Evidence- Custodio Reviewer

8/18/2019 Evidence- Custodio Reviewer

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RULE 130 SECTION 48 – OPINION RULE

Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not admissible,

except as indicated in the following sections.

Why the genera r!e"

• This is because a witness must testify as to facts that were

observed by him and it is for the court to draw conclusion from

the facts testied to.

• A witness is not allowed to express his opinions upon the very

question to be determined by the court

• The witness may not state his interference from data observed

by him provided that the observed data on which the inference

is based have been or cane be reproduced in court, by words

or gestures of this witness or others, so fully, exactly, and

adequately, as a basis for the inference, that the witness

opinion is merely super!uous to the assistance to the court "n

the ascertainment of the truth #$%

E#ce$tion% to the o$inion r!e&

a' E#$ert O$inion(' O$inion o) Or*inary Witne%% on certain %$eci+c %!(,ect%

a. "dentity of a person(. &andwritingc. 'ental sanity*. "mpressions of emotion, behavior, condition, or

appearance of a person

-1' Ney Li /%. C 2!*ge ictorio o) RTC o) Panga%inan

an* 2!an Li – 14 S 53

(acts)

*. petitioner +elly im and -uan im were lawfully married to each

other.. $etition )or ann!ent& the -uan im then led a petition for

annulment of their marriage on the ground that his wife, the

petitioner, was su/ering from schi0ophrenia 1before, during, and

after the celevration of the marriage, and until the present23. the e#$ert 6itne%%& during the trial, the private respondent

presented 3 witnesses, among them was 7ra. ca$a*o who is a

'edical 4pecialist "" and in5charge of the (emale 4ervice of the

+ational 6enter for 'ental &ealth a fellow of the 7hilippine7sychiatrist Association and a 8iplomate of the 7hilippine 9oard of

7sychiatrists. She 6a% %!one* a% an e#$ert 6itne%%.

&owever, %he a%o ha$$ene* to (e the atten*ing $%ychiatri%t

o) the $etitioner Ney Li.:. otion to 9!a%h %!($oena an* %!%$en* $rocee*ing%& the

counsel of the petitioner then led a motion to quash subpoena to

be issued for 8ra. Acampado so that she may not be allowed to

appear as a witness in court.;. 7!ring the hearing )or the otion&

a. rg!ent o) the $etitioner& 8ra. Acampado is barred

from testifying under the rule on the condentiality of a

physician5patient relationshipb. rg!ent o) re%$on*ent& 8ra. Acampado is appearing

as an expert witness and would not be testifying on any

information acquired while attending to her patient +elly

im in her professional capacity.is denied? and forthwith allowed 8r. Acampado to testify.

&owever, the 6ourt advised counsel for respondent to interpose his

ob=ection once it becomes apparent that the testimony sought to

be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.@. 7ra. ca$a*o then too: the 6itne%% %tan* an* it 6a%

e%ta(i%he* (y the RTC an* the C that 7ra. ca$a*o 6a%9!ai+e* (y co!n%e )or $ri/ate re%$on*ent a% an e#$ert

6itne%% an* 6a% a%:e* hy$othetica 9!e%tion% reate* to her

+e* o) e#$erti%e. She neither re/eae* the ine%% %he

e#aine* an* treate* the $etitioner )or nor *i%co%e* the

re%!t% o) her e#aination an* the e*icine% %he ha*

$re%cri(e*.. The C !$he* the *eci%ion o) the RTC 2!*ge in ao6ing the

te%tiony o) the 7ra. ca$a*o when the petitioner led before

. raneta Note%. E/i*ence. tty. C!%to*io. Ter y 01;


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the said court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the

order denying the motion to exclude 8ra. Acampado. "t stated that)a. >ir%t the petitioner failed to establish the condential nature of

the testimony of 8ra. Acampadob. Secon*y the statements that 8ra. Acampado gave do not fall

within the realm of privileged communication because theinformation she disclosed were not obtained from the patient while

attending her in her professional capacity and neither where the

information necessary to enable the physicial to prescribe or give

treatment of the patient +elly im. And neither does the

information obtained from the physician tend to blacBen the

character of the patient or bring disgrace to her or invite reproach.C. &ence, the present action by the petitioner +elly im.

"ssue) 'ay 8r. Acampado be a witness for the respondent -uan imD

Euling) Fes. As an expert witness.

ur careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Hs to no other

course of action but to agree with the respondent 6ourts observation

that the petitioner failed to discharge that burden.

"n the rst place, 8r. Acampado was presented and qualied as an

expert witness. As correctly held by the 6ourt of Appeals, she did not

disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview

and treatment of the petitionerI moreover, the facts and conditions

alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing

on whatever information or ndings the doctor obtained while

attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that 8r.

Acampados answers to the questions propounded to her relating tothe hypothetical problem were in!uenced by the information obtained

from the petitioner. therwise stated, her expert opinion excluded

whatever information or Bnowledge she had about the petitioner which

was acquired by reason of the physician5patient relationship existing

between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial

court cannot then be excluded. The rule on this point is summari0ed as

follows)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

JThe predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that

the statutory physician5patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not

violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in

response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the

physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended

professionally, where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical

facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professionalBnowledge he may have concerning such patient. 9ut in order to avoid

the bar of the physician5patient privilege where it is asserted in such a

case, the physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts

hypothesi0ed in the question, excluding from consideration his

personal Bnowledge of the patient acquired through the physician and

patient relationship. "f he cannot or does not exclude from

consideration his personal professional Bnowledge of the patients

condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert

opinion.J

-' Peo$e /%. ?aeno – @1 S 5=

>act%&

#*% the accused appellant Galleno was charged with the crime of

4tatutory Eape of the ; year old child Kvelyn bligar Garganera.#% 8uring the trial, several witnesses were presented)

a. Kvelyn bligar who testied that when Galleno, a friend of

their family and neighbor, visited their house, he made her

sit on his lap facing him. $hen she was already sitting on

his lap, he inserted his penis in his vagina.i. That this caused lacerations and bleeding. 4he

needed medical attention.b. Thi% i% 6hat i% i$ortant& Three medical doctors who

were able to examine the victim Kvelyn were also

presented. They were the doctors to whom the parents of

Kvelyn brought her to treat her bleeding.i. 7r. )on%o 7. Oro%co the R!ra Aeath

Phy%ician o) aayon Ca$iB %tate* that&

Kvelyns vaginal laceration could have been caused

by a blunt instrument inserted into the vagina, that



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it was possible that a human penis in full erection

had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and that

a human penis in full erection is considered a blunt

instrument.ii. 7r. a. Lo!r*e% Laa*a o) the Ro#a% ?enera

Ao%$ita stated that) that 1there was a 3 cm.lacerated wound at the left anterior onethird of the

vagina2 and 1the presence of about *L*; cc of

blood2 at the vaginal vault. 8r. aMada

recommended that Kvelyn be admitted for

connement in the hospital because the wound in

her vagina, which was still bleedingiii. 7r. Toe*o o) the Ro#a% ?enera Ao%$ita

stated that) the child su/ered severe compound

laceration which could have been caused by a

normal and fully developed penis of a man in a

state of erection that was forcibly inserted into her

vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina tohemorrhage which thus required the transfusion of

;; cc of blood.c. 7e)en%e o) the acc!%e*& the accused however, was

tryoing to establish the fact the bleeding was not caused

by his penis, but of his ring nger with a long nail

accidentally penetrating the vagina of the victim while he

was playing with her and throwingNlifting her up and down.-3' 7eci%ion o) the RTC& the ETc rendered a decision against the

accused appellant and convicted him of the crime as charged.-4' Dy rea%on o) the $enaty i$o%e* the ca%e 6a%

a!toaticay rai%e* to the SC )or a!toatic re/ie6.

a. ong the contention% o) the acc!%e* a$$eant 6a%that the *octor% a*e no conc!%ion% a% to 6hat

reay ca!%e* the aceration% in the /agina o) the

/icti.b. the testimony of the three expert witnesses presented by

the prosecution, namely, 8r. Alfonso rosco, 8r. 'a.

ourdes aMada, and 8r. 'achael Toledo, which convinced

the trial court that rape was committed against the

o/ended party, is not impeccable considering that they

found that there was no presence of spermato0oa, and that

they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the

victims vaginaI that 8r. aMada herself testied that

Kvelyn told her that it was the nger of accusedappellant

which caused the laceration. "n addition, accusedappellant

banBs on the victims testimony on crossexamination, that

it was the nger of accused appellant which caused thelacerationI and that she even disclosed this to accused5

appellants father, Eaul Galleno.

I%%!e& 6hat i% the %igni+cance o) the te%tionie% o) the three

*octor%" re they a*i%%i(e" What i% their e/i*entiary

6eight"

R!ing& They are a*i%%i(e an* %!cienty %!$$ort the +n*ing

o) g!it o) the acc!%e* a$$eant.

