European Journal 2007 1

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Are innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures in policy

making democratic and effective?

YANNIS PAPADOPOULOS1 & PHILIPPE WARIN2

1University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 2CNRS/CERAT-PACTE, Grenoble, France

Abstract. The overall project aims to establish a dialogue between normative democratic

theory and research on policy formulation and implementation.This introductory article first

notes the growth of various participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making,

portrays the context of this growth and justifies the cases selected. It then presents the

conceptual framework used for the study of these procedures, which mainly draws on

participatory and deliberative democratic theory and the literature on the shift from

government to governance. Based on this conceptual framework, the article focuses on

four research questions the authors consider particularly important for the assessment of the

contribution of the devices under scrutiny to democratic and effective decision making:

questions of openness and access (input-legitimacy); questions regarding the quality of

deliberation (throughput); questions of efficiency and effectiveness (output-legitimacy);

and the issue of their insertion into the public space (questions of transparency and

accountability).

The context of the growth of participatory and deliberative procedures

in policy making

New participatory tools for policy making have been proliferating recently so

that today so-called communal activity (Verba et al. 1978) supplements tradi-

tional modes of democratic participation in several countries.1 Such innovations

include public inquiries, right-to-know legislation, citizen juries, policy dia-logues, impact assessment with public comment, regulatory negotiation, media-

tion and other kinds of third-party-facilitated conflict resolution (Dryzek 2000:

164). Weale (2001: 416417) distinguishes between deliberative opinion polls

where the participants form a representative sample, and devices involving

smaller groups like focus groups, consensus conferences or citizens juries.2

Labels vary in fact: consensus conferences are similar in their design to citizens

juries (and the same applies to German Planungszellen); policy dialogues in

Germany are frequently called Risikodialogen because they mainly deal with

the assessment and treatment of collective risks; mediation procedures are

called alternative dispute resolution or public conflict resolution, and so on.3

Most of these innovations can be subsumed under the label of democratic

experimentalism (Dorf & Sabel 1998) that is a complement to traditional

European Journal of Political Research 46: 445472, 2007 445

2007 The Author(s)

Journal compilation 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)

Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,

MA 02148, USA


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parliamentary and administrative policy making.4 They can be considered part

of what has been portrayed as a broader shift fromgovernment togovernance

that is, from vertical and hierarchical to more horizontal and cooperative

forms of steering. However, such a shift towards more stakeholder involve-

ment5 is primarily explained in functional terms by the imperatives of govern-

ability (output-side of legitimacy according to Scharpf (1970: 2128)), whereas

the mechanisms under scrutiny here may also aim in some cases at least to

remedy the deficiencies of representative democracy in terms of input-

legitimacy (as shown particularly in the article on Spanish citizens juries).

These innovations are increasingly introduced at different levels of

government, mainly to cope with political conflicts surrounding development

projects, siting-decisions, new technology, risk, environmental impacts, and the

distribution of the associated burdens and benefits (Holzinger 2001: 71). Inscientific and technological policies, for instance, participatory mechanisms are

considered suitable for different facets of risk-management: risk detection, risk

control, but also risk dramatisation (Joss & Durant 1995; Joss 1999; Rehmann-

Sutter et al. 1998; Vig & Paschen 2000). They are part of the public discussion

of science that is expected to make expertise more responsive to the public

and the public more enlightened through its participation both contributing

to the acceptance of policy choices (Weale 2001; Callon et al. 2001). In policies

entailing geographically concentrated costs, participatory governance schemesare set in the implementation phase (Renn et al. 1995; Papadopoulos 1998:

276ff; Kuebler 1999; Hunold 2000) to overcome local protest and the nimby

syndrome (Mazmanian & Morell 1994) against public bads (risk can be one

of their properties, but so can their cost, their ugliness, their social conse-

quences, etc.), and to insulate policy choices from irresponsible (e.g., narrowly

partisan) manipulation.6

The scope of these innovations has now extended to several policy areas,7

some of which are covered in this special issue. Although it would not bepossible to claim that the innovations studied here thoroughly mirror the

immense variety of experiences, we think that they are representative of the

most significant trends in contemporary advanced democracies. In fact, space

constraints prevented us from providing a wider sample of available proce-

dures, but we have selected from among the most widespread. Each article

refers to a different form of experiment located in a different European

country (all having consolidated democratic regimes). The chapters of this

special issue deal with:

Decisional arrangements implying network forms of collaborative

governance in various policy fields in Swiss agglomerations (D. Kbler &

B. Schwab).

446 yannis papadopoulos & philippe warin

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Local participatory devices involving associations and neighbourhood

councils in the nationally decided French politique de la ville

(Y. Sintomer & J. de Maillard).

Individual participatory experiments such as the nationwide deliberative

opinion poll on the Euro in Denmark (V. N. Andersen & K. Hansen) and

local citizens juries in Spain (J. Font & I. Blanco).8

The topicality of these issues should not cause us to forget that debate on

the role of citizens or social groups in the production of public decisions is

much older. For instance, claims about participatory urban regeneration, which

are central today in the debate on transformations of local democracy (Fung

2004; Booth & Jouve 2005), were central to social movements as early as in the

1960s (Bacqu et al. 2005). Or to take the example of the environment, ques-tioning of narrow economic thinking has been a constant feature of all Western

countries from the early 1960s as well. For decades, the crisis of confidence in

professional knowledge as well as the wish to solve environmental conflicts

without court action has spawned a number of rather top-down inspired

methods aimed at involving a wide diversity of actors in policy making from

the earliest possible stage on the basis of a win-win rationale. Examples in this

respect include working groups run by political parties in Sweden; public

hearings, citizen assessment committees or impact statement procedures in theUnited States; boards of inquiry in Canada; and referenda and scientific debate

on television in Austria. These methods have been far more attentive to

problem-setting than to puzzle-solving (Shon 1983), and some topical ques-

tions today have been on the environmental agenda for a long time the

environment being an area where the definition of priorities and the anticipa-

tion of future developments have always predominated. It is, moreover, inter-

esting that these approaches were often developed in contexts that were

hardly conducive to ideas of cooperation, solidarity or mutual aid.9

Theirsuccess derives primarily from the fact that the search for optimisation of

investments progressively led to a search for policy-making tools that contri-

bute to consensus and hence to the reduction of the conflict potential of

projects. Note in this respect that in the current debate on deliberative democ-

racy, key questions are: What is optimal deliberation?, and consequently:

What sorts of deliberation are best? as regards the possibility of reducing

conflict (Shapiro 2002).

