

that occasioned the explosion of the ship were very rapid, in such a way to render impossible

any reaction on the part of the persons on duty, or were originated in an inaccessible place,

rendering impossible also the prevision of the tragedy that was approaching. In relation to this

aspect it is important to emphasize that the chief officer of the ship, the operator of the terminal,

the representative of the maritime agency and the watchman of the Management Organ of Port

Labour (OGMO) who were passing in the proximities of the ship’s manifold moments before

the accident, survived the explosion and they did not report any detectable abnormality.

A theory initially considered to justify the explosion, in keeping with the traces

observed on the quay, was occurrence of a leakage in the manifold of the terminal and a spark

from some item of the electrical installation of the pier provoked the ignition of the mixture of

the vapour of the methanol with the atmospheric air, starting the process that culminated with

the explosion of the ship. Such theory presents the following aspects that should be considered:

i) the direction and the intensity of the wind, at the moment of the accident, would

push away an eventual cloud of methanol, which had been created in the proximities of the

manifold of the terminal, from the possible equipments or installations with capacity to generate

a spark that would start the explosion;

ii) methanol vapour is heavier than air, there being a tendency that it would not

spread in direction of the ship and reach the deck which was in a higher position;

iii) the forming of a cloud of methanol after the occurrence of a leakage is a process

which would demand some time, in view of the need for evaporation of the spilt liquid, which

certainly would give enough time for the operators to detect the problem and interrupt the

discharge;

iv) preliminary analyses indicate that the atmospheric condition at the time of the

accident were not propitious for the formation of a cloud of methanol with characteristics which

would justify the occurrence of the accident;

v) it is not expected that the ignition of a cloud of a combustible product has power

of destruction that justifies the breaking of the structure of the ship, which was corroborated by

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the fact that no deformation of the cargo tanks from outside inwards was found in the analysis

of the debris; and

vi) the ship possesses barriers that impede the entry of the flame created by the

ignition of a cloud of combustible into the interior of the cargo tanks and which, as far as could

be ascertained, did not present any deficiency.

A leakage in the network or manifold of the ship would have the same restrictions

presented above, increased by the fact that an eventual cloud of methanol generated would be

even more distant from possible sources of ignition found on the quay.

The breaking of the ship’s network as a result of a wrong handling of valves was

also considered, once that the freeing of the methanol under pressure would facilitate its mixture

with the air and, also, the breaking of a network would open an access to the interior of the tank

of an eventual external flame provoked by the ignition of the liberate product. However, this

theory was also discarded for the reasons presented below:

i) the positions of the valves of the manifold of the ship correspond to those expected

in keeping with the testimonies of the crewmembers;

ii) the ship’s pumps were of the centrifugal type, normally incapable of breaking a

steel tubing, so that, should they operate with the discharge network closed, cavitation of the

liquid in the interior of the pump would occur; and

iii) the network of discharge of methanol to the Catallini Terminal was

interconnected in the ship’s manifold with the two receiving lines on shore, that is, if one line of

the terminal was closed, the flow would continue normally by the other line.

Another theory that was considered, would be the occurrence of a fire in an eventual

leakage on the terminal that would have spread, through the hoses to the interior of the ship’s

cargo tanks. However no sign was found of burning or heating in the internal surfaces of the

two lines of hoses which were used to discharge the methanol, making this theory be discarded.

In relation to this item it is still important to emphasize that:

i) the inner walls of the hoses were of plastic material, sensitive to heat, which

certainly would present visible deformation if it was submitted to the action of a direct flame;

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ii) At the moment of the explosion the discharge operation was being carried out

with the flow in the opposite direction to that for spreading a flame with those characteristics;

and

iii) for occurrence of the spreading of the flame through the hose, and afterwards,

through the ship’s tubing to the cargo tanks, it would be necessary to occur the existence of an

atmosphere with favorable levels of oxygen throughout the whole extension of the networks, a

condition extremely improbable in a normal discharge operation, more so when one considers

the difference in level of the terminal in relation to the ship which certainly would provoke a

liquid seal that would impede the spreading of the flame.

The last theory considered by the experts was that the source of the initial ignition

of the methanol occurred in the interior of the tanks of the MT “VICUÑA”. The only possible

source of ignition existing in the interior of the tanks that there is registry of would be the

functioning of the cargo pumps. These pumps, in abnormal conditions, could generate a spark

through the contact of two metallic parts or then, the generation of heat resulting from the

attrition between the bomb’s components. The points that reinforce this theory are:

i) the pump of tank CS7, in which it is estimated the process started that would

culminate with the explosion of the ship, was operating at the moment of the accident;

ii) there exist documented registries of damages in the cargo pumps;

iii) the operator of the terminal heard a different noise in the operation of the pump

about 25 minutes before the occurrence of the explosion; and

iv) an ignition in the interior of the cargo tank it is believed could create effects

similar to those verified in the analysis of the wreckage, namely:

- by the fact of the ignition being confined in the interior of the tank, a partial

burning of the mixture would occur as a result of the small quantity of oxygen existing that,

despite not being sufficient to destroy the tank, could produce an increase of pressure that would

damage the deck and the adjoining bulkheads;

- the liberation of the gases through a relatively small opening in the deck producing

a jet of fire similar to that verified on the security camera on the moment immediately before

the occurrence of the first ball of fire; and

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- the damages produced in the bulkheads permitted the entry of the flame and additional

quantities of oxygen, making possible the start of the sequence of explosions.

3 – RECOMMENDATIONS

Observing the technical circumstances that culminated in the explosion and loss of MT

‘VICUÑA”, studies can be recommend for alterations of the “International Convention for

Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS):

1) All ships, independently of their tonnage, that transport potentially explosive or

inflammable cargoes, to be equipped with systems that permit maintaining these cargoes inert

during the transport, the loading/discharge or even render impossible the formation of an

inadequate atmosphere with the empty tanks.

Some aspects observed of the accident should also be emphasized: 1) The inspections of the loading/discharging pumps to be intensified and their

periodicity reduced for older ships.

2) Emphasize the use of materials approved by Classification Societies on important

equipments and restrict the use of reconditioned material on those equipments; and

3) The need for elaboration of a Contingency Plan, applicable to each locality/port,

in order to minimize the environmental impacts.

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Documents

EXPLOSION AND LOSS · MCP Power 7830 kilowatts MCA Power 3 x 650 kilowatts P & I BRITANIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE ASSOCIATION LIMITED CAPACITIES OF THE TANKS TANK VOLUME (M3) Cargo tanks