Upload
others
View
30
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Demographic Research a free, expedited, online journal of peer-reviewed research and commentary in the population sciences published by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research Konrad-Zuse Str. 1, D-18057 Rostock · GERMANY www.demographic-research.org
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH VOLUME 19, ARTICLE 15, PAGES 455-502 PUBLISHED 01 JULY 2008 http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/15/ DOI: 10.4054/DemRes.2008.19.15 Research Article
England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
Wendy Sigle-Rushton
This publication is part of Special Collection 7: Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe (http://www.demographic-research.org/special/7/) © 2008 Sigle-Rushton. This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, reproduction & distribution in any medium for non-commercial purposes, provided the original author(s) and source are given credit. See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 456 2 Fertility levels and trends 459 2.1 Trends in period fertility and completed family size 459 2.2 The postponement of childbearing 463 2.3 Differential fertility patterns 467 2.3.1 Teenage childbearing 467 2.3.2 Educational differentials 468 2.3.3 Fertility of immigrants and ethnic minority groups 471 3 Fertility related changes in patterns of family formation 473 3.1 The decline in marriage and the rise of cohabitation 473 3.2 A weakening of the link between marriage and childbearing 475 3.3 Divorce and union dissolution 478 3.4 Changes in sexual behaviour, contraceptive use and
induced abortion 479
4 Social and population policies 482 4.1 The employment rights of parents 483 4.2 Support for the care of children 485 5 Social and political changes affecting fertility 487 5.1 The labour market 487 5.2 The gender division of unpaid work 490 5.3 Fertility intentions 492 5.4 Family support 494 6 Conclusion 494 References 496
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
research article
http://www.demographic-research.org 455
England and Wales1:
Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
Wendy Sigle-Rushton2
Abstract
For nearly three decades, the total fertility rate in England and Wales has remained high
relative to other European countries, and stable at about 1.7 births per woman. In this
chapter, we examine trends in both period and cohort fertility throughout the twentieth
century, and demonstrate some important differences across demographic and social
groups in the timing and quantum of fertility. Breaking with a market-oriented and
laissez-faire approach to work and family issues, the last 10 years have seen the
introduction of new social and economic policies aimed at providing greater support to
families with children. However, the effect of the changes is likely to be limited to
families on the lower end of the income scale. Rather than facilitating work and
parenthood, some policies create incentives for a traditional gendered division of
labour. Fertility appears to have remained stable despite, rather than because of,
government actions.
1 The United Kingdom comprises the contiguous regions of Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland)
along with Northern Ireland. Its political system is relatively complex. To varying degrees, different regions
have different legislative powers and different regions take responsibility for collecting and disseminating
statistics. As a result, statistical information is sometimes collected and reported for the United Kingdom as a
whole (covering Northern Ireland and Great Britain), sometimes just for Great Britain, and, in an increasing
number of cases, separately for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This paper focuses
predominantly on England and Wales, which account for the majority – more than 85 percent -- of the UK
population. 2 Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London,
WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected]
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
456 http://www.demographic-research.org
1. Introduction
In 2001 the total fertility rate (TFR) for England and Wales reached an historic low of
1.63. It has, however, increased every year since and in 2006 reached 1.87 -- its highest
level since 1980 (Office for National Statistics 2007a). These recent fluctuations have
attracted a large amount of media attention, much of which belies the fact that fertility
has actually remained fairly stable. In the period since 1980, the average value of the
TFR was around 1.76, falling below 1.70 and exceeding 1.83 in only six of the 27 years
(see Figure 1 below). Moreover, the total fertility rates in England and Wales have been
relatively high within the European context. Recently Sobotka (2004) suggested that
England and Wales might, together with the Northern European countries, France and
Ireland, form a “high fertility belt” within Europe.
Demographically, England and Wales are well placed to deal with the challenges
of population ageing. In each year of the twentieth century, except 1976, the population
of the United Kingdom as a whole experienced growth from natural increase, and this
looks set to continue. Relatively high fertility combined with high rates of immigration
mean that population growth is projected for several decades. The latest population
projections for England and Wales estimate that the 2006 population of 53.7 million
people will increase by nearly 10 million in the period up to 2031. Longer-term
projections show the populations of both England and Wales continuing to rise at least
until 2056 (Bray 2008).3 Taking into account planned increases in the state pension age,
projections for the UK as a whole suggest that the working age population should
continue to grow at least until 2031, although old age support ratios are expected to
begin falling from around 2020 (Bray 2008).
Aggregate measures and indicators suggest that the current demographic profile is
relatively benign when compared to many other European countries (Sobotka 2004).
The demographic situation is somewhat unexpected given the social and political
environment. England and Wales have experienced many of the same social changes
that work to delay and, perhaps, inhibit fertility in other industrialised countries. Time
spent in education has increased, age at first partnership has increased, and cohabiting
first partnerships have become increasingly common (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000a).
Although fertility within cohabiting unions has increased, fertility rates within marital
unions remain at higher levels (Ekert-Jaffe, Joshi, Lynch, Mougin and Rendall 2002;
Kiernan 2004). Moreover, getting married and starting a family are no longer so closely
3 Projections for England and Wales have been reported separately, and for small areas such as Wales
projections are only reported up to 2056.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 457
timed. Together these trends have worked to increase the mean age at first birth from
around 24 in the 1960s, to 27.6 in 2005 (see Figure 6 below).4
Although it is aware of the problems associated with low fertility and population
ageing, the Government of the United Kingdom remains reluctant to intervene directly
to influence fertility outcomes, except to reduce rates of teenage motherhood (Gauthier
1996; Department for Education and Skills 2006). The current UK policy on
population, presented to the UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo
in 1994, reads:
The United Kingdom government does not pursue a population policy in the sense
of actively trying to influence the overall size of the population, its age-structure, or the
components of change except in the field of immigration. Nor has it expressed a view
about the size of population, or the age-structure, that would be desirable for the United
Kingdom. Its primary concern is for the wellbeing of the population, although it
continually monitors demographic trends and developments. The current level of births
has not been the cause of general anxiety. The prevailing view is that decisions about
fertility and childbearing are for people themselves to make (Office for National
Statistics 1993).
Not surprisingly, there is little that could be called pro-natalist in the UK policy
frameworks. Compared to other Western European countries, child benefits are low,
and the Government remains reluctant to intervene in the labour market (de Henau,
Meulders, O’Dorchai, and Périvier 2002; Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2006). Equal
opportunities legislation is strong, but, until recently, there was extremely limited
support for mothers’ employment in the form of regulation or the provision of childcare
services (Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997). Nonetheless, female labour market
participation has increased since the 1970s, and employment rates of both women and
mothers are high (Gregg, Gutierrez and Waldfogel 2003). However, the employment
experiences of women with and without caring responsibilities differ considerably. For
those in full-time employment, working hours are long relative to the EU-12 countries
(Himmelweit and Land 2007). There is no evidence that men reduce their working
hours when they become fathers – some studies find that fathers work longer hours on
average (Dermott 2006). The economic environment therefore reinforces a gendered
division of paid and unpaid work because men’s time is taken up with long hours of
work, and caring responsibilities are shifted onto the female partner. The high-intensity
work culture increases the costs of parenthood, and creates disincentives for
childbearing in dual-earner families, except perhaps amongst the most highly paid
4 Here and elsewhere, birth order refers to estimates of true birth order.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
458 http://www.demographic-research.org
women, who can afford to purchase substitute care (Joshi and Davies 1992; Sigle-
Rushton and Waldfogel 2007).
Despite the lack of government intervention, fertility rates in England and Wales
have remained stable and high relative to much of Europe (Coleman 2006). There is,
however, a good deal of diversity in timing and/or the quantum of fertility across
different demographic and social groups. Despite a general trend of postponement,
early first childbearing has persisted resulting in a ‘hump’ in the fertility schedule at
young ages (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 2002; Rendall et al. 2005). Consistently
high rates of teenage pregnancy distinguish England and Wales from its Western
European counterparts, and are associated with poor outcomes for both the mothers and
their children (Bynner and Parsons 1999; Social Exclusion Unit 1999; Hobcraft and
Kiernan 2001). Although researchers disagree on the extent to which early motherhood
is the outcome of, rather than the precursor to, disadvantage (see, for example, Duncan
2007), there is some evidence of a causal effect on some outcomes, even after
attempting to control for selection effects (Ermisch and Pevalin 2003).5 Whether the
associations are causal or not, young motherhood can be viewed as an indicator of
disadvantage for both the mother and her children. In addition, amongst the less-
educated and those with a weak attachment to the labour market, childbearing still often
occurs at young ages, and completed family sizes are larger (Rendall and Tomassini
2004). Conversely, those who obtain high levels of education tend to delay their first
birth. Conditional on a first birth, they are more likely to have (and move more quickly
to) a second birth, but as Berrington (2004) points out, the effect of postponement to
first birth is not offset by subsequent acceleration. The completed fertility of highly
educated women, particularly those in managerial positions, remains low relative to
other women, a pattern not observed in France (Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002). Finally, the
proportion of births to mothers born outside the United Kingdom has increased steadily
in recent years. These figures suggest that the costs of reproduction in England and
Wales may be falling disproportionately on specific population groups, as reflected in
its greater variation in completed family size and high concentration ratios (Coleman
1996; Shkolnikov, Andreev, Houle and Vaupel 2007). A closer examination of fertility
patterns in England and Wales might raise questions about whether the current
demographic regime is both stable and fair.
5 Although work that tries to isolate the casual effect of becoming a mother before the age of 20 finds little
evidence that early motherhood has negative effects on the woman’s qualifications, employment or earnings
at age 30, it does appear to decrease the likelihood of homeownership, and increase the likelihood that her
partner, if she has one, is unemployed (Ermisch and Pevalin 2003).
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 459
2. Fertility levels and trends
2.1 Trends in period fertility and completed family size
Although fertility began to decline in England and Wales from about 1875, fertility
change during transition, and in the post-transition years, was neither smooth nor
homogeneous. Fertility decline began earlier and fell more steeply amongst women of
higher social and occupational classes (Haines 1989). Fertility continued to fall during
the first decades of the twentieth century. By the 1930s, fertility had dropped to
historically low levels, and the TFR remained below two until 1942. Assumptions that
the sharp downward trends in fertility would continue unabated led to implausible
projections, whereby, under the most optimistic assumptions, the population of England
and Wales was projected to be around 28.5 million in 2000 (Hobcraft 1996). In the
1940s, however, fertility began to climb again, and despite the disruption of the second
World War and the subsequent period of austerity, the TFR peaked in 1947 at 2.68
births per woman. It subsequently fell to about 2.2 and remained at that level until 1955
(Figure 1). An even more dramatic upturn in fertility followed when, in the late 1950s
and 1960s, the TFR began to grow, and, in 1964, reached its highest level in the
twentieth century – this time inspiring population projections of 65 million by the year
2000 (Hobcraft 1996). In fact, the mid-year population in 2000 was just under 53
million (Ghee 2001). The 1960s baby boom was followed by an almost equally
dramatic baby bust in the 1970s. Since then, the TFR rebounded slightly and has been
relatively stable since the early 1980s (Figure 1).
Measures of completed cohort fertility are available for women born from 1920
onward, and are depicted in Figure 1. Completed family size follows a downward U-
shaped pattern which, except for the earliest cohorts, tends to track period trends fairly
closely. For women born in 1920, completed family size was around two children per
woman. Fertility levels increased in each of the subsequent cohorts up until those born
between 1934 and 1938. These women were at peak childbearing ages during the 1960s
baby boom and had around 2.4 children on average. Completed family size
subsequently declined, levelling off for cohorts born between 1954 and 1960 at levels
similar to those of the 1920 birth cohort. Women born after 1960 appear to have
experienced some further decline. Those born in 1964 and 1965 have had about 1.9
children on average.
Fluctuations in completed fertility are far less extreme than changes in period
fertility, particularly during the 1960s baby boom years. The size of the fluctuations in
the TFR relative to those that have been observed for completed cohort fertility can be
explained, in part, by changes in the composition of the population at risk (both by age
and parity) (Ní Bhrolcháin 1987) and by shifts in the timing of births (Bongaarts and
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
460 http://www.demographic-research.org
Feeney 1998). Counts of the female population by parity, first released in the 1960s,
can be used to construct an alternative measure of the TFR, one that takes into account
the structure of the population at risk by age and parity (Smallwood 2002b).6 When the
total fertility rate is calculated using parity progression ratios (TPPFR7) rather than age
specific fertility rates, total period fertility is generally similar but fluctuations are
noticeably less extreme during the 1960s baby boom years (Figure 1; see also Murphy
and Berrington 1993).
