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Ethics-less Theories and EthicalPracticesGeorgios Florosaa University of CyprusPublished online: 10 Feb 2014.

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Ethics-less Theories and Ethical PracticesOn Ethical Relativity in Translation

Georgios FlorosUniversity of Cyprus

Abstract. This paper discusses the issue of ethical responsibility on the part of the translator, specifically the need to act ethic-ally and make responsible translation-related decisions about politically sensitive texts, focusing on practices that emerge in the context of translator training. The underlying premise of the discussion is that a contradiction between theoretical ideals and actual contexts of practice hampers students ability to negotiate an ethical decision. In an attempt to enable students to arrive at well-thought out, responsible decisions, this paper outlines a po-tential framework for exploring the ethical implications of textual choices in translation. The notion of ethical relativity is introduced as a by-product of the dynamism and partiality of norms, narra-tives and values, and used to highlight the factors that have a bearing on decision making. The ultimate aim is to demonstrate that an ethical framework must be sought that allows students to question and negotiate norms and narratives in order to arrive at sound ethical decisions. This framework must also offer students the possibility to act responsibly as agents of political change. Two translation exercises of politically sensitive texts from the Greek context are discussed as case studies.

Keywords. Ethical decision, Ethical relativity, Ethical injunction, Norms, Narratives, Values, Conflict, Translator training.

The vast majority of the students I have taught come to translation theory and translation practice classes with the general presumption that translation is the easy task of re-expressing in another language what the text says. This problem is widely acknowledged in the literature on translator training (Nord 2005, Arrojo 2005). Students understanding of what translators do and how they function coincides mainly with the image of communicators uninfluenced by any factors that might either prevent the correct understand-ing of an original message or impede the production of a comprehensible target text.

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Specifically for the Greek-speaking area, this attitude can largely be explained in relation to two factors. On the one hand, students have been exposed to Greek translations of foreign literature that read fluently, with the foreign usually domesticated, thus creating the illusion1 that a different culture is not so different after all. This situation is reminiscent of a similar problem, albeit with different repercussions, widely discussed by Venuti (1995, 1998) in the framework of his critique of fluent strategies used in literary translation into English. On the other hand, students are constantly exposed to hilarious examples of bad quality subtitles on TV which contain obvious translation errors and hence create the illusion that translation is primarily about linguistic skills. In an attempt to challenge this attitude among my students, I use poems as well as morally charged political texts, even in introductory courses. Introducing students at the very beginning of their training to the complexities and ambivalences inherent in translation is intended to prompt a more questioning, and thus more critical, attitude to key theoretical concepts they will be introduced to later in their studies, such as equivalence and functionalism, and to strategies such as foreigniza-tion and domestication.

It is at this point, when they are introduced to the complexities of trans-lation, that students begin to realize that effecting a smooth transfer of an original content is an illusion, and that the image of the translator as a mere communicator is a rather nave one. Disillusioning students about theoretical concepts and foregrounding ethical thinking are prerequisites to reinforcing their sense of responsibility, both during training and later in their profes-sional life, and encouraging them to reflect on the complexities of their task. Alerting students to complexities might encourage them to resort back to the trainer for an easy solution, however. Thus the question how should I translate this is one that is often posed by students, who assign trainers the role of arbitrators and automatically attribute to them the authority of truth, as if there were an absolute truth which they themselves cannot see. This assumption derives not only from the students own attitudes to translation (and critical analysis in general) but to some extent is also a function of the training environment to which they have become accustomed, within both higher and secondary education institutions. Such training environment tends to favour a teacher-centred pedagogical approach which aims at duplicat-ing knowledge in students minds (Kiraly 2005:1098f.), and is sometimes referred to as performance magistrale (Ladmiral 1977). There has recently been a vibrant debate about replacing the teacher-centred approach with more student-centred approaches which also take into account the social conditions of learning as cognitive and situated practice.2 A student-centred

1 On the issue of the illusory effect of translations, see Pym (1997) and the discussion in Koskinen (2000: 97). 2 See, for example, Risku (2002) on situatedness, Kiraly (1995, 2000, 2005) on social constractivism in translation studies, and Cronin (2005) on creativity and risk-taking.

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Georgios Floros 67

approach is also adopted in this study, as will become clear in the discussion and examples that follow.3

Trainers are thus confronted with the need to engage in a double decon-struction. They not only need to reinforce the students critical stance by deconstructing the ethical validity of theoretical concepts such as equivalence and functionalism, they also need to deconstruct the image students have of the trainer as an authority. For example, once they are introduced to the con-cept of voicing the Other, students tend to immediately accept it as a general ethical injunction for translation. They also tend to accept functional theories (e.g. Skopos theory) as suitable mainly for pragmatic texts, although these theories in fact allow for a change in the function of the foreign text (e.g. summarizing translations, translations of scientific texts to appear as semi-scientific articles, etc.). Students are then surprised when they realize that there is a clash between theories they have found helpful in some contexts and the broad ethical injunction to voice the Other. From the perspective of ethics, a change in function suddenly appears rather unethical.

A similar problem arises when students are introduced to theories of translation such as those propagated by feminist or postcolonial scholars (for example, Simon 1996, Simon and St-Pierre 2000). Translating what the text says, i.e. voicing the Other, cannot be reconciled with the seem-ingly interventionist approach to translation maintained by postmodern literary theory. At the same time, however, students are fascinated by the democratic and anti-hegemonic stance inherent in these theories. Similarly, students start expressing doubts about domesticating translations which they previously admired. When juxtaposed to an injunction such as voicing the Other, domestication suddenly seems less ethical a practice than it previ-ously appeared. At the same time, students remain dismissive of the idea of translating what the text says when it comes to political texts in which the enemy speaks, as will be shown in the case studies below. Thus, when students are confronted with multiple discourses and morally charged texts where their own responsibility is at stake, they begin to see faithfulness and equivalence in a totally different light.

The above problems probably arise from the eagerness of students to understand translation strategies as tantamount to ethical stances an un-derstanding which represents a tacit rather than conscious level of ethical articulation. Some clarification is thus needed as to what these strategies

3 At this point it needs to be clarified that the examples discussed later in the article are taken from a rather unusual pedagogical environment. The translation training of students up to the time of data collection for this paper does not form part of a full-fledged trans-lator training programme, but of a foreign language and literature programme. Thus, their exposure to translation theory and practice is very limited. It is hoped that the new Translation Studies track about to be offered within the English Studies Programme at the University of Cyprus will contribute to educating students who are more conversant with theoretical issues in translation.

