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TheAgrarianQuestion&FoodSovereigntyMovements:AComparativeAnalysisofCapitalism,theState,and‘Peasant’ClassDynamicsinBolivia&Nepal

MarkTilzeyPaper#27

Apirila–Abril–April24,25,262017

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TheAgrarianQuestionandFoodSovereigntyMovements:AComparativeAnalysisofCapitalism,

theState,and‘Peasant’ClassDynamicsinBoliviaandNepal

MarkTilzey

Abstract

Beginning in the 1990s,many states in the global South experienced a ‘secondwave’ofpopularprotests,ostensiblyagainstneoliberalpoliciesderivingfromtheglobalNorthernimperium,butactuallydirectedinamoreprofoundsenseagainstlong-standing social inequities and political marginalization arising fromentrenched oligarchical power and failed ‘pro-peasant’ agrarian reforms at thelevel of the state (albeit situated within the international context of ‘centre-periphery’relations).Whatwasdistinctiveabouttheseprotestswastheirbroadlyagrarian character and their ‘peasant’, and frequently indigenous, complexion.While re-affirming the anti-imperialism and national sovereignty claims of the‘first wave’ of anti-neoliberal protests of the 1980s, the ‘second wave’ wasremarkable for its articulation and valorization, in opposition inter alia to both‘orthodox’neoclassical ‘developmentalism’and‘progressivist’Marxism,ofapro-peasantpositionality,often in combinationwithanewconcernwith indigenousand gender rights, and environmental sustainability. These protests suggestedthat theagrarianquestionwas far fromdead,and that rumours to thecontrarywerepremature if thepeasantprotagonists themselvesweretohaveanysay inthematter.Theseagrarian-basedprotestsoftencoalescedaround thenotionoffood sovereignty, and the first decade of the newmillennium witnessed someremarkable political gains both nationally and internationally, the latter oftenpropelled through the new global network of ‘peasant’ organizations, La ViaCampesina. Perhaps the most remarkable political successes, however,particularlygiventhenearuniversaldominanceofneoliberalismuntiltheturnofthemillennium,haveoccurredatnational levelwiththeelectionofasignificantnumberofleft-leaningregimesandtheadoptionintheirneworinterimnationalconstitutions of formal commitments to food sovereignty. Since about 2010,however, a common trend in these states has been a disappointing lack ofprogress inthetranslationofsuchformalcommitments intosubstantivepoliciesandchange‘ontheground’.ThestatesthatbroadlyembodythesetrendsincludeBolivia,Ecuador,Nicaragua,andVenezuelainLatinAmerica,andNepalinAsia.

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Introduction

Thecurrentpaper,takingtwoofthesestates–BoliviaandNepal–ascasestudies,seeks both to understand the key dynamics of this remarkable phenomenon of‘peasant’protestmovementsagainstabackdropofneoliberalglobalization,andtodelineatesalientlessonsfromitasweenteraperiodofdeepeningeconomic,political, and agricultural/ecological contradictions both of and for global andnationalcapitalisms.Specifically,thepaperseekstounderstand:

• The political economic (and ecological) basis of these ‘peasant’ protestmovements;

• The reasons for their selective political success embodied particularly intheconstitutionalizationoffoodsovereignty;

• The reasons for the general failure substantively to build on thesesuccesses in theperiodsince2010by reference to the interplayof class,state,andcapitalistdynamics;

• Whether the original aims and objectives of these protest movementsremain relevant and feasible today, and if so, how, politically and agro-ecologically,theymightberevivedand(re)-enacted.

ContextualizingtheAgrarianQuestion:Capitalism,theState,and‘Peasant’Resistance

Theconventionalwisdomof the lastquartercenturyhasbeenthat theagrarianquestion isa thingof thepastand that somehow,within thehubristicmilieuoflatecapitalism,wehavebeenliberatedfromtheconstraintsofagriculture, land,and nature. Such a position is common to both orthodox, neoclassicaldevelopmentalismand‘progressivist’Marxism.Thepremiseunderlyingthispaper,however,isthattheagrarianquestion,farfrombeingdead,isarguablythemostfundamentalquestionof the21st century. Indeed, this is the century,wewouldsuggest, in which the current system of trans-nationalizing capitalism andimperialism,andtheneoliberalfoodregimewhichformsanintrinsicpartofit,arelikely to reach their reproductive limits across both ‘political’ and ‘biophysical’dimensions (Tilzey 2016a). In response to the growing contradictionsof and forcapitalism (ibid.), the outcome of the predatory character ofmonopoly-financecapital and the ‘new imperialism’ that now characterizesNorth-South relations,there seems to be a renewed imperative towrest control of global agriculture,land,andothernatural resources fromtheseclass forcesandplace them in thehandsofthe‘wretchedoftheEarth’forthepurposesofautonomous,egalitarian,democratic,andecologicallysustainabledevelopment.

In order better to understand the current conjuncture, comprising thecontradictory nature of globalizing capitalism and its state-level variations andmediations,asprovidingthegeneralized,‘structural’backdroptotheemergenceof peripheral ‘peasant’ protest, it is important to survey, necessarily briefly, theemergenceandevolutionoftheagrarianquestionfromitsfirstexplicitintellectualformulation towards the close of the 19th century. Following this ‘classical’

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formulation of the agrarian question in Europe by Kautsky (1899), the‘peripheries’ of the global capitalist system received relatively little analyticalattention from Marxist theorists. Nonetheless, the process of European andsubsequentlyNorthAmericanandJapaneseimperialexpansionwouldinspirethebasis of a new critique emanating from responsive nationalistic and communistmovements inthe‘periphery’, forwhichthemilitarized‘enclosure’oftheworld,through land alienation, forced production for export, the pillaging of mineralresources,andracialdomination,becamepriorityconcerns.Induecourse,thesemovementswouldcondenseandtransformthe‘classical’agrarianquestionintoaprojectofnationalliberation,nowseen,however,asmorethanameremeansofindustrialdevelopment,productivistagriculture,andproletarianizationofthebulkof the peasantry as propounded by bourgeois and orthodox socialist theoristsalike. The agrarian question in the ‘periphery’ would thus become intrinsicallylinked to the realizationofnational independence.Aswe shall see, the issueofwhetherthe‘national’questionisframedinsub-hegemonic(capitalist)reformistterms,orincounter-hegemonic(anti-capitalist)revolutionaryterms,seemstobecrucial to the resolution of the agrarian question in favour of the global‘dispossessed’.

The turning point in nationalist struggles was the victory of the Chinesecommunists, theMaoist vision of which eliminated ‘conservative’ forces in thecountrysideandsetinmotionanautonomousdevelopmentprogramme.Here,itshistoriccontributiontotheagrarianquestionwasthere-articulationofthehomeeconomy free from imperial intervention in away thatwould seek tomaintainrural-urbanpoliticalunityandinter-sectoralbalance,allwithinaself-financedandrural-basedindustrialtransformation.Asweshallsee,thiswasavisionthatwouldstronglyinformthe‘peasant’mobilizationsinNepalfromthe1990s.

In the remainder of the periphery, however, a variety of transitions wasimplementedgenerallywithoutmajorstructuralreforms,particularlylandreform.With few exceptions, the large majority of peripheral states evaded industrialtransition altogether, remaining agrarian, wholly disarticulated and perpetuallysubordinatetoimperialcapitalandtonationally-basedcompradorclasses(landedoligarchyandcompradorbourgeoisie) (de Janvry1981). The imperium,with thecollaborationoftheseclasses,engineeredanewinternationaldivisionoflabourinagriculture, marked by unprecedented food dependence in the South. Theperipheryenteredaseriousagrariancrisis in the1960sasaconsequenceof thesocially polarizing consequences of the ‘green revolution’, the exodus to urbancentresofmarginalizedpeasantry,andenhanceddebtcrisis.Itwasaccompaniedbyawaveofmassmobilizations,culminatingeitherinnewrevolutionaryrupturesbypeasantguerillaforces(Vietnam,Cuba,Angola,Mozambique)(Wolf1969),ormilitary coups under the aegis of the globalNorthern imperium (LatinAmerica,Congo,Ghana,theArabworld).Imperialism,however,wasatthisjunctureforcedtemporarily into retreat. Continuing dependency notwithstanding, imperialismacquiesced to theexpansionofpolitical sovereignty to theSouthand to limitedexperimentation with ‘articulated’ development as a social bulwark againstfurtherrevolutionaryupheaval.