These procedures are also related to a more general context in which

we witness concern to involve consumers or clients more fully in the

implementation or even definition of public services (Gilliat et al. 2000). The

development of new public management is often called upon to explain

the generalisation of these mechanisms to all Organisation for Economic

are innonative procedures in policy making democratic and effective? 447

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Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The co-production of

public policies attests to the quest for more effective political choices through

the establishment of participatory mechanisms. This theme, born in the United

States in the late 1970s in various approaches relative to the upsurge of the

service economy and service society (Fuchs 1968; Gartner & Riessman 1974),

was taken up and developed in the theory of public choices (Whitaker 1980).

It is currently present in debate on administrative reorganisation and the

measurement of public performance, with a focus on the key question of

transformation of the role of the state (in very different research perspectives,

e.g., Kooiman 1996; Gaster & Rutqvist 2000). In Europe, and particularly

Germany, the co-production model has enjoyed success both in theory and

practice because debate on social policies and public services has drawn atten-

tion to citizens role in the production of the public welfare (Wirth 1986). Thetheme of co-production of public policies has been addressed extensively by

administrative officials not only to find ways of improving the quality of

services, but also to implement budgetary restrictions. Other applications of

this model have concerned the restructuring of urban services, especially in the

United States and the United Kingdom (Savas 2002). National contexts also

have to be taken into account, and the new mechanisms created seem to be

strongly influenced by the pre-existing institutional contexts and political tra-

ditions.10 Precisely the polysemy of the notion of participation allows a con-vergence between quite different challenges to the bureaucratic state, such as

the neo-liberal and the new-left critique (Ansell & Gingrich 2003; Bacqu

et al. 2005).

Participatory devices are not only innovative to various degrees and embed-

ded in different contexts, they are also characterised by dissimilarities. Their

decisions when any are taken can be binding or merely consultative, and they

can emerge at different territorial levels or different stages of the policy cycle.

Their emergence is, however, dictated to a large extent by a common rationale.As argued by McLaverty (1999: 23), the promoters aims for such initiatives are

more instrumental than expressive in that they mainly wish to maximise com-

munity support for policies and improve the quality of decisions. And as the

editors of a volume on participatory policy making maintain:

[P]articipatory governance is definitely less a matter of democracy in the

sense of institutionalizing a set of procedures for electing those in charge

of the policy-making, than it is a kind of second best solution for

approaching the question of effective participation of the persons likely

to be affected by the policies designed. . . . [P]articipation can be effective

in the realisation of policy objectives because it can help to overcome

problems of implementation by considering motives and by fostering the


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willingness of policy addressees to comply as well as through the mobili-

sation of the knowledge of those affected. (Gbikpi & Grote 2002: 23)

The main assumption is that norms are legitimate only if they are based on

public reason-giving resulting from a process of inclusive and equitable delib-

eration, in which citizens can participate and in which they are prompted to

cooperate freely (Bohman 1996). This assumption is present in the practical

approaches developed in the United States and Europe to manage (or antici-

pate and avoid) environmental conflicts. It has been recycled in the procedures

implemented today in other areas, as shown by studies on public participation

based on the analysis of actor networks.11

In F. Scharpfs terms, participatory procedures are supposed to enhance

the output legitimacy of policy making by achieving decisions that are moreefficient, owing to the involvement of actors with much local or sectoral

knowledge.12 At the same time, their decisions are more likely to be effective,

owing to the involvement of strongly concerned stakeholders. Duran (1999),

for instance, notes that the more general shift that took place in France

during the last two decades of the twentieth century from a tutelary state to

partnership relations derived mostly from the obligation to obtain consent

for policies from the relevant target groups. Likewise, in the European

Union (EU), fostering participatory democracy was interpreted as a sign ofthe instrumental value attributed to nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)

by the Commission: [T]hey are held in high esteem because it is assumed

that they contribute to the formation of European public opinion, they

provide feedback so the Commission can adjust its policy, they contribute to

managing, monitoring and evaluating EU projects, and their involvement

helps to win acceptance (Kohler-Koch 2000: 525). Majones argument on the

reasons for the proliferation in Europe after the United States of non-

majoritarian institutions such as independent administrative agencies andregulatory bodies also applies to participatory procedures: In a world where

national borders are increasingly porous, the possibility of achieving policy

objectives by coercive means is severely limited; credibility, rather than the

legitimate use of coercion is now the most valuable resource of policy

makers (Majone 2000: 561). Regarding their functions, these mechanisms

are also expected to contribute to de-fundamentalising the positions of con-

flicting parties (Holzinger 2001: 72). To sum up, the procedures under scru-

tiny can be considered as being targeted to counteract (although not

necessarily in a similar way) some of the pressures that reduce the ability to

practise political steering effectively.

As we shall see below, whether or not participatory procedures do indeed

fulfil these functions, and are not, for instance, viewed by policy makers


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primarily as public relations exercises designed to legitimise decisions actu-

ally taken in other arenas, needs to be checked. However, because of their

participatory orientation, such innovations are also considered by political

theorists as democratic (Bohman & Rehg 1999; Dryzek 2000: 164), or as

forms of empowered deliberative democracy (Fung & Wright 2001).13

Hence, it is also expected that the direct involvement of people (or their

representatives) that are usually only policy takers will strengthen the input

legitimacy of democratic policy making, and at the same time inject more

throughput legitimacy by generating widespread beliefs about procedural

fairness. For that reason, each contribution in this special issue devotes par-

ticular attention to an assessment of the democratic content of the partici-

patory instruments.

