Exec dept cases.docx

7/28/2019 Exec dept cases.docx

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G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004

SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., et.al, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

(Digest by Ali Caronongan Sourced from class digest)

FACTS :

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing theCOMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and localelections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral formsand printing materials.

The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of themachines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued itsimplementation.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocatingthe sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a

further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual votingand counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations withcompanies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerizedvoting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, theCOMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficialresults of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, alsodubbed as an "unofficial quick count."

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No.


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6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement in tabulationprocedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the OmnibusElection Code that:

Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices,taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available forthe purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the authorizedrepresentatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected bythe use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty daysprior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC inauthorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

HELD:

YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preemptsthe sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for thePresident and the Vice-President.

REASONS:

Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authorityvested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored themisapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELECChairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be inviolation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):

"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would ineffect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, whichnot only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be

lacking of any constitutional authority."

The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,

as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436,the accredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized touse a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of thevotes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the


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respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns forpurposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.

In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to bedelivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed byto verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may beestablished.

Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contendsthat Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC asthe statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latesttechnological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover,the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited politicalparties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technologicaland electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use ofsuch devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified allpolitical parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.


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Macalintal vs PET, GR 191618, June 7, 2011

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,

sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rulesfor the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court

and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agencyperforming quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs

decision dismissing the formers petition and declaring the establishment of the

respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the

Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, ArtVIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing onthe basis of the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of allelection contests for the President or Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of theConstitution.

Issue:

Whether or not PET is unconstitutional.

Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.


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Held:

Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to aPresidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that

in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, theyconstitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme

Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessaryimplication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential electionscontests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of theConstitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in the

Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as

essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolvesa presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially ajudicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve electioncontests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of theexplicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for theCOMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)of the Constitution.


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Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No.146738, March 2, 2001

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was electedPresident while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems thatslowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor ChavitSingson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family andfriends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediatelyignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmittedthe Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all

the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000,the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the secondenvelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met

by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter,the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government.Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefsresigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath torespondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitionerissued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake ofpeace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared thaton the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declarationthat he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that byoperation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the ActingPresident. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate PresidentPimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters.

Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were setin motion.


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Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanentdisability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must bean intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. Thevalidity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can

be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as theresignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts showthat petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leavingMalacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to bedetermined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or bythe totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantialevidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritativewindow on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of ExecutiveSec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiationbetween Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful andorderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the

second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as agiven fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to beundertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held thatthe resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leavingMalacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) heacknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, butwith the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace,the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healingprocess of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind ofinability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve

them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may comeahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to joinhim in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation andsolidarity.


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The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarilyunable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a Presidenton leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sentto Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House ofRepresentatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by

Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nominationof Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondentArroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that theinability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejectedpetitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of

inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question ispolitical in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is apolitical issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing theprinciple of separation of powers.


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Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

on September 22, 2011

0 0

Inquiry in aid of legislation Executive Privilege

Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong XingTelecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services forthe National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the PRC. TheSenate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, DeVenecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokerswere using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. Heappeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during whichhe admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange forhis approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed PresidentArroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept thebribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBNProject, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular,

he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followedup the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c)whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the otherhearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SRBC averring that the communicationsbetween GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senatevs Ermita be applied. The SRBC cited Neri for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SRBC to be answered fallsunder executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory processonly to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.


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The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by thepresidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the

President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without theconcurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippinejurisprudence.

2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under

the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, beinga member of President Arroyos cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify thelimitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere byan appropriate investigating authority.


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Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T.David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Bothpetitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek adeclaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued byPresident Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of theCabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than

government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinentprovisions of EO 284 is as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or otherappointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primaryposition, hold not more than two positions in the government and governmentcorporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, theymust relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next inrank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than hisprimary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation shouldeither be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it addsexceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution.According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office oremployment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. TheVice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial andBar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.


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Issue:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

Decision:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declarednull and void.

Ratio:

In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No.284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinetmembers, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition theirprimary position to not more that two positions in the government and governmentcorporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment indirect contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987

Constitution itself.

The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal

interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitutionitself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.