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This interlude of ‘benign’ imperialism and relative in-dependence for theperiphery lastedonlyuntil the late1970s,however.At thispoint, theneoliberalprojectwaslaunchedbytheimperialNorth,astrategytorecuperatemonopolisticprofits and stave off an emergent South. In so doing, the project abandonedwhatever incipient policy commitment to ‘articulated’ development hadpreviouslyexisted.Neoliberalismheraldednotthe‘end’oftheagrarianquestion,butratherthere-launchingoftheagrarianquestionofmonopoly-financecapital.Through the instrument of debt leverage, the bulk of the global South wasgradually re-opened and placed at the disposal of trans-nationalizing capital.‘Disarticulated’developmentre-asserteditself,withconservativeforces,theagro-exporting oligarchies that had been reluctant adherents to ISI and land reformduringthe‘in-dependence’interlude,nowbenefittingfromthenewdependency.Thus, the highly indebted peripheral and semi-peripheral states in which theseclass forces predominated (counterposed to a burgeoning class of semi-proletarian‘peasantry’)were‘forced’(or,fromtheoligarchies’perspective,werehappy) to lift state controls on currencies, prices, capital and trade, roll backindustrial policies, privatize public enterprises and retreat to the export of cashcrops and minerals as a means of servicing debt (and making profits for theoligarchies). This trend received further reinforcement with the collapse of theSovietblocinthelate1980s,andthe1990sbecameadecadeofalmostunbridledneoliberalism.

The result of this resurgenceof neoliberal andmonopoly-finance capitalwas toshift once again the coordinatesof the agrarianquestion. The rural exodus andsemi-proletarianization of the peasantry continued unabated, but withoutabsorption of the (part)-expelled workforce into industrial employment as wassupposed to happen in a ‘classic’ agrarian transition to capitalism. Agro-exportcapital continued to marginalize the peasantry, while national industriescollapsed. This new ‘precarious’ workforce has remained to this day insecurelyemployed, under-employed, or unemployed (manifested most obviously in the‘informal’ economy), in constant flux between town and country, and acrossinternationalborders(growthoftheremittanceeconomy).Insteadoftheclassicaldichotomybetween‘peasants’(ormorepreciselyfarmers)and‘workers’seenin‘articulated’ development, and in transitions from the former to the latter, thephenomenon that has prevailed is that of permanent semi-proletarianization.Heretheexpelled,thepartiallyexpelled,andsuper-exploitedworkforcecompeteswiththoseinrelativelysecureemploymenttodrivedownwagesacrosstheboard,deliveringsuper-profitstotrans-nationalcapital.

This phenomenon has been interpreted, by both orthodox ‘development’theoristsand‘progressive’Marxistsalike,asthe‘disappearance’ofthepeasantry– for the latter, it is now simply an ‘agrarian question of labour’ in which the‘peasantry’merelyconstituteaslightlydifferentformoftheproletariat(Bernstein2010). Nonetheless, members of the semi-proletariat themselves have neverabandoned the agrarian question or the land question (de Janvry 1981). Thedemand for land has expanded in rural areas, and it continues to be seen asfundamental to the reproduction of the household. Indeed, themost politically

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significanttrendoverthelasttwoorthreedecadeshasbeentheupsurgeinlandoccupationsinthecountrysideoftheSouth.Thispoliticallyreflexiveresponsebythesemi-proletariatasagenthasplacedtheagrarianquestionontheagendaasanagrarianquestionoflandaccessandofrightsforthe‘peasantry’.So,accesstoland for the expelled or partially expelled is now also a question of regainingaccess to basic citizenship and social rights, or perhaps to claiming ‘realcitizenship’ beyond bourgeois superficialities that has never yet been their (seeMooers2014,Tilzey2016b).

Wearecurrentlyinthemidstofamonumental,epochalcrisisofneoliberalism,ifnotyetofcapitalismingeneral. Imperialmonopoly-financecapitalhasescalateditsaccumulationoflandandnaturalresourcesintheperipheries,yetitfacesthreepoliticalchallengeshere(tosaynothingoflongertermbiophysicalconstraintstowhich these are, in varying degrees, conjoined). The first two represent sub-hegemonic challenges to the hegemony of neoliberalism: firstly, the nationalsovereignty regime established in the 20th century, although attenuated, isnonethelessstillexercisedevenbythesmallstates;secondly,theemergingsemi-peripheries (the sub-imperium), the unintended consequence of globalization,which, although not radical in themselves, have created new spaces andopportunities formanoeuvre by peripheral states. This sub-hegemonic trend isitself not without its own internal contradictions, these being intrinsic tocapitalismanditsnecessarilystate-basedform(Tilzey2016a).Monopolisticfirmsarespringingupinthesub-imperium(China, India,Brazil,SouthAfrica,etc.)andscramblingthemselvesfornaturalresources,land,andfoodsupplies.TheirhomestatesmaynotbemilitarizingimperialisminthemanneroftheglobalNorth,andthey do oftenmaintain a higher commitment to the sovereignty regime and tonationaldevelopment.Moreover,theeconomicflowsusheredinacrosstheSouthhavepermittedsometocircumventtheWesterndebttrap,aswiththe‘pinktide’states of Latin America. But all are, nonetheless, subject to the socially andecologicallycontradictorydynamicsofcapitalism.

The agrarian question now certainly remains a question of national sovereigntyunderconditionsofimperialismandsub-imperialism,therefore.Butthereisalsonow a tension between national sovereignty as the ‘old’, reformist vision ofarticulated capitalist development (even as a means to socialism), on the onehand, and national sovereignty as a ‘new’, revolutionary, vision of pro-peasant,pro-environmental, and possibly post-developmental anti-capitalism, on theother.Itisthelatterthatrepresentsthethird,orcounter-hegemonic,challengetoneoliberalism. Questions of gender equity, indigenism, and ecologicalsustainabilityare,inadditiontoclass,nowcentraltothislattervision.Thepoliticalquestionnowappearstobe:whattypeofpoliticalorganizationcanattendtothesemi-proletariat, not to transform it into a proletariat or a class of commercialfarmersinafulltransitiontocapitalism,butrathertore-valorizeitsidentityasapeasantrythroughaccesstolandandthefulfilmentofitsvocationassmall-scaleandecologically-basedprovidersofsecurefoodsuppliesforthemselves,thelocalcommunity,andthenation–inshort,foodsovereignty.

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Inresponsetodeepenedneoliberalimperialismandaresurgentlandedoligarchy,the ‘peasantry’ have, against all expectations and predictions of their demise,risen up. From the 1990s, rural protest movements have proliferated in LatinAmerica (Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia), Africa (most notablyZimbabwe), and Asia (particularly Nepal, but also India, Philippines) to pursuenoneotherthantherecuperationoflandbymeansofmassoccupations,amongother tactics. The environmental cause has become one of their priorities,particularly in Latin America, given that the destruction wrought by extractivecapitaloccursmostimmediatelyattheexpenseofmarginalizedcommunities.Thisexplains, at least inpart,why these ruralmobilizationshaveoften incorporatedindigenousrights,feminist,andenvironmentalmovements.

Itisonlyinahandfulofcases,however,these‘peasant’protestmovementshavesucceeded in gaining some political power at the level of the state (Bolivia,Ecuador,Venezuela,Zimbabwe,Nepal)andhavebeenable, interalia, to securecommitments in their respective national constitutions to the principle of foodsovereignty.Inmostcases,evenhere,however,suchaccesstothestatehasbeenpossibleonlythroughfragileallianceswithanemergent,sub-hegemonic,nationaland anti-imperialist bourgeoisie. This means that such alliances have, from theoutset, tended tocompromiseandsubvert theoriginalambitionsof theprotestmovement. While these national bourgeoisies, together crucially with a pettybourgeoisie of upper peasantry, still nurture visions of ‘articulated’ capitalistdevelopment, (with the peasantry transformed into capitalist farmers and/or afullyproletarianizedworkforce),the(middleandlower)peasantryitselfseemstohaveotherideas.Theyappeartobeproposinganalternativesocietywhichtakesseriously ‘re-peasantization’ or re-agrarianization as amodern project (althoughcallingstronglyontraditionsdrawnfromthepast),alongwithcooperativeformsof production and labour absorption. What appears perhaps most distinctiveaboutthisnewvision,atleastinitsLatinAmericanvariant,isthede-legitimationofcapitalism,forpolitical,cultural,andecologicalreasons,bothasanendinitselfandasaputativetransitionalpathwaytosocialism.

