181. The present action relates to the possession and ownership of a certain piece or parcel of land The plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of said parcel of land; that the defendant was illegally interfering with his possession of the same; that prior to the commencement of the present action the defendant had presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration (Cause No. 8350) for the registration of said parcel of land in his name as administrator of the estate of Antonio Bueno, deceased; that the present plaintiff opposed the registration of said parcel of land, alleging that he was the owner of the same; that said cause was brought on for hearing in the Court of land Registration and was finally decided; that the Court of Land Registration, after hearing the evidence, reached the conclusion that the petitioner (the defendant herein) was not entitled to have said parcel of land registered; that said parcel of land belonged to the oppositor (the petitioner herein); that notwithstanding said decision of the Court of Land Registration the defendant herein continued molesting the plaintiff and interfering with his possession of said parcel of land. The defendant answered said petition by a general denial.he alleges that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibits E and F of the plaintiff. In support of said assignment of error the appellant alleges that said documents had not been properly identified and that their due execution and delivery had not been proved.EVIDENCE; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENT; POWERS AND DUTIES OF NOTARIES PUBLIC, DISCUSSED. The rule is well established that before private documents may be admitted in evidence their due execution and delivery must be proved (section 321, Act No 190). Their due execution and delivery may be proved (a) by any one who saw the document executed, (b) by evidence of the handwriting of the maker, or (c) by a subscribing witness (section 324, act No. 190). There are certain statutory exceptions to the foregoing rule (section 326, Act No. 190). A public document duly acknowledged before a notary public, under his hand and seal with his certificate thereto attached, is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and delivery until some question is raised as to the verity of said acknowledgment and certificate. One of the very purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public is to authorize such documents to be given in evidence without further proof of their execution and delivery.

182. This action was begun in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, pursuant to a complaint by means of which the plaintiffs Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered by the deed of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to pay the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by way of damages, and to pay the costs. Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense, not sworn to, in which she asked that judgment be rendered declaring the contract of sale theretofore made between herself and Basilia Bough null."The lower Court erred in finding that the plaintiff Gustavus Bough, having prepared a contract of separation between the defendant Matilde Cantiveros and her husband, Jose Vasquez, sought to cause her to believe that she exposed herself to a suit by her husband regarding her property, notwithstanding the contract of separation, and for that reason and for the purpose of shielding herself from the consequences of the apprehended suit, that she and her mother executed the document Exhibit A."Counsel relies on the provisions of article 1218 of the Civil Code, which provides that "Public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."as the law well says "public instruments are evidence of the fact which gave rise to their execution" and are to be considered as containing all the terms of the agreement, yet, if the validity of the agreement is the issue, parole evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud. Evidence to establish illegality or fraud, is expressly permitted under section 285 of theCode of Civil Procedure, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence, aided by legitimate inferences from the direct facts. We hold that parole evidence was properly admitted to show the illegality of the contract of sale introduced as Exhibit A.183. The defendants, Valeriano Pagkaliwagan and Victoriano Pagkaliwagan, have appealed from a judgement of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, finding them guilty of homicide prejudicial error was committed by the trial court; for the fact remains that their guilt is duly established by the direct testimony of two eyewitnesses, Leon Rayos and Delfin Garcia, who had no reason for making a false imputation. Thus, we deduce from the evidence for the prosecution, whose side has also been well expounded in the brief for the Government, that appellant Valeriano Pagkaliwagan, after embracing Teodoro Ebora perhaps more as a strategic move than as a gesture of conciliation abruptly took hold of his bolo and struck Teodoro