Edmund Husserl 1

Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl in about 1900.

Born April 8, 1859Pronitz, Moravia, Austria (present-day Prostjov, Czech Republic)

Died April 27, 1938 (aged79)Freiburg, Germany

Era 20th-century philosophy

Region Western Philosophy

School Phenomenology

Maininterests Epistemology, Ontology, Mathematics

Notableideas Phenomenology, epoch, natural standpoint, noema, noesis, eidetic reduction, phenomenological reduction, retention andprotention, Lebenswelt, pre-reflective self-consciousness,[1] transcendental subjectivism, criticism of "physicalistobjectivism"[2]

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (German: [hsl]; April 8, 1859 April 27, 1938[3]) was a philosopher andmathematician and the founder of the 20th century philosophical school of phenomenology. He broke with thepositivist orientation of the science and philosophy of his day, yet he elaborated critiques of historicism and ofpsychologism in logic. Not limited to empiricism, but believing that experience is the source of all knowledge, heworked on a method of phenomenological reduction by which a subject may come to know directly an essence.Although born into a Jewish family, Husserl was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He studied mathematics under KarlWeierstrass and Leo Knigsberger, and philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl himself taughtphilosophy as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Gttingen from 1901, then at Freiburgfrom 1916 until he retired in 1928. Thereafter he gave two notable lectures: at Paris in 1929, and at Prague in 1935.The notorious 1933 race laws of the Nazi regime took away his academic standing and privileges. Following anillness, he died at Freiburg in 1938.

Edmund Husserl 2

Life and career

Youth and educationHusserl was born in 1859 in Prostjov (German: Prossnitz), a town in the Bohemian province of Moravia, which wasthen in the Austrian Empire, after 1918 in Czechoslovakia, and since 1993 in the Czech Republic. He was born into aJewish family, the second of four children (boy, boy, girl, boy). His father was a milliner (one who designs, makes,trims, or sells hats). His childhood was spent in Prostjov, where he attended the elementary school. Then Husserltraveled to Vienna to study at the Realgymnasium there, followed next by the Staatsgymnasium in Olomouc (Ger:Olmtz).[4][5]

At the University of Leipzig from 1876 to 1878, Husserl studied mathematics, physics, and astronomy. At Leipzig hewas inspired by philosophy lectures given by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern psychology. Then hemoved to the Humboldt University of Berlin (at that time called the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitt) in 1878 wherehe continued his study of mathematics under Leopold Kronecker and the renowned Karl Weierstrass. In Berlin hefound a mentor in Thomas Masaryk, then a former philosophy student of Franz Brentano and later the first presidentof Czechoslovakia. There Husserl also attended Friedrich Paulsen's philosophy lectures. In 1881 he left for theUniversity of Vienna to complete his mathematics studies under the supervision of Leo Knigsberger (a formerstudent of Weierstrass). At Vienna in 1883 he obtained his Ph.D. with the work Beitrge zur Variationsrechnung("Contributions to the Calculus of Variations").[4]

Evidently as a result of his becoming familiar with the New Testament during his twenties, he asked to be baptizedinto the Lutheran Church in 1886. Husserl's father Adolf had died in 1884. Prof. Herbert Spiegelberg writes, "Whileoutward religious practice never entered his life any more than it did that of most academic scholars of the time, hismind remained open for the religious phenomenon as for any other genuine experience." At times Husserl saw hisgoal as one of moral "renewal". Although a steadfast proponent of a radical and rational autonomy in all things,Husserl could also speak "about his vocation and even about his mission under God's will to find new ways forphilosophy and science," observes Spiegelberg.[6]

Following his doctorate in mathematics, he returned to Berlin to work as the assistant to Karl Weierstrass. Yetalready Husserl had felt the desire to pursue philosophy. Then professor Weierstrass became very ill. Husserlbecame free to return to Vienna where, after serving a short military duty, he devoted his attention to philosophy. In1884 at the University of Vienna he attended the lectures of Franz Brentano on philosophy and philosophicalpsychology. Brentano introduced him to the writings of Bernard Bolzano, Hermann Lotze, J. Stuart Mill, and DavidHume. Husserl was so impressed by Brentano that he decided to dedicate his life to philosophy; indeed, FranzBrentano is often credited as being his most important influence, e.g., with regard to intentionality.[citation needed]

Following academic advice, two years later in 1886 Husserl followed Carl Stumpf, a former student of Brentano, tothe University of Halle, seeking to obtain his Habilitation which would qualify him to teach at the university level.There, under Stumpf's supervision, he wrote ber den Begriff der Zahl (On the Concept of Number) in 1887, whichwould serve later as the basis for his first important work, Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891).[7]

In 1887 he married Malvine Steinschneider, a union that would last over fifty years. In 1892 their daughter Elizabethwas born, in 1893 their son Gerhard, and in 1894 their son Wolfgang. Elizabeth would marry in 1922, and Gerhardin 1923; Wolfgang, however, became a casualty of the First World War.[5] Gerhard would become a philosopher oflaw, contributing to the subject of comparative law, teaching in the USA and after the war in Austria.

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Professor of philosophyFollowing his marriage Husserl began his long teaching career in philosophy. He started where he was in 1887 as aPrivatdozent at the Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg. In 1891 he published his Philosophie derArithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen which, drawing on his prior studies in mathematics andphilosophy, proposed a psychological context as the basis of mathematics. It drew the adverse notice of GottlobFrege, who criticized its psychologism.[8][9]

In 1901 Husserl with his family moved to the Georg-August University of Gttingen where he taught asextraordinarius professor. Just prior to this a major work of his, Logische Untersuchungen (Halle 19001901), waspublished. Volume One contains seasoned reflections on "pure logic" in which he carefully refutes"psychologism".[10][11] This work was well received and became the subject of a seminar given by Wilhelm Dilthey;Husserl in 1905 traveled to Berlin to visit Dilthey. Two years later in Italy he paid a visit to Franz Brentano hisinspiring old teacher and to Constantin Carathodory the mathematician. Kant and Descartes were also nowinfluencing his thought. In 1910 he became joint editor of the journal Logos. During this period Husserl haddelivered lectures on internal time consciousness, which several decades later his former student Heidegger editedfor publication.[12]

In 1912 at Freiburg the journal Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und Phnomenologische Forschung ("Yearbook forPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research") was founded by Husserl and his school, and which published articlesof their phenomenological movement from 1913 to 1930. His important work Ideen[13] was published in its firstissue. Before beginning Ideen Husserl's thought had reached the stage where "each subject is 'presented' to itself, andto each all others are 'presentiated' (Vergegenwartigung), not as parts of nature but as pure consciousness."[14] Ideenadvanced his transition to a "transcendental interpretation" of phenomenology, a view later criticized by, amongothers, Jean-Paul Sartre.[15] In Ideen Paul Ricur sees the development of Husserl's thought as leading "from thepsychological cogito to the transcendental cogito." As phenomenology further evolves, it leads (when viewed fromanother vantage point in Husserl's 'labyrinth') to "transcendental subjectivity".[16] Also in Ideen Husserl explicitlyelaborates the eidetic and phenomenological reductions.[17][18] In 1913 Karl Jaspers visited Husserl at Gttingen.In October 1914 both his sons were sent to the fighting on the Western Front of World War I. The next year his sonWolfgang was badly injured at the front. On March 8, 1916, on the battlefield of Verdun, Wolfgang Husserl waskilled in action. The next year his son Gerhard was wounded in the war but survived, and his mother Julia died. InNovember 1917 one of his outstanding students and later a noted philosophy professor in his own right, AdolfReinach, was killed in the war while serving in Flanders.[5]

The Kiepenheuer Institute for Solar Physics in Freiburg, Husserl'shome 1916 -1937

Husserl had transferred in 1916 to the Albert LudwigsUniversity of Freiburg (Freiburg im Breisgau) where hecontinued bringing his work in philosophy to fruition,now as a full professor.[19] Edith Stein served as hispersonal assistant during his first few years in Freiburg,followed later by Martin Heidegger from 1920 to 1923.The mathematician Hermann Weyl begancorresponding with him in 1918. Husserl gave fourlectures on Phenomenological method at UniversityCollege, London in 1922. The University of Berlin in1923 called on him to relocate there, but he declinedthe offer. In 1926 Heidegger dedicated his book Seinund Zeit ("Being and Time") to him "in grateful respectand friendship."[20] Husserl remained in his professorship at Freiburg until he requested retirement, teaching his lastclass on July 25, 1928. A Festschrift to celebrate his seventieth birthday was presented to him on April 8, 1929.

