Enhancing European Militaryand Police Contributions toUN Peacekeeping

FEBRUARY 2013

Demand for United Nations peacekeeping has been aconsistent feature of the post–Cold War internationalpeace and security agenda. Today, the UN Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations manages sixteen missionsacross the globe, using more than 80,000 troops, morethan 13,000 police, and nearly 2,000 military observers,in addition to approximately 20,000 civilian personnel. Given its expanded size and needs, the burden of supporting UN

peacekeeping must necessarily be shared among UN member states in variousways. The US, Japan, and the European Union (EU) member states togetherfund around 80 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget, while “boots on theground” are largely provided by African and Central and South Asian memberstates, which together provide 71 percent of the UN’s uniformed personnel.However, the notion that Western countries are absent from UN operations ispartially misleading. The sixteen European countries represented at the Berlinroundtable were contributing 5,492 uniformed personnel—around 6 percentof total uniformed contributions to UN peace operations. European personnelare largely concentrated in UN operations in the Middle East; only 383 fromthis group are deployed to the six UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa (0.5percent of the total uniformed peacekeeping personnel in that region).European countries contribute relatively low numbers of police, but thosecontributors are spread across all UN operations. At present, the UN has little problem finding adequate numbers of troops,

police, and observers to staff its operations. However, the capabilities of UNcontingents are inconsistent due to a number of factors, including differencesin training, leadership, and equipment. In many of its largest and mostchallenging operations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, UN peacekeepingstill lacks an array of critical enablers, which significantly limits its operationalcapabilities and negatively affects the implementation of mission mandates. Atthe same time, personnel may lack the specialized skills required to effectivelyimplement complex mandates. For example, the role of UN Police has movedfar beyond the monitoring of host-state police toward more specializedfunctions, such as restructuring police organizations or mentoring host-statepolice. The UN continues to rely on member states, including Europeancountries, to identify, prepare, and deploy personnel with the appropriate skillsand expertise to deliver on diverse mandates.Thus, the need for specialized military and police contributions to UN peace

operations and skilled personnel is a pressing concern. At the same time, thedemands that contemporary peace operations place on contributing countries

On October 24–25, 2012, the

second regional roundtable of the

International Peace Institute–

Pearson Centre Being a Peace -

keeper series took place in Berlin,

Germany, hosted by the Center for

International Peace Operations (ZIF)

with the support of the Directorate

for Strategic Affairs of the French

Ministry of Defense and the Federal

Foreign Office of Germany. With the

impending NATO withdrawal from

Afghanistan as a backdrop, the

discussion focused on future

European commitments to UN

peacekeeping, the strategic security

context, current developments and

challenges in UN peacekeeping, UN

command and control, partnership

arrangements, and mutual needs

and opportunities in the way

forward.

This meeting note reflects the

rapporteurs’ interpretation of the

roundtable discussion and not

necessarily the views of all other

participants. IPI owes a debt of

gratitude to its generous donors

who make publications like this one

possible.

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have become increasingly challenging. Existingcontributors and the UN Secretariat haveassembled an impressive inventory of lessonslearned, guidance, and best practices, yet the needfor continued dialogue, reflection, and improve-ment remains. In its most recent reports, the Special Committee

on Peacekeeping Operations has continued toemphasize the need to broaden the base of troop-and police-contributing countries, recommendingthat “coordinated initiatives be taken to reach out tonew contributors, that former and existing contrib-utors be encouraged to contribute further and thatsupport to emerging contributors be provided.”1

The Being a Peacekeeper series—a joint initiativeof the International Peace Institute (IPI) and thePearson Centre—is a response, in part, to thatrecommendation. It seeks to facilitate networkingat a regional level among experienced contributorsand countries considering becoming more activelyengaged in peacekeeping. It also provides a forumfor interaction among peacekeeping contributorsand other key elements in the UN peacekeepingsystem, such as the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO), the Department of FieldSupport (DFS), interested member states, and thepolicy research community.The Berlin roundtable was held under the

Chatham House rule of nonattribution. Thefollowing is a summary of the key themes thatemerged during the discussions.