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may offer in terms of ethical practice. I would argue that they offer a pool of possibilities for practical action, which means that what may appear as ad hoc choices can in fact reflect an ethical stance. It is social conventions, rather than strategies per se, which are the sources of ethical stances. Schleiermachers foreignizing method is a case in point. While Schleiermacher (1813/2000) advocated foreignization in order to enrich the German language, later translation scholars such as Berman (1984) and Venuti (1991, 1995, 1998) advocated the same method as a means of combatting ethnocentrism (see also Koskinen 2000:49). Thus, the same strategy is used to serve different ethical stances, and once one recognizes this, it becomes obvious that the strategy itself is not an ethical stance, but the result thereof. In a pedagogical context, this means that the discussion of the ethical cannot revolve only around its results but needs to include its causal factors, i.e. social conven-tions, as well.

1. Ethics and conventions

In contemplating the ethical in translation, one has to recognize that ethics calls for value-based rather than fact-based thinking. Although there has been some debate on whether value-based thinking is desirable for transla-tion as a discipline, the fact is that, at best, values and contingencies might be dispensable in the exact sciences, where natural phenomena might be studied in a value-free manner, but not in a humanities-based discipline. I would thus disagree with Vermeers call for keeping translation theory value-free (1996:83).

At the same time, since any contemplation of the ethical in the context of translation has to engage with concrete language, we have to engage in fact-based discussions of language constraints and linguistic peculiarities of transfer. The resulting tension may be resolved by viewing values as facts, which would entail studying the contexts in which facts are created and, ul-timately, their very viability. These ends may best be served by sociological approaches to translation, including approaches that engage in the critical examination of norms (as discussed in Descriptive Translation Studies, e.g. Toury 1980, Schffner 1999, Chesterman 1997/2009), and of narratives (e.g. Baker 2006). Toury (1980:51) defines norms as follows:

[Norms are] the translation of general values or ideas shared by a certain community as to what is right and wrong, adequate and inadequate into specific performance-instructions appropriate for and applicable to specific situations.

Schffner (1999:1) follows the same line of thought, although she stresses the status of norms as collective knowledge, in addition to being perform-ance instructions:

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in each community, there is a knowledge of what counts as cor-rect or appropriate behaviour, including communicative behaviour. In a society, this knowledge exists in the form of norms. Norms are developed in the process of socialisation. They are conventional, they are shared by members of a community, i.e. they function intersubjectively as models for behaviour, and they also regulate expectations concerning both the behaviour itself and the products of this behaviour.

The dependence of ethics on norms seems clear, as is the dependence of norms on values. The latter is explicitly reaffirmed by Chesterman in his description of an ethics of responsibility (1997/2009:35):

Deontic actions (those the agent feels ought to be done) are governed by norms, and norms themselves are governed by values. A norm, after all, is accepted as a norm because it embodies or manifests or tends towards some value. Values are thus examples of regulative ideas.

Chesterman (ibid.:36ff.) goes on to distinguish among four fundamental values underlying four different norms, respectively: The value of clarity (governing expectancy norms), the value of truth (governing the relation norm), the value of trust (governing the communication norm) and the value of understanding (governing the accountability norm).

Norms do not only depend on values, but also on narratives. Drawing on narrative theory, Baker argues that members of communities entertain narratives about themselves and the institutional formations around them. She defines narratives as public and personal stories that we subscribe to and that guide our behaviour. They are the stories we tell ourselves, not just those we explicitly tell other people, about the world(s) in which we live (2006:19). Adopting the typology of narratives proposed by Somers and Gibson (1994), Baker then differentiates between ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives (ibid.:28-48), emphasizing the power and function of narratives rather than their structural make-up (ibid.:19). Narra-tives have a strong ethical dimension since [o]ne of the effects of narrativity is that it normalizes the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, uncontestable and non-controversial (ibid.:11).

The normative potential of narratives, then, lies in their ability to become the basis for seemingly benign and incontestable conventions, just as values are often adopted unreflectively and unquestioningly.4 If, in addition, narra-tives become collective (i.e. acquire the status of public or meta-narratives),

4 Baker explicitly addresses the ethical import of narratives in an extensive discussion of their role and the role of translators and interpreters in situations of conflict.

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they can exercise considerable persuasive power about what is thought to be good or bad, correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate, etc. Thus narratives may potentially solidify into norms. Values, narratives and norms should not be conflated, however: values and narratives may both fall under the general heading of social conventions that have an ethically regulating character, whereas norms could be regarded as the culmination of such conventions, manifested through actual translation practice and possibly informing future translations.5

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of narratives (and values) is their dynamic nature. Narratives may change in subtle or radical ways (Baker 2006:3) as people are exposed to new stories, varieties of stories or competing stories. The same may be said of values, which are constantly revalidated. Thus, ethical standards may vary over time, and norms may be reformulated. This is especially important in the case of mediators between communities, as they seem to be particularly exposed to a variety of com-peting and often incompatible narratives and values. Even more important, however, narrative theory offers some space for cases where ethical stand-ards are not formed on the basis of dominant narratives but on the basis of individual representations of correctness or incorrectness, informed by the specific narratives that individual translators, or groups of translators, may tell themselves. Translators do not necessarily follow dominant norms of translational behaviour, but may also be inclined towards forming their own judgements of how they should behave. Schleiermacher is again a good ex-ample: in his time, enriching the German language may have been a rather innovative stance towards translating the foreign, based on his own convic-tions (narratives) about the status of his nation. These convictions need not necessarily count as the norm for his society or specific sectors within it. Similarly, feminist and postcolonial approaches today offer us innovative insights which often clash with more traditional understandings of fidelity. These approaches attempt to challenge existing norms to make space for a new agenda, one that reflects a particular narrative take on the world.

Apart from individual interpretations of values and narratives, there is yet another crucial factor regulating norms: the translators provenance and the direction into which a translator works. Most theories of translation take into consideration an ideal translation situation, that of translators who belong to the target culture and translate the foreign into their native tongue. Alternatively, they envisage a translator ideally located in an uncontaminated space between cultures. While the formation of an in-between intercultural space, such as the one described by Pym (1997), may be desirable, this space is better conceived of as a third space of turbulence and negotiation,

5 I am very grateful to Carol Maier and Mona Baker for their invaluable feedback on this issue.

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as described by Homi Bhabha a conflictual and constantly renegotiated and hybridised space of diasporic identities (Bhabha 1994:164, quoted in Koskinen 2000:71). As Batchelor explains (2008:54f.), this space is not to be conceived in spatial terms, as some translation theorists imply (e.g. Wolf 2000), but as the sum of all conditions relevant to the interpretation of cultural signs in any given moment of their enunciation, conditions that are in constant flux and never entirely identifiable. This depiction of space is much closer to the reality of translation, as particularly evident in the case of minor languages demanding translation (on which their survival almost hinges) an issue that has started to gain more attention lately.