% a genera r!e witnesses must state facts and not draw

conclusions or give opinions. "t is the courts duty to draw conclusions

from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved.

Ao6e/er conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many

cases, and are not conned to expert testimony, based on the principle

that either because of the special sBill or expert Bnowledge of the

witness, or because of the nature of the sub=ect matter under

observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in

reaching a =udgment.

In the ca%e at (ar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not onlywith the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions

as to the possible cause of the victims laceration, but also the

testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim

herself. In other 6or*% the tria co!rt *i* not rey %oey on the

te%tiony o) the e#$ert 6itne%%e%. S!ch e#$ert te%tiony

erey ai*e* the tria co!rt in the e#erci%e o) it% ,!*gent on

the )act%. Aence the )act that the e#$ert% en!erate* /ario!%

$o%%i(e ca!%e% o) the /ictiF% aceration *oe% not ean that

the tria co!rtF% in)erence i% 6rong.



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RULE 130 SECTION 4@ – OPINION O> EGPERT WITNESS

Section 4@. OPINION O> EGPERT WITNESS. O5 The opinion of a

witness on a matter requiring special Bnowledge, sBill, experience or

training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

Three things must concur in order for the opinion of the expert witness

be admissible in court)

*. S!(,ect atter& the sub=ect under consideration must be one

that requires that the court has the aid of Bnowledge or

experience of an expert which men not especially sBilled do not

have, and such therefore cannot be obtained from ordinary

witnessI

• Kxperts may give their opinions and inference upon

questions of science, sBill or trade, or other of the

liBe Bind, or when the sub=ect matter of the inquiry

is such that inexperienced persons are unliBely to

prove and are incapable of forming a correct

=udgment upon it without assistance, order to

attain Bnowledge of it

• Are not admissible when the inquiry is into a

sub=ect matter, the nature of which is not as to

require any peculiar habits or study, in order to

qualify a man to understand

• Kxample) in a case for annulment under Art. 3< of

the (amily 6ode, the courts must consider as

decisive evience the expert opinion of the

psychological and mental temperaments of thepartiesI in identifying the blood stains in the

clothing of the accused, a medical expert is

necessary for suchI expert testimony as to the

identity of t ngerprint is admissible because the

method of identication of ngerprints is a science

requiring close study. n E#$ert& the witness called as an expert must posses the

Bnowledge, sBill or experience needed to inform the court in

the particular case under considerationI



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• 9efore a witness is presented as an expert can be

asBed to give any opinion on the sub=ect matter of

the inquiry, his qualication as an expert must rst

be shown and he may then state the facts showing

his requisite Bnowledge and sBill.

• upon such a question, the expert may testify notonly as to the facts but also to his conclusions

based on the facts because the court is without

Bnowledge necessary to enable it to draw the

conclusion for itself without aid

• not limited to classied and special profession but

is admissible wherever peculiar sBill and =udgment

applied to a particular sub=ect are required to

explain the result by tracing them to their causes

• there exists no test in determining such, but the

court considers an expert a person who in the

opinion of the court has a special acquaintance

with the immediate line of inquiryI yet he need not

be thoroughly acquainted with the di/erentia of the

specic under consideration

• one possessing, in regard to a particular sub=ect

department of human activity, Bnowledge not

usually acquired by other persons3. Ree/ance an* i% the i%%!e& the testimony must be to a

matter that is in issue.

• The testimony is not admissible as to a matter not

in issue

o*e o) E#aining an E#$ert 6itne%%

o The expert need not have personal observation on the data

on which his opinion is to be basedo "t is possible that the expert is stated with the data

hypothetically, so that the court may be able to re=ect his

opinion later if he does not accept the data that were his

basis and for the parties to be able to dispute the said data

Pro(ati/e a!e o) the O$inion o) the E#$ert Witne%%

o Although meriting consideration, it is not conclusive, and must

be weighed in relation to other proofs presentedo The 6ourt is not bound by the opinion of an expert and

ordinarily not conclusiveo

The probative force of the testimony of the expert does not liein a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the

aid that he can render to the courts in showing the facts which

serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which

the logic of his conclusions is foundedo iBe any other testimony, in the light of the =udges general

Bnowledge and experience on the sub=ect of the inquiry, it will

be weighed especially when there are con!icting expert

opinions

(or example, cases of forgery will not depend entirely on the

expert opinion of a handwriting expert, and in fact, not

indispensable

Ca%e 1. Ce(! Shi$yar* an* Engineering Wor:% Inc. /%. Wiia

Line% Inc. – 30= S 5=

Partie% o) thi% ca%e&

o 6ebu 4hipyard and Kngineering $orBs #6ebu 4hipyard% is a

domestic corporation engaged in the business of dry docBing

and repairing of marine vesselso $illiam ines, the plainti/, is the owners of the Pessel 'NP

'anila 6ityo The private respondent 7rudential is the insurer of $illiam

ines who is the subrogee

*. $illiam ines contracted with 6ebu 4hipyard for the repairs to

be done on the vessel 'NP 'anila 6ity.. After the ma=or repairs were done, it was then transferred from

6ebu 4hipyards grave docB to the docBing quay where the

remaining repair to be done was the replating of the top of

$ater 9allast +o. *. 4uch was done by -+9 General 4ervices,



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the subcontractor of 6ebu 4hipyard for the said repair and

cleaning.a. At such time, the crew of 'P 'anila employed by

$illiam ines were using the accommodations in the

vessel3. 8uring the cleaning of TanB Top +o. * where there cleaners

were, a re broBe out and ultimately causing the destruction

and the sinBing of the said vessel.:. &ence, $illiam ines led a complaint against 6ebu 4hipyard

for complaint for damages against 64K$, alleging that the re

which broBe out in 'NP 'anila 6ity was caused by 64K$s

negligence and lacB of care.;. 7!ring the tria o) the ca%e Ce(! Shi$yar* intro*!ce*

e#$ert 6itne%%e% e%%r% 7a/i* ?rey an* ?regory

So!thear* +re e#$ert% for the probable origin of the re in

'P 'anila 6ity.a. the said re experts were one in their opinion that the

re did not originate in the area of TanB Top +o. *where the -+9 worBers were doing hotworBs but on the

crew accommodation cabins on the portside +o.

decB.


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RULE 130 SECTION ;0. OPINION O> OR7INRH WITNESS.

Section ;0. The o$inion o) a 6itne%% for which proper basis is

given may be received in evidence regarding)

a% the identity of a person, about whom he has adequate

BnowledgeIb% a handwriting with which he has suQcient familiarityI andc% the mental sanity of a person with whom he is suQciently

acquainted.d% The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,

behavior, condition or appearance of a person.

Con*ition% )or a*i%%i(iity

*. the opinion is relevant. it is the best nature of the case admits of 3. must come from a competent witness

RULE 130 SECTION ;1. Character E/i*ence

7e+nition&

o 6haracter is the aggregate of the moral qualities which belong

to and distinguish an individual personI it refers to what a man

is depends on the attributes he possesseso 'ust be di/erentiated with reputation because such is the

dependent on the view of the others as to the qualities he

possesses.o 6haracter is what the person really is and reputation is what

the person based on others

SECTION ;1. Character E/i*ence not generay a*i%%i(e

e#ce$tion%—

a% "n 6riminal 6ases)*. the accused may prove his good moral character which is

pertinent to the moral trait involved in the o/ense charged.

. Hnless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad

moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait

involved in the o/ense chargedI3. The good or bad moral character of the o/ended party may

be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree

the probability or improbability of the o/ense charged.

b% "n 6ivil 6ases. Kvidence of Good moral character of a party in a

civil case is admissible only when the issue of pertinent

character is involved in the case.c% The character of $itnesses5 in the case provided or in Eule

*3, 4ection *:.