The conceptual framework

The literature often tends to be somewhat idealistic as regards deliberation,

public consultation and democracy. It has only been in the past ten years, for

example, that normative theories of justice and positive theories of democracy

have started to move closer together (Saward 2003).14 Two normative schools of

thought have influenced the positive assessment of participatory mechanisms,probably motivated by a concern to identify experiments that would embody

their prescriptions: theories of participatory and of deliberative democracy.

Any normative theory of democracy privileges some specific conditions for

policy-making processes to be judged democratically legitimate. Participatory

and deliberative theories share a common target of improving legitimacy by

improving the quality of public life albeit by slightly different means.15

Participationists16 primarily believe not only that participation is highly valued

by the public, but also that public virtue is likely to arise from citizens sustainedand direct involvement in public affairs (irrespective of its forms, conventional

or not, etc.).Deliberationists17 focus more on the virtues of discussion leading

to choices that thus become more quiet, reflective, open to a wide range of

evidence, respectful of different views (Walzer 1999: 58). Other-regardingness,

associated with reflection, is considered a necessary ingredient of decision

making in plural societies.18 With few exceptions (see below) advocates of

deliberative democracy pay less attention to practical obstacles to inclusion,

problems of representation, and so on, in spite of their own undeniably strong

normative commitment to equality.They are more attentive to thethroughput

dimension of policy making, while participationists favour questions of open

access and care less about the refinement of preferences likely to occur among

participants through the deliberation process.


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It is therefore possible that these theories have competing objectives.

There is, for instance, a trade-off between democracy and deliberation

since the latter would only be possible in small circles (Fishkin 1991).19

As a result, participation and deliberation are not necessarily co-terminous:

deliberation might be inescapably elitist, while strong democracy at the mass

level would hardly be favourable to sustained deliberation.20 Fishkin, for

example, is a deliberationist who strongly disagrees with the increasingly

populist-majoritarian design of American political institutions. Like him

and unlike most participationists who do not break with an aggregative

though enlarged conception of democracy,21 few deliberationists would,

for instance, consider with much sympathy a mere extension of direct

democracy provisions without any safeguards to ensure the quality of

opinion formation, avoid the risk of majority tyranny, and so on.22 In areappraisal of their theory, for instance, two major deliberative theorists

(Gutmann & Thompson 2004: 7, 3031, 60) stress the need for public justi-

fication and reason-giving in decision making, and think at the same time

that the quality of deliberation may be better in representative, rather than

direct, democracy.

Nevertheless, participationist and deliberationist theories should not be

seen as strongly opposed: there are no controversies between advocates of

participatory and deliberative democracy similar to the theoretical clashesbetween participationists and elitists, or between deliberationists and advo-

cates of aggregative versions of democratic theory, with the former stressing

the need for reason-giving in decision making as opposed to sheer reliance

on voting procedures that are considered in the aggregative model as a suf-

ficient basis for decisional legitimacy. The participatory and the deliberative

school converge on the belief that existing democratic institutions should be

improved and supplemented by novel institutions (which should not merely

replace the existing ones: see Fishkin (1996); Smith (2000: 30); Saward(2003a)). However, participationists criticise principal-agent problems in

representative democracy, while deliberationists criticise the limited place of

public discussion in voting mechanisms. Deliberative theory claims to be a

more just and indeed democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggre-

gative or realist models of democracy. . . . Talk-centred democratic theory

replaces voting-centric democratic theory. Voting-centric views see democ-

racy as the arena in which fixed preferences and interests compete via fair

mechanisms of aggregation. In contrast, deliberative democracy focuses on

the communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede

voting (Chambers 2003: 308), or a deliberative approach focuses on quali-

tative aspects of the conversation that precedes decisions rather than on a

mathematical decision rule (Chambers 2003: 316).23


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Virtually no participationist thinker would dispute that associating more

ordinary people with political deliberations is necessary for their empower-

ment and for the governability of the political system.24 However, not all new

tools for policy making rely on the inclusion of lay people; depending on the

mechanism, even grassroots movements or local residents can be represented

by delegates.This can cause principal-agent problems between spokespersons

and their constituencies, with negative effects on both the input and the

output legitimacy of policy choices. Are the latter determined from below

(input)? If not, are they at least responsive to the wishes of the constituencies

(output)?

This is a problem increasingly addressed by another body of literature:

works on network governance. As noted above, these works emphasise the

proliferation of numerous cooperative schemes involving civil society actorsin policy making at local, national and now EU, transnational or multi

(i.e., involving actors of different territorial units) levels as opposed to classic

top-down steering by a government endowed with uncontested central author-

ity. Governance schemes take the form of partnerships, contracts, roundtables,

intergovernmental conferences, committees of various sorts and the like. Pref-

erence for this form of contextual steering (Kontextsteuerung; see Willke

1992) primarily results from the necessity to counteract the centrifugal dynam-

ics of interest fragmentation, along with recognition of the fact that the statelacks the necessary resources to carry out this task on its own. Like other

participatory devices, governance networks aim to enhance state resources in

terms of knowledge (learning about complex and uncertain causal relations),

organisation (ensuring adequate expertise and capacity to implement policy

choices) and authority (avoiding blackmailing by veto groups and inducing

compliance by policy takers) in policy making. It is expected that well-

designed and well-organised participation of stakeholders in the policy process

will favour a win-win logic because policies will be increasingly perceived asthe outcome of a co-production including their addressees. As a result, gov-

ernance networks not only include public actors (government officials and

state administrators) who can represent different territorial levels, but also

experts and representatives of interest groups (business groups, life-

style communities, etc., depending on the policy area). Finally, governance by

networks presupposes an accommodative orientation among participants, who

are expected to demonstrate an inclination for compromise-seeking instead of

engaging in conflictual relations, and possibly a shared willingness to learn

from one another that may induce participants to behave in a deliberative

manner.

The literature on governance arrangements has gradually shifted from a

focus primarily on managerial considerations (are these arrangements func-


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tional for steering?) to a deeper concern with issues of democracy, partici-

pation and representation and to more scepticism as to the actual

achievement of these goals.25 Horizontality in fact means cooperation

between actors that count, or to add yet another step in terms of selec-

tivity cooperation between the leaderships of collective organised actors.