Strategic Security Context:New Realities and EmergingThreats

The available supply of European peacekeepingcapabilities might soon increase as NATO troopnumbers decline in Afghanistan. At the same time,European governments continue to struggle withthe implications of the global economic crisis.Reductions in defense spending have beenaccompanied in some countries by strategic defensereviews to define future threats, challenges,objectives, and capabilities. The goal of thesereviews is to be more precise and consistent in

defining the aims of intervention and cleverer inspending money. Conflict prevention and diplomacy remain key

aspects of European countries’ foreign and defensepolicies, while the promotion of the rule of law iscommonly recognized as a core competence ofEuropean (civilian and police) crisis management.“Europe’s interest,” in the words of one roundtableparticipant, “is in a just international order thatemphasizes the responsibilities of nations to therule of law; freedom of communications; access[for] all to sea, air, space, and cyberspace; and theresolution of disputes without the use of force.”Such a vision of the international order, however, iscurrently confronted by the reality of complex andviolent conflict just beyond Europe’s borders.Vacuums of state authority have allowed for theresurgence of conflict and extremism, leading to an“arc of crises” from Kandahar to Dakar.UN peacekeeping continues to be only one

element of European countries’ crisis-managementtools, albeit an important one. For Europeans, theUN remains the primary framework formaintaining international order based on interna-tional human rights and the rule of law—despitethe ongoing polarization among the permanentmembers of the Security Council over questionssuch as Syria. Given the complexity of the conflictson its periphery and the finite set of availableresources, increased collaboration with regionalorganizations will be a critical element in Europe’sattempts to address such challenges. On Syria, inparticular, both the UN and the EU should worktogether now, it was said, to be ready to do theirpart when the civil war eventually ends. Thesituation in Mali is another current threat to Europethat must be addressed, but not without the cooper-ation of the other key regional actors, such as theEconomic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). In addition to partnering with regional and other

entities, European countries also realize the need tomaintain their own capabilities for high-intensityoperations, especially as the United States begins tofocus on other parts of the world, such as Asia-Pacific. In this light, it was noted that during peacetime, UN peace operations provide real-world

1 United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 2010 Substantive Session, UN Doc. A/64/19, 2010, para. 75.

opportunities for the training and skill develop-ment of European militaries and police, particularlywith regard to offering young officers commandexperience. However, European governments mustbe honest about the fact that lengthy deploymentsto Afghanistan have created a considerable degreeof fatigue, leaving less public appetite for otherprolonged international engagements. Integrated regional security policy in Europe,

although more advanced than anywhere else, is stilla work in progress. More than ten years after itsfounding, the Common Security and DefensePolicy (CSDP) is still struggling with its proceduresand structures, and with a lack of consensus onwhat the CSDP should—and should not—aim todeliver. As the EU intensifies its efforts toimplement the Lisbon Treaty, it will also work tostrengthen its high representative for foreign affairsas vice president and voice of the union. TheEuropean External Action Service (EEAS) is onlytwo-years old and thus still evolving, but thestrategic review of the EEAS in 2013 and 2014brings with it the opportunity to develop a strongervision of EU-UN partnership. Participantsacknowledged that more frequent EU operations inthe field would help the EU learn to better strategi-cally align its missions with the UN and otherpartners, as well as make operations more effectiveand cost-efficient.

Contemporary UNPeacekeeping: Evolutionand Reform

“Europe should stop living under the shadow ofSrebrenica. Just about everything in the UN haschanged in twenty years. There is no limit to what theUN can do if the member states agree to it and investin it.” – Berlin roundtable participantFollowing their experiences with the UN in the

Western Balkans, some European countries haveexhibited a reluctance to participate directly withtheir troops or police in UN peace operations. As aresult, such countries may be less aware of themajor changes since that period toward the profes-sionalization of UN peacekeeping, particularly inthe areas of doctrine development, logistics, andcommand-and-control arrangements. Progress inthese fields is by no means complete, however. The

composition of peace operations has alsoundergone a transformation, as civilian andpolicing components of multidimensionaloperations have steadily increased in size and, at thesame time, their scope of work has broadened.COMMAND-AND-CONTROLARRANGEMENTS

