Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-Level – And Effective?

JensNewig1andOliverFritsch2

1 Leuphana University Lüneburg, workgroup Sustainable Development and Participation, Institute forEnvironmental and Sustainability Communication, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Scharnhorststr. 1,21335Lüneburg,Germany

2UniversityofAarhus,NationalEnvironmentalResearchInstitute(NERI),DepartmentofPolicyAnalysis,Kalø,Grenåvej14,8410Rønde,Denmark

This is a preprint of an article published in Environmental Policy and Governance 19, 197-214 (2009), published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/eet.509

Abstract

Currentpolitical trendsandscholarlyresearch increasinglypromotecollaborativeandpartici‐patorygovernance inmulti‐level systemsas away tomore sustainable andeffective environ‐mentalpolicy.Yetempiricalfindingsaswellasconceptualworksfromdifferentacademicfieldsremainambiguousaboutthisclaim.Thispaperexploreswhetherandtowhatextenttheexist‐enceofmultiplelevelsofgovernanceaffectstheabilityofparticipatorydecision‐makingtode‐liverhighqualityenvironmentalpolicyoutputandtoimproveimplementationandcompliance.Tothisend, findings fromthe literatureonmulti‐levelgovernance,publicparticipation,policyimplementationaswellasoncomplexsystemsareintegratedinfivesetsofhypotheses.Inordertoputthesetoa‘plausibilityprobe’,ameta‐analysisof47casestudiesfromNorthernAmericaandWesternEuropeisconducted.Thesecasesprovidequalitativeinsightsandallowforsomegeneralizationintheformofcorrelationanalysis.Thestudyfindsthat,predominantly,environ‐mentalpreferencesoftheinvolvedactorsdeterminetheenvironmentaloutputs(andoutcomes)ofdecision‐making.Further,face‐to‐face,butnotmeretwo‐waycommunicationappearstoposi‐tivelyinfluencetheecologicalstandardofdecisions.Theanalysisalsosuggeststhatahighlypol‐ycentric governance systemcomprisingmany agencies and levelsof governanceyieldshigherenvironmental outputs than rather monocentric governance. However, correlations betweengovernanceeffectivenessanddecision‐makingscaleaswellaspolicydeliveryandinstitutionalfit to ecosystemcouldnotbe identified.Thepaper concludesbyoutliningpathways formoresystematiccomparativeresearchonthesepressingresearchquestions.

Keywords:civicparticipation,multi‐levelgovernance,re‐scaling,policyimplementation,institu‐tionalfit,meta‐analysis,casesurvey

1.Introduction

Environmentalpolicy inEuropeandelsewherehasbeensuffering froma lackofeffectiveness(Lenschow1999;Jordan2002;KnillandLiefferink2007).Asaresponse,twokeystrategieshavebeenproposedandpartlypursued:(1)toadaptthelevelandspatialscaleofgovernancetothatoftheenvironmentalproblems;and(2)toenhanceparticipationofnon‐stateactorsinenviron‐mentaldecision‐making:

Environmentalproblemsappearondifferentandmoreor lessdistinctspatial scales.Whereassoilcontaminationonahazardouswastesitemayremainastrictlylocalproblem,waterpollu‐tiontypicallyextendsthescaleofariverbasin(andbeyond),andclimatechangeandbiodiversi‐

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ty loss indicate the global level of cause‐and‐effect‐chains. Typically, these scales of socio‐ecologicalinterlinkagescutacrossandtranscendestablishedadministrativeterritorialjurisdic‐tions. In order to effectively respond to environmental problems, it has repeatedly been pro‐posed to adapt the scaleof governance institutions to thatof theenvironmental issue (Young2002). Increasingly, functionally specific governance institutions on natural spatial scales arebeingmarshalled(HoogheandMarks2003).For instance, theEUWaterFrameworkDirective(2000/60/EC)mandatesriverbasinsastherelevantunitforplanning,managementandprotec‐tion of inland waters. To date, a high number of vertical, horizontal and, across these, task‐specific levels of governance exist in Europe. Thus, environmental governance has become ahighlycomplexsystemofdecisionpoints(Meadowcroft2002).Yetsuchsystemsofmulti‐levelgovernance (Marks 1993; Scharpf 1997) raise their own problems of effectiveness. From theperspective of policy implementation theory, a high number of decision points (‚clearancepoints’; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984 [1973]) and involved actors (veto players, Tsebelis1995)hamperseffectivepolicydelivery.Ontheotherhand, ‘polycentricity’isregardedascon‐ducivetolong‐termeffectiveenvironmentalpolicy(Ostrometal.1961;McGinnis1999b).

Animportantaspectofgovernance–asopposedtogovernment–,andofmulti‐levelgovernanceinparticular,istheparticipationofnon‐stateactorsindecision‐processesonthedifferentlevelsofgovernance(BacheandFlinders2005;Papadopoulos2007;Kluvankova‐Oravskaetal.,2009).Inthiscontext,astrongerdecentralizationinpolicyimplementationisadvocated(Jordan2002).Prominently,theEuropeanCommission’sWhitePaperonGovernance(2001)andthereportbytheMandelkernGrouponBetterRegulation (MandelkernGroup2001) represents stimulatingimpulses for the architecture of European governance. In the light of increasingpolicy imple‐mentation gaps (Jordan 2002), these documents develop criteria for ‘good European govern‐ance’andmarshalnovelproceduresfor‘betterregulation’,includingextendedstakeholdercon‐sultations. In the field of environmental policy, in particular the inclusion of non‐stake actorsinto policy‐making achieved prominence thanks to four EU directives pushing forwardmorecollaborativeformsofgovernance;forexample,theWaterFrameworkDirective(2000/60/EC)andthePublicParticipationDirective(2003/35/EC).Theguidancedocumentonpublicpartici‐pationinrelationtotheWaterFrameworkDirectiveexplicitlystatesthat“publicparticipationisnotanendinitselfbutatooltoachievetheenvironmentalobjectivesofthedirective”(EU2002,p.6).Drawingontheacademic literature(Steele2001;Pellizzoni2003),participatorygovern‐ance is expected to contribute to improving the ‘quality’ of decisions by incorporating locallyheldknowledgeandbyopeningupthepoliticalarenaforenvironmentalinterests.Further,itisargued that the inclusion of stakeholders increases the acceptance of decisions and thus im‐provescomplianceandimplementationontheground(MacnaghtenandJacobs1997;Schenketal.2007).Basedontheseprerequisites,participatoryandcollaborativeformsofgovernanceareexpectedto leadtomoreeffective improvements inenvironmentalquality(Newig2007;DietzandStern2008).

Neither of these claims regarding the potential effectiveness of multi‐level and participatorygovernancehasremainedundisputed,norsystematicallyempiricallysubstantiated.Itisargued,forinstance,thatmanysocietalandenvironmentalproblemscanbetackledbestathigherlevelsofgovernance,inparticularinthosecaseswhenlocaldecisionswouldbetakenattheexpenseofthird parties because of the dominant interest structures of local actors. This is typically ex‐pectedwith environmental problems characterised by increasingly complex spatial interrela‐tionsofsocietalandecologicalprocesses(Meadowcroft2002;Youngetal.2006,alsoseeRennandSchweizer,2009).

