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EITM Institutions EITM Institutions WeekWeekJohn AldrichJohn Aldrich
Duke UniversityDuke University
Arthur LupiaArthur Lupia
University of MichiganUniversity of Michigan
Coalition DurationCoalition DurationCoalition DurationCoalition Duration
• M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. • When and how they end has a broad societal impact. When and how they end has a broad societal impact.
• NH. CD’s causes and consequences are independent of NH. CD’s causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics.negotiation dynamics.
• P. Vary by paper.P. Vary by paper.
• C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration.yield better explanations of coalition duration.
• M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. M. Most parliamentary governments can end at any moment. • When and how they end has a broad societal impact. When and how they end has a broad societal impact.
• NH. CD’s causes and consequences are independent of NH. CD’s causes and consequences are independent of structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, structural attributes, critical events, country-specific factors, negotiation dynamics.negotiation dynamics.
• P. Vary by paper.P. Vary by paper.
• C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models C. Increasingly integrated theoretical and empirical models yield better explanations of coalition duration.yield better explanations of coalition duration.
Empirical EvolutionEmpirical Evolution
Browne, et al (1986)Browne, et al (1986)Browne, et al (1986)Browne, et al (1986)
• M. Why do governments dissolve before their time?M. Why do governments dissolve before their time?
• NH. Structural attributes largely determine a NH. Structural attributes largely determine a government’s duration. government’s duration.
• P. Governance contains stochastic elements.P. Governance contains stochastic elements.
• C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation.more variation.
• M. Why do governments dissolve before their time?M. Why do governments dissolve before their time?
• NH. Structural attributes largely determine a NH. Structural attributes largely determine a government’s duration. government’s duration.
• P. Governance contains stochastic elements.P. Governance contains stochastic elements.
• C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain C. Stochastically occurring critical events explain more variation.more variation.
Browne PremisesBrowne PremisesBrowne PremisesBrowne Premises
• The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals (time intervals ( a Poisson process). a Poisson process). • Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1).Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1).• P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r!P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r!• P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt.P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt.• The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events.The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events.
• The stated null hypothesis is that observed The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model. distributions will not follow this model.
• The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a The probability, p, of a critical event occurring in a given time interval is both low and invariant across given time interval is both low and invariant across time intervals (time intervals ( a Poisson process). a Poisson process). • Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1).Partition the CIEP into N intervals (Np=1).• P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r!P(X=r|N, p) = [e-Np(Np)r]/r!• P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt.P(X(t) dissolved|X(0) undissolved) = 1-e-Npt.• The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events.The baseline expectation is of a constant flow of events.
• The stated null hypothesis is that observed The stated null hypothesis is that observed distributions will not follow this model. distributions will not follow this model.
Browne DataBrowne DataBrowne DataBrowne Data
• 238 cabinets from 12 European countries 1945-1980.238 cabinets from 12 European countries 1945-1980.• Caretaker governments excluded.Caretaker governments excluded.
• 238 cabinets from 12 European countries 1945-1980.238 cabinets from 12 European countries 1945-1980.• Caretaker governments excluded.Caretaker governments excluded.
Browne implicationsBrowne implicationsBrowne implicationsBrowne implications
• Cabinets with multiple members, minority Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical governments possess less ability to deflect critical events.events.
• Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations.stochastic explanations improve explanations.
• Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events…of such events…
• Cabinets with multiple members, minority Cabinets with multiple members, minority governments possess less ability to deflect critical governments possess less ability to deflect critical events.events.
• Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but Structural attributes approaches not rejected, but stochastic explanations improve explanations.stochastic explanations improve explanations.
• Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes Unidentified, however, are the descriptive attributes of such events…of such events…
King, Alt, Laver and Burns King, Alt, Laver and Burns (1990)(1990)
King, Alt, Laver and Burns King, Alt, Laver and Burns (1990)(1990)
• M. Structural attributes versus critical events.M. Structural attributes versus critical events.
• NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. specific.
• P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables.institutional and country-specific variables.
• C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior.superior.
• M. Structural attributes versus critical events.M. Structural attributes versus critical events.
• NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are NH. A unified explanation is no better. No cabinets are more durable than others. The real story is country-more durable than others. The real story is country-specific. specific.
• P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, P. Unifies the two approaches. Includes censoring, institutional and country-specific variables.institutional and country-specific variables.
• C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation C. The approaches are reconcilable. Unified explanation superior.superior.
KABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL Premises
• Critical Events: YCritical Events: Yii = = ee--yiyi
• YYii – a random variable describing cabinet duration – a random variable describing cabinet duration
length, length, the rate of event occurrence the rate of event occurrence
• 1/ 1/ expected duration expected duration
• Structural Attributes: YStructural Attributes: Yii = x = xii + + ii
• Could duration be generated by a normal Could duration be generated by a normal distribution?distribution?
• Critical Events: YCritical Events: Yii = = ee--yiyi
• YYii – a random variable describing cabinet duration – a random variable describing cabinet duration
length, length, the rate of event occurrence the rate of event occurrence
• 1/ 1/ expected duration expected duration
• Structural Attributes: YStructural Attributes: Yii = x = xii + + ii
• Could duration be generated by a normal Could duration be generated by a normal distribution?distribution?
KABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL Premises
• Is cabinet durability constant for the entire Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country?history of a country?• The termination hazard has systematic and The termination hazard has systematic and
stochastic components.stochastic components.
• Durations are independent.Durations are independent.
• Governments lasting longer than 12 months before Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow.the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow.
• Is cabinet durability constant for the entire Is cabinet durability constant for the entire history of a country?history of a country?• The termination hazard has systematic and The termination hazard has systematic and
stochastic components.stochastic components.
• Durations are independent.Durations are independent.
• Governments lasting longer than 12 months before Governments lasting longer than 12 months before the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow.the CIEP ended partly because of its shadow.
King, Alt, et. al. ConclusionsKing, Alt, et. al. ConclusionsKing, Alt, et. al. ConclusionsKing, Alt, et. al. Conclusions
• Model 1.1. Browne et al. BaselineModel 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline
• Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit.Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit.
• Model 1.3. Include country and structural Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit.attributes. Even better fit.• Majority status increases duration.Majority status increases duration.
• Number of formation attempts reduce duration.Number of formation attempts reduce duration.
• Model 1.1. Browne et al. BaselineModel 1.1. Browne et al. Baseline
• Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit.Model 1.2. Censoring improves the fit.
• Model 1.3. Include country and structural Model 1.3. Include country and structural attributes. Even better fit.attributes. Even better fit.• Majority status increases duration.Majority status increases duration.
• Number of formation attempts reduce duration.Number of formation attempts reduce duration.
KABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL PremisesKABL Premises
• Model 2.1. Best Country Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model.attributes only model.
• Models 2.2 -2.3 Structural Models 2.2 -2.3 Structural attributes added. Improved attributes added. Improved fit.fit.• Comparing best models, Comparing best models,
country-specific effects country-specific effects disappear.disappear.
• Number of formation attempts Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability.corresponds to less durability.
• Table 3 shows the fit.Table 3 shows the fit.
• Q: Censoring and strategy?Q: Censoring and strategy?
• Model 2.1. Best Country Model 2.1. Best Country attributes only model.attributes only model.
• Models 2.2 -2.3 Structural Models 2.2 -2.3 Structural attributes added. Improved attributes added. Improved fit.fit.• Comparing best models, Comparing best models,
country-specific effects country-specific effects disappear.disappear.
• Number of formation attempts Number of formation attempts corresponds to less durability.corresponds to less durability.
• Table 3 shows the fit.Table 3 shows the fit.
• Q: Censoring and strategy?Q: Censoring and strategy?
