EVID CASES.docx

8/10/2019 EVID CASES.docx

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G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA,Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,Respondents.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from himwithout any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. Butthe fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cardsthat the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not needsuch items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting theSony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning duringthe pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that shereceived the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone numbersbelonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to provethat the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers tosummon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12Consequently, the prosecution did nothave to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent thosemessages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13His defense wasthat he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irishand he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the

cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate thesame. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it wasmost unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify thesender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes anelectronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, asprovided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected tothe admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should bedeemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on ElectronicEvidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrativeproceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of thecrime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee, v. NOEL ENOJAS YHINGPIT, ARNOLDGOMEZ YFABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS YDELANTAR, AND ROGERJALANDONI YARI,Appellants.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently providesbasis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:

1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciouslyparked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to thepolice station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent

inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained messages which led to theentrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.

2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police stationwhere he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something tohide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.

3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running awayfrom the scene of the shooting.

4. The text messages identified Kua Justin as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in theshootout; the messages also referred to Kua Justin as the one who was hit in such shootoutand later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.

5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accusedSantos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly madereferences to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin, one of the gunmen, andhis subsequent death.

7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized groupof taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.

8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with callnumbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone thataccused Enojas left in his taxicab.13

The Court must, however, disagree with the CAs ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a)aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan tomurder. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting inthe commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise theyare to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on theother hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstancesmentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide tomurder.14Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide,aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

As to the admissibility of the text messages , the RTC admitted them in conformity with theCourts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15Textmessages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or haspersonal knowledge of them.16Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged textmessages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those

messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personalknowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
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The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assumingthat this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but forrejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as anincident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had beencommittedthe killing of PO2 Pangilinanand the investigating police officers had personalknowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17The textmessages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strongleads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in anentrapment using this knowledge.

The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to currentjurisprudence.18crallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIESthe Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R.CR-HC 03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas yHingpit, ArnoldGomez yFabregas, Fernando Santos yDelantar, and Roger Jalandoni yAri GUILTYof thelesser crime of HOMICIDEwith the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensedfirearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court SENTENCESeach of them to 12years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal,as maximum. The Courtalso MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to P30,000.00, with anadditional P50,000.00 for civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.


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[A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601. August 11, 2005]

MERCEDES G. DUDUACO, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM,Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

On March 4, 2002, complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco charged [1]respondent Judge Lily

Lydia A. Laquindanum[2]of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabacan-Carmen, North Cotabatowith grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleged that on April 27, 2001, respondent brought her vehicle to the ToyotaService Center in Davao City (Toyota-Davao) for repairs and replacement of parts that weredamaged due to a vehicular mishap.

Upon being advised that her vehicle is ready for pick-up, respondent went to Toyota-Davao on June 23, 2001 at around 11:00 a.m. She was met by Jeson M. Garao, a serviceadvisor, who told her that the vehicle would be released upon payment of deductiblefranchise. Respondent allegedly refused to pay insisting that the same will be paid by theinsurance company. She then asked to speak with the manager, herein complainant, but thelatter was in a meeting.

At 3:00 p.m., respondent was referred to Randy A. Saragoza, Toyota-Davaos

Administration and Marketing Head. Saragoza claimed that he tried to explain to respondentthat the payment of the deductible franchise was upon instruction of the insurance company butthe latter got angry and raised her voice while demanding to see the manager.

She was eventually referred to Vicente U. Yez,[3]Service Department Manager, whoalleged that respondent heatedly disagreed with him and shouted that she was a judge andinsisted on seeing the manager. Upon being told that complainant was in a meeting,respondent furiously replied that she should be given preferential treatment over saidmeeting.[4]

At this point, respondent asked for a demand letter and upon presentation thereof, shepaid the amount stated therein under protest.

Thereafter, Saragoza required respondent to sign the Release of Claim with Subrogationbut she again refused. She allegedly became enraged and said that as a judge, she knew better

than to sign a blank form. Yez offered to fill in the blanks but respondent curtly informed himthat she will not sign just the same.

Judge Laquindanum left the service center without the car. On July 4, 2001, she filed acase for Replevin, Damages and Attorneys Fees, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ ofReplevin.[5]

In her Comment,[6]respondent denied that she threw her weight around and abused herjudicial authority. She claimed that upon being informed by Garao about the deductiblefranchise, she instructed the latter to communicate with her insurer. After the lapse of two (2)hours, Garao told her that he could not contact the insurers office because it was closed onSaturdays. She was referred to Saragoza and Yez but when no agreement was reached, shesuggested that they put in writing the demand for the deductible franchise before she wouldpay.

