ARTICLE IN PRESS

Energy Policy 38 (2010) 2633–2640

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Energy Policy

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Engaging the public on paths to sustainable energy: Who has totrust whom?$

Miriam Ricci, Paul Bellaby �, Rob Flynn

Institute for Social Cultural and Policy Research, University of Salford, The Crescent, Salford M5 4WT, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o

Available online 25 July 2009

Keywords:

Public engagement

Hydrogen energy

Trust

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work represented here has been funded

ring and Physical Sciences Research Council,

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not only to our funders, but also to our colle

sciences, from whom we have learned much,

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esponding author. Tel.: +44 01612952819; fax

ail address: p.bellaby@salford.ac.uk (P. Bellab

a b s t r a c t

The aim is to observe how hydrogen, in its wider meaning as a ‘system innovation’, is understood by a

cross section of the general public in three regions of the UK that have embryonic developments:

Teesside, South West Wales and London.

Focus groups were conducted in two separate phases: the first, involving nine groups, took place

between June 2005 and March 2006; the second, involving seven groups, took place in the period

October–November 2006, mainly with groups reconvened after the first phase. They presented to

participants ‘user-friendly’ information about possible scenarios for a hydrogen economy, and helped

the group to identify criteria that might be most salient for decision-makers.

Public awareness of hydrogen in the three case study areas, both in general and in relation to local

demonstration projects, proved minimal, with the exception of the few who had direct experience of the

chemical industry (in Teesside and South West Wales).

When engaged in an informed debate about hydrogen and its future possible developments,

participants were willing to learn about the different options and expected to be fully informed on how

these would impact on their everyday lives as consumers and citizens. Risk perception is important, but

not the only factor in lay understanding of hydrogen. More relevant is the extent to which the different

configurations of hydrogen systems align with the public’s ‘view of the world’ (social and environmental

values, needs and expectations) and how participants think hydrogen energy would be embedded in

their daily routines. There is a lack of trust in political authorities, business and industry, and within and

across different social groups; ambivalence in how trust is placed on information providers, role models

and opinion formers; and public unease in dealing with, and making sense of, conflicting information

coming from ‘expert’ sources.

The evidence is useful to inform policy, both on national and local level. It is especially useful in

addressing public engagement as a political strategy.

& 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Studies of perceptions of new technologies or changes of policyoften reveal that members of the public are not confident in theirsources of information and do not trust stakeholders to actappropriately—even others like themselves (Flynn and Bellaby,2007). Here, we report a study of how the public view sustainableenergy futures in the UK—specifically the hydrogen energy

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est Wales and Teesside.

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option. Its findings are more than a matter of social scienceinterest. Engaging the public is also a possible, maybe even anecessary, political strategy for changing energy-usage, so shiftingthe pattern of demand that producers and distributors mustsupply, and also putting pressure on government to alter or firmup policy. Trust and mistrust would be of material importance inthis context.

Much of the discourse around energy policy is a debatebetween two poles. Contributors locate themselves somewherealong the continuum. Neo-liberalism is one such pole. It dominatescurrent practice, not least in energy. In the world so constructed, itis assumed that markets (alone) allocate efficiently; that actorsmaximise benefits and minimise costs according to their pre-ferences; and that their preferences are for (more and better)material goods and services. In this world, the good state does nomore than protect markets from monopoly and defend citizensfrom external threat. If it seeks to plan for the future, it tends toget things badly wrong.

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The opposite pole is statism. Here, the view is that nationstates, acting within their own boundaries and with each otherthrough treaties, can make policy choices that will avertwhichever of the two tipping points is more imminent. Thiscould be the point at which exploitation of fossil fuel reservesbecomes hugely more expensive than at present or else the pointat which global warming and the climate change that is likely tofollow become irreversible.

In view of the uncertainties as to which of several long-termgoals and short-term means is likely to succeed in averting crisis,any decision taken now could turn out to be wrong. A big decisionby the state or a multinational company, even more so by allstates or all multinationals concertedly, carries a greater prob-ability of being wrong than many different decisions taken bysmall stakeholders, some of which are likely to be the rightchoices.

On the other hand, every venture by private capitals or indeedlocal communities in the sustainable energy arena is likely torequire both the protection that energy policy consistentlyimplemented offers against the risks of re-investing in sustainableenergy, and also reason to expect that demand for sustainableenergy will increase and make re-investment cost-effective.

There is, then, plenty of room for debate about whether theimpending crisis can better be averted by market or plan or someblend of the two, and indeed about whether the crisis itself is dueto nation states not allowing the market to act freely or rather tofailure by states to plan and form adequate treaties. But arguablythe continuing debate between market and plan is beside thepoint. More significant may be that energy use and energytechnology alike tend to be locked into linear paths and to changeonly incrementally, whereas a rapid step change seems requiredfor a sustainable energy future.