Todate,empiricalresearchhasyettoprovideevidenceforthesuperiorityofcollaborativeandmulti‐levelformsofgovernanceintermsofpolicyeffectiveness.Countlesssinglecasestudieson(participatory) environmental governance have been published, varying greatly in scope andquality. It is virtually impossible to citeevena representative fractionof these.On thewhole,moreover,mostofthestudiesconsiderenvironmentalimpactsinarathercursorymanner,ifatall(Newig2007).Whilethevastmajorityofpublicationsanalysesinglecases,anumberofcom‐parativeassessmentsareavailable,mostofwhicharerestrictedtotheUnitedStates.Withthe

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exceptionofChessandPurcell(1999),whostudyonly20cases,noneofthese1investigateenvi‐ronmental outcomes in any stringentmanner.Ofparticular interest is thehithertomost com‐prehensivecasesurveybyBeierle&Cayford(2002),whoanalyse239cases,albeitwithconsid‐erablemethodologicalshortcomings.Toconclude,the‘instrumentalclaim’hasnotbeensystem‐aticallysubstantiatedbyempiricaldata.Moreexplicitly,ithasrecentlybeenarguedthat‘acon‐siderable gap remains in ourunderstandingof the effect of process characteristics andpolicyoutputsonenvironmentaloutcomes.[…]Weneedtoknowwhichtypesofdecision‐makingpro‐cesses–multisectoralcollaboration,hierarchicalplanning,commandandcontrolregulation,ormarket‐basedmechanisms – perform best in terms of environmental outcomes’ (Koontz andThomas2006,p.118;seealsoBeierleandCayford2002,p.76;foramorethoroughdiscussionseeRauschmayeretal.,2009).

Aparticularchallengeforresearch(andpractice)arisesfromthefactthatthequestionof(civic)participation is invariably connected to the issueof governance level, becauseparticipation isalwayscarriedoutonaparticular–typicallylocalorregional–level.Forinstance,thepercep‐tionsandpreferencesofcitizensandinterestgroupsarepresumablynotneutralregardingthespatial distance to environmental resources or problems, neither is the engagement of actorsneutralregardingthelevelofgovernance(Koontz1999).Althoughitisplausibletoassumethatthere is unexpected potential and fundamental contradictions embedded in the relationshipbetweenparticipationandmulti‐levelgovernance,thishasnotyetbeenthesubjectofscholarlyattention(exceptinWarleigh2006).

Inanattempttorespondtotheresearchgapsoutlined,thispaperexploreswhetherandtowhatextenttheexistenceofmultiplelevelsofgovernanceaffectstheabilityofparticipatorydecision‐making to deliver high quality environmental policy output and improve implementation andcompliance.Tothisend,theacademicliteratureonmulti‐levelgovernance,publicparticipation,policyimplementationaswellasoncomplexsystemsisintegratedinordertodevelophypothe‐sesontherelationshipbetweenmulti‐levelgovernanceandenvironmentalpublicinvolvement(section2). Inanattempttoputthesehypothesestoa ‘plausibilityprobe’ inthesenseofEck‐stein(1975),weconductapreliminarymeta‐analysisof47casestudiesfromNorthernAmericaandWesternEurope.Ontheonehand,thecasesprovidequalitativeinsights;moreover,therela‐tivelylargenumberofcasesanalysedallowsforsomegeneralizationintheformofcorrelationanalysis. After a brief introduction of the research design (section 3), findings of the meta‐analysiswillbediscussed(section4).Insection5,wedrawconclusionsforfurtherresearchonthescaleandmulti‐levelimplicationsofparticipatorygovernanceanditseffectiveness.

2.Theoryandhypotheses

Multi‐levelgovernance(MLG)hasbeendefinedas‘politicalstructuresandprocessesthattrans‐gressthebordersofadministrativejurisdictions,aimingtocopewithinterdependenciesinsoci‐etaldevelopmentandpoliticaldecision‐makingwhichexistamongterritorialunits’(Benz2006,p.95,translationJN).Systemsofgovernanceatdifferentlevelsaretypicallyassumednottobehierarchical in a chain‐of‐command sense (Bache and Flinders 2005), but rather to compriseformally independent,yetmutually interactinggovernance levels,whichcanbedistributedei‐

1Bingham(1986)compared161casesofenvironmentalmediationwithregardtothepotentialforcon‐sensus.Coglianese(1997)examined67casesofnegotiatedrulemaking,arguingthatparticipatorypro‐cesses last longerand leadto litigationmoreoftenthannon‐participatorydecisions,withoutstudyingthesubstantivecontentorimpactsofthedecisions,whileLangbeinandKerwin(2000)findthecontra‐ry.LeachandPelkey(2001)andSabatieretal.(2005)measuredthedemocraticmeritsofcollaborationin 76 watershed partnerships. Their analyses include variables such as social capital and collectivelearning. Lubell et al. (2002) studied the genesis and viability of 958watershed partnerships in theUnitedStates.TheUSNationalAcademyofSciences(DietzandStern2008)publishedabroadstudyontheoverallvirtuesandrisksofparticipationinenvironmentalassessmentanddecision‐making,review‐ingalmost300cases,albeitlargelyorganisedasaclassicreview.

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ther ‘vertically’or ‘horizontally’(Scharpf1997;Paavola2008).OnecentralassumptionofMLGresearchisthatdecision‐makingatdifferentlevelsisincreasinglycharacterisedbytheparticipa‐tion of non‐state actors (Bache and Flinders 2005). However, little is known on the concreterelationshipbetweenparticipationandthemulti‐layerednessofgovernance,andhowthisinflu‐encesgovernanceeffectiveness(alsoseePaavolaetal.2009).

Integrating conceptual insights fromdifferent strands of scholarly research such as participa‐tion,policyimplementationandcomplexsystemsresearch,wefindthatanumberofhypothesescan be put forward regarding the relationship between participatory governance, multi‐levelaspectsandenvironmentaloutcomes.Asaguidinghypothesis,weassumequitegenerallythatthechoiceofgovernancescaleandlevelaswellasthenatureofparticipation(oritsabsence)ingovernancedecisionsaffectsenvironmentaloutcomes.Weassumethatscalematters,thatpar‐ticipationmatters,andthatthewayinwhichthetwocombineisofparticularimportance.

1.Participatoryversustop‐downmodesofgovernance

Recentparticipationliteraturestressestheeffectivenessthatparticipationbringstogovernance.Itisarguedthattheinvolvementoflocallayknowledgeleadstobetterinformeddecisions,ena‐bles social learning and thushelps to revealwin‐win‐potential and, overall, fostersmore sus‐tainabledecisions(Yearleyetal.2003;Pellizzoni2003).Moreover, it isassumedthat involve‐mentofnon‐stateactorsinlocaldecision‐makinghasthepotentialtoopenupestablished,non‐sustainableactornetworksforecologicalmatterssuchthatparticipatorydecision‐makingyieldsoutputswithastrongerecologicalstandard(Dryzek1997;Smith2003).

H1a: Participationofnon‐stateactorsleadstomoreecologicallyrationaldecisionsthanintop‐downmodesofgovernance.