Figure 1: Period and cohort fertility indicators, England and Wales
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Year
Child
ren
pe
r w
om
an
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Cohort
TFR
TPPFR
Completed Fertility
Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 Nos.13, 27–34, Tables 1.4 1.7, 10.2.
Note: TPPFR is the total period parity fertility rate, an alternative measure of TFR calculated using period parity progression ratios.
See Smallwood (2002a).
6 Vital statistics only contain information on birth order for children who are born to married mothers, and
even this information is complicated by the way in which information about multiple births is recorded.
Estimates of the number of all births by ‘true’ birth order are produced by combining vital registration
information with data collected by the General Household Survey (Smallwood 2002a; Office of Population,
Censuses and Surveys 1985). 7 The TPPFR is calculated using information on the female population broken down by age and parity. For
detailed information on how it was calculated, see Smallwood (2002a), Box 3. This method is somewhat
different from that used by Murphy and Berrington (1993) which used information on birth intervals (duration
of exposure).
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 461
The decline in fertility after the 1960s baby boom is due in part to a steady decline
in fertility rates, particularly at parities two and higher (Figure 2). The probability of
progressing to higher order births fell by around 30 percentage points. In contrast, the
probability of having a first or second birth fell far less dramatically. Amongst childless
women, the probability of having a first birth fell steadily from just over 90 percent in
the 1960s, to about 80 percent in 1982. Similarly, for women of parity one, the
probability of a second birth fell by only 8.7 points between 1964 and 1982 (Smallwood
2002a). The 1980s brought a break with past trends. Consistent with the postponement
of first births, the first birth probability has continued to fall, but progression from other
parities noticeably levelled off (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Period parity progression ratios for England and Wales, 1964–2000
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999
a_0 a_1 a_2 a_3 a_4+
Source: Smallwood (2002a).
An examination of the parity distribution of different birth cohorts (Figure 3)
indicates that, for cohorts born in the two decades before the 1940s, the proportion of
women having two or more children rose (see also Frejka and Sardon 2006). The
decline in completed family size for cohorts born since 1938 (Figure 1) appears to have
been due to two different trends. For the 1940-1950 cohorts, a decline in large families
(following an earlier increase) was accompanied by a further increase in two-child
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
462 http://www.demographic-research.org
families. For more recent cohorts, rates of childlessness increased and the proportion
having two children began to decrease. Proportions at all other parities remained
relatively stable. About 13 percent of women born in 1950 were childless at age 45, up
from around 11 percent of the 1940 birth cohort). For women born 10 years later, this
increased to 18 percent (Figure 3). Although the shift towards a two-child family
observed in earlier cohorts was not entirely reversed, about half of the earlier gains
were negated (Office for National Statistics 2006). The predominance of the two-child
family and the decline of larger families are similar to trends in other European
countries, but it is noteworthy that the distribution of completed fertility amongst
women who have recently completely their fertility is more dispersed than in most other
countries with relatively high rates of both childlessness and of large families. Only
Ireland follows such a distinctively flat parity distribution (Shkolnikov et al. 2007,
Table 5).
Figure 3: Percentage distribution of women according to final
number of children by birth cohorts 1920-1960
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960Birth cohort
Per
ce
nt
childless1 child2 children3 children4+ children
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.5.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 463
2.2 The postponement of childbearing
Since the mid-1960s, at the height of the baby boom, the timing of fertility has changed
considerably. Slightly less than two-thirds of women aged 15–29 were childless in
1970. By 2000, 75 percent of women aged 15–29 were childless (Smallwood 2002a).
Reflecting this trend of postponement, the peak of the age specific fertility schedule has
been moving to the right. Since the mid-1970s, fertility rates for women aged 30 and
over have been increasing, and, in 2005, age-specific fertility rates between the ages of
30 and 40 were similar to 1965 levels (Figure 4). Recently released data for 2006
suggest this movement to older ages has not abated. The highest birth rate of 99.4 live
births per 1,000 women was recorded for the 30–34 age group. Although the fertility
rate of women aged 40+ remains low at 11.4 births per 1,000 women, it is more than
double what it was in 1986 (Office for National Statistics 2007a).
Figure 4: Age-specific fertility rates in England and Wales, 1965-2005
0
50
100
150
200
250
15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45
Per
tho
usan
d
1965 1970
1975 1985
1995 2005
Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.1.
An obvious consequence of these trends is that the mean age at childbearing has
been increasing since 1974 for all births, offset to some extent by teenage fertility rates
(Figure 5). Although age at first birth started moving upward slightly earlier (in 1971),
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
464 http://www.demographic-research.org
the age at birth at all parities has increased since 1974, but more slowly and less
dramatically for non-marital births and births of parity four or higher (Smallwood
2002a; Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys 1985).
Figure 5: Trends in the mean age of motherhood in England and Wales,
1938–2005
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Ye
ars
of
age
all births marital births first birth
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983, Historical series FM1 No. 13, and Vol. Nos. 27, 28, 29 and 33,
Tables 1.5 and 1.7a; Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (1985).
Although trends in age-specific fertility rates suggest both postponement and
subsequent recuperation, the shape of the fertility schedule has changed in other, more
distinct, ways. In the years following the mid-1960s, peaks in age-specific fertility rates
have fallen considerably, flattening in the early twenties and, to a lesser extent, at
younger ages, reflecting a far smaller decrease in rates of childbearing amongst
teenagers in England and Wales compared to other European countries. This flattening
means that peak rates tend to be lower and the fertility profile more dispersed than in
other European countries (Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns 2002). These patterns can be
observed in cohort profiles as well. For women born in the mid- to late-1950s, the age
profile of first births is more dispersed than in France and Norway, countries with
similar levels of TFR. As a consequence, a substantially higher proportion of women
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 465
gave birth at the youngest ages, and a higher proportion delayed childbearing until after
they turn 30 (Rendall et al. 2005).
The effect of these changes becomes more apparent when the age-specific fertility
rates for single years of age are added together to produce fertility rates for five-year
age groups (Figure 6). The stability of the total fertility rate since the 1980s is due to a
decrease in fertility at ages 20 to 29, which is offset by an increase at ages 30 to 40.
Fertility at the oldest and youngest ages has remained fairly stable. Since 2000, fertility
for those aged 20 to 29 has levelled off. In contrast, for women in their thirties, it has
continued to rise. These trends contributed to the recent rise in the TFR between 2001
and 2006 (Office for National Statistics 2007a).
Figure 6: Age-specific fertility rates (per 100 women) for five-year age groups,
1965–2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
15-1920-2425-2930-3435-3940-45
Source: Smallwood (2002a); Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.1
Note: Each point in the graph above represents data from a single calendar year. Age-specific fertility rates are summed together for
each five year age group.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
466 http://www.demographic-research.org
Patterns of postponement and recuperation can be observed at a cohort level as
well. Figure 7 plots the cumulative fertility, every five years from age 15, of successive
cohorts of women, relative to those born in 1950 who had 2.07 children on average.
Teenage fertility declined for the next three cohorts, with a cumulative fertility at age
20 of 0.05 (1955 cohort), 0.12 (1960 cohort), and 0.16 (1965 cohort) fewer children.
This figure then stabilised for each of the subsequent cohorts at around 0.14 to 0.16
fewer children.
The gap in fertility widened until age 25 for the cohorts born in 1955 and 1965,
and until age 30 for each successive cohort with data at that age. Although women born
after 1950 never reached the same level of fertility, more than half the gap at age 30
was closed by either age 40 (1955 and 1965 cohort) or age 45 (1960 cohort). Compared
to women born in 1950, completed fertility for the 1955 and 1960 birth cohorts was
0.05 to 0.09 fewer births per woman, respectively. Data at age 40 for the 1965 cohort
suggest further decline is likely unless fertility increases very steeply over the next five
years. However, the convergence of the curves for the 1975, 1980 and 1985 cohorts
suggests that patterns of postponement may be stabilising.
Figure 7: Cumulative fertility by age for birth cohorts,
compared with women born in 1950
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
19501955196019651970197519801985
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 No. 34, Table 10.2.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 467
2.3 Differential fertility patterns
Compared to other European countries, fertility rates in England and Wales have
remained stable in a context where government support for families, particularly
working families, has been improving but remains fairly limited. To some extent, the
low fertility that might be expected in this context has materialised, but as we see in this
section, only for some groups.
2.3.1 Teenage childbearing
From the 1970s, teenage fertility rates fell only slightly, while the rest of the fertility
schedule was shifting more emphatically down and to the right as fertility was being
postponed. This trend is reflected in the continuously high and overlapping curves at
early ages for the 1985, 1995 and 2005 age-specific fertility rates, characteristic of most
English-speaking countries, which have emerged over the past three decades (Chandola
et al. 2002; Figure 4). Although there is evidence for the intergenerational transmission
of early motherhood in England and Wales (Huerta and Sigle-Rushton 2008), rates of
teenage childbearing amongst women who were born to older mothers are high as well,
and explain most of the cross-country differences (Rendall 2003).
The Government’s Social Exclusion Unit (1999) considers high teenage pregnancy
rates to be due to low aspirations (stemming for high levels of inequality), ignorance
about the risks of unprotected sex, and mixed messages about the appropriateness of
sexual behaviour. Although the official understanding of the issues surrounding early
motherhood, particularly the ignorance of young women, has not gone unquestioned
(see for example van Loon 2003; Duncan 2007), data drawn from the Millennium
Cohort Study suggest that a large majority of young mothers—86.9 percent of those
who gave birth before the age of 18, and 75.9 percent of those who gave birth between
the ages of 19 and 21—describe their pregnancy as unplanned (Joshi, Hawkes and
Ward 2004, Table 5). This suggests that there is some scope for interventions aimed at
giving women more control over the timing of their first conception.
In 1999, the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy was implemented. The Strategy set
targets for reducing the under-18 conception rate by 2004 (by 15 percent) and 2010 (by
half), relative to their 1998 levels (Social Exclusion Unit 1999; Department for
Education and Skills 2006). Since the targets were set, under-18 conception rates in
England have fallen year on year and, because of increases in abortion (see Section 2.4
below), under-18 birth rates have fallen even more (Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2008).
Data for Wales, where teenage conception rates tend to be higher, suggest that under-18
conceptions fell quickly between 1998 and 2001, and continued to decline thereafter,
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
468 http://www.demographic-research.org
but far more slowly (Statistics for Wales, 2005). Despite some success, the 2004 target
was not met, and if current trends continue, it is unlikely that the 2010 target will be
met (Wilkinson et al. 2006; see also Teenage Pregnancy Unit 2008).
Although it is likely that an initiative which successfully reduced teenage
parenthood would simply result in the postponement of early births to later ages, and
that the overall impact on completed family size would be small, it is nonetheless worth
noting that teenage childbearing makes a notable contribution to period fertility rates
(Figure 6). In 2005, the TFR of 1.80 would have fallen to 1.73 if contributions from
those under twenty were halved. All else equal, a substantial reduction in teenage
childbearing would have worked to reduce the TFR in the first years of the twenty-first
century.
2.3.2 Educational differentials
Although only a few studies have examined differences in fertility by women’s
educational qualifications in England and Wales, evidence suggests considerable and
widening differentials in the timing of fertility by education level. These differentials
reflect both the composition of different educational groups (minority ethnic groups and
those from impoverished or low social class backgrounds tend to have lower levels of
education) and the link between education and labour market position (Hobcraft 2000;
Hobcraft and Kiernan 2001; Robson and Berthoud 2003). The age profile of first birth
rates has shifted and flattened for both medium- and high-educated women, both over
time and relative to patterns observed in Norway and France. Comparing women born
between 1954 and 1958 with those born between 1963 and 1967, Rendall and
colleagues (2005) find that, amongst those born in the 1950s, 46.2 percent of medium-
educated and 49.1 percent high-educated women had a child between the ages of 21 and
29.8 For those born in the 1960s, the percentage of women giving birth in their twenties
had fallen to 41.7 for the medium-educated, and to 37.3 for the high-educated.