Warwick (1992)Warwick (1992)Warwick (1992)Warwick (1992)
• M. Are termination hazard rates constant?M. Are termination hazard rates constant?
• NH. Yes.NH. Yes.
• P. Event history model applies.P. Event history model applies.• What is the termination rate given survival at time t?What is the termination rate given survival at time t? (t)=exp((t)=exp(’x(t))’x(t))0(t)0(t)
(t) – hazard rate; (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered.0(t) baseline rate after x considered.
• Censor only involuntary terminations.Censor only involuntary terminations.
• T1. Without other factors, T1. Without other factors, (t)/ (t)/ t >0 for most countries.t >0 for most countries.
• T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length.
• M. Are termination hazard rates constant?M. Are termination hazard rates constant?
• NH. Yes.NH. Yes.
• P. Event history model applies.P. Event history model applies.• What is the termination rate given survival at time t?What is the termination rate given survival at time t? (t)=exp((t)=exp(’x(t))’x(t))0(t)0(t)
(t) – hazard rate; (t) – hazard rate; 0(t) baseline rate after x considered.0(t) baseline rate after x considered.
• Censor only involuntary terminations.Censor only involuntary terminations.
• T1. Without other factors, T1. Without other factors, (t)/ (t)/ t >0 for most countries.t >0 for most countries.
• T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length. T3. W/ other factors, baseline rate increases w/ term length.
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Coalition Termination and the Strategic
Timing of Parliamentary ElectionsTiming of Parliamentary Elections Coalition Termination and the Strategic Coalition Termination and the Strategic
Timing of Parliamentary ElectionsTiming of Parliamentary Elections Motivation:Motivation:• What determines the timing and nature of coalition What determines the timing and nature of coalition
terminations?terminations?• What factors affect government membership and What factors affect government membership and
portfolio allocation?portfolio allocation?
Null Hypotheses:Null Hypotheses:• Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to
explain the timing of governmental transitions. A explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing.strategic approach adds nothing.
Motivation:Motivation:• What determines the timing and nature of coalition What determines the timing and nature of coalition
terminations?terminations?• What factors affect government membership and What factors affect government membership and
portfolio allocation?portfolio allocation?
Null Hypotheses:Null Hypotheses:• Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to Structural attributes or critical events are sufficient to
explain the timing of governmental transitions. A explain the timing of governmental transitions. A strategic approach adds nothing.strategic approach adds nothing.
Lupia and Strom:Lupia and Strom:Null HypothesesNull HypothesesLupia and Strom:Lupia and Strom:Null HypothesesNull Hypotheses
• 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. systems.
• 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior.2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior.
• 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive.survive.
• 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are 1. All important determinants of coalition politics are unique to, and embedded in, particular political unique to, and embedded in, particular political systems. systems.
• 2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior.2. Preferences alone explain coalition behavior.
• 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is 3. If cooperation among potential coalition partners is mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and mutually advantageous, then a coalition will form and survive.survive.
ConclusionsConclusionsConclusionsConclusions
• Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination.sufficient for replacement or termination.
• In coalition governments, a party’s size need not directly In coalition governments, a party’s size need not directly effect government composition or action.effect government composition or action.• Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk-away Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk-away
values.values.
• Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of “critical Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of “critical events.”events.”• Implication: An event’s impact depends heavily on the election Implication: An event’s impact depends heavily on the election
cycle.cycle.
• Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or Favorable electoral prospects are neither necessary or sufficient for replacement or termination.sufficient for replacement or termination.
• In coalition governments, a party’s size need not directly In coalition governments, a party’s size need not directly effect government composition or action.effect government composition or action.• Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk-away Bargaining advantages attributed to size are due to walk-away
values.values.
• Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of “critical Bargaining dynamics determine the impact of “critical events.”events.”• Implication: An event’s impact depends heavily on the election Implication: An event’s impact depends heavily on the election
cycle.cycle.