Ontheotherhand,itispostulatedthatpublicinvolvementeffectivelyrespondstoimplementa‐tion deficits in eco‐politics by increasing non‐state actors’ acceptance and compliance(Macnaghtenand Jacobs1997;Bulkeley andMol2003).This isbasedon the assumption thatsocietaloppositionwilldecreaseoncenon‐stateactors find thepreferencesand interests theyvoicedinaparticipatoryprocessrepresentedinthefinalpolicydecision.Proceduraljusticere‐search(LindandTyler1988;Tyler1990)suggests,moreover, thatacceptanceofpublicpolicywillbehighevenincasesofsubstantialdisagreementorlackofconsiderationofnon‐stateactorinterestsas longas thedecision‐makingprocedure is regarded fair and legitimate.Taking thecue from participatory democratic theorists who highlight the legitimacy benefits of involve‐ment procedures, scholars assume that collaborative forms of decision‐making contribute tohigherlevelsofacceptanceandimplementationrates(Sabatieretal.2005).

H1b: Participationofnon‐stateactors leads to improvedcompliancewithdecisionsandthusbetteroutcomesandimpactsinecologicaltermsthantop‐downmodesofgov‐ernance.

2.Spatialrelevanceofactorinterests

Spatialscaleisimportantregardingactors’perceptions,interestsandproblem‐solvingpotentialthat vary with their spatial relationship to the relevant environmental goods or problems(Schmitter2002;Heinetal.2006;HunsbergerandKenyon2008).Itwasobservedthatcitizenslivinginclosespatialproximitytoanaturalresourcetendtofavouritseconomicuse,whereasthoselivingatagreaterdistancetendtofavourresourceconservation(Koontz1999).

H2a: Citizenslivinginclosespatialproximitytoanaturalresourcetendtofavouritseco‐nomicexploitation,whereas those living fartheraway tend to favour its conserva‐tion.

Ecologicalgoalscanoftenbemoreeffectivelypursuedathigherspatialscales,economicgoalsmoreeffectivelyat lowerspatial scales (Koontz1999),because localpolicy‐makers tend tobesubject to higher economic pressure compared with those at higher levels of governance(Sabatier1974).Participatoryprocessestendtobemoreprofessionallymanagedathighergov‐

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ernancelevels(RockloffandMoore2006),whileatthesametimespecificknowledgeregardinglocalmattersdecreases.

H2b: Wheredecisioncompetencesregardingenvironmentalissuesareatlowerlevelsofgovernance,astrongerandmoreinfluentialparticipationofcitizenswitheconomicinterestscanbeexpected.

3.Local‐scaleversushigher‐scaledecision‐making

DrawingagainonDahl1994,therearestrongargumentstosupportthatcollectivematters(andenvironmentalproblems,inparticular)cantypicallybedealtwithmoreeffectivelyonwider(e.g.nationalorsupranational) rather thanvery local scales (Flynn2000).Thecentralargument isthat local activities oftenhavedistant effectsharmful to the environment; in economic terms,negative externalities or regional spillovers (Oates 1999). An attempt to solve such problemslocallypresentsa‘collective‐actiondilemma’(Hardin1968;Olson1969)inwhichthecostsen‐suingfromlocalenvironmentallyconsciousbehaviouraregreaterthanthebenefitsexperiencedatthislevel–theburdenofcostisexperiencedlocally,whilethebenefitsextendfurtherthanthelocalcommunity.Preferencesoflocalparticipantsarethusassumedtypicallytobelessinfavourof environmental action.Moreover, local administration is assumed tobemore susceptible tolobbying(regulatorycapture)byeconomicdevelopmentinterests(Demmke1997).Inaddition,itisoftenarguedthatathigherspatialscalesparticipantshaveagreatercompetency(RockloffandMoore2006),suchthatmoresuitableandbetterdecisionsinecologicaltermsaretakenatthislevel.

H3a: Theenvironmentaleffectivenessofdecisionscorrelatespositivelywith thescaleofthegovernanceunit.

Ontheotherhand,manyparticipationscholarsholdthat–consistentwithhypothesesH1andH2–localgovernance,especiallywhenstronglyparticipatory,ismorelikelytoleadtoecologicallyrational outcomes than governance on higher spatial scales (Leach et al. 2002). This involvesargumentsoftheusefulnessoflocallayknowledge(Steele2001;Pellizzoni2003;Yearleyetal.2003),butalsoofthecapacityoflocalgroupstoself‐organiseandthusbetterensuresocialcon‐trol,acceptanceandcompliance(Ostrom2005,1990;Ostrometal.1961):

H3b: Theenvironmentaleffectivenessofdecisionscorrelatesnegativelywiththescaleofthegovernanceunit.

4.Spatialfitbetweengovernancescalesandnaturalscales

Agrowingbodyof literature,rootedinthetheoryofcomplexadaptivesystems,dealswiththesustainability of coupled social‐ecological systems (Adger et al. 2003; Berkes 2002; Armitage2008).Itstudiestheinteractionsandtensionsbetweendifferentscalelevelsanddimensions.Acentralissueisthe(mis)fitbetweennaturalandinstitutional(governance)scales–environmen‐talproblemsandthemultiplefactorsthatcausethemextenddifferentiallyinspaceandexhibitdifferentgeographicalpatterns.Thesetypicallycutacrossterritorialgovernanceunits,involvingspilloversinneighboringjurisdictions.If,forinstance,airpollutioniscausedinonejurisdictionbut extends into others, co‐operation between bothwill be necessary in order to resolve theproblemathand.Thecentralconclusion is to improve thespatial fitbetweengovernanceandnaturalscaledimensions:‘Overall,thepresumptionisthatthecloserthefitbetweenecosystemsand institutionalsystems, thebetter therelevant institutionswillperform,at least in termsofsustainability’(Young2002:20,referringtoBerkes&Folke1998).Inthemulti‐levelgovernanceliterature these task‐specific governance institutions whose geographic boundaries relate tonaturalorculturalgeographicalboundariesaretermed‘TypeII’systems,asopposedtoclassicalterritorial jurisdictionswhichdonotcutacrosseachother,whichtypicallypossessanencom‐passingcompetency,andwhicharetermed‘TypeI’MLGsystems(Hooghe&Marks2003).

H4a: Governanceofnaturalresourcesonnaturalscalesleadstomoreecologicallyration‐aloutcomesthangovernanceonterritorialscales.

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However,the‘institutionalfit’approachinH4aisnotentirelyundisputed.Preciselybecauseofthe overlap of territorial governance units with ‘new’ ecosystem‐related Type II governancescales,coordinationofdifferentactorsandtheiridentificationwithcommontasksissaidtobeproblematic,especiallyregardingcommonfinancingofmeasuresimposed(Ingram2008).Thisraises the question of the horizontal coordination (institutional interplay) between differentactors,competencesandpolicyfields,suchaswaterresourcesplanning,agricultureandindus‐try (Moss 2003; Young 2002). Thus there appears to be a dilemma concerning the ecologicalrationalityofgoverningnaturalresourcesontheir‘appropriate’scaleandtheresultingtransac‐tioncosts.

H4b: Governanceofnaturalresourcesonnaturalscalesleadstolessecologicallyrationaloutcomesthangovernanceonterritorialscales.

Asameanstoimprovebothinstitutionalfitandhorizontalinterplay,participatoryprocessesarerecommendedas ‘tools tohelpusbridge thediscontinuitybetweengeographicaland jurisdic‐tionalboundaries’andthusarriveatamoresustainablemanagementofnaturalresources(DelliPriscoli2004:225).