‘Engage the public’ could be part of the prescription forachieving a step change. It implies individuals taking responsi-bility for the public good and cooperating as needed. Energy usetends to be by unreflective-consumers, whose preferences andrational choice are supposed to drive economies, are creatures ofhabit where energy use is concerned (Shove and Warde,2002)—and so, to escape the lock-in to fossil fuels, consciousnessmust be raised.

There are two possible scenarios. In the first, the tipping pointfor depletion of economically accessible fossil fuels precedes thatfor irreversible climate change. In such a case the rising cost offossil fuel will begin to make the price of sustainable alternativescompetitive. In the second scenario, the tipping point for climatechange is reached before accessible fossil fuel reserves run out. Insuch a case, demand for sustainable energy to save the planet willdepend heavily on direct public engagement with making energysustainable. Publics will have to put a ‘cost’ on greenhouse gasemissions and on air pollution that will offset the likely lowermarket prices of fossil fuels.

In reality, there is considerable uncertainty about whichtipping point will come first. Extensive public engagement withthe idea of sustainable energy may be necessary simply to insureagainst the risk of making the wrong choice. Not least, publicengagement of some degree is needed if only to enablealternatives to be developed and come near to market well beforeeither type of crisis is reached.

Any democratically elected government is prey to its opposi-tion, if it makes what the electorate believes to be a mistake inpolicy. Without effective public engagement with a sustainableenergy future, it is unlikely that any government will take the riskof a firm energy policy, especially if that policy requires sacrificesof what people value or else higher costs.

Because of the stress on individuals taking responsibility forconsequences of their behaviour and because of the considerable

uncertainty about what the future holds, any politics of publicengagement would turn on a considerable element of ‘trust’—thepublic’s trust in science, policy-makers and business and indeedin each other; trust also by the stakeholders of the public who aresubject to their power and influence.

2. Key concepts and questions

An earlier study by colleagues (McDowell and Eames, 2006) ofscience, business, government and NGO stakeholders’ visioning ofhydrogen in the future suggests at least six scenarios. It alsoshows that stakeholders do not necessarily agree on which ofthese is the most likely to be realised, or even on the criteria bywhich they should be judged. It seems unlikely that members ofthe public would form a more unified judgement, given theirrelative lack of knowledge of, or a similar interest in, the future ofhydrogen energy

To help overcome the unfamiliarity of the topic to participantsin the project, the work reported here was confined to three areasof England and Wales in which embryonic development of ahydrogen economy was taking place. In two areas – Teesside andSouth West Wales – the recent and projected development wasbuilt on a much older chemical industry; whereas in the third –Greater London – it was ‘parachuted-in’, taking the form of the EUCUTE (www.global-hydrogen-bus-project.com) hydrogen-fuel-cell-powered bus.

Notwithstanding the particular context, the public’s frame ofreference would be not just which H2 scenario might seem mostacceptable, but how any scenario involving hydrogen as fuelcompared with alternatives involving petroleum products andnatural gas or other renewable energy, such as biofuels; and,finally, how hydrogen was produced, distributed and stored.

2.1. What is ‘the public’?

There are not one, but several publics, and also each member ofthe public is likely to have not one but various roles. We have toconsider the relevance of scenarios to publics, as potentialconsumers, residents, citizens and kin-keepers for future genera-tions. For consumers, the future of hydrogen energy implies not somuch, as for producers and distributors, whether it is efficient, canbe produced competitively and can be marketed profitably, butrather whether it is likely to be expensive, there are going to beenough outlets and it is too risky to have on board a vehicle, in mygarage or in my house. The type of use people might put it to willcondition responses, such as whether they drive regularly or elseuse public transport.

For residents, the issue will be whether it is safe to havehydrogen infrastructure in the neighbourhood and it is securefrom terrorism, or maybe whether locating it there would lowerthe value of property.

For citizens, considered here as guardians of the public good, itmay be whether hydrogen has a contribution to reducing thethreat of global warming and/or of fossil fuels running out, thoughthe scale of public spending and taxation it entails will weigh inthe balance too.

For kin-keepers, the issues may be similar to those of citizens,but be coloured by willingness to make sacrifices for futuregenerations that are identified with one’s grandchildren, actual orpotential: that is, whether the world can carry on much as now ormajor changes are required, and whether such changes mustsacrifice what we have and want, or, on the contrary, will rid us ofwhat we do not like and put better things in its place.

While each member of the public has several roles, for some,one role may be more salient than another. Each may differ in

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background – ethnicity or culture, social class, generation, gender,sexual preference among them – and this difference mayinfluence one’s viewpoint. In public engagement, it is importantto confront and deliberate upon different viewpoints. Here, ourfindings are derived from groups that are mixed, mainly in termsof age and gender; except that, in London, one of the groups wascomposed entirely of young people.