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For Husserl 1933 was an ugly year, when the racial laws of the new Nazi regime were enacted. On April 6 Husserlwas suspended from the University of Freiburg by the Badische Ministry of Culture; the following week he wasdisallowed any university activities. Yet his colleague Heidegger was elected Rektor of the university on April2122, and joined the Nazi party. By contrast, in July Husserl resigned from the Deutsche Academie.[5]

Despite retirement, Husserl gave several notable lectures. The first, at Paris in 1929,[21] led to Mditationscartsiennes (Paris 1931).[22] Husserl here reviews the epoche and transcendental reduction, presented earlier in hispivotal Ideen (1913), in terms of a further reduction of experience to what he calls a 'sphere of ownness.' Fromwithin this sphere, which Husserl enacts in order to show the impossibility of solipsism, the transcendental ego findsitself always already paired with the lived body of another ego, another monad. This a priori interconnection ofbodies, given in perception, is what founds the interconnection of consciousnesses known as transcendentalintersubjectivity, which Husserl would go on to describe at length in volumes of unpublished writings. There hasbeen a debate over whether or not Husserl's description of ownness and its movement into intersubjectivity issufficient to reject the charge of solipsism, to which Descartes, for example, was subject. One argument againstHusserl's description works this way: instead of infinity and the Deity being the ego's gateway to the Other, as inDescartes, Husserl's ego in the Cartesian Meditations itself becomes transcendent. It remains, however, alone(unconnected). Only the ego's grasp "by analogy" of the Other (e.g., by conjectural reciprocity) allows the possibilityfor an 'objective' intersubjectivity, and hence for community.[23] But more recently, scholars such as KathleenHaney, James Mensch, and Dan Zahavi have worked to prove that Husserl's descriptions of intercorporeality andintersubjectivity might actually work much more efficiently to show how intersubjectivity in fact is given throughembodiment. In 1934 Jos Ortega y Gasset came to visit him.Later Husserl lectured at Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, which resulted in a very differently styled work thatwhile innovative is no less problematic: Die Krisis (Belgrade 1936).[24][25] Husserl describes here the cultural crisisgripping Europe, then approaches a philosophy of history, discussing Galileo, Descartes, several Britishphilosophers, and Kant. The apolitical Husserl before had specifically avoided such historical discussions, pointedlypreferring to go directly to an investigation of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty and others question whether Husserlhere does not undercut his own position, in that Husserl had attacked in principle historicism, while specificallydesigning his phenomenology to be rigorous enough to transcend the limits of history. On the contrary, Husserl maybe indicating here that historical traditions are merely features given to the pure ego's intuition, like any other.[26][27]

A longer section follows on the "life world" [Lebenswelt], one not observed by the objective logic of science, but aworld seen in our subjective experience.[28] Yet a problem arises similar to that dealing with 'history' above, achicken-and-egg problem. Does the life world contextualize and thus compromise the gaze of the pure ego, or doesthe phenomenological method nonetheless raise the ego up transcendent?[29] These last writings presented the fruitsof his professional life. Since his university retirement Husserl had "worked at a tremendous pace, producing severalmajor works."[4]

After suffering a fall the autumn of 1937, the philosopher became ill with pleurisy. Edmund Husserl died at Freiburgon April 27, 1938, having just turned 79. His wife Malvine survived him. Eugen Fink, his research assistant,delivered his eulogy.[30] Gerhard Ritter was the only Freiburg faculty member to attend the funeral, as an anti-Naziprotest.

Heidegger and the Nazi eraHusserl was incorrectly rumoured to have been denied the use of the library at Freiburg as a result of the anti-Jewish legislation of April 1933.[31] However, among other disabilities Husserl was unable to publish his works in Nazi Germany; cf., above footnote to Die Krisis (1936). It was also rumoured that his former pupil and Nazi Party member, Martin Heidegger, informed Husserl that he was discharged, but it was actually the former rector.[32]

Apparently Husserl and Heidegger had moved apart during the 1920s, which became clearer after 1928 when Husserl retired and Heidegger succeeded to his University chair. In the summer of 1929 Husserl had studied

Edmund Husserl 5

carefully selected writings of Heidegger, coming to the conclusion that on several of their key positions theydiffered, e.g., Heidegger substituted Dasein ["Being-there"] for the pure ego, thus transforming phenomenology intoan anthropology, a type of psychologism strongly disfavored by Husserl. Such observations of Heidegger, along witha critique of Max Scheler, were put into a lecture Husserl gave to various Kant Societies in Frankfurt, Berlin, andHalle during 1931 entitled Phnomenologie und Anthropologie.[33][34]

In the war-time 1941 edition of Heidegger's primary work, Being and Time (first published in 1927), the originaldedication to Husserl was removed. This was not due to a negation of the relationship between the two philosophers,however, but rather was the result of a suggested censorship by Heidegger's publisher who feared that the bookmight otherwise be banned by the Nazi regime.[35] The dedication can still be found in a footnote on page 38,thanking Husserl for his guidance and generosity. Husserl, of course, had died several years earlier. In post-wareditions of Sein und Zeit the dedication to Husserl is restored. The complex, troubled, and sundered philosophicalrelationship between Husserl and Heidegger has been widely discussed.[36][37]

On May 4, 1933, Professor Edmund Husserl addressed the recent regime change in Germany and its consequences:"The future alone will judge which was the true Germany in 1933, and who were the trueGermans--those who subscribe to the more or less materialistic-mythical racial prejudices of the day, orthose Germans pure in heart and mind, heirs to the great Germans of the past whose tradition they revereand perpetuate."[38]

After his death, Husserl's manuscripts, amounting to approximately 40,000 pages of "Gabelsberger" stenographyand his complete research library, were in 1939 smuggled to Belgium by the Franciscan priest Herman Van Breda.There they were deposited at Leuven to form the Husserl-Archives of the Higher Institute of Philosophy.[39] Much ofthe material in his research manuscripts has since been published in the Husserliana critical edition series.[40]

Development of his thought

Several early themesIn his first works Husserl tries to combine mathematics, psychology and philosophy with a main goal to provide asound foundation for mathematics. He analyzes the psychological process needed to obtain the concept of numberand then tries to build up a systematical theory on this analysis. To achieve this he uses several methods andconcepts taken from his teachers. From Weierstrass he derives the idea that we generate the concept of number bycounting a certain collection of objects.From Brentano and Stumpf he takes over the distinction between proper and improper presenting. In an exampleHusserl explains this in the following way: if you are standing in front of a house, you have a proper, directpresentation of that house, but if you are looking for it and ask for directions, then these directions (e.g. the house onthe corner of this and that street) are an indirect, improper presentation. In other words, you can have a properpresentation of an object if it is actually present, and an improper (or symbolic as he also calls it) if you only canindicate that object through signs, symbols, etc. Husserl's Logical Investigations (19001901) is considered thestarting point for the formal theory of wholes and their parts known as mereology.[41]

Another important element that Husserl took over from Brentano is intentionality, the notion that the maincharacteristic of consciousness is that it is always intentional. While often simplistically summarised as "aboutness"or the relationship between mental acts and the external world, Brentano defined it as the main characteristic ofmental phenomena, by which they could be distinguished from physical phenomena. Every mental phenomenon,every psychological act, has a content, is directed at an object (the intentional object). Every belief, desire, etc. hasan object that it is about: the believed, the wanted. Brentano used the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicatethe status of the objects of thought in the mind. The property of being intentional, of having an intentional object,was the key feature to distinguish mental phenomena and physical phenomena, because physical phenomena lackintentionality altogether.