Ebora on the chest, thereby inflicting a gaping wound that extended to the abdomen. The rule against hearsay evidence had merely been given application by the court in refusing to admit Exhibits 2 and 3 are respectively an affidavit of Director of the Mindoro Provincial Hospital to the effect that Valeriano Pagkaliwagan was confined and treated for wounds on his face and head, and an affidavit of the Provincial Fiscal of Mindoro to the effect that said appellant voluntarily reported to his office for investigation with respect to the incident in question. Indeed, in order to always preserve the right of parties to cross-examine, Rule of court 123, section 77, provides that "the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation." Said affidavits are not, as contended by counsel for appellants, in the nature of public documents contemplated in Rule of Court 123, section 39.184. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision*of the Court of Appealsaccused-appellant was appointed on 17 January 1955 as a warehouseman-cashier in the National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC for short) at Jaen Nueva Ecija agency; that he continued in said position until 21 December 1956; that on or abou t 8 April 1957, the property and money accountability of the accused, as agent-in-charge and cashier of the NARIC at Jaen Nueva Ecija, was audited by NARIC Auditor Lucas Estrella; that at the time of the audit, the accused was found short of P 253.18 in cash, 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice valued at P 7,044.90, 5 cavans and 36 kilos of palay valued at P 51.62, and 6,161 empty sacks valued at P 3,760.10 (P0.61 each), or for a total of P 11,109.70; that in computing the net stock of rice and palay under the charge and custody of the accused, he was credited with a shrinkage allowance of 4% of the stock received; and that Auditor Estrella demanded of the accused to produce the shortage but the latter failed to do so.Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Exhibit 2 was not signed and duly authenticated; it is a mere carbon copy and no explanation was given why Flavio Vasquez was not presented as a witness.The only question to be resolved is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in their appreciation of the evidence leading to the conviction of the accusedThe record shows7asigned affidavitof Pedro Esquivel dated 20 February 1959. There appears to be no reason why this same affidavit was not presented before the trial court, Obviously, the execution of the document appended to the petition filed before this Court is an afterthought not really worth considering. Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if the affiants are available as witnesses. The use of affidavits should be regulated by the hearsay rule8to safeguard every opportunity to cross examine the affiants with regard to their contents and due execution.9A signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the original.14But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.The non-production by the accused of the original document, unless justified under the exceptions iN Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence"18adverse to him (the accused). Besides the charge order in question has a total price of P 8,171.68, while the misappropriated amount of 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice is P 7,044.90, and the amount of 5 cavans and 36 kilos of palay is 109.80 or a total of P 7,154.70. Counsel for the accused appears to be confused, as he claims that the value of the rice in the charge order is P 7,044.90,"19instead of P 8,171.68 which actually appears thereon.185. Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)Ponente: Fernando, J.

Facts:January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila ChronicleFidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to ManilaoAn American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island which contained, among other things, a two way radio set.Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committed on the island since Christmas of 1955.oPhilippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro. They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion whodiscovered that Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.oMajor Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoaxthe same word to be used by the newspapers who covered the sameJanuary 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and clothing being scarceJanuary 29, 1956 - This Week Magazinein the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to civilization.Called it Hoax of the yearIn both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different person of the same nameFidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, BulacanoJanuary 27, 1957published statements correcting their misprint and explained that confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13thissues deadlineCruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in relation to the hoax of the year?oWON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?

