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February 2012 Study on Lessons Learnt from Drought Early warning Systems in Uganda and Kenya ___________________ Centre for Innovative Programs (CIP Consult Uganda) Ltd P O Box 1131 Kampala Uganda Tel: 256(772)517485 Email: [email protected]

Embassy of France - Food and Agriculture Organization Study Report... · 5.1 Relevance of indicators and data to drought and vulnerability ... Last but not least the team would like

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______________________________

February 2012

Study on Lessons Learnt from Drought Early warning Systems in Uganda and Kenya ___________________

Centre for Innovative Programs (CIP Consult Uganda) Ltd P O Box 1131 Kampala Uganda Tel: 256(772)517485 Email: [email protected]

ACTED UGANDA Country Office – Plot 100, Kira Road, Bukoto, Kampala, Uganda Phone +256 41 4340489 Email [email protected] Website www.acted.org

Contents

Acknowledgement .................................................................................................................... 1 Abbreviations and acronyms .................................................................................................... 2 Executive summary .................................................................................................................. 3 1. Background to the Drought Early Warning Systems ......................................................... 8

1.1 The Uganda Drought Early Warning System.............................................................. 8 1. 2 The Kenya Drought Early Warning System ................................................................ 8

2 Objectives of the review ................................................................................................. 11 2.1 Main Objective ......................................................................................................... 11 2.2 Specific objectives ................................................................................................... 11 2.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 11

3 The concept of Drought Early Warning Systems ............................................................ 12 4 Findings ......................................................................................................................... 14

4.1 The process of DEWS in Uganda and Kenya ........................................................... 14 4.1.1 Uganda DEWS ................................................................................................. 14 4.1.2 Kenya DEWS .................................................................................................... 16

5 Assessment of key elements in the DEWS ..................................................................... 19 5.1 Relevance of indicators and data to drought and vulnerability monitoring ................ 19 5.2 Reliability of data collected and its sources .............................................................. 20 5.3 Efficiency, coverage, representation of data and dissemination systems ................. 21 5.4 Commitment and involvement of local authorities in implementation ........................ 22 5.5 Cost-effectiveness of the DEWS .............................................................................. 23 5.6 Opportunities for both systems to use new technologies .......................................... 23 5.7 Ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages ....................................... 24

5.7.1 Uganda ............................................................................................................. 24 5.7.2 Kenya ............................................................................................................... 26

5.8 The capacity of the community at risk to take action for effective response ............. 26 6 Strengths and Weaknesses ............................................................................................ 28

6.1 Uganda .................................................................................................................... 28 6.1.1 Strengths .......................................................................................................... 28 6.1.2 Weaknesses ..................................................................................................... 29

6.2 Kenya ...................................................................................................................... 29 6.2.1 Strengths .......................................................................................................... 29 6.2.2 Weaknesses ..................................................................................................... 30

7 Lessons learnt ................................................................................................................ 31 7.1 Lessons Uganda’s can learn from Kenya DEWS ..................................................... 31 7.2 Lessons Kenya can learn from Uganda DEWS ........................................................ 31

8 Conclusion and recommendations ................................................................................. 32 8.1 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 32 8.2 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 32 8.2.1 Recommendations for Uganda DEWS ................................................................. 32 8.2.2 Recommendations for Kenya DEWS .................................................................... 32 8.2.3 Recommendations for both Uganda and Kenya ................................................... 33

References ............................................................................................................................ 35 Annex 1 Assessment of elements of DEWS in Kenya and Uganda .................................... 36 Annex 2 Kenya DEWS Management Structure .................................................................. 38 Annex 3 Uganda DEWS Management Structure ................................................................ 39 Annex 4 List of Key Informants Interviewed ........................................................................ 40 Annex 5 List of Focus Group Discussion Participants ......................................................... 41 Annex 6 Maps of all concerned districts.........................................................................

ACTED UGANDA Country Office – Plot 100, Kira Road, Bukoto, Kampala, Uganda Phone +256 41 4340489 Email [email protected] Website www.acted.org

Acknowledgement

The Team wishes to acknowledge the support of several persons that enabled the review of Drought Early Warning Systems (DEWS) in Kenya and Uganda to be successful. Mr. Sebastian Lambroschini, Director ACTED for Horn of Africa and his senior staff are appreciated for the guidance that set the team on the right path. The team is specifically grateful to Ms. Malika Ogwang - Early Warning Specialist, ACTED for providing information and making important clarifications. The team is further grateful to Isaac Obai ACTED Coordinator and his team in Karamoja for mobilizing district officials and communities in the districts of Kotido and Nakapiripirit for the review. Furthermore, the efforts of Onesmus Kimuteilangat Assistant Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, ACTED Cross-Border Mission in Kapenguria, West Pokot is appreciated for mobilizing local communities and accompanying the team to the review site in Kodic in West Pokot. In addition, Wilfred Oluoch, Software Consultant is appreciated for giving information on the two systems and the Nokia Data Gathering (NDG) technology that increased the team’s knowledge of the two systems. We are also indebted to Patrick Cantin, ACTED Deputy Director for Horn of Africa based in Nairobi for making appointments with officials of Arid Lands Resources Management Project (ALRMP) in the Ministry of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Areas in the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kenya; and Mr. James Oduor, Coordinator ALRMP for the authorisation that enabled the team to access study sides and respective respondents; Similarly, Ms. Mary Mwale Drought Management Officer, ALRMP, Office of the Prime Minister is appreciated for providing valuable information and documents to the team and informing ALRMP staff in Samburu District about the review. We are also grateful to David Logoose, Data Analyst ALRMP for mobilizing communities in Kirisia and Wamba divisions in Samburu District respectively for the review. The team would like to thank all the officials at district and national levels and communities in both Kenya and Uganda, who provided data and information to the review team without which the exercise would not have been possible. Last but not least the team would like to thank Mr Cox Just Bwomono who drove the team to Karamoja and West and North Pokot districts, and Moses Gathira who drove the team on the hazardous road to Maralal in Samburu District.

Onweng Tobias Angura Richard Bugembe Max Alfred Anyuru

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ALRMP Arid Lands Resources Management Project ASAL Arid and Semi Arid Lands C&D Cooperation and Development CBPP Combined Bivine Pleuro Pneumonia CBO Community Based Organisations CAO Chief Administrative Officer CDMC Community Drought Management Committee DB Drought Bulletin DCA Dan ChurchAid DCF Drought Contingency Fund DCM Drought Cycle Management DDMC District Disaster Management Committee DEWS Drought Early Warning System DMA Drought Management Authority DMI Drought Management Initiative DMO Disaster Management Officer DSC District Steering Committee ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Office EDRP Emergency Drought Recovery Project EWPC Early warning Phase Classification FMD Foot and Mouth Disease MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries NDG Nokia Data Gathering NGO Non Governmental Organisations OPM Office of the Prime Minister SSD Social Services for Development UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

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Executive summary

The Uganda DEWS was established in 2008 and is being implemented in the Karamoja sub region (covering seven districts) by ACTED in collaboration with local and national governments, international organizations and UN agencies. Its main objective was to build resilience to drought in communities from Karamoja and is funded by European Commission Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Office (ECHO) under the Drought Cycle Management. The Kenya DEWS was implemented under the Arid Land Resources Management Project (ALRMP) funded by World Bank and other development partners. The ALRMP was a community-based drought management project of the Kenya Government (covering 28 districts). It utilized a credit facility from the World Bank under the Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands in Office of the President. The first phase of the Project, whose objective was to reduce chronic poverty and enhance food security in the arid lands became operational in October 1996 and ended on 30th June 2003 and the second phase (ALRMP II) started in September 2003 and wound up in December 2011. The ALRMP was recently been transformed into a Drought Management Authority (DMA). A study on the Uganda and Kenya Drought Early Warning Systems (DEWS) was carried to identify lessons learned and best practices with the view to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the two systems by the Centre for Innovative Programs (CIP Consult Uganda) Limited for and on behalf of the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED). A participatory and consultative process that involved household interviews and focus group discussions with members of the local communities; and key informants interviews with key district and national officials in Uganda and Kenya was undertaken. Increasingly, drought has been reported in both Kenya and Uganda as the most frequently occurring natural catastrophe. While it is mostly reported in the north eastern part of Uganda, in Kenya it is said to occur in close to two thirds of the country spanning the entire north and most other regions. In fact communities in these areas the review team interacted with noted that they live with the expectation of drought. The suffering they are enduring is thus perennial and appears to be increasing in severity due to impact on ever decreasing livestock holdings and less responsive support networks. This bleak picture notwithstanding, the drought early warning systems (DEWS) set up in both countries endeavour to reduce the risk and prepare communities and local governments for response. DEWS in Kenya has been in existence for the last 15 years while that of Uganda is only as recent as 2009. This review sought to examine the functionality of both DEWS so as to derive experiences and initiatives that could be shared for adaptation and improvement. The functionality of DEWS as used here connotes a complete system that generates and effectively puts to use advance information to minimise risk to the catastrophe of drought. All the constituent components of DEWS are expected to be fully integrated so as to reduce the vulnerability of communities at risk of drought. In this bid, both systems rely or take onto existing national social service delivery structures. While in Uganda the process is dependent on the decentralised district service delivery structure, in Kenya DEWS is a parallel process to the county service delivery. In both cases, however, the data verification and response is the mandate of the local government. The following was established in the functions of both DEWS.

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Key Functional Element

Uganda Kenya

Risk Knowledge Drought on-set data systematically collected from 10 households in selected sentinel sites

Risk assessment done on generalised livelihood options

Local people knowledgeable of drought hazard and vulnerabilities

Trends and patterns though established in local knowledge, not traced in DEWS

Risk maps and data not widely available

Drought on-set data systematically collected from 30 households in selected sentinel sites

Risk assessment done on generalised livelihood options

Local people knowledgeable of drought hazard and vulnerabilities

Trends and patterns though established in local knowledge, not traced in DEWS

Risk maps and data not widely available

Monitoring & Warning Service

Parameters/indicators number 26 to monitor hazard and vulnerability

The data collected is largely reliable but with incidences of contestation from technocrats

Accuracy & timeliness of warnings is modest (hampered by late bulletins)

Parameters/indicators number 60 to monitor hazard and vulnerability

The data collected is largely reliable but with incidences of contestation due to interferences & household seasonal migrations

Accuracy & timeliness of warnings is modest (hampered by late bulletins)

Dissemination & Communication

Communication of risk information hampered by poor attendance of technical team (DDMC)

Warnings contained in bulletins do not reach those at risk (technical terms, English, late releases)

Messages sent over radio are far reaching but affected by low radio ownership

Technical risk warnings understood at local government level but not translated for lower levels

Warning information usable at local government level but hampered by poor facilitation

Communication of risk information put to use most by local governments and support agencies

Warnings contained in bulletins do not reach those at risk (technical terms, English, late releases)

Risk warnings understood at local government level but not translated for lower levels

Response Capability

National & community response yet to be noticeable (communities demand support)

Local capacities & knowledge used in analysis but not response

Communities aware of hazard trends but largely unprepared for response

National response evident but inadequate at community level

Local knowledge used in analysis

Communities aware of hazard trends but largely unprepared for response

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This review established that it is the full integration of the DEWS elements that enables reduction of the risk from serious imbalances that endanger livelihoods, human health, livestock and environmental health to sustainable management. As they stand now, both systems still require work on full integration. For instance, both appear to have credible and much needed advance information on drought risk but are unable to translate this into timely response especially on the part of the duty bearers i.e. the governments. They continually have to rely on scattered response efforts of non-state actors whose reach is limited in addition to stopping at relief as opposed to building the resilience of communities through more robust development support. Overall, while the indicators are reliable as the DEWS process from data collection to dissemination is very elaborate with quality control mechanisms placed at several stages, there are however factors that reduce the reliability of data including modification of recommendations in the Drought Bulletins (DB) by politicians, collection of inaccurate data by field monitors and mobility of pastoral communities in search of water, grass or due to insecurity. Data collection is efficient as it is undertaken in 10 and 30 households per site in Uganda and Kenya respectively and can be generalized to the whole district and therefore representative. The dissemination systems are efficient in Uganda but may not be effective as spot messages are disseminated on radio that though able to reach a large population within a short time may not be effective because of limited access to radio receivers by most community members. Similarly, while drama is loved by community members as a media of communication of messages, it is a localised event and may not be of benefit to distant communities. In Kenya, while DB may be disseminated to the local and central government authorities and development partners, responses are planned and implemented without dissemination of warning messages to the community.