T6o i%%!e% to (e re%o/e* in reation to character e/i*ence&

-W'

*. Ree/ance an* *i%%i(iity& is a persons disposition—i.e.,

a trait, or group of traits, or the sum of his traits admissible and

relevant for certain purposesD. o*e o) Pro/ing& $henever it is so admissible as an

evidentiary fact and thus becomes its turn a proposition to be

proved, how it is to be evidenced, 55 by the communitys

reputation, and by that only, and what conditions

?enera R!e& 6haracter evidence, as a rule, is not admissible

o 9ecause it is generally irrelevant in determining c controversy

because the evidence of a persons character or trait is not

admissible to prove that a person acted in conformity with such

character or trait in a particular issue

o "f the courts would be allowed to be in!uenced by thecharacter or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to

have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than rely on the

factual inquiry onto the merits of the case

A. 6riminal 6ases



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*. cc!%e* $ro/ing hi% goo* ora character $ertinentto the ora trait in/o/e* in the oJen%e charge*

Rea%on )or ao6ing the R!e&

o

The defendants character showing the probability of his doingor not the act charged, is essentially relevanto &ence. The defendant may give evidence as to his

good moral character to evidence the improbability of

his doing of the act charged, unless there is some

collateral reason for exclusiono Jor*% the $re%!$tion again%t the coi%%ion

o) a crie an* %trengthen% the $re%!$tion o)

innocence

Weight&

o The in!uence of good moral character of the accused as

evidence in criminal cases depends upon the nature andcircumstances of the crime charged and upon the probative

force of the proof presented as to the circumstances of the

crime charged and upon the probative force of the proof

presented as to the guilt of the accusedIo (or example, if the crime charged is one which involves cool

deliberation and involved in the common and daily life of the

accused, the same is strongI but when the crime is unusual

that it must have been induced by motives not frequently

operating on the accuseds mind, good character as an

evidence is weaB. Another example is that when the evidence

of the crime is clear and convincing, character evidence will

not be of useo An accused is not entitled to acquittal because of his good

moral character and exemplary conduct alone

The Pro%ec!tion i% not ao6e* to initiay attac: the character

o) the acc!%e* Kxcept when #concurrence of both%)

Eeason for the rule) to prevent the pre=udice that may be caused by

the showing of bad character

>ir%t& it i% in re(!tta

o the purpose is to refute the claim that he accused has good

character and thus to prevent the court from drawing

therefrom the inference that the accused is innocent of the

crime charged

Secon*& when it is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the o/ense

charge

o having reference and analogy to the moral trait involved in the

crime chargedo for example, the defendants character for truth is irrelevant in

a case for attempted murder

3. The good or bad moral character of the o/ended party maybe proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degreethe probability or improbability of the o/ense charged.

Character o) the oJen*e* $arty

o character of the o/ended party may only be proved if it tends

to establish the probability or the improbability of the o/ense

chargedo must be related to the traits and characteristics

involved in the crime chargedo e.g., character of chastity on the crime of rapeI

character for peaceableness or violence on the charge



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of assaultI character for honesty on a charge of

embe00lement

(' In Ci/i Ca%e%. E/i*ence o) ?oo* ora character o) a

$arty in a ci/i ca%e i% a*i%%i(e ony 6hen the i%%!eo) $ertinent character i% in/o/e* in the ca%e.

o 1character involved in the issue2 is a technical expression,

which does not mean simply that the character may be

a/ected by the result, but that it is of a particular importance

in the suit itself, as the character of the plainti/ in an action for

slander or that of a woman in an action for seductiono example)

*. action for defamation) bad reputation and character of the

plainti/ would entitle the plainti/ for lesser damages. action for breach of promise to marry or alienation of

a/ection) the plainti/s dissolute character may lessen

entitlement to damages3. prosecution for Beeping a bawdy5house or gambling house5

reputation of the house is the actual issue:. in a case for seduction5 the reputation and character of the

woman is an issue

RULE 131 SECTION 1 – DUR7EN O> PROO>

Section 1. D!r*en o) $roo). K D!r*en o) $roo) i% the *!ty o) a

$arty to $re%ent e/i*ence on the )act% in i%%!e nece%%ary to

e%ta(i%h hi% cai or *e)en%e (y the ao!nt o) e/i*ence

re9!ire* (y a6.

o 1onus probandi2 refers to the obligation of a party to a litigation

to persuade the court that he is entitled to relief o the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts hisNher right

o also called the risB of non5persuasion #$%

D!r*en o) $roo) r!e a$$ie% to (oth the $aintiJ an* the

*e)en*ant

o "t is inaccurate to state that the burden of proof lies only with

the plainti/ because the rules states not only of a claim but

also of defenseo &e who asserts or denies must proveo $hoever asserts the aQrmative of an issue is the party who

has the burden to prove ito &ence, the plainti/ always has the burden of proof for

its positive assertionso n the other hand, the defendant)

in maBing aQrmative defenses is not a denial

of the plainti/s cause of action but one which,

if established, will be a good defense as such is

an avoidance of the claim in maBing his denials, he must also prove the

same

D!r*en o) Proo) D!r*en o) E/i*ence+ever shifts and it remains

exactly throughout the entire case

exactly where the pleadings

#complaint and answer% placed it

shifts to one party when the other

has produced suQcient evidence

to be entitled as a matter of law

to a ruling in his favor

Te%t )or *eterining 6ho ha% the (!r*en o) $roo)&

*. ies on the party who substantially asserts the aQrmative of

the issue



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a. The suitor who relies upon a fact should be called upon

to prove his own causeb. 7rove own aQrmative allegations

. 9urden of proof in a proceedings lies rst on that party against

whom the =udgment of the court would be given, if no evidence

at all were produced on either side

What nee* not (e $ro/e*&

*. those which are =udicially noticed. those which are admitted3. those which are presumed

A. 6ivil 6ases

Negati/e egation%

o

genera r!e& they need not be provedo E#ce$tion& it should be proved when it is an essential part of the

statement of the right or title upon which the cause of action or

defense is foundedo Kxample) allegation of the plainti/ that the debt has not

yet been paid must be provenI plainti/ must show that in

an action for damages, failure of the defendant to follow

the plans must be provenIo E#ce$tion to the E#ce$tion& if it is denial of the existence of the

document, the custody of which belongs to the other party, it need

not be proved

9. 9urden of proof in 6riminal 6ases

The accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

Aence the $ro%ec!tion %ha ha/e the on!% $ro(an*i o)

e%ta(i%hing the g!it o) the acc!%e*

The 7octrine o) E9!i$oi%e or E9!i$on*erance 7octrine

o Eefers to the situation where the evidence of the parties is

evenly balanced, or there is doubt on which side the evidence

preponderates #or weighs heavily%. "n this case the decision

should be against the party with the burden of proof o &ence, where the burden of proof is with the plainti/ and the

evidence does not suggest that the scale of =ustivce should

weigh in his favor, the court should render a verdict for the

defendanto "n a criminal case, where the evidence is evenly

balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence

tilts the scales in favor of the accused

1. 2ieneB /%. NLRC – ;= S 84

>CTS&

*. 7rivate respondents 7edro and (redelito -uanatas, father and son,

led a claim for unpaid wagesNcommissions, separation pay anddamages against petitioners --s TrucBing andNor 8r. -imene0. Alleged that they were hired by -imene0 as driverNmechanic

and helper, respectively, in --s TrucBing, where they were

assigned to a *L5wheeler trucB to haul 6oca5cola soft drinBs

and paid on commission basis, initially at *@R later increased

to LR. That they received only partial commission #7:B% from --s

total gross income of almost 7*' for years. 6onsequently,

there was unpaid balance of 7*L


11/51

-imene0 are =ointly and severally liable to pay complainants their

unpaid commissions #7:,[email protected];%.

ISSUE& $+ +E6 correctly ruled that private respondents were not

paid their commissions in full.

RULIN?& HES. NLRC correcty r!e* that the entire ao!nt o)

coi%%ion% 6a% not $ai*.

Eeason) e/i*ent )ai!re o) herein $etitioner% to $re%ent

e/i*ence that )! $ayent thereo) ha% (een a*e

"t is a basic rule in evidence that each $arty !%t $ro/e hi%

arati/e aegation. 4ince the burden of evidence lies with the

party who asserts an aQrmative allegation, the plainti/ or complainant

has to prove his aQrmative allegations in the complaint and the

defendant or respondent has to prove the aQrmative allegations in his

aQrmative defenses and counterclaim. 6onsidering that petitioners

herein assert that the disputed commissions have been paid, they havethe bounden duty to prove that fact.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving

it. E/en 6here the $aintiJ !%t aege non$ayent the

genera r!e i% that the (!r*en re%t% on the *e)en*ant to $ro/e

$ayent rather than on the $aintiJ to $ro/e non$ayent.

The *e(tor ha% the (!r*en o) %ho6ing 6ith ega certainty that

the o(igation ha% (een *i%charge* (y $ayent. $hen the

existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in

the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by

payment devolves upon the debtor who o/ers such a defense to theclaim of the creditor. Where the *e(tor intro*!ce% %oe e/i*ence

o) $ayent the (!r*en o) going )or6ar* 6ith the e/i*enceKa%

*i%tinct )ro the genera (!r*en o) $roo)K%hi)t% to the

cre*itor 6ho i% then !n*er a *!ty o) $ro*!cing %oe e/i*ence

to %ho6 non$ayent.

Although private respondents admit receipt of partial payment,

petitioners still have to present proof of full payment. $here the

defendant sued for a debt admits that the debt was originally owed,

and pleads payment in whole or in part, it is incumbent upon him to

prove such payment. That a $aintiJ a*it% that %oe $ayent%

ha/e (een a*e *oe% not change the (!r*en o) $roo). The

*e)en*ant %ti ha% the (!r*en o) e%ta(i%hing $ayent%

(eyon* tho%e a*itte* (y $aintiJ.

"n this case, petitioners failed to present evidence to prove payment.