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Case Digest on Estrada V. Arroyo Legitimacy of the Arroyo Presidency

November 10, 2010

G.R. No. 146738

FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting

any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office,until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted.Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to

be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippinestemporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent tohave taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an actingcapacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

HELD:

FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.

The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certainprovisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 ofArticle VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII.The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit.They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicialpublicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has beenlaid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to

say what the law is . . .

The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People PowerII. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew

the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speechand freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances whichonly affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and thelegitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject ofjudicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sittingPresident that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President aresubject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involveslegal questions.


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SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President.

a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be acandidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency evenat that time.

b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day periodpromised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.

Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want anymore of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, theintrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.

The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. Theintent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.

Ayoko na are words of resignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as agiven fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to beundertaken by the parties during and after transition period.

d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the pressrelease containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of therespondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its

legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, forthe sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did notsay he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed hisgratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he wasreferring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) heassured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in thesame service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge afteroccupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his

supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit ofreconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and

solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The pressrelease was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now

in the past tense.

THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President.

Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under

the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his


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functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as thePresident.

The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENTGLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITSSUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OFTHE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate

Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ASVICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitionerEstrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim ofinability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannotsuccessfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merelyunable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and thedecision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branchof government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for

the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Theimpeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of theprosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7,

2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that theImpeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now

functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first beimpeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted,would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the ConstitutionalCommission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become mootdue to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases mayalready be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are

immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their

incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance thatthe impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter helost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to hiscriminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in theimpeachment proceedings.

Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commitcriminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule


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is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer whoacts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any othertrespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavelcoverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of thetrial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not showthat the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of theextensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality ofcircumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixedopinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even byevidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actualbias and he has not discharged the burden.


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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003]

ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO, ROMEO M. FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA S. ESTRADA,JULIETA C. FAJARDO, ADELAIDA B. GAWIRAN, MARCIANO M. SERVO, VICTORIA S.DAOANG, FELICIANO N. TOLEDO III, JAYNELYN D. FLORES, MA. LIZA B. LLOREN,ROMELIA A. CONTAPAY, MARIVIC B. TOLITOL, PAZ LEVITA G. VILLANUEVA,EDITHA C. HERNANDEZ, JOSE HERNANDEZ, JR., VERONICA C. BELLES, AMELITA S.BUCE, MERCELITA C. MARANAN, CRISTITUTO C. LLOREN, HERNANDO M.EVANGELISTA, and CARLOS BACAY, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA,in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON. ANDREW B. GONZALES, in hiscapacity as the Secretary of Education, and HON. CARLOS D. TUASON, in his capacityas the Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with prayer for temporaryrestraining order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and Memoranda Nos.01592 and 01594.[2] The assailed executive order transferred the sportsdevelopment programs and activities of the Department of Education, Culture andSports (DECS for brevity) to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC for brevity).

The questioned memoranda (DECS Memoranda for brevity), on the other hand,reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS for brevity)

personnel named in the DECS Memoranda to various offices within the DECS.

The Facts

On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.81[3] (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities

of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine SportsCommission and Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports.

EO 81 provided thus:


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Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program and Activities to the PSC. All thefunctions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports development asprovided for in Sec. 16 of EO 117 (s. 1987) are hereby transferred to PSC.

Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. The DECS shall havejurisdiction and function over the enhancement of Physical Education (P.E.)curriculum and its application in whatever form inside schools.

Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary agency tasked to formulate policies andoversee the national sports development program, the management andimplementation of all school-based sports competitions among schools at thedistrict, provincial, regional, national and international levels, in coordination withconcerned public and private entities shall be transferred to the PSC.

Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary

Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000.

Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency of the service, allremaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS effective March 15,2000.

On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within theDECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnelaffected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their reassignment,petitioners filed the instant petition.

In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for beingan undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidentsissuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also

challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their right to security of tenure.

Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray thatthis Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sportsdevelopment. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court


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issue a temporary restraining order against respondents to desist fromimplementing EO 81.

During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity),

otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enactedon August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred thefunctions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to thePSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:

SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. All functions, programs and activities of theDepartment of Education related to sports competition shall be transferred to thePhilippine Sports Commission (PSC). The Program for school sports and physicalfitness shall remain part of the basic education curriculum.