Local authorities in both countries are fully involved and committed to DEWS. The level of involvement is, however, reduced by low commitment among local authority staff in Uganda as they consider DEWS as an additional activity that would require additional “facilitation” within a well defined incentive framework. In Kenya the effectiveness is undermined by the allocation of limited funding to the districts for response. The DEWS in Uganda is largely implemented by the district local government with support from ACTED. All activities from data collection to analysis and production of DB are undertaken by the district officials. The DEWS in Uganda can therefore be said to be cost-effective, however, the local government has its own challenges. Kenya has an effective DEWS but less efficient because it is implemented by a structure parallel to local authorities which is costly. Modern technology makes DEWS work easier and quicker and more efficient as evidenced by the introduction of Nokia Data Gathering in Uganda for data entry data and processing. Both systems use computer software for data analysis. There are possibilities of using other technologies such as satellite imaging for capturing conditions of vegetation, crops conditions and water availability and SMS for delivery of warning messages. Lack of adequate funds and technical capacity limits effective use of technology. The two systems have the ability to issue accurate warning messages when quality control mechanisms put in place. The accuracy of warning messages are, however, reduced by modification of DB by politicians to suit their interests especially in Kenya, slow decision making that may make the warning come too late, lack of affordable media to ensure that the messages reach a wider audience in a timely manner.

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While the community have the capacity to take actions like economic use of food by reducing brewing of alcoholic drinks and sale of food, storage of food, taking livestock for vaccination and improving personal hygiene, some of them may not be able to procure seeds for early planting and all of them have no capacity for mitigation like de-stocking, construction of valley tanks or water pans, maintenance of roads and provision of food and water during large emergencies. The fact that the communities are increasingly aware of the system and respond to the radio messages is evidence that these messages help them build their resilience. In addition, stakeholders are supporting the development of the local institutions such as Community Disaster Management Committee (CDMC) and Agro-Pastoral Field School (APFS) where issues related to the EWS are discussed, which contributes to strengthening the resilience of communities to drought. Lastly the availability of the Drought Bulletins helps development partners to better target their intervention and adjust it to the changing needs of the population.

Recommendations Recommendations for Uganda DEWS

1. Full integration of the DEWS into Disaster Management Policy to ensure inclusion of the DEWS into development plans and budgets at both national and local levels and to facilitate government ownership. In addition to this, a functioning DEWS, regular update of the contingency planning and availability of contingency funds should be part of the indicators on which the departments of the local government are evaluated by the line ministries.

2. Decentralization of adequate funds from the centre to the district level would enable the

local authorities to take quick action in response to emergency of mitigation measures against drought, floods and related hazards.

3. Local and national government leaders should ensure that the various steps of Drought

Bulletins production and dissemination are achieved in a timely manner, involving a limited number of staff so as to reduce inertia that is common in government structures. .

4. The provision of development support to increase on the resilience of the community to drought and other related hazards would reduce the dependency of communities on aid from government and other development partners’ overtime.

5. The government however should continue to provide enabling conditions that

communities have no capacity to provide such as improvement of infrastructure like roads, water, education and health services and provide security to enable the communities undertake mitigation and development activities.

Recommendations for Kenya DEWS 1) The mandate and operational guidelines of the Drought Management Authority should

be clearly stipulated and designed in a way that minimizes inertia of operations due to conflict of interest between various institutions. 2) Decentralization of adequate resources to the districts would facilitate timely early

warning and cost-effective drought response

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3) Upgrading technologies for data gathering and analysis and piloting use of other technologies like SMS would quicken the DEWS process and enable timely and accurate dissemination of drought early warning messages.

4) Messages should be extracted from the DB and disseminated to communities in a timely manner to enable take prompt actions.

5) The provision of sufficient development support to increase on the resilience of the

community to drought and other related hazards would gradually reduce the dependency of communities on aid from government and other development partners but strengthen their capacity to mitigate the effects of drought on their own with minimum support.

6) The government however should continue to provide enabling conditions that

communities have no capacity to provide such as improvement of infrastructure like roads, water, education and health services and provide security to enable the communities undertake mitigation and development activities.

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1. Background to the Drought Early Warning Systems

1.1 The Uganda Drought Early Warning System The Drought Early Warning System in Uganda is being implemented in the Karamoja region by the local government, with the financial and technical support of ACTED. This project is part of a broader project implemented by Dan Church Aid (DCA) led consortium constituted of Cooperation and Development (C&D), Social Services for Development (SSD) and ACTED, which aims at building resilience to drought in communities from Karamoja and North Pokot. The DEWS is funded by European Commission Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Protection Office (ECHO) under the Drought Cycle Management initiative which was expected to last until December 2011. The Project started with a pilot in Nakapiripirit district in 2008 where ACTED was running a pilot EWS inspired from the Kenyan model. At the beginning, data collection was done by Community Animal Health Workers, while the data analysis and production of Drought Bulletins was done entirely by ACTED. In 2009 the organization decided to build up from this experience and to expand the project to the whole region of Karamoja (initially 5 districts and now split into 7 districts). This allowed the opportunity to fully re-design the project and adapt it to the context of Karamoja. This work has been achieved in collaboration with local and national government representatives, with local and international organizations and UN agencies. All of these actors found a consensus on the list of indicators to be used as well as the modus operandi of the system for data collection, analysis, dissemination and how it should be integrated within the local government. One year after the implementation of the project, ACTED underwent a monitoring and evaluation assessment to identify the gaps and designed appropriate adjustments to enhance the efficiency of the project. The list of indicators was revised and reduced (from 36 to 26 indicators), the number of sentinels’ sites was reduced, 75 parishes were re-sampled and a data quality control system was been put in place. Since the beginning of 2011, new innovations and new components of the project have been designed and put in place such as the use of Nokia phones for instant data collection, a new software in collaboration with the developer of the Kenyan EWS software, a wide community awareness component including dramas and songs, dissemination of warnings and recommendations down to the community using radio spot messages and SMS and the establishment of an Early Warning Phase Classification Methodology (not yet completed). Such a project requires time before reaching its maximum efficiency. Learning from neighbouring experiences to try to save time and resources has been a driving force since the beginning of the Project.

1. 2 The Kenya Drought Early Warning System The Kenya Drought Early Warning System is implemented under the Arid Land Resources Management Project (ALRMP) funded by World Bank. The Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) cover about 467,200 square kilometres which is over 80% of the Kenya country’s total landmass of 584,000 sq km. The area is inhibited by over 40% of Kenya’s population. The ASAL areas have the highest incidences of poverty and the lowest level of access to basic services in the country. The ASALs contributed over 52% of Kenya’s livestock and account for over 80% of economic-tourism interests in the country. The ALRMP is a community-based drought management project of the Kenya Government that utilizes a credit facility from the World Bank. The Project previously operated in the Office of the President under the Ministry of State for Special Programmes but is currently under the

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Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands. The first phase of the Project, whose objective was to reduce chronic poverty and enhance food security in the arid lands became operational in October 1996 and ended on 30th June 2003 with a total budget of US $ 21 million. The Government of Kenya with support from the World Bank implemented the Emergency Drought Recovery Project (EDRP) during the drought periods of 1991-1996. The EDRP covered Mandera, Marsabit, Tana River, Turkana and Wajir districts. Experience gained during this period indicated that Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) require projects that have long-term implementation period in order to have a meaningful impact on the lives of population in these areas. The ALRMP I covered 10 arid lands districts of Baringo, Garissa/Ijara, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale, Samburu, Tana River, Turkana and Wajir. It had three components including Drought Management, Community Development and Marketing and Infrastructure. The Project made some achievements, but in view of the persistent drought emergency during the implementation period, the Project could not be institutionalized. It was on this basis that the second phase of ALRMP II was born. The ALRMP II was launched in September 2003 and covered 17 semi-arid districts of West Pokot, Laikipia, Nyeri, Meru North, Tharaka, Mbeere, Mwingi, Kitui, Makueni, Kajiado, Narok, Trans Mara, Taita Taveta, Lamu, Malindi, Kilifi, Kwale and 11 arid districts of Turkana, Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, Isiolo, Samburu, Baringo, Garissa, Ijara, Tana River which were selected based on agro-ecological characteristics and other criteria as indicated below:

1. Aridity index as contained in guidelines of the draft ASAL policy 2. Rainfall patterns and amounts 3. Poverty levels 4. Food insecurity 5. Civil conflicts 6. Human population 7. Livestock populations

The Project was implemented over a period of seven years (2003-2010).The project funding of US$ 144.9 million was sourced from the IDA, the Government of Kenya and the community. Drought Management Initiative (DMI) brought on board €17,696,000 and targeted 7 million people. The ALRMP II development objective was to reduce livelihood vulnerability, enhance food security and increase access to basic services in 28 drought prone arid and semi-arid districts in Kenya. The ALRMP II components included Drought Management, Natural Resource Management and Community Driven Development. The Drought Management Component has established an early warning information system, national and district coordination and response units/institutions, strengthening drought preparedness, mitigation/response, and recovery and setting up, and operationalising using a Drought Contingency Fund (DCF) at district and national levels. Mandated by the Government of Kenya to collect, analyze and report on early warning information, the ALRMP II has deployed data collection monitors based in the community, to collect data and send to the coordinating office based at the district level on a monthly basis. Data is then analyzed and a drought early warning bulletin produced. All government agencies and NGOs at the district and national levels rely on this bulletin produced for early warning information. The ALRMP plans and coordinates intervention through District Steering Groups.