As such, it is not tantamount to the inclusion of ordinary citizens and there-

fore not necessarily conducive to genuine democratisation. As Andersen and

Burns (1996: 229) argue with regard to what they call post-parliamentary

governance:

In these specialised policy settings, the democracy of individual citizens

tends to be replaced by a de facto democracy of organised interests,

lobbies and representatives of organisations (and movements) thatengage themselves in policy areas and issues that are of particular

concern. In other words, the system of post-parliamentary governance

tends increasingly to be one of organisations, by organisations and for

organisations. Expert sovereignty tends to prevail over popular sovereignty

or parliamentary sovereignty. (emphasis in original)26

To sum up, we pursue two major goals in this special issue. First, we wish to

contribute towards establishing dialogue between the more normative litera-ture on participation, deliberation, new forms of democracy, and so on, and the

analytical literature on policy formulation and implementation (steering,

governance, networks, partnerships, etc.). And second, we test the conclu-

sions of these bodies of theory on concrete experiments, and particularly

regarding their contribution to democratic and effective decision making, as

highlighted by their openness and access (input-legitimacy), the quality of

their deliberative activity (throughput), their impact (output) and ulti-

mately their insertion in the public space (issues of transparency and account-ability).We thus hope, through case studies nourished by theoretical reflection,

to contribute to cumulative knowledge by providing additional tests not only

of theories of deliberative and participatory democracy, but also of theories of

the policy process that emphasise the virtues of concerted policy making for

governability.

The case studies of participatory mechanisms presented here examine

the extent to which such procedures keep their promises with respect to

the above-mentioned forms of legitimacy, and whether they face some

limitations. In particular, we asked the authors dealing with individual

experiments to address a common set of questions on the basis of criteria

drawn mainly from the literature on participatory policy making and policy

deliberation. These case studies provide several interesting responses to


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these questions, even though, due to limitations in the available em-

pirical evidence, not all questions are always extensively covered in all

articles.

Referring in her account of deliberative democratic theory to Gutmann

and Thompsons work, Chambers (2003: 316) writes:

In designing and proposing deliberative forums, scholars generally have

four goals in mind: to augment legitimacy through accountability and

participation; to encourage a public-spirited perspective on policy issues

through cooperation; to promote mutual respect between parties through

inclusion and civility; and to enhance the quality of decisions (and opin-

ions) through informed and substantive debate.27

Clearly, these goals can be formulated in a different ordering or can even

conflict with each other: if legitimacy cannot be acquired through participa-

tion, then accountability of delegated authorities can be a substitute; mutual

respect, public-spiritness and cooperation seem to be interrelated (even

though cooperation can also be achieved by egoistic actors for strategic

reasons); inclusion does not necessarily lead to civility; good quality debate

has no necessary impact on decisions, and so on. To assess more specifically

citizens juries, Smith and Wales (2000) use the criteria of inclusiveness, thequality of deliberation and empowered citizenship. While the first criterion

refers to inputs and the second to throughput (procedures and substance of

deliberation), it is hard to operationalise the third (a kind of long-term

outcome?). Hunold (2000) also uses inclusiveness, and adds equality and

publicity. We propose to include considerations of the impact of participatory

procedures on decision making (output) as well, as this is important for the

assessment of their political relevance.28 Normative political theory claims

that deliberative forms of stakeholder participation in policy making aremore adequate in dealing with these four basic aspects than pure aggregative

models of decision that tend to underplay normative and practical problems

resulting from power inequalities (the fictitious character of the one man,

one vote adage), elite autonomy, a narrowly utilitarian view of actors pref-

erences considered to be given and fixed, and so on. Participatory theories

emphasise inclusiveness as a condition for policy effectiveness and legiti-

macy, deliberative theories stress the importance of public discussion for the

same purpose, and both theories are sensitive to issues of transparency and

accountability. Therefore four types of questions are central to this thematic

issue: questions of openness and access; questions of the quality of delibera-

tion; questions of efficiency and effectiveness; and questions of publicity,

transparency and accountability.


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who have to concert with each other and at the same time consider the

preferences of their constituencies.

Quality of deliberation

Classic theory of representation (Burke, Madison) viewed deliberation as a

necessary step in the formation of individuals preferences. Contemporary

political theory also attaches a number of improvements to the deliberative

process. Deliberation is expected to contribute to competent policy making

through reflection and, as far as possible, to consensual decisions. It should

help to improve understanding of problems and of alternative solutions, and

thus to reduce bounded rationality. It should also help people to become aware

of possible contradictions between the objectives they would like to achieve,and thus to clarify the reasons for their preferences and to rank them better

(Fearon 1998: 4952; Manin 1985: 8284).

The belief that actors have learning capacities and, moreover, are willing to

engage in learning processes is central for proponents of deliberative deci-

sional formulas that are considered to play an educative role. Hence, not only

is deliberation expected to clarify peoples preferences; it is also expected to

help them to acquire information on others preferences and to take account

of others needs and interests (Benhabib 1996: 7172; Cohen & Rogers 1995:256; Hunold & Young 1998: 87).34 Deliberation should also enhance mutual

respect and recognition because participants are forced to think of what

would count as a good reason for all others involved in, or affected by, the

decisions under discussion (Cooke 2000: 950). Exchange of arguments and

discussion on them thus aim at producing shared collective meaning;35 they are

conducive to mutual understanding, if not to full consensus (Warren 2002:

184185).36 Deliberation is also deemed favourable to the acquisition of a

stronger sense of community, which is all the more important considering thatmodern fragmented societies experience centrifugal forces likely to under-

mine solidarity and cohesion. Deliberation and participation are therefore

believed to spawn virtuous citizens an idea on which all theses in favour of

these mechanisms are based, and that international institutions seeking good

governance tools honour (EU, IMF, WB, OECD, etc.). In this way, citizens

participating in deliberative procedures can be asked to do what voters can

supposedly no longer be expected to do that is, be encouraged to learn

enough to be able to vote for their interests intelligently (Hardin 2002: 212).