The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby abolished.The personnel of the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC, are hereby transferredto the PSC without loss of rank, including the plantilla positions they occupy. Allother BPESS personnel shall be retained by the Department.

The Issue

The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.

The Courts Ruling

We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.

As manifested by both petitioners[4] and respondents,[5] the subsequentenactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot andacademic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the DECS functions

relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit that it is no longerplausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the functions of theBPESS.[6] Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not transferred


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to the PSC shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept thatthe lawexplicitly protects and preserves[7] their right to security of tenure.

Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point

out that Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as theAdministrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority toreorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. ThePresident, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achievesimplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize theadministrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he maytake any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers Systemand the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging unitsthereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Departmentor Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other

Departments and Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other departmentor agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from otherDepartments or Agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2)and (3) of EO 292,[8] EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to

reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power inrecognition of the recurring need of every Presidentto reorganize his office toachieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve

center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of thePresident must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in themanner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office ofthe President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the


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Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of theOffice of the President.

Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is

immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the ExecutiveBranch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and(3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency ofthe DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to theOffice of the President.[9] Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer thefunctions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports development[10] to

the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.

However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under

Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power toreorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, thePresident can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit toanother. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power

to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within theOffice of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies fromthe Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. Theabolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employees cessation inoffice, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itselfceases to exist.[11] On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does notresult in the employees cessation in office because his office continues to existalthough in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESSemployees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then laterpermanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continuedemployment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees shall be

retained by the Department.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.


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Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Such

appointment was renewed in temporary capacity twice, first by ChairpersonDemetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim,Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELECCommissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office andassumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did notact on said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basisof the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporaryappointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of officeby Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their adinterim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the same positionsviolate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C

RULING:

Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effectimmediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointeehas qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by the Commission

on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itselfmakes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effectiveuntil disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the nextadjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of theConstitution provides as follows:


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The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall beeffective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until thenext adjournment of the Congress.

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or nextadjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by thePresident. xxx

...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by

the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean atemporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term,although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal

meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at thatmoment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoysthe constitution protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be

removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim

appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualifiedinto office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possibleonly if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and anywithdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once anappointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected notonly by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, afternotice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in theConstitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by theCommission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congresswithout the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These twocauses are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all adinterim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of


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Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complainbecause it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the headsof the ad interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as providedby law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can bewithdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary oracting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. Thisis the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President frommaking to the three independent constitutional commissions, including theCOMELEC xxx

Was the renewal of appointment valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission onAppointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is afinal decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checkingpower on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision onthe merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent

after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution doesnot provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and bindingon the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the Presidentcan no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibitionon reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission onAppointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of theCommission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passedappointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the

Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is nofinal decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent tothe appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, thePresident is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx


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The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitutionapplies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. Adisapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interimappointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of theConstitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2),

Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revivedby a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval underSection 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not resultin the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.


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Ulpiano Sarmiento III et al vs Salvador Mison & Carague

on October 31, 2011

Political Law Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was appointed as theCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of theDepartment of Budget. Their appointment was done without the concurrence of theCoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutionallaw questioned the appointment of the two sans confirmation by the CoA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four(4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministersand consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwiseprovided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest inthe President alone.


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The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Shouldthey be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) ofthe CoA? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory constructionthat an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it wouldfollow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group

require the consent (confirmation) of the CoA.

Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous Constitutions, theframers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a middle

ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the CoA for the 1st group ofappointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, theappointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd and 3rd groups as well as thosein the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it was pointed outby the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987Constitution, which reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in

the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law,lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to confirmationby the CoA; and, if this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmationby the CoA. Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merelydeclares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest theirappointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the variousdepartments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reasonhowever is submitted for the use of the word alone in said third sentence

The SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful study of the

deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the wordalone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more

than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship.

In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to excludepresidential appointments from confirmation by the CoA, except appointments to


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offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently,there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the wordalone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest theappointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or inthe heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the

President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President,without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16,Article 7.

Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated merely that, in thecase of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment inthe President, in the courts, or in the heads of various departments of thegovernment. In short, the word alone in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of

the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the 1935 Constitution, appears to beredundant in the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, thisredundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in thefirst sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the CoA.Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed.


