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Beyond Bin Laden: Al-Qa’ida’s Evolution Through the Charismatic Cycle

Eric Elsner

Johns Hopkins University

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Abstract

When Usama Bin Laden (UBL) died on 01May 2011, al-Qa'ida lost its founder, a seeming

victory for the United States after almost eleven years of hunting down the man who authorized

and backed the worst terrorist attack on United States soil. The leadership of al-Qa'ida appeared

at the time to be at its weakest, but al-Qa'ida endures today as one of the most substantial threats

to the United States and its objectives in the Middle East and the world. What should have been

the end of an organization based on an unstable form of leadership has endured; while a new

charismatic leader rises in the crisis of Syria's civil war. These Charismatic organizations rise

from crises and grow by the success of charismatic leaders message, but endure after the loss of

these same leaders through routinization, changing the organization from a charismatic cause to a

traditional organization determined to continue the mission of their leaders. Through Max

Weber's theory of Charisma and Leadership, the rise of al-Qa'ida can be explained through a

cycle of crisis, leadership's message, and routinization.

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Beyond Bin Laden: Al-Qa’ida’s Evolution Through the Charismatic Cycle

Executive Summary

Usama Bin Laden has been dead for more than three years, but the organization he

founded lives on. Through Max Weber's theory of charismatic leadership, the intelligence

community can understand the cycle of charismatic leadership; the charismatic leader rises

through a crisis, reveals a message and finds those followers who are drawn to the message, and

once the leader falls or is lost, the organization created will begin to transform itself into a more

permanent structure, turning into either traditional or rational/legal leadership. Al-Qa'ida started

as an organization centered around a charismatic leader, Usama Bin Laden, who himself rose

from the crisis of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, grew an organization based on the message

of Jihadist ideology and the need to attack the United States. Al-Qa'ida wants to continue to

spread the message of Bin Laden, continuing through the leadership of Ayman Zawahiri and has

been able to spread its influence through affiliates which have been acting in "al-Qa'ida's" name.

These affiliates have been al-Qa'ida's growth, but also a problem as their actions can reflect

negatively against al-Qa'ida. Now one of its affiliates, al-Qa'ida in Iraq, has broken away and

declared itself the Islamic State, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Jihadists

are turning to Abu Bakr and his message of Jihadist ideology, the newly declared caliphate, and

the "global nature of the Islamic State's struggle" (Al-Tamimi, 2014). The survival of any

charismatic organization is dependent on its ability to cope with immediate changes after losing

its charismatic leader; in al-Qa'ida's case, it is now facing the competition of a new charismatic

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leader who is using success to grow a state based on Jihadist ideology Bin Laden embodied when

he began al-Qa'ida.

Understanding Weber's theory of charismatic leadership and the rise of charismatic

leaders through crisis shows intelligence community how to prepare for such leaders and find

methods to counter the charisma and the message delivered by the charismatic leader.

Understanding of charismatic leadership allows intelligence community understand survivability

of fragile organizations and prepare better strategies to counter these organizations.

Weber's Definition of Charisma

According to Max Weber, the term "charisma" applies "to a certain quality of an

individual by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with

supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Weber,

1978). It is characterized as a "gift of grace" of "self-appointed leaders who are followed by

those in distress" (Gerth, 1973). To Weber, "Charisma is the great revolutionary force" (Weber,

1978) which embodied the rise of a new force to oppose traditional authority systems. Genuine

charisma does not come from any formal or legal structure of authority, but from the charismatic

leader who has arisen to take on a mission targeted at a specific group. The group targeted for

the mission can be social, political, or any group of people who feel they are marginalized or in

crisis. From these people, a charismatic leader will find his followers.

Charismatic leaders succeed when they find followers. If the charismatic leader does not

find any followers, his charisma breaks down and his message fails. When a leader finds his

followers, they begin to form a bond that is "outside the ties of the culture, the job, even the

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family" (Gerth, 1973). The group rejects all ties to the outside "in favor of the exclusive

glorification of the charismatic leader, its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything"

(Gerth, 1973). Charismatic movements are enthusiastic, the circumstances giving rise to a

charismatic leader are direct and interpersonal in order to rise above the ordinary. The

relationship between the charismatic leader and his followers is a "charismatic bond constructed

through a complex process of negotiation which rests on an exchange of mutual needs, the

charismatic leader is given authority in return for recognition, affection, and reinforcement of

worth" (Hoffman, 2014). To Weber, genuine charisma "quickly give way to institutions,

emerging from a cooling off of extraordinary states of devotion and fervor" (Gerth, 1973). The

charismatic leader was most influential at the beginning of the mission, then there was "cooling

off" of the mission's enthusiasm. In it's pure form, charisma is anathema to everyday structures.

In order for charisma to become more permanent, it is "necessary for the character of the

charismatic authority to radically change" (Weber, 1978). This "routinization" of charisma

"comes rapidly, the leader's thoughts are assimilated into the needs of the members of the group"

(Yinger, 1970).

Charisma is not a permanent structure, but it is in fact the opposite of permanence.

Charisma is a phenomenon of enthusiastic movements, but once its domination is established "it

gives way to forces of everyday routine" (Weber, 1978). In theory if successful, "charisma

almost immediately moves in the direction of routinization, but once routinized, charisma

becomes either traditional or rational-legal authority" (Ritzler, 2000). What the organization

routinizes into depends on the nature of the institution. Weber argues "all efforts are doomed to

failure; (in the) long run charisma cannot be routinized and still be charisma" (Ritzler, 2000).

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Once charisma becomes traditional or rational-legal authority, the stage is set for the cycle to

begin again.