Of course it is not at all sure that the deliberative ideal will prevail. Moreover,

even though strategically minded actors can also learn through deliberation to

behave more argumentatively, after having deliberated at length without

reaching a consensus, actors might prefer for reasons of time and energy saving


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(reduction of transaction costs) to agree on mutual compromises (Benz 1994:

112168).Although such compromises should not be viewed as less noble than

consensus achieved through deliberation (Mansbridge 2003), they clearly

reflect the balance of forces, not the weight of arguments (Walzer 1999: 62).

Strategic bargaining as opposed to persuasion or to argumentative problem

solving (Scharpf 1991) is therefore also of relevance here.37 Oebergs (2002)

work on Swedish administrative corporatism lends some support to the thesis

that governance networks operate along deliberative rather than bargaining

principles, while Holzinger (2001a), using discourse analysis techniques, tests

whether mediation procedures operate along deliberative lines or whether

bargaining prevails. Benz (1994) invites us to consider the sequence of the

policy process as an explanatory variable. Elgstroem and Joensson (2000: 701)

were able to test some other hypotheses on the conditions favouring delibera-tive problem solving within the comitology procedures in the EU.They express

reservations on the alleged role of deliberation: the level of politicisation of

decisions has to be low, deliberation mostly takes place at the preparatory and

implementation (as opposed to the decisional) phases of the policy cycle, and

redistributive or constituent issues are not suitable for it.38 Whether actors in

participatory mechanisms behave according to deliberative principles is thus

an empirical question.

Efficiency and effectiveness

One of the alleged properties of the procedures under scrutiny is that they will

improve the quality of outputs in several respects, although not to the same

extent. Governance networks, for instance, often make de facto binding deci-

sions, which is not true for deliberative polls mainly because, unlike elected

representatives accountable to their constituencies, their participants lack

authorisation (Parkinson 2003: 192193).In conditions of uncertainty and complexity, stakeholders involvement

increases the chances of policy acceptance. Furthermore, stakeholders contrib-

ute their local or sectoral knowledge, which can be of help in preventing causal

errors in policy choices that, in turn, are likely to impede goal achievement,

generate perverse effects and so on. This is an important component of the

contribution of participatory tools to policy efficiency, but not the only one. In

fragmented societies, ordinary majoritarian procedures can result in choices

made by ill-informed majorities, causing prejudice to minorities whose intense

preferences are thus violated (Guggenberger 1984;Scharpf 1999) for instance,

socially stigmatised groups (Waelti et al. 2004). Moreover, as suggested by

the literature on neo-corporatism considered as a governability device, elec-

toral competition can engender over-promising and short-term calculations


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(Lehmbruch 1977). By contrast, consultation between the relevant interests

(Kontextsteuerung) is expected to lead to more responsible and sustainable

(i.e., more fact-, other-, and future-regarding (Offe & Preuss 1991)) decisions

or proposals for decisions.39 This assumption should, however, also be scruti-

nised.The literature on distributive coalitions and rent-seeking (Olson 1982)

mostly driven by a Madisonian view of the role of organised interests

(suspicious of factionalism) rather than by a Tocquevillian view that would

instead emphasise the positive role of the intermediate system for citizens

empowerment and control over the government40 teaches us that rational

participants in decisional circles will be tempted by their particularistic capture

that is, they will seek to maximise benefits of policy choices and externalise

costs to actors excluded from them (Benz 1998: 206; Pierre & Peters 2000: 20).

It is therefore necessary to clarify whether the bodies under considerationreally enhance the overall support for policy outputs by the population, or

whether acceptance is limited to participants. This again raises the problem of

the consequences (this time on the output side) of limited participation. Do the

specific forms of participation under scrutiny actually contribute to broader

policy acceptance and, as a result, to more effective policy making (as argued

in general by works on implementation and on responsive evaluation)? As

noted above, another property of these tools is their alleged contribution to

conflict resolution, be it through deliberation (conducive to consensus) orthrough bargaining (conducive to compromises). This is debatable too: among

the major theorists of deliberative democracy, Gutmann and Thompson (1996)

think that (consensual) discursive agreement is hard to reach on moral issues.

In fact, if discussion can effectively reveal private information about peoples

preferences on policy outcomes, then there is no reason why in particular cases

it might not reveal that the extent of conflict is greater than previously

believed (Fearon 1998: 57; see also Ferejohn 2000: 85).

Empirical evidence on these issues can hardly be considered conclusive.The alternative dispute resolution literature, for example, concentrates for

the most part on what happens inside participatory procedures, while external

factors likely to influence consensus or conflict (such as alternatives available

to participants, restrictions on solutions set by their constituencies, political

directives, etc.) are not given systematic attention. Holzinger (2001: 93),

however, maintains that no negotiation or discursive procedure, regardless of

how well it otherwise progresses, can overcome exogenous restrictions and

better outside options. Such restrictions not only have an impact upon access

to, and influence within, participatory forums, they also condition the actors

behaviour in them and, consequently, their collective outputs and the extent of

the overall support for those outputs. Even if internal cohesion in these forums

is achieved, its effects will have to be qualified if some relevant, albeit more


2007 The Author(s)



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weakly organised interests, are excluded. We should consider in that respect

that consensus is not valued among all deliberationists because it can be

criticised as the outcome of strategic action and symbolic manipulation (Smith

& Wales 2000: 63 n.; Young 2000: 4344). It can be perceived as an impediment

to critical dialogue by powerful interests that dominate the agenda and wish to

veil the interests of the weaker (Sanders 1997; Mansbridge 2003: 183).

The actual impact of these procedures on policy choices must also be

assessed because they can result from motivations typical of symbolic politics

leading to participatory window-dressing (Fung & Wright 2003a: 265).

