05/27/23

Session No. 8

Course Title: Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters, and U.S. Emergency Management

Session Title: Disaster As A Growth BusinessTime: 3 Hours

Objectives:

8.1 To provide an awareness of the increasing risk and vulnerability of the U.S. population to hazards as well as some of the more important factors bearing on this increase.

8.2 To describe some of the actions that could be taken to reduce vulnerability and loss.________________________________________________________________________Scope:

To introduce this session, the professor describes disaster as a growth business from the international and U.S. perspectives. Next, the students explore the factors that contribute to the growing risk of disasters and attempt to discern between superficial reasons and root causes. Finally, the class examines potential actions that could lessen vulnerability and losses in the United States. ________________________________________________________________________Suggested Student Homework Reading Assignment:Need to determine specifics._________________________________________________________________________

Additional Sources to Check:

American Meteorological Society. 2000. Policy Issues In Hurricane Preparedness and Response – Report of The Weather Channel Forum. Washington, DC: AMS Atmospheric Policy Program, September.

Association of State Floodplain Managers. 2000. National Flood Programs in Review, 2000. Madison, WI: ASFPM. Available online at URL: www.floods.org.

Changnon, Stanley A. and David Changnon. “Record High Losses for Weather Disasters in the United States During the 1990s: How Excessive and Why?” Natural Hazards, Vol. 18, pp. 287-300.

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Claussen, Eileen and Lisa McNeilly. 1998. Equity & Global Climate Change: The Complex Elements of Global Fairness. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, October 29.

Contingency Planning & Management. “East Coast Collisions: The 1999 Atlantic Hurricane Season.” Vol. 5, No. 1, January/February, pp. 24-28.

Davies, Kert. 2000. Heat Waves and Hot Nights (A Report by Ozone Action and Physicians for Social Responsibility). Ozone Action and Physicians for Social Responsibility, July 26. Online document at URL: http://www.ozone.org/heatstress.

Easterling, David R., et al. 2000. Climate Extremes: Observations, Modeling and Impacts. Science’s Compass. 22 September 2000. Vol. 289. www.sciencemag.org.

Field, C.B. et al. 1999. Confronting Climate Change in California: Ecological Impacts on the Golden State. Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA and The Ecological Society of America, Washington, DC.

Flavin, Christopher. 1994. “Storm Warnings: Climate Change Hits The Insurance Industry.” World Watch, Vol. 7, No. 6, November-December, pp. 10-20.

Foster, John. 2000. “Global Warming & Risk Management.” Public Risk, Vol. 14, No. 5, May-June, pp. 22-23.

Gornitz, Vivien. 2000. Climate Change and a Global City: An Assessment Of The Metropolitan East Coast (MEC) Region. Coastal Zone Sector Report: Sea Level Rise And Coastal Hazards. www.nefsma.org.

Heinz Center (The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment). 2000. Evaluation of Erosion Hazards. Washington, DC: Heinz Center. Available online at URL: http://www.heinzcenter.org.

Hooke, William H. 2000. “U.S. Participation In International Decade For Natural Disaster Reduction.” Natural Hazards Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, February, pp. 2-9.

Insurance Services Office, Inc. 1999. Financing Catastrophe Risk: Capital Market Solutions (Executive Summary). http://www.iso.com/docs/stud013.htm.

Lichterman, Joshua D. 1999. “Disasters to Come.” Futures, 31, pp. 593-607.

Newman, James E., Gary Yohe, Robert Nicholls, and Michelle Manion. 2000. Sea-Level Rise & Global Climate Change: A Review of Impacts to U.S. Coasts. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Also online at URL: http://www.pewclimate.org.

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NOAA. 1998 (online). State of the Coast Report. Silver Spring, MD: NOAA. URL: http://state-of-coast.noaa.gov/bulletins/heml/pop_01/pop.html.

Panel on Reconciling Temperature Observations. 2000. Reconciling Observations Of Global Temperature Change.

Peilke, Roger A., Jr., 2000. “Policy History of the US Global Change Research Program: Part I. Administrative Development.” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 10, pp. 9-25.

Quarantelli, E.L. 1999. “Implications for Programmes and Policies From Future Disaster Trends.” Risk Management: An International Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 9-19.

Robinson, Andrew. 1993. “Global Climatic Change.” Chapter 9 (pp. 259-295) in Earth Shock – Hurricanes, Volcanoes, Earthquakes, Tornadoes and Other Forces of Nature. NY, NY: Thames and Hudson, Inc.

Schlmadinger, Bernhard and Gregg Marland. 2000. Land Use & Global Climate Change – Forests, Land Management, and the Kyoto Protocol. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June.

Subcommittee on Global Change Research. 2000. Climate Change Impacts on the United States: the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change (Review Draft). Committee on Environment and Natural Resources of the National Science and Technology Council, National Science Foundation.

Vellinga, P. and W. J. van Verseveld. 2000. Climate Change and Extreme Weather Events. Amsterdam: Institute for Environmental Studies, World-Wide Fund for Nature.

Western Governors Association. 1999. Flood Plain Management and Dam Operations: An Issue Paper for the Western Governors Association.

Wigley, Tom, M.L. 1999. The Science of Climate Change: Global and U.S. Perspectives. Arlington, VA: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June 29. Also available online at URL: http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/env_science.html.

Dynes, Russell R. 1997. The Lisbon Earthquake in 1755: Contested Meanings In The First Modern Disaster. Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.

General Requirements:

PowerPoint slides have been prepared to support this session. The session is not dependent upon the utilization of these visual aids. They are provided as a tool that the professor is free to use as PowerPoints or overhead transparencies.

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Objective 8.1 To provide an awareness of the increasing risk and vulnerability of the U.S. population to hazards as well as some of the more important factors bearing on this increase.

You may wish to introduce this session by reminding the students of the range and state of U.S. hazards that they explored in the last session. Encourage the students to recall how losses from all types of disasters are increasing and how projections point to worsening losses in the future. Explain that to begin this session, the students will examine how disaster seems to be a growth business, both globally and in the United States.

Disaster Risk From An International Perspective

In the previous session we learned that disaster seems to be a growth business, both globally and in the United States. Addressing himself to the global situation, Chris Tucker has written in the Emergency Preparedness Digest that:

“…we are seeing world-wide, rapidly escalating human and economic losses from weather-related disasters.”1

This trend of increasing and costlier catastrophes poses serious implications for the role of emergency preparedness.

o In 1996, floods, windstorms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions around the world claimed 12,000 lives2 and caused economic losses exceeding US$60 billion. (Of this, US$9 billion were insured losses.)

o In comparison with the 1960s, five times as many natural catastrophes are now occurring, costing the world’s economies (taking inflation into account) eight times as much, and the insurance industry fifteen times as much. (Tucker, Etkin, Henault 1998, 14.)

“The explosive combination of human-driven climate change and rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions will set off chain reactions of devastation leading to “super disasters” in the years to come.”3

1 Chris Tucker, David Etkin, and Jacques Henault. 1998. Climate Change: Implications for Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Preparedness Digest (Canada (January-March)): 14 and 15.2 A very small percentage of worldwide disaster-related deaths take place in the U.S., however. While economic damage runs very high, deaths generally do not. It has been estimated that “[in] the USA a mere 0.01 per cent of the population has died from severe natural disasters” (Smith 1996, 7; citing A.F. Fritzche).3 Natural Hazards Observer, September 1999. p. 14.