Additionally, high-educated women in the younger cohort were far less likely to have
given birth by age 33 – a fall of more than 10 percentage points (Table 1). In Norway
and France, percentages of high-educated women giving birth by age 33 were well over
70 percent. In contrast to the profiles of the medium- and high-educated, amongst low-
educated women the age profile of fertility changed little across cohorts. Around 42
percent of low- educated women gave birth before the age of 21 in both cohorts, and
8 Age in this study is measured as age completed during the calendar year. All other data in this chapter are
based on age completed last birthday.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 469
more than 80 percent gave birth before the age of 33 (Table 1). These patterns suggest
that trends in postponement differ substantially by education level.
Table 1: Percentage of women with a child by select ages, by cohort and
education level*, 1950s and 1960s cohorts
Age Low education Medium education High education
1950s 1960s 1950s 1960s 1950s 1960s
19 23.8 23.6 10.0 8.0 0.4 0.0
21 41.8 42.6 20.3 17.0 1.8 0.2
25 66.0 67.0 45.9 38.2 16.9 9.9
29 80.3 78.0 66.5 58.7 50.9 37.5
33 84.1 82.3 76.9 72.1 65.3 53.8
Source: Rendall et al. (2005).
Note: * Women’s education level was reported at about age 25.
Research comparing longitudinal data for Great Britain with similar data from
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden tells a similar story about differentials in the
timing of birth by level of education. In the 1990s, the mean age at first birth amongst
British mothers who were high-educated was five years older than that of mothers with
low education – the widest gap observed across all four countries. Fertility patterns in
the 1950s and 1960s showed far less differentiation by educational attainment, and most
of the subsequent divergence was due to high-educated women postponing their first
birth (Gustafsson, Kenjoh, and Wetzels 2002). Although there are clear patterns of
postponement, this study does not consider the implications of postponement for
childlessness or completed family size. So it is not clear to what extent high-educated
women recuperate postponed fertility.
The prevailing view amongst policymakers that work and childbearing decisions
should be largely determined privately appears to have created a situation where higher
level work and motherhood have been increasingly difficult to combine, at least at
young ages (Office for National Statistics 1993; Dixon and Margo 2006). There is,
however, some evidence that postponed fertility is recuperated. Amongst those born in
the 1950s, higher qualified mothers had a median age at first birth that was about five
years older than that of women with less education, but, conditional on having had a
first birth, they were more likely to go on to have a second or third birth and to do so
more quickly (Rendall and Smallwood 2003; Table 2). Nonetheless, more than 22.5
percent of high-educated women had remained childless by age 40, compared to 15.2
percent of women with lower qualifications. Ekert-Jaffe and colleagues (2002) report
similar findings. Berrington (2004) examined a sample of women who were in their
early forties when they were interviewed for the 2000 and 2001 General Household
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
470 http://www.demographic-research.org
Survey (which covers all of Great Britain), and found that 28 percent of women with
the highest educational qualifications were childless. For those with a medium level of
education (“intermediate qualifications”), rates of childlessness were only 20 percent.
Finally amongst those with no qualifications, only 16 percent were childless in their
early forties. One-child families were more common amongst women with high
qualifications, so about half of the high-educated had a completed family size of one or
less. Conversely, very few women with no qualifications had only one child, and about
one in five had a completed family size of four of more children. These studies
demonstrate differentials in not just the timing of fertility, but the quantum of fertility
by level of education.
Table 2: Proportions of mothers having a second birth and timing
of second births, by age at first birth and education level,
1954–58 cohort in England and Wales
age 25 age 30 age35
Percentage having a
a second birth
no higher qualifications 93.0 83.5 59.8
higher qualifications 96.0 90.8 73.6
Timing of second births
Within 2 years
no higher qualifications 53.4 48.9 45.6
higher qualifications 60.6 56.7 51.7
Within 5 years
no higher qualifications 92.7 91.9 93.6
higher qualifications 95.2 94.7 95.2
Source: Rendall and Smallwood (2003).
While various studies have documented changes in the timing of first births, and
some studies have documented educational differentials in childlessness and completed
family size for specific cohorts, few have examined change over time in the relationship
between education and fertility. There is little evidence concerning trends in the
numbers remaining childless, or on completed family size by education level. It may
well be that high-educated women are postponing their first birth, but accelerating
subsequent births, and that, consequently, their completed fertility is little changed
relative to historic levels. If that is the case, we cannot conclude that reproduction is
being shifted towards other population groups in the long run, making concerns about
changes in the distribution of the costs of childbearing less worrying. Even if
differentials are not changing, they clearly exist, and issues of fairness may remain
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 471
salient, especially in a context where support for families is low relative to much of the
EU-15. On the other hand, it is possible that fertility that has been increasingly
postponed has also been, and will continue to be, increasingly foregone. If this is the
case, educational differentials in fertility may have contributed to the upward trend in
child poverty rates in the 1980s and 1990s (for a discussion in the US context, see
Lichter 1997).
2.3.3 Fertility of immigrants and ethnic minority groups
Information on immigration to England and Wales is limited. The main source of
information on the number of international migrants is the International Passenger
Survey (IPS) which collects information on place of birth, citizenship and place of
origin for a sample of individuals passing through UK ports. In addition, counts of
foreign immigrants, broken down by citizenship only, is available from the Home
Office Control of Immigration Statistics. However, information on place of birth is
available in vital statistics (asked as a voluntary question at the registration of births and
deaths since 1969) and census data. Data from the 2001 census indicate that just under
nine percent of the population of England and Wales were born outside of the United
Kingdom. Finally, the Labour Force Survey contains information on birthplace,
citizenship, and date of entry, but for an analysis of small groups the numbers are often
insufficient, and samples from several years must be combined in order to obtain
statistically significant results (Coleman and Smith 2005).
Registration data from 1971 suggests that 11.3 percent of all births were to women
born outside the United Kingdom. Thirty-five years later, 21.9 per cent of births were to
women born outside of the United Kingdom (Office for National Statistics 2007b). In
the 1980s, more than eight percent of all births were to women who were born in the
New Commonwealth or Pakistan. By 2003, this figure had increased to nearly 19
percent of all births (Coleman and Smith 2005). In particular, women born in Pakistan
and Bangladesh, many of whom are young mothers and poorly educated as well, have
had consistently high levels of fertility (Robson and Berthoud 2003).
Table 3 sets out estimates of the total fertility rate by country of birth for several
years. The denominators are constructed using the estimated population by place of
birth using information from the last census, combined with birth and death
registrations and international migration estimates. With limited information on
international migration, it is likely the measure is subject to greater levels of error the
farther away it is from the last census date (Coleman and Smith 2005). For Pakistani
and Bangladeshi women, TFRs were above six in the early 1980s, and, despite having
fallen somewhat during the 1990s, are still well above European levels. In 2001, the
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
472 http://www.demographic-research.org
TFR for these women was more than twice the national average. In contrast, the fertility
of women born in India and the rest of the world is far closer to the national average.
Table 3: Total fertility rate: by country of birth of mother,
England and Wales 1981 – 2001
Country of birth of mother 1981 1987 1991 1997 2001
Total 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6
United Kingdom1 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6
Total outside UK 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2
New Commonwealth 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.1 2.8
India 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3
Pakistan 4.8 5.3 4.7
Bangladesh 6.5 5.2
5.3 4.8 3.9
East Africa 2.1 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.6
Rest of Africa2 3.4 3.2 2.7 3.5 2.0
Rest of New Commonwealth3 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.9 2.2
Rest of the World 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.8
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics FM1 Nos. 22, 24, 26, and 32, Table 9.5
Note: 1 Including Isle of Man and Channel Islands
2 Includes countries listed under Southern Africa and Rest of Africa in Table A of birth statistics, series FM1 No.32
3 Includes countries listed under Far East, Mediterranean, Caribbean and Rest of New Commonwealth in Table A of birth statistics,
series FM1 No 32.
The contribution of foreign births to the overall TFR is small, but not trivial.
Estimates suggest that, in England and Wales in 2001, the total fertility rate of 1.63
would have fallen to 1.56 if the 17 percent of all births to mothers who had been born
outside of the whole United Kingdom were excluded. In 2006, the TFR for the UK as a
whole would have fallen by 0.1 births per woman (Office for National Statistics 2007b).
Because of increased tempo shortly after migrating9 and data issues
10, their longer-term
contribution to fertility is more difficult to determine. In any case, net migration is
9 As Toulemon (2006) illustrates, the TFR for migrants can overstate the number of births that migrants are
likely to have because migrants often have particularly high rates of fertility shortly after they have migrated,
and lower rates before arriving. These effects will be particularly strong in a context where recent migrants
comprise a large share of all migrants. 10 The most recent TFR of 1.87 may be biased upward because of high levels of immigration and poor quality
immigration data. The migrant population has increased substantially since 2000, but is not well counted.
Mothers tend to be counted and are included in the numerator of fertility rates. However, many women who
have migrated but remain childless are unlikely to be precisely counted. The contribution of immigrants to the
numerator should be far more precise. Their contribution to the denominator is likely to be underestimated by
high levels of poorly recorded migration.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 473
estimated to have increased by 48 percent between 2003–04 and 2004–05. Although
TFRs for UK-born women have increased, high levels of migration and a higher share
of new immigrants as a proportion of the foreign born have contributed to the increase
in the TFR between 2001 and 2006 (Office for National Statistics 2007b). If current
migration trends continue, the contribution of immigrants to period fertility indicators
should increase in importance.
3. Fertility related changes in patterns of family formation
3.1 The decline in marriage and the rise of cohabitation
For cohorts born in the first half of the twentieth century, marriage occurred early and
was nearly universal. Amongst those born between 1931 and 1951, more than half of
men and three-quarters of women were married before the age of 25 (Table 4). By age
50, 11.1 percent of men born in 1951 had never married. For women the figure was
even lower. Data for younger cohorts show that marriage was increasingly both
postponed and foregone (Murphy and Wang 1999; Bynner et al. 2002; Office for
National Statistics 2006). For those cohorts born in 1965, fewer than 30 percent of men
and just under half of women were married by age 25. By age 40, over 29 percent of
men and 21 percent of women had never married – a substantial increase in non-
marriage relative to previous birth cohorts. Turning to the most recent cohorts, young
marriage has become even more uncommon. In recent years, mean age at first marriage
has increased to over 29 for women, and to 31 for men (Office for National Statistics
2006).
The postponement of marriage is linked to a more prolonged and, in some ways,
more difficult transition from adolescence to adulthood. Over the second half of the
twentieth century, fewer men and women were leaving school with no qualifications,
and numbers enrolled in higher education have grown. This has worked to increase the
number of years spent in education during late adolescence – a stage in the life course
when many earlier cohorts were entering marriage. Comparing men and women born in
1958 and 1970, Bynner and Parsons (2001) find that fewer members of the 1970 cohort
were unqualified, and more had gone on to obtain higher qualifications. As time spent
in education was being prolonged, the labour market was changing rapidly. By 1986,
the youth labour market had deteriorated in many parts of the UK, and those leaving
school were often unemployed or only able to obtain casual employment. There were
fewer apprenticeships, although some enrolled in youth training programmes (Bynner et
al. 2002). Finally, those born in 1970 were entering adulthood at a time when housing
costs were prohibitively high. To make matters worse, the policy of selling off local
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
474 http://www.demographic-research.org
authority housing, which had a large effect from the mid-1980s, meant that there was a
limited stock of public accommodation available. Moreover, the available stock was
“concentrated in the least salubrious areas and among the most economically and
socially disadvantaged groups” (Smith and Ferri 2003: 206). Those making the
transition to adulthood in the late 1980s and at the turn of the century faced similar
problems with the costs of housing. These conditions, along with less job security and
increasing rates of youth unemployment (discussed in more detail in Section 5 below),
made leaving the parental home particularly difficult. Data for the UK as a whole
indicate that more than 37 percent of men and 18 percent of women aged 20–24 in 1994
were still living with their parents (Aassve, Billari, Mazzuco and Ongaro 2002).