Al-Qa'ida under Usama Bin Ladin

Weber believed a charismatic leader was someone with extraordinary gifts whom

followers were meant to find and follow during a crisis. Bin Ladin did come from an extremely

wealthy family which started from a poor man in Yemen to become extremely rich through

construction for Saudi Arabia and the Saud family. Bin Ladin was one of 50 brothers and sisters

who did not seem to be stand-out in the family. Bin Ladin's charisma would rise in crisis.

Crisis

Charismatic Leader rises

with a message

Charismatic Leader Departs

Organization Routinizes to

Continue Message

Figure 1, Cycle of Charisma

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Sayyid Qutb and Islamist Ideology, the Base of al-Qa'ida's Message

Weber saw charisma as a revolutionary force in leadership and crisis as a catalyst for a

charismatic leader to rise. In Jihadist ideology, Islam is in continual crisis against corrupt

leaders, Western values, and those in the world who are not under Islam. One of the first modern

Islamist theorist, Sayyid Qutb, believed that Islam was the only moral choice for mankind. Qutb

was an Egyptian who saw colonial rule and the rule of King Farouk as corrupt and anti-islamic.

In his mind, Qutb saw the modern world "steeped in Jahiliyyah (ignorance of Divine guidance),

and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this

ignorance (Qutb, 1964)." Qutb's Islamist ideology was framed during a time when Egypt was in

crisis, Egypt and other Arab countries lost the war to destroy Israel in 1949, it was the final days

of King Farouk and colonialism of the British in Egypt, and the revolution which would bring

Gamel Nasser into power was underway. In Qutb's view, the West was a corrupt, crusader world,

and everything from outside, including Marxism, Capitalism, Democracy, Christianity, and

particularly anything from the West, was corrupt and a threat to Islam. Qutb believed " Islam

was under assault, and redemption could not wait for a bloodless revolution (Kramer, 1996)."

Qutb believed a revolutionary vanguard was needed to "organize itself, retreat from impious

society, denounce lax Muslims as unbelievers, and battle to overturn the political order. As Qutb

put it: those who have usurped the power of God on earth and made His worshippers their slaves

will not be dispossessed by dint of Word alone (Kramer, 1996)." Qutb is one of the most

important theorists for Jihadist ideology and was a direct influence on Bin Ladin and Zawahiri.

Qutb was one of the first in the modern era to espouse the Jihadist message, a message Bin

Laden would hear early in his life.

Bin Laden's Early Years and Abdullah Azzam's Message

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Bin Ladin would be exposed to Jihadist ideology early in his life. When he was 14, he

studied at the al Thagher Model School, "the most prestigious high (school) in Jedda (Coll,

2005)." While at al Thagher he participated in the Islamic study group led by a man who taught

radical Islamic ideology. An interesting point to note that even as Bin Laden was being

influenced by these teachers of radical Islamist ideology, Bin Laden himself never studied Islam

formally. For someone who would be spreading a message of Islamic domination under Sharia

law, Bin Laden was not taught about the message of Islam but was influenced by the simple

message of Jihadist ideology. But in his academic career, he met teachers who would influence

his future calling; a calling which would be influenced by events in the Middle East and shaped

by a limited view of history that would define Bin Laden's ideology. Teachers like Abdullah

Azzam would continue to shape Bin Laden's Jihadist ideology and directly influence his own

message. Azzam was an influence on Bin Laden as one of his teachers in Jeddah in the 1970s.

Azzam a Palestinian Islamist who tried to fight for the Palestinian cause but found it too

secular when he wanted to movement to be Islamist. Azzam saw Jihad as sacred warfare

"interrelated and (forming) a singular chain from which the next operation, war or conflict will

be born (Abou-Eneim, 2010)." Azzam taught Jihadist ideology focused on Muhammad the

warrior, a myopic view of Muhammad and Muhammad's message of Islam. Azzam himself had a

myopic view of history seen through a narrow lens of Muslim victimhood. Azzam would further

the message of martyrdom, turning it into a fantasy. The messages of Qutb and Azzam would

begin to shape and define Bin Laden's ideology and grow as part of Bin Laden's message to

Jihadists as growing up he watch crises in the Muslim world.

In his teens and college years Bin Laden would see Islam in continual crisis with the rise

of an Islamist government in Iran and the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, but the

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largest event to define Bin Laden was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. This one

event would bring about Bin Laden's transformation from pious student and billionaire's son to

Jihadist, and the first step toward the rise of Bin Laden's charisma. Later Bin Laden would work

under Azzam in the Maktab al-Khidmat, or Service Bureau, set up by Azzam in Pakistan after

the Soviet Invasion. Azzam wanted to see more Arabs join in the fight against the Soviet Union.

Bin Laden worked for Azzam after leaving his father's business. Under Azzam, Bin Laden

organized and expanded the operations of the Service Bureau and started to fund-raise for

refugees and mujahedeen as well as recruit Arabs to go and fight against the Soviet forces. Bin

Laden was able to "fix an organization that was badly run and had little effect for the

mujahedeen in Afghanistan (Wright, 2006)." This would begin Bin Laden's early days of being a

Mujahedeen and be one of his earliest successes.

While Azzam and Bin Laden were old friends, Bin Laden was ambitious and wanted to

show what the Arab volunteers could do in battle. He was frustrated by perceptions by the

Afghanistan mujahedeen that the Arab volunteers were not good in battle and should be used as

support rather than as actual fighters. In 1986, Bin Laden ignored Azzam and others to establish

his own base and fighting force in Jaji, Afghanistan. This became an important step in beginning

Bin Laden's charisma, bringing a message of Arab volunteers being directly involved in Jihad.

The base was established near a Soviet base and was known as al Masada, aka the Lions' Den.