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Another composite measure of disaster impact is the number of people adversely affected.

o Using Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) data, the total number of people in this category has grown from less than 50 million per year in the late 1960s to a present-day [1993] average of around 250 million each year.”4

According to the Natural Hazards Observer (Sept. 1999, p. 14), a report issued by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) states that:

“In 1998, natural disasters created more refugees than wars and conflict; the report indicates that declining soil fertility, drought, flooding, and deforestation drove 25 million ‘environmental refugees’ from their land and into the already vulnerable squatter communities of fast-growing cities. They represented 58% of the total refugee population worldwide.”5

The cost of global disasters in just the last couple of years has been enormous:

“Man-made and natural disasters killed 17,000 people and caused $38 billion in losses in 2000, the Swiss Reinsurance Co. (Zurich) reported. This compares to 105,000 fatalities and $100 billion in losses in 1999.”6

Janet Abramovitz, in Unnatural Disasters, sees irony in the fact that, while the United Nations had designated the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR),

“Instead, the 1990s may go down in history as the International Decade of Disasters, as the world experienced the most costly spate of floods, storms, earthquakes, and fires ever.

4 Keith Smith. Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster (2nd Ed). London and NY. Routledge, 1997. p.39.5 World Disasters Report 1999. (For details on the report, see the IFRC website: http://www.ifrc.org.)6 Emergency Preparedness News. January 16, 2001. “Cost of Global Disasters: $38B.” Business Publishers, Inc. p. 20.

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“Around the world, a growing share of the devastation triggered by ‘natural’ disasters stems from ecologically destructive practices and from putting ourselves in harm’s way. Many ecosystems have been frayed to the point where they are no longer resilient and able to withstand natural disturbances, setting the stage for ‘unnatural disasters’—those made more frequent or more severe due to human actions. By degrading forests, engineering rivers, filling in wetlands, and destabilizing the climate, we are unraveling the strands of a complex ecological safety net.”7

Abramovitz elaborates on “unnatural disasters,” citing the “enormous expansion of the human population and our built environment. . . the migration of people to cities and coasts” in the developing world—putting “untold numbers of people at risk”8

Disaster Risk From a U.S. Perspective

From a U.S. perspective, it is uncontestable that disaster costs are going up.

o Within the 20-year period, 1965 and 1985 there were about 500 Federally-declared disasters in the U.S.9

o Between 1989 and 1995 the U.S. experienced a sizable increase in the number and expense of its natural disasters, with roughly 300 disasters large enough to warrant a Presidential Disaster Declaration.

Jerry T. Mitchell and Deborah S.K. Thomas describe the trends in hazard events, losses, and casualties as “escalator-like,” with major contributors to the totals being exceptional disasters such as Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki; the Northridge and Loma Prieta earthquakes; and the Midwest floods.10

7 Janet Abramovitz. October 2001. Unnatural Disasters (Worldwatch Paper 158). Washington, DC. Worldwatch Institute. p. 6.8 Ibid.9 Claire B. Rubin, Anthony M. Yezer, Qaizar Hussain, and Anne Webb. 1986. Summary of Major Natural Disaster Incidents in the U.S., 1965-1985. Special Publication #17. Boulder, CO. Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center. Quoted in Roenigk 1993, p. 207.10 Jerry T. Mitchell and Deborah S.K. Thomas. “Trends in Disaster Losses,” Chapter 5 in American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters.” Susan L. Cutter, Ed. 2002, Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press. p. 112.

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Mitchell and Thomas provide this estimate of losses:

“Natural hazards conservatively cost this nation $12.5 billion annually during the past 24 years. Damages from natural hazards are highly variable from year to year and from decade to decade. However, steady increases in losses were found during the 1990s, the most disastrous decade ever. Fatalities remained relatively steady during the past 24 years.” (Cutter, 112)

“A burgeoning population and a desire to congregate in attractive, yet hazard-prone areas may alter these trends in the future, especially if we base our projections on the decade of the 1990s. For example, the population of all coastal counties has outpaced the total U.S. population growth by 15 percent in the past two decades.” (Ullmann, 2000)

According to FEMA, 75 percent of housing stock in the United States is susceptible to natural hazards. For example, in 2000, there were:

o 10 million homes at risk from flooding.

o 25 million homes at risk from wind hazards.

o 2 million homes at risk from coastal storm surges.

o 50 million homes in counties with significant earthquake risk.11

In 1998, 90% of the country’s population lived in seismically active areas,12 and in 1990, more than 50 percent of all Americans lived in coastal regions.

In Florida alone, over 80 percent of the State’s population lived within 10 miles of the coast in 2000.13

“. . . the state of Florida represents more than $900 billion at risk.”14

11 William D. Wagoner. 2000 Hazard Mitigation/Comprehensive Plan Interface—Integration of Emergency Management Into the Comprehensive Planning Process (FEMA IMI Student Manual G626). Emmitsburg MD: FEMA, Emergency Management Institute, p. SMI-10; citing FEMA.12 ISO (Insurance Services Office, Inc.). 1998. Evaluating Building Code Effectiveness—Answers to Your Questions. New York, NY: Insurance Services Office, Inc.13 FEMA. 2000b (Sep.). Planning for a Sustainable Future (FEMA 364). Washington, DC. FEMA, p. 7.14 Ryland. 1999. 260, citing the Insurance Information Institute. 1999.

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Note: Explain to the students that the growing population in coastal areas is but one factor that contributes to disaster as a growth business. But growth itself is not necessarily a root cause of the problem. At this point, you may wish to elicit student suggestions of additional factors and note them on chart paper for reference during the following discussion.

Factors Contributing to the Growing Risk of Disasters

There are a number of factors that contribute to the increase and severity of disasters in the U.S. Many explanations that might be put forth as reasons, however, are superficial in that they do not address the root causes. Here, we will discuss first the most common examples of these types of explanations, and then also some of the underlying factors—the root causes—that contribute to disaster as a growth business.

Superficial Explanations

(1) Population Growth and Population Density or “Urbanization”

The population of the U.S., like that of the entire world, increases every day. It has been estimated that the rate of global population growth runs at 1.6 percent annually, adding nearly 100 million people per year, primarily in developing countries.15

More people live in major metropolitan areas and are thus more vulnerable to disaster events. For example, in 1990, more people lived in Dade and Broward counties in South Florida than lived in all 109 counties from Texas through Virginia along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts in 1930.16

The United Nations newsletter, Stop Disasters, points out that this is one of the primary reasons why, worldwide, the number of people affected by disasters has been growing by 6% per year and has been doing so since the early 1960s.17

It has been estimated that “by the year 2000, half the world’s population will live in urban areas, crowded into 3% of the earth’s land area,” and that at least 80% of the population growth through the 1990s will be in larger towns and cities.18

15 Rodney White and David Etkin. 1977. Climate Change, Extreme Events and the Canadian Insurance Industry. Natural Hazards 16, No. 2-3 (November). p. 155.16 R.A. Pielke, Jr., and C.W. Landsea. 1998. Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995. Weather and Forecasting 13. pp. 621-631. Website: http://www.dir.ucar.edu/esig/HP_roger/hurr-norm.html.17 United Nations. 1997. Stop Disasters. No. 28. p. 4.18 Ibid.