Table 4: Proportions of men and women ever married at select ages,
by birth cohort 1931–1985
Age in years
Men 20 25 30 40 50
1931 2.8 52.3 80.9 90.1 91.8
1941 6.3 60.5 83.0 90.8 92.1
1951 9.8 58.5 78.0 87.2 88.9
1961 5.7 38.2 61.5 76.4
1965 3.1 28.9 52.7 70.6
1975 0.9 11.1 31.1
1980 0.7 8.5
1985 0.5
Women 20 25 30 40 50
1931 18.7 75.0 88.9 93.6 94.7
1941 28.0 80.4 90.7 94.9 95.7
1951 30.6 77.4 88.1 92.7 93.6
1961 20.2 57.7 74.3 83.5
1965 12.3 47.3 66.5 78.3
1975 3.9 22.1 44.1
1980 2.8 17.3
1985 2.1
Source: Office for National Statistics, Marriage Divorce and Adoption Statistics, Series FM2, No. 32 Table 3.36.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 475
With changes in the transition to adulthood came changes in the nature of first
partnership. Specifically, cohabitation replaced direct marriage for a large percentage of
young adults (Kiernan 1999). Up until the late 1970s, the prevalence of cohabiting
unions was low and the majority of those cohabiting were divorced and separated. Since
that time cohabitation has become far more common, and the characteristics of women
and men who choose to cohabit has changed. Between 1976 and 1998, the proportion of
unmarried women who were cohabiting in Great Britain increased more than threefold,
from nine percent to 29 percent, and the percentage of cohabiting women who were
never married increased sharply (Haskey 2001). For the cohort born between 1950 and
1962, data drawn from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) show that those
from high social class backgrounds were more likely to cohabit. For the 1963–76
cohort, cohabitation was more normative, and the association is not significant
(Ermisch and Francesconi 2000b). Using the same data source, another analysis reports
that, for those born between 1963 and 1967, premarital cohabitation as a first
partnership was most common amongst women with degree level qualifications
(Kiernan 1999, Table 8). Amongst those who had a first partnership by 1992, only 27
percent of the most highly educated women married directly, whilst over 40 percent of
women with lower qualifications reported having done so. Educational differentials
have subsequently disappeared. Ermisch (2005) suggests these changes are due to a
diffusion of more tolerant attitudes about consensual unions spreading from the more
privileged innovators to the wider society. The increasing popularity of unmarried
cohabiting unions and their changing character mean that the time spent outside of a
partnership in young adulthood has grown, but far less than figures on the
postponement of marriage would suggest (Ermisch and Francesconi 2000a).
About half of all cohabitating unions formed by women born in 1970 were
subsequently dissolved, and rates of dissolution are higher for those with low levels of
education (Ermisch 2005). Nonetheless, in analyses that compared cohorts born in 1958
and 1970, Steele and colleagues (2006) find that having children is associated with
relatively greater stability in the younger cohort, and the authors suggest that the
distinction between married and cohabiting partnerships with children may be less
important now than it was in the past.
3.2 A weakening of the link between marriage and childbearing
In the last three to four decades, the nature of the relationship between marriage and
first childbearing has changed. In the 1970s, a small (but increasing, especially after
1977) proportion of births occurred outside of marriage (Figure 8), and first marital
births tended to occur very shortly after marriage. In more recent years, longer intervals
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
476 http://www.demographic-research.org
between marriage and first birth have become increasingly common. In 1970, 59
percent of all marital first births were to women who had been married one year or less,
and nine percent were to women who had been married for five years or more. By 2005,
16 percent of first marital births were to women who had been married five years or
more. Moreover, 48 percent of marital first births took place in the first two years – an
11 point decline since 1970 (Table 5).
Figure 8: Annual number of marriages and births, England and Wales,
1938–2004
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Th
ousands
Marriages
All births
Marital births
Non-marital births
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13); FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28 to 33,
Tables 1.5 and 2.1.
Over the same period, it became less likely that marriage would precede
childbearing. The percentage of births taking place outside of marriage – many but not
all of which are first births to never married women – increased from around nine
percent in 1975, to 43 percent in 2004 (Figure 8). Part of this increase was apparently
due to a decline in the propensity of women to marry shortly after becoming pregnant.
That one in four first marital births in 1970 were to women who had been married seven
months or less suggests that it was not uncommon for a woman’s pregnancy to instigate
marriage (Table 5). By 2005, only nine percent of first marital births occurred so
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 477
quickly after marriage. Data on first marriages tell a similar story about changes to the
relative timing of marriage and childbirth. In the 1960s, around one in five first
marriages were followed by a birth in the next eight months. By 2003, this had
decreased to 9.5 percent, although levels and rates of change vary considerably by age
at marriage (Table 6).
Table 5: First marital births by duration of the marriage,
all married women 1970–2005
Percentage of first marital births by duration of marriage
Completed months Completed years
All
durations(N) 0–7 8–11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
1970 277,407 0.25 0.11 0.36 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.06
1975 226,944 0.17 0.08 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.09
1980 240,975 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.13
1985 212,017 0.16 0.08 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.13
1990 200,394 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.13
1995 168,118 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.13
2000 146,509 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.13
2005 155,953 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.11
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13); FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28 to 34,
Table 5.1.
The rise of unmarried cohabitation has led to an increasing proportion of births
taking place within unions, but outside of marriage (Steele, Joshi, Kallis and Goldstein
2006). Although non-marital births have increased substantially, simulations suggest
that only about one-fifth of the increase can be attributed to changes in non-marital
fertility rates. Most of the increase appears to be due to growth in the population at risk
of a non-marital birth – many of whom are in cohabiting unions – and not to increases
in the non-marital fertility rates, which remain low compared to marital fertility rates
(Ermisch 1999). Changes in partnership and fertility behaviour have contributed to a
rather small increase in the median age of motherhood. Comparing cohorts of women
born between 1950 and 1952 with women born from 1962–1976, Ermisch and
Francesconi (2000b) found that the median age of motherhood increased over a year
from 26.4 to 27.5.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
478 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table 6: The percentage of first marriages where a birth occurs
within eight months, by age of mother at marriage
Age at Marriage
Under 45 Under 20 Age 20–24 Age 25–29 Age 30–44
1955 14.8 24.3 13.4 10.4 8.1
1960 18.6 33.8 13.6 12.3 9.1
1965 22.3 38.3 15.6 13.5 10.2
1970 20.0 35.4 13.6 11.8 9.9
1975 13.0 23.8 8.1 7.4 7.4
1980 14.0 25.5 9.8 9.6 10.7
1985 13.4 26.8 10.9 10.4 11.0
1990 11.5 24.0 10.4 9.5 11.7
1995 10.1 20.6 10.3 8.3 10.8
2000 9.3 19.9 10.9 7.5 8.8
2003 9.5 20.1 11.2 7.8 9.0
Source: Office for National Statistics Birth Statistics 1837–1983 (Historical series FM1 No 13) Table 1.7; FM1 Volume No's 18 and 28
to 33, Table 1.8.
3.3 Divorce and union dissolution
Secular divorce was first created in 1857. The Matrimonial Causes Act (1937)
permitted fault-based divorce on the grounds of adultery, cruelty and desertion of at
least three years. There are no reliable statistics on divorce prior to 1950, but it was not
until the availability of legal aid in 1950 that divorce became affordable for a significant
portion of the British population. The Divorce Reform Act of 1969 introduced divorce
by mutual consent with a separation period of at least two years. This was followed
shortly after by the Matrimonial Causes Act in 1973, according to which a divorce can
be granted if the petitioner has been married for at least one year, and the marriage has
“broken down irretrievably”. Irretrievable breakdown is evidenced when one of the
following five facts is established as “proof”: adultery of the other spouse, unreasonable
behaviour of the other spouse, desertion after two years, separation with mutual consent
after two years, or separation with no consent after five years (Smart 1999). In about 70
percent of cases in England and Wales, the divorce petitioner cites adultery or
unreasonable behaviour in the petition for divorce (Office for National Statistics 2007c)
In 1995, the government mooted the idea of divorce law reform, and published
Looking to the Future: Mediation and the Ground for Divorce (Lord Chancellor’s
Department 1995). The Family Law Act of 1996 soon followed. The Act would have
led to the adoption of no-fault divorce. The Bill was passed but only partly
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 479
implemented. Since then, divorce reform in England and Wales has been in a state of
limbo. The law continues to be fault based and, for the most part, based on the
Matrimonial Causes Act (Smart 1999).
Although there had been short-lived increases in previous decades, the divorce rate
did not begin its consistent and steep upward trend until the early 1960s (Smith 1997).
The total divorce rate11
increased from 0.1 to 0.4 between 1960 and 1980. It
subsequently stabilised after 1995, at around 0.45. While not the highest in Europe, this
rate places England and Wales on the high end of EU countries (Eurostat 2004; Council
of Europe 2005).
The net effect of divorce on fertility is difficult to predict. High divorce rates
combined with the high rates of dissolution amongst cohabitating couples should work
to dampen fertility, but fertility intentions may be revised upward with repartnering to
take into account the preferences of the new partner, or because of the desire of newly
formed couples to have at least one shared child (Vikat, Thomson and Hoem 1999).
This may have countervailing effects. Data from the early 1990s suggest that 45 percent
of British women who experienced a divorce gave birth within twelve years of having
dissolved their marriages. Interestingly, the woman’s parity at the time of dissolution
was not strongly associated with subsequent childbearing. This finding suggests that the
decision-making process of previously divorced women differs from that of women
who are still in their first marriage, where parity is likely to be a key consideration
(Jefferies, Berrington and Diamond 2000).
3.4 Changes in sexual behaviour, contraceptive use and induced abortion
The 1960s and 1970s saw unprecedented change in both sexual behaviour and the
control of reproduction. Delayed marriage was not met with similar delays in sexual
debut. Data from the Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles Survey indicate that nearly one in
five British women born between 1926 and 1930 had experienced their first sexual
intercourse by the age of 20. For this birth cohort, the median age at first intercourse
was 23 – about the median age at first marriage. For the cohort born in the second half
of the 1950s, the median age had fallen to 19, an age at which fewer than 20 percent
were married (Botting and Dunnell 2000). Those born in between these two cohorts
engaged in more pre-marital sexual activity at young ages than those born earlier, but
did not benefit from good access to contraception. The result was a large number of
‘shotgun marriages’ in the post-war period, as evidenced by the peak in premarital
11 The total divorce rate is a period measure calculated by summing divorce rates by duration of marriage for
a given year.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
480 http://www.demographic-research.org
conceptions in the 1960s, especially for those under 20, which fell subsequently to
1950s levels by the second half of the 1970s (Hobcraft 1996). These patterns also
suggest that contraception and abortion were widely used once they became legally
available.
Women reaching adulthood in the 1970s had unprecedented access to reliable
contraceptive methods and legal abortion. The contraceptive pill was made available for
purchase in January of 1961. At first, contraceptive services were only available to
married women and for medical reasons, and their extension to women who were
unmarried took place over many years. However, by 1974, the contraceptive pill was
provided by the National Health Service to all women free of charge (Hobcraft 1996).
Women first gained legal access to abortion in 1968 (legalised by a new Act of
Parliament in 1967). For the first five years, services were limited and rates of use were
low (Table 7). As services became more widespread between 1969 and 1974, rates of
use more than doubled. Currently, a woman can obtain an abortion in the first 24 weeks
of pregnancy (lowered in 1990 from 28 weeks in the original Act), as long as two
doctors conclude that a woman’s physical or mental health or her child(ren)’s physical
or mental health will be under greater threat if she continues with the pregnancy than if
she terminates it. In cases where two doctors decide a woman’s health is gravely
threatened if she carries the pregnancy to term, or that the foetus is likely to suffer from
severe physical or mental abnormalities, there is no legal time limit. In practice, most
abortions take place well within the time limit. In 2006, 89 percent of abortions were
carried out within 13 weeks of conception (Department of Health 2007).
Table 7: Frequency of induced abortion in England and Wales, 1969-2005
Year
Number of
Abortions
Abortions per
100 conceptions*
All Ages Crude
Abortion Rate(15–44)
Standardised
Abortion Rate
1969 54,819 5.9 5.3 5.2
1974 162,940 14.6 11.5 11.2
1979 149,746 15.9 12.0 11.5
1984 169,993 17.6 12.8 12.2
1989 183,974 19.9 15.5 15.1
1994 166,876 19.1 14.6 14.6
1999 183,250 21.8 16.2 16.8
2004 194,498 22.5 16.9 17.8
2005 194,353 n.a. 17.0 17.8
2006 201,173 n.a. 17.5 18.3
*Not ending in miscarriage
Source: Department of Health (2007).
