Europe to Britain: Our Patience is Running Out Tim Oliver Non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS HUFFINGTON POST Posted: 02/10/2014 11:04 BST Updated: 02/10/2014 11:59 BST http://www.hufÞngtonpost.co.uk/tim-oliver/brexit_b_5913296.html The E.U. values Britain's membership and a "Brexit" would be felt across Europe and around the world. But Britain is not indispensable. If faced with a choice the E.U. comes Þrst, Britain second. Once again Europe has found itself transÞxed by British politics. Scotland's independence referendum raised unease across Europe, whether it was Spanish worries about Catalan independence or German concerns an independent Scotland would carry on Britain's habit of demanding special E.U. opt-outs. But one concern registered everywhere: that a Scottish exit from the U.K. might make a British exit from the E.U. more likely. Almost all debate about a Brexit is about what it would mean for Britain. Y et a Brexit would h ave big - but largely un explored - implications for the E.U. and Europe's place in the world. A recent compilation of research from 26 countries from across Europe and countries such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, China, Singapore and Brazil has shed light on European and international thinking about where U.K.-E.U. relations are headed. The message for Britain is hardly positive. Britain's European debate does not pass unnoticed. But understanding of the nuanes of the debate varies from country to country. While nobody is planning for a Brexit, many feel p lans may become necessary because Britain's debate increaingly seems detached and closed to outside inßuence. Nobody is under any illusions that a Brexit would be an unprecedented and damaging experience for the E.U. and Europe. It is the U.K., however, that many feel would be the most damaged. Views of Britain's behaviour are framed more by the wider concerns facing the E.U., especially the Eurozone. While the catchwords of the U.K.'s reform agenda for the E.U. - competitiveness, ßexibility , democracy - resonate a cross the E.U., the rea l pressure for reform comes from those rescuing the Eurozone. Countries within the Euro zone, Euro pre-in countries such as Poland and Sweden, and even Denmark with its opt-out, have focused on Germany and France for leadership. Despite its efforts, London is seen as a bystander and at times an additional hurdle. T oo often Britain misunderstands initiatives that seem to align with the U.K.'s own hopes. States such as the Netherlands and Germany seek a better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity, not London's aims for repatriation. A multispeed E.U. is considered a possibility, but not - as the U.K. might hope - in a pick-and-choose fashion. There is increasingly less appetite in Brussels for "third ways" like Switzerland. For other E.U. member states, London's proposals, while tempting in the short-term, are not seen as sustainable in the longer run as they could leave the E.U. weak and divided. This does not mean nobody worries about losing the U.K. Almost every state worries about losing Britain's free-market, liberal outlook. Y et some countries note a growing "mercantilist" attitude in British thinking. Some countries traditionally close to the U.K. also note a decline in economic links, and some are clear they would seek to exploit the economic opportunities that could arise from Britain's marginalisaiton. Britain can forget any hope of securing a withdrawal deal which allows it to undercut the E.U. States outside the E.U. fear the economic disruptions of a Brexit, and dread the E.U. becomming more inward looking.
Europe to Britain: Our Patience is Running Out
Tim Oliver Non-resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic
Relations, SAIS
HUFFINGTON POST Posted: 02/10/2014 11:04 BST Updated: 02/10/2014
11:59 BST
http://www.hufÞngtonpost.co.uk/tim-oliver/brexit_b_5913296.html
The E.U. values Britain's membership and a "Brexit" would be felt
across Europe and around the world. But Britain is not
indispensable. If faced with a choice the E.U. comes Þrst, Britain
second.
Once again Europe has found itself transÞxed by British politics.
Scotland's independence referendum raised unease across Europe,
whether it was Spanish worries about Catalan independence or German
concerns an independent Scotland would carry on Britain's habit of
demanding special E.U. opt-outs. But one concern registered
everywhere: that a Scottish exit from the U.K. might make a British
exit from the E.U. more likely.
Almost all debate about a Brexit is about what it would mean for
Britain. Yet a Brexit would have big - but largely unexplored -
implications for the E.U. and Europe's place in the world. A recent
compilation of research from 26 countries from across Europe and
countries such as the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
China, Singapore and Brazil has shed light on European and
international thinking about where U.K.-E.U. relations are headed.
The message for Britain is hardly positive.
Britain's European debate does not pass unnoticed. But
understanding of the nuanes of the debate varies from country to
country. While nobody is planning for a Brexit, many feel plans may
become necessary because Britain's debate increaingly seems
detached and closed to outside inßuence. Nobody is under any
illusions that a Brexit would be an unprecedented and damaging
experience for the E.U. and Europe. It is the U.K., however, that
many feel would be the most damaged.
Views of Britain's behaviour are framed more by the wider concerns
facing the E.U., especially the Eurozone. While the catchwords of
the U.K.'s reform agenda for the E.U. - competitiveness,
ßexibility, democracy - resonate across the E.U., the real pressure
for reform comes from those rescuing the Eurozone.
Countries within the Euro zone, Euro pre-in countries such as
Poland and Sweden, and even Denmark with its opt-out, have focused
on Germany and France for leadership. Despite its efforts, London
is seen as a bystander and at times an additional hurdle.
Too often Britain misunderstands initiatives that seem to align
with the U.K.'s own hopes. States such as the Netherlands and
Germany seek a better enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity,
not London's aims for repatriation. A multispeed E.U. is considered
a possibility, but not - as the U.K. might hope - in a
pick-and-choose fashion. There is increasingly less appetite in
Brussels for "third ways" like Switzerland. For other E.U. member
states, London's proposals, while tempting in the short-term, are
not seen as sustainable in the longer run as they could leave the
E.U. weak and divided.
Euroepan secuirty would also be changed. France would be left
facing Germany's "culture of restraint" on international affairs,
leaving little hope of improvements in European defence. For the
USA, a Brexit would stunt long-standing hopes for improvements to
European defence cooperation, weakening relations between the E.U.
and NATO. A Brexit would create opportunities for outside powers to
play on European divisions.
While economic and security concerns remind other E.U. members of
the U.K.'s role, they do not necessarily generate sympathy. Instead
the feeling is exasperation at London's inability to offer anything
but negative leadership. The U.K.'s debate on limiting immigration
is seen as a direct attack on the Single Market's right of free
movement of people and labour. E.U. countries fear the inßuence of
British Eurosceptics on their own domestic debate and are
frustrated London has not done more to confront the issue.
The end result is a situation where the rest of the E.U. is angry
at how the U.K. appears to be advancing agendas that are about
Britain's national interest and where the threat of Brexit is used
as leverage - or blackmail as some see it - to achieve these
aims.
For both the E.U. and the U.K., avoiding a further deterioration of
relations will not be easy. With the U.K.'s general election
campaign soon to get underway (and the ongoing fallout from
Scotland's referendum), engaging London on European policies is
likely to become even more difÞcult.