Held:Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:1.Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Guilibel is "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,"Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel"Publication of a person's photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."oIn this case3rdperson was Cruzhis picture being published beside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year

2.Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any talismanic immunity form constitutional limitationsState interest in press freedomciting Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is necessary for the maintenance of good governance Public officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments on official actsof course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.Last word on the subjectCiting Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracyFreedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal valuesTEST of LIABLITYmust prove there was actual malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this was not done in this case)

186. For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of the plaintiff, the petitioner in this case, the respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint "for failure of the plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference.We do not agree. The respondent Judge manifestly erred. He acted with indecent haste. He could have easily required the counsel for the plaintiff to buy the required one-peso documentary stamp outside the court room and affix the same to the special power of attorney and that respite would not have taken ten minutes. Had he been less technical and more sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court and of his own would have been avoided.What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that document.That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in evidence.187. This is an action for partition and damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, The case is now before us on petition for review filed by defendants.It appears that one Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land, known as Lot No. 2195 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Negros Occidental as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024. Upon the death of Pedro Mahilum in 1934, he was succeeded by his six children, executed a "deed of definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia Flora, married to Basilio Sotes, whereby in consideration of P2,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by them.The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D. Destua. It further appears that Gorgonia Flora, the herein plaintiff, had declared the contested portion for taxation purposes and began paying the taxes therefor in 1936.1wph1.tThe Mahilums, however, claimed that they never sold any portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 2195 of the San Carlos Cadastre. As a matter of fact, according to them, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-6024 (22893) is free from any encumbrance whatsoever. errors are assigned by petitioners, (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the deed of sale (Exh. "D") is inadmissible in evidence because it lacks the necessary documentary stamps.The first assignment of error is without merit. Exhibit D is a duplicate copy of the original, signed and/or thumbmarked by the parties and acknowledged before notary public Nicolas D. Destua. The stamps referred to by petitioners (and required by Section 238 of the Internal Revenue Code so that a public document may be admitted as evidence) are supposed to be, and as a matter of practice actually are, affixed to the original or first copy of the document and not to any of the duplicates or carbon copies thereof. There is no evidence whatsoever that such practice was not observed in regard to the deed of sale involved in this case, and consequently the presumptions that official duty has been regularly performed, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that the regular course of business has been followed, must be applied (Sec. 69[q], Rule 123; now Sec. 5, Rule 131). The burden is upon those who seek to destroy this presumption to do so by convincing proof.With respect to the contention that Exhibit D should not have been admitted as evidence because it is only a copy and the non-production of the original has not been explained, it should be pointed out that said exhibit is itself a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as the original. This is what is known as duplicate original, and it may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the other copies.188. Counsel for Telesforo Alo brought a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on the 12th of July, 1904, against Clodoaldo Rocamora, and asked that judgment be given in his favor, condenming the defendant to return a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Giloctog, municipality of Barili of that island (Cebu);The defendant in his answer denies each and all of the allegations contained in the different paragraphs of the complaint. After hearing the evidence introduced by the parties, the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment against the defendant, and directed that the case be dismissed, To prove his title to the land he introduced in evidence the document which appears on page 5 of the record.Exhibit A is a document which was drawn up in the presence of thegobernadorcilloof the town of Barili and the attesting witnesses on the 5th day of November, 1888. It is true that the title introduced in evidence by the plaintiff did not appear to have been recorded in the Registry of Property, but the defendant has failed to establish his ownership of the land by means of any document or title recorded or unrecorded in the said registry.As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may be said that it was fully established by the testimony of the plaintiff himself and by that of the witness, Vicente Alquizola, who signed the same together with thegobernadorcilloand who testified under oath that he was present when the document was executed and signed by those whose names are subscribed thereto.Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the said instrument, the latter having been one of the accompanying witnesses of the local authority before whom it was executed. Consequently there is no doubt as to the authenticity of the said document, nor as to the truth of the contents thereof, nor is there anything in the record, or any legal reason, that would justify this court in holding that the said document was false. In fact there is no claim that such document is false. Moreover, there is no evidence in the case tending to show that the contents of the said document are false.189. Sofronio de la Cruz was charged with having threatened Dolores Coronel in a letter with death or the burning of her house unless she gave him P500, which she must deposit in the place indicated to her in the letter. This letter was found by Rafaela Coronel, who was living with Dolores, in the fence around her house, and as she was then on her way to church she turned it over to the neighbor Agustin Coronel, who read its content to Dolores Coronel, an old woman of 70 years, who became nervous and uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito Coronel reported the matter to the municipal president of Guagua, Pampanga, who went to Dolores' house and adopted some precautionary measures. Upon returning to town hall he found a man held under arrest by the Constabulary.One of the methods of proving the authenticity of a writing is collation, the comparison the court can make with other writings proven to its satisfaction to be authentic. The trial court held to be proven to its satisfaction as authentic the writing by the defendant (Exhibit B) that was found inside the pocketbook. The defendant tried to ascribe the writing to another to Tito Coronel and his counsel tested Tito Coronel by having him write in the court room what he dictated to him. He directed him to write the name of a person and of a place as the address of a letter, and it plainly appears that neither the free handwriting of the letter nor the firmness of the strokes of the writing is at all like somewhat rough and uncertain form, as a beginner, of the writing and strokes in Exhibit B and the anonymous Exhibit A and C. These are signed in the same way with a "Pulano Tal" so similar that it seems to be one signature traced over the other.190. It appears from the evidence that the defendants, Anastacio Roberto and Eugenia de los Santos, were formerly the owners of the parcel of land in question, which was then unregistered. Anastacio Roberto conveyed the land to his sister, Juana Roberto, the wife of the plaintiff Maximo Villaverde (Exhibit R). In the cadastral proceedings of 1930 the land was registered in favor of the conjugal partnership of Maximo Villaverde and Juana Roberto, as evidenced by original certificate of title No. 15353 in the office of the register of deeds for the Province of Bulacan (Exhibit I). Exhibit 2 is a deed of conveyance executed on June 14, 1930, which purports to evidence the sale of the aforesaid property by Juana Roberto, with the consent of her husband, Maximo Villaverde, to the defendant Eugenia de los SantosMaximo Villaverde executed a public document, Exhibit A, which purports to evidence the sale of his one-half interest in the aforesaid land to the plaintiff Teresa G. Enrile Plaintiffs brought this action to have the deed of conveyance of June 14, 1930 declared null and void for fraud, and the transfer certificate of title in favor of Eugenia de los Santos cancelled, to recover possession of the land in question, and to require the defendants to account for the products which they had received therefrom.the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the lower court that the alleged sale of the land to Eugenia de los Santos and the signature of Maximo Villaverde in the document in questions are fictitious and forged.The two instrumental witnesses and the notary public testified to the due execution of the document and the payment of the consideration in their presence. They testified that Juana Roberto signed Exhibit 2 by placing her finger print thereon and Maximo Villaverde by writing his name under that of his wife. It will be observed that Exhibit R, the deed from Anastacio Roberto to Juana Roberto on January 19, 1927, also bears the finger print of Juana Roberto. The fact that a witness has been convicted of felony is a circumstance to be taken into consideration as affecting his character and credibility, but in the present case we see no particular force in the fact that the defendant has been convicted of coercion, because it is not the contention of Maximo Villaverde that he was forced to sign the document in question, but that he never signed it at all.191. Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10%per annum. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid. in Special Proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, pending Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, filed a pleading demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted upon., the lower court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael, whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim.The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same. However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition. It was for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination on the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices and predilection" of the witness.