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-ukenglandwales.html.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 481
In 1995, the proportion of conceptions leading to an abortion was, at 19, well
above the level observed in many other Western European countries, and similar to
those found in Scandinavian countries. At the same time, it was lower than in other
English speaking countries where it was legal (Henshaw, Singh and Haas 1999).
However, in 1996, the rate of conceptions and the rate of abortion both increased,
particularly amongst women aged 20–24. Researchers have linked the sudden increase
to a warning issued by the Committee on Safety of Medicines in October 1995 about a
link between seven brands of contraceptive pill and thrombosis (Wood, Botting and
Dunnell 1997). Despite increasing use of emergency contraception (Botting and
Dunnell 2003), abortion rates have continued to increase and, in 2004, 22.5 percent of
conceptions leading to either an abortion or a live birth ended in legal abortion. This
trend has not been well examined or well explained in the extant research. Although
some have suggested that subsequent pill scares are to blame (Summerfield and Babb
2003), there is little evidence that use of contraceptive pills has declined appreciably,
even at the time of the 1995 scare (Wood et al. 1997; Taylor, Keyse and Bryant 2006).
With the exception of legal abortion, there is little good information on the use of
contraceptive services prior to the Family Formation Survey (FFS) of 1976. At that
time, the contraceptive pill was the most commonly used method, and about 28 percent
of women aged 14–49 were using it (Botting and Dunnell 2000). In 2005, about 24
percent of women used the contraceptive pill, representing just under one-third of
women using any method (Table 8).
During the 1970s and 1980s, surgical sterilisation became common in England and
Wales, and has remained at high levels since that time (Botting and Dunnell 2000). In
line with historic trends, similar proportions of male and female sterilisations were
reported in 2005, when nearly 40 percent of women aged 40 and over reported that
either they or their partners had been sterilised as a means of contraception. The use of
sterilisation for women in their thirties has declined somewhat over time (Taylor et al.
2006). This is most probably due to trends in the postponement of fertility.
Except for condoms, the use of which has increased over time (often used in
addition to other methods), the proportions using other types of methods have remained
fairly low and stable since the 1970s. Condom use began climbing in the early 1990s,
most probably due to concerns about HIV-AIDS. Data collected in 1997 suggest that
disease prevention was a motivating factor for 54 percent of men and 62 percent of
women who reported having used a condom in the previous 12 months (Botting and
Dunnell 2000).
High and stable rates of fertility in England and Wales are not due to low levels of
contraceptive use, except perhaps for specific groups of younger people (Social
Exclusion Unit 1999). Modern methods of contraception – the contraceptive pill in
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
482 http://www.demographic-research.org
particular – have, at least since the mid-1970s, been used at high levels in young
adulthood, after which sterilization becomes increasingly common.
Table 8: Contraceptive methods used in 2005/06,
percentages by age group
Age 16–17 18–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 All
Percentage using any modern method 51 67 82 74 78 78 70 75 74
Current method(s) used (those using at least one method)
Non-surgical methods
Pill 61 60 63 47 43 23 15 6 32
Male condom 78 50 43 34 32 26 16 14 28
IUD 0 2 0 6 6 8 9 12 7
Injection/implant 12 21 13 9 6 4 2 1 6
Periodic abstinence 0 0 0 3 3 2 2 0 2
Withdrawal 6 0 4 7 5 4 6 4 5
Other non-surgical 16 6 3 3 8 4 3 7 6
Surgical methods
Sterilized 0 0 1 2 9 18 17 29 13
Partner Sterilized 0 0 1 4 5 15 34 29 15
Percentage not using any method 49 33 18 26 22 22 30 25 26
Reason for not using a method (those not using any method)
No heterosexual relations 96 100 87 65 40 45 42 42 55
Sterile after another operation 0 0 0 5 1 11 23 15 10
Wants to get pregnant 0 0 0 17 30 21 7 4 12
Currently pregnant 4 0 8 6 16 4 1 0 5
Possibly infertile (post-menopausal or other) 0 0 4 4 6 7 15 35 12
Doesn't like contraception 0 0 0 0 2 4 3 0 2
Other reason 0 0 2 3 3 9 8 5 5
N 55 39 154 161 214 270 261 224 1377
Source: Taylor, Keyse and Bryant (2006).
4. Social and population policies
Although there has been little policy that aims directly to influence fertility, it is likely
that changes to social and economic policies in recent years have had indirect effects by
altering the costs of childbearing. Prior to 1997, family policy was minimal, reflecting
the liberal, individualistic and market oriented ideology of the United Kingdom. Taxes
tended to be individualized (although there was some tax relief in the past for married
couples), and, for married couples, issues of fertility and child care were considered
private matters (O’Donoghue and Sutherland 1999; Randall 1999). In contrast, the
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 483
United Kingdom was unique (along with the Netherlands) in that it expected lone
mothers to remain at home and care for their children full-time, and provided low levels
of income support that enabled them to do so (Millar 1996). But changes in recent years
have reflected a marked move towards greater governmental support of families with
children, especially when those families are engaged in (low) paid work. Some of the
more important aspects of recent policy reforms and developments include
improvements to maternity and parental leave entitlements, including a right for parents
with small children to request part-time hours (Lewis and Campbell 2007); increases in
child benefit12
(counterbalanced for some families by the removal of the lone parent
supplement); changes to the tax system that increase incentives for people to take up
paid work (Brewer and Shephard 2004); and improved public provision of child care
(Brewer, Crawford and Dearden 2005). Although these changes took place fairly
recently, we can nonetheless speculate about the likely impact.
4.1 The employment rights of parents
Statutory maternity leave has existed since the 1970s, but it was originally only
available to women who had been continuously employed with the same employer for
at least two years (five years for women working short part-time hours). A substantial
proportion of working women failed to meet this requirement (McRae 1991).
Entitlement was only extended to all working mothers in the early 1990s, at which time
a two-tiered system of Ordinary Maternity Leave (OML) and Additional Maternity
Leave (AML) was put in place (Gregg et al. 2003). Until recently, all women
employees were entitled to 26 weeks of OML, and those who had completed 26 weeks
continuous employment with their present employer were eligible for a further 26
weeks of AML. For babies due on or after 1 April 2007, job protected maternity leave
was extended to one year for all women, regardless of length of service. At the same
time, entitlement to Statutory Maternity Pay was extended to 39 weeks. Currently, the
first six weeks are paid at 90 percent of earnings, and the remaining 33 weeks are paid
at a flat rate of £117.18 per week. The flat rate is more than double what it was in
1997.13
From 2010, paid maternity leave will be extended to one year.14
12 http://www.ifs.org.uk/ff/childben.xls. 13 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/WorkAndFamilies/DG_10029285. 14 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statutory-notices/paternity-leave-pay.htm. The goal is to extend entitlements by
the end of this Parliament, but the time of introduction has not been confirmed.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
484 http://www.demographic-research.org
Parental leave, an unpaid, individual entitlement consisting of 13 weeks per parent,
per child, was first introduced in December 1999.15
In contrast to maternity leave,
which has been increasing in length and the generosity of payment, parental leave
legislation complies with the minimum required by the EU Directive on Parental Leave,
and goes little beyond it (Lewis and Campbell 2007). Leave can be taken in blocks or
multiples of one week up until the child is aged five, but parents are not permitted to
take more than four weeks of leave per calendar year. All employees with at least one
year of continuous employment with their present employer, and who have, or expect to
have, parental responsibility for a child are eligible.16
Consistent with its reluctance to
impose strong regulations on the labour market or to interfere in ‘private matters’, the
Government’s Summary Guidance states that ‘wherever possible employers and
employees should make their own agreements about how parental leave will work in a
particular workplace.’(Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform n.d.).
Moreover, if employers ‘cannot cope’ they are permitted to postpone a period of leave
for up to six months (Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform n.d.).
Although rights to stay at home to care for a young child have been extended in
recent years, the focus has been on providing longer and better paid maternity leaves.
Rights for fathers to take leave have been far more limited, although since 2003 they
have had the statutory right to two weeks paid paternity leave. In 2010, when paid
maternity leave increases to one year, mothers will be able to transfer the last six
months of their leave entitlement to fathers, who would be compensated at the flat rate.
Not surprisingly, the Government expects take-up to be low. This policy approach,
which is unique in Europe, reinforces the traditional gendered division of paid and
unpaid work (Lewis and Campbell 2007).
To facilitate the work-life balance of working parents, legislation was also
introduced in 2003 that gives parents of children under the age of six (under 18 if the
child is disabled) a right to request flexible work in existing jobs. From April 2007, this
right to request was extended to those with caring responsibilities for adults as well
(Himmelweit and Land 2007). This measure could serve to reduce some of the
occupational segregation between full-time and part-time jobs. Research suggests that,
thus far, the majority of requests for flexibility have been granted, although mothers are
far more likely to make requests, and fathers are more than twice as likely to have their
requests turned down (Palmer 2004; Holt and Grainger 2005; Lewis and Campbell
2007). Other national evidence suggests the practice is limited, and only those who
think their requests will be granted place a request in the first place (Manning and
Petrongolo 2004). Likewise, local labour market studies suggest that flexible working
15 http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/workandfamilies/parental-leave/index.html. 16 http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Parents/Moneyandworkentitlements/Parentalleaveandpay/DG_10029416.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 485
arrangements are not widespread. Some firms have extended this right to all employees
(Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 2005), but, as the scheme remains
discretionary, the decisions that firms make are likely to vary with the state of the
labour market. Furthermore, qualitative studies have reported that, in practice, the
operation of flexibility on a day-to-day basis rests on decisions made by line managers,
irrespective of formal company policy (Perrons 1999, Yeandle, Wigfield, Crompton
and Dennett 2002, Standing 2006).
4.2 Support for the care of children
This section discusses recent policy changes, all explicitly aimed at providing better
support to families with children. These include expanded provision of government
subsidised childcare, as well as increased redistribution through cash transfers and
changes to the tax system.
In May 1998, the Government broke with a traditional reliance on the market to
provide efficient levels of high quality child care and launched a National Childcare
Strategy. The strategy aimed “to ensure good quality, affordable childcare for children
aged 0 to 14 in every neighbourhood, including both formal childcare and support for
informal arrangements.”17
Although it has been criticised for providing too few places
to children under three (Rake 2001), there has been a substantial increase in the number
of new childcare places made available since 1997.18
In addition, there has been an
expansion in free early education for three- and four-year-olds. Currently, all four-year-
olds are guaranteed a free early education place if their parents want one, but the hours
are part-time, and the minimum provision amounts to just 12.5 hours a week (Rake
2001). Even with minimum hours set to increase19
to 15 by 2010, for many dual-earning
families, taking up free early childcare means they must rely on a complex mix of
formal, informal and back-up support both for care and transportation between care
sites. Logistical requirements of this sort prevent some mothers from taking up paid
work (Skinner 2003).
In addition to measures aimed at facilitating work and motherhood, the
government has also increased the cash support that it offers to parents, particularly
those on low incomes. Child benefit is a universal cash payment made available to all
children under the age of 16 and, from April 2006, to families with children aged 16,
17, 18 and 19 who meet education or training requirements.20
The payment is made
17 http://www.surestart.gov.uk/aboutsurestart/about/thesurestartprogramme2/challenge/. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ccmmanual/CCM18025.htm.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
486 http://www.demographic-research.org
directly to the main care provider, usually the mother. As of April 2008, the benefit
amounts to £18.80 per week for the eldest child, and £12.55 per week for each
additional child.21
Compared to other EU-15 countries, the level of child benefit is not
generous. Despite above inflation increases in recent years, a fairly recent comparative
analysis placed the UK in the lower middle of the ranking for different amounts of
household incomes, just above the four Southern European countries (de Henau et al.
2002).
In the late 1990s, the Government introduced a series of targeted tax reforms
aimed at providing additional support to families with children. Key policies include an
integrated refundable tax credit for out-of-work families and low-paid working families
(with a supplement in the first year of a child’s life), and additional benefits for parents
working 16 hours or more per week (the Working Tax Credit) (Brewer and Shephard
2004). The effect of these policies has been to make the tax system increasingly less
individualised, to increase the incomes of poor families with children, and to increase
the number of households eligible for benefits (Sutherland 2005). More than three times
as many working age adults were receiving tax credits in 2004/05 as were receiving
what was then called the Family Credit in the early 1990s.22
While changes to the tax
system have improved the financial situation of many families, there are concerns about
the impact of these changes on gender equality. Because eligibility for tax credits is
calculated at the household level, the system may tend to discourage second earners,
usually the mother, from entering the labour market and accumulating work experience.