2.2. Seeking out the criteria by which people may judge options

The various roles that people play and the background theyhave are likely to condition the way they view issues, the more sothe more familiar and significant these are in their lives. Whereissues are relatively unfamiliar and they may not be highlyrelevant to them, people are more likely to be swayed by whatthey think an investigator wants to hear. Responses to ques-tionnaires tend to be superficial and responses to one-to-oneinterviews, which, when semi-structured, enable otherwise tacitunderstandings to be explored, are prone to influence by theinterviewer. For these reasons, we have used focus groups inwhich a range of opinions can be put and the moderator’s role isless conspicuous (because subsumed by the group) than is that ofthe one-to-one interviewer.

1 It was organised in collaboration with Dresner, Hughes and Tomei of the

Policy Studies Institute, London.2 Detailed analysis of both focus group series, illustrating the methodology

and rationale for the research, is provided in Ricci et al. (2006), Ricci et al. (2007)

and Dresner and Tomei (2007).3 Developed by our colleagues at PSI.

3. Research questions

3.1. Do the public focus only on the ‘risks’ of new materials and

technologies, or also on their benefits and costs?

A great deal of attention has been devoted to how the publicmight perceive the ‘risks’ that new materials and technologiesseem to present (Flynn and Bellaby, 2007), on the assumption thatit is the potential adverse effects of change from current to newusage that most exercises people. Hydrogen might be an obviouscandidate, because it is volatile, inflammable and explosive (Ricciet al., 2008). On the other hand, members of the public may,somewhat like economists, seek to weigh any such risks inrelation to the benefits and also the costs of hydrogen (or anyother form of energy). Of course that evaluation would in turncompare hydrogen with alternatives.

3.2. Do members of the public think in terms of a duality-knowledge

versus ignorance, or do they have an understanding of uncertainty?

Much as the lay public is often expected to consider risk one-sidedly, so too is it often thought to have little or no under-standing of uncertainty, and especially of probability. Theimplication is that where there is even a low probability ofadverse consequences, the risk will be avoided; or conversely thatonly certainty counts as knowledge. Is this borne out in what wefind in talking to the public about the palpably uncertain future?

Deciding whether or not to act for the public good is more thana matter of assessing the facts: it involves a value-commitmenttoo. One assumes responsibility or else attributes it to anotheragent.

3.3. How do members of the public define ‘responsibilities’ and to

whom do they assign them?

A key issue is to what extent, if at all, individuals assumeresponsibility for causing the impending energy crisis andwhether they consider it their duty to do what they can to avertthe crisis. ‘What they can do’ may be an important consideration,where there is disproportion between the scale of the problem

and their individual act. Given this disproportion, an individualmay prefer to ‘free-ride’, relying on others to do what is needed, ormay decide not to act unless an agent that is considered to bemore to blame or can make more of a difference to the solutionacts first.

3.4. How do the public define and assign ‘rights’ and judge what is

equitable?

Members of the public may counterbalance any responsibil-ities they are prepared to shoulder or other agents expect of themby insisting on certain rights, for instance to have their say or evento generate their own energy. They may also consider howequitable or otherwise a solution based on, say, hydrogen energymight prove: will only the rich be able to afford it?

4. Method

The focus groups were conducted in two separate phases: thefirst involving nine groups took place between June 2005 andMarch 2006; the second involving seven groups took place in theperiod October–November 2006.1 The second round of focusgroups consisted mainly of groups reconvened after the firstphase.2

The purpose of the focus groups was to present to participantssome basic ‘user-friendly’ information about possible scenariosfor a hydrogen economy, and to facilitate group identification ofthe criteria and issues that they believed to be most salient fordecision-makers. However, the focus groups did not attempt tocarry out a detailed multi-criteria mapping exercise, and partici-pants were not asked to state preferences or rank alternatives.Instead, they were encouraged to set out the issues that theybelieved require more public debate, identify the kinds of furtherinformation they require to give informed judgements, andcomment on appropriate formats for information.

In advance of the focus-group meetings, all prospectiveparticipants were sent six postcards,3 representing in a schematicway what hydrogen is, how it can be produced, stored anddistributed, and how it can be used in portable, mobile andstationary applications. The postcards aimed at helping partici-pants of earlier groups to recall the overall picture of the hydrogeneconomy, its potential benefits, disadvantages and unknowns.Moreover, they were used during the groups to elicit views aboutdifferent forms of information material. In addition to thepostcards, four different fact sheets were developed, eachexplaining in a more detailed and technical way the variousbuilding blocks of a hydrogen economy, from production to finalapplication. The fact sheets contained collated information abouthydrogen from a number of sources, in particular the USDepartment of Energy. These were given to participants onlyduring the groups, as supplementary material for them to takehome.