. aari /%. C – =; S 4;=

>act%&

1. 4ometime on 8ecember @, *CCL7at. 'anipon and 7fc.

Ksguerra, who were both then assigned at the 6apas 7olice

4tation, received reliable information that appellant 8iosdado

'allari, who has a standing warrant of arrest in connection with

6riminal for &omicide in *CC, was seen at 4itio *:, 4ta. Eita,6apas, Tarlac.

. The police oQcers immediately proceeded to 4itio *:, 4ta. Eita,

6apas, Tarlac. Hpon reaching the place, the arresting oQcers

surrounded the house of appellant, arrested him and told him

to remain stationary. There!$on the arre%ting ocer%

%earche* hi an* )o!n* a hoea*e g!n -$ati:' 6ith

one 1= i/e a!nition.3. the petitioner was charged with the crime of "llegal 7ossession

of (irearms and Ammunition, and pleaded not guilty on

arraignment. 4. The ET6 rendered a decision convicting the appellant guilty of

"llegal possession of (irearms and Ammunition. This was upheld

by the 6A. "n its decision, the 6ourt of Appeals held that the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, 7fc. 'anipon and 7at.

Ksguerra Junequivocally proved that the handgun #paltiB% and

the live '*< ammunition were recovered from the person of

the appellant #herein petitioner%.

Aence the $re%ent action (y the a$$eant arg!ing aong

a other% that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition

had in fact been found in his possession, the prosecution failed to



12/51

prove that he had no license therefor and absent this essential

element of the crime of illegal possession of rearms, it was

manifest error for the 6ourt of Appeals to uphold his conviction. "n

other words, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of

proving that he did not have the requisite license for the rearm

and ammunition found in his possession.

On the other han* it i% the $o%ition o) the SOL?EN that as therearm involved is a homemade gun or JpaltiBJ and is illegal per se. "t could not have been the sub=ect of license. This, according to the4olicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of proving thatpetitioner had no license to possess the rearm. &ence, it does noteven attempt to show evidence on record of petitionerSs nonpossessionof a license or permit for there really is no such evidence.

I%%!e& Who ha% the (!r*en o) $ro/ing that the a$$eant ha% no

icen%e"

"n criminal prosecutions, the prosecution has the burden of proving all

of the elements, even if they are in the negative.

"n crimes involving illegal possession of rearm, the prosecution has

the burden of proving the elements thereof, vi0)

#a% the existence of the sub=ect rearm and

#b% the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does

not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the

same.

The atter i% a negati/e )act 6hich con%tit!te% an e%%entia

ingre*ient o) the oJen%e o) iega $o%%e%%ion an* it i% the*!ty o) the $ro%ec!tion not ony to aege it (!t a%o to $ro/e it

(eyon* rea%ona(e *o!(t.

"n the case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a

certication from the PNP ->EU' that $etitioner 6a% not a

icen%ee o) the %ai* +rear 6o!* ha/e %!ce* )or the

$ro%ec!tion to $ro/e (eyon* rea%ona(e *o!(t the %econ*

eeent o) the crie o) iega $o%%e%%ion.Pre%!$tion%

o Assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requiressuch fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts

found or otherwise established in the actiono "t is not evidence and merely a/ects the burden of o/ering

evidenceo 8uring the trial of ana action, the party whi has the burden of

proof upon an issue may be aided in establishing his claim or

defense by the operation of presumptiono r the probative value of which the law attached to a

specic state of facts

EJect&

o a party in whose favour the legal presumption exists may relyon and invoBe such legal presumption to establish a fact in

issueo one need not introduce evidence to prove the fact for a

presumption is prima facie proof of the fact assumedo "t may operate against an adversary who has not introduced to

rebut the presumption

Ca%%e% o) $re%!$tion%&

*. 7resumption of aw or =uris) deduction which the law considers

as established from the facts given

. 7resumption of facts or hominis) deduction or inference whichreason or experience draws form other facts proved

Ca%%e% o) Pre%!$tion 2!ri%

Conc!%i/e $re%!$tion 7i%$!ta(e $re%!$tion%Absolute presumptions of law

which are not permitted to be

overcome by any proof to the

Which %!ce% !nti o/ercoe

(y contrary e/i*ence



13/51

contrary, however, strong6onsidered as if it is not a

presumption at allI it is

substantive directing the rpoof of

certain basic facts conclusiveRULE 131. SECTION & CONCLUSIE PRESUPTIONS

Section . Conc!%i/e $re%!$tion%. — The following are instances

of conclusive presumptions)

#a% $henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,

intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particular

thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation

arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify

it.

#b% The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the

time of commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant betweenthem. #3a%

E9!ita(e E%to$$e or E%to$$e in Pai%

E%to$$e i% a $rinci$e rooted upon natural =ustice, preventing a

person from going bacB upon his own acts and representations, to the

pre=udice of others who have relied on them

o 8enies the person the right to repudiate his acts, admission, or

representations which have been relied upon by the person to

whom they were directed and whose conduct they were

intended to, and did, in!uence

Klements on the part of the $er%on e%to$$e*&

#*% there must have been a false representation or concealment of

material facts which are inconsistent with the position taBen

and said party is subsequently asserting#% the representation must have been made with Bnowledge of

the factsI#3% must have been made with intention that the other party would

act upon it

#:% the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the

truth of the matter

Eeent% )or the $arty caiing e%to$$e& one who was misled by

the misrepresentation

#*% lacB of Bnowledge and the means of ascertaining the truth as

to the facts in question#% reliance in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the

party to be estopped#3% action or inaction based thereon of such character as o change

the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his

in=ury, detriment or pre=udice

#a% $henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,

intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particularthing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigationarising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted tofalsify it.

example)

*. an accused who enters a plea of guilty under a wrong name is

estopped form later on questioning the =urisdiction of the court

over his personI. one who clothes another with apparent authority as his agent

and holds him as such in the public, cannot be permitted to

deny the authority of such person to act as his agent to the

pre=udice of innocent third persons dealing with such agent in

good faith and in honest belief that he is what he appears to be3. sale by minors of real estate who represented that they are

capacitated, and if they have reached the ages of puberty and

adolescence then ma=ority, cannot excuse themselves form the

obligations assumed by them or seeB annulment:. corporations by estoppel



14/51

o the E6 suQciently protects the lessor from being questioned

by the lessee, regarding his title or better right of possession

as lessor because ha/ing a*itte* the e#i%tence o) e%%oran* e%%ee reation%hi$ the e%%ee i% (arre* )ro

a%%aiing the e%%orF% tite o) (etter right o) $o%%e%%iono for as long as the lessor5lessee relationship exists, the

lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn

the conclusive presumption that the lessor has valid

title or better right of possessiono it also applies even thought the lessor had no title at

the time the relation of the lessor and lessee was

createdo whyD 9ecause the relationship between them is not

dependent on the ownership of the lessor but on the

agreement between them

E#a$e&

1. in an action for e=ectment, the plainti/ is presumed to be the

owner of the property or that he at least, has the right to the

possession, and he cannot be compelled, and need not present

evidence showing his ownershipa. the tenant then cannot deny the title of his landlord at

the time of the commencement of the relation. in an action brought by the 6atholic 6hurch against the priest

who was out in possession to administer the property, the

latter is estopped from alleging ownership at the time he tooB

possession either to himself or in a third person

3. RULE 131 SECTION 3 – 7ISPUTDLE PRESUPTIONS

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions

are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and

overcome by other evidence)

-a' That a $er%on i% innocent o) crie or 6rong

• it is presumed that a person in innocent of a crime or wrong

• it is applicable in criminal and civil cases

• however, there is no constitutional ob=ection to the passage of a

law providing that the presumption of innocence may be

overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon human

conduct

-(' That an !na6)! act 6a% *one 6ith an !na6)!intent

• example) publication of defamatory matter was done with malice

presumably

-c' That a $er%on inten*% the or*inary con%e9!ence% o)

hi% /o!ntary act

•

hence where an accused in!icts in=uries upon a person other

than the one whom he intended to in=ure, he is liable for the

act and all its natural consequences

-*' That a $er%on ta:e% or*inary care o) hi% concern%

• example, a person will not sell his land for *N@th of its value, and

less thatn of its annual revenue unless the sale is intended

to be made merely as a security



15/51

-e' That e/i*ence 6i)!y %!$$re%%e* 6o!* (e a*/er%e

i) $ro*!ce*

•

failure to produce booBs and records in his possession gives

rise to the presumption that they would be adverse if produced

• failure of the prosecution to present evidence to refutetestimony of appellant and his witness, despite being able to

do so because it had at its disposal the power to compel

production of adverse evidence necessarily constitutes an

argument against said prosecution

• partys fraud in preparation and presentation of his case, his

fabrication and suppression of evidence

• production of fabricated documents

• not a$$ica(e 6hen& -Peo$e /% Naran,a'a. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties(. the suppression is not willfulc. it is merely corroborative or cumulative