Since the failures of the mid-1990s, the UN hasworked to strengthen and clarify its command-and-control arrangements, one of the major issues ofconcern cited by the UN’s European critics. Indeed,few seem to have a good understanding of thesystem. In a recent survey of member statesconducted by DPKO, two-thirds of member statesresponded that the UN’s command-and-controlarrangements are only “somewhat clear” to them.Last year, the UN undertook an evaluation of its

command-and-control (C2) arrangements. Theobjectives of the evaluation were twofold: to assessthe effectiveness of C2 arrangements and processesand to suggest measures to strengthen commandand control at all levels. The study noted several keycharacteristics of UN C2: it is based on anessentially political endeavor combining civilianand uniformed components; it is a decentralized,“flat” command structure supported by a policyframework; and it features delegated authority fromthe UN Security Council to the Secretary-Generalto his special representative (SRSG), with lightbackstopping at UN headquarters. The mainfindings of the evaluation included the following:(1) the SRSG–force commander relationship wasclear and effective; (2) the current UN C2 arrange-ments provide a good basis for conducting UNpeace operations; (3) UN C2 is suited to the UNcivilian political leadership design; (4) the flexible,decentralized command structure is a comparativeadvantage; and (5) current arrangements allow foran integrated military-police-civilian structure. It was unclear among the participants of the

roundtable what the specific European concernsrelated to C2 were, or if the issue was a lack ofclarity or an antiquated understanding of the UNC2. It was pointed out that, in certain respects, theUN’s command-and-control chain is more agilethan NATO’s. A UN force commander, for instance,can assign tasks to contingents—a decision that aNATO commander is unable to perform on hisown. Some questioned whether the oft-stated

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concern over C2 was in fact a cover for otherconcerns with UN peacekeeping, such as a lack ofconfidence in UN personnel.In terms of the police, the strategic and

operational division between military and policecomponents, each with a very different organiza-tional culture, may contribute to the lack of clarityamong member states regarding UN peacekeeping.Capitals have no operational control over the policethey deploy to UN peacekeeping, as this controlrests with the police commissioner. It wasrecommended that Formed Police Units (FPUs)could be provided with more flexible command-and-control arrangements, possibly with a militarycommander when there is likely to be a sustaineduse of military weapons. ENSURING CONSISTENT STANDARDSAND PERFORMANCE

Another criticism of UN peacekeeping fromEurope regards the lack of consistent standards forthe performance of the UN’s peacekeepers in thefield. DPKO officials underlined their ongoingefforts to strengthen both performance andaccountability in peace operations—includingthrough measures such as training; the develop-ment of guidance, standards, and evaluationmethodology; and taking a close look at the systemof accountability from the field to headquarters.Another key issue affecting performance (largelyout of the hands of the UN Secretariat) is theincentives provided to troop-contributingcountries (TCCs) and police-contributingcountries (PCCs). The recent deliberations of thesenior advisory group on troop reimbursementrates included discussions on providing highercompensation for key assets, for operating inhigher-risk theaters, and for improved perform-ance. DPKO has exerted much energy developing its

first manual of infantry battalion standards(UNIBAM), and is also developing trainingmodules for staff officers and standards for medicalsupport. It is hoped that the development and useof common capability will be a unifying factoramong the various TCC contingents in the field,leading to improved interoperability. Given the current model for training

peacekeepers employed by the UN, in which eachTCC or PCC is responsible for the training of its

own contingents, it has been a challenge tostandardize the training content and methodology,as well as to ensure that all UN personnel haveundergone peacekeeping-specific training prior todeployment. Participants made clear that, given theUN’s resource limitations for training, morecooperative partnerships are needed to developtraining materials that can help create uniformstandards.Efforts to improve compliance with standards,

guidance, and training materials may be aided bythe creation of the Directorate for Evaluation ofField Uniformed Personnel. Reporting directly tothe Under-Secretary-General for PeacekeepingOperations, this directorate would review, assess,and report on the efficiency and effectiveness ofuniformed personnel. The function would alsosupport member states by providing timely andaccurate feedback to PCC/TCCs on a broad rangeof issues, including missions’ utilization of contri-butions against endorsed requirements, UNpolicies and standards, training, best practices, andsafety and security issues. Such a role—common innational militaries—was employed in an ad hoc,informal way at the UN from 2003–2008.UN POLICING