KeyPrinciplesUnderlyingCapital-State-ClassDynamicsoftheAgrarianQuestion

Implicitinthischaracterizationoftheagrarianquestionisanumberoftheoreticalprinciples which enable us to understand its dynamics in general, and, inparticular, to understandwhy ‘counter-hegemonic’ peasant protestmovementsareaphenomenonoftheglobalSouth.Thefirstgeneralprincipletounderstandisthat capital-state dynamics are characterized not merely by inter-classcontestation,forexamplebetweencapitalandthe‘classesoflabour’,butalsobyintra-class contestation, for example, between the different class fractions ofcapital. These inter- and intra-class relations may also be characterized, indifferentconjunctures,byalliancesandco-optationasmuchasbycontestation.We need, therefore, to pay particular attention to the ‘political’ dynamics ofaccommodation and resistance between neoliberalism (in the present

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conjuncture, usually the hegemonic class fraction) and other capitalist classfractions, notably sub-hegemonic movements (other, particularly nationally-focused, forms of capitalism), and between these fractions and counter-hegemonic movements (advocates of anti-capitalism). Rather than the simplebinaryof‘corporatecapital’or‘empire’versusthe‘multitude’thatappearstobeacommonassumptionamongstfoodmovementactivistsandscholars,therefore,thepicturepresentedhereisoneofaspectrumofresistancestoneoliberalismofboth a ‘systemic’ (varieties of capitalism) and an ‘anti-systemic’ (anti-capitalist)kind.

Thispicture is further complicatedby theenduring,dialectical relationbetweencapitalism and the state, which, through processes of class co-optation andcompromise,blursboundariesbetweencapitalismandits‘other’. Thus,throughhegemony,andwithinthenecessarycontextofthestate-capitalnexusasItermit(Tilzey2016a),capitalismhasbeenremarkablysuccessful inneutralizingandco-opting resistance to its exploitative dynamic. This success, however, has beenlocated differentially in the global North. An essential part of this ability toneutralizeandco-optresistancederivesfromthecapitalistworldsystem’sbroadlybi-polar structure: the socially ‘articulated’ states of the global North, and the‘disarticulated’ states of the global South.1 Tendentially, oppositional relationsbetween capitalist and non-capitalist classes in ‘articulated’ states have beendefused by ‘flanking’ measures based on (re)-distributional, nation-building,environmental and other policies, together with the bestowal of (bourgeois)citizenshiprights(Chibber2013,Mooers2014,MoyoandYeros2011).

In the face of increased neoliberal class exploitation, attempts to sustain thiscompact in the global North have been undertaken increasingly by means ofimperialrelations,both‘informal’(economic)and‘formal’(politico-military),withtheglobalSouth.SurplusvaluefromtheclassesoflabornowflowsfromSouthtoNorth, ‘subsidized’ by the massive and destructive hemorrhage of ‘ecologicalsurplus’ that liesbehind this relationship (Exneretal. 2013,Moore2015, Smith2016). Burgeoning levels of social and ecological dislocation in the South havebeentheconsequenceof thisextractiverelationship.Neoliberalismhassimilarlysubverted the incipient processes of nation-building in the South that hadcharacterized the Keynesian ‘developmentalist’ era. Resurgent neoliberalprimitiveaccumulation,withthestateactingasanorganoftheexpropriatorsandagro-exporting fractions of capital, have served to undermine the legitimacyfunctions of the capital-state nexus throughout much of the global South. Theoutcome of this ‘new imperial’2 relationship between North and South (Smith

1Socialdisarticulationoccurswhenthestate-capitalnexusisinterestedinitslaborforceprincipallyfromtheperspectiveofproduction(itsabilitytogeneratesurplusvalue)andnotprimarilyfromtheperspectiveofconsumption(therealizationofsurplusvaluethroughthesaleofcommodities).Socialarticulationimpliesacomplementaritybetweentheroleofthelaborforceasproducersandconsumers,orasituationinwhichtheirroleasconsumersoutweighstheirsignificanceasproducers.2Althoughcircuitsoftransnationalcapitalareperforcenolongernation-based,thewholelogicofimperialismarisesfromthetransferofvaluefromtheSouthtotheimperiuminordertosustainthepolitical-economicpowerandintegrityofthelatter,arelationsustainedonlybytheimperialstate’scapacitytoactasguarantorofitstransnationalcapitalistinterests.

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2016)isthatcitizensoftheformerareaccordedprivilegesdeniedtothoseinthecapitalistperiphery(see,forexample,Mooers2014).

This legitimacydeficit intheglobalSouth,togetherwiththe‘formal’ratherthan‘real’subsumptionwithincapitalofthesemi-proletarianmajority,carrieswithit,however, the increased likelihood of challenge to the state-capital nexus bycounter-hegemonicforces.Attemptedre-appropriationsofthestatebycounter-hegemonic social forces are implied, comprising re-assertions of national, andpossiblypost-nationalandpost-capitalistic, formsof sovereignty3. Such ‘radical’counter-hegemonicsocialforcespotentiallychallengetheessentialfoundationsofcapitalism,potentially propounding amoreMarxian (changed social relationsofproduction, reversal of primitive accumulation), rather than Polanyian(‘embedding’ of capitalism), imaginary of social relational transformation (Tilzey2016b). Nonetheless, these global Southern re-assertions of sovereignty in itsnational form,arecharacterizedbystrongambiguity. Theycompriseacomplexmélange of sub-hegemonic (national capital fractions, petty bourgeois upperpeasantry) and counter-hegemonic (lower/middle peasantry, landless,proletarians,and indigenous)social forces.Theassertionofnational sovereigntyhere, as a counter-narrative to neoliberalism, represents a tension betweenpopulist, sub-hegemonic, ‘neo-developmentalism’, on the one hand, and(potentially) counter-hegemonic ‘post-developmentalism’ (combiningenvironmentalism, indigenism, re-peasantization, agroecology and foodsovereignty),ontheother(VeltmeyerandPetras2014).

ThismaybedescribedasaGramscianandPoulantzianviewof the state-capitalnexus, combined with a concern to understand their differing, but dialecticallyrelated, forms between the North and the South. Thus, Poulantzas, much likeGramsci,definedthefunctionofthestatenotsimplyintermsoftheinterestsofcapitalistclassfractions,butalso intermsoftheneedtosecurethecohesionofsocietyasawhole.Forthestateproperlytofunctionasacapitaliststate,itmustbeabletogoagainsttheindividualandparticularfractionalinterestsofcapitalistsinordertoactintheirgeneralinterestasaclass.Thestatemustalsobe‘relativelyautonomous’ from the interests and demands of capitalists. Although this givesthestateanappearanceofneutrality,however,itsclasscharacterisimplicitinitsfunction in relationtocapitalist society.ForPoulantzas, then, thestateprovidesthe institutional space for various fractions of the capitalist class, in additionpossibly tootherclasses, tocometogetherand form longer-termstrategiesandalliances, while at the same time, the state disorganizes non-capitalist classesthroughvariousmeansofco-optationanddivision.

ThisPoulantzian,ratherthanPolanyian,view,suggeststhatglobalcapitalismanditsstateformareratherlessmonolithic,andmorefractured,thanabinaryviewof‘corporateempire’versus ‘society’ would suggest. There is, firstly, an evident tension between the desire oftransnational capitalist fractions to transcend the state and implant a global system of 3Theothersideofthispictureis,ofcourse,theincreaseduseofcoercionandviolencebytheperipheralstate-capitalnexusintheexerciseofprimitiveaccumulation,frequentlysupportedfinanciallyandmilitarilybytheimperialpowerswhosecorporationsbenefitdirectlyfromtheexpropriationoflandandresourcesfrompeasantandindigenouspopulationsforthepurposesofagro-exportormineral/fossilfuelextraction.