The base was Bin Laden's dream of showing what the Arab fighters could do, and he went so far

as to want it close to Soviet forces to ensure it would be attacked. Bin Laden saw the base and

military force at the base as an important psychological boost for Afghans and the Muslim world

while ignoring Azzam's opposition to what was seen as a foolish and potentially dangerous

endeavor.

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In 1987, Bin Laden got his wish and al Masada was attacked by Soviet forces. While the

battle is seen by most outside the Muslim world as minor skirmish, but for Bin Laden it was the

beginning of "Bin Laden's almost mythic persona, because a group of Arabs had held off the

Soviets. It got a lot of play in the Middle East (Amanpour, 2006)." Even Azzam turned it into a

mythical battle of miracles as the small Arab force stood up against an overwhelming Soviet

force and managed to hold them off. In Azzam's magazine Jihad, he wrote

Beginning the night of Ramadan, the enemy tried to take over, but every time they tried,

our men hit them with weapons. And they tried again for another hit with their

commandos, but we hit them with our rocket-propelled grenades. And we saw them

retreating with our telescopes. Russia lost many of their well-respected commandos to the

mujahedeen. (Bergin, 2006, p 54)

This became a turning point for Bin Laden, both in his career as a mujahideen and his own

charisma. Bin Laden went from being a fund-raiser to a mujahedeen. His success built his

charisma and made him appear to be someone who was blessed. It also brought Bin Laden to the

attention of Jihadists active in Afghanistan; in particular, Ayman al-Zawahari. When Azzam was

killed in 1989, Bin Laden became "the most prominent leader of Arab fighters in Afghanistan

(Abou-Eneim, 2010)."

Al-Qa'ida pre-9/11

As the charismatic leader rises, his power is established by the followers who surrender

"to a message outside regular laws and authority (Weber, 1978)." Bin Laden had been inculcated

in Jihadist ideology. Qutb taught that Islam was the only pure way of life and must go against

Western civilization in order to build a better world, even using violence to bring about this end.

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Azzam taught it was duty of all Muslims to participate in Jihad and turned martyrdom into a

fantasy. Bin Laden would build his message on these foundations, adding that the real enemy of

Islam was the United States, who had to be defeated in order to bring about an Islamic state

under Sharia law. In 1996, Bin Laden declared a Jihad against the United States, condemning "

the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, criticized the international sanctions regime on Iraq,

and voiced his opposition to U.S. support for Israel (Blanchard, 2007)." Bin Laden believed the

U.S. was the greatest enemy of Islam and it had to be defeated and made to withdraw from the

Muslim world before an Islamic state could be established. Instead of building an organization to

fight the Muslim leaders, Bin Laden believed first you had to defeat their largest backer, then the

leaders would fall. This is the message Bin Laden used to build al-Qa'ida, finding followers who

wanted to build an Islamic state based on Sharia while ridding the Muslim world of U.S.

influence and power.

In a charismatic organization, the charismatic staff constitutes "a charismatic aristocracy

composed of select adherents, united by discipleship and loyalty and chosen according to

personal charismatic qualifications (Weber, 1978)." In a charismatic organization, there are "no

formal and regulated appointment or dismissal, no career, no supervisory or appeals body, no

jurisdiction, and no permanent institutions which are independent of personal charisma (Weber,

1978)." The members of the charismatic staff are not "officials", they are not appointed or

dismissed from positions, they do not have careers or promotions, only qualifications based the

needs of the charismatic organization. The disciples "tend to live primarily in communistic

relationship to the leader, with no administrative organs, but agents who have been provided with

authority by their chief or who possess charisma of their own (Weber, 1978)."

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Under Bin Laden, al-Qa'ida was an organization with a central core built around Bin

Laden. Al-Qa'ida reached out to organizations with the same ideology, but wanted to keep al-

Qa'ida under the direct control of Bin Laden. In the chart below, from Staff Statement 15 of the

9/11 commission, the "organizational structure should not be read as defining a hierarchical

chain of command for specific terrorist operations. It served as a means for coordinating

functions and providing material support to operations. But once a specific operation was

decided upon it would be assigned to a carefully selected clandestine cell, headed by a

senior al Qaeda operative who reported personally to Bin Ladin (National Commission On

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004).

(Organization chart derived from Staff Statement No. 15, found on www.globalsecurity.org)

The organizational structure included:

- The "Shura" or Advisory Council, an inner circle of Bin Laden's close associates

Figure 2, al-Qa'ida Structure under Bin Laden, Pre 9/11

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- The "Sharia" and "Political Committe" responsible for issuing fatwas - edicts purporting

to be grounded in Islamic Law directing or authorizing certain actions - including deadly

attacks

- The "Military Committee" responsible for proposing targets, gathering ideas for and

supporting operations, and managing training camps

- The "Finance Committee" responsible for fundraising and budgetary support for

training camps, housing costs, living expenses, travel, and the movement of money

allocated to operations

- The "Foreign Purchases Committee" responsible for acquiring weapons, explosives, and

technical equipment

- The "Security Committee" responsible for physical protection, intelligence collection and counterintelligence

- The "Information Committee" in charge of propaganda

(Staff Statement 15, 2004).

While the staff did not have to turn to Bin Laden for every mundane item, for large operations

Bin Laden had to be consulted. Like many charismatic groups, Bin Laden kept some distance

from the everyday needs of running al-Qa'ida, along with maintaining a social and physical

distance between himself and members. Bin Laden "limited his accessibility, but mnay aspring

jihadists heard him speak in al-Qa'ida camps, while personal audiences were much sought after

(Bergen, 2006)." This is seen in charismatic organization as "too much exposure leads to de-

legitimization, (while) some distance invites processes of projection (Hoffman, 2014). Would-

be recruits "often had to go through a vetting process before gaining access to Bin Laden

(Bergen, 2006)." In order to undertake a mission for al-Qa'ida, "Bin Laden had to approve,

though operational plans were planned by trusted lieutenants, being a figure who stood above the

fray (Bergen, 2006)."