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It is important to note that under the ALRMP, the drought early warning system of Kenya is referred to as the Drought Management Initiative (DMI) Programme initiated in 2007, which has received support from the European Commission. DMI is a four- year project implemented within the ALRMP II framework. DMI’s objective is to contribute to the improved effectiveness and efficiency of the drought management system in Kenya by strengthening the capacity to intervene in an appropriate, effective and timely fashion during the drought cycle.

The DMI is primarily implemented at the district level through the District Steering Groups (DSGs). At the community level, the community development committees are instrumental in drought management. Both structures spearhead the control of negative impacts of drought by operating DEWS. These structures have resulted into greater coordination and collaboration among stakeholders interested in drought management issues in Kenya including the central Government, UN agencies, Development Partners and NGOs.

Through the national, district and community management levels, the project undertakes provision of Early Warning and food security information in several ways:

Through its community based drought Early Warning System covering all the project districts. The system provides monthly, timely and credible EW information for action by all relevant stakeholders.

The project coordinates biannual multi-sectoral and multi-agency rapid food security assessments that provide actual food security situation at household levels.

In collaboration with other stakeholders, the Project conducts surveys related to food security issues in order to provide more in-depth information on some food security areas such as health and nutrition.

The project has developed drought contingency plans for all the project districts as part of the preparedness activity and the plans are revised regularly

The ALRMP has been reformed to Drought Management Authority (a semi autonomous body) ostensibly to strengthen their capacity to make quick decisions and use resources unhindered by the central government ministry bureaucracy to implement drought responses. This is a good move as it would make the drought response agency more effective as drought still affects a large part of Kenya as indicated by one senior official in the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Areas. Given that the DMA will still require the district in conducting its activities, it is difficult to understand how the Authority will function in collaboration with the national and district government structures.

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2 Objectives of the review

2.1 Main Objective The main objective of the review was to identify lessons learned and best practices from the two DEWS which would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the systems.

2.2 Specific objectives The objective of the review was to carry out an assessment of the two DEWS in order to evaluate how much the two systems are operational in terms of modus operandi, efficiency, effectiveness, reliability, timeliness and integration into the national Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy. The review specifically focused on assessing the:

i. Relevance of indicators and data collected for the purposes of drought hazard and drought vulnerability monitoring

ii. Reliability of data collected and its sources iii. Efficiency, coverage, representation of data collection and dissemination systems iv. Level of commitment and involvement of local authorities in implementation v. Cost-effectiveness of the Drought Early Warning Systems vi. Opportunities for both systems in terms of use of “new” technologies (e.g. satellite

imagery, digital data collection tools and analysis software among others) vii. Ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages viii. The capacity of the community at risk to take action to avoid, reduce risk or prepare for

effective response.

2.3 Methodology The review was undertaken in purposely sampled districts in Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda, Nakapiripirit and Kotido districts were selected out of the seven districts in Karamoja. In Kenya, two counties of West Pokot and Samburu were selected and the review was done in North Pokot and Samburu Central and East districts. The review used several methods including literature and documents review, key informants interviews, household interviews and focus group discussions as described below. Literature review Relevant literature was reviewed including literature on the concept and practice of DEWS, DEWS project documents, Drought Bulletins and minutes of DEWS meetings and workshops. Key Informants’ Interviews Several interviews were held with persons involved in the implementation of DEWS in both countries. These included; parish chiefs/sentinels, district DEWS focal persons, technical staff, data analysts, drought management officer, ACTED staff at district level, Nokia Data Gathering software consultant, ACTED DEWS Specialist and other national stakeholders. Key informants guide was used to collect data. Household interviews Face to face interviews were held with households that were involved in DEWS. Households were purposively selected in order to get respondents who had the information that the review needed. Either heads of households were interviewed or their spouses, the interest being any person who could report in the household. A total of 61 households were interviewed, 40 from Karamoja region, 10 from West Pokot and 11 from Samburu Central and East districts. Interpreters were selected from the local community of the household respondents to ease the communication between the interviewers and the heads of the households. Semi-structured interview schedule was used to gather data.

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Focus group discussions Focus group discussions were held with members of the community who were involved in DEWS in the sense that data was collected from their households. Purposive selection was done to ensure that the respondents selected had the knowledge of the subject being reviewed. A total of 5 focus groups discussions were held comprising three in Karamoja region in Uganda, one in North Pokot and one in Samburu East districts. Focus group discussion topic checklist was employed to guide the discussion. One person facilitated the discussion and another person took notes but chipped in to get clarification. A person who belonged to the ethnic group of the local community linked the community and the review team by interpreting the focus group discussion process.

Participants of a Focus Group Discussion with a member of the DEWS Review Team at a

sentinel site in Lokitelakwaibu Parish, Kotido District in Karmoja region, North-eastern Uganda.

3 The concept of Drought Early Warning Systems Early warning system can be defined as “the provision of timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to hazard to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response”, and is the integration of four main elements namely risk knowledge, monitoring and warning service, dissemination and communication and response capability (UNISDR, 2006, ). Therefore it is not enough for DEWS to involve the communities at risk of drought hazard in the collection of information regarding impending hazards. The programs need to demonstrate a sustained public education drive, a functional dissemination of messages and warnings as well as enduring preparedness.1 Indeed, DEWS by itself will not deliver risk reduction and an improvement of livelihoods of the vulnerable and those at risk unless early identification of impending crisis leads to implementation of adequate mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery actions by stakeholders. Therefore, DEWS needs to operate within a fully functional public administration system supported by comparatively well positioned support agencies (i.e. with grassroots presence) and responsive communities. Moreover, adherence to four elements of

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EWS (risk knowledge, monitoring and warning services, dissemination and communication, response capability) within the structure and operational systems of DEWS is central to the achievement of desired goal of disaster risk reduction. The review of the Kenyan and Uganda DEWS is premised on the understanding that they seek to run processes that predict possible catastrophic events and their expected impacts and help minimize their devastating impact on the environment and human life (Quansah, et al - 2010). As noted above, the systems should engender a process of real-time multiple-source data collection, data transmission, evaluation and analysis, timely dissemination of early warning information and efficient response to such information. Critical to the system is the ability of the communities exposed to hazard to utilize information thus generated to take action to avoid or reduce their risk and prepare effective response (Grasso, F. Veronica - undated) Both DEWS are deemed to integrate the four main elements of the ISDR namely;

1. Risk Knowledge: Risk assessment provides essential information to set priorities for mitigation and prevention strategies and designing early warning systems.

2. Monitoring and Warning Service: Systems with monitoring and predicting capabilities provide timely estimates of the potential risk faced by communities, economies and the environment.

3. Disseminating and Communication: Communication systems are needed for delivering warning messages to the potentially affected locations to alert local and regional and national governmental agencies. The messages need to be reliable, synthetic and simple to be understood by the authorities and public.

4. Response Capability: Good governance, coordination and appropriate action plans are a key point in effective early warning. Likewise, public awareness and education are critical aspects of disaster mitigation.

These elements inform the structuring of the DEWS system while at the same guiding the processes. The obvious course of action would commence with data collection, to analysis, to compilation/bulletin production, to dissemination and communication to response. This is especially true for drought which has been classified a slow-onset hazard with given levels of predictability and establishment of trends. However, this procedure is not cast in stone and may commence anywhere in the line up. What is critical for the Kenyan and Ugandan DEWS is the examination of structures and processes and how these deliver the effective reduction of devastating impact on the environment and human life. Failure of any part of the system will imply failure of the whole system. For instance particular to drought, while the information collected from communities may be early and accurate, the DEWS will have no impact if the population at risk is not prepared to act on avoiding and reducing the danger through timely dissemination and the building of local capacity to respond. As noted here; “predictions are not useful, unless they are translated into a warning and action plan the public can understand and unless the information reaches the public in a timely manner” (Glantz, 2003). Knowing that drought is classified among the “slow-onset (or creeping)” hazards, it is one that may over time cause serious crisis of hunger and/or famine due to its incremental and cumulative effect on the environment and further undermining the ability of at-risk communities to respond. It is imperative therefore that DEWS not only provide warning and periodic respite in response but build on the resilience of communities while repairing environmental resources.

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4 Findings

4.1 The process of DEWS in Uganda and Kenya

4.1.1 Uganda DEWS

The process of DEWS begins with data collection from 10 households in each of the selected sentinel sites (parishes) and is done by the respective parish chief. Using a questionnaire, data is collected on 26 indicators. The indicators include vegetation condition, rainfall, temperature, humidity, weather forecast, livestock body conditions, livestock migration, livestock disease incidence, calf mortality, abortion rate, type and number of animals in market, accessibility to grazing areas, types of crops planted in the month, crop condition, crop yields, type of water source, quantity of water fetched daily per household, type of water sources and time spent to fetch water, safe water points, incidence of malnutrition, type of food eaten, out migration of people, freedom of movement, price of firewood, terms of trade I(bull/sorghum, daily labour rate/sorghum, charcoal/sorghum) coping mechanisms and seasonal calendars. Weather forecast information is obtained from the Department of Meteorology (under the Ministry of Water and Environment). Data on incidence of malnutrition, crop yield, livestock disease incidence, rainfall are collected from the district. Data on rainfall are obtained from FEWSNET. Initially the completed questionnaires were sent to the DEWS focal person in the district, who enters data and summarises it. But currently, data from the 10 households per parish, verified by the sub-county chief is entered into a software in Nokia mobile handsets and sent to a server and then transmitted to the DEWS focal person in 5 out of 7 districts on Karamoja region. The focal person downloads the data which is automatically processed and displayed in forms of graphs and submits it to the Chief Administrative Officer who calls a meeting of technical persons including the District Agricultural Officer, District Water Officer, District Veterinary Officer, District Natural Resources Officer and District Internal Security Officer to do a detailed analysis and interpretation. A draft Drought Bulletin is produced every month with recommendations by district heads of department. Among these recommendations they identify which one should be given back to the community and recommendations that are of concern to development partners. If emergency actions are recommended then messages are extracted from the DB and sent as radio spot messages. The District Early Warning Focal Person edits the Drought Bulletin after analysis by District Heads of Department. The Chief Administrative Officer submits the DB to the District Disaster Management Committee for approval and planning of response. The involvement of district local governments, OPM and other sector ministries in DEWS activities is good as it is a process for integration of DEWS into local and central government structures. There is, however, need to officially integrate it through a policy process to ensure sustained funding and implementation. In addition, the integration should avoid the problem experienced in Kenya characterized by many stakeholders with interests that must be satisfied resulting in inertia and slow decision making and untimely and ineffective response. The DEWS structure should allow prompt decision making process that is required of a drought monitoring and response institution. In Kenya, the DSG that is responsible for assigning the states to the district, approving and adopting the DB and planning and implementing response has a membership that includes all the technical departments and virtually all interest groups including Members of Parliaments, women representatives, religious institutions, NGOs, CBOs among others that seriously slows down its operation. At the national level, the Kenya Food Security Working Group whose role is to verify the information in the DB has many government sectors, development partners, national NGOs that may be difficult to coordinate. This may explain the drought response period that was

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reported to be 4 months in one case and 11 months in another when drought had already transformed into a disaster (food crisis) and therefore making DEWS not timely enough. The change in technology of data collection from use of questionnaires that are processed at the district level to use of Nokia mobile handsets for data entry in the field and transmission of data sets to the server has made data entry easy and spreads the workload thereby reducing inefficiencies related to having only one person responsible for data entry. This is because entries are made by every parish chief of data in 10 households per month in contrast to the DEWS District focal person entering data for all the parishes in each district that would have been 220 questionnaires in the case of Nakapiripirit District. Once the drought bulletin is produced, technical heads of department decide on the importance to disseminate warning messages to the population and guide them on how to save resources with various recommendations. This feedback is given to the communities in form of radio spot messages which can be as follows:

Plant crops early to benefit from early rains

Diversify and grow quick maturing crops

Use organic pesticides

Avoid misuse of food by using grains such as sorghum to brew local beer

Advice on how to build granary and store food

Improve water storage by use of pots

Take livestock for vaccination and spraying to prevent diseases

Report any suspected cases of livestock disease

Prepare hays for livestock to feed on during drought

Fetch water for human consumption from boreholes only, and use separate water points for animals and other household needs

The drama sensitizes the community on DEWS and advises them to listen to radio messages and its recommendations.