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‘frictionless’capital flows4,ontheonehand,andtheneedby imperialstates,particularly,tocontinuetorespondtomorenationally-basedclassfractionsandtosecurelegitimacyamongstthenon-capitalistcitizenry,ontheother.Secondly,giventhenecessarilystate-securednatureofcapitalism,theemergenceofsemi-peripheralstatesastheoutcomeof‘globalization’(notablytheBRICS)contendingtobecomemembersoftheimperiumandrespondingtonationally-basedclassfractions,representsresistancetoneoliberalismbysub-hegemonicsocialforces.Thirdly,theburgeoningsocialandecologicalcontradictionsofimperialrelationsconcentratedlargelyintheSouth, and perpetuated by policies of neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism, and by‘peripheral’ formsof surplusappropriationmoregenerally,aregenerating resistances to thestate-capital nexus by ‘radical’ counter-hegemonic social movements. There are multipleincoherenciesinthecurrentconjuncture.ThesearepotentiallymostdisruptivetheglobalSouthbecause, as a periphery for the core, it is here that the contradictions of accumulation aregreatest and the legitimacyof the state is lowest. Consequently, it is in the South that thepotentialfortransformationstowards‘radical’,counter-hegemonicfuturesappearsgreatest.

In order to illustrate these theoretical arguments, this paper examines thedynamicsofagrarianclassstruggle,capitalism,andthestateinBoliviaandNepal.TheBoliviancase,forexample,demonstratesclearlytheinadequacyofanysimplebinaryassumption relating toa fully trans-nationalizedcapital/state,on theonehand, and an oppositional, united ‘multitude’, on the other. The picture isconsiderablymore nuanced than this. This case study suggests, firstly, that thestate, as a ‘social relation condensing the balance of class forces’ (Poulantzas1975, Jessop 2016), continues to be the key nexus through which capitalaccumulation is both secured and its contradictions ameliorated or legitimated.Secondly, that there is no one, undifferentiated capitalist class, but ratherfluctuatingintra-capitalistcontestationandalliancebetweenthreemainfractions:trans-nationalcapital,national landedoligarchy(hegemonicfractions),andsmallcommercial farmers (‘upper peasantry’) and entrepreneurs (sub-hegemonicfractions).Thirdly,thatthereisnounified‘peasantway’inputativeoppositionto‘Empire’. Rather, we witness clear class differentiation between a commercial‘upper peasantry’, espousing an increasingly capitalist rationality, and a class ofsemi-proletarians and landless who constitute themiddle and lower peasantry,andcleavetoanon-oranti-capitalistethos(counter-hegemonicclass).InBolivia,the sub-hegemonic class fractions have exploited widespread anti-neoliberalsentimenttoinstall inpowerthepopulistMovimientoalSocialismo(MAS)party.MAS, despite its pro-peasant and indigenous rhetoric, does not support thesmaller peasantry and landless in their agrarian struggles, however. Rather, itengages in an alliance with transnational, extractive capital selectively to

4Transnationalcapitalmaywantaglobalstate,buttrans-nationalizationandthesimultaneoustranscendenceofthenation-stateisadifficultacttopulloff,preciselybecauseofthenecessarilyunevendevelopmentofcapitalism,andneoliberalismespecially,andtheresultinglegitimacycrisesthatensue.Weretransnationalcapitalpermittedsimplytooperateonthebasisoftheglobalfreemovementofcapitalandlabourwithoutthecurrentlabourarbitrageandbeneficialtransfersofvaluetotheimperiumthatcurrentlyobtain,legitimacycriseswouldsoonerorlaterbeinevitable.ThecollapseoftheDohaRoundwaspreciselytheresultoftheimperium’sreluctancetoabandonasymmetriesinprotectionthatpermitit‘tohaveitscakeandeatit’.Buteventheseasymmetricalprotectionsvis-à-vistheSouthhaveproveninadequatetoinsulatetheNorthfromthelimitsoflegitimacythataremanifestinBrexitandTrumpism.So,thenation-statedoesseemtobeprofoundlynecessaryforthesurvivalofcapitalismifbothaccumulationandlegitimacyfunctionsaretobefulfilled.

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‘compensate’,viastatewelfareschemes,forthesocio-ecologicaldysfunctionalityofcapitalism,whilstadvancingtheinterestsofitsowncoresupportamongstthe‘upperpeasantry’(cocaleros).Inthisway,thepotentialcounter-hegemonyofthesemi-proletariat,landless,andindigenouspeoples,isbothdulledbymeansoftheMAS ‘compensatory state’ and thwarted by the opposed class interests of the‘upperpeasantry’,thelandedoligarchy,andtrans-nationalextractivecapital.Thisprocess of class co-optation and division has also been facilitated by thedeploymentofpost-classistandpopulistindigenistidentitypolitics,characteristicof the ‘new social movements’. While, as we shall, deployment of ethnic andindigenousidentityhasbeenanimportantfactorinfomentingpopulardiscontentandanti-neoliberalmobilization,andhence in supporting the riseof left-leaningregimes such as Bolivia and Ecuador, it has, by the same token, helped toobfuscate real class divisions and, thereby, subvert resolution of the agrarianquestioninfavourofthesemi-proletariatandlandless.

Differentiationof‘Peasant’MobilizationbetweenStates

Theprevioussectionidentifiedanumberofgeneralconceptualtoolswhichhelpus to explain why ‘counter-hegemonic’ ‘peasant’ mobilizations, as foodsovereigntymovements, have a tendency to arise in the global South, andhowthere is then thepotential for their co-optation inpopulist regimes (oroutrightrepression where the regime remains oligarchical). This does not explain,however, the clear differentiation between states in the global South in thedegree to which suchmobilizations have succeeded in unifying at the nationallevel, in subsequently overthrowing neoliberal regimes, and in institutingconstitutional and policy change, including provisions for food sovereignty. Thekey to successful anti-neoliberal protest in states such as Bolivia and Ecuadorappearstobefoundedontheabilitytodeployethnicandindigenous,inadditionto‘peasant’positionalities,asan‘anti-systemic’‘masterframe’(Rice2012).But,inordertofollowthroughon‘counter-hegemonic’transformation,andtoavoidco-optationintoreformism,thereseemstobeaneedtoretain,ortoidentify,aclassbasis for struggleasa complement, not as a negation, of thewider indigenous,ethnic ‘master frame’. Similarly, the indigenous, ethnic and ‘new socialmovement’ ‘master frame’ should not be deployed to deny the profoundimportanceofclass.

Thekey, inturn,toexplainingwhythisshouldhavebeenthecaseinBoliviaandEcuador,andnot inneighbouringAndeanstatesofChileandPeru, forexample,seemsto lie intheway inwhichthepeasantry,andtoacertainextentworkers,werehistoricallyincorporatedintothestate.InthecasesofBoliviaandEcuador,ethnic identities and forms of mobilization came to dominate class-basedorganization. By contrast, in neighbouring states such as Chile and Peru, thedistinct modes of popular political incorporation produced a dynamic wherebyclass-based identities and organizational forms came to dominate ethnicidentification. Strong and cohesive indigenous movements tend to emerge instates, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, where the peasantry has been politically

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incorporatedbymulti-class,populistparties,asopposedtothosestates,suchasChile andPeru,withahistoricalpatternofpeasantmobilizationbypartieswithself-proclaimedMarxist affinities. The grassrootsmobilizations of theseMarxistparties tended to create horizontal forms of organization, such as cooperativesandpeasantunions,whichcompetedwith,andinpartservedtoundermine,moretraditional, indigenous associational forms, such as ayllus and comunas. Incontrast, the vertical lines of dependence established between indigenouspeoples and populist or clientelist parties did not replace the horizontalorganizationalbondsof indigenouscommunities, and thecreationof competingclass-based bonds was less extensive than under explicitly leftist forms ofincorporation.Consequently,withtheadventofneoliberalismintheglobalSouthand the severingof corporatist tiesof thepeasantry to the state, itwasonly incertain states that conditions existed for the re-emergence of indigenous andethnicidentitiesasaplatformforwidespread,andagrarian-based,anti-neoliberalprotest.

In this way, it would seem that the mode of peasant incorporation into themodern, capitalist (peripheral) state sheds considerable light on the conditionsthatfacilitateorinhibitthearticulationof,intheAndeancase,ethnicidentitiesasa ‘master frame’ of anti-neoliberal protest. Following Yashar (1999) and Rice(2012),itispossibletodefinetheperiodofincorporationofthepeasantryasthefirst and sustained attempt at agrarian reform in a state, that is thetransformationofpre-capitalist tocapitalist social relationsprincipallybymeansof the ‘Junker road’,or the ‘farmer road’ (de Janvry1981).Thus, itwas throughagrarian reform, specifically the destruction of pre-capitalist and semi-servilelabour relations, that the ruralmasses in Latin Americawere first incorporatedinto themodern,peripheral capitalist state.Prior to theseagrarian reforms, theindigenouspeasantrywaslargelyunderthepoliticalcontroloftheruraloligarchy,andthusunavailableasapotentialbaseofsupportforcontestationbyclassesandclassfractionsinandaroundthestate.Henceforth,therewouldbeaninstitutionalseparation,characteristicof themoderncapitalist state,betweenthe ‘economy’and the ‘polity’, whereby ‘struggle’ would be confined to the realm of the‘political’,whiledemands formoreprofound ‘social relational’ transformation inthe ‘economy’ would be absorbed, within the limits of the capitalist state, byreformism.