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It can also be assumed that earthquakes, hurricanes, and many other hazards are much more of a threat in areas of population concentration.

And, as Mitchell has written in his 1993 book, Prediction and Perception of Natural Hazards:

“Urbanization is one of the most important factors propelling worldwide growth in natural disaster potential. People and material investments are pouring into cities that are already exposed to significant physical risks, are expanding into areas at risk or are pushing against the limits of biophysical systems and socio-technical systems.”19

According to Dr. Rutherford H. Pratt of the University of Massachusetts:

“Between 1950 and 2000, metropolitan population of the United States nearly tripled from 84 million (55% of U.S. total) to 226 million (80% of U.S. total). At the same time, the land area within designated ‘metropolitan statistical areas’ more than doubled from about 9% to about 19% of the coterminous U.S. land area. The expansion of metropolitan areas in size and number (from 169 in 1950 to 347 in 2000) has been accompanied by the degradation of local watersheds, streams, wetlands, groundwater aquifers, and coastal waters. Aquatic resources in the path of urbanization have been widely polluted, littered, dredged, filled, paved over, channelized, walled, and otherwise abused in the process. ‘Nature’s services’—including flood mitigation, water quality filtering, biotic habitat, nutrient uptake, soil formation, scenic amenity—have been impaired or obliterated. This has compelled cities, regions, states, and the federal government to substitute costly technology for those services, as with structural flood protection and water treatment plants.”20

19 J.K. Mitchell. 1993. Natural Hazard Predictions and Responses in Very Large Cities. In Prediction and Perception of Natural Hazards. Proceedings Symposium, 22-26 October 1990, Perugia, Italy. Edited by Jaromir Nemed, J.M. Nigg, and F. Soccardi. Dordrecht, the Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers. p. 29.20 Dr. Rutherford H. Platt, Project Director. (Department of Geosciences and Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Massachusetts at Amherst). Summary of New Research Project. Urban Stream Corridor Management in the United States: The Interaction of Ecology and Policy. The Ecological Cities Project. See website: www.umass.edu/ecologicalcities.

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Burton, Kates, and White write in their book, The Environment as Hazard:

“by extending its presence in more places and in larger numbers than before, the human race exposes itself and its artifacts more widely to risk from natural events….with accumulation of material wealth mounting in most countries, there is simply more property to be damaged” 21

(2) Increased Development and Property Values

A factor to consider when trying to understand why the costs of disasters have gone up and continue to do so is that development continues, in some places unabated, and this results in greater exposure. Inflation and demand translate into an increase in property values – again, greater exposure.

“Along with the growing complexity and cost of the physical plant responsible for the world’s industrial output, capital development has ensured that each hazard will encounter an increasing amount of property….”22

Consider the increased need for supportive infrastructure required for such development. Ever-expanding sewer systems raise the probability that sewage plants will be inundated by flood water and that systems will back up, thus flooding basements and low-lying areas. Nine sewage and water treatment plants were overrun by Hurricane Floyd.

Nonetheless, the value of insured residential coastal property in Florida increased 135 % between the years 1980 and 1993—from approximately $178 billion to $418 billion.

During the same time, insured commercial property increased from approximately $155 billion in 1980 to $453 billion in 1993—a 192 percent increase.

“…in addition to an increase in the number of natural disasters, the dramatic rise in disaster losses has been caused primarily by a large increase in the population of hazard-prone areas, as well as a rise in the costs of construction.”23

21 Ian Burton, Robert Kates, and Gilbert White. 1993. The Environment as Hazard. 2nd Ed. New York. Guilford Press. p. 24.22 Smith, 1996, p. 45.23 Howard Kunreuther. 1998. “Introduction.” Chapter One (pp. 1-15) in Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States. Howard Kunreuther and Richard J. Roth, Sr., (eds). Washington, DC, Joseph Henry Press. p. 2.

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“…from 1970 to 1990 we developed as much land in Maine as had been developed over the entire previous history of the state, consuming land four times faster than population growth. If we continue with that same pattern, land use consumption will double again by 2010.”24

“While population growth in Kansas City increased by less than 30% between 1960 and 1990, land devoted to housing and development rose by 110%; since 1970, every two years the location of the highest-valued homes has moved two miles farther away from downtown”25 (Beatley and Manning, 1997.)

(3) Changes in the Climate

Within the scientific community there is a debate underway concerning the frequency of natural disaster events.

Some argue that “the world will most likely experience a changing climate in the near future, with more frequent extreme events of some weather hazards…”

For example,

“Early in 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its third assessment report. This revealed that the speed and impact of anthropogenic climate change is likely to be substantially greater than previously thought, with temperatures forecast to rise by up to 8 degrees Celsius by the end of the century.”26

The authors of Natural Hazards and Environmental Change (2002) argue the case as follows:

“It is almost certainly no coincidence that modern human society has developed against a background of generally equable climate and geological calm. . . For the past two millennia. . . the Earth’s environment has been characterized by a general level of climactic and geological stability sufficient to ensure the growth of a technology-based global society.27

24 Beth Della Valle (Coordinator of Maine State Planning Office’s Land Use Team). 2001. “Are We Paving Over Paradise? Maine’s Efforts at Directing Development.” Coastal Services (NOAA), Vol. 4, Issue 2, March/April. p. 4.25 Timothy Beatley and Kristy Manning. 1997. The Ecology of Place. Washington, DC. Island Press.26 Bill McGuire, Ian Mason, and Christopher Kilburn. 2002. Natural Hazards and Environmental Change. New York: Oxford University Press. Preface.27 McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2002. p. 2.

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“Notwithstanding contemporary planetary warming—whether anthropogenetically attributable or not—the current period of relative environmental stability cannot be expected to last.28

“[E]vidence from the quaternary (the past 1.6 million years; Adams et al., 1000) reveals that large-scale global and regional climactic change over the last two and a half million years occurred rapidly rather than incrementally. Over the past 150,000 years in particular (Taylor et al., 1993), most significant climactic variations—involving regional changes in mean annual temperature of several degrees Celsius—appear to have occurred over periods ranging from centuries to as little as a few years.29

“A picture of a benign planet characterized by an unchanging or slowly changing environment has always, therefore, been a wildly inaccurate one. . . Environmental change is the norm rather than the exception.30

“Of most concern is the impact of rapidly rising concentrations of carbon dioxide and other ‘greenhouse gases’ in the atmosphere on surface temperatures and sea levels, and in turn on the frequency and severity of accompanying hazardous geophysical phenomena (e.g., Downing et al., 1999a; Saunders, 1999). To some extent the implications for natural hazards of the current period of environmental change can be forecast. Clearly, for example, if sea levels are elevated, then the impacts of storm surges and tsunami are liable to be correspondingly more severe.”31

The impact of this assessment seems uncertain:

“It is difficult to imagine certain elements of the international community taking the threat of contemporary environmental change seriously, without being shocked into action by events of a dramatic and unambiguous nature. Perhaps natural hazards will have a pivotal role to play here, and unless and until a hurricane obliterates Miami or wildfires rage through downtown Sydney, the dramatic consequences of our impact on the global environment will continue to be played down or disregarded.”32

28 McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2001.p. 3.29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. 2002. p. 4.32 McGuire, Mason, Kilburn. Preface.