With the realization that many stabilization tasks ina postconflict context are related to community lawand order rather than the use (or threat) of militaryforce, the growing numbers of police personnel hasbeen a major feature of UN peace operations overthe last decade. There is, however, a lack of keyspecialized policing capabilities and a shortage ofqualified police officers. Broadening the base of police-contributing

countries and deepening the pool of contributionsfrom existing contributors would help DPKOrecruit and select more qualified officers, as well asfind policing and rule-of-law specialists withimportant capabilities. This includes very basicrequirements, such as female police officers,French- and Arabic-speaking officers, or policingmentors. The minimum age requirements forindividual police officers often presents a barrier toyoung women who want to deploy earlier in theircareer. Financial considerations also pose anobstacle: Europeans have shifted away fromdeploying as UN police, opting instead for EUmissions, in part because EU compensation rates

for individual police officers are much higher. Theperception that European rule-of-law and policingexperts are not properly utilized when deployed toa UN mission may also have contributed to thisdynamic. Finally, the need for police in UN peace

operations is still growing, in part because of theincreasing threat of organized crime in postconflictenvironments. Increased staffing inside the UNOffice of Rule of Law and Security Institutions(OROLSI) reflects the importance of such threats.In such situations, experienced law-enforcementpersonnel with expertise in combating organizedcrime will be crucial to preventing both thecommercial trade of illicit materials and thecorrupting influence on state institutions thataccompanies such business. Given the UN’simportant role in supporting the development ofresponsible state institutions, such policing andrule-of-law issues must be given greater attentionby member states. It was noted that DPKO, for itspart, needs to do more to convince capitals of theadded value of sending their police to UN missions.

Obstacles to Increasing theNumber of European BlueHelmets

Despite a potential increase in the available supplyof European troops and police post-2014, a numberof obstacles to increased European participation inUN peace operations remain. Participants citedchallenges at the operational level and the strategiclevel, at the levels of domestic politics and interna-tional security, as well as on basic questions offinances. At the strategic level, there are statedhesitations among European militaries about a lackof doctrine guiding UN peace operations in thefield. Among some European contributors there isalso low confidence in the UN’s selection, recruit-ment, and training of its leadership, in bothheadquarters and the field. Command-and-controlarrangements, as noted above, are still cited byEurope as an impediment to its involvement,specifically with regard to the need to increasestrategic control of and support to operations fromheadquarters. At the operational level, interoper-ability—which is now functioning at a high level

among European militaries through planning,training, and shared experience in Afghanistan—cannot quickly or cheaply be achieved betweenEuropeans and the traditional UN TCCs. Communication is also seen as a weak link, with

several participants expressing the need to improvethe interactions between European governmentsand the UN. Mutual trust and confidence could bedeveloped through more frequent exchange,perhaps at the capital level, and a more specificarticulation of the UN’s expectations of Europeans.There is likewise a common impression thatEuropean governments lack suitable partners in theUN Secretariat with which to interact. Specifically,the elements of the Office of Military Affairsresponsible for communication with potentialTCCs were not perceived as having the mandate orresources to develop this relationship meaningfully.The UN needs a longer-term and more strategicforce-generation engagement to interact withEurope. European militaries have a much longerplanning horizon, and political approval fordeployments can take longer than it does for theUN’s more experienced TCCs.Domestic politics and financial considerations

can also be cited as limiting factors for theEuropeans. After a decade of engagement inAfghanistan, a segment of the European public isweary of continued military deployments abroad,even if undertaken through the UN rather thanNATO. The current fiscal climate also makes signif-icant commitments to the UN a challenge. Findingthe money for this in shrinking budgets and legiti-mating the use of that money for far-removedconflicts, rather than for immediate domestic orregional needs, can be a difficult political decisionin any country. European governments would needmore assistance from the UN in “selling” UNpeacekeeping to their publics as a justifiable fiscalpriority.