Inthisway,twopatternsofpeasantincorporationmaybedistinguished:agrarianradicalism,associatedwiththe‘farmerroad’toagrariancapitalism,wherebyclasscontestationaroundthestatesoughttoorganizeandmobilizethesupportofthepeasantry, and, in the process, offered it up for incorporation into the politicalsystemby theMarxist left. This type of incorporation is evident in the cases ofChile and Peru (the latter in the 1969-1975 reform period) (de Janvry 1981).Agrarianconservatism,associatedwiththe‘Junkerroad’, istheprocesswherebythepeasantrywasde-politicizedandcontrolledbythestate/politicalpartiesandeventually incorporated into the polity by means of patron-client linkages tomulti-classpopulist parties. This second typeof incorporation, demonstratedbythecasesofBolivia(1953-1964)andEcuador(1964-1976),wasmoreconduciveto

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the eventual politicization of ethnic cleavages, since it allowed local indigenouscommunalstructuresandassociationalformstoremainmoreorlessintact.Ethnicidentities took on greater political salience in these two states following theerosion of corporatist and clientelist linkages to parties under the pressures ofneoliberalreformsinthe1980s(Rice2012).

In Bolivia, organized workers in the mining sector were historically the centralprotagonists of popular struggle. Since the 1952 ‘revolution’ that brought thepopulistMNRtopower,Bolivia’s strong,Marxist-oriented labourmovementhashadatenuousrelationshiptothegoverningparty.Thepeasantry,however,wasdepoliticized after the revolution and tied to the party through an elaboratesystem of state corporatism and clientilism. While labour in Bolivia has beenorganizedaroundclass-basedentities,theincorporationofthepeasantryintothepolitical system followed a populist, clientilist pattern. The contemporaryindigenousmovement, and agrarian protest of which it forms an integral part,reflect these contradictory legacies. Thus, while strong at the national level,enablingEvoMoralestosweeptopower,itcontinuestobedividedbycompetingclass and, potentially obfuscating, ethnicity-based demands, which render itsusceptibletoco-optationintoreformism.Thisgoessomewaytowardsexplainingthe initial success, and subsequent disappointment, of counter-hegemonicmobilizationsinbothBoliviaandEcuador.

In consequence, the Bolivian and Ecuadorian experiences of agrarian andindigenous-based mobilizations from the 1990s are very similar. Thus, anti-neoliberal agrarian protests were undertaken largely by the semi-proletarianpeasantry,locatedmainlyintheAndes,andbytribal/communitarian,indigenousgroups in the eastern lowlands (Oriente). The latter, in particular, have beenadversely affected by the mineral/oil extractive and agri-food industries. Thepeasantry’s protests hark back to the incomplete land reforms and unresolvedagrarian question of previous developmentalist episodes, characterized by the‘Junker road’ to capitalism, whereby the landed oligarchy was the principalbeneficiary of reform. Their primary demand is for adequate land for self-subsistence as a matter of priority, and relief from the precarity of semi-proletarian existence. Somemay aspire tobecomemembers of the commercial(petty bourgeois) upper peasantry, but these are a minority. These protests,makingthemdistinct frompreviousmobilizations,alsohaveanoverlayof ‘post-developmental’ discourse, comprising concern for issues of indigeneity, gender,and ecology. In some respects, therefore, these protests have become ‘post-classist’,buttheclassproblematicnonethelessremainsstrong,whileexhibitingastrong indigenous inflection. These groups, in essence, are looking beyondcapitalism and the capitalist state, in other words, beyond reformism. Theiradvocacy, then, appears to be directed, via profound social relational changeawayfromcapitalism,towardswhatmightbetermedlivelihoodsovereignty–theability to lead fulfilling lives in socially and ecological sustainable ways, free ofexploitationandthecompulsiontoselllabourpowertoothers.

But these ‘radical’, counter-hegemonic groups have run up against, andsometimes been co-opted by, reformist, sub-hegemonic, nationally defined,discourses of sovereignty, including food sovereignty as productivist, national

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agriculture. This discourse is articulated also by the small class of commercialfamilyfarmers(thatis,theformer‘upperpeasantry’,notthecapitalistestatesofthe oligarchy), for example, the cocaleros of Bolivia. These sub-hegemonicconstituencies take their reformist cue, in part, from former developmentalistepisodes,suchastheMNRinthecaseofBolivia,apopulistmovementthatsoughtto build national ‘articulated’ development. The populist regimes ofMorales inBolivia and Correa in Ecuador articulate these sub-hegemonic discourses, andhave utilized widespread anti-neoliberal sentiment to forge alliances withcounter-hegemonic groups, united by a rhetoric of anti-colonialism/imperialismand of indigenous revival and livelihood principles such as buen vivir. But thisrhetorical ‘master frame’ hides the class divisions and real motivations thatunderlie the populist projects – those of favouring small scale and nationalcapitalists through reformism, whilst largely neglecting the counter-hegemonicaims, and current reproductive crisis, of the peasantry and lowland indigenousgroups.

Bolivia:TheAgrarianQuestionandtheSubversionofCounter-HegemonythroughReformism

WenowexaminethecaseofBolivia,anexemplarofthetrends identified intheprevioussection

Bolivia, like many other countries in the global South and in Latin America,underwent a neoliberal ‘structural adjustment policy’ (SAP) during the 1980s.Thus, Bolivia’s ‘New Economic Policy’ of 1985 dismantled public services andexposedthepeasantryand indigenousgroups toenhancedcapitalaccumulationby the agri-food oligarchy and transnational corporations. Neoliberal policiesreachedapeakofunpopularitywith theprivatizationof the state-ownedwatercompanySEMAPA(ServicioMunicipaldeAguaPotableyAlcantarillado),sparkingtheresulting‘CochabambaWaterWar’.ThismobilizationcombinedwithmassiveprotestsbyBolivia’slargestunionofpeasants(theruralworkers’union,CSUTCB,(Confederacion Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinas de Bolivia) and ageneral strike called by the non-rural workers’ union, the COB (Central ObreraBoliviana).ThreeyearsofclashesbetweenprotestersandtheoligarchicstateledultimatelytothetopplingoftwoBolivianpresidents.The2005electionwitnessedaclearvictoryforEvoMorales,the leaderofthecocagrowers’union.Hisparty,MAS(MovimientoalSocialismo),wasclosely linkedtotheemergent indigenous,anti-colonial,andpopulistsocialmovementsthathadcoalesced inoppositiontotheneoliberalreformsofthe1990sandbeyond.Thisbroadcoalitionofpeasant,indigenous, andworker organizations formed the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact)whichwasessential inMorales’risetopowerandbecameintegrated,tovaryingdegrees, within the new regime (Fabricant 2012, Webber 2015, McKay et al.2014).

An important source of rural anti-neoliberal protest derived from the parlousconditionofthepeasantryinBolivia,particularlythemiddleandlowerpeasantry.Thus,ruralclassstructureinBoliviaischaracterizedbyaconcentrationoflandinthe hands of a few, and large numbers of often landless peasants. Haciendas

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occupy ninety per cent of Bolivia's productive land, leaving only ten per centdivided between mostly indigenous peasant communities and smallholdingpeasants.Fourhundredindividualsownseventypercentofproductiveland,whilethere are two and a half million landless peasants in a country of ninemillionpeople (seventy-seven per cent of peasants are indigenous) (Enzinna 2007,Webber2015).