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Others argue against this position and posit that any postulated increase in disaster events in the recent past can be attributed to a cyclic nature of disaster occurrences as well as increased vulnerability.

If a tornado touches down where there are no people or structures it isn’t a disaster, whereas if it hits a town killing people and damaging property, it is—and people and structures are occupying more spaces.33

Some argue that the debate is over:

The trend of increasing and costlier catastrophes continues….A scientific consensus has arisen that the world will most likely experience a changing climate in the near future, with more frequent extreme events of some weather hazards….Evidence on how storminess will change in a warmer climate is conflicting, and conclusions, especially severe storms, must be viewed as uncertain. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that:

o The number of connective events will increase in a warmer climate, due to the thermodynamic changes.

o Warmer climates may cause higher extreme storm frequencies.

o There will be much more frequent heat waves as a result of climate warming; similarly, cold waves would become more rare.

o A warming of even a couple of degrees Celsius can have a major impact on heat waves.

o There will be an increase in flooding events, as a result of a trend towards more…precipitation and greater atmospheric absolute humidity.

o The frequency of meteorological droughts will increase in the future. (Tucker, Etkin, and Henault 1998, 14 and 15)

“Though the precise timing of climate change and its geographical effects are not fully known, there is strong logic to the argument that we should stop acting in the business-as-usual manner that may have caused the problem in the first place.”34

33 For a brief discussion of this dialog, see White and Etkin 1997.34 Pamela Friedman. “Rethinking Climate Risks.” Risk Management. April 2002. p. 8.

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Dennis Mileti (1999, 42) writes that after many years of disagreement and uncertainty…

“The highly respected Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came to an unambiguous conclusion in 1995. Global warming, it said, was occurring and continued emissions of greenhouse gases, through a direct chain of events, would cause a rise in sea level and increasingly malevolent weather extremes, such as flooding.”

Note: Explain that sea-level rise will be considered specifically next in this session.

If the global climate does warm, some medical scientists have expressed concerns about the extension of vector-born diseases such as malaria and yellow fever in that warmer climates create favorable conditions for the hosts over a wider area.35

While the subject of global warming is controversial, it should be clear to anyone who studies the history of the planet that the climate not only does change but is always changing.

According to the Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction, climate change today is affecting the natural barriers to storm surges along the east coast, storm severity is increasing, and storm tracks may shift northward with more storms making landfall along the U.S. east coast.36

Note: Explain that coastal erosion will be considered specifically next in this session.

Perhaps bearing on this question, the National Research Council notes that:

“El Niño events have become stronger and more frequent since 1980, certainly one reason for the increased losses from weather-related natural disasters over the past 15 years….”37

35 A. Haines, et al. 1993. Global Health Watch: Monitoring Impacts of Environmental Change. Lancet 342: 1454-1469. Cited by Rodney White and David Etkin in Climate Change, Extreme Events and the Canadian Insurance Industry, Natural Hazards (16, No. 2-3, November 1997). p. 175.36 Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction. 1995. Coastal Exposure and Community Protection: Hurricane Andrew’s Legacy. Boston, MA. IIPLR and Wheaton, IL. Insurance Research Council, April. p. 13.37 National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, Board on Natural Disasters, Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters. 1999. The Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation. Washington, DC. National Academy Press. p. 4.

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“The term El Niño (‘the child’ or ‘the Christ child’) refers to a warming of surface waters in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean. Through history, this pool of warm surface water periodically appeared off coastal Ecuador, Peru, and Chile near Christmas. The tremendous amount of energy contained within this water has the ability to disrupt atmospheric patters throughout the region and across the planet. The El Niño which developed in the eastern tropical Pacific during the summer of 1997, and lasted through much of 1998, was exceptionally warm and ultimately ‘blamed’ for several weather-related disasters in the United States during that period.”38

(4) Coastal Erosion and Sea Level Rise

A study issued in June 2000 by the Center for Climate Systems Research at Columbia University (with input from the Goddard Institute for Space Studies and the New York District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, states that, “anticipated climate changes will greatly increase risks to coastal populations in the near future.”39

It is inescapable that U.S. coastlines are receding. Further, even small rises in sea level “result in significant coastal land loss.”40

Researchers have determined that “nearly 90% of eastern beaches are eroding, and the average beach has lost two to three feet per year during the past century.”41

In October, 2001, experts at a forum on Sea Level Rise and Coastal Disasters held by the National Disasters Roundtable of the National Academies of Science in Washington, DC, stated that:

“[B]each erosion is a national problem—80 to 90 percent of the nation’s sandy beaches are eroding. Global warming and accelerated sea-level rise have the potential to increase erosion rates two to four times during the next century.”42

38 Ibid.39 NEFSMA News, Vol. VIII, Issue 3. “Impacts of Future Sea Level Rise on Coastal Flooding.” New England Floodplain and Stormwater Managers Association, Inc. December, 2000. p. 1. (For the full report, see NEFSMA’s website: www.nefsma.org. See Flood Happens!)40 Natural Hazards Observer. Vol. XXVI, No. 4. “Sea Level Rise and Coastal Disasters: Lessons from the East Coast and New Orleans.” March, 2002. p. 10.41 Ibid.42 National Hazards Observer. March, 2002. p. 11.

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New Orleans, Louisiana, has been found to be particularly vulnerable to the rising sea level. As stated in the National Hazards Observer (March 2002), had the levees and dikes of New Orleans broken during Hurricane Andrew in August 1991, as many as 100,000 people could have drowned. About one-third of Louisiana’s barrier islands have disappeared since 1880, and coastal wetlands erode at the rate of several acres per hour. “Relative sea-level rise” (land subsidence combined with the worldwide rise in sea level) is judged to be the primary cause.

In New Jersey and New York, remediation of beach erosion has become a costly business:

“Almost $1.08 billion in adjusted dollars has been spent for New Jersey beach erosion projects over the decades, more than any other state.. . . It had the costliest beaches in the country at more than $8.7 million spent per mile of shorelines for replenishment projects. Neighboring New York has the second most expensive beaches at $6.6 million a mile, testifying to the power of Northeast states in Congress.”43

“In 2001, Congress approved a record $135 million for 75 shoreline rebuilding projects and studies in 21 states. In the past 79 years, beach replenishment along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts has cost the federal treasury an estimated $3.6 billion in 2002 dollars. That’s about $1 million a mile of open coast along the Atlantic and gulf, according to records from Duke University’s Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines. . . . Once the federal government agrees to protect a beach, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is obligated to replenish the sand for the next 50 years.”44

The practice of beach replenishment remains controversial, with opponents calling it a subsidy for the rich and some proponents in tourist-dependent coastal communities defending it, citing it as necessary to their economies.

Finally, a report compiled by the Heinz Center for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimates that “over the next 60 years, 25% of the houses within 500 feet of the shore would fall into the water without mitigating action. (See the National Hazards Observer, Vol. XXV, No. 1, p. 10).