A number of problems constrain the Ugandan DEWS process. The first problem relates to the fact that DEWS is an unfunded priority that although integrated in the district plans has no resources to implement it. This makes it difficult to run DEWS activities. In the absence of a district official fully dedicated to disaster preparedness, appointment of existing officials to run DEWS can be controversial and may disrupt smooth running of activities. A related problem is that of motivating the district officials that work on the DEWS particularly the District DEWS focal person and parish chiefs. Although the DEWS focal person and the technical staff are paid when doing data analysis by the district, there is a feeling that some top-up allowance should be given on a monthly basis as they perceive it as an extra activity. Similarly the parish chiefs feel that they should also be paid for collection of data. In Kotido district there was a suggestion that the district should pay the parish chiefs some top-up allowance on a monthly basis for collecting data, but the district declined because the payment could not be sustained. Another problem is that sentinels may not systematically give reliable information. The information is therefore cross checked and approved by all district heads of departments before it is disseminated. This takes place through a monthly DEWS data analysis meeting, chaired by the District Early Warning Focal Person and attended by the main district heads of departments as mentioned earlier. Another problem is the difficulty in holding regular meetings by the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) responsible for dissemination of the DB and planning drought response. The DDMC composed of many stakeholders including district officials, NGOs, multilateral agencies was reported to have met only twice in the whole of 2011 in Kotido District.

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Despite these problems, however, the DEWS has been very useful in detecting emergencies that have been addressed based on evidence (for example: the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and the water crisis, in 2011 in Amudat district, South Karamoja). Secondly the communities have been able to respond to the messages by changing behaviour that may gradually build their capacity to respond to the effects of drought. The district officials and the community and other development partners have interests in DEWS. A district official indicated that with feedback the community has accepted to vaccinate and spray their livestock, improve water storage by use of pots and have learnt better hygiene and feeding among others. In addition, the Veterinary Officer of Kotido District revealed that DEWS has made their work easier when there is livestock disease outbreak by enabling them easily broadcast information to the community through radio spot messages. A focus group in Lokitelakwaibu parish in Kotido indicated that they have realized the benefits of preserving food for seasons when food is in short supply. In addition, through drama, they have realized the consequences of selling most of the food stock shortly after the harvest and not preserving enough until the next harvesting season. Similarly, a focus group discussion in Kalokwameri parish in Nabilatuk subcounty in Nakapiripirit district revealed that DEWS programme has taught them how to protect their animals from diseases and to save sorghum (by reducing its use for beer brewing) for use during times of food shortage. If the emerging problems are addressed, the DEWS will be strengthened to improve the ability of the community, government, NGOs and other stakeholders to effectively respond to the effects of drought.

4.1.2 Kenya DEWS

In Kenya, sentinel sites from where data is collected from districts are chosen according to livelihood zones. The livelihood zones include pastoral, agro-pastoral and mixed farming zones. The zones may vary from district to district. While West Pokot District has three zones namely pastoral, agro-pastoral and mixed farming zones, Samburu District (newly divided into Samburu Central, East and North districts that forms the newly created Samburu county) has pastoral and agro-pastoral zones. From each sentinel site, data is collected from 30 randomly sampled households by a field monitor or a sentinel who is usually a primary school teacher. The field monitor is a part time employee who works only during the period of data collection and is paid Kenya Shillings Four Thousand Five Hundred (approximately US $ 56) per data collection round . Each field monitor collects data from 30 households and 3 key informants from each sentinel site. Data collection takes 7 days. Data collected from households include demographic characteristics, livestock, income sources, sale of food, coping strategies and nutritional status. From the key informants data collected include rainfall, water resources and sources, forage, availability of cereals and legumes, prices of food commodities at market level, migration, human-wildlife conflict, security, human diseases, livestock diseases and relief items. A study of data collection instruments for key informants and households indicate that data is collected on only 17 indicators. Similarly, a scrutiny of the DB for both West Pokot and Samburu counties does not show evidence of reporting on 60 indicators as reported. The Data Analyst does spot check of field monitors as they gather data and collects completed questionnaire from each sentinel site, enters them in a computer programme, analyses and produces a draft DB. (NB: One ALRMP Office located in Samburu Central District also works in Samburu East and Samburu North districts all newly created that form Samburu County. There is only one Data Analyst for the 3 recently created districts that did not have separate ALRMP Offices by the time of the review. Although the Drought Bulletin is produced for all the 3 districts, it is entitled Samburu District Drought Monitoring Bulletin. To avoid confusion, this report adopts the title used in the Drought Bulletin namely Samburu District Drought Monitoring Bulletin. The Data Analyst verifies the DB in 3-5 households and disseminates to the stakeholders in the district before the 5th of the following month. The DB produced indicates one of the four warning stages in the district namely Normal, Alert, Alarm and Emergency. Normal stage is when stability (rainfall), availability (livestock/crop

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production), access (food/water) and utilization (nutrition) indicators show no unusual fluctuations and remain within the expected range for the time of the year. Alert stage is when stability indicators show unusual indicators outside expected seasonal ranges. This occurs within the whole district of localized areas/livelihood zone. Or asset levels are still too low to provide adequate subsistence levels and vulnerability to food insecurity is still high. Alarm stage is reached when stability and availability indicators (livestock/crop production) fluctuate outside expected seasonal ranges This condition affects the local economy affecting most parts of the district and directly or indirectly threatens the food security of vulnerable livelihood zones; Emergency stage is reached is when all indicators are outside of normal ranges and local production systems have collapsed. The draft DB is submitted to the Drought Management Officer who presents it to the District Steering Group (DSG) for approval and adoption. The DSG responds if it has capacity, otherwise the central government supports the DSG to implement the response. The DB is then submitted to the Project Coordinator at the Ministry Headquarters in Nairobi. The DB provides recommendations to the Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM) and District Steering Group (DSG). The KFSG has membership comprised of relevant line ministries of agriculture, livestock, water, health, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders. The DB does not provide recommendations on what the community should do. Instead, the KFSM and DSG plan action to be taken based on the recommendations. Several problems are experienced in implementing DEWS. The weakest aspect of the process is the fact that sometimes the field monitors make mistakes while collecting data. The second weakness that affects data collection is lack of consistency in data collected at household level due to the movement of households during drought period in search of water, grass or due to insecurity. Therefore it is sometimes not possible to collect data from a household consecutively for six months making it not possible to establish trends of conditions obtaining in the sentinels sites and district. This is common among households in rural areas, and less common in peri-urban households as they are more sedentary. For example there is more movement of households in households in Samburu North and less in Samburu Central districts in Northern Kenya. The third weakness of the DB is the subjectivity in assigning the states of normal, alert, alarm and emergency. The states are assigned by the DSG based on the current data but does not take into consideration the trends which could be retrieved from the existing baseline data. Recommendations in the DB are made by the Data Analyst in collaboration with the Drought Management Officer. If the DB revealed food shortage in a district, this is verified by the Kenya Food Security Working Group (KFSWG), a sub-committee of KFSM, by obtaining data from the ministries of Agriculture, Livestock; making consultations with the DSG and field visits. The KFSWG submits its report to the KFSM for final decision on the action to be taken. Attempts are being made to address this by development of Early Warning Phase Classification (EWPC) in which indicators will be reduced that will make it easier to make an accurate and objective states that may not be easily manipulated by politicians who influence the states and responses. The fourth weakness is that the decisions made of the warning levels are made late resulting in late response and not always appropriately resulting in under-resourced response mechanisms. Indeed the money that is allocated for a district to take action is sometimes limited. For instance, recently One Million Four Hundred thousand Kenya Shillings (KES 1,400,000) was provided to Samburu County for response. This amount was reported to be inadequate for emergency water trucking to communities. Moreover the time taken to verify the information can reduce the efficiency of the whole system. If livestock disease is revealed by the DB, recommendations are made to the District Veterinary Department to carry out further assessment to verify the existence of the disease. Similarly, food shortage identified by the DB is verified by the KFSWG by obtaining data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of

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Livestock Development, making consultations with the DSG and undertaking a field visit. This process although good as it enables response to be planned based on evidence; tends to delay response with potential serious implication for the affected community. For instance a disease affecting donkeys was identified in Wamba division in Samburu East district; due to slow response, however, all the donkeys in Sesia sub-location in Lodongokwe Location were decimated by the disease. This proves that a DB alone even if it is accurate does not necessarily lead to timely and appropriate decision making on the response to be implemented. In addition to the above internal weaknesses of the system, the quality of the response initiated by the system is hampered by external factors: The first one is the tendency to implement only immediate and temporary responses, while neglecting long term preparedness mechanisms which would enhance the resilience of the population and have lasting benefits for the pastoral communities. For instance, women respondents at household in both Samburu Central and Samburu East districts while appreciating the response overtime of the central government to drought, requested for a permanent solution to persistent water problem by providing permanent water sources. While households in Kirisia division in Samburu Central indicated that their source of water was a seasonal river flowing through a valley, households in Wamba division in Samburu East District said that their source of water is a solar driven borehole that does not function in the absence of sunshine. Households in both districts requested for permanent water sources. Another key factor that affects response to drought effects was found to be infrastructure. While the road from the Uganda border in Amudat District to Mukutano town in West Pokot District is in poor state having not been maintained by the time of the review, the road between Rumuruti town and Maralal Town in Samburu Central District is in a very poor condition, which can be shown by the fact that it takes 6 hours to cover 100 kilometers of marrum road most of which is large sharp stones, deep pot holes and broken bridges. The poor state of the infrastructure slows down transportation of emergency relief commodities and affects timely response. While it is passable during dry season taking 9 hours from Nairobi to Maralal a distance of 340 kilometres, the road is practically impassable during rainy season making emergency response to get food to the affected population during rainy season impossible.