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The elaboration of phenomenologySome years after the 1900-1901 publication of his main work, the Logische Untersuchungen (LogicalInvestigations), Husserl made some key conceptual elaborations which led him to assert that in order to study thestructure of consciousness, one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena atwhich it is directed (the objects as intended). Knowledge of essences would only be possible by "bracketing" allassumptions about the existence of an external world. This procedure he called epoch. These new conceptsprompted the publication of the Ideen (Ideas) in 1913, in which they were at first incorporated, and a plan for asecond edition of the Logische Untersuchungen.From the Ideen onward, Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. The metaphysicalproblem of establishing the material reality of what we perceive was of little interest to Husserl in spite of his being atranscendental idealist. Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward andperceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the "natural standpoint", which is characterized bya belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them. Husserl proposed aradical new phenomenological way of looking at objects by examining how we, in our many ways of beingintentionally directed toward them, actually "constitute" them (to be distinguished from materially creating objects orobjects merely being figments of the imagination); in the Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to besomething simply "external" and ceases to be seen as providing indicators about what it is, and becomes a groupingof perceptual and functional aspects that imply one another under the idea of a particular object or "type". The notionof objects as real is not expelled by phenomenology, but "bracketed" as a way in which we regard objects instead ofa feature that inheres in an object's essence founded in the relation between the object and the perceiver. In order tobetter understand the world of appearances and objects, phenomenology attempts to identify the invariant features ofhow objects are perceived and pushes attributions of reality into their role as an attribution about the things weperceive (or an assumption underlying how we perceive objects). The major dividing line in Husserl's thought is theturn to transcendental idealism.[]

In a later period, Husserl began to wrestle with the complicated issues of intersubjectivity, specifically, howcommunication about an object can be assumed to refer to the same ideal entity (Cartesian Meditations, MeditationV). Husserl tries new methods of bringing his readers to understand the importance of phenomenology to scientificinquiry (and specifically to psychology) and what it means to "bracket" the natural attitude. The Crisis of theEuropean Sciences is Husserl's unfinished work that deals most directly with these issues. In it, Husserl for the firsttime attempts a historical overview of the development of Western philosophy and science, emphasizing thechallenges presented by their increasingly (one-sidedly) empirical and naturalistic orientation. Husserl declares thatmental and spiritual reality possess their own reality independent of any physical basis,[42] and that a science of themind ('Geisteswissenschaft') must be established on as scientific a foundation as the natural sciences have managed:

"It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit the field ofsystematic scientific experience, thus effecting a total transformation of the task of knowledge."[43]

ThoughtHusserl's thought is revolutionary in several ways, most notably in the distinction between 'natural' and'phenomenological' modes of understanding. In the former, sense-perception in correspondence with the materialrealm constitutes the known reality, and understanding is premised on the accuracy of the perception and theobjective knowability of what is called the 'real world'.[] Phenomenological understanding strives to be rigorously'presuppositionless' by means of what Husserl calls a 'phenomenological reduction'.[44] This reduction is notconditioned but rather transcendental: in Husserl's terms, pure consciousness of absolute Being.[45] In Husserl'swork, consciousness of any given thing calls for discerning its meaning as an 'intentional object'.[46] Such an objectdoes not simply strike the senses, to be interpreted or misinterpreted by mental reason; it has already been selectedand grasped, grasping being an etymological connotation, of percipere, the root of 'perceive.[47]

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Meaning and objectFrom Logical Investigations (1900/1901) to Experience and Judgment (published in 1939), Husserl expressedclearly the difference between meaning and object. He identified several different kinds of names. For example,there are names that have the role of properties that uniquely identify an object. Each of these names expresses ameaning and designates the same object. Examples of this are "the victor in Jena" and "the loser in Waterloo", or"the equilateral triangle" and "the equiangular triangle"; in both cases, both names express different meanings, butdesignate the same object. There are names which have no meaning, but have the role of designating an object:"Aristotle", "Socrates", and so on. Finally, there are names which designate a variety of objects. These are called"universal names"; their meaning is a "concept" and refers to a series of objects (the extension of the concept). Theway we know sensible objects is called "sensible intuition".Husserl also identifies a series of "formal words" which are necessary to form sentences and have no sensiblecorrelates. Examples of formal words are "a", "the", "more than", "over", "under", "two", "group", and so on. Everysentence must contain formal words to designate what Husserl calls "formal categories". There are two kinds ofcategories: meaning categories and formal-ontological categories. Meaning categories relate judgments; they includeforms of conjunction, disjunction, forms of plural, among others. Formal-ontological categories relate objects andinclude notions such as set, cardinal number, ordinal number, part and whole, relation, and so on. The way we knowthese categories is through a faculty of understanding called "categorial intuition".Through sensible intuition our consciousness constitutes what Husserl calls a "situation of affairs" (Sachlage). It is apassive constitution where objects themselves are presented to us. To this situation of affairs, through categorialintuition, we are able to constitute a "state of affairs" (Sachverhalt). One situation of affairs through objective acts ofconsciousness (acts of constituting categorially) can serve as the basis for constituting multiple states of affairs. Forexample, suppose a and b are two sensible objects in a certain situation of affairs. We can use it as basis to say,"aa", two judgments which designate the same state of affairs. For Husserl a sentence has a propositionor judgment as its meaning, and refers to a state of affairs which has a situation of affairs as a reference base.

Philosophy of logic and mathematicsHusserl believed that truth-in-itself has as ontological correlate being-in-itself, just as meaning categories haveformal-ontological categories as correlates. Logic is a formal theory of judgment, that studies the formal a priorirelations among judgments using meaning categories. Mathematics, on the other hand, is formal ontology; it studiesall the possible forms of being (of objects). Hence for both logic and mathematics, the different formal categories arethe objects of study, not the sensible objects themselves. The problem with the psychological approach tomathematics and logic is that it fails to account for the fact that this approach is about formal categories, and notsimply about abstractions from sensibility alone. The reason why we do not deal with sensible objects inmathematics is because of another faculty of understanding called "categorial abstraction." Through this faculty weare able to get rid of sensible components of judgments, and just focus on formal categories themselves.Thanks to "eidetic intuition" (or "essential intuition"), we are able to grasp the possibility, impossibility, necessityand contingency among concepts and among formal categories. Categorial intuition, along with categorialabstraction and eidetic intuition, are the basis for logical and mathematical knowledge.Husserl criticized the logicians of his day for not focusing on the relation between subjective processes that give usobjective knowledge of pure logic. All subjective activities of consciousness need an ideal correlate, and objectivelogic (constituted noematically) as it is constituted by consciousness needs a noetic correlate (the subjective activitiesof consciousness).Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those thatprecede it.

Edmund Husserl 8

The first stratum is what Husserl called a "morphology of meanings" concerning a priori ways to relate judgmentsto make them meaningful. In this stratum we elaborate a "pure grammar" or a logical syntax, and he would call itsrules "laws to prevent non-sense", which would be similar to what logic calls today "formation rules".Mathematics, as logic's ontological correlate, also has a similar stratum, a "morphology of formal-ontologicalcategories".

The second stratum would be called by Husserl "logic of consequence" or the "logic of non-contradiction" whichexplores all possible forms of true judgments. He includes here syllogistic classic logic, propositional logic andthat of predicates. This is a semantic stratum, and the rules of this stratum would be the "laws to avoidcounter-sense" or "laws to prevent contradiction". They are very similar to today's logic "transformation rules".Mathematics also has a similar stratum which is based among others on pure theory of pluralities, and a puretheory of numbers. They provide a science of the conditions of possibility of any theory whatsoever. Husserl alsotalked about what he called "logic of truth" which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities,and precedes the third logical third stratum.

The third stratum is metalogical, what he called a "theory of all possible forms of theories." It explores allpossible theories in an a priori fashion, rather than the possibility of theory in general. We could establish theoriesof possible relations between pure forms of theories, investigate these logical relations and the deductions fromsuch general connection. The logician is free to see the extension of this deductive, theoretical sphere of purelogic.

The ontological correlate to the third stratum is the "theory of manifolds". In formal ontology, it is a freeinvestigation where a mathematician can assign several meanings to several symbols, and all their possible validdeductions in a general and indeterminate manner. It is, properly speaking, the most universal mathematics of all.Through the posit of certain indeterminate objects (formal-ontological categories) as well as any combination ofmathematical axioms, mathematicians can explore the apodeictic connections between them, as long as consistencyis preserved.According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematicaldevelopments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds (both Euclidean and non-Euclidean), HermannGrassmann's theory of extensions, William Rowan Hamilton's Hamiltonians, Sophus Lie's theory of transformationgroups, and Cantor's set theory.Jacob Klein was one student of Husserl who pursued this line of inquiry, seeking to "desedimentize" mathematicsand the mathematical sciences.[48]

Husserl and psychologism

Philosophy of arithmetic and FregeAfter obtaining his PhD in mathematics, Husserl began analyzing the foundations of mathematics from apsychological point of view. In his professorial doctoral dissertation, On the Concept of Number (1886) and in hisPhilosophy of Arithmetic (1891), Husserl sought, by employing Brentano's descriptive psychology, to define thenatural numbers in a way that advanced the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass, Richard Dedekind, GeorgCantor, Gottlob Frege, and other contemporary mathematicians. Later, in the first volume of his LogicalInvestigations, the Prolegomena of Pure Logic, Husserl, while attacking the psychologistic point of view in logic andmathematics, also appears to reject much of his early work, although the forms of psychologism analysed and refutedin the Prolegomena did not apply directly to his Philosophy of Arithmetic. Some scholars question whether Frege'snegative review of the Philosophy of Arithmetic helped turn Husserl towards Platonism, but he had alreadydiscovered the work of Bernhard Bolzano independently around 1890/91 and explicitly mentioned Bernard Bolzano,Gottfried Leibniz and Hermann Lotze as inspirations for his newer position.