Translators thus often work in different directions, both from and into the foreign language, the target culture being sometimes the Self, sometimes the Other. If in the case of translators working into the foreign (or typically dominant) language we follow Venutis (1998) argument for a visibility-enabling, minoritizing translation by means of non-fluent strategies as an ethical injunction, we might fail to secure not only acceptance but ultimately the survival of the texts we translate. Jones (2004/2009) discussion of trans-lation from a lesser-spoken language to a lingua franca thus stresses factors that shape the literary translators stance, which can ultimately favour even embellishment and fluency precisely in order to achieve visibility for the minority. These factors are important in the case of lesser-spoken languages and include the Self, the source text, the significant others beyond the target audience, and the social context, the latter permeated by specific images of source and target cultures (Robinson 1991).

The dynamism and partiality of narratives as described above lead to ethical relativity in translation.6 Students need to be made aware of this relativity as a first step in their contemplations of ethical issues. The ethical injunction to voice the Other, which students assume to be generally valid for translation, is inevitably attenuated or reinforced by values, narratives and norms. In practice, this results in a fluctuation of ethical thresholds rather than adherence to an injunction. Thus, ethical relativity could be defined as the fluctuation of ethical thresholds impinging on translation through in-herently subjective values and narratives that govern translation behaviour by creating equally subjective norms. The idea of a fluctuation of ethical thresholds takes us beyond the assumed dichotomy between the ethical and the unethical. This dichotomy may now be transformed into a series of decisions between different types of ethics; as Harpham puts it, ethical choice is always a choice between ethics (1995:396). Norms, conditioned by situation and power relations (Hermans 1999), thus provide a plurality of ethi-cal stances, not an account of ethicality vs. unethicality. This does not mean

6 I have opted for ethical relativity rather than ethical subjectivity because subjectivity is used by Levinas (1989) in the sense of being founded on subjection to rather than reciprocity with the other/Other (Inghilleri and Maier 2009:101).

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emerson

emersonThe author makes reference to the variability of ethics for the purpose of ethics is to avoid implication and resolve forthcoming and predictable issues. the relationship between norms and ethics is cyclical since norms are in essence subjective and shaped by time and context.

72 Ethics-less Theories and Ethical Practices

that ethical stances cannot clash or that certain situations may not demand a choice among them. Nor does it resolve the issue of responsibility on the part of the translator. Responsibility and decision-making are key terms in any discussion of translation ethics, as are self-reflexivity (Tymoczko 2007) and accountability (Maier 2007). Also important here is the responsibility of the translator trainer, an issue that was foregrounded by Hermans (in Schffner 1999:38) over a decade ago. Sensitizing students, as future translators, to the issue of ethical relativity is the first step towards self-reflexivity (critical reflection and possibility of contestation) and responsible action. But the re-sponsibility of the trainer cannot be entirely confined to awareness-raising. If the ethical injunction to voice the Other begins to be questioned by students, then it is the ethical duty of the trainer to guide students towards a different injunction, or, rather, a different framework of negotiation, inspired by and at the same time challenging ethical relativity.

2. The ethical repercussions of ethical relativity

The idea of norm and narrative-guided action, which leads to the assumption of ethical relativity, can easily be reduced by students to ethical anarchy, or to a do as you please motto. Translator trainers thus find themselves in the challenging position of having to prevent ethical anarchy at the same time as encouraging self-reflexivity. To this end, they need to rethink and renegotiate the issue of an ethical injunction in the context of translation, and to reflect on their own ethical responsibility when teaching translation ethics to students, a task which should not be limited to raising awareness and stating the obvious.

Perhaps the most important question here is whether we need an ethical injunction in the first place. In a wholly postmodern framework of thinking, generally valid injunctions are out of place. The celebration of individuality in the interpretation of concepts and entities is not a mere desideratum, but has successfully replaced much of the metaphysicality and rigidity inherent in other frameworks of thinking, such as romanticism and modernity. However, a more modest postmodern framework of thinking7 such as that advocated in this paper must recognize that undecidability may have a paralyzing effect and that self-reflexivity cannot ultimately be allowed to lead us into a void. The fact that students need to become self-reflexive should not be taken to mean that they can do whatever they want. Self-reflexivity is not a panacea for resolving ethical issues, and students need to contemplate the consequences of their action. In order to do so, they need a point of reference. If they are to choose among ethical stances, and hence among norms and/or narratives, the point of reference for their choice needs to reach beyond these norms and

7 For an extensive and, in my view, very balanced and useful discussion of postmodern thinking in translation studies, see Koskinen (2000). On postmodern ethics, see Bauman (1993).

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emerson

emersonThe author establishes the importance of making future translators aware of the relativity of ethics in their profession upon reflecting in the legal implications that their actions may have.

Georgios Floros 73

narratives, otherwise their self-reflexivity and choice will be ungrounded. After all, an anything-goes type of logic should be avoided when it comes to teaching. An injunction is thus needed precisely in order to avoid confu-sion and undecidability. Such a point of reference is to be seen as a minimum level of prescription that is, not prescription stricto sensu, because the idea is not to search for universal ethical properties which guide ethical choice. On the contrary, the aim should be to offer students a suitable framework for negotiating their choices. The ethical injunction will come as a tool for helping translators out of the complexities and undecidability caused by ethi-cal relativity. This is the understanding of an ethical injunction for translator training that this paper aims to put forward.

The question of whether an injunction is needed, then, may be recast as a question about the nature of such an injunction. In this respect, Arrojo (1995:101) offers a highly refreshing argument:

from the perspective of a postmodern critique of allegedly uni-versal values and rationality, the basic goal of any teaching project is the education of individuals who are conscious of their place, their roots and their social context, and who are able to deconstruct (and, therefore, also to exercise) power and authority within the groups to which they belong and in which they find the meanings they accept to be true.

Ethical relativity as the fluctuation of ethical thresholds incorporates the ambivalence inherent in the postmodern paradigm. In so doing, it provides a fruitful basis for shaping the injunction needed for translation. This injunction should be able to accommodate the coexistence of different values, norms and narratives, together with a framework for negotiating their fluctuation. Ethical relativity need not be seen as an altogether negative phenomenon. It can rather be seen as a source of inspiration for what might be considered a suitable injunction for translation. Instead of trying to avoid the fluctuation of ethical thresholds, we could turn this fluctuation into a site of diversity by making explicit a common ground for negotiation. As stated above, this common ground for negotiation needs to be sought beyond prevailing norms and narratives, beyond prevailing values. Instead, it could be oriented towards a value which is shared by all cultures/formations/individuals, something like an ur-value,8 such as self-preservation. Whatever the nature and scope of cultural formations, from the individual through to institutional forma-tions and national cultures, self-preservation is a powerful and self-fulfilling motivator, one that leads to products that are again governed by the aim of reaffirming self-preservation. This ur-value is the direct consequence of the original need to survive that is shared by people, institutions and even texts,