193. the spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of land to Marta B. Chivi, representing to her that the land was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that although the land was covered by a pre-war free patent application, the application had not been approved and no patent had been issued. The Sierras made that assurance because Chivi was not willing to buy the land if it was covered by a patent, since it would then be subject to repurchase. They agreed that the purchase price of P10,800.00 was not to be fully paid until the vendors could have the land registered under Act 496.At the instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for registration of the land While the application was pending Chivi,sold her rights and interests in the land to the herein petitioners-spouses Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00, with the stipulation that should Chivi fail to secure and transfer title to the Laicos she would return to them twice the amount of the aforesaid purchase price. To induce the Laicos to buy Chivis rights and interests, the Sierras showed them a petition withdrawing their free patent application. The Laicos thereupon continued with the registration proceeding in substitution of Chivi, who signed a deed of transfer of her rights.Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul: (1) the order of the trial court authorizing the Laicos to adduce evidence ex parte on their cross-claim against Marta B. Chivithe Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring null and void all the proceedings on the cross-claim of the spouses Laico against Chivi, as well as the orders, decisions, writs and processes issued in connection therewith, and restraining the therein respondent Judge and sheriff Could the cross-claim in this particular action stand after the complaint in the same action was dismissed with prejudice?chanrobles virtual law libraryA cross-bill strictly speaking is one brought by a defendant in an equity suit against ... other defendants in the same suit, touching the matters in question in the original bill. It is considered as an auxiliary suit dependent upon the original bill, and can be sustained only on matters growing out of the original bill. There is a well-defined distinction between a cross-bill merely defensive in character, and one seeking affirmative relief. The dismissal of the original bill carries with it a purely defensive cross-bill but not one seeking affirmative relief.1chanrobles virtual law libraryThe cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose entirely out of the complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs succeeded. Hence, under the principle above enunciated, it could not be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the nexus upon which its life depended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles vi194. In connection with an election protest filed by Benjamin R. Abubakar against Hadji Arsad Sali involving the office of Provincial Governor of Sulu, on motion of protestant Abubakar, and in the course of the revision of the ballots contested therein an order authorizing him "to avail himself of the services of handwriting and/or thumbmark experts" who "may at any time avail themselves of all the questioned ballots" in said case "for examination and study subject to the supervision" of the court. Purporting to act in conformity with this order, Abubakar availed of the services of handwriting and fingerprint experts of the National Bureau of Investigation and other employees of said office, who examined the ballots aforementioned under the supervision of the Clerk and the Deputy Clerk of Court of Sulu. protestee Sali instituted, however, the present case against Abubakar, the aforementioned officers of the NBI and the Clerk as well as the Deputy Clerk of Court of Sulu, for the purpose of preventing them from further examining said ballots and securing a declaration to the effect that the expert examination thereof conducted by NBI agents is null and void. Upon the submission of Abubakar's answer to the amended petition filed by Sali, which included the NBI Director as one of the respondents herein, the case was called for hearing and later submitted for decision, without the presentation of any evidence. Soon thereafter, the lower court issued an order,that the respondents NBI Agents as directed by respondent NBI Director were without legal authority to conduct the expert examination of the petitioner's questioned ballotsHence, this appeal by respondent Abubakar.whether or not the NBI may extend technical aid to parties other than law enforcement officers and/or entities of the Government, including courts. The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the law creating the NBI1merely authorizes the same "to give technical aid to all prosecuting and law enforcement officers and entities of the Government, as well as to the courts that may request its services"2; that said law does not authorize the NBI to give aid to private party litigants; and that, since the aforementioned order of the lower court, dated September 4, 1964, did not explicitly authorize Abubakar to engage the services of NBI experts, it follows that the examination of the contested ballots by said experts is illegal, as well as null and void.Indeed, any person, expert or not, either in his private or in his official capacity, may testify in court on matters, within his personal knowledge, which are relevant to a suit, subject to the judicial authority to determine the credibility of said testimony and the weight thereof. Upon the other hand, the question whether a public official may or shall be ordered or permitted by his superior to examine documents and testify thereon in a given case, is one mainly administrative in character which is within the competence of said superior officer, or the Bureau Director or Head of the Office, or the corresponding department head to decide, and is independent of the validity of the examination thus made or of the credence and weight to be given by the Court to the conclusions reached, in consequence of said examination, by the official who made it.195. The complaint, prayed for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-14429 registered in the names of David Lio and Victoria Ong Lio, covering Lot No. 3208 recovery of real property and damages. The main ground of the said complaint was that the deed of real estate mortgage executed with the Republic Bank, as mortgagee, covering nine (9) parcels of land previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and co-ownedpro indivisoby Rufino Co Ling and his brother Bonifacio Co, was signed in blank by Rufino Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng and on the assurance by Bonifacio Co that only his (Bonifacio Co's) one half (1/2) share of, or interest in the nine (9) parcels of land would be mortgaged. And yet, the mortgage covered the whole of said nine (9) parcels of land. the complaint was dismissed by the trial court after finding that Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng did not sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank but after it had been completely filled up. whether or not Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng signed the deed of real estate mortgage in blank, that is, before the entries in said deed were typed therein. Petitioners also urge that even the notary public, Atty. Remedios C. Balderama, positively testified that the parties appeared before her and signed the real estate mortgage after she typed the dates and numbers of their residence certificates. The foregoing testimony of the notary public was propped by the testimony of petitioners' expert witness, Desiderio Pagui, for it was based on a neutral and impartial report which remains unrebutted by petitioners.Both parties agree that by examining the document in question "with the naked eye conflicting impressions would result. As correctly observed by private respondents, the document itself is ambivalent, neutral. Therefore, it needed an expert to examine the document. Between a report on examination submitted by a private practitioner who was hired by an interested party and whose professional integrity has been placed in doubt, and the objective examination of a government agency "with accepted competence" and "cloaked with the mantle of impartiality and neutrality whose services were required by no less than the trial court itself, we agree with respondent appellate court that the latter's findings are entitled to full weight and credit. It follows that the Court of Appeals' conclusion is not absurd or a mistake.196. Assisted by her father, Federico Nalam, complainant , filed before the Butuan City Prosecutor a complaint stating that complainant accuses DOMINGO PAGPAGUITAN alias Pingkong and ROBERTO SALAZAR alias Opaw of the crime of Rape. Pagpaguitan admitted having sex with complainant, but insisted that it was consensual.He claimed they had eloped and that truly they were actually sweethearts. The trial court, however, disbelieved Pagpaguitans version.Finding the prosecutions evidence convincing, the court convicted Pagpaguitan and Salazar.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PUROK PRESIDENT AND THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT COMPLAINT WAS INITIALLY ELOPEMENT.during the proceedings before the purok president and the barangay captain, elopement was indeed mentioned.However, Pagpaguitans tale of elopement rang with far too many inconsistencies to be credibleIn rape the prosecution must rule out the victims consent to the sexual act.[19]Here, the testimony of private complainant was clear and convincing:she did not consent to penile invasion.Pagpaguitan claimed the above dialogue clearly showed their sweet relationship with each other and revealed intimacy in their relationship even before the sexual act.[21]However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the cited dialogue merely revealed familiarity rather than intimacy.[22]Even assuming for arguments sake, that they were sweethearts, nevertheless, rape was committed because by force, appellant had sex with the victim against her will.[23]The claim that they were sweethearts could not prove complainants consent[24]nor undermine her complaint.

197. the Philippine National Bank obtained a judgment against Joaquin M. Bondoc for P10,289.60 plus interest at the rate of 7% per annum computed from June 30, 1949. This judgment was never executed.After five years and upon the instance of the Philippine National Bank said judgment was revived in Civil Case No. 30663 on February 20, 1957 where the Court of First Instance of Manila condemned Joaquin M. Bondoc to pay the Philippines National Bank the sum of P16,841.64 plus 7% interest and costs. Neither was this judgment enforced during the five years thereafter.The lower court held that the right to revive the judgment has prescribed inasmuch as more than ten years had elapsed since it was first rendered on June 29, 1949. It further ruled that the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) or the New Civil Code does not provide for the revival of a revived judgment. Plaintiff has appealed from the order of dismissalwhether or not a revived judgment may itself be revived.Appellee's theory relates the period of prescription to the date the original judgment became final. Such a stand is inconsistent with the accepted view that a judgment reviving a previous one is a new and different judgment. The inconsistency becomes clearer when we consider that the causes of action in the three cases are different. In the original case, the action was premised on the unpaid promissory note signed by Joaquin Bondoc in favor of the Philippine National Bank; in the second case, the Philippine National Bank's cause of action was the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 8040; and in the present case, the basis is the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 30663. Parenthetically, even the amounts involved are different.The source of Section 6 aforecited is Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure which in turn was derived from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. The rule followed in California in this regard is that a proceeding by separate ordinary action to revive a judgment is a new action rather than a continuation of the old, and results in a new judgment constituting a new cause of action, upon which a new period of limitations begins to run.199. Petitioners are the heirs of Agapito Causapin who died in October 1954 leaving a 473-square meter lot in Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. they partitioned the land between them and the corresponding tax declarations were issued in their individual names. Erlinda resided in the land until 1963 when she went to work in Manila., the land was left to the care of her cousin, respondent Lorenza Manalo.Erlinda returned to Niugan and discovered that a building was being constructed on the land. Upon inquiry from the Register of Deeds