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Husserl's review of Ernst Schrder, published before Frege's landmark 1892 article, clearly distinguishes sense fromreference; thus Husserl's notions of noema and object also arose independently. Likewise, in his criticism of Frege inthe Philosophy of Arithmetic, Husserl remarks on the distinction between the content and the extension of a concept.Moreover, the distinction between the subjective mental act, namely the content of a concept, and the (external)object, was developed independently by Brentano and his school, and may have surfaced as early as Brentano's1870's lectures on logic.Scholars such as J. N. Mohanty, Claire Ortiz Hill, and Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, among others, have arguedthat Husserl's so-called change from psychologism to Platonism came about independently of Frege's review.[49] Forexample, the review falsely accuses Husserl of subjectivizing everything, so that no objectivity is possible, andfalsely attributes to him a notion of abstraction whereby objects disappear until we are left with numbers as mereghosts. Contrary to what Frege states, in Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic we already find two different kinds ofrepresentations: subjective and objective. Moreover, objectivity is clearly defined in that work. Frege's attack seemsto be directed at certain foundational doctrines then current in Weierstrass's Berlin School, of which Husserl andCantor cannot be said to be orthodox representatives.Furthermore, various sources indicate that Husserl changed his mind about psychologism as early as 1890, a yearbefore he published the Philosophy of Arithmetic. Husserl stated that by the time he published that book, he hadalready changed his mindthat he had doubts about psychologism from the very outset. He attributed this change ofmind to his reading of Leibniz, Bolzano, Lotze, and David Hume.[50] Husserl makes no mention of Frege as adecisive factor in this change. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl mentions Frege only twice, once in a footnote topoint out that he had retracted three pages of his criticism of Frege's The Foundations of Arithmetic, and again toquestion Frege's use of the word Bedeutung to designate "reference" rather than "meaning" (sense).In a letter dated May 24, 1891, Frege thanked Husserl for sending him a copy of the Philosophy of Arithmetic andHusserl's review of Ernst Schrder's Vorlesungen ber die Algebra der Logik. In the same letter, Frege used thereview of Schrder's book to analyze Husserl's notion of the sense of reference of concept words. Hence Fregerecognized, as early as 1891, that Husserl distinguished between sense and reference. Consequently, Frege andHusserl independently elaborated a theory of sense and reference before 1891.Commentators argue that Husserl's notion of noema has nothing to do with Frege's notion of sense, because noemataare necessarily fused with noeses which are the conscious activities of consciousness. Noemata have three differentlevels: The substratum, which is never presented to the consciousness, and is the support of all the properties of the

object; The noematic senses, which are the different ways the objects are presented to us; The modalities of being (possible, doubtful, existent, non-existent, absurd, and so on).Consequently, in intentional activities, even non-existent objects can be constituted, and form part of the wholenoema. Frege, however, did not conceive of objects as forming parts of senses: If a proper name denotes anon-existent object, it does not have a reference, hence concepts with no objects have no truth value in arguments.Moreover, Husserl did not maintain that predicates of sentences designate concepts. According to Frege thereference of a sentence is a truth value; for Husserl it is a "state of affairs." Frege's notion of "sense" is unrelated toHusserl's noema, while the latter's notions of "meaning" and "object" differ from those of Frege.In detail, Husserl's conception of logic and mathematics differs from that of Frege, who held that arithmetic could bederived from logic. For Husserl this is not the case: mathematics (with the exception of geometry) is the ontologicalcorrelate of logic, and while both fields are related, neither one is strictly reducible to the other.

Edmund Husserl 10

Husserl's criticism of psychologismReacting against authors such as J. S. Mill, Christoph von Sigwart and his own former teacher Brentano, Husserlcriticised their psychologism in mathematics and logic, i.e. their conception of these abstract and a priori sciences ashaving an essentially empirical foundation and a prescriptive or descriptive nature. According to psychologism, logicwould not be an autonomous discipline, but a branch of psychology, either proposing a prescriptive and practical"art" of correct judgement (as Brentano and some of his more orthodox students did)[51] or a description of thefactual processes of human thought. Husserl pointed out that the failure of anti-psychologists to defeat psychologismwas a result of being unable to distinguish between the foundational, theoretical side of logic, and the applied,practical side. Pure logic does not deal at all with "thoughts" or "judgings" as mental episodes but about a priori lawsand conditions for any theory and any judgments whatsoever, conceived as propositions in themselves.

"Here Judgement has the same meaning as proposition, understood, not as a grammatical, but as an idealunity of meaning. This is the case with all the distinctions of acts or forms of judgement, which provide thefoundations for the laws of pure logic. Categorial, hypothetical, disjunctive, existential judgements, andhowever else we may call them, in pure logic are not names for classes of judgements, but for ideal forms ofpropositions."[52]

Since "truth-in-itself" has "being-in-itself" as ontological correlate, and since psychologists reduce truth (and hencelogic) to empirical psychology, the inevitable consequence is scepticism. Psychologists have also not been successfulin showing how from induction or psychological processes we can justify the absolute certainty of logical principles,such as the principles of identity and non-contradiction. It is therefore futile to base certain logical laws andprinciples on uncertain processes of the mind.This confusion made by psychologism (and related disciplines such as biologism and anthropologism) can be due tothree specific prejudices:1. The first prejudice is the supposition that logic is somehow normative in nature. Husserl argues that logic istheoretical, i.e., that logic itself proposes a priori laws which are themselves the basis of the normative side of logic.Since mathematics is related to logic, he cites an example from mathematics: If we have a formula like "(a + b)(a b) = a b" it does not tell us how to think mathematically. It just expresses a truth. A proposition that says: "Theproduct of the sum and the difference of a and b should give us the difference of the squares of a and b" does expressa normative proposition, but this normative statement is based on the theoretical statement "(a + b)(a b) = a b".2. For psychologists, the acts of judging, reasoning, deriving, and so on, are all psychological processes. Therefore, itis the role of psychology to provide the foundation of these processes. Husserl states that this effort made bypsychologists is a "metbasis eis llo gnos" (Gr. , "a transgression to anotherfield").[citation needed] It is a metbasis because psychology cannot possibly provide any foundations for a priori lawswhich themselves are the basis for all the ways we should think correctly. Psychologists have the problem ofconfusing intentional activities with the object of these activities. It is important to distinguish between the act ofjudging and the judgment itself, the act of counting and the number itself, and so on. Counting five objects isundeniably a psychological process, but the number 5 is not.3. Judgments can be true or not true. Psychologists argue that judgments are true because they become "evidently"true to us. This evidence, a psychological process that "guarantees" truth, is indeed a psychological process. Husserlresponds by saying that truth itself as well as logical laws always remain valid regardless of psychological"evidence" that they are true. No psychological process can explain the a priori objectivity of these logical truths.From this criticism to psychologism, the distinction between psychological acts and their intentional objects, and thedifference between the normative side of logic and the theoretical side, derives from a platonist conception of logic.This means that we should regard logical and mathematical laws as being independent of the human mind, and alsoas an autonomy of meanings. It is essentially the difference between the real (everything subject to time) and theideal or irreal (everything that is atemporal), such as logical truths, mathematical entities, mathematical truths andmeanings in general.

Edmund Husserl 11

Influence

Husserl's gravestone at Freiburg Gnterstal

David Carr of Yale University commented in 1970 onHusserl's following: "It is well known that Husserl wasalways disappointed at the tendency of his students togo their own way, to embark upon fundamentalrevisions of phenomenology rather than engage in thecommunal task" as originally intended by the radicalnew science.[53] Notwithstanding, he did attractphilosophers to phenomenology.

Martin Heidegger is the best known of Husserl'sstudents, the one whom Husserl chose as his successorat Freiburg. Heidegger's magnum opus Being and Timewas dedicated to Husserl. They shared their thoughtsand worked alongside each other for over a decade atthe University of Freiburg, Heidegger being Husserl'sassistant during 1920-1923.[54][55][56] Heidegger's earlywork followed his teacher, but with time he began todevelop new insights distinctively variant. Husserlbecame increasingly critical of Heidegger's work,especially in 1929, and included pointed criticism ofHeidegger in lectures he gave during 1931.[57] Heidegger, while acknowledging his debt to Husserl, followed apolitical position offensive and harmful to Husserl after the Nazis came to power in 1933, Husserl being of Jewishorigin and Heidegger infamously being then a Nazi proponent.[58] Academic discussion of Husserl and Heidegger isextensive.