8 Ur-value is meant here as a primordial value (from the German prefix ur-, meaning original, primitive).

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as evident in Benjamins (1923/2000) view of translation as enabling a texts afterlife, a texts survival. The multiplicity of interpretive possibilities need not clash with this original drive for survival, as long as they do not warrant its total negation.9

Every cultural formation, then, is ultimately governed by the need to survive and harbours the ur-value of self-preservation. In translation, this is true for both the source and the target culture. Translators thus find themselves caught in a battle between cultures striving for self-preservation. They ex-perience a tension similar to that of a magnetic field, with the source and target cultures acting as magnetic empires to borrow Derek Walcotts metaphor (1984:XVI) that play the role of the magnetic poles. Staying rooted in a spot located in the middle of such a field is simply not possible. So is being torn apart in two halves. Clinging to one of the poles forever eliminates the very possibility of choice and freedom. Translators thus oscillate between the poles, sometimes approaching one, sometimes the other. And this hap-pens because they themselves are also guided by the need to survive in this tension. The only way to manage is by first accepting the impossibility of neutrality or a priori partiality (cf. Brownlie 2007:137). Ethical stances such as respect for the Other, voicing the Other, voicing the Self or neutrality (often understood as voicing the profession) risk being mistaken for mere political correctness, if the choice among them is not guided by an ethical injunction that reaches beyond them. Thus, realizing the source and target cultures mutual need to survive engages translators in an effort to do justice and to weigh ad hoc the best possible way to maintain justice.

Doing justice is inevitably dependent on the process of interpretation. Goodwin (2010:36f.) argues that Steiners hermeneutic contains within itself an ethics of translation:

Steiners model is self-consciously ethical, rather than descriptive. It tells us how we ought to approach the act of translation. In the mat-ter of cake-sharing, fairness is not defined in terms of the portion sizes for example, by saying each slice should be equal because there will always be cases where that outcome violates some strong intuition of fairness; rather, it is defined in terms of an agreed pro-cedure for cutting and choosing. Similarly, Steiners hermeneutic does not specify in advance what fidelity in any given translation should look like; it only gives guidance on how the translator should approach the task.

The first stage in Steiners model, the initiative trust needed to acknowledge that there is something there to be interpreted and understood (ibid.:30), is

9 It needs to be stressed here that inanimate objects such as texts can only metaphorically be said to have a need to survive. It is the producer(s) of a text who might have the need to safeguard the survival and preservation of the values and/or narratives expressed in it.

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particularly important for any further contemplation of how justice can be done to this something or to its initiator. This stage poses a fundamental question concerning not only the ethics of translation, but also meaning and the possibility of deconstructing it. As Goodwin puts it, the hermeneutic may equally be thought of as having an aporia at its heart, as having a real presence: even deconstruction cannot proceed to its nihilistic conclusion without setting out with initiative trust as its first condition (ibid.; emphasis in original).

By accepting both parties right to self-preservation10 as a general framework, translators can engage in a constant renegotiation of which norms/narratives/values can (or should) be accentuated in each specific situ-ation, possibly oscillating between seemingly conflicting ones. In this way, ethical relativity is alleviated and turned into ethical diversity. Doing justice to both parties involved in the translation process entails the possibility of the coexistence of domesticating and foreignizing strategies and the possibility of one set of strategies prevailing over the other. For example, a manual of a new product from a foreign culture can survive through a domesticating translation, as this would guarantee both the products dissemination and the receiving cultures self-preservation (by enrichment and development). A literary work written in a lesser-known language can survive via the use of both strategies, as this would secure a balance between its own self-preservation and its readability in the target culture, which in turn would be a form of recognition of the target cultures need for self-preservation.

Interestingly, a literary work, irrespective of the status of the language in which it is written, could also survive through a heavily foreignizing translation. This may be explained by a specific aspect inherent in the need to survive: survival via the Other. In their effort to preserve themselves and to ensure continuation, cultural formations very often turn to the Other as a source of inspiration, renewal and revival.11 Polysystem theory provides important insights into how the foreign can occupy central or peripheral positions within the receiving polysystem, according to the receiving poly-systems eagerness or rigidity towards accepting the foreign (Even-Zohar 1979, Bassnett 1993, Hermans 1999). The Other is always the entity against which the Self checks itself in order to form its identity. Bringing the Other in via foreignizing techniques does not necessarily, or automatically, need to be understood as an attack against the Self. It might also imply a fruitful goading of the Self towards its self-negotiation, perhaps also towards its

10 The difficulties of importing rights theory to translation have been pointed out and discussed by Goodwin (2010:24ff.), who expresses reservations about adopting human rights theory as an ethical framework in translation. Nevertheless, ur-values have often inspired cultural constructs such as the articulation of human rights, and it is in this sense that the word right is used here. 11 We cannot help creating our own narratives and should not attempt to stop doing so, because it brings us to our obligation to the Other . Our mental worlds must have input from a variety of sources, else we become egoistic (Slocombe 2004:10).

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positive restructuring, which will ultimately help it preserve itself. In fact, one of the most fascinating aspects of translation is that it sometimes allevi-ates the Others otherness. Traits of the Other can be found in the Self, and vice versa. Venuti (1998) explicitly reaffirms this possibility. It is then the translators duty to investigate to what extent a purely foreignizing translation might open up possibilities to ensure the receiving cultures self-preservation. The Derridean concept of pharmakon (1972) the coexistence of the cure and the poison in the same drug (Koskinen 2000:93) is relevant here. It is always the dosage that determines the effect. This is particularly true for situations in which the prospect of achieving justice seems unrealistic but is nevertheless worth attempting.

Needless to say, all this can easily turn into a curse, as translators can never be sure about their judgements on the mutual survival of entities. But even if they fail to achieve the intended results, at least they will have tried in an ethical manner. The key word here is reflection, a central concept in the social constructivist approach adopted by Kiraly (2000, 2005), who draws on Schn (1987). Schns greatest contribution was to introduce reflection as opposed to technical rationality in professional education. This reflection includes an initial aporia along with looking to our experiences, connect-ing with our feelings, and attending to our theories in use. It entails building new understandings to inform our actions in the situation that is unfolding (Smith 2001:n.p.). Schn (1983:68) writes:

The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique. He reflects on the phenomenon before him, and on the prior understand-ings which have been implicit in his behaviour. He carries out an experiment which serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomenon and a change in the situation.

This is the stage of reflection-in-action, which is then followed by reflection-on-action, a retrospective contemplation of what happened during the action. The initial aporia and the connection of the specific situation to our knowledge and feelings (reflection-in-action) very much resemble the way in which sensitive cases may be approached in translation. Such an approach can be considered as ethical per se. This holds even more for the stage of retrospective contemplation (reflection-on-action), as it mainly implies a contemplation of consequences, which is the cornerstone of acting in an ethical manner, and may, in addition, enhance change in political terms.