She eventually paid[7]

the deductible franchise under protest. She averred that sherequested for the execution of a demand letter[8]to serve as proof of her claim for

refund. Thereafter, Garao brought out the vehicle and gave the key to her driver, whoinspected the car to make sure that everything is in order. She then directed Salvador Caducoyto transfer her belongings from another vehicle.[9]

When respondent and her party were about to leave, Garao ran after them and told herthat she needed to sign a release form.[10]She was given a blank Release of Claim withSubrogation[11]form which she refused to sign. When Saragoza advised her that the vehicle willnot be released, she retorted that she will only sign if the form has been properly filled up. Theparties were at an impasse when Yez angrily said di fill up-an!, then took back the form andwent to his office but did not return.[12]

It was already 6:50 p.m. and respondent was still at the Toyota-Davao premises. Shewrote a letter[13]to complainant detailing her ordeal. The letter was received by a ladyemployee who gave her another demand letter[14]stating that in addition to the payment ofdeductible franchise, she is also required to sign a release form which she refused becausesome portions were blank. She left Toyota-Davao without her car.

On July 19, 2001, Yez, Saragoza together with complainant and Joe Linaza (Linaza) fromFEB Mitsui Marine Insurance, Co., came to see respondent in her sala to apologize.[15]

In his report, the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals recommended[16]thedismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Heobserved that respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was not intended to violatethe law. No fault can be attributed on respondent for refusing to sign a blank form. Hadrespondent grossly humiliated or berated Garao, Yez or Saragoza, they would not have gone toher office, together with complainant and Linaza, to apologize.

The OCA adopted the Investigating Justices recommendation with modification thatcomplainant Duduaco be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for filing this baseless harassmentsuit. The OCA opined that complainants insistence on pursuing her unsubstantiated chargesdespite lack of personal knowledge wasted the time and resources not only of respondent butalso of the Investigating Justice and this Court.

We agree with the recommendations of the OCA.

In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantialevidence the allegations in their complaints.[17]Administrative proceedings against judges are bynature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminalcases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges should thus bemore substantial and they must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[18]

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only becontrary to existing law and jurisprudence but were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonestyand corruption.[19]On the other hand, misconduct is any unlawful conduct on the part of aperson concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to theright determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conductmotivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[20]

Respondents refusal to pay the deductible franchise was justified. Her insistence that thedemand to pay be in writing, together with her refusal to affix her signature in the blank form,did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. Shewas only exercising her legal right. Had respondent signed the blank form, she would bedeemed to have waived her earlier protest and would have lost the right to claim for refund.

We agree with OCAs recommendation that complainant be sanctioned for filing thisunfounded complaint. Indeed, no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to

litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.[21]
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During the formal investigation, she admitted that she was absent when the eventtranspired on June 23, 2001,[22]which means that she has no personal and direct knowledge ofthe incident. Yet, in the verification portion of the complaint, she claimed that all the allegationstherein were true and correct of her own knowledge and belief.[23]Significantly, she also went torespondents office and apologized.

Human nature dictates that redress for a wrong done is ordinarily sought by the aggrievedwith zeal. Yet, it appears that it was more than eight (8) months after the incident thatcomplainant and Toyota-Davao filed this complaint against an alleged erring member of thebench. Verily, the delay militates against the veracity of their allegations.

Moreover, complainant filed the instant administrative case after Toyota-Davao lostpossession of the vehicle in favor of respondent and after she refused to settle the replevin suitshe filed against them. More specifically, the instant complaint was filed only on March 4, 2002or about eight (8) months after respondent filed the replevin case and secured the writ on July4, 2001. As the Investigating Justice fittingly observed, the timing couldnt be worse.[24]

The filing of the instant administrative complaint was not done in good faith. Incomplainants letter dated January 21, 2002,[25]she informed this Court about a similarcomplaint filed before the Judicial and Bar Council for the purpose of objecting to(respondents) application for appointment as Regional Trial Court in Midsayap, North Cotabatoor elsewhere. Clearly, this administrative case was filed not for the purpose of obtaining justiceto the aggrieved persons, however mistaken it may be, but for the sole purpose of degradingrespondents reputation and exposing her to public ridicule. This should not be countenanced.

In Retuya v. Gorduiz,[26]this Court penalized respondent-lawyer for filing a groundless suitagainst a former client in order to harass and embarrass her by suspending him from thepractice of law for six (6) months.

In Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. v. Bondad,[27]we affirmed the award of moraldamages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses imposed againstpetitioner for filing an unfounded suit in bad faith.

The fine of P10,000.00, as recommended by OCA, is commensurate under thecircumstances.

This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon erring membersof the bench. At the same time, however, the Court should not hesitate to shield them fromunfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration ofjustice. This Court could not be the instrument that would destroy the reputation of any memberof the bench, by pronouncing guilt on mere speculation.[28]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the administrative complaint against respondentJudge Lily Lydia A. Laquindanum, now Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Midsayap,Cotabato City, Branch 24, is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainant Mercedes G. Duduaco isFINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for having filed this baseless and unfounded suit.

SO ORDERED.
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Arnado vs Suarin

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantialevidence the allegations in his complaint. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalentto proof.[19]Atty. Dela Victoria failed to substantiate this burden. In stark contrast, Atty.Maloloy-on proved truthful her defense when she submitted a copy of the entire court recordsinvolving the criminal case against the Veranos,[20]including the certification[21]of Branch Clerkof Court Atty. Villariza that Atty. Dela Victoria did not file any motion to set bail and thecertification[22]of the MTCC Executive Judge Omelio that she did not arrogate unto herself, atany time in her capacity as clerk of court, the authority of determining the amount of bail to be

posted.

Culled from his very own complaint, it was the failure of Atty. Maloloy-on to apologizeto Atty. Dela Victoria that drove him to institute this administrative case, especially after beinglectured on why she could not accept his tendered cash bond. Obviously, he considered thisan affront, given that he is a former judge and has been engaged in the practice of law forthree (3) decades. Thus, he filed his complaint for alleged gross ignorance of the law, evenwithout competent evidence to support it.

We cannot overemphasize that a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administrationof justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its endsthe speedy, efficient,impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of finaljudgments. He should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethicalor improper practices that impede, obstruct, or prevent their realization, charged as he is withthe primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice by Canon12[23]of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[24] Although no person should be penalized forthe exercise of the right to litigate, this right must be exercised in good faith. A lawyer who filesan unfounded complaint must be sanctioned because as an officer of the court, he does notdischarge his duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of thejudiciary.[25]Such filing of baseless complaints is indeed contemptuous of the courts.[26]

Ordinarily, lawyers who file unfounded complaints are disciplined by imposing upon thema fine in an amount commensurate to the gravity of the offense to be determined by this Courtas the disciplining authority.[27] On various occasions, this Court has imposed a fine rangingfrom P2,000.00 toP5,000.00 for cases similar to the one at bench. In this case, the OCArecommends a fine of P2,000.00. We agree.

As to At ty. Dela Victoria's request for further investigation, the same must be denied,it having become moot under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, for filing his unfounded complaint against Atty. Maria Fe O. Maloloy-on, Atty. Alfonso L. Dela Victoria is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is meteda FINE of P2,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offensein the future shall be dealt with more severely. For having become moot because of thedismissal of his administrative complaint, the request of Atty. Dela Victoria for an investigationisDENIED.

SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented bythe Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs.HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting ordenying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor thestandard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply giventhe object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing ourjurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice

Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincingevidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.According to him, thisstandard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderanceof evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he isnot a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he isnot a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determinewhether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincingevidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISSthe petition. This case is REMANDEDto the trial court todetermine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing

evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediatedetention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C andadmitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principalevidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentencedto reclusion perpetua. 4

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in

evidence because of its illegal seizure. No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengotewas itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends thatthe testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should alsohave been disregarded by the trial court.

The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shallbe inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probablecause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable exceptupon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise asprescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissiblefor any purpose in any proceeding.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure isinadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.

There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we

here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm takenfrom him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit andmust therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the saidfirearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed tohim.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill ofRights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, theyallowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of therequirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence theyhad invalidly seized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim thathe was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in hispossession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did noteven discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-shortargument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to alawful arrest.

**Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of theprosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have beenconsidered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It isthe fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not anincident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest didnot come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless searchwas also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction andcommends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict thismalediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as thiscampaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the

protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. TheConstitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike againstany manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of theindividual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As JusticeHolmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that thegovernment should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate alaw to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against theaccused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he musttherefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant isACQUITTED. It is so ordered.