4.1. The focus-group topic list

The focus-group script covered four main areas of discussion.

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4.1.1. Continuity and change in our current way of life

We addressed whether:

a.

People had changed or would be prepared to change theirbehaviour in energy use, in the home and personal transport,to help reduce environmental problems such as globalwarming, air pollution, etc.

b.

They had any views on how to encourage behavioural changein the way energy is used.

c.

They would be prepared to pay more or make any sacrifices tohelp tackle environmental problems.

d.

They had views about becoming small-scale energy producers(for example, having a combine heating and power (CHP) unitin their home, or a micro wind turbine or solar panels).

4.1.2. Communicating about hydrogen and new energy technologies

We addressed people’s comments about the postcards andtheir views on ways to communicate such issues to differentpublics.

4.1.3. Identifying the criteria used by people to assess the different

components and configurations of the hydrogen economy

During the groups, a powerpoint presentation was shown,illustrating with pictures different hydrogen production routes,storage and distribution methodologies and end-use applications.We then asked participants what criteria they would use to assessall the different components and configurations, and how theywould judge whether any of the technologies was worth pursuing(prompts: benefits to the environment, reducing pollution, energysecurity, cost, benefits to the consumers, safety, economic growthand job creation, etc.). Finally, we showed images of localhydrogen projects and asked for comments.

4.1.4. Public engagement

We addressed:

a.

People’s views about involving the public in decisions abouthydrogen and energy futures in general.

b.

The most appropriate ways of doing this (for example, throughcitizens’ juries).

c.

Whether the participants themselves would be willing to beinvolved.

Each focus group was moderated by one of the research teamand included another member of the team armed with technicalinformation to answer questions from the group as necessary. Oneof the two was present at all the focus groups. Each member wasprovided with an information sheet and signed a consent form.There was a small honorarium for taking part (a gift voucher). Thesession was audio-recorded. It was subsequently transcribed andthe transcription verified against the audio-recording. Theanalysis carried out to this point has been thematic, not contentanalysis, and two coders have read independently through eachtranscript.

5. Results

Here, we present a summary of the results, stressing the majorthemes that emerged; direct quotations are omitted for reasons ofspace.

5.1. The broader context: environment and energy

5.1.1. Beliefs, values and concerns

Most participants were aware of the problems associated withenergy, and in particular those caused by fossil fuels (such asforeign dependence, finite resources, climate change and pollu-tion). Some people displayed an articulate knowledge of andinterest in environmental and energy issues, and could relatethem to international politics and economic phenomena; a fewwere familiar with the technical terminology (such as the phrase‘fossil fuels’); but the majority seemed to prefer naming thespecific type of fuel or energy and to be more confident whentalking about direct or indirect experiences.

When discussing the impacts of using fossil fuels to produceenergy, people said they were concerned and thought theseproblems were serious. They also acknowledged that they areglobal issues and need to be tackled on a global scale. A recurrentclaim made in all groups was that, even when people are awareabout energy and environmental problems and consider themrelevant as political issues, they find it difficult to connect themwith their daily life. The effects of climate change are generallyconsidered distant, both in space and time, and are not easilylinked to individual behaviour in areas such as, using electricity,providing heating and cooling in the home, getting around andtravelling. By contrast, air pollution has a stronger connectionwith people’s personal experiences.

Increases in fuel prices, wars (especially the one in Iraq) andinternational tensions between gas producers and importers (suchas the controversy over gas supply between Russia and Ukraine inthe winter 2005–2006) were frequently mentioned as signs ofimpending problems, which would eventually have an impact oneverybody’s lives.

Participants believed that renewable energy (which they tendedto call ‘green’ or ‘clean’) should be improved and become morewidespread, although most people recognised its technical andeconomic limitations. Some people stressed the need to improveenergy-saving technologies, which they thought are currentlyundervalued and do not receive enough financial support.

5.1.2. Current behaviour in energy use

Energy and environmental behaviour appears to be the outcomeof a complex interplay among many different factors, some of whichdepend on the individual and their own psychology and personalcircumstances, others on the cultural, social, economic and institu-tional context in which people live and interact. Energy consumptionencompasses many different behaviours, most of which are taken forgranted as part of people’s routines and are not usually understoodin terms of their impacts on the environment.

Most of our participants, in both focus-group series, claimedthey were aware of the basic steps they could take to reduceenergy consumption and limit its impacts on the environment.They also stated that they regularly engage in energy- andenvironmental-conscious practices, such as recycling, avoidingthe use of private transport when possible, insulating their homes,buying energy-efficient products, switching off lights and notleaving appliances on stand-by. Although environmental concernsand values could motivate such behaviours, most people agreedthat the prospects (or need) to reduce bills were stronger drivers.Across the groups, a need for guidance emerged on how peoplecan take effective steps in improving their actions towards theenvironment and in the way they consume energy.