*. suppression is an exercise of privilegee. failure to present witness listed in the information does

not give rise to such presumption

-)' That oney $ai* (y one to another 6a% *!e to the

atter

-g' That a thing *ei/ere* (y one to another (eonge*

to the atter

• hence, it may be shown that there is a mistaBe in the

delivery or maBing of the act. "f the presumption isrebutted, there is solutio indebiti

-h' That an o(igation *ei/ere* !$ to the *e(tor ha%

(een $ai*

• possession by the debtor of the private document

evidencing the debt raises the presumption tat the

creditor voluntarily delivered the document to himI

when creditor is in possession of the instrument, it is

presume that the amount of the debt has not yet been

paid

• ho6 re(!tte*& the delivery of the instrument may be

shown to be done demand payment and not to leave

the instrument evidencing credit

-i' That $rior rent% or in%taent% ha* (een $ai* 6hen

a recei$t )or the ater one i% $ro*!ce*

• not applicable when the contracts are separate) (y a

contract %e$arate an* *i%tinct )or the contract

o) ea%e

-,' That a $er%on )o!n* in $o%%e%%ion o) a thing ta:en in

the *oing o) a recent 6rong)! act i% the ta:er an* the

*oer o) the 6hoe act other6i%e that thing% 6hich a

$er%on $o%%e%% or e#erci%e% act% o) o6ner%hi$ o/er areo6ne* (y hi

section has parts)

(irst) $re%!$tion )ro $o%%e%%ion o) %toen goo*%

• unexplained possession of articles recently stolencreates the presumption that the possessor is theauthor of the theft or robbery

4econd) $re%!$tion o) o6ner%hi$ )ro $o%%e%%ion ore#erci%e o) act% o) o6ner%hi$

•

it is to be presumed that the articles, goods, or chattelsfound in the store of a corporation is owned by thecorporation, not of any members thereof

• continued occupation and use of public land by amunicipality gives presumption that such is ownedthrough a government grant in its favor



16/51

-:' That a $er%on in $o%%e%%ion o) an or*er on hi%e)

)or the $ayent o) the oney or the *ei/ery o)

anything ha% $ai* the oney or *ei/ere* the thing

accor*ingy

• bad faith or wrong is not presumed

-' That a $er%on acting in a $!(ic oce 6a% reg!ary

a$$ointe* or eecte* to it

-' That ocia *!ty ha% (een reg!ary $er)ore*

• when the law imposes certain duties and obligationsit

will be presumed that such duties and obligation have

been performed

• ho6 to re(!t the $re%!$tion& it is expressly made

to appear to the contraryo evidence of ill5motiveo clear and convincing evidence that the police

oQcers did not properly perform their duty or

that there was deviation from their regular

performance of business or that they were

inspired by an improper motiveo hence, defense of frame5up will require

stronger proof because of the presumption of

regularity in the prefomance of duty

-n' That a co!rt or ,!*ge acting a% %!ch 6hether in the

Phii$$ine% or e%e6here 6a% acting in the a6)!

e#erci%e o) ,!ri%*iction

• it is established as a general rule, that where a court of

general =urisdiction has exercised its powers, every

step necessary to confer =urisdiction will be presumed

to have been taBen in the absence of proof to the

contrary

•

6hen not a$$ica(e&

i. cannot apply in a petition for writ of amparo

under 4ection *@ of the Eule of the $rit of

Amparoii. 7eople vs 6amat) it is incumbent upon the

prosecution to show that that prior to

questioning during the custodial investigation,

all the constitutionally protected rights were

observed

-o' That a the atter% 6ithin an i%%!e rai%e* in a ca%e

6ere ai* (e)ore the co!rt an* $a%%e* !$on (y it an* in

i:e anner that a atter% 6ithin an i%%!e rai%e* in a

*i%$!te %!(itte* )or ar(itration 6ere ai* (e)ore the

ar(itrator% an* $a%%e* !$on (y the

• $here nothing appears in the record as to whether or

not the accused was granted a preliminary

investigation, it is presumed that the procedure

prescribed by law had been observed

-$' That $ri/ate tran%action% ha/e (een )air an*

reg!ar

• 4ettlements of accounts are presumed to be correct

•

"t is the duty of the contracting parties to learn and

Bnow the contents of the contract before signing and

delivering it

-9' That the or*inary co!r%e o) (!%ine%% ha% (een

)oo6e*

-r' That there 6a% a %!cient con%i*eration )or a

contract

-%' That a negotia(e in%tr!ent 6a% gi/en or in*or%e*

)or a %!cient con%i*eration



17/51

-t' That an en*or%eent o) negotia(e in%tr!ent 6a%

a*e (e)ore the in%tr!ent 6a% o/er*!e an* at the

$ace 6here the in%tr!ent i% *ate*

-!' That a 6riting i% tr!y *ate*

•

8ates written in the written instrument are presumed

to be correct and that such instruments are presumed

to have been executed at the times indicated by the

dates they bear

• "t does not apply however, in the following)a. 8oes not apply where a deed is o/ered to support

an action against one who is neither a party nor

privy to it(. 'ay not be invoBed in forged instrument or if there

is fraud or collusionc. 'ay not be invoBed also for truth of collateral facts

such as for example, the presence of allegedsigners

-/' That a etter *!y *irecte* an* aie* 6a% recei/e*

in the reg!ar co!r%e o) the ai

• $hen a letter or other mail matter is addressed and

mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable

presumption of fact that it was received by the

addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to

him in the ordinary course of business

• 7rovided that)a. "t is addressed properlyb. "t is mailed

-6' That a)ter an a(%ence o) %e/en year% it (eing

!n:no6n 6hether or not the a(%entee %ti i/e% he i%

con%i*ere* *ea* )or a $!r$o%e% e#ce$t )or tho%e o)

%!cce%%ion.

The a(%entee %ha not (e con%i*ere* *ea* )or the $!r$o%e o)

o$ening hi% %!cce%%ion ti a)ter an a(%ence o) ten year%. I) he

*i%a$$eare* a)ter the age o) %e/enty


18/51

(. $hyD 4prings from necessity of settling property

rights and statusc. This disputable presumption arises only until the

expiration of the seventh or tenth year, or fth or

fourth year*. "t is invoBed either in an action or in a special

proceeding which is tried or heard by, and

submitted for decision to a competent courte. "ndependently of such action or special proceeding,

the presumption cannot be invoBed, not can it be

sub=ect of an action or special proceeding

-#' That ac9!ie%cence re%!te* )ro a (eie) that the

thing ac9!ie%ce* in 6a% con)ora(e to the a6 or )act

-y' That thing% ha/e ha$$ene* accor*ing to the

or*inary co!r%e o) nat!re an* or*inary nat!re ha(it% o)

i)e

-B' That $er%on% acting a% co$artner% ha/e entere* into

a contract o) co$artne%hi$

-aa' That a an an* 6oan *e$orting the%e/e% a%

h!%(an* an* 6i)e ha/e entere* into a a6)! contract o)

arriage

• Kvery intendment of the law of fact leans toward the

validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage

bonds

-((' That $ro$erty ac9!ire* (y a an an* a 6oan 6ho

are ca$acitate* to arry each other an* 6ho i/e

e#c!%i/ey 6ith each other a% h!%(an* an* 6i)e

6itho!t the (ene+t o) arriage or !n*er /oi* arriage

ha% (een o(taine* (y their ,oint eJort% 6or: or

in*!%try.

-cc' That in ca%e% o) coha(itation (y a an an* a

6oan 6ho are not ca$acitate* to arry each other

an* 6ho ha/e ac9!ire $ro$ery thro!gh their act!a

,oint contri(!tion o) oney $ro$erty or in*!%try %!ch

contri(!tion% an* their corre%$on*ing %hare% inc!*ing

,oint *e$o%it% o) oney an* e/i*ence% o) cre*it aree9!a.

-**' That i) the arriage i% terinate* an* the other

contracte* another arriage 6ithin three h!n*re* *ay%

a)ter %!ch terination o) the )orer arriage the%e

r!e% %ha go/ern in the a(%ence o) $roo) to the

contrary&

-1' chi* (orn (e)ore one h!n*re* eighty *ay%

a)ter the %oeniBation o) the %!(%e9!ent

arriage i% con%i*ere* to ha/e (een concei/e*

*!ring %!ch arriage e/en tho!gh it (e (orn

6ithin the three h!n*re* *ay% a)ter the

terination o) the )orer arriage.

-' chi* (orn a)ter one h!n*re* eighty *ay%

)oo6ing the cee(ration o) the %!(%e9!ent

arriage i% con%i*ere* to ha/e (een concei/e*

*!ring %!ch arriage e/en tho!gh it (e (orn

6ithin the three h!n*re* *ay% a)ter the

terination o) the )orer arriage.