Hence, tax credits may serve to reinforce the male breadwinning model, and force some
women to make difficult choices about combining work and family (Brewer and
Shephard 2004).
Taken together, recent changes in both social policy and the labour market should
provide limited help to women who want to combine work and childbearing. They
should also work to lessen the economic costs of children. But, because the measures,
unlike those in many other countries, tend to redistribute resources vertically rather than
horizontally, any effects on fertility should disproportionately affect women on lower
incomes.23
Because of a strong reliance on means testing and flat rate benefits,
moderate- to high-earning women lose a higher proportion of their salary by taking 52
weeks of maternity leave (thirteen weeks of which is unpaid and all but nine at a flat
rate). They might be better able to afford the loss of earnings associated with maternity
leave, but they still face the possibility of occupational downgrading due to weak
21 http://www.ifs.org.uk/ff/childben.xls. 22 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key%20facts.shtml. 23 Horizontal redistribution takes place within income groups. It is also sometimes used to refer to
redistribution over the life cycle. An example would be Bismarkian-type social insurance policies that tend to
be status-preserving. In contrast, vertical redistribution is from the rich to the poor (Bonoli 1997).
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 487
regulations about the right to return (those taking more than six months are only
promised the right to return to a similar job) (Lewis and Campbell 2007) and may still
face long-term part-time pay penalties if they request and are granted part-time hours
(Francesconi and Gosling 2004). In that sense, the financial costs for those who are
better off could be far greater. Increased economic support for children in general
should improve the economic circumstances of families with children, but, again, the
effect on higher-income families (and those families who do want to adhere to a
traditional gendered division of labour) should be relatively small.
5. Social and political changes affecting fertility
5.1 The labour market
The labour market in the United Kingdom is characterised by high activity and
employment rates for both men and women, and, even taking into account recent
changes in family policy discussed above, low levels of labour market regulation
relative to the rest of Europe (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2005; Himmelweit and Land
2007). Participation rates in England and Wales exceed the Lisbon targets for female
employment (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2005). Unemployment rates have halved from
10 percent in the early 1990s, to five percent between 2001 and 2005 (Figure 9), and
long-term unemployment has fallen by more than 80 percent since 1997. The
proportion of children living in workless households has also fallen by 2.6 percent since
1997 (Sutherland 2005).
Head count rates of employment for women and men are high, although these
figures mask a good deal of heterogeneity. Chronic unemployment remains a problem
for some individuals, and figures from 2004 show that two-fifths of the long-term
unemployed who enter work find themselves out of work again within six months.24
The activity rates of women have been rising over time, but both levels and rates of
growth differ substantially by the age of the youngest child and by the presence of a
partner (Figure 10), as well as by ethnic group (Sigle-Rushton and Perrons 2006).
Mothers with small children have far lower participation and employment rates than
other women, and this is particularly the case for women living outside of a partnership.
For example, the employment rate of lone mothers in the United Kingdom was just over
55 percent in 2004, up from 44 percent in 1996 (Sutherland 2005). Only the
Netherlands has such a small percentage of lone mothers reporting employment or self-
24 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key%20facts.shtml.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
488 http://www.demographic-research.org
employment. This percentage is also small relative to the general population of women
age 25–49, of whom 72 percent report their main activity status as employed or self-
employed (Eurostat 2004).
Despite their increased presence in the labour market, mothers continue to
reconcile work and family by engaging in part-time work, and often only after children
have entered school. Relative to other European countries, part-time jobs are more
occupationally and vertically segregated. For example, in 2003–04, nearly one-quarter
of women part-time workers in Great Britain were shop assistants, care assistants or
cleaners (versus 7.7 percent of full-time workers). In contrast, only four percent of part-
time (versus 15 percent of full-time) working women were managers or senior officials
(Manning and Petrongolo 2004). Although the gender pay gap for full-time workers is
not extremely wide, part-time workers face a good deal of occupational segregation,
and an extremely large part-time pay penalty. As a consequence, many women (and
some men) trade flexible hours for low-paid and low-skill jobs. Of the 5.5 million
working age adults who earned less than £6.50 per hour in 2004, nearly two-thirds were
women and half were part-time workers.25
Moreover, there is concern that this has
resulted in an inefficient utilization of skills, because a high percentage of part-time
workers report working below their potential (Darton and Hurrell 2005; Equal
Opportunities Commission 2005). Hence, relative to other countries, the gap in earnings
between mothers and childless women, sometimes termed the “motherhood gap”, is
high, and does not narrow appreciably as children get older (Sigle-Rushton and
Waldfogel 2007).
Equal opportunity legislation is fairly strong, but the substantive effects for those
whose work patterns deviate from the standard male model are somewhat limited. The
Part-Time (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations, which aim to secure
parity between part-time and full-time workers in terms of holiday entitlements, sick
pay and pensions, were introduced in 2000. Their potential to reduce the part-time pay
gap is weakened by the degree of occupational and job segregation between full-time
and part-time workers, which makes it difficult to find comparable workers in order to
make a case for unfair or discriminatory treatment (Perrons and Sigle-Rushton 2006).
As long as the labour market remains highly segregated, women’s access to well-paying
jobs will be limited, unless they are willing and able to work full-time.
25 http://www.poverty.org.uk/summary/key_facts.htm Low pay is also strongly associated with qualification
levels.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 489
Figure 9: Unemployment rates of working aged women and men, by age group
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Women
Pe
rcen
t
all ages age 15-24 age 25-49 age 50+
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Men
Pe
rce
nt
all ages age 15-24 age 25-49 age 50+
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, author’s calculations.
Note: The sample includes women aged 15 to 59 and men aged 15–64 to reflect statutory retirement age, which differs by sex.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
490 http://www.demographic-research.org
In order to address high rates of relative poverty and child poverty, the
Government has, in recent years, implemented a wide range of new policy measures,
some of which should address gender inequalities in the labour market. As Sutherland
(2005) suggests, the approach can best be summarised as an attempt to reduce poverty
without creating incentives for inactivity. Some of the more important measures include
the introduction of a national minimum wage, and the introduction of the New Deal
employment activation programmes. The latter, however, have tended to focus
resources on groups of unemployed in which men are overrepresented (Rake 2001).
Overall, the Government has increased the amount of support offered to the low paid
(with a stronger emphasis on families with children), but it has been more radical in its
reforms to the income tax system, and more cautious in its efforts to impose additional
regulations on the labour market.
The first legislation for a national minimum wage was passed in 1998. It took
effect in April 1999, and has worked to raise the wages of the lowest paid, the majority
of whom were women and part-time workers. Concerns about the costs it would impose
on businesses and the effect it might have on unemployment rates meant that the main
rate was originally set at a fairly low £3.60 per hour (with a lower youth rate of £3.00
per hour) (Low Pay Commission 2000). However, it has been raised in each subsequent
year, and, as of October 2007, stands at £5.52 per hour (with a lower development rate
for 18–21 year olds of £4.60 per hour, and an even lower rate for 16–17 year olds of
£3.40 per hour).26
Set nationally, it remains well below a ‘living wage’ in more
expensive areas like London (Greater London Authority 2005). Despite the lower youth
rate, which is meant to encourage employers to hire the youngest workers,
unemployment rates for those aged 15 to 24 remain high, particularly for males (Figure
9). Inactivity rates remain high for young people as well (Bynner and Parsons 1999;
Rennison, Maguire, Middleton and Ashworth 2005).
5.2 The gender division of unpaid work
As discussed above, the economic and policy context creates incentives for a
specialised gender division of paid and unpaid work, especially for families with
children. What about actual behaviour? Data from the UK Time Use Survey show that,
although total time spent on paid and unpaid work is similar for women and men,
fathers report spending twice as much time in paid employment during the week, and
mothers spend nearly twice as much time on unpaid work and caring. Mothers are
responsible for 75 percent of the time spent on childcare during the week, and around
26 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/nmw/#b.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 491
two-thirds of the time spent on weekends. Having children increases the demand for
time for housework and care, but the extra work continues to be disproportionately
shouldered by women.27
Figure 10: Activity rates of women aged 20–45, by partnership status and age of
youngest child, 1993-2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Woman with a partner
under 3 aged 3-4 aged 5-9 aged 10-18 no children
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Woman without a partner
under 3 aged 3-4 aged 5-9 aged 10-18 no children
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, author’s calculations.
27 http://www.eoc.org.uk/PDF/time_use_and_childcare.pdf.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
492 http://www.demographic-research.org
5.3 Fertility intentions
Data on fertility intentions collected between 1998 and 2001 suggest that, although
average intended family size has declined, and the percentage of women aged 18–23
who intend to remain childless or have only one child has grown since the 1979–1981
period, the proportion of women intending to have exactly two children has remained
remarkably stable (Table 9). The two-child norm appears to be strongly entrenched, and
a lowest low fertility future, whereby the TFR falls below 1.3 children per women
(Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002), is not in line with stated intentions (Smallwood and
Jefferies 2003). Of course, the relationship between intentions and actual behaviour is
extremely complex. It is likely that intentions will change – upwards and downwards –
over time (McDonald 2002). In addition, unexpected fertility is not uncommon.
Although more than two in five recent parents reported that their pregnancies were
unplanned (Joshi et al. 2004), suggesting that a good many births were not intended or
were poorly timed, fertility intentions tend to consistently exceed actual future fertility.
This is especially true for childless women (Berrington 2004).
Data in Table 9 show that, although nearly one in five of the oldest women in the
most recent wave of data are childless, only about 15 percent intended to remain
childless. Birth statistics from England and Wales show similar proportions of
childlessness for women aged 36–38 in 1998, 2000 and 2001 (Office for National
Statistics 2006). Data from recent years suggest that only one to two percent of women
who were childless at that time managed to have a child. In other words, about one-
quarter of childless women in their mid- to late-thirties still thought they would have a
first birth, but only about 10 percent managed to do so by 2005. A gap between
intentions and outcomes can also be observed when we consider women aged 21–23 in
1979–1981 (birth cohort 1956–60), who reported that they intended to have about 2.23
children on average (Smallwood and Jefferies 2003). Those women would be aged 45–
49 in 2005, and with nearly completed fertility. The completed family size for this
cohort ranges from 1.98 (the 1959 and 1960 cohort) to 2.02 (1956 cohort), suggesting
that fertility intentions exceeded actual fertility by about 10 percent (Office for National
Statistics 2006).
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 493
Table 9: Intended parity distribution and mean number of children
in England and Wales using cross-sectional data collected
between 1979 and 2001, women between the ages of 18 and 38
Intended partity for
respondents stating their
intentions (percentages)
0 1 2 3 4+Year(s) of data
collection age
No intention
Stated
(percent)
Mean number
Of children
intended
Completed
fertility, of
those with an
intention N
1979–81
18–20 5 3 59 20 13 20 2.35 0.18 1586
21–23 5 6 59 21 9 18 2.23 0.59 1612
24–26 6 8 59 18 7 21 2.12 1.07 1609
27–29 7 11 55 19 8 19 2.12 1.55 1638
30–32 7 11 52 21 10 19 2.19 1.96 1848
33–35 7 13 49 21 10 11 2.19 2.12 1849
36–38 8 12 42 24 14 9 2.32 2.29 1552
1988–90
18–20 5 7 58 20 10 7 2.25 0.19 1259
21–23 5 8 57 21 9 6 2.23 0.48 1348
24–26 5 10 55 22 8 7 2.19 0.82 1505
27–29 6 11 51 23 8 5 2.20 1.33 1475
30–32 9 13 47 22 10 6 2.14 1.65 1390
33–35 10 12 45 22 11 6 2.13 1.83 1350
36–38 10 13 46 21 11 4 2.14 2.03 1305
1998, 2000–2001
18–20 9 12 54 18 7 4 2.05 0.23 761
21–23 7 10 57 17 9 3 2.14 0.42 744
24–26 10 11 55 18 5 3 1.99 0.69 874
27–29 8 14 52 18 7 2 2.04 1.07 1081
30–32 10 14 50 19 7 3 2.01 1.35 1211
33–35 13 13 46 19 9 1 2.01 1.65 1343
36–38 15 17 40 19 9 1 1.93 1.80 1279
Source: Smallwood and Jefferies (2003).