ExampleExampleExampleExample
PremisesPremises• Party A has 49 seats.Party A has 49 seats.
• Party B has 48 seats.Party B has 48 seats.
• Party C has 4 seats.Party C has 4 seats.
• Any coalition including C Any coalition including C produces value.produces value.
• Any coalition without C Any coalition without C produces no value. produces no value.
PremisesPremises• Party A has 49 seats.Party A has 49 seats.
• Party B has 48 seats.Party B has 48 seats.
• Party C has 4 seats.Party C has 4 seats.
• Any coalition including C Any coalition including C produces value.produces value.
• Any coalition without C Any coalition without C produces no value. produces no value.
ResultsResultsC has the fewest seats, C has the fewest seats,
but the largest walk-but the largest walk-away value.away value.
The only sustainable The only sustainable outcome involves a outcome involves a contract giving party C contract giving party C almost all of the power. almost all of the power.
ResultsResultsC has the fewest seats, C has the fewest seats,
but the largest walk-but the largest walk-away value.away value.
The only sustainable The only sustainable outcome involves a outcome involves a contract giving party C contract giving party C almost all of the power. almost all of the power.
Tested in Tested in • Daniel Diermeier and Randy T. Stevenson. 1999. “Cabinet Daniel Diermeier and Randy T. Stevenson. 1999. “Cabinet
Survival and Competing Risks” AJPS 43: 1051-1068.Survival and Competing Risks” AJPS 43: 1051-1068.• Sanford C. Gordon. 2002. “Stochastic Dependence in Sanford C. Gordon. 2002. “Stochastic Dependence in
Competing Risks” AJPS 46: 200-217.Competing Risks” AJPS 46: 200-217.• Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal. 1995. “Exit Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal. 1995. “Exit
models, hazard rates and government duration. With empirical models, hazard rates and government duration. With empirical application to government duration in the Benelux countries application to government duration in the Benelux countries (1945-1994).” ISCORE paper.(1945-1994).” ISCORE paper.
Tested in Tested in • Daniel Diermeier and Randy T. Stevenson. 1999. “Cabinet Daniel Diermeier and Randy T. Stevenson. 1999. “Cabinet
Survival and Competing Risks” AJPS 43: 1051-1068.Survival and Competing Risks” AJPS 43: 1051-1068.• Sanford C. Gordon. 2002. “Stochastic Dependence in Sanford C. Gordon. 2002. “Stochastic Dependence in
Competing Risks” AJPS 46: 200-217.Competing Risks” AJPS 46: 200-217.• Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal. 1995. “Exit Bernard Grofman and Peter van Roozendaal. 1995. “Exit
models, hazard rates and government duration. With empirical models, hazard rates and government duration. With empirical application to government duration in the Benelux countries application to government duration in the Benelux countries (1945-1994).” ISCORE paper.(1945-1994).” ISCORE paper.
Diermeier and Stevenson Diermeier and Stevenson (2000)(2000)
Diermeier and Stevenson Diermeier and Stevenson (2000)(2000)
• M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination?improve empirical work on cabinet termination?
• NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non-strategic NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non-strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. question.
• P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom.P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom.
• C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not.not.
• M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations M. Can institutional and bargaining considerations improve empirical work on cabinet termination?improve empirical work on cabinet termination?
• NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non-strategic NH. Critical events, structural attributes, non-strategic approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the approaches or static models are sufficient to answer the question. question.
• P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom.P. Stochastic version of Lupia and Strom.
• C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do C. Dissolution hazards increase. Replacement hazards do not.not.
Diermeier and Stevenson Diermeier and Stevenson Key AssumptionsKey Assumptions
Diermeier and Stevenson Diermeier and Stevenson Key AssumptionsKey Assumptions
• For all parties sFor all parties sii, c, cii, and k, and kii are constant, negotiation costs are the are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not “too high.”same for all parties and not “too high.”