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Umil v Ramos

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

***3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by thepersons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of thePhilippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensedfirearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possessionat the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the

requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be baseduponprobable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arrestingofficers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing theoffense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong inthemselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.10A reasonablesuspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part ofthe peace officers making the arrest.11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which wasreceived by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to thesaid hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the woundedman in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barr io, Caloocan City; that based on thesame information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "RonnieJavellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna.12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPAmember ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, isdeemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by

circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital.The actual facts supported by circumstances are:firstthe day before, or on 31 January 1988,two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5)"sparrows" including Dural;second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "RonnieJavellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third asthe records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospitalrecords were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediateattention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion forreconsideration, 13believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to theeffect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from theattending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law,14and,therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith bythe officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural aredeemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumedto regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did notappear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant,an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was

filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). Hewas thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arrestingofficers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusionperpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As toAmelia Roqueand Wilfredo Buenaobra(G.R. Nos. 84581-82), DomingoAnonuevoand Ramon Casiple(G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya(G.R. No. 83162), theirarrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrantsissued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunitionin their persons. They were, therefore, caught inflagrante delictowhich justified their outrightarrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should bementioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed incourt against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpusby announcing to this Court

during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody ofthe authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "inflagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by aformer NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila andthat a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in theVillaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manilawas being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the saidhouse was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August1988,pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of thehouse was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then confronted

he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was aranking member of the CPP.16

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of RenatoConstantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was anNPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and othermembers of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest ofAmelia Roquewas a consequence of thearrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to thewhereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the militaryagents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and sheadmitted then that the documents belonged to her.18


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4. As regards Domingo Anonuevoand Ramon Casiplethey were arrestedwithout warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arr ived at the said house ofRenato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agentsfrisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in thelatter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when shearrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one BenitoTiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whosehouse was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time

of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence andInvestigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car ofOcaya.20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that thereason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was theinformation given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by RenatoConstantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for theiroperations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine andBenito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (ofRoque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmedthe belief of the military agents

that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probablyguilty of the commission of certain crimes:first: search warrant was duly issued to effect thesearch of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person namedRenato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in hispossession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of theirarrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversivedocuments, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades inthe organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the correspondinginformations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as inthe case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantinosafehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated orirregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an cansay that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made anyarrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause fordisciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in thehands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the ac tsconstituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishmenttherefor.21An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power toarrest without warrant is without limitation as long asthe requirements of Section 5, Rule 113are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in ourcommunities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with theconditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons

arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Notevidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers,in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrestwithout warrant.23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Underthe conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if thearrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are notliable. 24But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can beheld liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25for damages under Article 32 of the CivilCode 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R.No.85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basisof the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spokeat a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasissupplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the NationalPress Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepneyand bus drivers) on 23 November 1988.28Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not forsubversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, inthe perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as fallingwithin free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right toinsist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to freespeech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of thepeace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soonthereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviouslybecomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority butonly for purposes of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered thebail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritucase moot and academic.For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quofor re-investigation, the peaceofficers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quoat theresumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that atabout 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects inthe said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companionsduring the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the policeagents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without

warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to


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know that Nazareno was probably one of those guil ty in the killing of Bunye II and the arresthad to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite thelapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest withoutwarrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, asfollows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his ar rest without warrant), an

information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others,with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court ofMakati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No.731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but themotion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989,even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, ManuelLaureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpuswas filed with this Courton behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issuedthe writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the

case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the PresidingJudge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolutiondenying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said NarcisoNazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an informationfiled against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila whichliad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion forbail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength ofthe evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espirituand Nazareno,the correspondinginformations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based

on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions setforth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court aquofor murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment ofconviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. stillundocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds foradmissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

In the case of Buenaobra(G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. Onthe other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31that the unlicensed firearms,

ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged toher.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of theirmembership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitionsand documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records,strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers basedtheir arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrestedwere probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that thepersons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests werepredicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrantis not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs.Enrile, and Ilagan vs.Enrileshould beabandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this timeto disturb the same, particularly lnthe light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challengedperhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrestwithout warrant be tested as to its legality viahabeas corpusproceeding. This Court. willpromptly look intoand all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the samethe legalityof the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be orderedreleased; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in hisdetention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted,with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Partymember or a subversive is absolutely nota ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions,not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth inSection 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, areprobablecauseand good faithof the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the recordsshow, the actual facts and circumstancessupporting the arrests. More than the allure ofpopularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

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EVID CASES.docx