A Samburu woman requesting the DEWS review team for a lift to take a very sick baby to a

health centre about 10 kilometers away along the road from Nyahururu Town (in Laikipia District) to Maralal Town (Samburu Central District). Public transport is very scarce along this extremely bad road constraining emergency drought response and access to social services.

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Regardless of its weaknesses, DEWS has been able to generate and disseminate data that informed response that has prevented drought from translating into famine saving millions of livestock and human beings from death. A focus group in Lodongokwe parish, Wamba division of Samburu East District indicated that through the information provided by the DEWS, government has supported the communities in accessing water and hay for livestock during drought periods, and restocking. Before the introduction of DEWS, when there was a drought, the communities would migrate to Marsabit and Isiolo to look for grass and water. If the programme is withdrawn it would be a challenge as it would be difficult to migrate due to insecurity arising from many groups with fire arms, lack of knowledge in de-stocking and marketing livestock To this extent therefore, DEWS can be said to be cost-effective and obtained value for money in terms of human lives that cannot be quantified in monetary terms.

5 Assessment of key elements in the DEWS

5.1 Relevance of indicators and data to drought and vulnerability monitoring While indicators such as rainfall, humidity and temperature may reveal the existence of drought and therefore relevant to drought monitoring, other indicators such as vegetation condition, crop condition, types of food eaten and level of livestock sales, among others need to be interpreted carefully as a condition may be caused by drought but also by other factors. For instance crop conditions may deteriorate due to water logging brought about by floods but not drought. In addition, while increased sale of livestock in one instance may be interpreted as increase in distress sales by households, it can also be due to need for cash to pay school fees or increased demand for livestock to satisfy new markets. In addition, the indicator types of food eaten should be interpreted with the knowledge of the context. While some household may eat a variety of food because of harvests time, other households that planted late may be facing food shortage because they have not yet harvested having planted late. Therefore, it is important to critically interpret the factors that are causing a condition. In addition, it is important to consider all the indicators together before drawing a conclusion on the state of the district in terms of normal, alert, alarm or emergency. Similarly, the knowledge of the political and socio-economic context is important to use of indicators to accurately monitor and predict drought. This means that indicators should be analyzed and interpreted by persons with good knowledge of their subject areas as well as socio-economic and political situation of the district.

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Goats grazing in a pastoral livelihood zone along the road to Maralal Town, Samburu Central

District, Northern Kenya

5.2 Reliability of data collected and its sources In Uganda there is an elaborate process from data collection to the production of the final Drought Bulletin. This process includes collection of data using well-designed and structured questionnaire by a trained person. Data is then entered into the Nokia Phone and sent to the District Early Warning Focal Person who organizes a meeting of heads of technical departments to analyse and then the DB is produced. DEWS has a data quality control system implemented by ACTED which consists of 1) households visits and cross checking if the information matches the one collected by the sentinel, 2) monitoring of sentinels especially because the Nokia phone shows where the data has been collected from by use of Global Positioning System (GPS) 3) One reliability assessment is done by collecting the same information from different households and checking if the conclusion were the same or not. It was reported that at the beginning the sentinels were sometimes collecting inaccurate data. For instance, the Water Department in Kotido District reported that in the process of data analysis, he discovered that the sentinel had recorded the source of water as water well or spring during the dry season which is not possible. With regular training of sentinels and reduction of indicators, the quality of data collected has improved. Given the rigorous process involved from data collection to analysis, it can be said that data is reliable. In Kenya, data collection process similarly goes through an elaborate process beginning from data collection from 30 household per sentinel site. The Data Analyst makes spot checks during data collection process. It is then verified by the Data Analyst after collection then it is analysed and a draft Drought Bulletin is produced. The Data Analyst analyses data but the assignment of the district state is done by the DSG that comprise all the district technical staff and other stakeholders working on drought and food security. In the meeting of the DSG, there is opportunity to cross-check or interpret data before it is approved and adopted. The DB is then submitted to ALRMP headquarters for further review and final approval. In some cases when the DB reveals an emergency such as livestock disease, recommendations are made to the Veterinary Department to verify it. Through this process, the data is cross-checked, validated and refined. To this extent therefore, it can be said that data is reliable.

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A Household in a sentinel site where DEWS data is collected located in Agroc-pastoral Livelhood zone in Kirisia Division, about 20 kilometres from Maralal Town, Samburu Central

District, Northern Kenya

There are however factors that make data unreliable. While the raw data is generally reliable enough it may be subjected to manipulation by politicians who influence its analysis for political gain. This means that the final recommendations and analysis may not be reliable. Secondly, some field monitors may not collect accurate data due to low levels of education. Thirdly, because of the mobility of pastoral communities in search of water, grass or due to insecurity data collected from a particular district may not be consistent over time.

5.3 Efficiency, coverage, representation of data and dissemination systems In Uganda, initially data collection was conducted by use of questionnaires that would be delivered to the focal person for entry and analysis; after which a DB would be produced. But with the introduction of NDG, it has become easier and faster to collect data and transmit from the field to the server and from the server to the focal persons who would download it for analysis. Currently therefore data collection and transmission is efficient. When a DB is produced, messages are extracted and disseminated to the local communities through radio spot messages. Although dissemination through radio may be efficient, it is not fully effective as most community members do not have radio receivers as revealed by focus groups conducted in the districts of Nakapiripirit and Kotido. It was pointed out that community members without radios get messages by listening to radios of members of the communities or those with radios can relay the messages, but there is no guarantee that most community members would listen to radios of other members or that members with radios would transmit radio messages that they have heard. Drama was reported to be a means of educating communities on general risk reduction strategies and by advising communities to listen to radio spot messages and its recommendations. Their limitations lie in the fact that communities in distant settlements may not attend drama. The use of SMS for dissemination of warning messages as planned by ACTED is a good option but this also depends on the accessibility of mobile phones by the communities.

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The Drought Bulletin is produced for the whole district. It would also be necessary to report on a parish and this requires data that can be generalized to the whole parish. In Uganda, data from 10 households may not be generalized to the whole parish as statistically a minimum sample of 30 elements is required to enable the findings to be generalized to the whole population. While the data collected in a whole district could be representative of the district state, findings from 10 households may not be representative of the parish. In Kenya, 300 completed questionnaires are collected by the Data Analyst, entered into a software and analysed and is therefore less efficient than the process in Uganda. Data however, can be generalized to the sentinel site (30 households) and district (300 households) and is representative. Data is disseminated to the DSG and KFSM through the Drought Bulletin but it is not disseminated to the communities, the main beneficiaries of DEWS.

5.4 Commitment and involvement of local authorities in implementation In Uganda, the local authorities have assigned their staff to undertake DEWS activities. The parish chiefs collect data from households at parish level, the district focal persons coordinate data analysis in a meeting with the district heads of departments called by the Chief Administrative Officer and the district EW focal person produces the DB. Based on the DB messages are written by the district heads of departments and disseminated as radio spot messages. If DB reveals the need for response, the District Local Government in collaboration with development partners uses its staff and funds to respond. In terms of involvement therefore the local authorities are fully involved in the process and they have taken it over as theirs. There is however still an attitude among the district staff that DEWS is an added responsibility that puts an extra load on them causing them to request for some additional monthly pay on top of their salaries. While may be an added responsibility to the District Focal Person DEWS given that he or she coordinates other departments, DEWS is not an added responsibility to other heads of departments. The demoralization that results from lack of top-up of the focal persons and other staff lowers their level of commitment. In addition, sometimes, the district authorities may not release money to implement DEWS activities. This also demonstrates reduced commitment in regards to allocation of funds to DEWS activity. In Kenya the District Steering Group (DSG) comprises all government departments, local council representatives, Members of Parliament, women representatives, NGOs, CBOs, religious organizations, community leaders, representatives of marginalized groups, research institutions and regional development authorities. The DSG undertakes many activities the key ones of which include:

Approve and adopt drought bulletins

Conduct rapid assessment, plan and coordinate drought responses

Send appeals during drought emergencies

Develop Annual Work Plans for the district level activities including funds under district service allocation

Operationalize the Annual work plans, Contingency Fund, District Service Fund and Community Driven Development

Approve/differ proposals in order to harmonise activities and programmes/projects in the districts

Resolve and conflicts that may emerge within/between communities, various stakeholders and cross-border communities

Plan with line ministries and jointly implement programme and activities

Mobilize resources for the district

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Given this long list of activities, it is clear that the district authority is fully involved in the DEWS activities in addition to other activities such as Natural Resources Management and Community Development. The DSG is a sub-committee of District Development Committee. Given that their mandate is planning and implementing drought response and development in general, it can be said they are involved and committed. Their commitment however can be reduced by limited funds available to undertake DEWS activities. In addition, the DSG is composed of many members who may have conflicting interests, and this tends to reduce their commitment to the DEWS objectives.

5.5 Cost-effectiveness of the DEWS The DEWS in Uganda is largely implemented by the district local government with support from ACTED and not a separate structure like in Kenya where DEWS has been largely implemented by Arid Lands Resources Management Project located within a separate Ministry of the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands parallel to other ministries. In Uganda, the resources put in include the district staff, NDG, stationery, vehicles and drugs for response. ACTED provides support in the provision of data entry software and the funding of spot messages. The benefits include reducing loss of livestock, livelihoods and human life which may not be quantified. DEWS attains its objectives with minimum resources and is therefore cost-effective. In Kenya, the social, economic and environmental cost of drought relief in forms of food and water is high. Massive resources both logistical and financial are required to prevent the loss of human life. Emergency response largely dependent upon bilateral donors and international organisations while effective in achieving their objective of reducing loss of livestock resources and human life often lead to dependency while contributing little to the sustainability of pastoral livelihoods. The DEWS has been implemented by Arid Lands Resources Management Project, a structure parallel to the district local authorities. Although a separate structure may make the Kenyan DEWS effective in the sense that they are focused, it is more costly and therefore its cost effectiveness could be improved.

5.6 Opportunities for both systems to use new technologies Technology makes DEWS work easier and quicker as evidenced by the introduction of Nokia phone in Uganda for field data entry, data processing and preliminary analysis. Both systems use computer software for data analysis. There are possibilities of using new technologies such as satellite imaging for capturing conditions of vegetation, crops conditions and water availability and SMS for delivery of warning messages. In Kenya, there is interest in using technology like the NDG that makes data entry and transmission easier. The main constraint however is the high cost implication given the large area in which DEWS is being implemented. Both systems would benefit from adding new technologies for collection and analysis of data and dissemination of early warning messages. New technologies would make data collection and analysis faster and dissemination of warning messages done early before the onset of drought enabling the community, government and other stakeholders to take action before the occurrence of drought averting its negative impacts. New technologies that can be used are satellite to collect data. The benefit of using satellite technology is its capacity to cover a large area within a short time but what is required is the training of personnel to accurately interpret the images taken. For example Rainfall Estimate (RFE) and Natural Deviation Vegetation Index (NDVI) are in use in Kenya and results show that it provides accurate data for the DB analysis. The use of SMS to disseminate warning message to the communities at risk is also a good option as it reaches a larger audience than radio. It is currently not in use in any of the

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reviewed system though it would effectively complement the existing means of communication if arrangements are made to provide some mobile phones for key community leaders.