Partnership Opportunitiesand Regional Arrangements

Given the challenges to increasing the level ofEuropean contributions, there is an obvious needfor more dialogue among European governments,the European Union, and the UN to find new

ENHANCING EUROPEAN MILITARY 5

modalities for contributing to UN peacekeeping.Enhancing or developing new peacekeepingpartnerships is not only a way to share commonburdens, but can also help build peace and securitycapacities and reform defense sectors in thedeveloping world. The ongoing financial crisis,while limiting the overall size of European contri-butions, could push European governments tofocus on quality over quantity and to ensure theybring added value to peace operations, likelythrough the contribution of specialized or nichecapabilities. The most obvious partnership option currently

available is a regional contribution via theEuropean Union or NATO. Such a partnershipwould likely be aimed at performing a specializedfunction (such as rapid response or surge capacity)for a limited time horizon (six or twelve months induration). Recent developments in the EU-UNrelationship aim for closer collaboration betweenthe two entities and include the establishment of aUN liaison office for peace and security in Brusselsand the re-launch of the UN-EU SteeringCommittee on Crisis Management, which will bediscussing issues like Mali, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, and Syria. The EU has alsoadopted a new plan of action to enhance its supportto UN peacekeeping and is planning to develop adetailed list of civilian and military capabilities thatthe EU could provide to the UN. However, progressin implementing the plan of action has been slow sofar. Given the current state of discord among EU

member states on a variety of big issues, fewroundtable participants were optimistic about thepossibility of a significant EU military contributionto UN peacekeeping in the near future. In general,it was stressed that dialogue on troop and policecontributions has to happen with national capitalsand not Brussels. With ongoing instability on theEU’s immediate periphery in North Africa and theMiddle East, however, it would not be impossible tosee the establishment of an initial EU peaceoperation that would eventually transition to a UNmission. On this issue, participants noted the needto learn the right lessons from the troubled experi-ence of transitioning between the two organizationsin Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008.The preparations for a mission in Mali were cited asa good example of cooperation between the EU,

UN, and African Union. Likewise, the UN and theEU continue to work together creatively andeffectively to support the African Union Mission inSomalia. It was suggested that a more structuredtrilateral strategic dialogue between the UN, EU,and African Union (AU) would be beneficial, aswould a structured dialogue with the Arab League.Bilateral and other joint arrangements are likely

options for European participation in UNpeacekeeping. Rather than operate through an EUmechanism, some European governments arelooking at arrangements to deploy jointly in smallgroups. For instance, the possibility was raised ofcontributing a joint unit composed of personnelfrom among the Nordic countries. North-Southbilateral arrangements have the added advantage ofhelping to build the capacity of developingcountries to contribute more effectively topeacekeeping. Broader bilateral defenseagreements, such as the one between Belgium andBenin, can include peacekeeping support in theirframeworks, allowing developing countries to gainvaluable experience with the UN. Numerous otherexamples of training provided by Europeans toother countries exist. Some notable examplesinclude the French Program for African Militaries;Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities(RECAMP); and, on policing, the Italian-hostedCenter of Excellence for Stability Police Units(CoESPU). Participants suggested that the UN playa greater role in facilitating the matching of capacitybuilders and training providers with thosecountries that might desire such assistance through,for example, mechanisms such as the G8++ AfricaClearinghouse. According to the UN’s Office of Military Affairs,

many of the gaps in UN peacekeeping capabilitiesare in the areas of interoperability, intelligence-driven operations, policing specialties, and airassets. European contributors may be in a positionto provide unmanned aerial vehicles, the use ofwhich is being considered for some UN peaceoperations. Niche and enabling capabilities such asthese, along with medical and logistics support andengineering, happen to be in greater supply amongthe Europeans than most other regions and wouldhave positive knock-on effects, greatly increasingthe overall operational capacity of current UNpeacekeeping missions. Assisting other UNTCC/PCCs in quick deployment to UN missions

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would also bridge an important gap in the start-upof UN operations. The rapid deployment ofmilitary observers and equipment to Syria was citedas a positive example, and the European AirTransport Command was brought up as anavailable capacity to be used in this regard.