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Nasser al-Bahri, aka Abu Jandal, was one of the militants that traveled to Afghanistan in

1996 and trained in an al-Qaeda camp, eventually becoming a trainer. In 1998, he was chosen by

Bin Laden to be one of his personal bodyguards. Abu Jandal described his first meeting with Bin

Laden as "beautiful." Abu Jandal described his security arrangement with Bin Laden, that Abu

Jandal was to kill Bin Laden because Bin Laden wanted "martyrdom rather than captivity."

(Bergen, pgs 259-260) Abu Jandal continued to describe his time with Bin Laden, stating "we

never felt afraid as long as we were with that man ... Our love for Sheikh Osama spring from the

fact that we went hungry together and were filled together ... The man was very simple in all his

dealings and in everything in his life. He was consistently very generous with others (Bergen pg

267)." One of Bin Laden's body guards, Shadi Abdallah, stated "bin Laden is a very charismatic

person who could persuade people simply by his way of talking. One could say he "seduced"

many young men ... He said (Bin Laden) that our common path must be the sacrifice for Islam."

(Bergen, pg 265)

Like other charismatic leaders, Bin Laden had to exert his authority in order to "maintain

a charismatic bond, relative to traditional and rational authority, impressions created are

inherently precarious (Hoffman, 2014)." Charismatic leaders "must perform a careful balancing

act, in order to maintain a constant reaffirmation of charismatic status, the primary source of

power (Hoffman, 2014)." The charismatic leader that cannot properly manage his authority risks

losing the charismatic bond that creates the charismatic authority over the followers.

Al-Qa'ieda after 9/11, Losing Control of the Message

After the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden had to go underground. He soon disappeared and was

only heard through videos. In one respect Bin Laden's charisma grew amongst Jihadists as he

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conducted the most successful terrorist attack on the U.S. and continued to elude U.S. pursuit.

This became another success for Bin Laden, growing the charisma he had already established

with his followers. During the time Bin Laden was in hiding, al-Qa'ida saw the growth of its

brand through different franchises, particularly in the Muslim world. Al-Qa'ida members fought

with the Taliban against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Qa'ida in

Iraq (AQI) emerged to fight against U.S. forces. Al-Qa'ida emerged in the Arabian Peninsula

(aka al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula or AQAP), and an affiliate emerged from the islamist

groups fighting in Algeria called al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). All of these groups

stated they followed the ideology of Bin Laden, even while the leader was hiding.

But while in hiding, Bin Laden was not able to balance his charisma with control over the

al-Qa'ida organization, particularly the affiliates. In the 17 documents released since the death of

Bin Laden, Bin Laden focused in his private letters was "Muslims’ suffering at the hands of his

jihadi 'brothers' (Lahoud, 2012)." The letters show "Bin Ladin’s frustration with regional Jihadi

groups and his seeming inability to exercise control over their actions and public statements

(Lahoud, 2012)." In the letters, there appear to be three different groups of opinions concerning

cells’ desire to affiliate with al-Qa'ida. One group wanted to remain faithful to al-Qa'ida and

distance or disassociate from those groups who would not consult with al-Qa'ida. The second

group believed in including the regional Jihadist groups to contribute to al-Qa'ida's growth. The

third group, apparently Bin Laden's position, wanted to maintain communications to urge

restraint from the regional affiliates, but did not want to grant formal unity with al-Qa'ida. The

affiliates themselves did reach out to Bin Laden to bless off on symbolic matters, but

operationally the affiliates rarely consulted or obeyed Bin Laden's directives. They operated in

al-Qa'ida's name, but did not act in ways that reflected positively on al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden became

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more of a symbolic figurehead for the affiliates, but not someone to formally work with. While

the affiliates were continuing operations, Bin Laden became very concerned with the mistakes

they were making, which he felt reflected badly on al-Qa'ida and himself. In a letter to

Atiyyatullah, or Atiyya, a leader in al-Qa'ida, Bin Laden expressed alarmed about the "increased

mistakes" committed by the "brothers" who are spread over "many regions" and communicated

a desire to bring the regional groups in line with al-Qa'ida's vision and code of conduct (Lahoud,

2012). In 2010, Bin Laden asked Atiyya to "prepare a memorandum of understanding that

would require jihadi groups to consult with al-Qa'ida Central (AQC) before they act (Lahoud,

2012)."

Bin Laden also discussed wanting to centralize al-Qa'ida's media and control the message

being sent out in the name of al-Qa'ida. He wanted al-Qa'ida's media to be more sophisticated

and believed a coherent media strategy was critical. In a letter to Attiya, Bin Laden stressed that

"(winning) the media occupies the greater portion of the battle today (Lahoud, 2012)." UBL

explained "we are in need of sincere internal advice and a constructive critical evaluation of all

our politics and (media) releases be they from AQC or from regional groups (Lahoud, 2012)."

UBL believed Jihadist media was inadequate, and was not alone in this opinion. Adam Gadahn,

a senior member of and a known spokesman for al-Qa'ida, wrote about Jihadist forums and

believed them to be "repulsive to most Muslims and a liability to al-Qa'ida ... most of their

participants are characterized by religious fanaticism and biases ... "distort to some extent the

image of al-Qa'ida (Lahoud, 2012)." Further, UBL wanted to create a credible jihadi media to

counter the current media portrayal of him which he considered full of factual errors and he

thought corrupted his legacy. UBL wrote to Atiyya "He who does not make known his own

history ... (runs the risk that) some in the media and among historians will construct a history for

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him (Lahoud, 2012)." Message is very important for a charismatic leader. The message brings in

followers who recognize the leaders charisma and authority. Bin Laden was clearly worried his

message was being distorted by the affiliates while he was losing his control over the

organization.