-ee' That a thing once $ro/e* to e#i%t contin!e% a% onga% i% !%!a 6ith thing% o) the nat!re

• Aence a person proven to be insane or sane is

presumed to be such until the contrary is proven

-J' That the a6 ha% (een o(eye*



19/51

-gg' That a $rinte* or $!(i%he* (oo: $!r$orting to (e

$rinte* or $!(i%he* (y $!(ic a!thority 6a% %o $rinte*

or $!(i%he*

-hh' That a $rinte* or $!(i%he* (oo: $!r$orting

contain re$ort% o) ca%e% a*,!*ge* in tri(!na% o) theco!ntry 6here the (oo: i% $!(i%he* contain% correct

re$ort% o) %!ch ca%e%

-ii' That a tr!%tee or other $er%on 6ho%e *!ty it 6a% to

con/ey rea $ro$erty to a $artic!ar $er%on ha% act!ay

con/eye* it to hi 6hen %!ch $re%!$tion i% nece%%ary

to $er)ect the tite o) %!ch $er%on or hi% %!cce%%or in

intere%t

-,,' That e#ce$t )or $!r$o%e% o) %!cce%%ion 6hen t6o

$er%on% $eri%h in the %ae caaity %!ch a% 6rec:

(atte or conagration an* it i% not %ho6n 6ho *ie*

+r%t an* there are no $artic!ar circ!%tance% )ro

6hich it can (e in)erre* the %!r/i/or%hi$ i% *eterine*

)ro the $ro(a(iitie% re%!ting )ro the %trength an*

the age o) the %e#e% accor*ing to the )oo6ing r!e%&

1. I) (oth 6ere !n*er the age o) +)teen year%

the o*er i% *eee* to ha/e %!r/i/e*

. I) (oth 6ere a(o/e the age %i#ty the yo!nger

i% *eee* to ha/e %!r/i/e*

3. I) one i% !n*er +)teen an* the other a(o/e

%i#ty the )orer i% *eee* to ha/e %!r/i/e*

4. I) (oth (e o/er +)teen an* !n*er %i#ty an* the

%e# (e *iJerent the ae i% *eee* to ha/e

%!r/i/e* i) the %e# (e the %ae the o*er

;. I) one (e !n*er +)teen or o/er %i#ty an* the

other (et6een tho%e age% the atter i% *eee*

to ha/e %!r/i/e*.

-::' That i) there i% a *o!(t a% (et6een t6o or ore

$er%on% 6ho are cae* to %!ccee* each other a% to6hich o) the *ie* +r%t 6hoe/er aege% the *eath o)

one $rior to the other %ha $ro/e the %ae in the

a(%ence o) $roo) they %ha (e con%i*ere* to ha/e *ie*

at the %ae tie. -;a'

other $re%!$tion% !n*er a6 an* ,!ri%$r!*ence&

a% rt. 1385 o) the Ci/i Co*e& All contracts by virtue of which

the debto alienates property by gratuitous title are presumedto have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor

did not reserve suQcient property to pay all debts contracted

before the donation.2a. Also when there is alienation of property by onerous

title made by a debtor against whom some =udgment

has been rendered in any instance or some writ of

attachment has been issued . from the tenor of law,

the decision or arrangement need not refer to the

property alienated and need not have been obtained

by the party seeBing rescissionb% A =udgment or nal order against a person, redender by a

tribunal of a foreign country with =urisdiction to render said =udgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between

parties and their successors5in5interesta. Hnless it be shown that) #a% there is want of

=urisdictionI #b% want of notice to the other partyI #c%

collusionI #d% fraudI #e% clear mistaBe of law or factc% 6ommon carriers are presumed to be negligent and at fault

when there is in=ury or damage to passengers or goodsd% "t is presumed that when a driver is in violation of a law, he is

negligente% Ees ipsa loquitur)



20/51

a. The accident is of a Bind which ordinarily does not

occur in the absence of someones negligenceb. "t is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive

control of the defendant or defendantsc. The possibility f contributing conduct which would

maBe the plainti/ responsible is eliminated

?enera R!e on Pre%!$tion%

o 7resumptions are not admissible, except when the fact form

which they are deduced are fully provedo +o presumption can, with safety, be drawn from another

presumption

Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. — Thereis no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three hundred

days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the

spouses. $hoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child

must prove his allegation. #


21/51

&ence, the conclusive presumption of presence of corporate entity that

will bind the parties acting for such association will not apply.

;. LRT /%. Nati/i*a* – 3@5 S 5;

Transpo case to guysU 8isputable presumption of negligence on

common carriers if there is in=ury to passengers or damage to goods.

>CTS&

*. +icanor +avidad entered the K84A ET station after purchasing

a 1toBen2 #representing payment of the fare%, who was at this

time drunB.. $hile standing on the platform near the ET tracBs, Kscartin

#security guard assigned to the area% approached +avidad.3. A misunderstanding or altercation apparently ensued that led

to a st ght and later +avidad fell on the tracBs. At that exactmoment, an ET train, operated by petitioner Eoman, was

coming in.:. +avidad was strucB by the moving train and was Billed

instantaneously.;. Thereafter, respondent 'ar=orie +avidad, along with her

children, led a complaint for damages against Kscartin,

Eoman, the ETA, the 'etro Transit rgani0ation, and 7rudent

4ecurity Agency for the death of her husband.


22/51

the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act

or omission.

In ca%e o) %!ch *eath or in,!ry a carrier i% $re%!e* to ha/e(een at )a!t or (een negigent an* (y %i$e $roo) o) in,!ry

the $a%%enger i% reie/e* o) the *!ty to %ti e%ta(i%h the )a!t

or negigence o) the carrier or o) it% e$oyee% an* the (!r*en

%hi)t% !$on the carrier to $ro/e that the in,!ry i% *!e to an

!n)ore%een e/ent or to )orce a,e!re. In the a(%ence o)

%ati%)actory e#$anation (y the carrier on ho6 the acci*ent

occ!rre* 6hich $etitioner% accor*ing to the a$$eate co!rt

ha/e )aie* to %ho6 the $re%!$tion 6o!* (e that it ha% (een

at )a!t an e#ce$tion )ro the genera r!e that negigence

!%t (e $ro/e*.

There is no such showing of proof, in the present case, to rebut and

overcome the presumption of negligence to common carriers.

monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. 6orollarily, in

Eamos v. 6ourt of Appeals, the 6ourt stressed that once negligence on

the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he

observed the diligence in the selection and supervision of its

employees shifts to the employer.

"n the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it

formulated rulesNguidelines for the proper performance of functions of

its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored

compliance therewith. (ailing to discharge the burden, petitioner

should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of 6apt. -usep.

4o also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents

failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not exercise due

diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. "n Piron

Transportation 6o., "nc. v. 8elos 4antos, it was held that it is not

necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or

selection of its employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by

operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the employee and

that of an employer5employee relation in the complaint are enough to

maBe out a case of quasi5delict under Article *L of the 6ivil 6ode.



23/51

. 7e%an /% CM Con%tr!ction

>CTS&

a% n ctober C, *CC:, 'NP 8elsan Kxpress, a ship owned and

operated by $etitioner 7e%an Tran%$ort Line% Inc.,

anchored at the +avotas (ish 7ort for the purpose of installing acargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tanB.

b% At around *)LL midnight of ctober L, *CC:, 6aptain

8emetrio T. -usep of 'NP 8elsan Kxpress received a report from

his radio head operator in -apan that a typhoon was going to

hit 'anila in about hours.c% At approximately )3; in the morning of ctober *, *CC:,

6apt. -usep tried to seeB shelter at the +orth &arbor but could

not enter the area because it was already congested. At *L)LL

a.m., 6apt. -usep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Pitas

mouth, : miles away from a +apocor power barge. At that

time, the waves were already reaching to *L feet high.

d% 6apt. -usep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter thewind which was dragging the ship towards the +apocor power

barge. To avoid collision, 6apt. -usep ordered a full stop of the

vessel. &e succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when

the engine was re5started and the ship was maneuvered full

astern, it hit the de!ector wall constructed by respondent. The

damage caused by the incident amounted to 7:;IRST ISSUE& FK4.

There i% negigence on the $art o) the e$oyee Ca$t. 2!%e$.

"n the case at bar, the 6A was correct in holding that 6apt. -usep was

negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at )3; in the morning

of ctober *, *CC:. As early as *)LL midnight of ctober L, *CC:,

he received a report from his radio head operator in -apan that a

typhoon was going to hit 'anila after hours. This, notwithstanding,

he did nothing, until )3; in the morning of ctober *, *CC:, when he

decided to seeB shelter at the +orth &arbor, which unfortunately was

already congested. The nding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon



24/51

proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the +orth &arbor

even if the transfer was done earlier.

$hen he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable

foresight of harm, 6apt. -usep showed an inexcusable lacB of care and

caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the

same situation. &ad he moved the vessel earlier, he could have hadgreater chances of nding a space at the +orth &arbor considering that

the +avotas 7ort where they docBed was very near +orth &arbor. Kven

if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seeB

refuge in other ports.