At Gttingen in 1913 Adolf Reinach (18841917) "was now Husserl's right hand. He was above all the mediatorbetween Husserl and the students, for he understood extremely well how to deal with other persons, whereas Husserlwas pretty much helpless in this respect."[59] He was an original editor of Husserl's new journal, Jahrbuch; one of hisworks (giving a phenomenological analysis of the law of obligations) appeared in its first issue.[60] Reinach waswidely admired and a remarkable teacher. Husserl, in his 1917 obituary, wrote, "He wanted to draw only from thedeepest sources, he wanted to produce only work of enduring value. And through his wise restrain he succeeded inthis."[61]

Edith Stein was Husserl's student at Gttingen while she wrote her On the Problem of Empathy (1916). She thenbecame his assistant at Freiburg 1916-1918. She later adapted her phenomenology to the modern school of ThomasAquinas.[62]

Ludwig Landgrebe became assistant to Husserl in 1923. From 1939 he collaborated with Eugen Fink at theHusserl-Archives in Leuven. In 1954 he became leader of the Husserl-Archives. Landgrebe is known as one ofHusserl's closest associates, but also for his independent views relating to history, religion and politics as seen fromthe viewpoints of existentialist philosophy and metaphysics.Eugen Fink was a close associate of Husserl during the 1920s and 1930s. He wrote the Sixth Cartesian Meditationwhich Husserl said was the truest expression and continuation of his own work. Fink delivered the eulogy forHusserl in 1938.[5]

Roman Ingarden, an early student of Husserl at Freiburg, corresponded with Husserl into the mid-1930s. Ingarden did not accept, however, the later transcendental idealism of Husserl which he thought would lead to relativism. Ingarden has written his work in German and Polish. In his Spr o istnienie wiata (Ger: "Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt", Eng: "Dispute about existence of the world") he created his own realistic position, which also helped to

Edmund Husserl 12

spread phenomenology in Poland.Max Scheler met Husserl in Halle in 1901 and found in his phenomenology a methodological breakthrough for hisown philosophy. Scheler, who was at Gttingen when Husserl taught there, was one of the original few editors of thejournal Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und Phnomenologische Forschung (1913). Scheler's work Formalism in Ethicsand Nonformal Ethics of Value appeared in the new journal (1913 and 1916) and drew acclaim. The personalrelationship between the two men, however, became strained, due to Scheler's legal troubles, and Scheler returned toMunich.[63] Although Scheler later criticised Husserl's idealistic logical approach and proposed instead a"phenomenology of love", he states that he remained "deeply indebted" to Husserl throughout his work.Nicolai Hartmann was once thought to be at the center of phenomenology, but perhaps no longer. In 1921 theprestige of Hartmann the Neo-Kantian, who was Professor of Philosophy at Marburg, was added to the Movement;he "publicly declared his solidarity with the actual work of die Phnomenologie." Yet Hartmann's connections werewith Max Scheler and the Munich circle; Husserl himself evidently did not consider him as a phenomenologist. Hisphilosophy, however, is said to include an innovative use of the method.[64]

Emmanuel Levinas in 1929 gave a presentation at one of Husserl's last seminars in Freiburg. Also that year he wroteon Husserl's Ideen (1913) a long review published by a French journal. With Gabrielle Peiffer, Levinas translatedinto French Husserl's Mditations cartsiennes (1931). He was at first impressed with Heidegger and began a bookon him, but broke off the project when Heidegger became involved with the Nazis. After the war he wrote on Jewishspirituality; most of his family had been murdered by the Nazis in Lithuania. Levinas then began to write works thatwould become widely known and admired.[65]

Jean-Paul Sartre was also largely influenced by Husserl, although he later came to disagree with key points in hisanalyses. Sartre rejected Husserl's transcendental interpretations begun in his Ideen (1913) and instead followedHeidegger's ontology.[66]

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is influenced by Edmund Husserl's work on perception,intersubjectivity, intentionality, and temporality, including Husserl's theory of retention and protention.Merleau-Ponty's description of 'motor intentionality' and sexuality, for example, retain the important structure of thenoetic-noematic correlation of Ideas I, yet furher concretize what it means for Husserl when consciousnessparticularizes itself into modes of intuition. Merleau-Ponty's most clearly Husserlian work is, perhaps, "thePhilosopher and His Shadow." Depending on the interpretation of Husserl's accounts of eidetic intuition, given inHusserl's _Phenomenological Psychology_ and _Experience and Judgment,_ it may be that Merleau-Ponty did notaccept the "eidetic reduction" nor the "pure essence" said to result.[67] Merleau-Ponty was the first student to study atthe Husserl-archives in Leuven.Gabriel Marcel explicitly rejected existentialism, due to Sartre, but not phenomenology, which has enjoyed a widefollowing among French Catholics. He appreciated Husserl, Scheler, and (but with apprehension) Heidegger.[68] Hisexpressions like "ontology of sensability" when referring to the body, indicate influence by phenomenologicalthought.[69]

Kurt Gdel is known to have read Cartesian Meditations. He expressed very strong appreciation for Husserl's work,especially with regard to "bracketing" or epoch.Hermann Weyl's interest in intuitionistic logic and impredicativity appears to have resulted from his reading ofHusserl. He was introduced to Husserl's work through his wife, Helene Joseph, herself a student of Husserl atGttingen.Rudolf Carnap was also influenced by Husserl, not only concerning Husserl's notion of essential insight that Carnapused in his Der Raum, but also his notion of "formation rules" and "transformation rules" is founded on Husserl'sphilosophy of logic.Karol Wojtyla, who would later become became Pope John-Paul II was influenced by Husserl. Phenomenology appears in a work co-authored by him, The Acting Person (1969). Originally published in Polish, it was written in

Edmund Husserl 13

collaboration with the Polish phenomenologist Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.[70] It combines phenomenological workwith Thomistic Ethics.[71]

Plaque commemorating Husserl in his home townof Prostjov, Czech Republic

Paul Ricur has translated many works of Husserl into French and hasalso written many of his own studies of the philosopher.[72] Amongother works, Ricur employed phenomenology in his Freud &Philosophy (1965).[73]

Jacques Derrida wrote several critical studies of Husserl early in hisacademic career. These included his dissertation, The Problem ofGenesis in Husserl's Philosophy, and also his introduction to TheOrigin of Geometry. Derrida continued to make reference to Husserl inworks such as Of Grammatology.

Stanisaw Leniewski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz were inspired byHusserl's formal analysis of language. Accordingly, they employedphenomenology in the development of categorial grammar.[74]

Ortega y Gasset visited Husserl at Freiburg in 1934. He credited phenomenology for having 'liberated him' from anarrow neo-Kantian thought. While perhaps not a phenomenologist himself, he introduced the philosophy to Iberiaand Latin America.[75]

Wilfrid Sellars, an influential figure in the so-called "Pittsburgh School" (Robert Brandom, John McDowell) hadbeen a student of Marvin Farber, a pupil of Husserl, and was influenced by phenomenology through him:

Marvin Farber led me through my first careful reading of the Critique of Pure Reason and introduced me toHusserl. His combination of utter respect for the structure of Husserl's thought with the equally firm convictionthat this structure could be given a naturalistic interpretation was undoubtedly a key influence on my ownsubsequent philosophical strategy.[76]

Hans Blumenberg received his postdoctoral qualification in 1950, with a dissertation on 'Ontological distance', aninquiry into the crisis of Husserl's phenomenology.The influence of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition in the 21st century extends beyond the confines of theEuropean and North American legacies. It has already started to impact (indirectly) scholarship in Eastern andOriental thought, including research on the impetus of philosophical thinking in the history of ideas in Islam.[77][78]

Reference notes[1] Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi's term for Husserl's idea that consciousness always involves a self-appearance or self-manifestation ();

"Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness" (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ self-consciousness-phenomenological/ ),Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

[2][2] .[3] Smith, D.W. (2007). Husserl. pp xiv[4] Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Biographical Note" per Edmund Husserl, at 17-20, in his edited Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl

and Its Interpretation (Garden City NY: Doubleday Anchor 1967).[5] Husserl Page Biography (http:/ / www. husserlpage. com/ hus_bio. html)[6] H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed. 1971) at I: 85-87. It was

reported "from witnesses of Husserl's last days - that Husserl had something like a deathbed conversion." Spiegelberg (1971) at I:85.[7] Kockelmans, "Biographical Note" per Edmund Husserl, 17-20, at 17-18, in his edited Phenomenology (Doubleday Anchor 1967). 'Husserl's

'Philosophie der Arithmetik is further discussed here below.[8] Cf., "Illustrative extracts from Frege's Review of Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik", translated by P.T.Geach, at 79-85, in Peter Geach and

Max Black, editors, Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1977).[9] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Husserl (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ husserl/ ) What the exact impact this criticism by Frege

may have had on Husserl's subsequent positions is the subject of debate. See below herein the section "Husserl and the Critique ofPsychologism" and the subsection "Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics".