5.1.3. Blame and responsibility

We found a tendency among those who participated in ourgroups to place both the blame for energy problems and

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environmental damage, and also the responsibility for action, onto‘others’. Most people believed that they, as citizens and con-sumers, have a much lower impact on the environment than bigindustry and business, and people in other countries such as theUS, China and India. As a consequence, most people felt it shouldbe those countries, and industry and business that make thegreatest sacrifices to avert energy and environmental crises ratherthan individual consumers. There were a few people, however,who felt that taking personal responsibility for the environmentin a global sense was a moral obligation.

5.1.4. Tackling the problems: expected and suggested actions

Participants in both focus-group series discussed the way inwhich energy and environmental problems could be dealt with.Most people expected that financial measures, such as taxes onpolluting fuels and incentives for adopting low-carbon technologieswould be used to shift behaviours, however, there was ambivalencein assessing such measures. On the one hand, they were considered‘inevitable’ and ‘necessary’; on the other, people expressed concernsabout the overall fairness of these policy interventions on individualconsumers with different income levels.

Individual sacrifices, such as paying a premium for ‘green’technologies and services, were viewed as a ‘luxury’ that only theaffluent classes would be able to afford. They were deemedineffective and unsustainable for the population at large. Thisconcern about inequity is especially relevant in a context wheresocial trust is poor and there is a tendency to place blame andresponsibilities on ‘others’.

Some of our participants also suggested that any attempt bythe UK Government to act alone on energy would be useless or, atworst, counterproductive. Yet, at the same time, the role ofGovernment was advocated as a leader in building commitment,and driving change. This applied as much among citizens as it didinternationally. Moreover, people demanded more and betterregulation to reduce the energy consumption and environmentalimpacts of industry and business.

5.1.5. Changes in personal behaviour

Most participants agreed that individuals would eventuallyhave to change how they consume energy, but thought changes inbehaviour are possible, as long as they do not disrupt people’slives and routines too much and cause inconvenience. An exampleof successful behavioural change is recycling, which in ourparticipants’ narratives was represented almost as a moralobligation and a visible sign of affiliation to an ‘environmentallyconscious’ social group. Environmental values can stimulatechanges. However, there was a widespread acknowledgement ofthe mismatch between values on one hand and behaviour on theother (the so-called ‘value-action gap’). People identified anddiscussed what they thought to be barriers to change:

�

The belief that personal action is ineffective when it is not partof ‘‘something bigger’’ (national and international agreementsand programmes, active involvement of whole communities,etc.). � A widespread sense of distrust in many areas of society,

including politics, big industry, business and ‘other people’.

� The difficulty of connecting global environmental and energy

problems, often perceived as distant issues both in space andtime, with the preoccupations of people’s everyday lives.

� The financial ability of people to adopt more environmentally-

friendly behaviour.

� Socio-cultural norms and established habits and routines,

which people associate with their ‘normal’ practices, comfortand convenience.

�

Infrastructure and institutional barriers, such as the lack ofefficient public transport in rural areas, and better regulationsand standards for new products, buildings, etc.

5.2. Perceptions of and attitudes towards hydrogen as an energy

carrier

5.2.1. Initial awareness and spontaneous associations

Generally, participants in our groups did not have established‘a priori’ opinions and views about hydrogen as an energy carrier.Levels of awareness of new hydrogen applications and knowledgeabout potential configurations of a future hydrogen economy wererather low. However, in Teesside and South West Wales, we foundgreater awareness and almost specialist knowledge of hydrogen asan industrial gas (chiefly in a few male participants), whichreflected people’s contextual experience of the chemical indus-try’s practices, facilities and infrastructure (as residents andworkers).

Spontaneous associations with the word ‘hydrogen’ weremainly neutral, but on several occasions older members of thepublic and those with work experience in the chemical industrymentioned ‘negative’ attributes. Very few associations that mightbe classified as ‘positive’ were made. Nevertheless, negativeassociations did not seem to predominate or pre-empt the contentof the subsequent discussion.

5.2.2. Views about a hydrogen-based economy: key issues at stake

There was a presentation of visual material, describing how anenergy economy based on hydrogen would look and outlining thehydrogen supply chain, its possible applications and demonstra-tion systems around the world. In the course of it and afterwards,participants in both series of focus group asked a number ofcogent questions. These were not only about the technicalspecifications of hydrogen (its properties as a fuel), but also inrelation to the broader implications of using it as an energycarrier:

�

How hydrogen would be produced, from which primarysources, at what costs and efficiency, and with what implica-tions for the environment (for example, whether and to whatextent CO2 emissions would be reduced). � How much hydrogen technologies would cost and how they

would compare with conventional and other alternativetechnologies, in terms of benefits, costs and risks.