5.7 Ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages Drought Bulletins of 2 districts in Uganda (Nakapiripirit and Kotido) and 2 counties in Kenya (Samburu and West Pokot) were studied to assess the extent to which they were able to issue accurate warning messages. As a good comparator, DBs for January to December 2011 for both systems were reviewed.

5.7.1 Uganda

In Nakapiripirit District, warnings that poor livestock body condition can be attributed to outbreaks of various suspected livestock diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) and CBPP (in addition to the competition for water and pasture by the native pastoral communities and Kenyan immigrants) issued in the Drought Bulletin of February 2011 of Nakapiripirit District was accurate and timely as by March 2011 livestock disease remained a challenge across the two districts of Nakapiripirit and Amudat as reported in the Drought Bulletin of March 2011 although it had subsided in areas where it was reported in February, 2011. In contrast, the seasonal forecast by the Meteorological Department issued in the Drought Bulletin of February that La Nina was most likely to affect the Karamoja region by making the usual rainy season of March/May be normal to below average rainfall leading to a water crisis was not accurate. This was because in March 2011 the following month, there was heavy rain that continued to April, through May and June 2011 resulting in the improved quantity and quality of pastures and water relieving of animals of long distances walked in search of pasture and improvement body conditions and decline in calf mortality. In October 2011, while the rains continued to be normal with decline in the amount as predicted in September 2011, the prediction in November 2011 that in December 2011 rain will be normal to above normal was not realized as on the contrary minimal rains were received in December, 2011 indicating dry season. In Kotido District, despite the prediction that the March to May rains would delay due to the effects of La Nina in the region, 106.9 mm of rains were received in March 2011 compared to 3.6 mm in February 2011 again indicating the inaccuracy of forecast. This resulted in the availability and accessibility of water and pasture for livestock and improvement in livestock body conditions and reduction in calf mortality. Despite the reduction of rain in April 2011, it increased in May 2011 leading to abundance of water and pasture for livestock. Despite the prediction that the July to September 2011 will show above to near normal rainfall the DB for July 2011 reported that rainfall received in July was below normal revealing inaccuracy in the prediction. This however did not reduce the amount of water and pasture available for livestock reducing calf mortality and time spent to access grazing land.

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A Water Pond a source of water for livestock on Kotido-Losilang road, Kotido District.

The fact that there was no warning on drought in February, 2011 was relevant as heavy rains were received in March contrary to the prediction of Meteorological Department that the seasonal rains of March/May would delay. Interviews with some persons from Karamoja region indicate that there were heavy rains in the region for most of 2011 with some short dry spells and reduced rainfall in some months as the DB for the two districts also show. Based on the above evidence, it can be concluded that the capacity of the Warning System to issue accurate warning is limited regardless of the quality control measure put in place to make the data reliable. This is because data collection and analysis is based on the district rather than on livelihood zones. Given the limitation of the current Drought Bulletin in issuing accurate warning, attempt is being made to increase the accuracy of the Warning System through an initiative called Drought Early Warning Phase Classification (DEWPC). This initiative may increase the accuracy of Early Warning System. DEWPC is a methodology which guides district officials on how to analyze data and identify warning stages per livelihood zone rather than districts. The livelihood zone is further subdivided into sectors. Data is collected from each sector in a livelihood zone and a warning stage is reported per livelihood zone. For instance, in agro-pastoral livelihood zone data is collected on crops and livestock and even if rainfall is normal resulting in healthy growing of crops, there can be livestock disease affecting the livestock sector, while Normal stage is issued for the crop sector, Alert is issued for the livestock sector within the agro-pastoral zone. The level at which the situation of one sector influences the general conclusion and the identification of warning stage depends on the livelihood zone. Therefore the conclusion may differ from one livelihood zone to another. This explains why the methodology is based on a livelihood zone approach rather than a district which is based on an administrative boundary. By sub-dividing the livelihood zones into sectors, collecting and analyzing data and giving warning stage by livelihood zone, the accuracy of the Warning System will be improved. It should be noted that this work is still ongoing and will be finalized in 2012.

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5.7.2 Kenya

In Kenya the Drought Bulletins of West Pokot gave the warning of Alert from February to April 2011 and Normal from May to December, 2011. This was influenced by rainfall which was below normal up to August 2011 when above normal rainfall was received. The below normal rainfall resulted in increased distance travelled to water sources for livestock and human consumption, reduced quantity and poor quality of pasture and poor livestock body conditions. The above normal rainfall reversed the negative trend by reducing distance to water, improvement in the quantity and quality of pasture and livestock body conditions. Response included provision of supplementary feeding to needy and vulnerable children most of the months of year 2011. While some other reports warn of progression of drought in West Pokot, there was no warning issued on drought except the DB of February 2011 that recommended close monitoring and assessment of drought situation. In Samburu District, the Drought Bulletin gave the warning of Alert throughout 2011 from January 2011 to November 2011 in Pastoral zone and Normal to Alert in agro-pastoral zone. This may have been influenced by the rainfall that was less than long term averages up to May 2011, resulting in increase in distance to water sources, but changed to greater than long term averages from June to November 2011 reducing distances to water sources. Throughout this period livestock body condition ranged from fair to good. In addition, supplementary feeding was provided to children below 5 years and lactating mothers was provided throughout the year; relief food was provided in some months and water was trucked to the needy for most of the year. There was, however, no explicit and specific warning on the onset of drought even when the responses indicate that the drought was already having affect on food security. In fact, the Government declared in May 2011 a national drought emergency mandating the Ministry of Special Programmes to urgently distribute food and relief supplies to a targeted 1.7 million people per month in northern and eastern Kenya and yet the Drought Bulletin did not give a specific warning on drought and its effects.. Even if West Pokot and Samburu were not as affected by the 2011 drought as other districts like Isiolo, Moyale, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, River Tana among others districts in northern and eastern Kenya, other reports warned of a progression to drought in both Pokot and Samburu . In addition, the Nutrition Cluster reported Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates above the UN WHO emergency threshold of 15% in Samburu and Kajiado district, Rift Valley Province; Isiolo, Makueni and Marsabit districts, Eastern Province and Wajir District, North-eastern Province (USAID, 2011). From the Drought Bulletin, it is not clear what the Alert warning refer to but can only be guessed by the reader. The Drought Bulletin does not state specifically and explicitly what the warning of Alert stage refers to. Therefore the ability of the DB and therefore the System to issue clear and accurate warning spelling out the factors that the warning is based to enable response by the government, community and other stakeholders is limited.. In Kenya, it was reported that the DEWPC is being developed with fewer indicators to ensure that the warning is more objective explicitly and specifically and linked to factors on which it is based. In addition, DEWPC will reduce manipulation of recommendations in the Drought Bulletin by politicians..

5.8 The capacity of the community at risk to take action for effective response In Uganda, the community in Karamoja region reported taking action either to mitigate the effects of looming drought by planting crops early to benefit from early rains, avoid misuse of food, storing of food when dry to be used when there is shortage of food, take livestock for vaccination and spraying to prevent diseases, improve water sources to prevent water-borne diseases, improve personal and home hygiene to prevent diseases, and improve feeding and nutrition. Communities however demanded for support to undertake some of these activities.

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They indicated that messages on early planting are good but they need to be provided seeds to plant in time. The message also tells them to plant trees, but they are not able to buy seedlings for planting and so they require support. Therefore while the community may take actions like economic use of food by reducing brewing of alcoholic drinks and sale of food, storage of food, taking livestock for vaccination and improving personal hygiene, some of them may not be able to procure seeds for early planting. The fact that the communities are increasingly aware of the system and respond to the radio messages is evidence that these messages help them build their resilience. They have however limited capacity to implement mitigation measures like the construction of valley tanks or water pans and maintenance of roads. In Kenya the districts and central government provide emergency food, water, vaccination and treatment of livestock as well as mitigation actions like de-stocking, construction of dams and water pans. This has created a dependency syndrome in the community to the extent that they feel they have no capacity to undertake both emergency and mitigation responses. Therefore it is of high importance that governmental institutions and development partners put constant effort in implementing long term measures outside emergencies but also in time of response in order to develop the capacity of the communities to develop their own response mechanisms and reduce their dependency to direct provision of food and water. An example of a good practice that builds the resilience of vulnerable pastoralist and farmers to drought is the development of local institutions such as Community Drought Management Committees (CDMCs) and Agro-Pastoral Field Schools (APFS) using Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy. In Uganda, CDMCs are trained by ACTED in collaboration with the local governments to analyze hazards, plan and implement micro-projects that increase their resilience to drought. The CDMC plans and mobilizes communities to implement interventions that strengthen their capacity to withstand drought including for instance the rearing of drought resistant livestock such as camels and improved goats. The APFS approach is used where farmers come and learn, from practical evidences, best practices that improve livestock and crop production. Each session is facilitated by local government technical staff and local expert from within the community. This initiative is being implemented with support from ACTED in West Pokot in Kenya and Amudat and Nakapiripirit in Uganda. It promotes effective resources management to improve food security and quality of life among communities. In addition, even though the communities and Local Governments have little means to build the resilience of vulnerable community members, NGOs/development partners have more means and the existence of the Drought Bulletins helps them to better target their interventions and tailor them to the needs of the population. For example UNICEF used the Drought Bulletin to address the problem of nutrition in Amudat, Similarly the URCS used the Drought Bulletin to improve their community based early warning programme in Kotido. Assessing the extent to which DEWS enables the local communities to change their way to address drought and initiate response measures using their own means is a concern of several other projects and would require a comprehensive KAP survey.

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Women fetching water from a borehole in Nabilatuk Town, the main source of water for

households during dry season in Nakapiripirit District

6 Strengths and Weaknesses

6.1 Uganda 6.1.1 Strengths

1. The use of Nokia Data Gathering (NDG) phone currently to collect, enter and preliminary analysis of data collection and entry easier than the previous situation when data was collected, brought to the DEWS District Focal Person who enters data and submits it to the district technical team for analysis, interpretation and production of a Drought Bulletin.

2. Verification of data is undertaken by on spot visits and use of GPS to ensure that data is actually being collected and from the sampled households.

3. Decision making is faster because of decentralized governance which allows the district to plan response if the DB reveals an emergency situation such as animal disease if the districts have adequate funds.

4. Joint data analysis and interpretation enables a better DB to be produced as it allows technical validation of data by the relevant technical personnel thereby improving the accuracy of the DB and its prediction power.

5. Dissemination of DB through drama and spot messages. Messages conveyed through drama have stimulated the interest of the community in the DEWS process. Spot messages would also reach most people if not constrained by limited ownership of radios by community members

6. The information in the DB is very useful to government and development partners in planning their activities

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7. There is growing feeling of ownership of the DEWS process from the district to national level because of awareness that ACTED will not provide technical and financial support indefinitely.