[10] Husserl's Logische, in its disentangling of psychology from logic, also served as preparation for the later development of his work in phenomenological reduction. Marvin Farber, "Husserl and Philosophical Radicalism. The ideas of a presuppositionless philosophy" 37-57 at

Edmund Husserl 14

47-48, in Kockelmans, ed., Phenomenology (1967).[11] Cf., Paul Ricur, Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Northwestern University 1967) at 29-30. Ricur traces Husserl's

development from the Logische Untersuchungen to his later Ideen (1913), as leading from the psychological to the transcendental, regardingthe intuition of essences (which the methodology of the phenomenological reduction allows). The book Husserl contains translations ofRicur's essays of 1949-1967.

[12] Husserl, Vorlesungen zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1928), translated as The Phenomenology of Internal TimeConsciousness (Indiana University 1964).

[13] Husserl, Ideen au einer reinen Phnomenologie und phnomenologischen Philosophie (1913), translated as Ideas. General Introduction toPure Phenomenology (New York: Macmillan 1931; reprint Collier), with "Author's Preface to the English Edition" at 5-22. Therein, Husserlin 1931 refers to "Transcendental Subjectivity" being "a new field of experience" opened as a result of practicing phenomenological reduction,and giving rise to an a priori science not empirically based but somewhat similar to mathematics. By such practice the individual becomes the"transcendental Ego", although Husserl acknowledges the problem of solipsism. Later he emphasizes "the necessary stressing of the differencebetween transcendental and psychological subjectivity, the repeated declaration that transcendental phenomenology is not in any sensepsychology... " but rather (in contrast to naturalistic psychology) by the phenomenological reduction "the life of the soul is made intelligible inits most intimate and originally intuitional essence" and whereby "objects of the most varied grades right up to the level of the objective worldare there for the Ego... ." Ibid. at 5-7, 11-12, 18.

[14] Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (1967) at 33. In his "Ideen period" (1911-1925) Husserl also produced twounpublished manuscripts later referred to as Ideen II and Ideen III. Ricur (1967) at 35.

[15] Jean-Paul Sartre, "La Transcendance de L'Ego. Esquisse d'une description phnomnologique" in Recherches Philosophiques, VI (1937),translated as The Transcendence of the Ego. An existentialist theory of consciousness (New York: The Noonday Press 1957). Sartre's"disagreement with Husserl seems to have facilitated the transition from phenomenology to the existentialist doctrines of L'tre et le Nant[1943]." F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, "Translator's introduction" 11-27, at 12, to Transcendance of the Ego (1957).

[16] Ricoeur Paul Ricur, Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Northwestern University 1967) (1967) at 29, 30; cf., 177-178.[17] Husserl, Ideen (1913), translated as Ideas (1931), e.g., at 161-165.[18] Ricoeur, Husserl (1967) at 25-27. Ideen does not address the problem of solipsism. Ricur (1967) at 31.[19] Peter Koestenbaum, "Introductory Essay" ix-lxxvii, at lxxv, in Husserl, The Paris Lectures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed. 1967).[20] In the 1962 translation Being and Time by Macquarrie and Robinson, Heidegger states: "Dedicated to Edmund Husserl in friendship and

admiration. Todnauberg in Baden, Black Forest, 8 April 1926".[21] Edmund Husserl, Pariser Vortrge [1929], translated as The Paris Lectures (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed. 1967), by Peter

Koestenbaum, with an "Introductory Essay" at ix-lxxvii.[22] This work was published first in French. Husserl, Mditations cartsiennes (Paris: Armand Colin 1931), translated by Gabrielle Peiffer and

Emmanuel Levinas. A German edition Cartesianische Meditationen (which Husserl had reworked) came out in 1950.[23] Ricoeur, Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Northwestern University 1967) at 82-85, 115-116, 123-142. Ricoeur wonders whether

here Husserl does not "square the circle" regarding the issue of solipsism.[24] Husserl, Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften un die transzendentale Phnomenologie (Belgrade 1936). "As a Jew who was denied

any public platform in Germany, Husserl had to publish, as he had lectured, outside his own country." Philosophia in Belgrade began itspublication. David Carr, "Translator's Introdution" xv-xliii, at xvii, to Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and TranscendentalPhenomenology (Northwestern University 1970).

[25] Quentin Lauer, "Introduction" 1-68, at 6-7, in Edumund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy (New York: Harper &Row/Torchbook 1965); translated are two works by Husserl: the 1935 Prague lecture "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man"[Philosophie und die Krisis der europischen Menschentums], and the 1911 essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" [Philosophie als strengeWissenschaft].

[26] David Carr, "Translator's Introdution" xv-xliii, at xxx-xxxi, xxxiv-xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii (historicism), xxxvi-xxxvii (as given), to Husserl,The Crises of European Sciences (1970).

[27] Paul Ricur, "Husserl et le sens de l'histoire" (1949), as translated in his Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (1967) at 143-174.[28] Husserl, The Crises of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Northwestern University 1970), e.g., at 127.[29] Carr, "Translator's Introdution" xv-xliii, at xxxviii-xlii, to Husserl, The Crises of European Sciences (1970).[30] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Husserl (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ husserl/ )[31] Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie Campus Verlag p.168, Walter Biemel "Erinnerungsfragmente" in Erinnerung

an Martin Heidegger Neske 1977 S.22[32] Rdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (Cambridge, Mass., & London: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 253-8.[33] Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed. 1971) at I: 281-283.

"Around this time, Husserl also began to refer to Heidegger and Scheler as his philosophical antipodes." Spiegelberg (1970) at 283.[34] Cf., Edmund Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927-1931), translated by

T. Sheehan and R. Palmer (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997), which contains his "Phnomenologie und Anthropologie" at 485-500.[35] "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten". Der Spiegel, 31 May 1967.[36] E.g., Husserl, Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1997).[37] Husserl is mentioned by Bernard Stiegler in the 2004 film The Ister.[38] Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin 2003) at 421 [source not confirmed].

Edmund Husserl 15

[39] Cf., Peter Koestenbaum, "Introductory Essay" ix-lxxvii, at lxxv-lxxvi, in his edited Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 2d ed. 1967). His widow Malvine Husserl was instrumental in this rescue project; she became a convert to Catholicism in1941.

[40] Kockelmans, "The Husserl-Archives", at 20-21, in his edited Phenomenology (Doubleday Anchor 1967).[42] This assumption led Husserl to an idealistic position (which he originally had tried to overcome or avoid). On Husserl's phenomenological

idealism see Hans Kchler, Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phnomenologie. Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismusund Realismus. (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Vol. 112.) Meisenheim a. G.: Anton Hain, 1974.

[43] Crisis of European Humanity, Pt. II, 1935[44] Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1962) 96103,

15567.[45] Husserl, Ideas 194.[46] Husserl, Ideas 24243.[47] Husserl, Ideas 105109; Mark P. Drost, 'The Primacy of Perception in Husserl's Theory of Imagining,' PPR 1 (1990) 56982. The German

begreifen, cognate with English 'grip,' carries the same sense.[48] See especially Klein's Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra (MIT Press, 1968).[49] Consider Jitendra Nath Mohanty, 1995, "The Development of Husserl's Thought" in Barry Smith & David Woodruff Smith, eds., The

Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge Univ. Press. For further commentaries on the review, see Willard, Dallas, 1984. Logic and theObjectivity of Knowledge. Athens OH: Ohio University Press, p. 63; J. Philip Miller, 1982. "Numbers in Presence and Absence,Phaenomenologica 90 (Den Haag: Nijhoff): p. 19 ff.; and Jitendra Nath Mohanty, 1984, "Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming ofPsychologism", in Cho, Kay Kyung, ed., Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective, Phaenomenologica 95(Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Nijhoff), p. 145.