� If hydrogen would really be effective in tackling energy and

environmental problems, and if it would bring private benefitsto people as well, such as better performance and increasedcomfort.

� What kind of new or improved storage technologies and

distribution infrastructure would need to be developed, atwhat costs, and how current prototypes would evolve.

� How hydrogen technologies (such as cars, domestic

CHP—combined heat and power-systems and refuelling sta-tions) would work in practice and if they would be easy to useand understand.

5.2.3. The role of risks to safety in public perceptions of hydrogen

Concerns about the safety of hydrogen were expressed in allgroups and encompassed the entire technological system basedon hydrogen, from production technologies to end-uses.

What people considered a ‘risk’ in hydrogen systems and howthey perceived such risks varied widely across our groups. Thosewho had specialist knowledge of the chemical industry, or had aninterest in technology in general, tended to point out the‘technological risks’ associated with hydrogen, such as volatility,

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flammability. People with little familiarity with hydrogen under-stood it as another type of fuel, using their own personalexperiences with conventional fuels to deal with the ‘uncertainty’and ‘unknown’ of hydrogen. Possible risks to public safety werediscussed not in abstract terms, but with reference to realistic,practical situations and in comparison with more familiar fuelsand technologies. In the two areas with a strong presence of heavyindustry, perceptions of risks were also shaped by attitudestowards employment prospects and representations of the localenvironment.

Despite the concerns, the groups did not express opposition tohydrogen, in fact there was a recurring expectation that hydrogentechnologies would be engineered to be safe if rolled out to themarket. Safety issues were not raised at all in the Young Peoplefocus group in London.

The group discussion allowed people with different viewsabout safety to confront their respective arguments and learnfrom each other, thereby developing a ‘communal’ understandingof such complex – and largely unknown and unfamiliar – issues.

5.2.4. Public acceptability of hydrogen

When asked if they would support hydrogen applications andtechnologies, most people tended to avoid direct answers. Supportwas conditional on knowing about the ‘bigger picture’ of hydrogenenergy systems and the context in which hydrogen developmentswould take place.

People’s attitudes and behaviour towards future hydrogensystems and applications, such as cars and domestic combineheating and power, and facilities where refuelling with hydrogenand production and storage might take place, would be theoutcome of a trade-off involving costs, safety and perceivedpersonal and global benefits.

There also emerged sceptical opinions about hydrogen, withsome people questioning the real environmental benefits ofhydrogen and the efficiency of the supply chain. There were alsoconcerns that other energy-saving technologies that are currentlyavailable might lose ground to the attractions of an uncertaintechnology such as hydrogen.

Participants in the second focus-group series were asked toidentify the criteria by which they would assess the ‘acceptability’of a hydrogen-based economy. We found that, as in the first focus-group series, people spontaneously adopted a ‘whole systems’approach in looking at hydrogen, thereby considering the entirechain from production to final use. Among the most frequentlycited criteria, were:

�

Cost, especially to the individual consumer. � Safety. � Performance and convenience. � Effectiveness in tackling environmental and energy security

problems.

People wanted to be reassured that hydrogen production wassustainable in the longer term and cost-effective in tacklingclimate change, and that the whole spectrum of new infrastruc-ture, technologies and applications would be safe. Peopleexpected that, to be fully accepted and adopted, hydrogenapplications would need to perform at least as well as conven-tional technologies (such as cars, buses and domestic heat andelectricity) and provide at least the same level of comfort andconvenience as people are used to.

People in Teesside and South West Wales were asked, inparticular, whether they would be more supportive of a large-scale hydrogen development, if it brought jobs and improved thelocal economy. Most people acknowledged that hydrogen could

bring new jobs, improve the economy and help regenerateobsolete industrial sites. However, local communities would needto be consulted if new facilities were planned, since being used toliving near big chemical complexes did not imply they wouldunconditionally accept new installations.

Overall, most people were not at ease in expressing criteria, asthey felt they did not have any practical experience of any newhydrogen development. Most people knew little aboutlocal hydrogen projects and felt they could have been publicisedmore.

From our groups, it appears that ‘acceptability’ should beconceptualised as a continuum of different dimensions and levels,rather than be simplistically associated with ‘risk acceptance’, as itis often the case with new, still unknown technologies.

5.3. Trust, communication and public engagement

Most participants agreed that people need sound, reliable andimpartial information about hydrogen and must see real applica-tions in use to be able to develop a better understanding. Somealso believed that hydrogen technologies should be endorsed by a‘celebrity’ to gain visibility and relevance among certain sectionsof the public.