8. The communities are willing to participate in the DEWS as they have experienced the value of spot messages by making them adopt behaviour that increase their resilience to drought such as reduction in

9. The commitment of ACTED to the DEWS process exhibited by the staff at the district and national level. In addition, there is a willingness to provide support when requested by the districts.

10. The plan to integrate DEWS within the national structure. In the plan the Chief Administrative Officer shall send the DB to the line ministries comprising the ministries of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF), Water and Environment, and Health for review and comment. The Office of the Prime Minister Focal Person shall follow with line ministries that reviews are being done, compile all comments and edits the final version of the Drought Bulletin and send it to the Chief Administrative Officers, line ministries and Focal Persons for UN agencies and NGOs and partners in Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia for dissemination.

6.1.2 Weaknesses 1. The feeling among the district officials involved in the DEWS process that it is an

added responsibility even when the Project is supporting them in doing their work better does work well is not a good indicator for efficient and effective DEWS. It should be noted that local governments have their own challenges and that this should be taken into account in the design of future DEWS. Based on the interface with district staff involved in DEWS from the parish chief up to the DEWS district focal person, it is evident that to some extent they are demoralized hence slowing up the process requiring a review of the incentive framework and also the memorandum of commitment by the local government authority to the DEWS.

2. Despite the fact that the Project is part of a concerted effort to build drought resilience to the communities, the efficiency of the developmental and preparedness interventions is limited and this hampers the efficiency of the DEWS. Indeed when recommendations are given to the communities on how to prepare to an imminent drought, their limited means reduce their capacity to implement the recommendations, and this discourages them from acting upon the warning messages.

3. The community should be referred to the relevant government ministries or projects and development partners to address their needs for agricultural inputs among others.

4. Feedback to the community using the media of spot messages and drama though appropriate may not be effective. This is because very few members of the community have radio receivers and some distant communities may not attend drama.

6.2 Kenya 6.2.1 Strengths

1. The DEWS is a coordinated response from data collection, analysis, dissemination and action to address the issues identified.

2. The staff working on DEWS from the sentinel site to the national level has extensive experience that can enable DEWS to be made sustainable

3. The system generates early warning information collected from the grassroots sentinel sites.

4. Spot checking of sentinel by Data Analyst in the process of data collection is a good practice to ensure that data for the month are actually being collected and correct mistakes being made before the process of data collection is complete

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5. Similarly the verification of data by the Data Analysts by conducting interviews in 3-5 households is a strength as it validates data before analysis and improves its accuracy

6. There is an adequate amount of data generated from all the sectors gathered over a long period of time including crop, livestock, water, food security, nutrition, security among others that can be used by other stakeholders.

7. There is high level commitment of government, stakeholders and development to the Project as the livelihoods of 40% of the population depend on it.

8. The transformation of ALRMP into Drought Management Authority that is expected to has the space to function autonomously with its own budget, does its own recruitment, mobilizes its resources and makes decision for rapid and effective drought response.

6.2.2 Weaknesses

1. The decision on whether the state of the district is normal, alert, alarm or emergency is subjective and the warning stage does not spell out the factors on which it is based. This is being addressed by the development of Early Warning Phase Classification which involved the reduction of indicators enabling it to be used to make accurate and objective decision on the status of the district.

2. Data Analysis undertaken by Data Analyst who may not be qualified in all the sectors from which data is collected.

3. The Drought Bulletin is not disseminated to the community as overwhelmingly testified by household respondents and participants of focus group discussion. The Drought Bulletins are given to the Field Monitors who hands them over to the local councillors and chiefs who are expected to disseminate the results to the community but there was no indication that they do. In addition, Field monitors sometime get opportunity to present the results in the Drought Bulletin to the a meeting of 4 elders that take place every week and the latter are expected to transmit the information to the community but there was no indication that they do.

4. Actions are planned and implemented by the district or central government without prior information to the community. For instance communities interviewed revealed that sometimes relief food items are brought for distribution to communities requiring food but some members of the community are not informed.

5. Sometimes there are long delays in taking action even when the DB reveals an emergency requiring emergency action. For instance in Samburu Central, the time between warning and action took eleven months by the central government.

6. The money allocated to the district for response is limited. For instance an allocation of 1.4 million shillings for six months is not adequate to truck water to the community that needs it in Samburu county

7. The existence of many stakeholders at both national and district level causes inertia that slows response as every stakeholder would want to be involved in decision making and in the process interests may conflict which may take time to harmonize

8. Given the area that the ALRMP deals with that is 80% of the country inhabited by 40% of the population, when the DB identifies a crisis or an emergency that covers a large area, funds may not be adequate to address the problem. In addition, undertaking projects to mitigate the effects of drought and building the capacity of the local community to be effectively resilient to the effects of drought in this vast territory takes vast sums of money and time.

9. Consultations revealed that politicians adjust the DB to suit the interests of their constituencies and ultimately their interests. It was reported that the status of districts in DB are sometimes changed to reflect alert, alarm or an emergency in order to increase emergency support or mitigation action, and get support from their communities.

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7 Lessons learnt

7.1 Lessons Uganda’s can learn from Kenya DEWS 1. Considering the difference of context in the 2 countries and the relative importance

of drought as compared to other disasters in other part of the country (outside Karamoja and the cattle corridor), the DEWS in Uganda would benefit from the existence of Disaster Management Officer at district level who, among other responsibilities, would be in charge of the running of the DEWS.

2. The commitment of the Government, other stakeholders and development partners to DEWS that enables their active participation and allocation of adequate resources.

3. The building of the resilience of local communities to drought and other hazards strengthens their capacity to mitigate its effects rather than emergency response that create dependency of communities on government. The fact that the DEWS in Kenya is part of a larger project (ALRMP) including providing support to the communities to enhance their ability to manage their natural resources and reduce their vulnerability to drought is an example to follow since it potentially increase the efficiency of the DEWS.

7.2 Lessons Kenya can learn from Uganda DEWS 1. The use of more cost-effective technology that is the Nokia Data Gathering

(NDG) for data collection and preliminary analysis 2. Fewer number of indicators that are easier to collect, enter and analyse and

enhances the predictive power of the Drought Bulletin 3. A structure that gives more responsibility for DEWS to the district level that

enables a timely, faster and cost-effective response 4. Timely dissemination of warning messages in the local language that can be

easily implemented by community. 5. Dissemination of messages aimed at making the community more resilient to

drought in a language the community can understand and through the media of drama that attracts and sustains community interests

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8 Conclusion and recommendations

8.1 Conclusion As mentioned above, it is the full integration of the DEWS elements that enables reduction of the risk from serious imbalances that endanger livelihoods, human health, livestock and environmental health to sustainable management. As they stand now, both systems still require work on full integration. For instance, both appear to have credible and much needed advance information on drought risk but are unable to effectively translate this into timely response especially on the part of the duty bearers i.e. the governments. They continually have to rely on scattered response efforts of non-state actors whose reach is limited in addition to emphasis on relief and limited building of the resilience of communities.

8.2 Recommendations 8.2.1 Recommendations for Uganda DEWS

1. Full integration of the DEWS into Disaster Management Policy to ensure inclusion of the DEWS into development plans and budgets at both national and local levels and to facilitate government ownership. In addition to this, a functioning DEWS, regular update of the contingency planning and availability of contingency funds should be part of the indicators on which the departments of the local government are evaluated by the line ministries.

2. DEWS structures and processes at both local and national levels should be designed

in such a manner that avoids inertia that is common in highly bureaucratic structures.

3. Decentralization of adequate funds from the centre to the district level would enable the local authorities to take quick action in response to emergency of mitigation measures against drought, floods and related hazards.

4. As a result of integration in the national budget, subventions to local governments

would enable timely response to emergencies and mitigation of related catastrophes. By implication, disaster preparedness would cease to be an un-funded priority thereby enabling local governments to respond to emergencies.

5. Implementation of DEWS will benefit most from directly linked structures and

processes between national and local levels. As such, DEWS should be designed in such a manner that provides for unencumbered communication, technical/logistical support and supervision.

6. It is the considered view of the team that DEWS should have a component of

development support to build the resilience of communities as is the case in ARLRMP. Development of the resilience of the community to drought and other related hazards would reduce the dependency of communities on aid from government and other development partners’ overtime while enhancing economic development.

7. There is a need for coordination of support efforts to communities especially among non-state actors. As such, DEWS should have in-built in its local level response systems the ability of local governments to coordinate responses.

8.2.2 Recommendations for Kenya DEWS

1. The creation of Drought Management Authority is an innovative decision as it gives it autonomy in the budget and decision unhampered by the government bureaucracy.

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Guidelines should however be developed to ensure that the many interest groups do not constrain its capacity for planning and implementing drought response.

2. Decentralization of decision making and resources to the counties and districts would

facilitate rapid early warning and timely and effective drought response

3. Regular capacity building of personnel and structures working on DEWS from the centre, district and local community levels would enhance their ability to collect and analyse data and generate Drought Bulletins, disseminate warning messages and response

4. Development of the resilience of the community to drought and other related hazards

would gradually reduce the dependency of communities on aid from government and other development partners but strengthen their capacity to mitigate the effects of drought on their own with minimum support. The government however should continue to provide enabling conditions that communities have no capacity to provide such as improvement of infrastructure like roads, water, education and health services and provide security to enable the communities undertake mitigation and development activities. The expression of the need by the community in Samburu East District to be introduced to livestock markets in Nairobi to get better prices for their products is an opportunity to strengthen capacity of the community to drive their own development which can be capitalized by the Drought Management Authority.

5. Upgrading technologies for data gathering and analysis would quicken the DEWS

process and enable timely and accurate dissemination of drought early warning messages.

6. A strategy should be developed to prevent politicians and other stakeholders from

modifying data to suit their interests. 8.2.3 Recommendations for both Uganda and Kenya

1. Listening to unique needs – communities across vast geographical areas have unique

needs especially in response to hazard risk. In many instances local knowledge may

point DEWS in the right direction of establishment and operation. It is imperative that

DEWS recognises this and works to respond appropriately.

2. Safeguarding quality – the quality of DEWS is engendered in systematic and reliable

data collection, effective early warning services, timely and usable dissemination

information as well as sound national and local capability to respond. DEWS

components should thus have equal support emphasis/focus to enhance effectiveness

and quality.

3. Clarity of roles and responsibilities – there has to be a thorough description of roles

and responsibilities of individuals and organisations across the DEWS structures in

relation to identifying and preventing serious failure – looking at both the systems and

processes being used and the values and behaviours that need to be exhibited in

order to ensure an effective early warning system

4. Practical arrangement for delivery – in addition to ensuring an environment that

facilitates effective response, DEWS must include multiple responses to ensure that

each level/organisation understands where it fits and what accountability it has.

5. Impact assessment - a survey to assess the effects of DEWS on the knowledge,

attitude and practice of the communities and evaluate to what extent the two systems

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build the capacity of the communities to respond to the effects of drought should be

carried out to complete the analysis made in this report.