Conclusion

As NATO draws down its forces in Afghanistan, thesecurity situation outside Europe’s borders and thefinancial situation inside them present continuingchallenges. The pace of change along Europe’speriphery is much faster than once seemedpossible, and preparing for “strategic surprise” is anecessity. Institutional capacities to respond tocrises (i.e., at the UN, EU, AU, etc.) have not yetevolved to match either the complexity of contem-porary crises or the dramatic speed of change. TheBerlin roundtable featured a strong rhetoricalcommitment from both the UN and the Europeancountries to work together to strengthen the globalcrisis-management tool that is UN peacekeeping.However, it remains to be seen if Europe will decideto make the required investments—in money, time,or effort—to play its part. Despite the perception of UN peacekeeping as a

global common good and a comparatively cheapconflict-management mechanism, Europeancountries still lack political will to increase theirdirect engagement for a number of reasons. On thetechnical side, there are European concerns overUN management, command and control, interop-erability, transparency, standards, and performanceassessments. The political issues are both national,within each European capital, and international,related to evolving geopolitical realities andperceived security threats. Indeed, the decision toengage in UN peacekeeping is a political one, madeby the political leaders of a country. When politicalwill exists, countries and organizations often find itmuch easier to work out the technical issues. Assuch, a key takeaway from the Berlin roundtablewas the need for the UN and European govern-ments to work together to convince the Europeanpublics that (1) peacekeeping “done well” serves thenational interest and (2) UN peacekeeping will dobetter with greater European involvement. In this light, recommendations emerged during

the two-day roundtable that centered on continuing

UN management reforms, enhancing dialogue, andbuilding confidence. If, in 2014, the UN and Europeare interested in greater collaboration, therecommendations below suggest that it will not bean overnight process but one that must startimmediately and be sustained through greaterefforts by both sides over the coming years.

Recommendations

STRATEGIC OUTREACH

1. DPKO must develop an outreach policytargeting European contributors as part of alonger-term force generation strategy. Thisshould focus on the military and the relevantministries, as well on the public. “The UNneeds to get out of New York,” was a commonrefrain.

2. A stronger argument for why Europeans shouldengage must be made. The reasons cannot onlybe value-based: they need to be interest-basedas well.

3. The UN must make clear what it needs andwhat, specifically, Europeans can contribute.

4. DPKO should appoint strategic-level interlocu-tors to engage with European capitals, inaddition to the operational-level team in theUN Office of Military Affairs.

5. EU member states should bring the discussionabout potential systems, structures, andpartnerships for UN peacekeeping back toBrussels. They should use the opportunity ofthe 2013–2014 strategic review of the EuropeanExternal Action Service to make it a strongerpartner for UN peacekeeping in the futurethrough its CSDP structures.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING

6. DPKO must build stronger political andpersonal connections with European capitals toincrease confidence in the UN Secretariat—itspeople and its systems.

7. A “group of friends” of some sort should beestablished among European TCC/PCCs toenhance the dialogue and the collaborationbetween UN leadership and European capitalson peacekeeping.

8. European governments must also begin toengage in a dialogue with traditional, non-

ENHANCING EUROPEAN MILITARY 7

European TCCs to alleviate any fears of aEuropean takeover of UN peacekeeping, butalso to develop more bilateral partnerships,including joint deployments.

9. Staffing some key positions at UN headquarterswith European officers may increase theirmilitaries’ confidence in the UN. In particular,DPKO could use more European militaryplanners.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

10. DPKO should continue efforts to “right-size”missions by assessing mandates at least everytwo years. It should also continue to developadequate transition strategies. Improvedalignment of peacekeeping operations withpeacebuilding strategies and priorities could be

one way of clarifying transition and exit strate-gies.

11. The creation of the position of “Directorate forEvaluation of Field Uniformed Personnel” forDPKO should be supported politically andfinancially by European governments.

12. There may be a need for a strategic commandcell at UN headquarters to increase Europeanbuy-in to the UN’s C2 system.

13. European governments should look for ways tobuild on the senior advisory group’s work ontroop reimbursement to find innovative waysto incentivize high performance and theprovision of key assets and specialized capabil-ities.