However, requests for more information must be put against abackdrop of widespread lack of confidence in information sources,institutions and industry, and public unease in dealing with, andmaking sense of, disagreement among experts.

Trust and especially distrust pervaded all group discussionsand appear to be key elements shaping and mediating publicbeliefs, attitudes and expectations. Distrust of national politicianscauses suspicion, when issues like climate change and energysaving are seen suddenly to become priorities in the politicalagenda or during elections. People do not trust industry andbusiness to take the environmental cause seriously, and they arealso sceptical about whether ‘other people’ will become com-mitted to the environment and energy saving.

Participants agreed that information should be differentiatedaccording to the specific target audience. Moreover, informationcampaigns should, as a first step, stimulate public interest onissues around energy and the environment, so that people wouldbe able to connect such issues with their everyday lives. Youngerpeople might prefer ‘high technology’ devices and websites, butfor most people TV, radio and newspapers remain the preferredchannels for getting information. There emerged, however, thebelief that such issues might appeal only to a certain section of thepopulation and a ‘‘shock campaign’’ might be needed to alertthose for whom energy and the environment are not immediateconcerns. Many people also suggested that children should betaught about hydrogen (and energy and the environment ingeneral) in science lessons at school, so that they would be able totake the message home to their parents.

Our groups demanded more public participation in decision-making about hydrogen, and more in general about energy andenvironmental issues, albeit highlighting the difficulties that itmight entail, such as the cost and appropriate scale of publicconsultation activities, the complexity of such decisions, and theneed for a clear strategy set by the government in partnershipwith all the relevant actors (industry, international organisations,etc.). Demands for more inclusive and participatory mechanismsof decision-making, however, co-exist and contrast starklywith a diffused sense of distrust of ‘other people’s’ effectivewillingness to be consulted on such matters, and with widespreadcynicism about the government’s commitment towards publicengagement.

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6. Discussion

Our fieldwork has allowed us to observe how hydrogen, in itswider meaning as a ‘system innovation’, is understood by a crosssection of the general public in three case study regions of the UK.The evidence we have collected and presented in this paper isuseful to inform policy, both on national and local level, which isdirected at fostering the development of hydrogen as an energycarrier in the UK. It is especially useful in addressing publicengagement as a political strategy.

6.1. Challenges

Our qualitative study has identified a number of challenges,which are resonant with findings of other UK SHEC socio-economic research independently carried out by colleagues atthe Centre for Sustainable Urban and Regional Futures, Universityof Salford, and at the Policy Studies Institute, London (available onhttp://www.psi.org.uk/ukshec):

�

Hydrogen cannot be considered a single technology, but ratheris a ‘system innovation’ in the way energy is produced, stored,distributed and used. � Whether and when a transition to hydrogen, like any other

complex transition, will occur is highly unpredictable.

� Visions and plans for developing ‘regional’ hydrogen econo-

mies in Teesside, South West Wales and Greater London differsubstantially on the basis of how hydrogen is perceived to fitwith the needs, capabilities and aspirations of the localtechnological, economic, social and cultural infrastructure.

� Public awareness of hydrogen in the three case study areas,

both in general and in relation to local programmes anddemonstration projects, is minimal, with the exception ofmembers of the public with direct knowledge and experienceof the chemical industry (in Teesside and South West Wales).

� When engaged in an informed debate about hydrogen and its

future possible developments, members of the public arewilling to learn about the different options and expect to befully informed on how these would impact on their everydaylives as consumers and citizens.

� Risk perception is an important, but not the unique component

of lay understandings and acceptance of hydrogen. What isrelevant to the public is the extent to which the differentconfigurations of hydrogen systems align with their ‘view ofthe world’ (in terms of social and environmental values, needsand expectations) and would be embedded in their dailybehaviours and routines.

� There is a crisis of public trust in political authorities, business,

industry, and within and across different social groups.

� There is ambivalence in relation to how trust is placed on

information providers, role models and opinion formers, andpublic unease in dealing with, and making sense of, conflictinginformation coming from ‘expert’ sources.These considerations suggest that public policy directed atengaging the public in a meaningful and informed debateabout hydrogen as a future energy carrier needs to take intoaccount the following issues:

� The distinctive character of ‘regional’ hydrogen economies

implies that engagement will have to be tailored to the localcontexts and reflect, on one side, the multiple values andaspirations of ‘formal’ stakeholders – who actively lobby forhydrogen developments as part of their institutional roles –and, on the other, those of ‘informal’ stakeholders—membersof the local community whose stakes in hydrogen are implicitin their wider interests and rights as consumers and citizens.