H4c: Participationimprovesthefitbetweennaturalandgovernancescalesandthusim‐provesenvironmentaloutcomes.

5.Polycentricityofthewhole(multi‐level)governancesystem

Finally,regardingtheenvironmentaleffectivenessofmulti‐levelgovernancesystems,againtwocompetinghypothesescanbeformulated.

Ontheonehand,policy implementationresearchassumesthatcomplexMLGsystemshampergovernance effectiveness. The involvement of multiple administrative levels and ‘clearancepoints’isregardedasinhibitivetopolicyimplementation,becausewitheachlevelofimplemen‐tationandeach furthervetoplayer (Tsebelis1995) theprobabilityofmisinterpretationof theoriginalpolicyprogramme,insufficientresourcesandopposinginterestsincreases(Pressman&Wildavsky1984[1973]). Innormativelymore ‘favourable’terms,thesamecircumstanceis in‐terpretedbythe‘bottom‐upschool’withinimplementationresearchasthatpolicyimplementa‐tionitselfregularlyinvolvespoliticaldecisions,andnotonlyameretechnicaltransformationofprogrammeintoreality(Hill&Hupe2003).

H5a: Themorelevelsandactorsinvolvedinapolicyimplementationprocess,thelesseritseffectiveness.

Ontheotherhand,thesystems‐orientedapproachregardsdiversityasastabilisingelement.Amultitudeofhorizontalandvertical,quasi‐autonomousdecisioncentres isassumedtobecon‐ducivetomediationbetweencentralizedanddecentralizeddecision‐makingandthereforebet‐terabletoadapttoexternalchangeanduncertaintybyvirtueofitsflexibility(McGinnis1999a),inparticularinsituationsinvolvingnumerouscausalinteractionsbetweenmultiplelevelsofde‐cision‐making (Cash et al. 2006). In this context, the cooperation of different stakeholders ‘atdifferentsocialandecologicalscalesinmulti‐levelinstitutionsandorganizations’(Folke2006)isregardedascrucial.

H5b: Ahighnumberofhorizontalandvertical,quasi‐autonomousdecisionpointsisbet‐terabletoadapttoexternalchangethanhierarchicalmodesofgovernance,leadingtoamoresustainableresourceuse.

3.Methodology

Theanalysisrelieson47casestudiesofparticipatoryenvironmentalgovernancethatwerecon‐ductedbetween1970and2007intheUnitedStates,CanadaandWesternEurope.Authoredbypolitical scientists, planning scholars, geographers or environmental sociologists, these textswere published in scientific journals or edited books and selected from a larger pool of case

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studies on citizen involvement in natural resources management, participatory planning andsustainable communityprogrammes.Themajorityof casestudies,both in thesampleand thedatabase,reportoncitizeninvolvementinNorthAmerica,whilefewertextsprovideadetailedaccountofparticipation inEuropeanenvironmentalmanagement.Thisdistributionattests thelong history of collaborative conflict resolution inUS eco‐politics,which is also reflected in alargershareofpublicationsinrelevantjournalsandbooks.However,statisticaltestshaveestab‐lishedthattherearenosignificantcorrelationsbetweenthegeographiclocationoftheprocessanddependent and independentvariables, indicating that thepredominanceofUS casesdoesnotbiastheanalysis.However,werecognisethattherearesignificantdifferencesbetweentheUSandseveralEuropeancountrieswithregardtohowmultiplelevelsofgovernancearesetupandinteractwitheachother.Thesesystemicdifferencescouldnotbeapproachedindetailinthepresentstudyduetothesmallnumberofnon‐UScases.Theinclusionofcasestudiesfromthe1970s and 1980s contributes to assessment of the impacts of participatory governance overrelativelylongtimeframesandalsotoanunderstandingofdifferencesintheimpactsofpartici‐patory governance in certain periods, e.g. due to changes of societal values or environmentalattitudes.

Themainselectioncriterion for thesampleof thisstudywasthecompletenessof informationprovidedinthecasereports.Itisthankstothepreliminarycharacterofthepaperandthecur‐rentstateofthison‐goingresearchprojectthatafullcoverageofpotentiallyexplanatoryfactorsappearedtobecrucialtotestthemethodologychosen(seebelow)andrefineresearchdesign,theory as well as hypotheses. However, we do not expect a systematic relationship betweencompletenessofstudyandindependentaswellasdependentvariablesofstudiedphenomenonand,therefore,biasesduetocaseselection.Asaconsequence,thesampleisnotfullyrepresenta‐tiveforallcasesinthepoolandalsodoesnotentirelyreflectthevarietyofallparticipatorypro‐cesses undertaken in the case study countries. However, the selected sample covers a broadspectrumofpoliticalissues,scales,societalcontextsandtypesofparticipation(seeTable1).

Case Country Year Reference

301hWaterRegulationCase USA 1977 Burgessetal.1983AargauLandfillSiting CH 1993 Rennetal.1998AlbemarlePamlicoEstuarineStudy USA 1990 Koontzetal.2004AnimasRiverStakeholderGroup USA 1998 Koontzetal.2004AshtabulaRiverRemedialActionPlan USA 1990 LandreandKnuth1993BayofQuinteRemedialActionPlan CA 1988 LandreandKnuth1993BelmontOpenSpaceControversy USA 1998 Layzer2002BraytonPointCoalConversion USA 1977 BurgessandSmith1983ChiwaukeePrairieSpatialPlanningCase USA 1983 Haygood1995ColdLakeLarge‐ScaleBitumenExtraction CA 1978 Elder1982CollingwoodHarbourRemedialActionPlan CA 1990 Krantzberg1996ColoradoGrandCanyonRiverManagementPlan USA 2001 Orton2005ColstripPowerPlantMediation USA 1978 Sullivan1983EastEvergladesPlanningStudy USA 1986 Abramsetal.1995FoothillsWaterManagementCase USA 1976 Burgess1983FrankfurtAirportAirstripExtension D 1999 Geis2005HolstonRiverChemicalPlantMediation USA 1974 Jaegerman1983HomestakeMiningCase USA 1980 WatsonandDanielson1983HudsonRiverPowerStationSettlement USA 1980 Talbot1984IdahoWildernessControversy USA 1990 Bairdetal.1995InlandNorthwestFieldBurningSummit USA 1990 MangerichandLuton1995Interstate90Extension USA 1976 Talbot1984JacksonSewageTreatmentPlant USA 1978 Hill1983LübeckWasteManagementProposal D 1995 Wiedemannetal.1995

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MaineRadioactiveWasteCitizenAdvisoryGroup USA 1990 ClaryandHornney1995MaineTransportationPolicyCase USA 1992 Bogdonoff1995MilwaukeeEstuaryRemedialActionPlan USA 1991 Kaemmereretal.1992MünchehagenHazardousWasteSiting D 1992 Striegnitz1997NeussWasteManagementPlan D 1993 FietkauandWeidner1998Pig’sEyeMississippiRiverandWetlandsCase USA 1980 Nelson1990aPortageIslandParkManagementCase USA 1979 Talbot1984PortlandGeneralElectric USA 1980 Mogen1986SandLakesQuietAreaOilDrillingNegotiation USA 1981 Nelson1990bSandspitHarbourMediation CA 1992 Sigurdson1998SanJuanNationalForestMediation USA 1983 Tableman1990SnoqualmieRiverFloodProtectionMediation USA 1974 DembartandKwartler1980SpeyRiverBasinManagementPlan UK 2001 Blackstock&Richards2007SpreewaldRiparianLandProject D 2002 BaranekandGünther2005SugarbushWaterWithdrawalMediation USA 1992 FitzhughandDozier1996SwanLakeHydroelectricPowerplantConflict USA 1979 Talbot1984ThreeRiversWatershed USA 1972 Mazmanian1979UmatillaBasinMediation USA 1992 Neuman1996UpperNarragansettBayWasteWaterTreatment USA 1996 Burroughs1999WildcatandSanPabloCreekFloodManagement USA 1972 Mazmanian1979WinfieldLocksToxicWasteCase USA 1992 Langton1996WisconsinGroundwaterCommission USA 1982 Edgar1990YukonWolfManagementTeam USA 1992 Todd2002

Table1:Listofcasestudiesanalysed.