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Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Ermita

on October 31, 2011

Political Law Ad Interim Appointments

While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries oftheir respective departments. They were appointed in acting capacities only.Pimentel together w/ 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment ofYap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned and GMA re-issued ad interimappointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity. Pimentelargues that GMA should not have appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because

in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary whocan be designated as Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that while Congress

is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacantposition of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having obtainedits consent; GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to departmentsecretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the Presidentsuch power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is allowed underSec. 16, Art 7 of the Constitution to make such appointments. Pursuant to theConstitution, the President shall have the power to make appointments during therecess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointmentsshall be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment ofthe Congress. Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointmentwith the exception that such temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily

designate an officer already in the government service or any other competentperson to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the

President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in thegovernment service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Also,Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appointautomatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.


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Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on thePresident who her alter ego should be.

What Bernas Says

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an actingcapacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointmentsare extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be

extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments aresubmitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; actingappointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Actingappointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, theycan also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission onAppointments.

** The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily apparentfrom GMAs issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately uponthe recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.


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De Castro v. JBC

Facts:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that hasarisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May

17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letterto the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the ChiefJustice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which statedthat they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position ofChief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbentChief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application orrecommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in thePhilippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step ofannouncing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file theirsworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,

2010.

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of ChiefJustice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when tosubmit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy inthis case being unresolved.

The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for

either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to passthe shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnightappointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of theRTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly


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referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15,Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint tojudicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUES

W/N the petitioners have legal standing?

W/N there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination?

W/N the incumbent President appoint the next Chief Justice?

W/N mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist ofnominees by the JBC?

RULING


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Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waivedby the Court.

Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases,suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operationof a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voterswho actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitionersare not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to

waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing andresolving the serious constitutional questions raised.

There is a justiciable issue

We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for

judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced theproceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to besubmitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed ChiefJustice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the factthat the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices,although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to theincumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe forjudicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of thecandidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview ofconstitutional experts, as may be needed.

The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the naggingquestions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that italready began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of theprocess.


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PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII DOES NOT APPLY TOAPPOINTMENTS TO FILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT OR TO OTHERAPPOINTMENST TO THE JUDICIARY.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and upto the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacanciestherein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteenAssociate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, orseven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrencethereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court:


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First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal thatthe framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging theConstitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangementof the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by theframers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of

what the Constitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of theawesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative(Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII).The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powersthat underlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, amongothers, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. Thepresidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of theArticle.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, ArticleVII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitlydone so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of theSupreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicialappointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly reston the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative,operating to impose a duty that may be enforced should not be disregarded.

Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make anappointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrenceof the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience tothe Constitution.


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The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill thevacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish adefinite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeatedby mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VIIprevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments inthe Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made byan outgoing Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the prohibitionin Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commissionconfined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. Theframers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination andscreening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate priorprocess of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments tothe Judiciary. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize

the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission onAppointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to

appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate JusticeRegalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the questionraised by some sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the

Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured thaton the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had noapplication to appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was

accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration thenominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.


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Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for theincumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of ChiefJustice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway therewill still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIIIremaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurringfrom Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to applySection 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the secondMonday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at thelatest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the

prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of theprohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the fullmandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is thatthere are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possibleperiod of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments)in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with theconstitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume thatthe framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt onwhether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President any President to appoint aChief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of theSupreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the Presidentfrom a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council forany vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

xxx


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The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court fromthe outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks ofcandidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sittingjustices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or personunlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as aduty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act againstwhich it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer.Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in aparticular way.

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) theplaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the

defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendantunlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to beperformed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any otherplain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.


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G.R. No. L-22754: Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar

Control Power Removal Power Appointees

Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and hadcaused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Secsuspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. Afterinvestigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The president then issuedan AO removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has nojurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to beremoved considering that he is an appointee of the president.

HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and removehim since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive orunclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluzbelongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and assuch he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by thePresident of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove isinherent in the power to appoint" . There is some point in the argument that thepower of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspendor remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if theyare presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can bejustified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power toappoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to theclassified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is inline with the provision of our Constitution which says that `the Congress may by lawvest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or

in heads of department.