N7 ISSUE& %ho!* the $etitioner %hi$$ing co$any then (e he*

ia(e )or the negigence o) it% e$oyee Ca$t. 2!%e$"

R!ing& He%.

6e +n* $etitioner /icario!%y ia(e )or the negigent act o)

Ca$t. 2!%e$. Un*er rtice 180 o) the Ci/i Co*e an e$oyer

ay (e he* %oi*ariy ia(e )or the negigent act o) hi%

e$oyee. Thus

Art. *L. The obligation imposed in Article *@< is demandable not

only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for

whom one is responsible.

x x x x x x x x x

Kmployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees

and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasBs,

even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x x x x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons

herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good

father of a family to prevent damage.

Whene/er an e$oyee% negigence ca!%e% *aage or in,!ry

to another there in%tanty ari%e% a $re%!$tion ,!ri% tant!

that the e$oyer )aie* to e#erci%e *iigenti%%ii $atri%

)aiie% in the %eection -c!$a in eigien*o' or %!$er/i%ion

-c!$a in /igian*o' o) it% e$oyee%. To a/oi* ia(iity )or a

9!a%iir%t& %eection o) the e$oyee% an*

Secon*& %!$er/i%ion o) hi% e$oyee%

In the $re%ent ca%e the $etitioner )aie* to $ro/e the %econ*

re9!i%ite. The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due

diligence in the selection of 6apt. -usep because the latter is a licensed

and competent 'aster 'ariner. 4uch is not enough. "t is not enough

that the employees chosen be competent and qualied, inasmuch as

the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its

employees.

4o also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents

failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not exercise due

diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. Allegations

of negligence against the employee and that of an employer5employee

relation in the complaint are enough to maBe out a case of quasi5delict

under Article *L of the 6ivil 6ode.



25/51

=. Peo$e /%. 7e ?!Ban – @ S 5@;< E7RNO

>CTS&

1. Accused5appellant de Gu0man has been in the watch list of the

police authorities as a prohibited drug peddler. n occasions,

they tried to entrap him without any success. On the thir* tie

the $oice ocer% %!ccee*e* in their (!y


26/51

5. Peo$e /%. Na/a,a – 0 S =4< PSCUL

>CTS&

*. Alexander +ava=a was the ob=ect of a (!y


27/51

their duty. "n the instant case, there exists no such contrary proof.

Accused has not presented evidence of any ulterior motive that could

have moved Eanulfo Kspina to testify against him. The rule is also

settled that in the absence of evidence that would show why the

prosecution witness would testify falsely, the logical conclusion is that

no improper motive existed and that such testimony is worthy of full

faith and credit.

8. Peo$e /%. Ca%tae*a – ; S 45< SLTERS

>act%&

#*% the accused5appellant 6astaMeda was charged with the crime of

Eobbery with Eape. The private complainant, Kugenia 4ese alleged

that she was at home with her children and her home is well lit by

three Berosene lamps and the moon was bright that night.

• That at about *Lpm n the evening, she went outside of

their house to expose their ampalaya leaces to

dewdrop outside.

• That in no time, an intruder grabbed the complainant

and poBed a Bnife at her necB with his right hand and

demanded money

• That since she had no money, they had to go inside the

house and get money from the apador

• That the robber not satised with the measly amount,

ordered her to pull down her pants and raped her

•

&e then disappeared into the darBness.#% 7rivate complainant woBe up her children and sought help from

'ariano Apolinar and his wife, Apong Gunding. The house of

Apolinar is forty #:L% to fortyve #:;% meters away from her house.

4he recounted her ordeal to them but sealed her l ips about the

threat. Apolinar, in turn, summoned 9arangay 6aptain 7onciano

6unanan and 6ouncilman Eodolfo 'analoto. 4he retold her story to

the barangay oQcials, who decided to report the matter to the

police authorities.#3% "t was **)LL p.m. The barangay oQcials walBed with private

complainant to the police headquarters in 6oncepcion, Tarlac. n

their way, she saw a man wearing red shorts and white striped

shirt passing in front of a lighted house near the boundary ofbarangays 4an -ose and 4ta. 'aria. 4he recogni0ed the man as the

one who robbed and raped her. 4he pointed him to 'ariano

Apolinar. $hen they approached him, it turned out to be the

accused appellant.#:% 7!ring the tria

• The defendant was trying to establish the alibi that he

was with his brother5in5laws birthday party and stayed

there



28/51

• n the other hand, the prosecution presented among

all others, the 9arangay Tanod, that private

complainant told him that she could not identify the

person who robbed and molested her. 4he described

the criminal to be tall, thin, with a tie around his head,

and that the suspect belonged to the larves family.#:% The ET6 convicted the accused appellant of the crime of

robbery with rape. This was upheld by the 6A.

&ence, the present action by the appellant, contending among others

that, he was misidentied as barangay tanod 8avid testied that the

culprit was described by private complainant as tall, slim, and a

larves. Allegedly, this description was given in the presence of

barangay oQcials who were not called as witnesses by the prosecution.

&e charges the prosecution with suppression of evidence.

"ssue) 'ay the presumption on suppression of evidence apply in the

present caseD

Euling) +o.

The contention cannot succeed. The rule on suppression of evidence

cannot be invoBed by accusedappellant where the same evidence is

available to him. "n the case at bar, accusedappellant could have

subpoenaed the barangay oQcials who allegedly heard the description

of the culprit given by the private complainant. These barangay

oQcials were not under the control of private complainant, a lowly

housewife in barangay 4ta. 'aria, 6oncepcion, Tarlac. "t is far fetchedto accuse her and the prosecution of suppressing their testimonies.

'oreover, their testimonies could only be corroborative. "n 7eople v.

oren0o, we held that the presumption laid down in 4ection ;#e%,

Eule *3* of the Eules of 6ourt that 1evidence willfully suppressed

would be adverse if produced2 does not apply when the testimony of

the witness not produced would only be corroborative.

@. Peo$e /%. Si(!an – 14 S ;35 – RNET

(%tract& a buy bust operation was done and the accused 4imbulan

and 4uguui were eventually convicted by the courts for violation of the

8angerous 8rugs Act. They were found guilty heavily based on the

testimonies of the oQcers who conducted the buy5bust operation. The

accused questioned the credibility of the said oQcers, but the 46 held

the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties

because of the absence of proof of evidence to the contrary or having

done so by improper motives.

1. The D!y< D!%t O$eration&a. a male informant came to the oQce +AE6' and

relayed to t. Eeuben 4indac the information that

+K+K #"rene 4imbulan% and KP"K #Klvira 4ugui%, herein

accused, were engaged in the selling of shabu at'asangBay 4t., 'aBati, 'etro 'anila.

b. (inding this information to be viable #to use his own

word%, t. 4indac submitted to t. 6ol. Eaval of the

+AE6' a preoperation report. t. 6ol. Eaval approved

the said preoperation report and directed t. 4indac to

constitute a team and conduct a buybust operation.c. Hpon reaching the house of +K+K the informant

BnocBed on the door and when +K+K opened the door

and came out, he introduced 4gt. 8irecto as a person

wanting to buy shabu.d. Almost simultaneously W +K+K handed to 4gt. 8irecto

a transparent plastic bag containing what appeared tobe shabu. Hpon her receipt thereof, 4gt. 8irecto raised

her right hand which was the prearranged signal to her

coteam members that she had already concluded the

purchase of shabu.. 9y reason of this operation, the appellant5 accused were

arrested and eventully charged with the conspiracy in the sale

and delivery of .*@ gram of 1shabu2 in violation of 4ection

*#b%, Article "P, in relation to 4ection *;, Article """ of Eepublic

Act +o.


29/51

3. 8uring the trial of the case) the following were presented)a. >or the $ro%ec!tion& oQcers who conducted the buy5

bust operation were presented and established the

abovementioned narration of factsIb. >or the *e)en%e& the accused appellants gave

completely di/erent versions of the operations as

expected. They made it appear that the a certain Angelwhich they have Bnown for a long time was the person

who was buying and that +K+K merely gave the shabu

she did not own. The money she had given to Klvie was

actually payment for the wristwatch she bought.:. After evaluating the con!icting testimonies of the parties, the

ET6 gave more weight to the testimonies of the oQcers than

that of the accused appellants and stated that)

1x x x, in the course of their testimonies, the 6ourt was intently

observing the prosecution witnesses, particularly 4gt. 8irecto

and t. 4indac, and the 6ourt was impressed by their

candidness and straightforward manner of testifying, which in

the mind of the 6ourt indicated that they had testied

truthfully. As a matter of fact, t. 4indac, who is only @ years

#old% had impressed the 6ourt that he is a professional whose

only concern is to do his =ob and to do it well. x x x.2**

hence, the present action of accused appellants, questioning mainly

the credibility of the said oQcers in giving their testimonies.