43 Frank Kummer. Courier Post. “NJ Rakes In Lion’s Share Of Beach Money.” July 28, 2002.44 Paige St. John and Larry Wheeler, Gannett News Service. “Erosion Threat Fails To Stop Development.” USA Today. July 29, 2002. p. 8A.

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(5) Increased Incidence of Events

Data compiled by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), at the University of Louvain, Belgium, for the years 1963-1992 looking at worldwide disasters reveal:

…a consistent upward trend over a 30-year period. While the number of disasters claiming at least 100 deaths has more than doubled, disasters creating economic damage equivalent to 1 per cent or more of GNP [Gross National Product] have risen well over four-fold. This evidence for rapidly rising economic losses can be supported by insurance data, which tend to reflect conditions in the MDCs [more developed countries]. Berz (1990)45

showed that major natural disasters increased approximately five-fold from the 1960s to the 1980s. (Smith 1996, 38)

In the United States, according to the General Accounting Office:

“The growth in disaster assistance costs in the 1990s has been attributed to a number of factors, including: a sequence of unusually large and costly disasters …”46

This is an area of controversy. There does indeed seem to be an increased frequency in hazardous events, but this could be due to improvements in reporting systems and to the spread of populations into hazardous areas as Burton, Kates, and White note (1993, 25).

Nonetheless, these authors believe that “further increase in the incidence of disaster is the probable ‘wave’ of the next decade.” (1993, 238)

Causes are being sought as to the increase of certain events:

“Despite warnings of crackling dry conditions, bans on campfires and canceled fireworks shows, most of the major wildfires in the West this year have been man- or woman-made.”

“In Arizona alone, 1,198 out of a total of 1,317 fires were manmade, according to the Southwest Coordination Center in Albuquerque, which tracks fires in Arizona and New Mexico.”

“In New Mexico, 718 out of 998 fires this year have been started by people. Nine of Colorado’s last 15 major fires were manmade.”

45 G. Berz. 1990. “Natural Disasters and Insurance/Reinsurance.” UNDRO News (Jan./Feb.) pp. 18-19.46 General Accounting Office. 1998. Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Costs and Approaches for Reducing Them (GAO/T-RCED-98-139). Washington, DC. GAO. p. 1.

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“Over the Memorial Day weekend, rangers in Arizona wrote more than 140 tickets to people for violating the no-burning rules. One camper actually used a paper sign reading “No fires” to start his barbecue.”47

Government fire-suppression policies are under scrutiny:

“The wild lands in the West are filled with dense, dangerous underbrush that helps blazes burn hotter and faster, and that brush is the consequence of a long-standing federal policy to suppress all fires as soon as they start.”

“And as residents keep moving to the forests’ edge, it gets more complex and expensive by the year.”

“Conservation groups that support forest thinning—and most do—are clashing with western politicians on another important issue: where the clearing should occur. Environmentalists say thinning should take place first near vulnerable communities. . .

“But to clear underbrush near new housing developments could mean imposing rules on homeowners, which westerners have traditionally resisted. It certainly means changing the aesthetic of the forest and producing smoke from a procedure called a prescribed burn. And for many residents and tourism officials, that is too much to bear—especially after the tactic went awry two years ago in a forest near Los Alamos, NM, and ignited a wildfire that destroyed 220 homes.”48

Some believe that even carefully planned prescribed burns are unsafe. And the preventive practice would be extremely expensive. Thomas M. Bonnicksen, a member of the Advisory Board of the National Center for Public Policy Research and Professor of Forest Science at Texas A&M University critiques prescribed burning and suggests an alternative:

“Each 20,000 acres of ‘prescribed burn’ is likely to produce one escaped fire. That means there could be as many as 243 escaped fires in a year.

“In addition, most forests require thinning before prescribed burning, and 73 million acres need such treatment.

47 Associated Press. “People Largely To Blame For Wildfires.” Payson, AZ.. June 17, 2002.48 Rene Sanchez and William Booth. The Washington Post. June 27, 2002. “Did Politics Put A Match To West’s Wild Lands? Officials, Groups Trade Charges Over Fire Policy.” p. A-3.

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“The initial treatment would cost about $60 billion during the first 15 years. And maintenance costs of about $31 billion for subsequent 15-year periods would continue ad infinitum. That figure does not include the vast amounts of money spent to fight escaped fires, rebuild destroyed homes, control erosion and plant trees to replace burned forests.

“Restoration provides the best hope for returning health to our forests because it uses forest history as a model for management. . . It would take little public funding since restored forests would come close to supporting themselves from the sale of carefully harvested wood products.”49

(6) Lowered Eligibility Requirements for Federal Disaster Aid

The U.S. General Accounting Office in its 1998 report, cited earlier, stated:

“The growth in disaster assistance costs in the 1990s has been attributed to a number of factors, including…a general increase per year in the number of presidential disaster declarations; and a gradual expansion of eligibility for assistance, through legislation and administrative decisions” (GAO 1998, 1).

The same report continues:

“For fiscal years 1984 through 1988, the average number of such declarations was 26 per year, whereas, for the periods from fiscal years 1989 through 1993 and from fiscal years 1994 through 1997, the average number was 42 and 49 per year, respectively” (GAO 1998, 5).

“…more facilities have become eligible for disaster assistance. Over the years, the Congress has generally increased eligibility through legislation that expanded the categories of assistance and/or specified persons or organizations eligible to receive assistance. For example, 1988 legislation expanded the categories of private nonprofit organizations that are eligible for FEMA’s public assistance program.

FEMA’s Inspector General reported in 199550 that the agency’s administrative decisions on eligibility for disaster assistance—such as the threshold for determining whether to repair or replace a damaged public facility—may have expanded federal disaster assistance costs” (GAO 1998, 5).

49 Spokesman Review.com (Knight-Ridder). “Forests need Return To Historic State. August 4, 2002.50 Options for Reducing Public Assistance Program Costs (Inspection Report I-02-95, July 1995.)

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Patterns of repeat claims have been discovered. For example, St. Charles County, MO, had more repetitive losses than any other river community in the United States. In his chapter, “Uncle Sam—Floodplain Recidivist,” Steinberg states that, “In all, 899 structures had filed two or more claims under the National Flood Insurance Program since 1978. ‘There are people in St. Charles County who collect insurance every time two guys upstream spill their beers in the river,’ said Ron McCabe of FEMA.”51

Steinberg goes on to say that the county’s building commissioner at the time of the 1993 flood stated, in regard to FEMA policy, “Taxpayers have bought some of these people refrigerators and chain saws 10 times over. . . FEMA’s idea of relief. . . was to stand on the back of a pickup truck and throw away sacks of $100 dollar bills” (2000, p. 108).