Ofthe446,000peasantproductionunitsremaininginthecountrytoday,225,000arelocatedinthealtiplano,164,000inthevalleydepartments(yungas),andonly57,000 in the eastern low- lands. Capitalist relations of production nowpredominate in the eastern lowlands and are increasingly displacing small-scalepeasantproduction in thevalleysandaltiplano,althoughthe lattercontinuestobe themost important formofproduction in thealtiplano (OrmacheaSaavedra2007).(Thealtiplanoaccountsforonlynineteenpercentoftotalcultivatedland.)Theruralpopulationisdiminishingthroughoutthecountryasprocessesofsemi-proletarianizationandproletarianizationacceleratewiththegradualexpansionofcapitalist relationsofproductiontoallpartsof thecountry (OrmacheaSaavedra2007). From the early 1970s,migrant semi-proletarians provided theworkforceforsugarcaneandcottonharvestsinthelowlands,while,fortherestoftheyear,theymaintainedsmallplotsoflandinthehighlanddepartmentsfromwhichtheyprimarilytravelled(that is,Cochabamba,Potosi,andChuquisaca).Between1976and1996,ruralpopulationasapercentageoftotalpopulationfellfromfifty-nineto thirty-nine percent (Pacheco Balanza and Ormachea Saavedra 2000). Thisdeclinewascausedbytwomainfactors:decliningproductioninthealtiplanoduetosoilexhaustionandincreasingdivisionoflandintominifundiosovertimeduetopopulationexpansion;andincreasedcapitalizationofagricultureinthelowlands,leadingtodecreasedemploymentopportunities(PachecoBalanzaandOrmacheaSaavedra2000).Thissqueezehasaccentuatedthedifferentiationofthepeasantryinto rich, medium, and poor strata. 1988 survey data suggest that seventy-sixpercentofpeasantrywerepoorpeasants(lackingmeanstoreproducetheirfamilylabour-power on their own land and obliged to sell labour elsewhere on atemporarybasis).Mediumpeasantsconstitutedelevenpercentof thepeasantry(defined as family units able to reproduce labour without selling labour-powerelsewhere). Rich peasants (making a profit after reproducing their family andmeans of production, and purchasing the labour of poorer peasants and usingmoderntechnology)comprisedthirteenpercent(OrmacheaSaavedra2007).Thisprocess of peasant differentiation has only accelerated since then (the middlebeingsqueezed),with richerpeasantsbecomingcommercial farmers (OrmacheaSaavedra2007).

To what extent has the Morales regime addressed these contradictions of thepeasantry? Following on the demands for a constituent assembly made byindigenousandpeasantorganizations,Moralesinitiatedaprocessthroughwhichanewconstitutionwouldbewritteninwhichprovisionwastobemadefor‘foodsovereignty’.Whentheconstitutionwasfinallyapprovedin2009,itincludedfoodsovereignty as a central element of several sections of the document. First, itrefers (Article 255) to food sovereignty in the context of international relationsand treaties, suggesting that they must function to meet the interests andsovereignty, including food sovereignty, of the people (Bolivian Constitution2009). Second, the chapter on Sustainable Integrated Rural Developmentemphasizes food sovereignty as integral to rural development, laying out the

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objective to ‘ensure food security and sovereignty, prioritizing domesticproduction and consumption…and establishing mechanisms to protect Bolivianagriculture(BolivianConstitution2009,Article405)(Fabricant2012,McKayetal.2014).Itisimportanttonotethatthesestatementscouldbetakentomeaneitherproductivism and developmentalism, or amore pro-peasant and agroecologicalprogramme,or indeedboth.Asweshall see, theemphasishas tendedtobeonthefirstoftheseoptionsratherthanthesecond.

The position of theMorales regimewith respect to food sovereignty is furtherclarified in the first National Development Plan defined in 2006. Here foodsovereigntywasidentifiedasakeyelementinthe‘newvisionfordevelopment’,thevision in factbeingvery reformist incharacteranddrawing inspiration fromtheMAS’populistpredecessor, theMNR,whichcametopower in the1950s. In2008, the ‘new vision’ was elaborated into the Rural Development and FoodSovereignty and Food Security Policy (PSSA), and this was to be implementedthroughfourmainprogrammes:

1. SEMBRAR, promoting private-public partnerships and largely dependenton overseas development assistance for short-term investment projectsdesigned to increase food production (Ministerio de Desarollo Rural yTierras(MDRyT)2010,63);

2. CRIAR, financing community-led initiatives to support small-scaleagriculture(MDRyT2010);

3. EMPODERAR,fundingagro-entrepreneurialdevelopmentprojects(MDRyT2010);

4. Promotion of Agroecological Production (Fomento a la ProduccionEcologica/Organica),supportingagroecologicalproducerswithproductionandmarketing(MDRyT2010,66).

These programmes relied upon external funding and did not significantlyrestructure agriculture and governance (McKay et al. 2014) and, by definition,therefore,didnotchangetherelationsofproduction,orsocial-propertyrelations,uponwhich any transition to amore ‘radical’ vision of food sovereignty wouldhavedepended.

ApotentiallymoredirectmeansofengenderingfoodsovereigntytooktheformofBolivia’s ‘Agrarian Revolution’ under the 2006 Ley de Reconduccion no. 3545(Extension Law). This redefined natural resources as state property, and placedgreateremphasisonstatecontrolandoversightoflandconsolidationandlabourrelations.Theprogrammehasfourmainpolicyaims:

1. Thedistributionofstate-ownedlandandredistributionbyexpropriationoflandnotservinga‘socio-economicfunction’(FES)inrespectofindigenouspeoplesandpeasantcommunities;

2. Themechanizationofagriculture;3. Subsidizedcreditsforsmall-scaleproducers;4. Marketsfortheproductsofpeasantorigin.

Theredistributionofland,unfortunately,haslargelyfailedtohappen,sothatthemain beneficiaries of this reform have been the small commercial farms of theupper peasantry (the crucial petty bourgeois constituency for the populist

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reformists).Moreover, the agrarian oligarchy of the eastern lowlands has beenleft essentially intact (Fabricant 2012, Webber 2015). Thus, superficially, theagrarian reformappeared to be relatively successful,withmore than thirty-onemillionhectaresbeingtitledandover100,000ofthesetitlesbeingdistributedto174,249beneficiaries(McKayetal.2014,INRA2010,Redoetal.2011).However,crucially, ninety per cent of titled land has ‘been endowed by the state and iscomposedentirelyofforestreserves’(Redoetal.2011,237).Thus,lessthantenpercentofthereformsectorhasactuallybeenredistributedtothosewhoneeditmost. So, while the ‘Agrarian Revolution’ was ‘intended’ to challenge theprevailingandunequalagrarianstructure,ithasfailedtodoso.Forexample,thelandceilingof5000hectaresinthereformhasbeenrenderedeffectivelyobsoleteby Article 315 (II) which states that if a corporation has several ‘owners’ or‘partners’, each can have amaximumof 5000 hectares,making land size limitsvirtually non-existent (McKay et al. 2014). Furthermore, the land ceiling appliesonlytolandacquiredafter2009,exacerbatingitsineffectiveness.Theprovisionofcredit for agriculturalmechanization is also clearly designed to benefit the newclassof small commercial farms,not themiddleand lowerpeasantries,whileofcoursebeing,atthesametime,environmentallyunsustainable.

TheprocessofmiddleandlowerpeasantattritionhasthereforecontinuedunderthegovernmentofEvoMorales,despitehispro-peasantandindigenousrhetoric.Capitalist social relations in agriculture have continued to expand under thisregime, fromseventy-ninepercentof farmproduction toeighty-twopercent. In2005-6 small peasant production accounted for twenty-five percent of totalagriculturalproductioninthealtiplano.By2008-9,however,thisfigurehadfallento under twenty-two percent. State subsidies and support are directed tocapitalist,agro-industrialproductioninthelowlandsandtothesmallcommercialfarmsector,whilesmall-scalepeasantproducers in thehighlandsareeffectivelyabandoned(OrmacheaSaavedra2011).

Thepopulist,reformist,PolanyianpositionofMoraleshasitsownpoliciesanditsown analytics, deriving from its essentially petty bourgeois (‘progressive’) classbase.Accordingtothisclasspositionality,thepeasantryisahomogeneousgroup,definedbyChayanovianprinciples,byindigeneity,andbyoppositiontocorporate,monopoly capital and to the landed oligarchy. By contrast, a ‘radical’, counter-hegemonic,orclassrelationalpositionality,wouldsuggestthatcertaingroupsofthe peasantry, that is, the upper peasant stratum, are actually benefitting fromthese processes of differentiation at the expense of other groups e that is, thegreatmajorityintheformofsemi-proletariansandtherapidlydiminishingcohortofmiddlepeasants.The reality is thata significant,andgrowing, stratumof thepeasantry is coming to be defined as ‘rich’ as per the tripartite classificationabove.Itisaccruingprofitsasadirectresultofsurplusappropriationthroughtheworkofsalariedlabourers,thatis,ofsemi-proletariansfromthegrowingstratumof poor peasants in most instances. They also have growing motivations forexpanding accumulation through expropriation of further land, either from themiddle or lower strata of peasantry, or from indigenous tribal groups in thelowlandsthroughaprocessofprimitiveaccumulation(OrmacheaSaavedra2011,Webber2015).