Traditionally, empirical research on participatory governance draws on conducting single ormultiplecasestudies(smallN).Whilethisallowsaqualitative,in‐depthunderstandingofpartic‐ipatorydecision‐making,theobviousdisadvantageliesinthelackofgeneralisabilityinthefaceofamultitudeofdifferentproceduresaswellassocietalandenvironmentalcontexts(Ragin&Sonnett 2005).While classicworksof comparative research (Lijphart1971) significantly con‐tributed to setting up most‐similar or most‐different research designs and, thus, to isolatingcausalfactors,theykeeprelyingontheanalysisofasmallnumberofcasesonly.Whilethecom‐parativemethodhasbroughtexcellentresearch inmanyfieldsof interest,wemaintainthat inparticipation research, due to the large number of potential influencial factors, the study of alargenumberofcases(largeN)representsapromisingalternativebasedonreplicableexperi‐ments and quantitative statistical analysis. For reasons of resources, however, these are onlypossible under highly controlled contexts and only for a limited set of (participatory)mecha‐nisms (Mahoney 20074). One traditional way to integrate the knowledge of many empiricalstudies is toconductreviews.However, reviewsrelystronglyon thesubjective judgementsofthereviewerandareseldomperformedinatransparentorreplicableway.

Hundredsofcasestudiesonparticipatoryenvironmentaldecisions,manyofwhichprovidein‐formationonenvironmentalimpacts,presentarich,yetextremelyscatteredandthusunexploit‐ed source of empirical data. As amethod to integrate qualitative case‐oriented research in atransparentmanner,theproposedprojectwillusethecasesurveymethod(Lucas1974;YinandHeald1975;Larsson1993),combiningqualitativeandquantitativetechniques.Thebasicideaisto draw on existing and published case study reports, following the procedure proposed byLarsson (1993, p. 1516‐7): “(1) Select a group of existing case studies relevant to the chosenresearchquestions;(2)designacodingschemeforthesystematicconversionofthequalitativecasedescriptionsintoquantifiedvariables;(3)usemultipleraterstocodethecasesandmeas‐uretheirinterraterreliability,and(4)statisticallyanalyzethedata”.Thus,casesurveysdrawontherichnessofthecasematerial,ondifferentresearchersandresearchdesigns.Casesurveysareparticularlyusefulwhencasestudiesdominatetheareaofresearch,whenabroadrangeofcon‐

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ditionsisofinterestandwhenanexperimentaldesignisimpossible(Larsson1993),allofwhichappliestotheproposedproject.Themethodovercomesthemajordrawbackofsinglecasestud‐ies,namelytheirinabilitytogeneralisefromtheirrespectivecontext.Casesurveysthuscombinethevirtuesofidiographic(case‐based)andnomothetic(cross‐case)research.

Usingexistingcasestudiesasempiricalmaterial,theauthorsappliedadetailedcodingschemeinordertoextractrelevantinformationandsubsequentlyconductedstatisticaldataanalysis.Tothisend,aconceptualframeworkwasdevelopedincludingseveraldozenvariablesonthecon‐text,theprocess,andtheoutcomesof(participatory)environmentaldecision‐making.Basedonthisframework,acodingschemewaselaboratedand,afteracarefulreadingofallcasestudies,used forcodingmostof thevariablesona five‐pointsemi‐quantitativescale intoanMicrosoftAccessdatabase.Inordertomaintainintercoderreliabilitywheninterpretingdata,thefirstdoz‐enofcaseswerereadbyatleasttwocoders.77percentofthesecodeswereidentical,whereas23percentweredifferent,inwhichcasethearithmeticmeanwascalculated.Intotal,thecasestudiesprovided informationon86percentofallvariables.Finally,wecalculatedcorrelationcoefficientsamongvariables.Asmanyvariables turnedoutnot tobenormallydistributed,weusedSpearman’srho.Forstatisticalanalysis,weaggregatedsomeoftheoriginalvariables,e.g.bydefiningthenewvariable‘actorgoals’asthearithmeticmeanofallindividualactorgoals.

4.Empiricalfindings

In this section we will subject the causal hypotheses discussed in section 2 to a ‘plausibilityprobe’(Eckstein1975).Applyinghypothesesfromverydifferentstrandsofresearchtoacom‐monsetofcasesprovidesanexcellentopportunitytotesttheirvalidityinacomparativeman‐ner.Atfirst,weanalysetheextenttowhichpublicparticipationindecision‐makingimprovesthequalityofpolicies,andalsotheirimplementation.Secondly,weexploretheinfluenceofmultiplelevelsofgovernanceaswellasspatialscalesonenvironmentalpolicyeffectiveness.

1.Participatoryversustop‐downmodesofgovernance

H1a: Participation of non‐state actors leads to more ecologically rational decisionsthantop‐downmodesofgovernance.

InSection2wediscussedanumberofpossiblecausalfactorsthatcouldaffectthequalityofen‐vironmentaldecisions.Inordertodeterminewhetherparticipationreallymakesadifferenceasopposedtohierarchicaldecision‐making,wecomparedparticipatorypolicyoutputstohypothet‐icaltop‐downscenarios.Thelatterwerebasedonthepositionheldbythecompetentauthoritypriortoorinthepublicinvolvementprocess.

Accordingtoouranalysis,interestsandpoliticalgoalsofstateandnon‐stateactorsappeartobethemostimportantcausalfactorsexplainingparticipatorypolicyoutputs(meanactorgoalscor‐relatewithr=.84withp<.001).Itisthusreasonabletoassumethatactorgoalscontributeasmuch to increases or decreases in environmental policy outputs. One ‘negative’ example arepublic authorities such as theUSEPA,whose core agency goal is to reducepollution and im‐prove environmental conditions, organise public involvement processes. Deliberations withagenciesonastate‐levelorwithnon‐stateactorsthatdonotsharetheUSEPA’shighecologicalaspirationsorwhosepoliticalagendaisevenopposedtoenvironmentalprotectionoftenleadtoa watering down of agency proposals. Collaborative agreements therefore often represent acompromisebetweencompeting interests rather thanacollectivesearch forecologicallyopti‐mal solutions.A case inpoint is theSpreewald public involvement inEasternGermanywherelocalactors fromforestry, fishery,agricultureandtourisminapublicengagementprocessop‐posedstrictmeasuresconcerningsustainablelanduseandwatermanagementinordertokeeprevenues high. However, other cases demonstrate that local actors can form a coalitionwithenvironmentalprotectionagenciesoncetheyperceivetheirhealthandpersonalwell‐beingtobeindanger.TheColstrippowerplantcasegivesevidenceofhowatribeofNativeAmericansop‐posedmodernisationofanearbypowerplantonhealthgrounds. Inapublicconsultationpro‐

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cess,theyenforcedadditionalairqualitymonitoringandprotectivemeasuresasapreconditionfortheextensionoftheplant.