A similar view:

“There’s the one group who. . . the women and children go to church and pray that the rain stops and the men go out and start sandbagging. And then there’s the other group, who the women and children go to church and pray that the rain doesn’t stop and the men go to the bar and have a few drinks and talk about how they’re going to spend their flood money.” (Steinberg 2000, p. 109)

Also:

“Until recently, one heard stories about the ‘neighborhood washing machine.’ In theory, people would move a beat-up old washer from house to house in advance of the adjuster, collecting insurance money repeatedly. Eventually FEMA started taking down serial numbers to stave off any further fraud. It would be a mistake, however, to see these worst-case scenarios as the norm. Most of those with federal flood insurance were not trying to rip off the system. In fact, if anything, the system was more likely ripping off the people. Recall that the entire rationale for the federal flood insurance program centered on the offer of subsidized insurance in return for more stringent land-use regulation at the state and local levels. But instead of holding communities to the bargain, the federal government has. . . simply weakened the standard to the point that by 1994 the Clinton administration simply required that ‘positive attitudes’ with respect to floodplain management be ‘encouraged.’ Paying for a few extra washers is one thing, but what the federal government has perpetuated on the American people here is the equivalent of passing out the keys to the treasury.” (Steinberg 2000, p. 111)

51 Ted Steinberg. 2000. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America. Oxford University Press. p. 108.

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Finally, there is the question of FEMA flood maps that are outdated, or improperly drawn. For example, a $2.3 million lawsuit was settled in favor of homeowners in a new subdivision (shown outside the floodplain) that was flooded during routine spring floods in 1996 and 1997.

‘“In many places, FEMA’s floodplain boundaries were traced on a topographic map by someone who has never visited the river basin in question,’ said Fred Metzler, a specialist with FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in Denver.”52

‘“We’ve always taken what they’ve given us, which is the engineer taking the FEMA maps and transposing them onto a subdivision map, said Lanette Windemaker, county planner and interim floodplain manager.”53

(7) Federal Budgetary Procedures

The GAO report also cites Federal budgetary procedures as a factor that may influence disaster assistance costs:

“According to the Senate Task Force report, federal budgeting procedures for disaster assistance may have influenced amounts appropriated for disaster assistance. This is because disaster relief appropriations have often been designated as ‘emergency’ spending. If the Congress and the President agree to designate appropriations as emergencies, the appropriations are excluded from the strict budget disciplines that apply to other spending—specifically, the discretionary spending limits under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1999…

…one criticism of the procedures for emergency spending is that the assistance provided is more ‘generous’ than would be the case if it had to compete with other spending priorities.” (GAO 1998, 6)

(8) Increased Technological Risks

Large-scale use of hazardous chemicals in production processes and aircraft that carry larger numbers of passengers are but two of dozens of high risk technologies that did not exist in prior centuries. Add to this a growing concern “that bio-technology will bring us a major disaster sooner or later.” (Quarantelli 1996, 230)

52 Nick Gevlock. Bozeman Daily Chronicle. “NFIP: Federal Maps Could Be Leading Flood Plain Development Astray.” February 27, 2002.53 Ibid.

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(9) Increased Dependence on Technology

A society becomes vulnerable to catastrophe when it becomes dependent upon complex energy and capital-intensive ‘high’ technologies that radically extend control over nature, but simultaneously increase the potential for catastrophic side effects and social breakdown. (Orr 1979, 43)

A major new threat that is developing is associated with the disastrous consequences that will come from the computer revolution that human society is presently undergoing. It is making life easier for most of us, in many ways. Yet our increasing dependence on computer technology will magnify future disasters and turn some minor emergencies into major crises. This is particularly true because many sectors of government and business are increasingly computer-based for the data and information they need to function, sometimes literally from minute to minute. (Quarantelli 1996, 229)

“…the more a society becomes dependent on advanced technology, the greater is the potential for disaster if technology fails.” (Smith 1996, 45)

(10) Better Data Collection, Reporting, and Media Attention

Tobin and Montz speculate that one of the lesser reasons that contributes to the trend of higher disaster costs is that with higher awareness and interest in hazards and disasters, along with better communications and better data collection techniques, more disaster loss information is collected and enters into the public discourse.

Root Causes of Disaster as a Growth Business

Note: At this point, you may wish to seek student suggestions as to the underlying causes in the incidence and cost of disasters. Record the students’ suggestions and encourage the class to compare them to the superficial explanations.

(1) Increased Settlement in High-Risk Areas

In answer to the question “Why are losses from natural disaster in the United States increasing?” one disaster researcher has written:

“Because Americans like to build on beaches, in floodplains, atop earthquake faults, and in the middle of forested areas.” (Dane, see also Kunreuther 1998, 2)

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More people reside in coastal areas, which are hurricane prone and in earthquake prone areas, because of favorable climates and the availability of work.

It has been estimated that Florida’s population alone has increased more than 500% since 1950. (Knap 1998)54

“Moreover, 80 percent of Florida’s population lives within 10 miles of the coast.” (Schwab, et al. 1998, 12)

Improvements in building, planning, and hazard-reduction programs are largely offset each year by the increasing number of people and value of property in high-risk areas.55 56 57

Indeed, within the U.S. it has been estimated that:

“. . . by the year 2000, 75 per cent of the U.S. population will live within 10 miles of either coast, subject to hurricanes in the East and Gulf Coast and earthquakes in the West.” (Quarantelli 1996, 233)

And, if sea levels rise, as is predicted by some “Greenhouse Effect” models, then coastal hazard risks will also rise. (White and Etkin 1997, 156)

Yet another projection is that by the year 2010, more than 73 million Americans will live in hurricane-prone counties (double the 1995 population of 36 million). (GAO 1998, 5)

54 See also Burton, Kates, and White. 1993. p. 25.55 Raymond J. Burby and Linda C. Dalton. 1993. State Planning Mandates and Coastal Management. In Coastal Zone ’93, edited by W.S.W. Oriville, T. Mangoon, Hugh Converse and L. Thomas Tobin. New York. American Society of Engineers. p. 229.56 National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, U.S. National Committee for the Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. 1991. A Safer Future: Reducing the Impacts of Natural Disasters. Washington, DC. National Academy Press.57 Thomas A. Birkland. 1997. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, DC. Georgetown University Press. p. 47.

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It is also anticipated that between now and 2010 the population density in the hurricane-prone southeast will increase 23%.

Moreover:

The dollar value of residential and commercial structures in the first tier of coastal counties along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, a band of real estate approximately fifty miles wide, as of 1993, was $3.15 trillion. That represents an increase of 69% over 1988.58

“More recent demographic trends, significantly increasing the populations of States like Utah and North Carolina, continue to move people into other vulnerable areas of the country, the former facing seismic hazards and the latter famous for coastal hazards, particularly on its barrier islands.” (Schwab et al. 1998, 12)

A closer look at the development patterns along the Pacific Coast makes obvious that demographic trends have been moving people closer to serious hazards.

o Four of the largest and fastest-growing metropolitan areas in those five coastal states—Los Angeles, the Bay Area, Seattle, and Anchorage—are directly affected by underlying active fault zones, and all have a history of recent seismic disturbances.

o Each of these areas has a large inventory of existing hazard-prone buildings already in place, a problem that Los Angeles has recognized for nearly two decades with an ordinance aimed at seismically retrofitting older structures.

o Moreover, local topography in both Southern California and the Bay Area add serious wildfire hazards to the mix, again with a history of costly recent disasters.” (Schwab et al. 1998, 12)

We’ve examined increases in population and development as a cause for an increase in loss. It is suggested that where and how the increases occur is the more causal issue:

o Frequently, the demand for more land to accommodate urban spread translates into the use of marginal land more prone to such threats as floods and landslides.

58 Eugene Lecomte, President Emeritus, Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction (IIPLR). 1997. Remarks at Annual meeting of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, March 19, 1997, Washington, DC: Statistics from IIPLC report Coastal Exposure and Community Protection, 1995.