Summarizing the above discussion, the following points seem relevant in the context of translation pedagogy:

(a) The awareness that ethical stances are not to be conflated with transla-tion strategies, methods, etc. (disillusionment); also, the awareness that

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ethical stances can be multiple (ethical relativity), as they are created by sometimes conflicting social conventions (values and narratives) which give rise to norms.

(b) The need for an explicit discussion of ethical relativity and its implica-tions in the classroom (ethical injunction), and

(c) The need for critical reflection on values, narratives and norms and the possibilities of negotiating or contesting them. This can highlight the potential of (future) translators to become agents of political change (self-reflexivity and responsibility).

The case studies below will attempt to illustrate the above complexities and possibilities.

3. Negotiating conventions and norms

Ethical relativity and the general framework for its negotiation can now be ex-emplified through the discussion of two case studies. Both involve politically sensitive texts that are of particular interest here because of students reac-tions and their initial unwillingness to negotiate the almost unconsciously established values and narratives that led them to adhere to specific norms, which they in turn tended to conflate with specific translation strategies and theories. The first text is an online article on a controversial north Cyprus property legal dispute, where among other things north Cyprus is referred to as Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It presents events in a rather provocative way for Greek Cypriots, as it touches upon the still unresolved Cyprus issue, adopting the point of view of the enemy, as will be shown below. The second is again an online article about the enlargement of NATO, where former US President George Bush refers to FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as Macedonia. This touches on the issue of another unresolved conflict, this time revolving around the name of Greeces northern neighbour, and maintains a designation (Macedonia) that is provocative in the Greek context. The two texts were deliberately chosen precisely because they refer to political conflicts which in the last decades have been translated into national causes for both Greeks and Greek Cypriots, thus ensuring that students would hold strong opinions on the content of the articles.

The texts, which were written in English, were given to a mixed class of Greek Cypriot and Greek students as English-to-Greek translation exercises during the same seminar in 2008. This seminar was given towards the end of the semester as part of the Translation Studies I course, which is a compul-sory introduction to theoretical issues in translation that also includes some practical exercises, and is a prerequisite for the elective course Advanced Translation Studies. As previously explained, the two courses are offered to students of a BA programme in English. The class consisted of 34 students, of which roughly 80% (27 students) were Greek Cypriots (Republic of Cyprus),

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15% (5 students) mainland Greeks (Hellenic Republic) and the remaining 5% (2 students) were Erasmus exchange students from Belgium and France. The translation brief for Example 1 stipulated that the translation should be pre-pared for the electronic version of the Cypriot newspaper Politis (Citizen), for a Greek-speaking audience (Greeks and Greek-Cypriots) potentially spread worldwide. The newspaper is considered politically independent in Cyprus. For Example 2, the translation brief stipulated that the translation should be prepared for the Greek newspaper Kathimerini (Daily), a rather conservative newspaper addressed to a mainly domestic Greek audience and considered to be independent as far as political parties are concerned. No reference was made to formal style guidelines concerning national nomenclature, as the point of the exercise was to explore students impromptu reactions.

3.1 Example 1

The first text (henceforth Text 1) was found on Isnare.com Articles, submitted by Leslie Hardy of Wellington Estates Ltd. (Hardy 2006):

Cherie Blair, The Orams, And North Cyprus Property

Cherie Blair, wife of the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is acting for a British couple in a controversial North Cyprus property legal dispute. Linda and David Orams paid around 160,000 for a refurbished detached house in Lapta in 2003. A Citizen of the Greek Republic of Cyprus, Mr Meletis Apostolides, claims that he is the rightful owner of the land on which the villa is built. When Cyprus was partitioned into North and South, then Greek Cypriots residing in the North fled to the South, and Turkish Cypriots residing in the South moved north. Property, land and possessions were abandoned by the fleeing refugees. Since 1974, both the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North and the Greek Cypriot admin-istration in the South have devised policies as to how this property and land should be used. The North Cyprus administration has issued TRNC title deeds in relation to previously occupied and owned Greek land. The authorities in South Cyprus have been more circumspect on this matter. In October 2005, the South Nicosia District Court registered the adverse judgement against the Orams with the British High Court in London. Ms Cherie Booth, also known as Blair, represented the Orams. Ms Booth reminded the court that when the republic of Cyprus joined the EU, it signed and accepted Article 1 Protocol 10, which states We (the Greek Republic of Cyprus) have no effective control over the North. Considering Article 1 and the fact that the case is still

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at appeal stage, the UK and other EU states cannot interfere in the affairs of Northern Cyprus, she said. This is a powerful argument, as the Greek Cypriot administration, by its own admission, has no effective power to enforce a ruling made by a Greek court in Nicosia on a property in Lapta, which is some 25 miles away. Indeed, since the attempt to serve a writ on Mrs Orams the TRNC authorities have made it clear that any repeat of this exercise will lead to the arrest of those persons attempting to serve an unauthorised writ. Viewed from this perspective, the Greek Cypriot effort to register a Greek Republic of Cyprus court judgement in London lacks logic and could be considered mischievous.

Text 1 displays some particularly interesting features in terms of both content and they way it is represented, making it useful for developing a general understanding of the narrative surrounding the issue at stake.

The Republic of Cyprus was declared an independent state in 1960, fol-lowing a five-year struggle for independence from British colonial rule. The newly-founded state consisted of two communities, with Greek Cypriots representing around 82% of the population and Turkish Cypriots representing the remaining 18%. The new constitution stipulated, among other things, that due to the ethnic constellation of the region and its former regime, Britain, Greece and Turkey would be the guarantor powers of the new state. Soon after independence was declared, conflicts broke out between the two commun-ities, escalated to armed clashes, and even led to a de facto division of the capital, Nicosia, as early as 1963. Meanwhile, in 1967, the military coup in Greece established a dictatorship that lasted until 1974. Also in that year, the Greek military junta perpetrated a coup against Cyprus elected govern-ment as well. Turkey, exercising its guarantor rights, referred to Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee and invaded Cyprus with the aim of protecting the Turkish Cypriot population against the attempted coup. Despite the failure of the coup in Cyprus and the restoration of democracy in Greece, Cyprus still remains a divided and traumatized country whose two communities have suffered a great deal over the years: a violent exchange of populations, numer-ous missing persons and a still unresolved political issue having a large and painful impact on the social and cultural makeup of both sides. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared the areas occupied by the Turkish army, inhabited meanwhile almost exclusively by Turkish Cypriots, an independent state by the name of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).12 The United Nations never recognized this newly formed state, and the Republic

12 cf. Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01_en/cyprus01_en?OpenDocument (last accessed October 2010).