Theresult isthat it isverydifficulttospeakofa ‘peasantway’ ingeneralasoneencompassingtheclassinterestsofallthreestrataofpeasantry.Rather,theupper

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peasantry is likely toespousea typeofPolanyian ‘alterity’moreakin to thatofsmall capitalists and petty commodity producers of the global North (the‘progressives’ accoroding to Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011), their primaryopponents being the agro-industrial landed oligarchy with whom they are incompetition for land and labour, and the transnational corporations. Absentthreats from this quarter, the rich peasantry is relatively happywith the statusquounderMAS,fromwhomthelatterdrawsitscoresupport(andtheclassfromwhichMoraleshimself comes), andwhich isoneof themainbeneficiaries fromthe ‘Agrarian Revolution’. By contrast, it is the middle and semi-proletarianpeasantry who, for the reasons identified above, are most likely to advocate‘radical’changeawayfromthestatusquoandtowardslandandfoodsovereignty- a change involving, at its heart, fundamental land reform in favour of theselowerpeasantstrata.This isacounter-hegemonicroadtoalteritythroughsocialrelational change to ‘real citizenship’ throughhumanemancipationbymeansofthere-unificationofproducerswiththeirmeansofproduction.Thelandinvolvedinsuchreformwillneedtobetakennotonlyfromthelandedoligarchybutalsofromtheupperstratumofpeasantry.Theobjectiveofsuchlandreformislikelytobethecreationofastablestratumofmiddlepeasantry,abletosupport itsownreproduction and to produce modest surpluses from which to supply the non-farmingpopulation.

A transformation in thisdirectionwillbe important, indeedvital, forbothsocialand ecological reasons. The current conjuncture is highly unstable andunsustainable forboth reasons - for thesocial reasons identifiedabove,and forthe ecological reasonsderiving from thenature-destroying and fossil-fuel basedcharacter of the agro-industrial agriculture being practiced in the easternlowlands. The classes benefitting from this process, the landed oligarchy,extractive industries, and the upper peasantry, are placing in jeopardy thelivelihoods of themajority of Bolivians - themiddle and lower peasantry (semi-proletarians),theurbanproletariat,andlowlandindigenousgroups.Todate,theurbanproletariathasbeenplacatedbythe‘compensatorystate’(Gudynas2012)through the proceeds of ecologically and socially destructive extractivism e butthiscannotcontinueandis,indeed,faltering,asthecommodityboomdeceleratesand austerity again begins to bite. The class interests of themiddle and lowerpeasantriescoincideinthisconjuncturewiththoseofproletarianseindeedmany‘proletarians’aresemi-proletarians.IfthesustainableutilizationandstewardshipofBolivia'srichecosystems,includingagro-ecosystems,aretobeassuredthroughfoodandlandsovereigntyforthelong-termbenefitofallas‘realcitizens’,thenanallianceof thesesubalternsocial forces - themiddle/lowerpeasantry, theurbanproletariat, and lowland indigenous groups - would seem to be an imperativedevelopment.

In the present, but increasingly unstable, conjuncture, buen vivir has beendeployedasthefoundational‘myth’fortheMASpopulistprogramme,takenasaprojectionofthecollective,cooperativeAndeanand indigenousway.Therealitydescribedabove,oneofextractivecapitalandtheperipheral,compensatorystate,isverydifferentfromthisassumedcooperativeideal.Usingthiscooperativeidealtolegitimateitsstandingamongstthesubalternclasses,MAShasattempted,viathecompensatorystateandreformism,toembedcapitalisminPolanyianfashionby mitigating, in some measure, the impacts of extractivism on the subalternclasses.

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ArethereanyindicationsthattheagrarianquestioninBoliviamayberesolvedinfavour of a ‘radical’, counter-hegemonic interpretation of food sovereignty?Under conditions of neo-extractivism and the ‘compensatory state’, the classstruggleinBoliviaappearstohaveassumedtwoprincipledimensions(Veltmeyer2014).Thefirstdimensionrelatestolabourinthepublicsectorandtothemassofproletarianized and semi-proletarianized rural and urban workers comprising,firstly,thehugeurbanproletariatofself-employedworkersintheinformalsectorand,secondly,aruralproletariatof landlessornear- landlessworkers.Labourinthissectormakesupwelloverhalf the ‘economicallyactivepopulation’andthemass of the urban poor. This dimension of struggle refers in themain to ruralurbandynamicsinthealtiplanoandyungasregionsofBolivia,largelyoutsidethenewextractivezoneslocatedprimarilyintheeasternlowlandsofthecountry.

The seconddimensionof class struggle, located largely in theeastern lowlands,relates,firstly,totheconditionsgeneratedbytheoperationsofextractivecapital,conditionsthathavegivenrisetoconflictbetweentheminingcompaniesandthegovernment, on the one hand, and the indigenous peoples and communitiesnegativelyaffectedbyextractivism,ontheother.Itrelates,secondly,tothemega-infrastructure projects proposed or undertaken by the MAS government andcapitalinsupportofextractivism(Veltmayer2014).Theclassstrugglehereisonewagedessentiallybyindigenousgroupsindefenceoftheirterritorialrightstotheland,waterandsubsoil resourcesonwhich their socialexistenceandwell-beingdepend,andinprotestagainstthedestructiveeffectsofminingoperationsontheenvironmentandtheirlivelihoods.Themovementsformedtothisendhavebeenincreasingly active in recent years, as the foreign mining companies haveintensifiedtheiroperationswithgovernmentsupport(Webber2015).

There are indications that these two dimensions of the class struggle arebeginningtocoalesce,withtheconfrontationbetweenthegovernmentandsocialmovements becoming increasingly dynamic and fractious. The proposal by theMASgovernmenttoconstructatrans-continentalhighwaythroughtheTerritorioIndigenayParqueIsiboroSecure(TIPNIS)insupportofextractivismandagainstitsownconstitutionalcommitmenttoprotectindigenouslandsandnaturehasactedas a catalyst for the coalescence of these two dimensions of class struggle(OrmacheaSaavedra2011,Veltmeyer2014).

The approach to development taken by the Morales government, the‘compensatorystate’through‘progressive’extractivism,andthepolicymeasurestaken to redress the ‘inequality predicament’, raise seriousquestions about thelikelihood,oreventhepossibility,ofthisregimeconsolidatingandsustainingthefew,althoughstrategicallydirected,gainsmadetowardsfulfillingitsstatedaimofcreatingacooperativeandcommunitariansocietyinwhichallBolivians‘livewell’in social solidarity and in harmony with mother nature (Veltmeyer 2014). Thegovernment, likeothers inLatinAmerica,haschosentobuild thecompensatorystateontheproceedsofaparticularlyregressiveanddestructiveformofcapitalaccumulation, in which the heavy social and environmental costs are bornedisproportionatelybythecommunitiesmostdirectlyaffectedbytheoperationsofextractivecapital(VeltmeyerandPetras2014).

Thisextractivistoffensivehasgivenrisetoadestabilizingprocessofclassstrugglecharacterizedbyaveritablewaveofprotestandsocialresistance(Webber2015).

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In the last few years, a large number of movements and struggles have beencallingintoquestiontheextractivist-exportmodelanditsattendantviolenceandenvironmental devastation wrought primarily by transnational capital via themediumoftheMoralesregime.Bymeansofthecompensatorystate,theMoralesgovernmenthasconstructedastructureoflegitimacy,orinotherwords‘flanking’measures, to support renewed capital accumulation through extractivism(Orellana2011).Thisrepresentsanattempttoembedcapitalismthroughincomeand infrastructure measures for low-income groups founded on a narrative ofcommunalism and cooperation as vivir bien. In this way, theMAS governmenthad, until recently, temporarily stabilized the contradiction between theaccumulationand legitimation functionsof the capitalist state.Butbecause thisdevelopment model, as reformism, has failed to address the class andenvironmental contradictionsof capitalism, it nowappears tobeunravelling, aselsewhere in Latin America. With the de-legitimation of extractivism, theproletariat, lower andmiddle peasants, and indigenous groups are increasinglyadvocatingamodelofthecooperativesocietybeyondcapitalism.Thecapacityofthe ‘compensatory state’ to subvert counter-hegemony by means of strategicmaterial and rhetorical devices (including anti-imperialism and indigenism)remainsstrong,however,anditremainstobeseenwhetherreflexiveresponsesby the subaltern classes to Bolivia’s socio-ecological crisis can transformreformismintorevolution.