[50] Husserl-Chronik, p. 25-26[51] See the quotes in Carlo Ierna, Husserls Critique of Double Judgments, in: Filip Mattens, editor, Meaning and Language:

Phenomenological Perspectives, Phaenomenologica 187 (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Springer, 2008, pp. 50 f.[52] Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, volume 1, edited by Dermot Moran, trans. by J.N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 112.[53] David Carr, "Translator's Introduction" xv-xlii, at xxv, to Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental

Phenomenology (Northwestern University 1970).[54] Kockelmans, "Introduction [Martin Heidegger]" 267-276, 273, in Kockelmans, editor, Phenomenology (1967).[55] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Husserl (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ husserl)[56] Heidegger was at Marburg 1923-1925.[57][57] See above subsection "Heidegger and the Nazi era".[58] The multivalent, including the "horrifying", aspects of Heidegger in a parallel context are recounted in Peter Eli Gordon, Rosensweig and

Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy (University of California 2003) at 13-14 (Heidegger and Rosensweig's early "kinship"with him). "In 1929, however, one could still read Heidegger's philosophy without being drawn into a controversy concerning its relationshipto National Socialism, anti-semitism, and the like. The German philosophical world as a whole still cloaked itself in a mantle of relativeinnocence." Gordon (2003) at 303-304. "Rosensweig's work represents the culmination of what is often called the German Jewish Tradition."Gordon, "Preface" (2003) at xix.

[59] Edith Stein, "Reinach as a Philosophical Personality [Selection from her memoirs] xxvii-xxix, at xxvii, in Aletheia, III (1985).[60] Adolf Reinach, "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des brgerlichen Rechtes" in Jahrbuch fr Philosophie und phnomenologische Forschung, I:

685-847 (1913), translated as "The A Priori Foundation of Civil Law" in Aletheia, III: 1-142 (1983).[61] Edmund Husserl, "Reinach as a Philosophical Personality [Obituary notice] xi-xiv, at xi, in Aletheia, III (1985).[62] Waltraud Herbstrith, Edith Stein. A Biography ([1971]; New York: Harper and Row 1985) at 13-14, 24; 42-44.[63] John Raphael Staude, Max Scheler (New York: Free Press 1967) at 19-20, 27-28.[64] Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (2d ed. 1971) at 258-259; 371 (Scheler), 379-384 (use of method).[65] Unsigned "Preface" at vii-x, to Emmanuel Levinas. Basic philosophical writings (Indiana University 1996), edited by Adriaan Peperzak,

Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi.[66] Sartre, The Transcendent of the Ego. An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness [1937] (New York: Noonday 1957).[67] Remy C. Kwant, "Merleau-Ponty's Criticism of Husserl's Eidetic Reduction" in Joseph J. Kochelmans, Phenomenology. The Philosophy of

Edmund Husserl and its Interpretation (Garden City NY: Doubleday Anchor 1967) at 393-408, 394-395, 404-405.[68] Herbert Spiegelberg and Karl Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement (Springer Verlag 1982) at 438-439, 448-449.[69] Cf., A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy (University of Notre Dame 1971) at V: 284-285.[70] The World Phenomenology Institute (http:/ / www. phenomenology. org)[72] Cf., Paul Ricur, Husserl. An analysis of his phenomenology (Northwestern University 1967), collected essays, translated.[73] Ricur, Freud and Philosophy: An essay in interpretation ([1965]; Yale University 1970).[74][74] Cf.[75] Herbert Spiegelberg and Karl Schuhmann, The Phenomenological Movement (Springer Verlag 1982) at 658-659.[77] See for instance: Nader El-Bizri, The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Heidegger (Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications

SUNY at Binghamton, 2000); and also refer to: Nader El-Bizri, "Avicenna's De Anima between Aristotle and Husserl", in The Passions of theSoul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), pp. 67-89

Edmund Husserl 16

[78] Refer also to the book-series published by SPRINGER on phenomenology and Islamic philosophy: (http:/ / www. springer. com/ series/6137)

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Ideas) 1928. Vorlesungen zur Phnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. 1929. Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (Formal and

Transcendental Logic) 1931. Mditations cartsiennes (Cartesian Meditations) 1936. Die Krisis der europischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phnomenologie: Eine Einleitung in

die phnomenologische Philosophie (The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: AnIntroduction to Phenomenological Philosophy)

1939. Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik. (Experience and Judgment) 1952. Ideen II: Phnomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. 1952. Ideen III: Die Phnomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften.

In English

Philosophy of Arithmetic, Willard, Dallas, trans., 2003 [1891]. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Logical Investigations, 1973 [1900, second revised editions 1913], Findlay, J. N., trans. London: Routledge. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", translated in Quentin Lauer, editor, 1965 [1910] Phenomenology and the

Crisis of Philosophy. New York: Harper & Row. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - First Book: General

Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, 1982 [1913]. Kersten, F., trans. The Hague: Nijhoff. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Second Book: Studies in the

Phenomenology of Constitution, 1989. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, translators. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy - Third Book: Phenomenology

and the Foundations of the Sciences, 1980, Klein, T. E., and Pohl, W. E., translators. Dordrecht: Kluwer. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), 1990 [1928]. Brough, J.B., trans.

Dordrecht: Kluwer. Cartesian Meditations, 1960 [1931]. Cairns, D., trans. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Online. (http:/ / www. archive. org/

details/ cartesianmeditat017661mbp) Formal and Transcendental Logic, 1969 [1929], Cairns, D., trans. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Edmund Husserl 17

Experience and Judgement, 1973 [1939], Churchill, J. S., and Ameriks, K., translators. London: Routledge. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, 1970 [1936/54], Carr, D., trans. Evanston:

Northwestern University Press. Universal Teleology. Telos (http:/ / www. telospress. com) 4 (Fall 1969). New York: Telos Press.Anthologies: Willard, Dallas, trans., 1994. Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Welton, D., ed., 1999. The Essential Husserl. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Secondary literature Bernet, Rudolf, et al., 1993. Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University

Press. ISBN 0-8101-1030-X Hopkins, Burt C., (2011) The Philosophy of Husserl. Durham: Acumen. Derrida, Jacques, 1954 (French), 2003 (English). The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy. Chicago &

London: University of Chicago Press. --------, 1962 (French), 1976 (English). Introduction to Husserl's The Origin of Geometry. Includes Derrida's

translation of Appendix III of Husserl's 1936 The Crisis of European Sciences and TranscendentalPhenomenology.

--------, 1967 (French), 1973 (English). Speech and Phenomena (La Voix et le Phnomne), and other Essays onHusserl's Theory of Signs. ISBN 0-8101-0397-4

Everdell, William R. (1998), The First Moderns, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ISBN0-226-22480-5 Fine, Kit, 1995, "Part-Whole" in Smith, B., and Smith, D. W., eds., The Cambridge Companion to Husserl.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fink, Eugen 1995, Sixth Cartesian meditation. The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method with textual

notations by Edmund Husserl. Translated with an introduction by Ronald Bruzina, Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press.

Fllesdal, Dagfinn, 1972, "An Introduction to Phenomenology for Analytic Philosophers" in Olson, R. E., andPaul, A. M., eds., Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia. John Hopkins Univ. Press: 417-30.

Hill, C. O., 1991. Word and Object in Husserl, Frege, and Russell: The Roots of Twentieth-Century Philosophy.Ohio Univ. Press.

-------- and Rosado Haddock, G. E., 2000. Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics. OpenCourt.

Levinas, Emmanuel, 1963 (French), 1973 (English). The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology.Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Kchler, Hans, 1983, "The Relativity of the Soul and the Absolute State of the Pure Ego", Analecta Husserliana16: 95-107.