As with other charismatic leader, Bin Laden was worried about the perception of al-

Qa'ida, so much so he wanted more control over the message and actions linked to al-Qa'ida.

Charisma depends on the success of the leader and his message. When groups associated with

al-Qa'ida fail, al-Qa'ida and Bin Laden fail. These failures, both operational and the message

delivered through Jihadist media, undermine the charisma of the leader. When the message from

the media becomes murky and "repulsive" to the main audience of the message, this also

weakens the charisma of the leader. His strongest criticism was for al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and

its leaders.

AQI under Abu Musab al Zarqawi was the most brutal affiliate. AQI directly targeted

civilians, particularly the Shi'a. AQI also performed beheadings and filmed them to be shown

throughout the world. While Zarqawi was in charge of AQI, al-Qa'ida's leader distanced itself

from AQI as it became more brutal. Al-Qa'ida did not want to be branded with such brutal

tactics that were alienating Iraqis and other Muslims against al-Qa'ida in general, and AQI in

particular. But Zarqawi would not listen to al-Qa'ida's leadership and continued mass attacks and

beheadings. Zarqawi was never able to set aside his violent tendencies. By all accounts,

"Zarqawi never elevated himself beyond thug and butcher, never set aside violent tendencies,

even to preserve unity among sunnis (Abou-Eneim, 2010)."

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Zarqawi's actions ended up hurting al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden's message of jihad was to unite

Muslims against the West and attack the U.S. Instead, Zarqawi attacked Muslim's and beheaded

westerners, all under the name of al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden's message was guide Muslims towards

true Islam while weakening Western influence in the Muslim world. According to Weber, if the

ideas are not adopted "the message will fail to influence or the followers will be alienated (Gerth,

1973)." Zarqawi's attacks on Muslims weakened the message of al-Qa'ida, for which Bin Laden

tried to dissuade Zarqawi, but couldn't. In the letters, Bin Laden was disappointed with AQI.

Even after Zarqawi's death, AQI under Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (AUAB) and Abu Ayyub al-

Misri (AAM) declared an Islamic State and were perceived by Jihadi leaders as "more repulsive

and dangerous than al-Zarqawi (Lahoud, 2012)." The leaders were continuing to make mistakes

and were rebuked, but the leaders continued to target Shi'a Muslims and the declaration of the

state made it vulnerable to Coalition attacks. Bin Laden hoped after the deaths of AUAB and

AAM there could be unity in the Iraqi militants.

Bin Laden was becoming more limited in his direct role in al-Qa'ida after 9/11. While in

hiding he watched al-Qa'ida expand from core of followers built around himself and his message

of violent Jihad against the U.S. to affiliates that expanded al-Qa'ida's influence throughout the

Middle East and North Africa. However, without the direct control over the operations and

messaging of these organizations, Bin Laden became frustrated with the mistakes the affiliates

made in al-Qa'ida's name. His message of Jihad and the hope of building a Sharia ruled Islamic

state were being undermined by operations and messages that reflected badly on al-Qa'ida. Bin

Laden hoped to eventually bring the affiliates back under a central al-Qa'ida leadership which

would guide the affiliates away from their mistakes and once again be able to spread the message

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of Bin Laden to attack the U.S. and lead Muslims to a Sharia ruled state. Bin Laden would not

see this happen, but would be killed in May 2011, leaving Zawahiri to take over al-Qa'ida.

Death of Bin Laden and Zawahiri as the Successor

According to Weber, charismatic organizations were fragile and unstable. There is a

"desire to transform the rulership into a permanent relationship, especially from the leader, his

disciples, and the followers (Weber, 1978)." The loss of the leader is one of the greatest hazards

a charismatic staff has to deal with as they are "likely to outlive the leader, and have vested

interests in continuing the existence of the organization (Ritzler, 2000)." The charismatic staff

must create circumstances to continue the message of the leader, adopting a variety of strategies

to create a lasting organization. If Zawahiri is unable to adopt a strategy of continuation, the

ideas will not be "adapted, and the message will fail to influence or the followers will be

alienated (Gerth, 1973)." The nature of the leadership will radically change "as the purely

personal character of charisma is eliminated (Ritzler 2000)." The organization will create a set of

rules to choose a new leader, but such rules become the basis of tradition, changing charismatic

leadership into traditional or even rational leadership. The new leader will be chosen according

to the rules set by the charismatic staff but is "unlikely to achieve the same success as the

predecessor (Ritzler, 2000)."

Zawahiri took over al-Qa'ida in June of 2011 with little argument from the Shura council.

Despite taking over the leadership, Zawahiri has not been able to shed the image of him lacking

charisma, being rigid, and described as an "irritable micromanager (Mulraine, 2011)." Upon

taking over al-Qa'ida, he assumed control of an organization that has affiliates in North Africa,

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the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant, with its core membership still active in Afghanistan and

Pakistan. However, like Bin Laden, Zawahiri had to remain in hiding and could exercise little

direct control over the affiliates. Zawahiri has taken over a al-Qa'ida whose central leadership

has been decimated and has not conducted a successful major attack against the U.S. for over a

decade. Further, Zawahiri and al-Qa'ida are losing ground in a confrontation with the Islamic

State, the latest incarnation of AQI. As Weber stated, the Charismatic leader "gains and

maintains authority solely by proving his strength in life (Gerth, 1973)." Zawahiri's most recent

announcement was the creation of al-Qa'ida in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) in September

2014, after a two year silence. The move was seen as " a desperate response to the existential

challenge posed to al-Qa'ida Central (AQC) by the upstart IS, whose seizure of Northwestern

Iraq and swaths of Eastern Syria has seemingly rendered al-Qa'ida impotent and irrelevant in the

eyes of many potential recruits along with formerly dependable donors (Olmstead, 2014)."