Acceptance

by participants Environmental standard of output

Environmental standard of outcome

Mean actor preferences ‐.03 ‐.84*** ‐.36*

Face-to-face comm. ‐.28* ‐.38* ‐.06

Two-way information flow ‐.16 ‐.14 ‐.13*

Table2:Spearmancorrelationcoefficients;*:significantwithp<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

We also found evidence for environmentally beneficial impacts of direct face‐to‐face interac‐tions.At the same time,however, our calculations suggest that there is anegative correlationbetweentwo‐wayinformationflowinpublicparticipationandenvironmentaloutputquality.Itappearsthatourcasestudysamplecontainsalargenumberofstudiesreportingoninvolvementprocesseswithnon‐stateactorsthatarerathercriticaltostringentenvironmentalregulation.Inthesecases,two‐waycommunicationchannelsopenupopportunitiesforinfluencethatarenotalways for thebenefitofenvironmentalprotection.At thesametime,nocorrelationsbetweensociallearningandthequalityofenvironmentaldecisionscouldbeobserved.

Insum,itappearsthatH1acannotfullybeconfirmedsincethecausalrelationshipsmotivatingthehypothesisvarytoalargeextentwithregardtotheirrelativeimportanceand,what’smore,can both support or prevent improvements of environmental outputs. While participation isindeedabletoopenupnetworksfor‘green’preferences,thiseffectismorethancompensatedbythepossibilityof localdevelopment intereststoprevail.Ouranalysisalsosuggeststhatthe in‐volvementofnon‐stateactorsdoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheutilityoflocalknowledgeandthepotentialofsociallearningforachievingmoresustainableoutputs.

H1b: Participation of non‐state actors leads to improved compliance with decisions

andthusbetteroutcomesandimpactsinecologicaltermsthantop‐downmodesofgovernance.

According to theacademic literature,publicparticipationcontributes to improvedcomplianceandpolicyimplementation.This isduetotheenhancedconsiderationofnon‐stateactor inter‐ests in policy decisions and also due to acceptance gains based on procedural justicemecha‐nisms.Ourquantitativeanalysessuggestthat,ontheonehand,involvementproceduresincreaseacceptanceofpublicdecisionsandthat,ontheotherhand,acceptanceisamajorpreconditionfor compliance and a swifter implementation. In accordance with the theory, increased ac‐ceptance canmainly be attributed to consideration of the positions held by non‐state actors,whileothersignificantcorrelationscouldnotbeidentified.

ThesefindingscanbeillustratedbytheHolstonRivercase,whichillustrateshowcollaborativedecision‐makingbetween theUSEPAanda large chemicalplant contributed to improved im‐plementationofwaterqualitystandards.Althoughthefinalagreementwas,fromanecologicalpointofview, lessstringentthandemandedbyenvironmentalmovements, involvementof thebusiness community helped to avoid time‐consuming court trials and swiftly allowed waterqualitystandardstobeputintopractice.Inlightofthedilutionofenvironmentalstringencydis‐cussedabove, itcanbehypothesisedthattrickydisputesbetweenenvironmentalagenciesandpowerful economic actors can be resolved and policiesmore easily implementedwhen stateagencies arewilling to compromise. However, some studies reported cases of environmentalpublicparticipationthatexperienceddelayedimplementationofcollaborativelymadedecisions.Moreoftenthannotthiswasthecasewhenoneormorepartiesperceivedtheprocesstobeun‐fair orwere deliberately excluded, as theAlbemarle‐Pamlico estuarinemanagement case sug‐gests.

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2.Spatialrelevanceofactorinterests

H2a: Citizens living inclosespatialproximitytoanaturalresourcetendto favour itseconomicexploitation,whereasthoselivingfartherawaytendtofavouritscon‐servation.

Inordertotestthishypothesis,wecodedthegeographicscaleoftheparticipatoryprocessasanindicatoroftheproximityofnon‐stateactorstotheenvironmentalproblemathandandexam‐inethisagainsttheactorpositionsheld.Accordingtoouranalysis,thereisnostatisticallysignif‐icantcorrelationbetweenthescaleofparticipatorygovernanceandinterestsvoicedinthepro‐cess,refutingthehypothesis.Acloserlookintothecasestudies,however,revealsthatactorin‐terestsaretoaconsiderableextentdependentongeneraleconomictrendsinthelocalcommu‐nityandthebroaderregion.Thehypothesis,therefore,requiresfurtherrefinementandshouldallowfor flexibilitywithregardtoresolvingthetrade‐offbetweeneconomicdevelopmentandenvironmentalprotectionincertainpolicycontexts.

Mean actor

preferences Mean weighted actor influence

Problem scale ‐.12 ‐.16

Governance (participation) scale ‐.06 ‐.19

Table3:Spearmancorrelationcoefficients;*:significantwithp<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

Forexample,intheUmatillaBasinmediationtheopposinginterestsoflocalandnon‐localactorscanbeobservedinoneandthesamecase.Inthe1970s,fishermen,farmersandenvironmental‐istsdiscussedwhether rivers inOregonshouldbediverted for thebenefitof local agricultureand at the expense of fisheries.While local actorsmainly pursued their economic well‐beingduringthenegotiations,itwasexternalenvironmentalactivistswhoeffectivelydefendedecolog‐icalvalues.However,publicparticipation in theremediationof theGreatLakesgaveevidencethateconomyandecologycanturnouttobesurprisingbedfellows.Basedonabilateralagree‐mentbetweenCanadaandtheUS,theseriouspollutionproblemsofthissingularaquaticenvi‐ronmentweretoberesolvedinanumberoflocalparticipatoryprocessesthatwerecloselytiedtosupranationalnegotiations.IntheAshtabulaRiverandCollingwoodHarbourcases,localactorswerewillingtoimproveenvironmentalconditionsasthiswouldsupporteconomicdevelopmentinanindustriallydeprivedregion,e.g.inthefisheryortouristicsector.

H2b: Wheredecisioncompetencesregardingenvironmentalissuesareonlowerlevels

ofgovernance,astrongerandmoreinfluentialparticipationofcitizenswitheco‐nomicinterestscanbeexpected.

Inouranalysis,wecodedandtestedcorrelationsbetweenactorinterests,willingnesstopartici‐pateincollaborativedecision‐makingandalsoscaleofgovernance.Nocorrelationbetweengov‐ernancescaleandthemeanofactor interestsandparticipationtendency is found.However,aslightlynegativeyetstatisticallynotsignificantcorrelationbetweenregulatoryscaleandactorinfluencesisrevealed.Basedonin‐depthstudyofthequalitativecasestudies,wefoundindeedevidencesustainingthehypothesisinanumberofcases.However,manyotherpolicycontextsand involvement processes are characterised by complex factorial relationships that are notaccountedforinthehypothesis.