�

Public engagement will have to be understood and implemen-ted as a cluster of different mechanisms, characterised bydifferent levels of participation – from simple informationprovision to active deliberation – and different formats,accounting for an heterogeneous public with different degreesof interest and knowledge. � People with different perceptions of their ability to influence

policy (because of their social status, for example) will need tobe engaged in different ways, by ensuring that the approach issocially inclusive, the process is accessible to everyone andpeople are informed about how their views will be incorpo-rated.

� Engagement will have to connect with the issues that people

consider relevant and avoid being framed only in terms oftechnological and economic assessments. People will need tobe able to scrutinise the rationale for hydrogen and how costs,benefits and risks will be distributed, managed and regulated.They also need to understand what a local hydrogen develop-ment will mean for them, and future generations, as con-sumers, residents, citizens and kin-keepers.

6.2. Further research

The research reported here was based on three areas ofembryonic hydrogen economy development in England andWales. A parallel study by the authors for the UK Departmentfor Transport ‘Horizons’ research programme examined case studyareas that have no such context—no industrial history ofhydrogen, and no CUTE bus or similar project either (Bellabyand Upham, 2008).

In areas of embryonic hydrogen energy development andothers too, one has to think hard about how to so present thescience as to avoid getting back answers that the focus-groupdesigners feed in. Our aim has been to cover the range of opinionsabout the feasibility of a hydrogen energy future and to be specificabout the arguments for and against, as debated by stakeholders.The two phases of the work reported here relayed scientificallyaccredited information about hydrogen energy. ‘Postcards’ alongwith slides, in the second phase, used largely diagrams andminimal text. The ongoing Department for Transport studytakes this a step further. It uses a documentary film developedspecifically for the project, again with advice from scientists,with an experienced broadcaster as its presenter to form thespine of focus-group discussion. The medium itself is morefamiliar to lay people than are diagrams and the content putsthe science into the context of how new technologies may affecteveryday life.

6.3. How does public engagement sit with ‘representative

democracy’?

Our public engagement exercises have aimed for relativelywide coverage of disparate publics. Others have been moreintensive for a smaller number for participants and used moretime. In some situations, ‘Citizens’ juries’ can be asked to makedecisions and can call for evidence to help them in doing so. Ourfocus groups have not been expected to make decisions and theevidence has been ‘pre-packaged’ for them, though the ‘expert’attending each session has answered questions that demandtechnical knowledge. The more members of the public areengaged—as through an extensive approach such as ours, themore likely is well-informed pressure upon their elected repre-sentatives in local and central government.

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6.4. On what grounds ought the public to be engaged in deliberation

about sustainable energy futures?

Expediency on the part of policy-makers or business is onemotivation for public engagement. Policy-makers and indeedscientists often perceive themselves as victims of a decline inpublic trust and look to public engagement to put this right. Thereis no obvious reason why being better informed about the issuesshould make people more trusting of those who lead them. Ifanything, the contrary is the case, especially if the public looks forleadership and finds it lacking. Akin to this expedient approach topublic engagement is to expect it to generate a sense of personalresponsibility for remedying the problem that is being addressed.Again, however, our findings suggest that this is improbable. Onthe other hand, the opportunity to discuss issues in a group,receive information and have questions answered, is likely to raiseconsciousness among members of the public. The approach thatwe have adopted promises to do this more widely than thecitizens’ juries could.

Finally, our findings suggest that policy-makers and businessmay have as much to learn from the public as the public has fromexperts. What is learned should be used to adjust policy andpolicy-makers’ expectations of the public.

7. Conclusion

Hydrogen energy is seen by many as a step change of the orderrequired to remedy what might otherwise be irreversible climatechange. It is unlikely that a solution will be found by either marketor plan by itself, or indeed that either will effect the step changerequired without wide engagement of the public, whose use ofenergy and willingness to accept change and the uncertainties itbrings would generate demand or withhold it, or vote for oragainst a government that took what might be painful decisions.

Our study has focused on the criteria people might adopt inevaluating sustainable hydrogen energy as a prospective substitute forfossil fuels in a future energy system. The results show that trust and

mistrust play a major part in shaping the sense of responsibilityindividuals have for their own ‘carbon-footprints’—trust/mistrusttowards others like themselves (who, they imply, might free-ride),business and of political leaders and finally the governments of othercountries. Trust also features in the willingness of many to accept thatif hydrogen were introduced it would be made safe, and somemistrust is featured among others with experience in industry or asresidents in areas where hydrogen is produced or stored.

As researchers we have sought to learn from the exercise aboutthe criteria people might bring to such debates. This we believe isthe most valuable lesson for policy-makers, business, science andtechnology that the study carries. The trust that publics have insome sources of information or actors and mistrust in othersrequires the same special attention of policy-makers and othermajor players in the energy arena as we have given it.

References

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