Zawahiri runs an organization that has influence throughout the Middle East and North

Africa, with potential allies in Africa. However, in the face of the rise of the Islamic State (IS),

Zawahiri is being perceived as failing against a former affiliate and rising charismatic

organization. In order to become more viable and not lose more recruits, donors, and face

against IS, al-Qa'ida will need to build more successes. In September 2014, AQIS tried to

"hijack Pakistani Navy frigates and use them to attack U.S. and Indian vessels (Shay, 2014)."

The attack was "carried out in party by Pakistan navy personnel that had been recruited by al-

Qa'ida (Shay, 2014)." But Zawahiri and al-Qa'ida continues to lose ground against IS. More

jihadists appear to be impressed with IS and its actions as

21

Al-Qaeda foot-soldiers, from Yemen, Libya, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, are flocking to

ISIS standard. To them, its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi si confronting the apostates and

building the Caliphate, while al-Zawahiri talks. (Lister, 2014)

Rise of Abu Bakr and the Islamic State, Message of International Jihad

Weber stated "charismatic authority is specifically unstable, when the leader's mission is

extinguished, followers will look for a new holder of charisma (Gerth, 1973)." While al-Qa'ida

goes down its own path, it and the world are faced with a new challenge born out of a new crisis,

the rise of the Islamic State. Since its rise from the Syrian civil war, the Islamic State has seized

Iraqi cities, captured weapons from the Iraqi Army, and pilfered hundreds of millions of dollars

from the Iraqi state. It is a highly organized and brutal organization centered around the

leadership of Abu Bakr. Its brutality has made other rebel groups have turned against the Islamic

State; even al-Qa'ida has renounced the Islamic State for its brutality and arrogance. Yet IS is

finding more recruits as it continues to succeed in taking and holding territory in Syria and Iraq

As Weber noted " the Charismatic leader must continually prove his right and divine mission to

the benefit of followers or lose his followers and authority (Weber, 1978)."

The Islamic State started out as al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), an affiliate of al-Qa'ida under

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After Zarqawi was killed, leadership of AQI went to Abu Ayyub al-

Misri (AAM) with Abu Umar al-Baghdadi (AUAB) as head of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), a

declared Islamic state in Iraq in 2006 under the control of AQI. After the deaths of AAM and

AUAB, Abu Bakr took over AQI, then known as Abu Dua. The AQI he inherited was weaker,

and seemed to be on the brink of collapse after the Sunni awakening in Iraq turned the Iraqi

22

Sunnis against AQI. But the civil war in Syria gave AQI new life. The Syrian Civil war brought

to life two factions affiliated with al-Qa'ida,"Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), which was founded at the

beginning of 2012 by Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani, and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham

(ISIS) (Al-Tamimi, 2014)." During the formation of both groups, Abu Dua, now calling himself

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proposed the groups be merged into one group under his leadership. Abu

Mohammed al-Jowlani disagreed and wanted to keep JN separate from ISIS, and in a secret letter

from Zawahiri, AQC agreed with al-Jowlani. Instead, Abu Bakr claimed JN was under ISIS.

The relationship between al-Qa'ida and AQI deteriorated until in 2014, Zawahiri declared al-

Qa'ida had "no connection" with ISIS, which is not an affiliate with the al Qaeda group and has

no organizational relation with it. Furthermore, al Qaeda's general command is not responsible

for ISIS' actions (Joscelyn, 2014)."

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a man described as "ruthless, resilient and ambitious terrorist

leader who unfortunately has shown a knack for tactical operations and, it seems, military

strategy (Ignatius, 2014)." Abu Bakr has become a leader with far more charisma than Zawahiri

and has succeeded in Iraq and Syria while Zawahiri is stuck hiding in Pakistan. The perception

of Abu Bakr is his ability to inspire intense support from his followers combined with an

"unusual degree of organization, technical skill, and planning (Ignatius, 2014)." It is reported

Abu Bakr holds a master's and doctorate in Islamic Studies, a major difference from both UBL

and Zawahiri, from Baghdad University. Abu Bakr is also claiming to be a direct descendent of

the prophet Muhammad. In his time as the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr has taken a

large swath of Iraq and Syria and a near blitzkrieg assault. Abu Bakr has been described as

headstrong and opportunistic.

23

Abu Bakr is highly reclusive, keeping a low profile and limited movements and contacts.

He maintains "operational control over the Islamic State despite the fact there are leaders and

deputies in the Islamic State who have never seen him (McGrath, 2014)." Like other charismatic

leaders, Abu Bakr maintains a distance between himself and his followers, both for security and

to build a mystic around himself. As of now, Abu Bakr's charisma is built through his successes

in Syria and Iraq. Abu Bakr has learned from the mistakes his predecessors and does not try to

alienate the Sunnis, but uses their distrust and alienation from the Iraqi government to grow the

Islamic State and recruit from the tribes. He is the undisputed leader of the Islamic State, but

Abu Bakr "empowers his local commanders and employs a decentralized structure to run the

Islamic State, combined with brutal methods to terrorize the civilian population (Ignacius,

2014)." The Islamic State has also learned to effectively use social media to boost its cause. It

published its own magazine called Dabiq, a name

Taken from the area named Dabiq in the norther countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham.

This place was mentioned in the hadith describing some of the events of Malahim (what

is sometimes reffered to as Armageddon in English). One of the greatest battles between

the Muslims and the crusaders will take place near Dabiq. (Dabiq, 2014).