she learned that it was already titled in the name of respondent-spouses Dominador de Guzman and Anastacia Batas under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1796.Weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence, the trial court concluded there was no valid transfer of the property of Erlinda to respondents. However, the trial court declared as valid the sale of Alberto's share to respondent-spouses de Guzman because he failed to persuade the court that no consideration was paid for the sale. it is alleged that the Court of Appeals completely failed to give probative value to the attendant facts and the testimony of petitioner Erlinda with respect to the purported source of all the conveyances While that document and the alleged deed of sale between petitioner Erlinda and respondent Eusebio Calugay stated that Erlinda was of age, she however testified under oath that she was only seventeen (17) years old in 1963. Therefore, said documents transferred no rights whatsoever to respondents due to Erlinda's incapacity by reason of minority. The first of these is to determine how much and to what extent genuine writing will diverge from a certain typeThe trial court resolved the first ground in this wise: ". . . on close observation, the signature of Erlinda appearing on the alleged Deed of Sale to Eusebio, which is of course denied, is very different from her signature appearing in the verification of her complaint in the instant case, and even in the Deed of Sale from Alberto Causapin to the de Guzmans which Erlinda signed as Administratrix."12This is a loose end which the lower court failed to settle. An accurate examination to determine forgery should dwell on both the differences and similarities in the questioned signaturesA comparison of Erlinda's signature in the "Bilihang Tuluyan" with her signatures on the other documents reveals that the slight differences in strokes are overshadowed by the significant similarities. These similarities suffice to convince us that the signature of petitioner Erlinda on the deed of sale between her and respondent Eusebio is genuine; afortiori, the deed of sale between them is valid. Moreover, it is highly noticeable that the signatures of Erlinda that were analyzed by the trial court are on documents executed several years apart, to wit, 29 July 1963, 17 August 1967 and 20 June 1986. The passage of time and a person's increase in age may have decisive influences in his writing characteristics.14Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature.

200. plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of defendant bank's branch at Sucat, Paraaque, under current checking account no. 210-0053-60. Plaintiff claims that three (3) checks all payable to cash and all drawn against plaintiffs aforementioned current account were presented for encashment Plaintiff also claims that due to defendant bank's gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff's checks and in determining the forgery of drawer's signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation. The trial court was convinced that the petitioner bank had exercised due care and diligence in determining the authenticity of the checks in question before they were encashed. It was rather the private respondent that had been negligent in the care and custody of the corporate checks.the trial court is missed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court The Court of appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove that the signatures on the three checks in question were forged of the following admissions set forth in petitioner's answer, the petitioner alleges that the best evidence of the forgery were the original checks bearing the alleged forged signatures of private respondent's officers. In spite of the timely objection made by the petitioner, the private respondent introduced in evidence mere photocopies of the questioned checks. The failure to produce the originals of the checks was a fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the instruments were forgeries. Likewise such failure amounted to a willful suppression of evidence, which created a presumption that its production would be unfavorable to respondent's case.6It could also be presumed that "the checks in question [were] genuine checks regularly issued by the respondent in the course of its business, bearing the genuine signatures of the officers whom it authorized to sign in its behalf." Also, an unfavorable inference could be drawn from the unexplained failure of private respondent to call as its witness Mr. Co Yok Teng, whose signature was among those allegedly forged.201. Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned.After canvass,petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers. Roberto Miguel filed a protest on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista.The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest.The trial court rendered a decision. Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy.Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City. From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the opinion of oneDesiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert witness.Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person.Desiderio A. Pagui, Examiner of Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document Examiner, NBI), who was allowed by the lower court to assist it in the appreciation of ballots contested by either party as having been written by a single hand and to take photographs of the questioned ballots, his report and photographs having been submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his memorandum. Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with each other in order to determine whether or not they were indeed written by a single hand, and this Court is convinced beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, N and O, were written by a single hand, considering the remarkable similarity if not almost identity of the writings on these ballots. The lower Court's ruling on these twelve (12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes for protestee-appellee based thereon should be deducted from him.