Blondiaux (2005: 126), for instance, criticises the fetichism of rhetorics of

proximity in official political discourses. Participatory and deliberative pro-

cedures are useful tools for public relations exercises, where good gover-

nance and deliberative democracy become catchwords manipulated bypolitical elites (Blondiaux & Sintomer 2002). Their implementation allows

rulers to show that they are willing not only to deal with crucial issues, but also

to associate the profane in decision making. As argued recently by Bernard

Manin (2002: 41), whose pioneering article on normative political theory

(Manin 1985, 1987) became one of the major points of reference for the

deliberationist school: It seems that deliberative democracy became an ide-

ology whose presence is noticed as a social phenomenon in several sectors, and

in particular in the implementation of public policies (our translation fromFrench).41 Whether practice corresponds to discourse depends on the more or

less reflexive devices used for conflict management, and must again be

empirically established. According to a path dependence hypothesis, involve-

ment of non-public actors in polities with a strong state is very likely to be

mere window-dressing instrumentalised by politicians (for an example from

French local economic development policies, see Taiclet 2006). In such cases,

one can hardly consider these procedures as effective in terms of actual policy

implementation. Similarly, path dependence theory also suggests that policychoices that are objects of deliberation in participatory forums are locked in

chains of past choices and therefore not easily reversible (Barthe 2002).

Finally, one could argue that after all it does not make much sense to assess

the impact on the decisional system of procedures that were not designed for

that purpose, such as most citizens juries and above all deliberative polls

although Saward (2003a) makes some interesting proposals for integrating

them into specific phases of decision making. Rather, their effectiveness could

be assessed by checking the extent to which they achieve their own proclaimed

aims, such as the improvement of the political skills of their participants or

even of the citizenry at large. As suggested by participatory theory, participa-

tion in such mechanisms is expected to create a virtuous feedback in the future,

and is therefore deemed to produce its effects in the long run.


2007 The Author(s)



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Publicity and accountability

Institutionalisation of participatory procedures is another dimension to be

considered, and one that may be independent from their effectiveness: proce-

dures can be institutionalised, but merely play a symbolic role; and they can be

effective, but weakly institutionalised. Are procedures formalised or ad hoc?

This is an important question that is often overlooked by the relevant litera-

ture (e.g., works on governance by networks focus more on the latters rela-

tional properties than on the processes of their institutionalisation in codified

procedures: committees, etc.). In fact, procedural visibility which is strongly

correlated with institutionalisation is a key condition for accountability.42 The

extent to which accountability channels are associated with these procedures

must also be discussed especially if these mechanisms have an influence onlegally binding decisions. It cannot be asserted as a principle that, because the

procedures under scrutiny are participatory or imply consultation of wider

interests, they satisfy criteria of accountability as well. Governance arrange-

ments, for instance, are oriented towards cooperative decision making; yet at

the same time effective cooperation can more easily take place in oligarchic,

non-transparent and selective political structures (Benz 1998: 212).

The issue of the (more or less loose or tight) coupling of new policy-making

tools with the well-institutionalised processes of representative democracy(perhaps also in a country like Switzerland with direct democracy) also has to

be examined (Van Eeten 2001: 424). These procedures may, for example,

contribute to governability (policy implementation, conflict resolution, etc.),

although that could be problematic if they become substitutes for legitimate

democratic procedures (and problematic not only in normative terms, because

the procedures will in all likelihood be challenged by those dissatisfied with

their outcomes). This is not so much the case for deliberative opinion polls or

citizens juries that are usually limited to a consultative role, but can be true fornetwork forms of governance. Although actors in these networks are not

authorised as a rule to make firm decisions, they can acquire such a crucial

influence on policy choices that formally authorised bodies like parliaments

will not really be able to challenge their options.Thus if these procedures tend

to replace in practice the influence of the demos exerted through its elected

representatives by group influence tied to sectoral or local expertise, this is

likely to engender legitimacy problems.A crucial problem is that of the uneasy

coupling of decisional arenas that operate under different principles of legiti-

mation:43 deliberation and negotiation between (sometimes collective) stake-

holders in participatory procedures versus competition for authorisation in the

representative circuit. These neglected problems have received more interest

recently in the literature on network governance (Benz 1998, 2000; Pierre


2007 The Author(s)



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2000; Pierre & Peters 2000; Rhodes 1997), although without much empirical

research so far.They are of particular relevance if we do not take it for granted

(see above) that deliberation and negotiation between stakeholders neces-

sarily yield outputs that are beneficial to the public interest. If this is uncertain,

then participatory procedures must be all the more subject to ex ante autho-

risation and act under the shadow of ex post control.

Acknowledgements

The title of this special issue alludes to Fritz W. Scharpfs (1999) book on

European governance with democracy preceding effectiveness, however.

For his or her insightful critical comments and very useful suggestions forimprovement, we are indebted to an anonymous reviewer of EJPR.

Notes

1. Communal activity combines two types of activity: individual contacts by citizens with

government officials where the subject of that contact is some general social issue, and

cooperative, non-partisan activities involving group or organizational attempts to deal

with some social issue. Such activity is outside of the regular electoral process. It conveysa great deal of information to leaders. The amount of pressure depends on the influence

of the participating individual or group (Verba et al. 1978: 54).

2. For a synthesis of the consequences of minipublics (participatory devices implicating

rather a small number of individuals) on participation, information, civic education,

efficiency and justice in policy, consequences that depend on the forms of their design,

see Fung (2003).

3. Participatory governance networks at the local level are added here (see below), as

could experiments made possible by the Net, such as electronic voting that raises specific

problems (e.g., the digital divide: Norris (2000), or privatisation of the vote: Barber

(1995)) but that alone would require a special issue.4. For Dorf and Sabel (1998), democratic experimentalism implies a sophisticated frame-

work where local deliberative units transfer their experiences to a governance council

in charge of coordination a property that is often missing in the local experiences. Its

major task is to enhance learning across deliberative units through formulation of best

practice standards. Parliaments are expected to facilitate experimentalism through del-

egation and bureaucracies can act as further learning instances.

5. In so-called multilevel governance, along with governmental and administrative units

of different territorial levels, all sorts of NGOs, groups and even private firms are

associated to the formulation or the implementation of collectively binding decisions.