IS also uses beheading videos of prisoners try and intimidate enemies while showing its power

to recruit like-minded individuals to join the organization. Through social media, Abu Bakr has

put out an autobiography on himself stressing his piety and family background of a father who

was a tribal elder and pious grandfather. Abu Bakr is portraying himself as an individual

"considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least

specifically exceptional powers or qualities (Weber, 1978)." Abu Bakr's message for IS has

become the internationalization of Jihadist ideology. In a video-taped speech, Abu Bakr stated

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So let the world know we are living today in a new era... The Muslims today have a loud,

thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement that will cause the

world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the

idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature.

The world has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present;

the camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy - the camp of

the Muslims and the mujahedeen everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders,

their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by

America and Russia, and being mobilized by the Jews. (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2014)

In Abu Bakr's speech, he has decided to divide everyone into believers and non-believers. He

has created a black and white message of believers and non-believers, where non-believers are to

be attacked, no matter who they are.

As the Islamic State continues to succeed, it may already be routinizing Abu Bakr's

charisma, changing from a purely charismatic organization into bureaucratized state built around

Jihadist ideas of Sharia law. Under Abu Bakr, there are two deputies,"(one) who supervises the

State in Iraq and is essentially the second man in the organization, and (another) who oversees

Islamic State operations in Syria (Barrett, 2014)." Under them are the councils, which are

responsible for the military and administrative organization of IS. Two councils are directly

under Abu Bakr, the Shura Council and the Sharia Council. The Shura Council is "responsible

for conveying directive from Abu Bakr down the chain of command and for ensuring that they

are carried out (Barrett, 2014)." The Sharia Council is "directly overseen by Abu Bakr and is the

most powerful body of The Islamic State (Barrett, 2014)." The Sharia Council is responsible for

25

"selecting a Caliph and ensuring the compliance of all other parts of the administration with

Sharia law, according to its own interpretation (Barrett, 2014)." In addition, there is a Security

and Intelligence Council to find dissent and eliminate challenges, the Military Council, the

Finance Council, and the Media Council. In comparison, al-Qa'ida was directly centered around

Bin Laden who only had one deputy, Zawahiri. However, al-Qa'ida was a Jihadist group that did

not have any state apparatus, but was a Jihadist movement attempting to attack Western

influence in the Muslim world. IS is a declared Islamic state, trying to build a state apparatus to

attract Muslims to help build the state and continue attacking all non-Muslim interests. The

whole of the Islamic State is designed to enforce Sharia on the people living in the state,

including Sharia courts and special religious police who enforce Sharia laws that cover all parts

of everyday life. All of it centered around the Caliph, Abu Bakr.

Conclusion

The U.S. has been fighting al-Qa'ida for over 13 years and is now facing the Islamic

State. While the death of Bin Laden was a victory, it was not the end of al-Qa'ida.

Crisis, the First Stage of Charisma

Charismatic leaders tend to rise from crises which "centralize the emergence of

charismatic authority by setting the social context that shapes an audience susceptible to the

influence of charismatic leaders (Hoffman, 2014).". In the case of al-Qa'ida, Bin Laden rose in

the crisis of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He then took what he learned from that crisis

and built on the Jihadist ideology on Islam being in crisis to form al-Qa'ida. Since his death,

Zawahiri has been chosen to continue Bin Laden's message of jihad and crisis. Zawahiri has

26

been rebuilding an al-Qa'ida that has been weakened in its core membership through years of

fighting, but still can rely on affiliated groups to continue Bin Laden's message and mission. The

crisis of the Syrian civil war has brought about the leadership of Abu Bakr and the rise of the

Islamic State. Crisis sparks the rise of charismatic leaders who will seek out those who are draw

to the message and mission of the leader. As long as crises continue in Syria and throughout the

Middle East, people who espouse and are attracted to Jihadist ideology will find charismatic

leaders whom to follow. When the crisis is over, or at least mitigated, then the charisma of the

leader will flounder. The charismatic leader's strongest time is early when his followers are the

most enthusiastic. This moment goes away quickly.

Message, the Second Stage of Charisma

When a charismatic leader arises the leader needs followers who will heed his message

and support his mission. Message is very important for the Charismatic leader. It is what bring in

the followers who will help build a community and begin to spread the message of the leader.

The leader will gain more followers as he succeeds in his mission. Success continues the leader's

charisma, spreading the message and allowing the community and the leader's authority to grow.

Success is important to charisma. When the leader succeeds, his charisma grows, but when he

fails, the followers begin to doubt his charisma. The more the leader fails, the more the leader's

charisma fails. Since charisma is not based on any authority other than the belief that the leader

is exceptional and is therefore been blessed to spread his message, failure undermines the

authority of the leader.

In his writings, Bin Laden was deeply concerned about the failings of the al-Qa'ida

affiliates. When they did actions Bin Laden did not agree with, he worried those actions would

27

reflect badly on al-Qa'ida. Bin Laden understood when the affiliates failed, it was as though al-

Qa'ida itself failed, and by connection, Bin Laden failed. AQI's brutality against Muslims in Iraq

was directly connected to al-Qa'ida. This action went against Bin Laden's message of fighting

for Muslims and trying to bring about a better world through Jihad and Sharia. AQI's failure

became a failure for Bin Laden and weakened his message, and undermined his charisma.

Without the charisma, Bin Laden would have no authority in the Jihadist movement.

Zawahiri is also understanding how failure can hurt even after the leader has been lost.