--------, 1986. Phenomenological Realism. Selected Essays. Frankfurt a. M./Bern: Peter Lang. Mohanty, J. N., 1974, "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship", Research in Phenomenology 4:

51-62. --------, 1982. Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. --------, 1982. Husserl and Frege. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Moran, D. and Cohen, J., 2012, The Husserl Dictionary. London, Continuum Press. Natanson, Maurice, 1973. Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. Evanston: Northwestern University

Press. ISBN 0-8101-0425-3 Ricur, Paul, 1967. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Rollinger, R. D., 1999, Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano in Phaenomenologica 150. Kluwer. ISBN

0-7923-5684-5

Edmund Husserl 18

--------, 2008. Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Others on Mind and Language.Frankfurt am Main: Ontos-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-86838-005-7

Schuhmann, K., 1977. Husserl Chronik (Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls). Number I in HusserlianaDokumente. Martinus Nijhoff. ISBN 90-247-1972-0

Simons, Peter, 1987. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sokolowski, Robert. Introduction to Phenomenology (http:/ / www. amazon. com/ dp/ 0521667925). New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1999. ISBN 978-0-521-66792-0 Smith, B. & Smith, D. W., eds. (1995), The Cambridge companion to Husserl (http:/ / books. google. ru/

books?id=1PIhzc6ZBlIC& printsec=frontcover& dq="cambridge+ companion+ to+ husserl"#v=onepage& q&f=false), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN0-521-43616-8

Smith, David Woodruff, 2007. Husserl London: Routledge. Stiegler, Bernard, 2009. Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Zahavi, Dan, 2003. Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-4546-3

External links

Husserl archives Husserl-Archives Leuven (http:/ / www. hiw. kuleuven. ac. be/ hiw/ eng/ husserl/ ), the main Husserl-Archive in

Leuven, International Centre for Phenomenological Research. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke (http:/ / www. hiw. kuleuven. be/ hiw/ eng/ husserl/

Husserliana. php), the ongoing critical edition of Husserl's works. Husserliana:Materialien (http:/ / www. hiw. kuleuven. be/ hiw/ eng/ husserl/ Materialien. php), edition for

lectures and shorter works. Edmund Husserl Collected Works (http:/ / www. hiw. kuleuven. be/ hiw/ eng/ husserl/ Collected. php), English

translation of Husserl's works. Husserl-Archives (http:/ / www. husserl. uni-koeln. de/ ) at the University of Cologne. Husserl-Archives Freiburg (http:/ / www. husserlarchiv. uni-freiburg. de/ husserl. html). Husserl Archives at the New School (http:/ / www. newschool. edu/ gf/ phil/ husserl/ ) (New York). Archives Husserl de Paris (http:/ / www. umr8547. ens. fr/ fonds-d'Archives. html), at the cole normale

suprieure, Paris. Husserl Archives at Duquesne University, Pittsburgh (http:/ / www. library. duq. edu/ silverman/ collections.

htm).

Other links Edmund Husserl (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ husserl) entry by Christian Beyer in the Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy Phenomenology (http:/ / plato. stanford. edu/ entries/ phenomenology) entry by David Woodruff Smith in the

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). (http:/ / www. iep. utm. edu/ husserl/ )

Marianne Sawicki. Accessed 2011-04-28. Barry Smith, Papers on Edmund Husserl (http:/ / ontology. buffalo. edu/ smith/ articles/ husserl. html) The Husserl Page by Bob Sandmeyer (http:/ / www. husserlpage. com/ ) Includes a number of online texts in

German and English. Husserl.net (http:/ / www. husserl. net), open content project. " Edmund Husserl: Formal Ontology and Transcendental Logic. (http:/ / www. ontology. co/ husserle. htm)"

Resource guide on Husserl's logic and formal ontology, with annotated bibliography.

Edmund Husserl 19

The Husserl Circle. (http:/ / www. husserlcircle. org/ ) Cartesian Meditations (http:/ / archive. org/ details/ CartesiamMeditations) in Internet Archive Ideas, Part I (http:/ / www. archive. org/ details/ IdeasPartI) in Internet Archive

Article Sources and Contributors 20

Article Sources and ContributorsEdmund Husserl Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=564473877 Contributors: 2002:62F6:A0C4:1234:226:8FF:FEE2:BADD, 271828182, Adicarlo, Albedo, AllyD, AlterBerg,Alteraphael, Am088, Amerywu, Anaxial, Andreasmperu, Andrew Gray, Andygx, Antandrus, Anthony Krupp, Anthrophilos, Arcaterra, Areteichi, Arpose, Attilios, Autrecourt, Avoided,Axeman89, BCST2001, Balonkey, Bender235, Big iron, Bluerasberry, Bolekpolivka, Br.locke, Bunnyhop11, Byelf2007, CCS81, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Carlo.Ierna, CatholicW, CharlesMatthews, Chris the speller, Chris09j, ChrisGualtieri, Clown in black and yellow, Cmaric, Colonies Chris, Commander Keane, CommonsDelinker, Conversion script, Crasshopper, Cyrusc, D6,Daniel Quinlan, DanielPerrine, Danny, Danny lost, Davehi1, David Eppstein, David Kernow, David Ludwig, Dbtfz, Der Zeitgeist, Dimadick, Dina, Dvdrvance, EPadmirateur, East of Borschov,Editor at Large, Edward Nygma, Ekindedeoglu, Ekwos, Elfelix, Empetl, Epbr123, Epsilon0, EstherLois, Everyking, Filinthe, Filippowiki, Firstwingman, FranksValli, FredHyden, Fredrik,Frobishero, Gabbe, Gaius Cornelius, Giftlite, GirasoleDE, Glenn, Goethean, Gregbard, Grisunge, Guillermogp, Gustav von Humpelschmumpel, Henry Flower, Hgilbert, Hiram,Homagetocatalonia, Hugo999, Husserl 2, IZAK, Impat10, Interwiki de, Introvert, Inwind, Ioannes Pragensis, Iokseng, Island, Itafroma, Ivan Bajlo, JKeck, JaGa, Jagdfeld, Javanbakht, Jayjg, John,JorgeGG, Joyson Prabhu, KD Tries Again, Kaniczer, Karl-Henner, Kelisi, Ketiltrout, Knucmo2, Koavf, Kwamikagami, Kzollman, Laburke, Lapaz, Ledevinir, Lestrade, Leszek Jaczuk, Levalley,Lfh, LonesomeDrifter, Lucidish, Ludvikus, M4gnum0n, MER-C, MPerel, Maelnuneb, Magioladitis, Marc Girod, Mark Christensen, MartinZwirlein, Martinevans123, Maryevelyn, MatthewFennell, Maurice Carbonaro, Mav, Max Kaertner, Max543, Mia229, Michael Grinberg, Mike Rosoft, Mime, Moagim, Modify, Mtevfrog, Mxm33, Naddy, Narcisse De D., Neal O'Donnell,NewEnglandYankee, Newport, NicolaM, Nkgal, Noah Salzman, Olessi, Omnipaedista, Ontoraul, Oracleofottawa, Peterdjones, Petrejo, Pgg7, Phcople, Phenomenologique, Piotrpazdro, Pjoef,Platypusjones, Polisher of Cobwebs, Ponyo, Poor Yorick, Porcher, Primate Press, Prosario 2000, Pseudo account, Psychiatrick, Pvosta, Qertis, Radgeek, Rajah, Ramfublio, Rayana fazli,Remotelysensed, RenamedUser01302013, Rich Farmbrough, Rick Norwood, Rje, Rjwilmsi, Roachgod, Rodii, Runcorn, Running VAI, Rursus, RyanGerbil10, Ryannagy, SE7, Sailor1889,Salamurai, Sandaag, Sdbaets, Sebesta, Shiki2, Simonides, Sir Paul, Skomorokh, Smdo, Sol1, Solus ipse Inc., Sophroniscus, Stephensuleeman, Storkk, Str1977, Supervert, Tedpennings, ThomasAsh, Tigmic, Tillwe, Tomisti, Tresoldi, Triwbe, Tuschek, Tweisbach, Viator slovenicus, Wandering Courier, Whosyourjudas, Wik, Wikix, Wingroras, Woohookitty, Writtenright, Wvbailey,Yehudi, Youandme, YoungSpinoza, ZWizard666, Zeno Gantner, Zeno Izen, Zfr, , , 320 anonymous edits

Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Edmund Husserl 1900.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Edmund_Husserl_1900.jpg License: Public Domain Contributors: Park4223, Psychiatrick, Vegetator, 1anonymous editsFile:Kiepenheuer Institut Freiburg.JPG Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Kiepenheuer_Institut_Freiburg.JPG License: Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0Contributors: user:Joergens.miFile:Grabmal Edmund Husserl Freiburg Gnterstal.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Grabmal_Edmund_Husserl_Freiburg_Gnterstal.jpg License: CreativeCommons Attribution 3.0 Contributors: Dr. med. MabuseFile:Edmund Husserl.jpg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Edmund_Husserl.jpg License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Contributors:cs:User:Pernak

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Edmund HusserlLife and careerYouth and educationProfessor of philosophyHeidegger and the Nazi era

Development of his thoughtSeveral early themesThe elaboration of phenomenology

ThoughtMeaning and objectPhilosophy of logic and mathematics

Husserl and psychologismPhilosophy of arithmetic and FregeHusserl's criticism of psychologism

InfluenceReference notesBibliographyPrimary literatureIn GermanIn English

Secondary literature

External linksHusserl archivesOther links

License