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o Some 3.5-5.5 million acres of this have been urbanized, with over 6,000 communities (each with populations of 2,500 or more) exposed to flood hazard.

o The rate of urban growth on floodplains (1.5 to 2.5% annually) has been twice that of the rest of the country (Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, 1992).” (Cited in Tobin and Montz, 1997, 28.)

o Increasing populations also means that more land is devoted to population support.

o That leads, for example, to deforestation—more people living in forested areas, resulting in more forest fires and more forests destroyed for land-use development.

o More people means more dams and levees (many of which are now unsafe).

o It means more wetlands are filled in; and it means that more land is paved over—all of which leads to a higher risk of flooding.

As the National Research Council writes:

“Various forms of economic development have also driven up the costs of natural disasters. For example, the destruction of wetlands, the clearing of forests for a range of human activities, and the paving of roads and parking lots all have increased the peaks of runoff from heavy rainfall.” (NRC 1999, 8)

In addition, heavy engineering of flood control works sometimes lulls communities into a false sense of security and encourages inappropriate risk-taking—this is sometimes called the Levee Effect.

Finally, tourism increases the hazard. This situation is made more complicated by the fact that many high risk areas, particularly along the coasts, are also tourist attractions and thus experience surges in holiday, weekend, and seasonal population increase.

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Inequalities as a Factor

Vulnerability is increasing for persons with disabilities:

“The time is long overdue for disaster researchers and disaster management policy analysts to start systematically singling out the effects of disasters upon particular groups of people. . . Persons with disabilities make up one of the groups that exists in every population that warrants consideration in disaster mitigation policy formulation.59

It is believed that vulnerability is increasing in this group because the percentage of this population is increasing as people live longer lives:

“Due to improved nutrition, more effective public health measures, and new medical treatments, life expectancies in the U.S. and other Western industrial societies have increased. At the same time, chronic health problems and their attendant physical disabilities have become increasingly widespread (Berkowitz, Johnson, and Murphy, 1976; Fingerhut, Wilson, and Feldman, 1980).”60

Vulnerability does not extend solely to the aged, however.

“Disability is also common at the opposite end of the life cycle. Infant mortality has declined, and the health care system now intervenes in seriously disabling physical conditions, such as severe birth defects, that in the past would have been fatal. As a result, severely impaired younger members of the population survive, but may require high levels of physical support.”61

Disability should not preclude equality of safety during disasters:

“Increased vulnerability should not mean that persons with disabilities should inevitably experience a higher casualty rate in disasters. They have the right to expect an equivalent level of safety protection in disasters to that experienced by people in general.”62

59 Arnold R. Parr. “Disasters and human rights of persons with disabilities: a case for an ethical disaster mitigation policy. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management. Vol. 12, No. 4. Summer 1997-98, p. 2.60 Kathleen J. Tierney, William J. Petak, Harlan Hahn, University of Southern California. 1988. Disabled Persons and Earthquake Hazards. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Program on Environment and Behavior, Monograph #46. pp. 2-3.61 Ibid.62 Parr, p. 2.

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Disaster vulnerability is also closely associated with the economic gap between rich and poor, which is growing in many areas. (Smith 1996, 43)

o Compounding this problem is the fact that quite often it is the poor, those least able to shoulder the financial burdens of disaster, who use marginal land. For example, “In the U.S.…approximately 7% of the country can be defined as floodplain (94 million acres), which puts 9.6 million households and $390 billion worth of property at risk.”

Finally, as indisputable as the increase in populations is as a factor leading to increased disaster costs and risk, this factor alone cannot explain the increase in vulnerability and disaster losses. As Bolin and Stanford point out,

“Certainly there are four billion more people now variously exposed to environmental hazards than there were in 1900. But if all four billion were securely housed in well-planned communities, appropriately educated, and had access to adequate diets, health care, and well-compensated livelihoods, their vulnerability to calamities might be minimized. ”63(1998, 2)

(2) The Bottom Line Is Not Building Smart

If all new construction were built in a way congruent with local risks and hazards, then disaster losses would go down.

The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS) point out:

“The startling fact is that in spite of increased knowledge, better building regulations, land-use ordinances, and improved construction practices, many new buildings still have the same kinds of vulnerabilities as do those in the existing inventory.”64

The vulnerabilities in residential and commercial buildings are similar:

“Experience has shown that the insured losses in residential and commercial buildings will occur primarily as a consequence of vulnerabilities in the roof, building envelope, structural, and foundation systems, and the disaster agents of the specific peril or natural hazard. (ASCE and IBHS, 2001, 6)

63 Robert Bolin with Lois Stanford. 1998. The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster. London and New York: Routledge. p. 2.64 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS). The Most Wanted: A Search for Solutions to Reduce Recurring Losses from Natural hazards. Fall, 2001. p. 5.

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It’s not that there have not been “lessons learned.”

“. . . we conclude that, in the United States and other developed countries a lack of knowledge is not a major contributory factor to the growth of disaster losses.”65

White, et al. suggest that “There is perhaps more reason to attribute rising losses on the failure to act.” (2001, p. 89)

Some find specific reasons why we have failed to act on the lessons learned:

“Corruption and vested interests in and around government play a large role in many of the long-term precursors to disaster.”66

“Others point to failures in the political system.”67

Objective 8.2 To describe some of the actions that could be taken to reduce vulnerability and loss.

What To Do

David Weir, in his comparison of the failure of the British R101 airship in 1930 and the 1986 Challenger explosion suggests that “. . . we may have to recommend to the authorities that they should change the way we do things.”68

“…the part that state and federal governments need to understand, is that government is influencing how development happens by their investments. If you build a road, they will come. If you develop a job center, people will go to it. If you build a school, houses will develop around it” (Valle 2001, 4).

65 G.F. White, R.W. Kates and I. Burton. “Knowing better and losing even more: The use of knowledge in hazards management.” Environmental Hazards. Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4. September/December 2001. p. 89.66 Abramovitz. 2001, p. 36.67 Ian Christoplos, Anna Liljelund and John Mitchell. “Re-framing Risk: The Changing Context of Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness.” Disasters, 2001. Oxford UK and Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers. p. 187.68 David Weir. “When will they ever learn? The conditions for failure in publicly funded high technology projects: the R101 and Challenger disasters compared.” Disaster Prevention and Management. Volume 11, No. 4. 2002. pp. 299-307. For full text, see http://www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm.

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Cristoplos, et al., write that:

“A number of long-standing challenges remain: most of all, the complexities of maintaining the political will that is needed to ensure that risk management becomes more than a passing fad.” (2001, p. 186)

Susan Cutter believes that, “First and foremost, a shift in public policy is required.” (2002, 158)

Her recommendations include:

o Move away from a disaster assistance mindset (rewarding individuals and communities for building and living in hazard-prone areas) to one that fosters long-term thinking about mitigation, loss reduction, and personal responsibility for actions.

o Work toward sustainable and disaster-resistant communities.

o Defederalize the costs of disasters and limit federal subsidies on risk. We need to make sure that individuals and communities who choose to build in known hazardous environments take responsibility for the risk they assume.

o Improve hazards mitigation and reduce our vulnerability through wise land-use decisions and ensure that land-use policies are integrated so as to preclude development and redevelopment of hazardous environments.” (2002, p. 158)

Note: At this point, you may wish to solicit student suggestions of additional steps that could be taken to reduce vulnerability and losses from disasters in the United States. Relate the discussion to the upcoming session, “What is Emergency Management?”