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Agenda

Enhancing European Military and Police Contributionsto UN Peacekeeping: A Being a Peacekeeper Regional Roundtable

Berlin, Germany

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

09:00 Welcoming Remarks

Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg, Director-General for the UN and Global Issues,Federal Foreign Office, GermanyMichel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defense,FranceAlmut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

09:15 Opening Remarks“The State of UN Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe”

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations

10:30 Panel 1: Strategic Security Context Post-2014—Europe, the UN, and the World

Chair Louise Fréchette, former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, former DeputyMinister of Defense of Canada

SpeakersUlrich Stefan Schlie, Director, Policy Directorate, Federal Ministry of Defense, GermanyMichel Miraillet, Director, Policy and Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defense,FranceSvein Efjestad, Director General, Department of Security Policy, Ministry of Defense,NorwayMassimo Marotti, Deputy Director General, Directorate General for Political Affairs andSecurity; Principal Director for the UN and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

13:45 Panel 2: Evolving Capability Needs in UN Peacekeeping—What can Europe Offer?

Chair Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKO

SpeakersSalvatore Farina, Chief and National Policy Director, Department for Military Planning andPolicy, General Staff, Ministry of Defense, ItalyMichael Rendi, Director, Department for International Organizations, Federal Ministry ofEuropean and International Affairs, Austria

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15:30 Panel 3: Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping

Chair Robert Gordon, former UN Force Commander and Senior Adviser to the Challenges Forum

Speakers David Haeri, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPET, UN DPKOPaolo Serra, Head of Mission and Force Commander, UNIFILEllen Margrethe Løj, former SRSG and Head of Mission, UNMIL

18:30 Evening Event “Keeping the Peace in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for PeaceOperations”

Opening RemarksIna Lepel, Deputy Director-General for Global Issues, German Federal Foreign Office

Discussants Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, UN DPKOLouise Fréchette, former United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, former DeputyMinister of Defense of Canada

Moderators Andrea Böhm, Journalist, Die ZEIT Bernd Mützelburg, former Special Envoy to Afghanistan/Pakistan, Federal Foreign Office;Managing Director, Ambassadors Associates

Thursday, October 25, 2012

08:30 Panel 4: Ensuring Consistent Standards and Performance of Blue Helmets

Chair Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace Institute (IPI)

Speakers Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, UN DPKOPatrick Nash, former Operation Commander, EUFOR Chad/CARReinhard Trischak, Director, Military Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, Austria

10:15 Panel 5: Specialized Policing Needs and Opportunities

Chair Birgitta Ekelund, Deputy Director, Police Division, Ministry of Justice, Sweden

Speakers Mehmet Erdem, Deputy Head, International Relations Department, Turkish NationalPolice, TurkeyStefan Feller, Commissioner, International Police Missions, Federal Ministry of the Interior;former Head of Mission, EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)

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Ata Yenigun, Chief, Police Selection Recruitment Section, UN DPKO

11:30 Panel 6: Bilateral Capacity-Building Partnerships and Joint Deployments

Chair Winrich Kühne, Steven Muller Professor, Bologna Centre, School for AdvancedInternational Studies (SAIS)

Speakers Vincenzo Coppola, Commander, Mobile Units Division, Carabinieri Corps, Treviso, ItalyMatthew Rowland, Head, Peacekeeping Team, Conflict Department, Foreign andCommonwealth Office, United KingdomAlfons Vanheusden, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, Belgium

13:30 Panel 7: UN-Europe Partnership Arrangements: Past and Future

Chair Marco Bianchini, Senior Liaison Officer, UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security, Brussels

Speakers Timothy Clarke, Head, CSDP Policy, Partnerships and Agreements Division, CrisisManagement Planning Directorate (CMPD), European External Action ServiceRichard Gowan, Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign RelationsAllan Jacobsen, Head, International Department, Ministry of Defense, Denmark

15:30 Panel 8: Enhancing European Contributions to UN Peacekeeping – What Steps AreNeeded?

Chair Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)

Speakers Michael Freiherr von Ungern-Sternberg, Director-General for the UN and Global Issues,Federal Foreign Office, GermanyCiarán Murphy, Assistant Secretary General, Department of Defense, IrelandJoakim Vaverka, Head, Global Division, Security Policy Department, Ministry for ForeignAffairs, Sweden

17:00 Concluding Remarks

Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperationsFrancesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research, International Peace Institute (IPI)Kevin McGarr, President and CEO, Pearson Centre

AGENDA 11

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