The literature on governance has rapidly grown: among the major recent books, seeKjaer (2004), Kooiman (2003), Pierre (2000), Pierre & Peters (2000).

6. Kuebler (1999) convincingly holds that discursive devices were established in the imple-

mentation of Swiss drug policy to curb the risk of the nimby syndrome being exploited

by anti-establishment parties who found fertile soil for their claims in local opposition.


2007 The Author(s)



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7. See Goss (1999), Lowndes et al. (2001), OECD (2001) and Smith (2005), where a variety

of experiments in different countries are presented.

8. The articles on Switzerland, Denmark and Spain are thoroughly revised versions of

papers presented by their authors to an ECPR workshop directed by the special issue

editors on Governance and Democratic Legitimacy (Grenoble joint sessions, 611April 2001). The co-authored article on France was commissioned by the editors to two

French specialists who presented distinct papers at the ECPR workshop.

9. E.g., it was during the Reagan period that the collaborative approach was developed in

the United States, inspired by ideas of Kropotkine, the early twentieth-century anarchist

geographer. With this approach, an alternative to court action (increasingly frequent,

costly and slow) is presented for environmental conflicts. Above all, this approach allows

consensus on the way of addressing environmental problems on which the federal

government has no specific policy, while public opinion is more and more mobilised on

these issues. For examples of collaborative dialogues in policy making in California, see

Innes & Booher (2003).10. Concerning, e.g., the influence of direct democracy and of traditions of power-sharing in

Switzerland, see Linder (1994: 8596).

11. For the French case, which is an element of a more global approach, see Warin & La

Branche (2005).

12. Fischer (2000) is an example of work that emphasises the positive contribution of lay

knowledge to policy making.

13. Referring to five reforms that they present, Fung and Wright (2001: 7) argue: Although

these five reforms differ dramatically in the details of their design, issue areas and scope,

they all aspire to deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in

and influence policies that directly affect their lives. Apart from this special issue of

Politics & Society (29(1), March 2001) edited by A. Fung and E.O. Wright (and subse-

quently expanded into a book with additional commentaries: Fung & Wright 2003) with

the normative aim to establish Real Utopias (such concerns are not central to our

undertaking and we are instead more concerned with possible problems and limits of

innovative experiments), case study monographs on procedures similar to those studied

in this issue are still scant. Some can be found in Khan (1999); McLaverty (2002); Bacqu

et al. (2005); Gastil & Levine (2005). For a more critical approach, see the special issue

ofPolitix on Limpratif dlibratif (Blondiaux & Sintomer 2002). The discussion has

now spread over to the transnational level as attested by the special issue of Governance(January 2003) edited by M. Verweis and T.E. Josling and entitled Deliberately Democ-

ratizing Multilateral Organization.

14. See, e.g., the special issue of the Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(2), June 2002, which

launched the series Philosophy, Politics and Society.

15. Clearly these are not the only schools of thought in political science preoccupied with

the impact of participation on the quality of democracy. One simply needs to think of the

prescriptions drawn (including by governance bodies like the World Bank) from

research on social capital (Putnam 1993, 2000), or the normative concerns of commu-

nitarian political thinkers (Etzioni 1993, 1995).

16. Classic works of contemporary theory are Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984), butseveral others point in the same direction, including Bachrach & Botwinick (1992) and

Berry (1989). Budge (1996) is a participatory approach of direct democracy, and De

Leon (1997) of policy making. Some variants emphasise the role of organised societal

actors like theories of associative democracy (Hirst 1994; Cohen & Rogers 1995), and


2007 The Author(s)



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others the diffusion of democratic institutions and practices in new fields (economy,

education, etc.): see Gould (1988); Graham (1986).

17. It is again impossible to quote the abundant literature, which is frequently inspired by

Jrgen Habermass (1984, 1993) arguments on communicative action, and whose con-

clusions and prescriptions are not always concordant. To mention but a few: Chambers(1996); Dryzek (2000); Gutmann & Thompson (1996, 2004), and numerous contributions

in edited volumes: Benhabib (1996); Bohman & Rehg (1999); Elster (1998); Macedo

(1999).

18. This is the reciprocity condition of deliberation as stated by Gutmann and Thompson

(1996) that requires reasonableness from actors (Young 2000). In the flourishing lit-

erature on deliberation, not all authors agree on its properties, and in practice there

might be incompatibilities between some of its ideal dimensions (e.g., publicity that is

advocated by authors concerned with transparency can generate demagogy and thus be

inimical to argumentative rationality).

19. Unfortunately, examples do not abound in the literature on deliberative democracy andthe few empirical pieces are often so strongly driven by normative concerns that one

should be sceptical about their optimistic conclusions. On the lack of concretisation of

theories of deliberative democracy, see Abromeit (2002). For a few exceptions, see Eder

et al. (1997); Elgstroem & Joensson (2000); Fischer (2000); Holzinger (2001a); Hunold &

Young (1998); Joerges & Neyer (1997); Oeberg (2002).

20. Ackerman and Fishkins (2002) proposal for a deliberation day that would reconcile

deliberation with mass participation is considered by the authors themselves as utopian.

21. Participationists usually favour more voting procedures, either by introducing referenda

on political issues or by introducing elections of representatives in traditionally non-

political spheres (in private companies, the education system, etc.).

22. See, e.g., Marx Ferree et al. (2002) for a comparison of conceptions of the public space

in theories of participatory and deliberative democracy.

23. It has however been asserted that the incompatibility between the aggregative and the

deliberative approach to democracy has been exaggerated (see Saward 2003a: Note 10).

E.g., although Chambers (2003: 308) also argues that through the central role conferred

to justification in deliberative theory, accountability replaces consent as the conceptual

core of legitimacy; accountability is crucial for aggregative theories, too, through the

central role conferred to the anticipation by decision makers of the retrospective vote of

their constituencies, that forces them to behave in a responsive way. And consent isexpected to occur in deliberative theories, too, as the result of mutual learning and

persuasion. The co-existence of accountability and consent as sources of legitimacy

appears in consent being expressed in electoral support (input-legitimacy) and in

support being in turn generated by convincing public justifications of incumbents about

their action (output-legitimacy).