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of Cyprus considers the state illegal and the areas it controls occupied terri-tory of the Republic of Cyprus. Numerous efforts have been made to reach a solution ever since. Recently, after the rejection of the Anan plan in 2004 by a clear majority of Greek Cypriots, a new round of talks began between the two communities and negotiations are currently ongoing. For Turkish Cypriots, the TRNC is the expression of a minority struggling for status and self-preservation, while the Republic of Cyprus sees this formation as an open wound and a continuous threat to its stability.

The above paragraph offers a brief summary of the narrative maintained by Greek Cypriots, which also informs a very strict media policy in Cyprus. In their effort to support the claim that, in their view, the Turkish invasion was in violation of all rules of international legality and to point out that the ensuing establishment of TRNC was condemned by the UN, all Greek Cypriot governments stress the illegality of the TRNC by referring to it as the pseudo-state ( ). In news reporting, all institutions of the TRNC are referred to using modifiers such as illegal () or so-called (), or with the addition of scare quotes. So, for example, the government of the TRNC is the illegal government, and the countrys High Court is the so-called High Court. This policy is followed by all Greek Cypriot media, with very few and rare exceptions. In fact, failing to mark the state or its institutions with the above modifiers implies a silent and de facto recognition of the state, which has to be avoided at all costs. As I have shown in previous work (Floros 2009), this policy has been extended to (news) translation as well. When translating any reference to the TRNC and its institutions, a very specific norm, i.e. denial of status, is respected, leading to the above choices.

If read against the historical background given above, the narrative con-structed in Text 1 seems to come much closer to the narrative maintained by the Turkish Cypriot side than to a narrative striving for historical objectivity or neutrality, as might be expected by a press article on a legal issue.13 The narrative elaborated here is constructed in various ways:

(a) The capitalization of North and South in North Cyprus or North and South implies that North Cyprus is an entity enjoying official recognition as a state (e.g. North Korea, North Carolina, etc.), especially since north is not capitalized in other instances, such as residing in the South moved north;

(b) The same is implied by the use of TRNC in instances such as TRNC title deeds or TRNC authorities;

(c) The de facto division of the country is carefully presented as an almost

13 The reason I say striving for here is because the term historical objectivity borders on the illusionary. Being Greek myself, I cannot but admit that the way I present facts displays partiality, though hopefully not in extreme form.

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de jure partition without any mention of the way this division came about, e.g. When Cyprus was partitioned into North and South.

(d) Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side and its institutions are not mentioned by their official name. So there is Greek Republic of Cyprus, Greek Cypriot administration in the South, or South Cyprus instead of Republic of Cyprus, and South Nicosia District Court instead of Nicosia District Court. Not excluding the possibility of a typo, it is worth noting that Republic of Cyprus is not capitalized in when the republic of Cyprus joined the EU.

The author of Text 1 is clearly anything but ignorant of the political back-ground of the content he presents. Therefore, his phrasing is deliberate. For example, Greek Cypriot administration in the South and Greek Republic of Cyprus are not innocent explicatory metonymies, but form part of a wider narrative which aims at presenting the two parties as equal in status exactly the opposite of the narrative supported by the Greek Cypriot side, which often uses the designation Turkish Cypriot administration in the context of discussing negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot side.

The majority of the students (about 80%) complied totally with the na-tional media policy of the Republic of Cyprus and with the prevailing norm, offering the following solutions:

As to (a), they either did not capitalize by translating North Cyprus as (north Cyprus) or they used a gloss such as (northern part of Cyprus). One student suggested (occupied areas). South was translated either as (South) or even as (free territories) by two students.

For (b), they either transliterated and labelled TRNC as , or translated with a modifier, e.g. (the so-called TRNC), or even as (the pseudo-state).

For (c), they all translated was partitioned into as (was divided).

For (d), both Greek Cypriot administration in the South and Greek Republic of Cyprus were changed into (Re-public of Cyprus) by all students, who also omitted South in South Nicosia District Court and South Cyprus.

About 20% of the students (including Cypriot Greeks, Greeks and the two Erasmus students) transliterated TRNC without labelling, but some trans-lated Greek Cypriot administration in the South word-for-word into Greek, whereas they changed Greek Republic of Cyprus into

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(Republic of Cyprus). The two Erasmus students opted for a word-for-word rendition and remained distanced throughout the discussion.

There were various justifications for the choices made. Some students openly rejected any possibility of not complying with the dominant norm, while others tried to justify their choices even by appealing to Skopos-theory. The latter stated that since Skopos-theory allows for a change of function, they saw in it an endorsement of their choices. More specifically, they argued that their readers would presumably demand to see their own truth instead of that of the other side. A minority of students argued that they translated what the text says, but they gave no clear answer as to why the same does not apply for Greek Republic of Cyprus, since they did change this designa-tion. Going back to the majority group, I asked why the general injunction to voice the Other, which they used to praise in previous translation exercises, was attenuated in this case. Some replied that the text presented a forged truth and they felt it would be more ethical to restore truth rather than perpetuate its falsification. Implicitly, these students expressed criticism of the minority group, which translated faithfully. They, in turn, insisted that they too felt strongly about the cause of their nation, but it was the truth of the original which had to be respected, not that of the target culture/readers. In so doing, they forgot how conveniently flexible they found, for example, Skopos-theory in other texts so far. In any case, the interesting aspect here is that, although the same narrative regarding the Cyprus issue was respected by the overwhelming majority of students, there was a clash of values concern-ing truth. While most students followed the norm, others were led to break it. Breaking the norm did not translate into an appropriation of the opposite narrative, but merely into a displacement of the discussion from the target social context (target truth) to the source textual content (source truth). The ethical relativity in this case was brought about by a dissonance between different values, not narratives.

The students soon turned to me for the verdict. But no verdict other than a call for considering a wider ethical framework can be given. As to the majority group, they needed to dissociate themselves from a Skopos-theory-based argumentation (disillusionment) and realize that it was the specific values they cherished which guided their action. This need not imply that they were a priori wrong, but as translators they should reflect upon the possible consequences of their choices and perhaps be prepared to negotiate their own values. This also held for the minority group. Reflecting on consequences might lead them, too, to abandon their a priori position and negotiate a dif-ferent one, since faithfulness does not automatically equate to ethicality. In both cases, responsibility would only result from a consequence-driven reflection upon the ethical. This kind of reflection will be outlined further below, after examining the second example.