In Florida’sEastEverglades, parkmanagers and environmentalistswere in conflictwith localfarmerswhoincreasinglywithdrewwaterto irrigatetheirfieldsattheexpenseofanationallyprotectedandecologicallyvaluablemarshland.Themediationresultedinacompromisewhichhastobeinterpretedasasuccessforlocalagriculture,takingintoaccountthestronglegalstat‐uteoftheNationalPark.Themainreasonsbehindthecompromisewereconcernsregardingthesocioeconomicwellbeingoftheregion.Inothercases,however, localeconomicinterestsfailedtohaveamajorimpactonaparticipatorydecisionasaresultofstrategicmistakes,asthePig’s

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Eyecaseillustrates,whereaneconomicallypromisingdredgingprojectinMinnesotacouldnotberealiseddespitethat italsohadthesupportof localpoliticians.Thiswasbecausethedomi‐nantbusinesscoalitionfelt,thankstoitspoliticalandeconomicpower,unwillingtocontinueapublic involvement exercise and to compromise in favourof environmental interests. Instead,theypreferredtofighttheirwaythroughthecourtsandlost–totheadvantageofmembersoftheenvironmentalmovement.

3.Local‐scaleversushigher‐scaledecision‐making

H3a: Theenvironmentaleffectivenessofdecisionscorrelatespositivelywiththescaleofthegovernanceunit.

H3b: Theenvironmentaleffectivenessofdecisionscorrelatesnegativelywiththescaleofthegovernanceunit.

Environmental

standard of output Environmental standard of outcome

Problem scale ‐.18 ‐.14

Governance (authority) scale ‐.05 ‐.23

Governance (participation) scale ‐.02 ‐.06

Table4:Spearmancorrelationcoefficients;*:significantwithp<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

These two hypotheses were put to the test by looking for correlations between outcome‐orientedvariablesandbothscaleoftheparticipatoryprocessandscaleofthecompetentauthor‐ity.Inouranalysis,wewereunabletoidentifyanypositiveornegativecorrelationbetweenthe‐sefactors.Thiscouldbeexplainedbythefactthatbothhypotheticaleffects,thegainsofgrouplearningandsocialcapitalontheonehandandaprofoundinterestinafunctioninglocalecono‐myontheother,eveneachotherout.However,withinthescopeofthispaperitwasnotpossibletotestthisnewlydevelopedassumption.Alternatively,itcanbeconceivedthatdifferentsubsetsofcasesdisplayeitheroneofthehypotheses,suchthatthedatasetasawholedoesnotdisplayanycorrelation.Ifthisistrue,thenthiswouldcallforcontextvariablestobefoundthatdeter‐minethecasesubsets.Again, this isachallenge for futureresearch.Nevertheless, the findingsrelatingtohypothesis2suggestthatthegeographicaldistributionofactorinterestsmightpro‐videastartingpointtofurtherunderstandtheeffectsofpolicyscaleonpolicydecisionsinenvi‐ronmentalgovernance.

4.Spatialfitbetweengovernancescalesandnaturalscales

H4a: Governanceofnaturalresourcesonnaturalscalesleadstomoreecologicallyra‐tionaloutcomesthangovernanceonterritorialscales.

H4b: Governance of natural resources onnatural scales leads to less ecologically ra‐tionaloutcomesthangovernanceonterritorialscales.

Environmental

standard of output Environmental standard of outcome

Problem scale – Governance (participation) scale ‐.18 ‐.30*

Problem scale – Governance (authority) scale ‐.05 ‐.00

Table5:Spearmancorrelationcoefficients;*:significantwithp<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

Asaroughindicatorofspatialfit,wecalculatedtheabsolutevalueofthedifferencebetweenthegeographicalscaleoftheenvironmentalproblemandthegeographicalscaleoftheparticipation

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processaswellasthedifferencebetweenproblemscaleandscaleoftheleadingauthority’sju‐risdiction.However,thereisnodenyingthatinparticularthosecaseswithanaturalscalelargerthantheregulationscaleareof interest,becausethisarrangementimplieseithercollaborationbetweenauthoritiesofdifferentjurisdictionsorthatthemisfithasbeenignoredattheexpenseoftheenvironment.Accordingtoouranalysisandcontrarytotheory,however,nopositivecor‐relationscouldbeidentified;surprisingly,theformerisevenslightlynegativelycorrelatedwithenvironmentaloutcomes.Themain factorunderlyingthis findingseemstobe that, in thevastmajorityof casesanalysed, governance scalematchesorexceeds thenatural (ecologicalprob‐lem)scale,whilethenaturalscaleactuallyexceedsthegovernancescaleinonlyfouroutof47cases.Methodologically,aconsiderablylargersamplewouldhavetobestudiedinordertopro‐videanysignificantresultsforthistheses.Ontheotherhand,ouranalysisdoesshowthatspatialmisfitappearstobealesssalientissuethantheliteraturehasbeenassuming.

H4c: Participation improves the fit betweennatural and governance scales and thus

improvesenvironmentaloutcomes.

Inordertotestthishypothesis,wecheckedforcaseswhereaparticipatoryprocesswasusedasameanstomatchgovernancescalewiththenaturalboundariesofthepolicyproblemathandbyinvolvinganumberofstateornon‐stateactorsfromregionsgeographicallymuchmoreremotethanthecompetentauthority.Inoursample,wehaveonlyfourcasesthatmatchthesecriteriasothatstatisticalanalysiswasinappropriate.Aqualitativeassessmentdidgiveevidenceforsig‐nificantimpactsonenvironmentaloutputsandoutcomesresultingfromrescalingefforts.IntheFoothillscase,whereinordertoguaranteewatersupplyforthecityofDenverconstructionofanecologicallyinferiordamwasdebated,collaborativegovernancecontributedtoachievementofanidenticalmatchbetweenthenaturalscaleandscaleofgovernance.However,ecological im‐provementscouldnotbeobservedasaresultoftherescaling.Onthecontrary,thelargenumberofstateagencies indifferentsectorsandatdifferentpolicylevels increasedthenumberofdif‐ferentpositionsheldandrepresentedamajorhandicapwithregardtofindingcommonground.Apparently,rescalingbymeansofparticipatoryprocessesappearstobeabletoachieveidentityofscalebutalsocanleadtoinvolvementofactorswhodonotnecessarilyshareecologicalgoals.This isnotonly thecasewithregard tonon‐stateactors;publicagenciesentrustedwith tasksotherthanenvironmentalprotectionmaybeasobstinateasbusinessoragriculture.

5.Polycentricityofthewhole(multilevel)governancesystem

H5a: Themorelevelsandactorsinvolvedinapolicyimplementationprocesstheless‐eritseffectiveness.

H5b: A largenumberofhorizontal andvertical, quasi‐autonomousdecisionpoints isbetter able to adapt to external change thanhierarchicalmodesof governance,leadingtomoresustainableresourceuse.

Thesetwocontradictoryhypotheseshavebeentestedbycodingandchecking forcorrelationsbetween the number of implementing agencies participating, the number of policy levels in‐volvedandpolicyoutcomevariables.Ourfindingssuggestthatthenumberofgovernancelevelsinvolved strongly correlateswithenvironmental outputquality,while thenumberof agenciesshowsaslightlyweaker,butstillclearcorrelationtothequalityofpolicyoutputs.