Nepal

Asnoted,theprecisereasonforselectingBoliviaandNepalascasestudiesisthatbothstateshavefoodsovereigntywrittenintotheirrespectiveconstitutions,factsthat reflect the force of rural social movements, particularly during the firstdecadeofthenewmillennium,inpushingforagrarianreformagainstentrenchedlandedoligarchies,politicalmarginalization,andtheneoliberalizationofpolicy.Inthistherearebroadstructuralsimilaritiesbetweenthetwostates:largelyagrariansocial base (albeit with a largely and increasingly semi-proletarian ‘peasantry’),unequal landdistribution(majorityofruralpopulationwithinsufficientaccesstoland to meet subsistence requirements), progressive semi-proletarianization of‘peasantry’, large ‘informal’ economy, and growth of remittance economy. Thesignificance of these structural similarities, and the continuing relevance of theagrarian question and ‘peasant’ protest, is captured by a broadlyGramscian/Poulantzian/peripheralstateversionofMarxiantheory inwhichclassdynamics, the state, imperialism, and dependent development are centralanalytical categories (although the analytics here, in line with ‘post-developmental’ thinking, now question profoundly both the desirability orfeasibility of capitalist development in its own right, andmore particularly as aputativelynecessarypreludetoasocialistfuture).

There are, nonetheless, significantdifferencesbetween the case studies: Boliviahasa largeprimaryexporteconomy–agriculture,oil,minerals, togetherwithasignificant nationally-focused bourgeoisie; Nepal has none of these (or if some,then only in small measure); Bolivian rural protest was broad-based, non-vanguardist,heavily influencedby indigenousgroupsandenvironmentalism,andtherefore quite ‘post-developmental’ in tone; Nepal’s was explicitly Maoist,

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vanguardist, and classist (led by educated Marxists schooled in the ‘orthodox’,technologically determinist variant of Marxism – see Bhattarai (2003), forexample), with little reference to a ‘post-developmental’ or an agroecologicalethos (although indigenousrights issueshavecomprisedasignificantelement inthe Maoist uprising). In this, the Maoist movement was heavily and explicitlyinfluenced by theMaoist Sendero Luminosomovement in Peru (Nickson 1992).Additionally,capitalistrelationsofproductionhavebeendominantinBoliviasincethemodernizing‘revolution’of1952,whileNepalhasneverhadacomprehensiveprogramme of modernising, capitalist reform. Indeed, significant pre-capitalistandfeudalsocialrelationsremain inNepal (Sugden2013),and,farfrombeingamere residue of the past, appear actually to be reinforced in the currentconjuncture as a formof ‘functional dualism’, delivering ‘super-profits’ to thosewhocontrollabourpower.Thesefeudalsocialrelations,togetherwiththesurvivalofanabsolutistmonarchy,areamongsttheimportantpredisposingfactorsbehindthe Maoist mobilization of the 1990s, a mobilization that was to lead to theinstallation of full (representative) democratization in the following decade andtheinclusionoftheterm‘foodsovereignty’inNepal’snewinterimconstitution.

The Maoist mobilization was, then, an explicitly class-based and vanguardistmovement, led typically by newly educated local elites frustrated by lack ofopportunitiesforadvancementinasystemossifiedbyanabsolutemonarchy,bycaste discrimination, and by an absence of democracy. TheMaoists deployed adiscourse essentially of democraticmodernism, not of ‘post-developmentalism’,withanabsenceofconcernforissuesofagroecologyandecologicalsustainability.‘Foodsovereignty’,a termnot reallyunderstoodandadopteduncriticallyat thetime of the 2009 Interim Constitution (Adhikari pers. comm), essentiallymeantnational food security, supported by the rather vague notion of ‘scientificagriculture’, implicitly comprising modern, intensive, productivist farmingpractices. So, Maoism is a discourse generated by the survival of semi-feudalrelations of production, an absolutist monarchy, and consequently inadequatechannelsthroughwhichagrowingstratumofeducatedlocalelitescouldrealizeitspoliticalambitions.Inasense,thisstratumutilizedthewell-foundedgrievancesofthe ‘peasantry’ and landless to achieve its own ends – that of politicalrepresentationandpower.Once(representative)democracywassecuredin2007andtheinterestsofthecadreofMaoistsrelativelysatisfiedpolitically,theaimsofMaoism could be easily subverted by the capitalist reformism of the NepaliCongress Party. However, while these short-term ambitions of the Maoistvanguardistshavebeensatisfied,thestructuralcontradictionsofruralNepalthatthey purported to articulate,most particularly poverty, exploitation, and highlyunequal access to land, have only deepened since 2007. Indeed, thesecontradictions have been compounded by declining yields, soil erosion, chroniclack of investment in farming, lack of national food security (let alonesovereignty), and by an almost complete absence of land reform. Thus, thetransformation envisaged around a new agrarian future thatwas central to theMaoistmovementinNepal,hasnowbeenallbutforgotten(Sugdenperscomm).Inshort,therehasbeenasignalfailuretomakeanyprogressatalltowardsthatnebulous (as far as the vastmajority of Nepalis are concerned) notion of foodsovereignty.TheagrarianquestionofthepeasantryandfoodsovereigntyinNepalremains,therefore,completelyunresolved.

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Indeed, since the end of theMaoist war, a number of reactionary trends havebeenevident.Theriseofrightwingpopulismhadbeenimportant inNepal(as inmany other countries), as a reactionary backlash by the comprador elite, whomobilizepeasantsaroundissuesofethnicmajoritarianismandnativismtodivertattention away from the national level failings in a dependent, import basedeconomysuchasNepal.Atthesametimetheethniccounterpoliticsoftenlinkedto indigeneity has largely avoided issues of peasant politics focusing onrepresentationwithinthepoliticalsphere–althoughwhentheseissuesdosurfaceit is linked to historical animosities surrounding much older relations ofproduction – namely the abolition of communal land by the feudal state in theearlytomid20thcentury.Thisraisesalargerissuerelatingagaintopre-capitalistformations. InNepal, feudal landownership,particularly in the lowlands,and insomepartsof thehills, representsacompetingsetofclass interests to those inthe capitalist sector. This has both affected peasant movements for foodsovereigntyas theprimarycontradiction isbetweenpeasantsand landlordsandnotbetweenpeasantsandglobalagri-business.InthecaseofNepal,farmexportsareactuallylimited,althoughfarmersarebondedtoglobalagri-businessthroughdependenceoninputs.Nevertheless,theleftmovementinNepalhasunderplayedinternal pre-capitalist divisions andoverplayedexternal role of imperialism, andthis has perhaps made it more difficult to develop a broad-based peasantmovementinthepost(Maoist)warcontext(Sugdenperscomm).

While the fundamental questions surrounding the agrarian question remainunresolved, the peasantry and landless, meanwhile, are obliged to deviselivelihood survival strategies asbest they can. Inmany instances, thishas takentheformoftheremittanceeconomy,seasonalmigrationabroadtoMalaysia,theGulfStates,SouthKorea,and Indiatoworkonconstructionsites, industry,or inagriculture. Some twenty-five per cent of Nepali GDP now derives fromremittances fromoverseaswork. This trendhasbeenencouragedby successiveNepali governments as ameansof relievingpressure for internal reform,whilstenablingsemi-proletarianstoekeoutlivingsfromtheirtinyplotsoflandbymeansof the remittance supplement. The remittance economy, together with thecountry’sheavydependencyoninternationalaid,hasenabledtheNepalistatetodolittleornothingtoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofcrisis,socialandecological,that derive from the unresolved agrarian question. These twin criseswill surelyengulf the country as the remittance economy falters, however, and thecontradictions are again ‘internalized’ within the bounds of the state. Thrownback on its own resources, it is at this point that Nepali state (as the socialrelationalcondensationofclassinterests)willagainneedtoconfronttheagrarianquestion, either of its own volition, or through compulsion as the outcome ofrenewedsocialupheaval.

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NazioartekoHizketaldiaELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:

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