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References

1. ACTED, Dan Church Aid and Save the Children, Minutes of National Drought Early Warning, Entebbe 23-24, November, 2011

2. Glantz M.H., (2003) Usable Science: Early warning systems: Do’s and Don’ts. Report

of workshop, 20-23 October, Shangai

3. ISDR and Germany Federal Foreign Office (2006) EWC III The Third International

Conference on Early Warning; From Concept to Action, Bonn

4. Kotido District Drought Bulletins, January-December, 2011

5. Nakapiripirit District, Drought Bulletins, January-December, 2011

6. Office of the Prime Minister (2009) Capacity Building Manual for District Steering Groups, Nairobi

7. Quansah, E. Joseph Bernard Engel, and Gilbert L. Rochon (2010) Early Warning

Systems: A Review, IAPWS/USGS National Wetland Research Center, Purdue

University

8. Report on the Exchange Learning Visit to Arid Lands Resources Management Project, Nakuru, Kenya

9. Samburu District, Drought Bulletins for Samburu District, January-December, 2011

10. Swift Jeremy, Barton David and Morton John, Drought Management for Pastoral Livelihoods: Policy Guidelines for Kenya

11. UNISDR (2006) International Strategy for Disaster Reduction: Platform for the

Promotion of Early Warning

12. USAID (2011), Kenya Drought Fact Sheet 2

13. West Pokot District, Drought Bulletins for West Pokot District, January-December, 2011

ACTED UGANDA Country Office – Plot 100, Kira Road, Bukoto, Kampala, Uganda Phone +256 41 4340489 Email [email protected] Website www.acted.org

Annex 1 Assessment of elements of DEWS in Kenya and Uganda

KENYA UGANDA

Relevance of indicators and data to drought and vulnerability monitoring

Indicators are relevant but should be interpreted together but not individually as an indicator as a condition may be caused by drought but also by other factors. It is also important to consider the socio-economic and political context of the district

Indicators are relevant but should be interpreted together but not individually as an indicator as a condition may be caused by drought but also by other factors. It is also important to consider the socio-economic and political context of the district

Reliability of data collected and its sources

Quality control system put in place at data collection ensures reliability of data. The elements include on-spot check of field monitor during data collection, verification of data by collecting information from 3-5 households and comparing it with the one collected by the sentinel and assigning of states by the DSC that include all technical departments, rapid assessment of information by Kenya Food Security Working Group (KFSWG) by getting data from relevant sectors, consultations with DSC and field visit, While the raw data is reliable, it may be sometimes subjected to manipulation by politicians who influence its analysis for political gain. This means that the final recommendations and analysis may not be reliable.

Quality control system put in place during data collection enhances its reliability. The elements of quality control includes well designed questionnaire administered by a trained person; monitoring sentinels using GPS, household visits to cross-check if information matches the one collected, verification of data during analysis by technical district heads of department, field visit by the relevant department to confirm data collected.

Efficiency, coverage and representation of data and dissemination systems

Data is personally collected by the Data Analyst from every sentinel site, entered into a software and analysed and is therefore less efficient as data from 300 questionnaires have to be collected from the field and entered. Data can be generalized to the sentinel site and district and is representative. Data is disseminated to the DSC and KFSM through the Drought Bulletin but it is not disseminated to the communities, the beneficiaries of DEWS.

With use of NDG data entry is easier, faster and efficient as data is collected from 10 households and entered by the parish chilled every month and transmitted online to the District DEWS Focal Person via the server for analysis by the District Heads of Department. Data is representative of the district as the households is over a threshold beyond which data can be generalized to the district. Data may however not be generalized to a parish because the number of 10 households is below the statistically required number of 30. Data is dissemination to district, OPM, sector ministries, development partners through the DB and to the community through radio spot messages and drama. Dissemination system to the community by use of spot messages is efficient as it can reach a wider audience instantaneously but constraints include lack of radio receivers among communities. Drama is also efficient as the cost incurred is minimum constrained only by lack of attendance by communities in distant settlements.

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Involvement and Commitment of local authorities in implementation

The DSG is involved in the implementation of DEWS as it approves and adopt drought bulletins and conduct rapid assessment, plan and coordinate drought responses.

The district is fully involved in DEWS as most activities from data collection, analysis, production of DB and dissemination and response are done by the district. ACTED provides support only where the district may not have the capacity and means to implement. The district is also committed as it assign its staff and allocates it

Cost-effectiveness of DEWS

DEWS is implemented by a structure parallel to local government structures and though effective may be more costly and therefore less efficient.

DEWS is implemented by already an existing structure therefore less costly and more efficient may be less effective.

Opportunities for both systems to use new technologies

The need for use of new technology was expressed to facilitate faster field data entry and transmission, but it is constrained by the high cost implication of the technology as the ASAL is 80% of the country. Some data in the DB is collected by satellite systems funded by donors which shows that the opportunity for use of new technology options is there but only constrained by lack of funds.

The use of NDG makes data entry and transmission faster and production of DB timely. There is opportunity to use of satellite technology for data collection only limited by funding.

Ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages

The ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages is limited by lack of objective criteria to assign warning stages and manipulation by politicians.

The ability of the system to issue accurate warning messages is limited by data collection and reporting based on district rather than livelihood zones

The capacity of the community at risk to make effective response

The community are able to take some drought response actions like treatment of livestock diseases, de-warming of livestock using locally produced salt, contribution to purchase of drought resistant animals like camels and goats, and preserving of grass to be used by livestock during drought seasons. They are however unable to construct boreholes, water dams and pans. The fact that the communities are increasingly aware of the system and respond to the radio messages is evidence that these messages help them build their resilience. They have however limited capacity to implement mitigation activities such as the construction of valley tanks or water pans and maintenance of roads. Stakeholders are supporting the development of local institutions like the CDMC and APFS that strengthen the resilience of communities to drought.

The community are able to take actions within their capacity such as early planting of crops, reduction in sale of crops and brewing of local drinks, reporting any livestock disease outbreak, maintaining good personal and home hygiene and improving nutrition. Some community members may not have the capacity to take some apparently simple actions like planting crops early due to lack of affordability of seeds or treat livestock because of lack of drugs. The fact that the communities are increasingly aware of the system and respond to the radio messages is evidence that these messages help them build their resilience. They have however limited capacity to implement mitigation activities such as the construction of valley tanks or water pans and maintenance of roads. Stakeholders are supporting the development of local institutions like the CDMC and APFS that strengthen the resilience of communities

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to drought.

Annex 2 Kenya DEWS Management Structure

Minister of State for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands

Permanent Secretary

National Project Coordinator

Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSM)

Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG)

District Steering Group

Drought Management Officers

Community

Data Analysts

Field Monitor

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Annex 3 Uganda DEWS Management Structure

Office of Prime Minister

Sector Ministries

District Disaster Management Committee

Chief Administrative Officer

District Heads of Department

DEWS District Focal Person

Parish Chiefs

Community

ACTED

ACTED

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Annex 4 List of Key Informants Interviewed

NAME TITLE DISTRICT COUNTRY 1. Dorothy Titin D/District Focal Person DEWS Kotido Uganda 2. Christine Lokiru District Focal Person, DEWS Kotido Uganda 3. Robert K. Okuda Agriculture Officer Kotido Uganda 4. Brandonel Achilla Veterinary Officer Kotido Uganda 5. John Paul Kedi District Water Officer Kotido Uganda 6. Emmanuel Oding District Focal Person Nakapiripirit Uganda 7. Dominique Aliat Parish Chief, Kamor Parish Kotido Uganda 8. Picho Okello Parish Chief, Lokitelakwaibu Kotido Uganda 9. Amer Lupelecimoi Kraal Leader, Lopotha Parish Kotido Uganda 10. Mario Loron Kraal Leader, Losilang Parish Kotido Uganda 11. Paul Longoli Sentinel, Losilang Parish Kotido Uganda 12. Paul Iriama Sentinel, Kalokwameri Nakapririprit Uganda 13. Geoffrey Omwony Kraal Leader, Losilang Parish Kotido Uganda 14. Joseph Apaikwa Kraal Leader, Kalokwameri Parish Nakapiripirit Uganda 15. Charles Ogwang Parish Chief, Town Council Nakapiripirit Uganda 16. Dr.Anthony Wesonga District Veterinary Officer West Pokot Kenya 17. Baraza Sungwacha Division Agriculture Officer West Pokot Kenya 18. Abraham Lorot Community Mobilizer, ACTED West Pokot Kenya 19. Moses Ngimor Chairman CDMC, Kodic Location North Pokot Kenya 20. Wilfred Oluoch Consultant Software Development Kenya 21. Mary Mwale Drought Management Officer, OP Nairobi Kenya 22. David Loosenge Data Analyst, Samburu County Samburu Kenya 23. Slias Lemongai Field Monitor, Wamba Division Samburu East Kenya 24. Deus Bamanya Senior Meteorologist, OPM Uganda 25. Stellah Sengendo Food Security Programme Officer FAO Uganda 26. Agnes Atyang National Coordinator FEWSNET Uganda 27. Emmanuel Okecho Disaster Management Officer OPM Uganda 28. Annunciata Hakuza Senior Agric. Economist EW/FS/Gender MAAIF Uganda 29. Malika Ogwang Early Warning Specialist, ACTED

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Annex 5 List of Focus Group Discussion Participants

Lopotha Parish, Panyangara Sub-county, Kotido District

1. Anna Atyang 2. Akello Sidonia 3. Amer Lopelecimo 4. Lokawa Lotimireng 5. Akello Pamella 6. Lotiki Naledo 7. Paul Lomenmoni 8. Akello Nager Anna

Kalokwameri Parish, Nabilatuk Sub-county, Nakapiripirit District

1. Lokiru Paul 2. Lodim Joseph 3. Abong Mariko 4. Lomongin Agnes 5. Akiyo Charles 6. Anna Iriama 7. Achuka Rose 8. Akol Agnes 9. Chegem Alice 10. Anna Lowoto 11. Iriama Paul

Kodic Sub Location, Kodic Location, North Pokot District

1. Loduk Epedeo 2. Kapelinyang Longarinyang 3. Lohach Suleiman 4. Lokwachupa Nachola 5. Chepetui Pkinyony 6. Chepokwaha Akales 7. Chepokayal Yarakapel 8. Chapakong Yakapel 9. Yarakori Yabakuli 10. Cheparwas Lomerikwang 11. Chepochonyar Petan 12. Aripo Kwopot 13. Akori Lemukwang 14. Cheposero Lokorio

Lodongokwe Parish, Wamba Division, Samburu East

1. Diwani Lenkokwai 2. Nyanotoe Lemorash 3. Lkausian Lotongormic 4. Lemarle Tinku 5. Lolem Lenkupae 6. Lemito Lasanguru Kuri 7. Kiampi Lesiangal 8. David Leitore 9. Subela Lenkokwai 10. Sopia Lenkokwai 11. Tiberio Leno Lkuguks

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Annex 6 District maps

UGANDA

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KENYA