#di na na5specify sa case Bung ano yung mga questions talag sabi

lang, credibility of the witnesses, which is exactly why, natalo ang mga

accused%

"ssue) $as the lower court correct in giving more credence and weight

to the testimony of the oQcersD

Euling) Fes.

The narration o) the inci*ent (y the $ro%ec!tion 6itne%%e% are

6orthy o) cre*it. They are $oice ocer% 6ho are $re%!e* to

ha/e $er)ore* their *!tie% in a reg!ar anner there (eing

no e/i*ence to the contraryan* ore %o %ince there i% nothing

in the recor* 6hich 6o!* in*icate that they 6ere act!ate* (y

i$ro$er oti/e%.

(urthermore, we have perforce to once again reiterate the entrenched

rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness

stand is best and most competently performed by the trial =udge, who,

unliBe appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of

the declarants demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is

thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between

the true and the false.@ Appellate courts will not disturb the credence,

or lacB of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses

unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooBed or

disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of signicance in

the case.

In the ca%e at (ar 6e +n* nothing 6hich 6o!* 6arrant

*e/iation )ro the genera r!e.



30/51

10. Peo$e /%. Da!**a – 318 S ;03<

>CTS&

The version of the prosecution as summari0ed by the 4olicitor General,

runs thus)

#*% "n the morning of 4eptember :, *CCL, 6*6 'auro 6amat was at

4itio 8angdangla, 9arangay 6ardis, 9agulin, a Hnion together with

other members of the 6ivilian Armed (orces Geographical Hnit

#6A(GH%, a regular unit of the 7hilippine +ational 7olice composed

of civilian volunteers, when they received information about people

passing by the area carrying huge quantities of mari=uana. The

6A(GH units 6ommanding Qcer, (irst ieutenant 'anuel de Pera,

immediately ordered 6amat and his companions to patrol the area.#% The following day, the police oQcers encountered appellant

9aludda together with 'aximo 9aludda, 8omingo Atebew and 9en

9aristo carrying sacBs on their bacBs. The encounter with appellant

and his companions tooB place in a forested area on the mountainof 4itio 8angdangla and it was noticed that the sacBs they were

carrying were bulging.#3% About ve #;% meters away from appellant and his companions,

6amat halted them and introduced themselves as 6A(GHs.

&owever, upon being told that the 6A(GH unit merely wanted to

see what was in the sacBs they were carrying, appellant and his

companions ran away except for 'aximo 9aludda who stayed

behind.#:% Although 9en 9aristo and 8omingo Atebew were able to elude

arrest, appellant and 'aximo 9aludda were apprehended. The

sacBs carried by appellant and his companions were opened and

found to contain mari=uana leaves.#;% The accused appellants were then apprehended by the 6A(GH and

charged with the crime of "llegal 7ossession of 'ari=uana.

The defense theori0ed as follows)

. That on -anuary @, *CC*, the four accused were charged under

4K6T"+ : of E.A.


31/51

shifted on the possessor of the dangerous drug to

explain absence of animus possidendi.

"n the case under consideration, it is not disputed that appellant was

apprehended while carrying a sacB containing mari=uana.

6onsequently, to warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was

innocent and done without intent to possess, i.e. without Bnowledgethat what he possessed was a prohibited drug.

#*% Appellant theori0ed that he merely acceded to the request of

'aximo 9aludda, his uncle, to carry the sacB without Bnowing that it

contained mari=uana. % ratiocinate* (eo6 it i% contrary to

h!an e#$erience that a an 3 year% o) age 6o!* rea*iy

agree to carry the oa* o) hi% !nce 6itho!t e/en :no6ing the

$ace 6here to *ei/er %!ch oa* an* 6itho!t a%:ing 6hie

negotiating a )ore%te* area ho6 )ar i% their *e%tination an*

ho6 ong it 6o!* ta:e the to reach the $ace, especially so

because when they were apprehended at around ;)LL in the afternoon,

they had already been walBing for around three #3% hours.

#% $orse still for appellant is the undeniable fact that he and his

companions, except 'aximo 9aludda, !ed towards di/erent directions

after the police authorities announced their presence. "f appellant had

nothing to do with the transporting of sub=ect prohibited drugs, or if he

really had no Bnowledge that the sacB he carried contained mari=uana,

there would have been no cause for him to !ee. "f he had to run at all,

it would have been more consistent with his protestation of innocence

if he ran towards, and not away from, the police oQcers. O(/io!%y

6hat a$$eant *i* reo/e* any %hre* o) *o!(t o/er hi% g!it

e#e$i)ying the (i(ica a*age& The 6ic:e* ee 6hen no an

$!r%!eth& (!t the righteo!% are a% (o* a% a ion.



32/51

RULE 13 PRESENTTION O> EI7ENCE

. EGINITION O> WITNESSES

I. E#aination to (e *one in o$en co!rt

SECTION 1. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial orhearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or aQrmation.Hnless the witness is incapacitated to speaB, or question calls for adi/erent mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be givenorally.

?R& examination of witness should be done in open courtE#c$t& testimonies, which need not be made in open court

a% Hnder the Eules of 4ummary 7rocedure, the aQdavitsof the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies ofthe witnesses

b% 8epositions need not be taBen in open court and may

be taBen before a notary public or before any personauthori0ed to administer oaths

When i% it in o$en co!rt"

• The act done publicly in the presence of the =udge andthe other oQcers of the court, as opposed to 1inchambers2

Rea%on )or the r!e&

• To enable to the court to =udge the credibility of thewitness by the witness manner of testifying, theirintelligence, and their appearance

!%t (e a*e !n*er oath or arationOath rationAny form o attestation by which aperson signies that he is boundin conscience to perform an actfaithfully and truthfullyI outwardpledge made in

4olemn and formal declaration orassertion that the witness will tellthe truth substituting oath

Why"

• To a/ect the conscience and if he willfully falsies the truth, hemay be punished for per=ury

• &e will be barred if he refuses to taBe oath or aQrmation

?enera R!e& must be made orallyKX67T)

• witness in incapacitated to speaB

• question calls for a di/erent mode of answer

Ao6 *oe% a 6itne%% a$$ear in co!rt-1' voluntarily or-' as required by the court through a subpoena

RULE 13 SECTION & PROCEE7IN?S TO DE RECORE7Section & The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including thequestions propounded to a witness and his answers thereto, thestatements made by the =udge or any of the parties, counsel, orwitnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable

by the court.

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the oQcialstenographer, stenotypist, or recorder and certied as correct by himshall be deemed prima facie correct statement of such proceedings.

RULE 13 SECTION 3 – RI?ATS N7 ODLI?TIONS O> WITNESS

-IN RELTION TO TAE RI?AT ?INST SEL><INCRIINTION'

Section 3. Right% an* o(igation% o) a 6itne%%. — A witnessmust answer questions, although his answer may tend to establish aclaim against him. &owever, it is the right of a witness)

#*% To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions,and from harsh or insulting demeanorI

#% +ot to be detained longer than the interests of =ustice requireI

#3% +ot to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to theissueI



33/51

#:% +ot to give an answer which will tend to sub=ect him to a penalty foran o/ense unless otherwise provided by lawI or

#


34/51

a )oren%ic chei%t 6ho %ai* %he )o!n* the(oth $o%iti/e )or g!n$o6*er re%i*!e.

:. The defense pleaded alibi. According to 4alveron his uncleEomeo 4alveron fetched him on 'arch *, *C


35/51

d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i

o n Y # b y t h e p r o p o n e n t % o n b e h a l f o f t h e o p p o n e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e l a t t e r S s t a n d I i t s h o u l d c o v e r a l l t h e f a c t s w h i c h t h e p a r t y e x p e c t s t o e l i c i t f r o m t h e w i t n e s s

c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n Y # b y t h e o p p o n e n t % t o w e a B e n o r d i s c r e d i t t h e t e s t i m o n y

g i v e n o n t h e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n I p u r p o s e i s t o b r i n g t h e t r u t h o f t h e f a c t s t e s t i e d i n t h e r s t s t a g e

r e 5 d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i

o n Y # b y t h e p r o p o n e n t % t o r e b u t t h e c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n

r e 5 c r o s s e x a m i n a t i

o n Y # b y t h e o p p o n e n t % t o r e f u t e t h e m a t t e r s d i s c l o s e d i n t h e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n

evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly

overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender

of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum.

"n other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the

Bernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion

(urthermore, the 'iranda Eights will also not apply as to the

admissibility of evidence as violations of 'iranda rights will only have

the e/ect of maBing the extra=udicial confession or admissions during

custodial investigation inadmissible.

&ence, in the present case, even if indeed he was not informed of his

rights, these constitutional shortcuts do not a/ect the admissibility of

'alaBiSs wallet, identication card, residence certicate and Beys for

the purpose of establishing oth

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