Environmental

standard of output Environmental standard of outcome

Number of governance levels involved ‐.40** ‐.23

Number of agencies involved ‐.35* ‐.25

Table6:Spearmancorrelationcoefficients;*:significantwithp<.05;**p<.01;***p<.001

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Strikingexamplesof improvements in environmentalpolicy as a result ofdecision‐makingonmultiplelevelscanbewitnessedintheGreatLakeswatermanagementregime.ThecasestudiesonremedialactionplanningatAshtabulaRiver, theBayofQuinte andCollingwoodHarbour alldemonstratethattheinteractionbetweenlocal,regionalandsupranationalactorscontributedtoasharedunderstandingoftheproblemsathand,acoherentsetofmeasuresaswellasprovisionof the necessary resources to secure swift policy implementation. Furthermore, participatoryprocessesinamulti‐levelgovernancecontextoftenseemtobecharacterisedbyhierarchically‐setpolicygoals.Thankstoparticipationofanumberofdifferentactors,inparticularhigherlevelagencies,compliancewiththesepolicygoalsisassured.However,thisisnottosaythathypothe‐sisH5ahas been refuted. In fact, this hypothesiswas initially elaborated in relation to a top‐down policy process with a sequential implementation chain. Implementing agencies oftenchoosetodelayimplementationonsubstantivegroundsorfailtocomplyduetoresourceprob‐lems.Inparticipatorydecision‐making,agenciespotentiallyimposingdelaysinimplementationareundermuchgreaterpressuretojustifydelaystotheirco‐participants,inparticulartonon‐state actors. Also, resource scarcities and other anticipated causes of delay can be addressedearlier.

5.Summaryandoutlook

Participatoryandmulti‐level,scale‐adaptedgovernancearecurrentresponsestolackingeffec‐tivenessofenvironmentalpolicyinEuropeandothermoderndemocracies.Scholarlyliteraturehasremainedsparseandambiguousabouttheempiricaleffectsofthesemodesofgovernance.Inparticular,therelationbetweenpublicparticipationontheonehandandmulti‐levelgovern‐ance and re‐scaling on the other hand as well as its environmental effects have barely beentreated.Thispaperaimedtoaddressthe issueof theenvironmentaleffectivenessofparticipa‐toryandmulti‐levelgovernancebothconceptuallyandempirically.Tothisend,fivesetsofhy‐pothesesweredeveloped,drawingonscholarlyliteratureonmulti‐levelgovernance,policyim‐plementation,publicparticipationandcomplexsystems.Hypothesesrelatetoparticipatoryver‐sus top‐downmodesof governance; the spatial relevanceof actor interests; local‐scaleversushigher‐scaledecision‐making; thespatial fit(ormisfit)betweennaturalscalesandgovernancescales;andtothepolycentricityofwhole(multi‐level)governancesystems.Reflectingdifferentassumptionsintherespectivefieldsofresearch,someofthehypothesescontradicteachother,puttingforwardcompetingclaims.

Inordertoputtheseclaimstoapreliminiaryempiricaltest(plausibilityprobe),weusedacom‐parativemeta‐analysisof47casestudiesonenvironmentaldecision‐making inNorthAmericaandEurope,whichispartofalargerongoingresearchproject(NewigandFritsch2009;FritschandNewig2009).Onthequantitativeside,wecalculatedcorrelationsbetweenrelevantvaria‐bles; on the qualitative side,we searched the casematerial for convincing evidence of causalprocessesthatsustainorrefutethehypotheses.Almostallprocessesdescribedintheliteraturecouldbefoundinsomeoftheanalysedcasestudies,whichindicatesthatscholarlyworkinthefield providesmeaningful assumptions regarding the effectiveness of participatory andmulti‐levelgovernance.However,onlytwosetsofhypothesesyieldedsignificantstatisticalmaterial:Regardinghypotheses1a/b,morethananyothervariabletheenvironmentalpreferencesoftheinvolved actors determine the environmental outputs (and outcomes) of decision‐making.Moreover,wefoundthatface‐to‐face,butnotmeretwo‐waycommunicationappearstopositive‐ly influencetheecologicalstandardofdecisions.Regardinghypotheses5a/b,ouranalysissug‐geststhatahighlypolycentricgovernancesystemcomprisingmanyagenciesandlevelsofgov‐ernanceyieldshigherenvironmentaloutputsthanrathermonocentricgovernance.

Ourfindingssuggestthatfurtherresearchisneededinordertounderstandthespecificrelation‐shipbetweenmulti‐levelgovernanceandpublicparticipationinenvironmentalgovernance:

Inlightofouranalysesitcan,firstly,beassumedthatmanyhypothesesarticulatedinthelitera‐tureneed further refinementwith regard to contextualisation. Someof theapproaches testedappeartobesometimes‐trueapproacheswhileotherscouldbeconfirmedtoalargeextent,but

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in‐depthanalysisofcasestudiesrevealsthattheirunderlyingcausalrelationshipsweredifferentormorecomplexthanpredictedbytheory.Furtherresearchwillhavetodrawonamorecom‐prehensivecomparisonofempiricalmaterial inordertoyieldasufficientnumberof instancesonparticularparticipatoryandmulti‐levelaspects.Thisincludesabroadcontrolofthirdvaria‐blesand thedevelopmentof specific conditionsunderwhichcertainapproacheswillhaveex‐planatorypower.

Controllingforthirdvariablesasapreconditionforrigorousin‐depthcasestudiesimplies,sec‐ondly,thatsmall‐Nresearchdesignsbeparalleledbylarge‐Nqualitativestudies.Ahighernum‐berofcasesmightcontributetoisolatingthesecausalfactorsthatexplainaspectsofparticipa‐torymulti‐levelgovernanceinamajorityofcasesfromthosethatappeartoberelevantinspecif‐icsituationsonly.

Studies focussingon the relationshipbetweenmulti‐level governanceandpublicparticipationarescarceandtheoreticalapproachesunderdeveloped.Weargue, thirdly, that futureresearchshouldincludeabroadervarietyofcasestudies,inparticularwithregardtotheireffectivenessandachievementofpresetgoals.There isnodenial thatpublicparticipationcan contribute todelivereffective,legitimateandefficientenvironmentalpoliciesinamulti‐levelcontext.Howev‐er,weneedtobetterunderstandwhichcontextualorprocessfactorsmakebest‐practicecasesso good in order to successfully learn from them. Comparisonswith problematic, complex orfailedcasescanhelptoachievethatgoal.

Finally,wehopethatourconceptualconsiderationsandinitialempiricalfindingswillstimulatefellowresearcherstojointheefforttobetterunderstandthecomplexrelationsbetweenpartici‐patory,multi‐levelandscale‐adaptedgovernanceandtheeffectivenessofenvironmentalpolicy.

Acknowledgements

Part of this researchwas conductedwithin the project GoverNat –Multi‐level Governance ofNatural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and Biodiversity, a Marie Curie ResearchTrainingNetworkfundedbytheEuropeanCommissionunderthe6thFrameworkProgramme,ContractNo.0035536.WethankJouniPaavolaandtwoanonymousreviewersforthevaluablecommentsonanearlierversionofthiscontribution.

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