Note: The higher proportion of women not stating an intention in the 1979–81 period is because uncertain respondents were not
further probed as they were in later waves.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
494 http://www.demographic-research.org
5.4 Family support
The rapid social and demographic changes that have taken place in England and Wales
should have important implications for family support networks. Increased longevity
and lower fertility have worked to reduce the size of each generation, while at the same
time increasing the number of generations alive at any one time (Bengtson, Rosenthal
and Burton 1990). Indeed, Dench, Ogg and Thompson (1999) showed that three-
quarters of British respondents were part of a three-, four- or even five-generation
family group. This suggests more potential for support across generations than within
them.
Using a somewhat dated (1988/89) sample of British adults aged 55–75, Grundy
(2005) shows that at least two-thirds of parents reported having regular or frequent
intergenerational exchange between themselves and their children. Parents were more
likely to report providing than receiving support, with childcare and domestic help
being the most commonly reported forms of assistance. That a high percentage of
parents reported providing help with childcare is not surprising given that childcare at
that time was often expensive and in short supply. These findings suggest that regular
or frequent intergenerational support, the most common of which requires contact, is
relatively common, even if co-residence is not (Pampel 1992; Grundy 2000). Despite
the increasing geographical dispersal of family members, working parents – for a
combination of reasons related to preferences and cost constraints – rely to a great
extent on informal childcare provided by grandparents (Woodland, Miller and Tipping
2002). Hence, for many working parents, private solutions have been found to allow
them to combine work and childbearing. Attempts to increase the employment rates of
older people, if successful, may remove this option for some families, increasing the
costs of childbearing.
6. Conclusion
Despite recent demographic and social changes, and despite limited levels of support
for families with children, fertility in England and Wales has remained high and stable
relative to much of Europe. Like its European neighbours, England and Wales has seen
an increasing percentage of young people continuing their education beyond the
compulsory level; a more protracted transition to adulthood; an increase in female
labour market participation; the postponement of marriage and fertility; and the wide
acceptance of contraceptive methods, including abortion. In contrast to most other
countries in the “high fertility belt” (Sobotka 2004), the government has been reluctant
to implement policies to encourage childbearing, and many of its policies aimed at
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 495
supporting families with children reinforce a traditional gendered division of labour. In
this context, women may find it difficult to combine (full-time, well-paid) work and
childbearing. Put simply, fertility appears to have remained stable despite, rather than
because of, government actions.
Do the findings in this chapter suggest that policy can do little to influence
fertility, and that generous support for families as we see in other European countries
with similar levels of fertility is unnecessary? Given that the challenges of population
ageing appear to be benign relative to lowest-low fertility countries like Italy (Dixon
and Margo 2006), perhaps policies to support fertility now and in the future are not
needed. A closer look at the timing and the quantum of the fertility of sub-groups
suggests that the answer, at least in the longer term, might be no. In recent years,
fertility has remained high relative to much of Europe, in part because specific sub-
groups of the population have high rates of fertility (e.g. certain ethnic groups,
immigrants), or have not changed their fertility behaviour (e.g. the low-educated). The
fertility of teenagers and women with low levels of education have helped to keep
period total fertility rates stable in recent years. The low-educated, in particular, are
more likely to have children and to have larger families. The social polarization of
fertility by education level and occupational class – which, despite similar levels of
fertility, is stronger than in France (Ekert-Jaffe et al. 2002) - suggests that better-
educated and more economically secure women are having either small families or no
families, while those with fewer outside opportunities and less economic stability are
accounting for the shortfall. Increased financial support in recent years may have
offered the latter some compensation for the costs of reproduction. But the laissez-faire
approach to fertility issues in general, and to labour market interventions in particular,
may well have made the combination of work and motherhood too difficult for other
groups women.
Current Government strategies include cutting rates of teenage parenthood (Social
Exclusion Unit 1999), increasing and widening participation in higher education
(Department for Education and Skills 2003), reducing occupational segregation by
encouraging women to move into traditionally male occupations (Trade and Industry
Committee 2005), increasing the education and skill levels of the immigration stream,28
and addressing poor employment opportunities at the lower end of the socio-economic
scale.29
If the Government meets these goals, but does so without paying more attention
to the economic costs and consequences of childbearing for all families, the result may
well be a less benign, lower fertility future.
28 “Immigration points system begins” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7269790.stm. 29 “Skills drive 'to boost workforce'” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/7097125.stm.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
496 http://www.demographic-research.org
References
Aassve, A., F. Billari, S. Mazzuco, and F. Ongaro. 2002. Leaving home: a comparative analysis
of ECHP data, Journal of European Social Policy 12(4): 259–275.
Bengtson, V., C. Rosenthal, and L. Burton. 1990. Families and aging: diversity and
heterogeneity, in R. H. Binstock and L. K. George (Eds.), Families and Aging: Diversity
and Heterogeneity, Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences (third edition). San
Diego: Academic Press, pp: 263–287.
Berrington, A. 2004. Perpetual postponers? Women’s, men’s and couple’s fertility intentions and
subsequent fertility behaviour, Population Trends 117: 9–19.
Bongaarts, J., and G. Feeney. 1998. On the quantum and tempo of fertility, Population and
Development Review 24(2): 271–291.
Bonoli, G. 1997. Classifying welfare states, Journal of Social Policy 26(3): 351–372.
Botting, B., and K. Dunnell. 2000. Trends in fertility and contraception in the last quarter of the
20th century, Population Trends 100: 32–39.
Bray, H. 2008. 2006-based national population projections for the UK and constituent countries,
Population Trends 131: 8–18.
Brewer, M., C. Crawford, and L. Dearden. 2005. Reforms to childcare policy, in R. Chote, C.
Emmerson, D. Miles and Z. Oldfeld (Eds.), Green Budget. London: Institute for Fiscal
Studies, pp: 146–174.
Brewer, M., and A Shephard. 2004. Has Labour Made Work Pay? York: Joseph Rowntree
Foundation.
Bynner, J., P. Elias, A. McKnight, H. Pan, and G. Pierre. 2002. Young People’s Changing Routes
to Independence. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Bynner, J., and S. Parsons. 1999. Young People Not in Employment Education or Training and
Social Exclusion: Analysis of the 1970 Cohort Study. London: Social Exclusion Unit.
Bynner, J., and S. Parsons. 2001. Qualifications, basic skills and accelerating social exclusion,
Journal of Education and Work 14: 279–291.
Chandola, T., D. A. Coleman, and R.W. Hiorns. 2002. Distinctive features of age-specific fertility
profiles in the in the English speaking world, Population Studies 56, 2: 181–200.
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development [CIPD]. 2005. Flexible Working: The
Implementation Challenge. London: CIPD. http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/
rdonlyres/EBAA2100-EF46-43EE-9C6D16577DCBC6DE/0/flexwork1005.pdf.
Coleman, D. A. 1996. New patterns and trends in European fertility: international and subnational
comparisons, in D. A. Coleman (Ed.), Europe’s Population in the 1990s. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp: 1–61.
Coleman, D. A., and M. D. Smith. 2005. The Projection of Ethnic Minority Populations:
Problems and Data Needs. Background paper no.2 for the research project ‘Demographic
consequences of international migration to the UK’. London: the Nuffield Foundation.
Coleman, D. A. 2006. Population ageing: an unavoidable future, in C. Pierson and F. G. Castles
(Eds.), The Welfare State Reader. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp: 298–309.
Council of Europe. 2005. Recent Demographic Developments in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of
Europe Publishing.
Darton, D., and K. Hurrell. 2005. People Working Part-Time Below Their Potential. Manchester:
Equal Opportunities Commission.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 497
de Henau, J., D. Meulders, S. O’Dorchai, and H. Périvier. 2002. The Relative Generosity of the
EU-15 Member States' Child Policies. The Rationale of Motherhood Choices: Influence
of Employment Conditions and of Public Policies, Final Report. Brussels: D. Meulders
and S. Gustafsson.
Dench, G., J. Ogg, and K. Thompson. 1999. The role of grandparents, in R. Jowell, J. Curtice, I.
Park and K. Thompson (Eds.), British Social Attitudes Survey: The 16th
Report. Ashgate:
Aldershot, pp: 135–156.
Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [BERR] (n.d.). Parental Leave. A
Short Guide for Employers and Employees. http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/
employment-legislation/employment-guidance/page18480.html.
Department for Education and Skills [DfES]. 2003. Widening Participation in Higher Education.
Cheshire: DfES. http://www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/EWParticipation.pdf.
Department for Education and Skills [DfES]. 2006. Teenage Pregnancy: Accelerating the
Strategy to 2010. Nottingham: DfES. http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/resources-
and-practice/ig00156/.
Department of Health [DOH]. 2007. Abortion statistics, England and Wales: 2006.
www.dh.gov.uk/PublicationsAndStatistics.
Dermott, E. 2006. The Effect of Fatherhood on Men's Employment. Swindon: ESRC.
Dixon, M., and J. Margo 2006. Population Politics. London: Institute of Public Policy Research.
Duncan, S. 2007. What’s the problem with teenage parents? And what’s the problem with social
policy?, Critical Social Policy 27(3): 307–334.
Ekert-Jaffe, O., H. Joshi, K. Lynch, R. Mougin, and M. Rendall. 2002. Fertility, timing of births
and socio-economic status in France and Britain: social policies and occupational
polarization, Population (English edition) 57(3): 475–507.
Equal Opportunities Commission [EOC]. 2005. Britain’s Hidden Brain Drain – Final Report.
Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission.
Ermisch, J. 1999. Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Britain. Paper presented at
the Institute for Research on Poverty Conference on Non-marital Fertility, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 29-30 April, 1999.
Ermisch, J. (2005). The puzzling rise of childbearing outside marriage, in A. Heath, J. Ermisch
and D. Gallie (Eds.), Understanding Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press for
the British Academy, pp: 22–53.
Ermisch, J., and M. Francesconi. 2000a. Cohabitation in Great Britain: not for long, but here to
stay, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 163(2): 153–171.
Ermisch, J., and M. Francesconi. 2000b. Patterns of household and family formation, in R.
Berthoud and J. Gershuny (Eds.), Seven Years in the Lives of British Families, Evidence
on the Dynamics of Social Change from the British Household Panel Survey. Bristol: The
Policy Press, pp: 21–44.
Ermisch, J., and D. J. Pevalin. 2003. Does a ‘Teen-birth’ Have Longer-Term Impacts on the
Mother? Evidence from the 1970 British Cohort Study. Working Papers 2003-28. Essex:
University of Essex, Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Eurostat. 2004. Household formation in the EU – Lone parents. Statistics in Focus. Luxembourg:
European Commission.
Francesconi, M., and A. Gosling. 2004. Career Paths of Part-Time Workers. EOC Working
Paper 19. Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
498 http://www.demographic-research.org
Frejka, T., and J.-P. Sardon. 2006. Cohort Birth Order, Parity Progression Ratio and Parity
Distribution Trends in Developed Countries. MPDIR Working Paper WP 2006-045,
Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.
Gauthier, A. H. 1996. The State and the Family: A Comparative Analysis of Family Policies in
Industrialised Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ghee, C. 2001. Population review of 2000: England and Wales, Population Trends 106: 7–14.
Gornick, J., M. Meyers, and K. E. Ross. 1997. Supporting the employment of mothers: policy
variation across fourteen states, Journal of European Social Policy 7(1): 45–70.
Greater London Authority [GLA]. 2005. A Fairer London: The Living Wage in London. London:
GLA.
Gregg, P., M. Gutierrez-Domoenech, and J. Waldfogel. 2003. The Employment of Married
Mothers in Britain: 1974–2000. CMPO Working Paper Series Number 03/078. Bristol:
CMPO.
Grundy, E. 2000. Living Arrangements and the Health of Elderly People in Developed Countries.
Paper presented at the UN Technical Meeting on Population Ageing and Living
Arrangements of Older Persons: Critical Issues and Policy Responses. New York, 8-10
February 2000.
Grundy, E. 2005. Reciprocity in relationships: socio-economic and health influences on
intergenerational exchanges between third age parents and their adult children in Great
Britain, The British Journal of Sociology 56(2): 233–255.
Gustafsson, S., E. Kenjoh, and C. Wetzels. 2002. The role of education on postponement of
maternity in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, in E. Ruspini and A. Dale
(Eds.), The Gender Dimension of Social Change, The Contribution of Dynamic Research
to the Study of Women’s Life Courses. Bristol: The Policy Press, pp: 55–79.