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3.2 Example 2

The second text (henceforth Text 2) was found on The Sofia Echo online bulletin, submitted on April 2, 2008 by Elena Koinova (Koinova 2008):

Bush wants Macedonia in Nato

US president George Bush called on Greece on Wednesday to refrain from vetoing Macedonias bid to join Nato, Reuters news agency reported on April 2. If Greece does otherwise, it would threaten to pile further pressure in the Balkan region, Bush said in a keynote speech in Bucharest, where the 26-strong Nato will hold a three-day summit starting April 2. Tomorrow in recognition of their progress, Nato will make a his-toric decision on the admission of three Balkan nations Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, the US president said, as quoted by Reuters. These countries have launched the difficult path of reform and built thriving free societies. They are ready to contribute to Nato and their citizens deserve the security that Nato brings, he added. For weeks, Athens has been threatening to veto the invitation of its northern neighbour over its illegitimate, as Greece calls it, appro-priation of the name Macedonia. Greece insists that Macedonia is the legal name of its northernmost province and calls the coutnry [sic] the former Yugoslav republic [sic] of Macedonia (FYROM), the name used by the United Nations and other international organisations. Greek officials have said that Athens was unlikely to change its current position, which is that it would agree to the invitation only if Skopje surrenders any claim on the name Macedonia.

Text 2 does not pose a significant challenge to the narrative maintained by the Greek side on the FYROM issue. In fact, it seems to remain sufficiently distanced from any dominant narrative (a) by making explicit the instances where information is reported (e.g. Reuters news agency reported, or by quoting directly) and (b) by using scare quotes around potentially provocative modifiers (illegitimate, as Greece calls it). Just like the author of Text 1, the author of Text 2 seems to have investigated the issue thoroughly before reporting on it. But unlike Hardy, Koinova does not seem to explicitly sup-port any of the opposing narratives surrounding the name issue. The problem arises from Bushs use of the name Macedonia instead of FYROM, which, as will be shown below, is an issue that is too complex to be reduced to a set of opposing narratives. Therefore, it is again useful to begin with a historical account14 in an effort to outline not only the two opposing narratives, but also the ensuing complexity at the international level.

14 Again I need to acknowledge that partiality is inevitable in presenting this case.

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The conflict arose in 1991, when the southern Republic of ex-federal Yu-goslavia declared its independence under the name Republic of Macedonia. Since the end of World War II and until 1991 this region was called Socialist Republic of Macedonia. It was a name given by Josip Broz Tito, when he granted a region formerly known as Vardar Banovina the status of a socialist Republic within federal Yugoslavia. Upon the declaration of independence, Greece strongly opposed the new states choice of the Republic of Macedonia as a designation. Thus, in 1993, the country was admitted to the UN under the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The differ-ence over the name is noted in Security Council Resolution 817 of 1993 and, further, Resolution 845 of 1993 calls upon Greece and FYROM to enter into negotiations for a definite solution. The two parties undertook this obligation by signing an Interim Accord in 1995. Since then, little progress has been made in the negotiation process and the issue remains unresolved. Greece maintains that, while the term Macedonia refers to a broader geographical region that includes territories of various Balkan countries, the largest part of this geographical region coincides with ancient Greek Macedonia, which lies within the boundaries of modern Greece (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Greece further argues that the residents of FYROM are Slavs by descent and arrived in the region of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia at a much later stage. Therefore, the use of the name Republic of Macedonia is an illegal appropriation, a usurpation of Greeces national and historical heritage and a falsification of history. Even worse, Greece explicitly expresses serious concerns that FYROM aims to maintain the irredentist doctrine of a United Macedonia, raising territorial claims against its neighbours in an attempt to gain access to the Aegean Sea. Meanwhile, FYROM states that:

The Republic of Macedonia participates in active [sic] and construc-tive manner in the negotiations process under the auspices of the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Mathew Nimetz, in order to overcome the irrational issue imposed by the Republic of Greece concerning the difference about the name of our country. The Republic of Macedonia is continuously engaged in finding a mutually acceptable solution that would not infringe on the Macedonian national identity, language, and culture. (Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; my emphasis)

Since 1991, Greeces northern neighbour has cultivated its national identity in ways that appear to be extremely offensive for Greece, for example by using the Vergina star15 in the flag of the new state, or naming the capitals

15 This is the golden decoration found in the royal tomb of Philip II (father of Alexander the Great) near Thessaloniki, Greece.

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international airport Skopje Alexander the Great Airport.16 In retribution, Greece will not ratify FYROMs accession to the EU or NATO, unless the name issue is resolved with, among other things, a definitive composite name with geographical qualification of the term Macedonia (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

These circumstances have led to a rather confusing situation, with some 127 countries using the name Macedonia for bilateral purposes (among them the United States), most of them even having recognized FYROM by its con-stitutional name, and all other countries using the name FYROM. The policy in Greece is rigid in denouncing any use of the term Macedonia as an official name for FYROM, and this policy enjoys wide acceptance by the media. As was the case with Example 1, the translation norm which soon developed around this issue was one of denouncing the use of Macedonia when referring to FYROM. It should be obvious why this issue is very sensitive for Greece and the Greek people, but also that opposing narratives are at work here. Each side wants to see itself as the direct descendant of an ancient kingdom and a glorious past, and the prevailing logic is one of appropriation and ownership on both sides. This logic is inevitably inextricable from the issue of survival. Both sides are struggling for survival on the basis of the same argument. For FYROM, appropriation of the Macedonian kingdom is central to developing a much-needed sense of identity, in order to hold together a young political formation of mixed origin. For Greece, maintenance of the glorious past is vital for preserving a cultural heritage which in many ways represents the countrys chief national product. In addition, Greece wants to avoid instability in the Balkans, a region that has long suffered from violent conflicts, so as to preserve the status quo in terms of territory and national borders.

The choices made in the translation of Text 2 were comparable with the ones opted for in Text 1. Macedonia was changed to FYROM by the vast majority of students, who again complied with Greek national policy and with the dominant norm. About 85% changed Macedonia both in the title of the article and in the statement of the former US President. No other significant changes were introduced in translating the rest of the text. At first sight, the arguments were again the same as for the choices in Text 1, i.e. restoring the truth, for those who changed Macedonia into FYROM, and being faithful to the original, for those who left Macedonia unaltered. A rather extensive debate ensued in relation to that particular example, whereas the students were more restrained in the discussion of Text 1. This might be explained by the fact that, the majority of the students being Greek Cypriots, they felt distanced enough (from an issue concerning mainland Greece) to defend their opinions and stances less hesitantly. The intensity of debate notwithstanding,

16 Skopje Alexander the Great Airport, http://skp.airports.com.mk/default.aspx?ItemID=345 (last accessed October 2010).

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there was a fundamental difference to the classroom discussion of Text 1. The dispute was triggered not only by conflictual conceptions of truth, i.e. by the question of which side to do justice to, but mainly by conflictual narratives among students. Unlike Example 1, students did not share the same narrative in this case. The majority group subscribed to the narrative maintained by the Greek side, but a minority group, including the Erasmus students, supported what they saw as an anti-nationalist, more liberal and democratic narrative that required acknowledging a nations right to self-determination and freedom to form an identity; these students did not wish to question FYROMs claims. Interestingly, the discussion did not focus so much on strategies or Skopos-theory and the like, but revolved around the controversy between patriots and democrats. Ethical relativity in this case was rather a matter of narratives and political ideology.