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Citation: Ang-Angco v. Castillo, No.L-17169, SUPREME COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES, 9 SCRA 619, February 16, 1960, Argued, November 30, 1963,Decided.

Facts: The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of pepsi-cola concentrateswhich were not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. Its counselsapproached Collector of Customs AngAngco to secure the immediate release of theconcentrates, but advised the counsel to secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office. The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angcowhich stated that his office had no objection to the release of the concentrates butcould not take action on the request as it was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angcotelephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his approval of the release onthe basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates.When Commissioner of Customs learned of the release he filed an administrativecomplaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco. For three years Ang-Angco hadbeen discharging the duties of his office. Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, byauthority of the President, rendered his judgment against the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the President is empowered to remove officers and employees in theclassified civil service.

Previous History: Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his powerof control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct actionand dispose of the administrative case in subordinate officers of the executivebranch of the government.

Holding: The President does not have the power to remove officers or employees inthe classified civil service.

Reasoning: It is clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid downin connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said thathe has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.

The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate,suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department


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if they are presidential appointees but not with regard to those officers oremployees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent powercannot be exercised.

This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congressmay by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, inthe courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution).With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads ofdepartments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removalprecisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil ServiceAct of 1959.

Significance: It well established in this case that it is contrary to law to take direct

action on the administrative case of an employee under classified service even withthe authority of the President without submitting the case to the Commissioner ofCivil Service.


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Case Digest on Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

November 10, 2010

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 ofAdministrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires localgovernment units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regularappropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents fromimplementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internalrevenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal

autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention byway of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, areconsistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued bythe President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. Adirectory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. TheAO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities toundertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in thecountry. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscalmatters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector

deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers ofthe Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various localleagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of theDepartment of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget andManagement; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal yearpreceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is theautomatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This ismandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which

orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitutionand the law.


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Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006

The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying beforeCongress does not turn on executive privilege, buton the Chief Executives power ascommander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armedforces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered bythe same limitations as in executive privilege.

FACTS:

On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, includingGen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on NationalDefense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections whereinallegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief ofStaff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan andcompany from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidentialapproval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before saidCommittee, prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court Martialproceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime,

President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying at alegislative inquiry

RULING:


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We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of herpower as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer whodefies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also holdthat any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a militaryofficer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to

compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testifybefore it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not soinclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel theattendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law ofthe land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress isbased on Commander-in-chief powers

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanketrequirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature toattend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerablelimitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formallyinvoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to preventmilitary officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executiveprivilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control theactions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives ascommander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executiveprivilege.

RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require militaryofficers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is basedforemost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives ofthe President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over thearmed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title ascommander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to theposition. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of commandmandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed

forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn betweenobeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitationaffirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitutionprescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.


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Remedy is judicial relief

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military toappear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself

recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid oflegislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with thePresidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for thePresident to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries.

The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anywaydespite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with itspronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent frommembers of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality bywhich members of the military may be compelled to


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Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

"Take Care" Power of the President

Powers of the Chief Executive

The power to promulgate decrees belongs to the Legislature

FACTS:

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state ofnational emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaringthat the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP1017.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power toenact laws and decrees

If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

HELD:

Take-Care Power

This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfullyexecuted, based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all theexecutive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws befaithfully executed.


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As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of thePresident is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied inexisting laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employeesof his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath oraffirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others,execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may

employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all thearmed forces of the country, including the Philippine National Police under theDepartment of Interior and Local Government.

The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce

obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated byme personally or upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292.President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in theforegoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by FormerPresident Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of thesame category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the

President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Lawunder the 1973 Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grantsPresident Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is

peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically statesthat the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which

shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither MartialLaw nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos

exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through themilitary?


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As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. Itfollows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respectto laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as

customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations andcontracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce

laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.


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Olaguer vs Military Commission

Habeas Corpus

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and theywere placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. Theywere charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2)conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate

cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4)conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5)arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, TeodoroValencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy andproposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, thepetitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeascorpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because bythe time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already releasedfrom military confinement. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the

application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for theissuance of th

Documents

Exec dept cases.docx