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REFERENCES

Abramovitz, Janet. October 2001. Unnatural Disasters (Worldwatch Paper 158). Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute.

American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) and The Institute for Business & Home Safety (IBHS). The Most Wanted: A Search for Solutions to Reduce Recurring Losses from Natural hazards. Fall, 2001.

Beatley, Timothy and Kristy Manning. 1997. The Ecology of Place. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Berz, G. 1990. “Natural Disasters and Insurance/Reinsurance.” UNDRO News (Jan./Feb.) pp. 18-19.

Birkland, Thomas A. 1997. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Bolin, Robert, with Lois Stanford. 1998. The Northridge Earthquake: Vulnerability and Disaster. London and New York: Routledge.

Burby, Raymond J. and Linda C. Dalton. 1993. State Planning Mandates and Coastal Management. In Coastal Zone’93, edited by W.S.W. Orivlle, T. Magoon, Hugh Converse and L. Thomas Tobin. New York: American Society of Civil Engineers.

Burton, Ian, Robert Kates, and Gilbert White. The Environment as Hazard. 2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press, 1993.

Christoplos, Ian, Anna Liljelund and John Mitchell. “Re-framing Risk: The Changing Context of Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness.” Disasters, 2001. Oxford UK and Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishers. p. 187.

Emergency Preparedness News. Business Publishers, Inc. Silver Spring, MD.

FEMA. 2000b (Sep.). Planning for a Sustainable Future (FEMA 364). Washington, DC. FEMA.

Friedman, Pamela. “Rethinking Climate Risks.” Risk Management. April 2002.

General Accounting Office. 1998. Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Costs and Approaches for Reducing Them (GAO/T-RCED-98-139). Washington, DC: GAO.

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Haines, A. et al. 1993. Global Health Watch: Monitoring Impacts of Environmental Change. Lancet 342: 1454-1469. Cited by Rodney White and David Etkin in Climate Change, Extreme Events and the Canadian Insurance Industry, Natural Hazards (16, no. 2-3, November 1997): 175.

Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction. 1995. Coastal Exposure and Community Protection: Hurricane Andrew’s Legacy. Boston, MA: IIPLR and Wheaton, IL: Insurance Research Council, (April).

Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO). 1998. Evaluating Building Code Effectiveness—Answers to Your Questions. New York, NY: Insurance Services Office, Inc.

Kunreuther, Howard. 1998. “Introduction.” Chapter One (pp. 1-15), in Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States. Howard Kunreuther and Richard J Roth, Sr., (eds.). Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press.

Lecomte, Eugene. President Emeritus, Insurance Institute for Property Loss Reduction (IIPLR). 1997. Remarks at Annual Meeting of the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, March 19, 1997, Washington, DC: Statistics from IIPLC report Coastal Exposure and Community Protection, 1995.

McGuire, Bill, Ian Mason, and Christopher Kilburn. 2002. Natural Hazards and Environmental Change. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, J.K. 1993. Natural Hazard Predictions and Responses in Very Large Cities. In Prediction and Perception of Natural Hazards. Proceedings Symposium, 22-26 October 1990, Perugia, Italy. Edited by Jaromir Nemec, J.M. Nigg, and F. Soccardi. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Mitchell, Jerry T. and Deborah S.K. Thomas. “Trends in Disaster Losses,” Chapter 5 in American Hazardscapes: The Regionalization of Hazards and Disasters.” Susan L. Cutter, Ed. 2002, Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press.

Mittler, Elliott. 1997. A Case Study of Florida’s Emergency Management Since Hurricane Andrew. Natural Hazards Research Working Paper #98. Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center.

National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, U.S. National Committee for the Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. 1991. A Safer Future: Reducing the Impacts of Natural Disasters. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

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National Research Council, Commission on Geosciences, Environment and Resources, Board on Natural Disasters, Committee on Assessing the Costs of Natural Disasters. 1999. The Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

New England Floodplain and Stormwater Managers Association, Inc. (NEFSMA) NEFSMA News, Vol. VIII, Issue 3. “Impacts of Future Sea Level Rise on Coastal Flooding.” New England Floodplain and Stormwater Managers Association, Inc. December, 2000. p. 1. (For the full report, see NEFSMA’s website: www.nefsma.org. (See Flood Happens!)

NSTC (National Science and Technology Council, Committee on the Environment and Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Natural Disaster Reduction). 1996. Natural Disaster Reduction: A Plan for the Nation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December.

Orr. 1979. Quoted in Thomas Drabek, Human System Responses to Disaster: an Inventory of Sociological Findings (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986) 375.

Parr, Arnold R. “Disasters and human rights of persons with disabilities: a case for an ethical disaster mitigation policy. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management. Vol. 12, No. 4. Summer 1997-98.

Pielke, R.A., Jr., and C.W. Landsea. 1998. Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995. Weather and Forecasting 13: 621-631. Website: http://www.dir.ucar.edu/esig/HP_roger/hurr_norm.html.

Platt, Rutherford H. 1998. Planning and Land Use Adjustments in Historical Perspective. In Cooperating with Nature, edited by Raymond J. Burby, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, Joseph Henry Press.

Quarantelli, E.L.. The Future Is Not The Past Repeated: Projecting Disasters in the 21st Century From Current Trends. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 4, no. 4, (December).

Roenigk, Dale J. 1993. Federal Disaster Relief and Local Government Financial Coalition. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 11, no. 2, (August) 207-225. Citing Raymond J. Burby, Beverly A. Cigler, Steven P. French, Edward J. Kaiser, Jack Kartex, Dale Roenigk, Dana Weist, and Dale Whittington, Sharing Environmental Risks: How to Control Governments’ Losses in Natural Disasters. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

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Rubin, Claire B., Anthony M. Yezer, Qaizar Hussain, and Anne Webb. 1986. Summary of Major Natural Disaster Incidents in the U.S., 1965-1985. Special Publication #17. Boulder, CO: Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center. Quoted in Roenigk 1993, 207.

Schwab, Jim, with Kenneth C. Topping, Charles C. Eddie, Robert E. Deyle and Richard A. Smith. 1998. Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction. Chicago, IL and Washington, DC: American Planning Association, Planning Advisory Service, and FEMA.

Smith, Keith. Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster (2nd ed.). London and NY: Routledge, 1996.

Steinberg, Ted. 2000. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America. Oxford University Press.

Tierney, Kathleen J., William J. Petak, Harlan Hahn, University of Southern California. 1988. Disabled Persons and Earthquake Hazards. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Program on Environment and Behavior, Monograph #46.

Tucker, Chris, David Etkin, and Jacques Henault. 1998. Climate Change: Implications for Emergency Preparedness. Emergency Preparedness Digest (Canada (January-March)): 14 and 15.

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Valle, Beth Della (Coordinator of Maine State Planning Office’s Land Use Team). 2001. “Are We Paving Over Paradise? Maine’s Efforts at Directing Development.” Coastal Services (NOAA), Vol. 4, Issue 2, March/April.

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