Before explicitly calling on students to again reflect on their choices in view of possible consequences, I decided to expose them to a few hard facts in an effort to inspire further considerations. On the one hand, according to international agreements, the US President was right in using Macedonia, since the US is one of the countries that use this name for bilateral purposes. On the other hand, Greece is not one of the countries that do so, and it thus makes sense to avoid the name. In practice, neither group of students was factually right. To avoid the ensuing undecidability, a different kind of criti-cal thinking was called for.

3.3 Merging the results: The ethical injunction

The results of the two exercises are interesting, since they reveal that students, however unconsciously, were strongly inclined to reproduce their own values, narratives and political ideology. On the basis of this ideology they were eager to forget their mediating role and sacrifice the difference/foreignness of the original, although they had previously been eager to voice otherness in translation exercises that did not threaten or negate their position.17 But even in the case of students who did attempt to voice the otherness of the original, the discussion revealed that this was again not the result of self-reflexivity or responsibility, but rather a case of blind adherence to what was introduced to them as the ideal stance of the translator. In both cases, the dominant value/narrative appeared as an a priori given and positively valued construct that could not be negotiated. The inability to negotiate adherence to or flouting of the respective norm appears to be due to the influence of covert ethical injunctions, be they conservative or progressive vis--vis standard practice. This became clear in the vagueness of students discussion of Skopos-theory, which showed that they were practically unable to distin-

17 Cf. ethics of sameness in Levinas, as discussed by Eaglestone (2005:131).

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guish among (a) theoretical considerations, (b) political considerations in their context of practice, and (c) their own overt or covert ethical injunctions, since they conflated the latter with accepted standard translation practice or with mere rebellion against it. One of the aims of the exercises was precisely to enable them to distinguish among the three.

When the issues of consequence and mutual right to self-preservation were brought into the discussion of the two examples, students started real-izing that the crucial question was not so much about which norm, narrative or ideology to adhere to beforehand, but rather about the consequences of their action in ethical terms. Students needed to realize that the texts they were translating were not simply ignorance-driven falsifications of truth that needed to be restored. Rather they present attempts to disseminate a discourse that is totally different to theirs. As such, they have the right to survive.

At the same time the target readers also have a right to preserve them-selves. But by presenting them with a restored truth that complies with what they seek to achieve we, as translators, may deny them the possibility of seeing the media at work, as it were, and of reacting accordingly. This would ultimately deny their very ability to preserve themselves. The legal complexities notwithstanding, what would be the use of target readers reading a translation that comfortably reproduces their own discourse and leaves them with the illusionary impression that a real estate agent out there shares their view of a national cause? Similarly, what is the use of changing the statement of the former US President under such sensitive circumstances in Text 2? This would only sedate the target readers by making them believe that an influential leader is actually on their side, since he uses the designations they themselves would use. Such illusion does not promote self-preservation on the part of the audience. Although appropriation of the Other could be considered the best way to directly serve the survival of the target culture, it denies the survival of the source text. Voicing the Other cannot be an ethi-cal stance per se. It can only be one possible strategy for serving the ethical stance of mutual survival, as the above case studies demonstrate. After all, sedating the readers does not seem very ethical, either.

If student translators are to become responsible agents in the context of political conflict, they need to carefully negotiate and rethink the truth elaborated in the source text, the truth they themselves believe in and the truth they present to their target readers. I consider this to be the most important point of engaging in the above exercises. However, negotiating truths is not an easy task, and is certainly not served by adopting a neutral position. Neutrality, a stance students often tried to revert to as a potential solution, only appears to be a safe option because it shields the translator from the responsibility of reflecting on the possible consequences of their choices. Acknowledgement of translation as situated practice and of the translators role as burdened by competing forces means that translators

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must be encouraged to take decisions that are sensitive to the conflict inherent in individual situations. This is the first step towards turning translators into agents of political change, potentially one of the outcomes and an additional gain of the above discussions in the classroom.

At the end of the discussions, students managed to reach some consensus on the optimal solutions for Text 1. They abandoned more radical choices such as (occupied areas), (free territories) and (the pseudo-state) and decided to avoid labelling or modi-fying TRNC. However, they insisted on translating was partitioned into as (was divided), Greek Cypriot administration in the South and Greek Republic of Cyprus as (Republic of Cyprus) and on omitting South in South Nicosia District Court and South Cyprus. The most important aspect in this consensus was that students no longer suggested these choices as a compromise between the two groups, but as a conscious effort to allow both narratives (the source and the target ones) to coexist out of respect for their survival. Unfortunately, the same could not be achieved for Text 2. Although many students seemed to demonstrate under-standing of the sedating effect of changing Macedonia into FYROM, they remained adamant in their view that leaving the original unchanged would completely deny the self-preservation of the target readers. In any case, the main thing is that the above results were only possible because they were products of student interaction on the basis of a near-authentic assignment along the lines of a social constructivist approach. Moreover, the results point to the need for redesigning the educational system at various levels, so as to allow students to consider themselves potential agents of political change in the first place.

4. Conclusion

The theoretical considerations and the study of specific cases outlined in this paper should be seen as an attempt to maintain a modestly postmodern framework for negotiating a responsible decision. The main aim is to follow a logic of both/and (Bannet 1993:103f.) in that ambivalence is impossible to eliminate and translators need to learn to live with it. Texts and stances are not either good or bad, correct or incorrect. They can be both at the same time. Similarly, translators need no longer be seen as caught up in the binary opposition of agent or patient (ibid.), because they can be inclined (or forced) to act sometimes as the one, sometimes as the other.

However, the exigencies of translation, and the need to arrive at deci-sions, require a minimally prescriptive framework against which moral action can be measured, so as to avoid unconscious and totally arbitrary action. In the translation curriculum, this minimal framework could take the form of gradually but consistently sensitizing students to the moral complexities of

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even seemingly innocent translation situations. The cultivation of respon-sible thinking must begin with an acknowledgement of the teachers own responsibility. This responsibility translates into offering students a minimal level of prescription which can provide them with the necessary guidance in shaping their own concrete judgement and decisions, instead of ready-made solutions. Teachers would thus guide students and set them free at the same time. As the famous architect Joshua Prince-Ramus would say, they would productively lose control (Prince-Ramus 2010).

GEORGIOS FLOROSUniversity of Cyprus, Department of English Studies, 75 Kallipoleos Avenue, P. O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. gfloros@ucy.ac.cy

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