24. These can be viewed, respectively, as bottom-up and top-down perspectives on par-

ticipation (Papadopoulos 1995).

25. Interestingly, R. Mayntz, together with F. Scharpf one of the leading figures of the school

of Akteur-zentrierter Institutionalismus, which is authoritative in Germany in the field

of research on Steuerung, provided a short intellectual history of studies of governance(Mayntz 1997) where she showed that they were strongly practice-oriented initially and

aimed above all at preventing policy failures in top-down planning processes. One of the

editors of this special issue addressed elsewhere the democratic question raised by

cooperative forms of policy making (Papadopoulos 2003; Benz & Papadopoulos 2006).


2007 The Author(s)



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26. Furthermore, it should be noted (although this is not the object of this special issue) that

similar concerns regarding the democratic quality of policy-making procedures are

raised about expert regulatory bodies that are becoming increasingly important in

Europe, too (Majone 1996), such as central banks, administrative agencies, commissions

and boards operating outside the oversight of democratically elected governments.In that case, the question is Who regulates the regulators? (Rhodes 2000: 359). One

should not overestimate, however, the cohesiveness of expert advice (Dumoulin et al.

2005).

27. See also the section Why is Deliberative Democracy Better than Aggregative Democ-

racy?by Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 1321) where they expose in more detail these

four points (and also emphasise the advantages of deliberation in terms of learning).

28. The decisional impact of participatory procedures is seldom a subject of discussion in the

literature. E.g., Saward (2000), which is a theoretically well-informed volume on related

subjects, favours issues of participation and deliberation over the output dimension.

29. See the literature on mass behaviour about political stratification. Usually critiques onparticipatory devices have an elitist flavour; see, however, the ground-breaking study of

town meetings by Mansbridge (1983), the issue of class power in Latin American

countries raised by Huber et al. (1997), and the discussion in Papadopoulos (2001a).

Empirical evidence does not always confirm the thesis of the selectivity of participation

in such bodies: see the contributions in Politics & Society (29(1), March 2001), and in

Jouve & Gagnon (2005). Institutional design can explicitly aim to safeguard represen-

tativity as in deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin 1996); see also some interesting

attempts to produce representative samples in citizens juries in France (Boy et al. 2000:

783, 803) and in Germany (Sintomer 2005).

30. See Olsons (1965) famous paradox of collective action: broad interests are more diffi-cult to organise than narrow interests.

31. Holzinger (2001a) lists a number of reasons that can make some actors opt for less

deliberative alternatives instead of joining mediation procedures.

32. Cohen and Rogers (2003: 248249) write:[A]ctors with sufficient power to advance their

aims without deliberating will not bother to deliberate. . . . Equally, if parties are not

somehow constrained to accept the consequences of deliberation, if exit options are

not foreclosed, it will be implausible that they will accept the discipline of joint reason-

ing (see also Ferejohn 2000: 80, 84).

33. For a synthesis, see Bendor et al. 2001.34. Through the process of public discussion with a plurality of differently opinioned and

situated others, people often gain new information, learn of different experiences of

their collective problems, or find that their own initial opinions are founded on prejudice

or ignorance, or that they have misunderstood the relation of their own interests to

others (Young 2000: 26, 115120).

35. Specialists of the role of ideas in policy making such as Jobert and Muller (1987) call

this a rfrentiel global that would make the synthesis between various rfrentiels

sectoriels.

36. See also Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 2629), who distinguish between consensual

and pluralist conceptions of deliberation.37. Persuasion . . . involves changing peoples choices of alternatives independently of their

calculations about the strategies of other players. People who are persuaded . . . change

their minds for reasons other than a recalculation of advantageous choices in light of

new information about others behaviour. . . . Unlike bargaining on the basis of specific


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reciprocity, persuasion must appeal to norms, principles and values that are shared by

participants in a conversation (Keohane 2002: 341; emphasis added).

38. Pollack (2003: 138) also finds that deliberation is much more likely to occur within

comitology committees on issues where there is uncertainty about policy effects (e.g.,

risk management) than when national delegates have clear preferences, as is the rule forredistributive policies (e.g., in the EU structural funds).

39. For a similar categorisation of individual preferences (more considered, empathetic and

far-reaching), see Goodin (2003: 7).

40. See the discussion on the role of associations by Fung (2003a).

41. There is indeed a parallel to be drawn between the success of participatory and delib-

erative conceptions of democracy in political theory and the diffusion of participatory

recipes with much ambiguity and variation as to their content in policy-making

practice (their deliberative component is less strongly emphasised in practical dis-

courses). However, no empirical studies are available to our knowledge that would

substantiate causal mechanisms between evolutions in the scientific and in the political-administrative system (e.g., the influence on policy practice of experts familiar with

developments in current democratic theory), especially as there are but few actors

participating in both systems (Bacqu et al. 2005a: 42). The article by Yves Sintomer and

Jacques de Maillard in this special issue briefly addresses this point with respect to the

French politique de la ville (role of policy evaluations, etc.). The growth of participatory

procedures is particularly striking in local development projects within less developed

countries, where it is part of broader managerial attempts for good governance (as

opposed to partisan and bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption), in all likelihood

favoured by the weakness of traditional democratic institutions (Bacqu et al. 2005b:

304) (see, e.g., the IDS (Institute of Development Studies) Bulletin, 35(2), April 2004,entitled New Democratic Spaces?). Yet initiatives more strongly oriented towards

empowerment exist too, such as the widely publicised participatory budget in Porto

Alegre (Brazil).

42. Accountability of course also requires in a deliberative perspective that decision

makers be constrained to give reasons for their choices to target groups and to the

citizenry at large. This means that the policy takers have adequate resources to credibly

threaten decision makers with sanctions if they do not behave in a responsive manner.

43. For a very sensitive assessment of problems related to incongruence between different

logics of action coupled together in policy-making processes, see Lehmbruch (1999: 403).

For an illustration of problems of coupling between direct and representative democracy

in Switzerland, see Papadopoulos (2001).

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