• As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline.As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline.
• Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs.Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. time until CIEP. time until CIEP. >0.>0. i,j and i,j and ’<’<, g, gii
jj(() – g) – giijj((’)>0.’)>0.
• Implication: The termination hazard is Implication: The termination hazard is (()=()=(+o(+o())))(s,c,gij((s,c,gij())))
• The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ.SQ.
• For all parties sFor all parties sii, c, cii, and k, and kii are constant, negotiation costs are the are constant, negotiation costs are the same for all parties and not “too high.”same for all parties and not “too high.”
• As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline.As the CIEP approaches, coalition values decline.
• Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs.Electoral prospects are Poisson RVs. time until CIEP. time until CIEP. >0.>0. i,j and i,j and ’<’<, g, gii
jj(() – g) – giijj((’)>0.’)>0.
• Implication: The termination hazard is Implication: The termination hazard is (()=()=(+o(+o())))(s,c,gij((s,c,gij())))
• The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer The initial coalition is a Nash Equilibrium: parties weakly prefer SQ.SQ.
Diermeier and StevensonDiermeier and StevensonTheoretical ConclusionsTheoretical ConclusionsDiermeier and StevensonDiermeier and StevensonTheoretical ConclusionsTheoretical Conclusions
• Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches.
• Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. increasing as the CIEP approaches.
• The same is not true for replacement hazards.The same is not true for replacement hazards.• Must know more about electoral prospects.Must know more about electoral prospects.
• These predictions are different than Browne, other These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work.previous empirical work.
• Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly Hazard rates for pooled terminations are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches.
• Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically Hazard rates for dissolutions are strictly monotonically increasing as the CIEP approaches. increasing as the CIEP approaches.
• The same is not true for replacement hazards.The same is not true for replacement hazards.• Must know more about electoral prospects.Must know more about electoral prospects.
• These predictions are different than Browne, other These predictions are different than Browne, other previous empirical work.previous empirical work.
Diermeier and StevensonDiermeier and StevensonEmpirical ConclusionsEmpirical Conclusions
Diermeier and StevensonDiermeier and StevensonEmpirical ConclusionsEmpirical Conclusions
• No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL.No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL.
• Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches.approaches.
• Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches.increasing as CIEP approaches.• The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8].The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8].
• Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models.dynamic models.• Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions.Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions.
• No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL.No censoring. Data similar to Browne, Warwick, KABL.
• Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP Pooled hazards: After big initial spike, HR increasing as CIEP approaches.approaches.
• Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR Dissolution hazards: after the spike and a flat region, HR increasing as CIEP approaches.increasing as CIEP approaches.• The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8].The same is not true for replacement. [F6-8].
• Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more Strategic approach promising. Further progress requires more dynamic models.dynamic models.• Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions.Ignoring the bargaining filter yields incorrect predictions.
D&S ResultsD&S ResultsD&S ResultsD&S Results
InstitutionsInstitutionsInstitutionsInstitutions
• If an institutional, preference, or country-specific If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalition’s contract, it must affect factor is to affect a coalition’s contract, it must affect a pivotal actor’s walk away value.a pivotal actor’s walk away value.
• Institutions that affect walk away valuesInstitutions that affect walk away values• formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel)formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel)
• size/composition rulessize/composition rules
• internal party rules internal party rules
• independence of the judiciary and civil serviceindependence of the judiciary and civil service
• If an institutional, preference, or country-specific If an institutional, preference, or country-specific factor is to affect a coalition’s contract, it must affect factor is to affect a coalition’s contract, it must affect a pivotal actor’s walk away value.a pivotal actor’s walk away value.
• Institutions that affect walk away valuesInstitutions that affect walk away values• formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel)formateur rules (e.g., change in Israel)
• size/composition rulessize/composition rules
• internal party rules internal party rules
• independence of the judiciary and civil serviceindependence of the judiciary and civil service