When he tried to keep Abu Bakr from taking over al-Qa'ida's operations in Syria, he went into

direct confrontation with Abu Bakr and AQI. Instead of falling in line, Abu Bakr declared all al-

Qa'ida operations in Syria were under his control, going against Zawahiri. Zawahiri's failure to

keep Abu Bakr in line with al-Qa'ida has led to a schism within the Jihadist movement and

undermined Zawahiri's authority. Zawahiri's failure is further shown as Abu Bakr has done what

al-Qa'ida has not been able to do and taken control of a large area of the Middle East and

declared an Islamic state. Al-Qa'ida looks weak and ineffective compared to the Islamic State,

while Abu Bakr becomes the new charismatic leader for the Jihadist movement, succeeding in

the crisis of the Syrian civil war.

One of the keys to defeating a charismatic organization is exposing the message of the

leader to failure and countering it with another message. If the leader's message fails, it will not

attract those whom the message is aimed at. When the leader's message fails to attract followers,

it undermines the charisma of the leader. Since charisma does not derive its authority from

traditional or rational-legal powers, it is only the perceived charisma of the leader which gives

authority. When this authority is undermined, the leader loses his right to hold authority and the

charismatic message and mission fails. Bin Laden's feared his message was failing due to the

28

mistakes of affiliates, Zawahiri is seeming to fail in the face of the rise of the Islamic State. It

will have to be seen how to make Abu Bakr fail. While a coalition against the Islamic state and

small victories in the battlefield have occurred, Abu Bakr's charisma still seems to be on the rise.

As long as Abu Bakr continues to succeed in the face of the enemies of the new state, he will be

seen as the new leader of the Jihadist movement and a continual threat in the Middle East.

In the case of al-Qa'ida and the Islamic state, countering the message is one of the best

ways to break the Charisma cycle. Both rely on limited interpretations of Islam and give black

and white answers to complex questions in the problems Islam is facing. Finding scholars who

can argue persuasively against the message al-Qa'ida and IS are spreading can undermine their

message. Continue to show the hypocrisy of their actions and how they are hurting more

Muslims then they are actually helping. Zarqawi's operations in Iraq turned the Shi'a and the

Sunnis against AQI and countered the terrorist groups operations in Iraq. When the message of

al-Qa'ida and IS are countered and defeated, the Charisma of their leaders is defeated and the

leaders are weakened.

Routinization, the Final Cycle of Charisma

Charismatic organizations turn to routinization when the leader is lost. The members of

the organization do this to continue the message of the leader. While the death of Bin Laden was

hoped to usher in the end of al-Qa'ida, it has instead continued, routinizing its message and

mission through its affiliates. Zawahiri still commands an organization with influence throughout

North Africa and the Middle East, even keeping a presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan despite

the loss of most of its core leadership. Al-Qa'ida changed, going from a centralized organization

led by one man, it has evolved into affiliated groups who use the name of al-Qa'ida to spread the

29

message of Jihadist ideology. While the message of al-Qa'ida has spread throughout the Middle

East and North Africa, the organization has become more disperse and less centralized. When

Bin Laden was alive, he was afraid the message of al-Qa'ida was being hurt by the actions of the

affiliated groups. Under Zawahiri, the organization continues to spread Bin Laden's message,

but his control of the organization outside of the core members has been weakened.

In the Islamic State, the message is international Jihad and a new Caliphate ruled under

an austere interpretation of Sharia law. While Weber pointed out that Charismatic organizations

have "no formal rules, no administrative organs (Ritzler, 2000)." But the fragile nature of

Charisma leads organizations to routinize.

In order for Charismatic authority to become more permanent, it is necessary for the

character of the charismatic authority to radically change. In its pure form, charismatic

authority cannot remain stable, but must become either traditionalized, rationalized, or a

combination of both. (Weber, 1978)

The Islamic State already seems to be routinizing through an administration built around Abu

Bakr's authority. Abu Bakr is aided by a "cabinet of deputies, who manage both the Islamic

State's military operations and its new, self declared, caliphate (Sherlock, 2014)." The Islamic

state has its own councils directly under the command of Abu Bakr. There are Islamic courts

and Islamic police who are authorized to enforce Sharia laws on the people in the Islamic state.

Abu Bakr is already routinizing his mission into a permanent bureaucracy, going from

charismatic authority to bureaucratic authority in less than a year.

In the end, a greater understanding of the charismatic cycle and how it works, particularly

in the face of terrorism and terrorist groups. Understanding that charismatic leadership is

30

sparked by a crisis, rises with the message of the leader, then can continue even when the leader

falls by routinizing the charisma of the leader, the intelligence community can gain greater

insight and build better policies to deal with these organizations. The continuing crises in the

Middle East along with perceptions of crisis in Islam will continue to see the rise of charismatic

leaders determined to fight against the West and especially the U.S. The charismatic leaders that

have so far arisen in these crises have turned to Jihadist ideology as a message to attract

followers. When these leaders succeed, their charisma grows and strengthens their mission. If

these organizations are to be defeated, the message has to be defeated. The message coming from

these organizations is narrow, simplistic, and contradictory to the values Islam is suppose to

convey. Understanding that these presumed fragile organizations can become durable

organizations through routinization can allow the intelligence community to understand how

these organizations survive even with the loss of their founding leader.

Once the intelligence community begins to understand this cycle, it more effectively

understand the survival of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations, leading to more effective

policies to undermine and dismantle terrorist groups. Dealing with crisis earlier and more

decisively can undermine the creation of charismatic leaders and their organizations. Continuing

to argue effectively against Jihadist ideology and its message of crisis in Islam can better

undermine the charismatic message of the Jihadist leaders. If an organization does emerge under

a charismatic leader, the U.S. needs to understand that defeat and failure and needed to

undermine the leader. If the leader continues to fail, he loses his charisma then he loses his

authority. Then the cycle of charisma can be broken and the U.S. can build more effective

policies to deal with these organizations.

31

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