Haines, M. R. 1989. Social class differentials during fertility decline: England and Wales
revisited, Population Studies 43(2): 305–323.
Haskey, J. 2001. Demographic aspects of cohabitation in Great Britain, International Journal of
Law Policy and the Family 15: 51–67.
Henshaw, S. K., S. Singh, and T. Haas. 1999. The incidence of abortion worldwide, International
Family Planning Perspectives 25 Supplement: S30–S38.
Himmelweit, S., and H. Land. 2007. Supporting Parents and Carers. Equal Opportunities
Commission Working Paper Series No. 63. Manchester: EOC.
Hobcraft, J. 1996. Fertility in England and Wales: a fifty year perspective, Population Studies
50(3): 485–524.
Hobcraft, J. 2000. The Roles of Schooling and Educational Qualifications in the Emergence of
Adult Social Exclusion. Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion [CASE] Working
Paper No. 43. London: CASE.
Hobcraft, J., and K. E. Kiernan. 2001. Childhood poverty, early motherhood and adult social
exclusion, British Journal of Sociology 52(3): 495–517.
Holt, H., and H. Grainger. 2005. Results of the Second Flexible Working Employee Survey.
Employment Relations Research Series No. 39 London: Department of Trade and
Industry.
Huerta, M. C., and W. Sigle-Rushton. 2007. Pathways to early motherhood in the United
Kingdom. Mimeo: London School of Economics.
Jefferies, J., A. Berrington, and I. Diamond. 2000. Childbearing following marital dissolution in
Britain, European Journal of Population 16(3): 193–210.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 499
Joshi, H., and H. Davies. 1992. Day care in Europe and women’s foregone earnings,
International Labour Review 131(6): 561–580.
Joshi, H., D. Hawkes, and K. Ward. 2004. Unequal Entry to Motherhood and Unequal Starts in
Life: Evidence from the First Survey of the Millennium Cohort. Paper presented to the
Harvard Inequality Seminar. Harvard University: Kennedy School of Government, 4
October 2004.
Kohler, H. P., F. C. Billari, and J. A. Ortega. 2002. The emergence of lowest-low fertility in
Europe during the 1990s, Population and Development Review 28(4): 641–681.
Kiernan, K. 1999. Cohabitation in Western Europe, Population Trends 96: 25–32.
Kiernan, K. 2004. Unmarried cohabitation and parenthood in Britain and Europe, Law and Policy
26(1): 33–55.
Lewis, J., and M. Campbell. 2007. UK work/family balance policies and gender equality 1997–
2005, Social Politics 14(1): 4–30.
Lichter, D. 1997. Poverty and inequality among children, Annual Review of Sociology 23: 121–
145.
Lord Chancellor’s Department. 1995. Looking to the Future: Mediation and the Ground for
Divorce. The Government’s Proposals, London: HMSO, Cm 2799.
Low Pay Commission. 2000. The National Minimum Wage. Second Report of the Low Pay
Commission, The Story So Far. London: HMSO Cm 4571.
Manning, A., and B. Petrongolo. 2004. The Part-Time Pay Penalty. London: Department of
Trade and Industry and Women and Employment Unit.
McDonald, P. 2002. Low Fertility: Unifying the Theory and the Demography. Paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America, Atlanta, Georgia 9-11
May 2002.
McRae, S. 1991. Maternity Rights in Britain. The PSI Report on the Experience of Women and
Employers. London: Policy Studies Institute.
Millar, J. 1996. Mothers, workers, wives: comparing policy approaches to supporting lone
mothers, in E. B. Silva (Ed.), Good Enough Mothering? London: Routledge, pp: 97–113.
Murphy, M., and A. Berrington. 1993. Constructing period parity progression ratios from
household survey data, in M. Ní Bhrolcháin (Ed.), New Perspectives on Fertility in
Britain. London: HMSO, pp: 17–32.
Murphy, M., and D. Wang. 1999. Forecasting British families into the 21st century, in S. McRea
(Ed.), Changing Britain, Families and Households in the 1990’s. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp: 100–138.
Ní Bhrolcháin, M. 1987. Period parity progression ratios and birth intervals in England and Wales
1941–1971, Population Studies 41(1): 103–125.
O’Donoghue, C. O., and H. Sutherland. 1999. Accounting for the family in European income tax
systems, Cambridge Journal of Economics 23(5): 565–598.
Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys. 1985. Period and Cohort Birth Order Statistics:
Period Analyses for Years from 1938–1985 and Cohort Analyses for Women Born in
Each Year Since 1920 (England and Wales). London: HMSO.
Office for National Statistics [ONS]. 1993. Editorial, Population Trends 72.
Office for National Statistics [ONS]. 2006. Birth Statistics, Review of the Registrar General on
Births and Patterns of Family Building in England and Wales, 2005. Series FM1 No. 34.
London: Office for National Statistics.
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
500 http://www.demographic-research.org
Office for National Statistics [ONS]. 2007a. Report: live births in England and Wales, 2006: area
of residence, Population Trends 128:71–78.
Office for National Statistics [ONS]. 2007b. Both UK and Foreign-Born Women Contribute to
Rise in Fertility. News Release. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/fertility1207.pdf.
Office for National Statistics [ONS]. 2007c. Annual update: marriages and divorces during 2004
and adoptions during 2005, England and Wales, Population Trends 127: 68–73.
Palmer, T. 2004. Employment Relations Occasional Papers. London: Department of Trade and
Industry.
Pampel, F. C. 1992. Trends in living alone among the elderly in Europe, in A. Rogers, W. H.
Frey, A. Speare, Jr., P. Rees and A. Warnes (Eds.), Elderly Migration and Population
Redistribution. London: Belhaven Press, pp: 97–117.
Perrons, D. 1999. Flexible working patterns and equal opportunities in the European Union:
conflict or compatibility?, European Journal of Women's Studies 6(4): 391–418.
Perrons, D., and W. Sigle-Rushton. 2006. Employment Transitions Over the Life Cycle: A
Literature Review. Equal Opportunities Commission Working Paper Series No. 47.
Manchester: EOC.
Rake, K. 2001. Gender and new labour’s social policies, Journal of Social Policy 30(2): 209–231.
Randall, V. 1999. Childcare policy in the European states: limits to convergence, Journal of
European Public Policy 7(3): 346–368.
Rendall, M. 2003. How important are inter-generation cycles of teenage motherhood in England
and Wales, Population Trends 111: 27–37.
Rendall, M., C. Couet, T. Lappegard, I. Robert-Bobee, M. Ronsen, and S. Smallwood. 2005. First
births by age and education in Britain, France, and Norway, Population Trends 121: 27–
34.
Rendall, M., and S. Smallwood. 2003. Higher qualifications, first birth timing, and further
childbearing in England and Wales, Population Trends 111: 18–26.
Rendall, M., and C. Tomassini. 2004. Occupational Change and Family Change 1981 to 2001.
Paper presented to the conference on Linking the Longitudinal Study to the 2001 Census.
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 21 September 2004.
Rennison, J., S. Maguire, S. Middleton, and K. Ashworth. 2005. Young People not in Education
Employment or Training: Evidence from the Education Maintenance Allowance Pilots
Database. Department for Education and Skills Research Report RR628. Loughborough:
Loughborough University.
Robson, K., and R. Berthoud. 2003. Early Motherhood and Disadvantage: A Comparison
between Ethnic Groups. Institute of Economic and Social Research, Working Papers
2003-29. Essex: University of Essex.
Shkolnikov, V. M., E. M. Andreev, R. Houle, and J. W. Vaupel. 2007. The concentration of
reproduction in cohorts of women in Europe and the United States, Population and
Development Review 33(1): 67–100.
Sigle-Rushton, W., and D. Perrons. 2006. Employment Transitions over the Lifecycle– A
Statistical Analysis. Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission.
Sigle-Rushton, W., and J. Waldfogel. 2007. Motherhood and women’s earnings in Anglo-
American, Continental European, and Nordic Countries, Feminist Economics 13(2): 55–
92.
Skinner, C. 2003. Running Around in Circles: Coordinating Childcare, Education and Work.
Bristol: The Policy Press.
Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 15
http://www.demographic-research.org 501
Smallwood, S. 2002a. New estimates of trends in births by birth order in England and Wales,
Population Trends 108: 32–48.
Smallwood, S. 2002b. The effect of changes in timing of childbearing on measuring fertility in
England and Wales, Population Trends 109: 36–45.
Smallwood, S., and J. Jefferies. 2003. Family building intentions in England and Wales: trends,
outcomes, and interpretations, Population Trends 112: 15–28.
Smart, C. 1999. Divorce in England 1950–2000: A Moral Tale. Paper presented at the CAVA
Workshop on Frameworks for Understanding Policy Change and Culture. University of
Leeds, 29 October 1999.
Smith, I. 1997. Explaining the growth of divorce in Great Britain, Scottish Journal of Political
Economy 44(5): 519–544.
Smith, K., and E. Ferri. 2003. Housing, in E. Ferri, J. Bynner and M. Wadsworth (Eds.),
Changing Britain, Changing Lives: Three Generations at the Turn of the Century.
London: University of London, Institute of Education, pp: 194–206.
Sobotka, T. 2004. Is lowest-low fertility explained by the postponement of childbearing?,
Population and Development Review 30(2): 195–220.
Social Exclusion Unit. 1999. Teenage Pregnancy. London: TSO.
Standing, K. 2006. Swings and Roundabouts: Work, Childcare and Women’s Career
Progression. Paper presented at the researching women’s experiences of work and family
life, 24 May, Liverpool.
Statistics for Wales. 2007. Teenage Conceptions in Wales, 2005. Statistical Bulletin SB 61/2007.
http://new.wales.gov.uk/docrepos/40382/40382313/statistics/health/health-2007/sb61-
2007.pdf?lang=en.
Steele, F., H. Joshi, C. Kallis, and H. Goldstein. 2006. Changing compatibility of cohabitation
and childbearing between young British women born in 1958 and 1970, Population
Studies 60(2): 137–152.
Summerfield, C., and P. Babb. 2003. Social Trends No. 33. London: HMSO.
Sutherland, H. 2005. Can Child Poverty be Abolished? Promises and Policies in the UK. Paper
presented at the Australian Social Policy Conference, 20–22 July 2005, Sydney,
Australia: University of New South Wales.
Taylor, T., L. Keyse, and A. Bryant. 2006. Contraception and Sexual Health 2005/06. Omnibus
Survey Report No. 30, London: Office for National Statistics.
Teenage Pregnancy Unit. 2008. Teenage Conception Statistics for England 1998–2006.
http://www.everychildmatters.gov.uk/_files/6D17854AF93522B6D2C32EE0A954ADA8
.doc.
Toulemon, L. 2006. Fertility Among Immigrant Women in France: New Data, a New Approach.
Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Population Association of America.
Los Angeles, CA 30 March-1 April 2006.
Trade and Industry Committee. 2005. Jobs for the Girls: The Effect of Occupational Segregation
on the Gender Pay Gap. London: HMSO.
van Loon, J. 2003. Deconstructing the Dutch Utopia: Sex Education and Teenage Pregnancy in
the Netherlands. London: Family Education Trust.
Vikat, A., E. Thomson, and J. M. Hoem. 1999. Stepfamily fertility in contemporary Sweden: the
impact of childbearing before the current union, Population Studies, 53(2): 211–225.
Wilkinson, P., R. French, R. Kane, K. Lachowycz, J. Stephenson, C. Grundy, P. Jacklin, P.
Kingori, M. Stevens, and K. Wellings. 2006. Teenage conceptions, abortions, and births
Sigle-Rushton: England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences
502 http://www.demographic-research.org
in England, 1994–2003, and the national teenage pregnancy strategy, The Lancet 268:
1879–1886.
Wood, R., B. Botting, and K. Dunnell. 1997. Trends in conceptions before and after the 1995 pill
scare, Population Trends 89: 5–12.
Woodland, S., M. Miller, and S. Tipping. 2002. Repeat Study of Parents’ Demand for Childcare.
DfES Research Report No. 348. Norwich: Department for Education and Skills.
Yeandle, S.E, A. Wigfield, R. Crompton, and J. Dennett. 2002. Employed Carers and Family-
Friendly Employment Policies. Report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Bristol: The
Policy Press.