Reco

nstru

ctio

n an

d re

gion

al d

iplo

mac

y in

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f

ROOS

HAKG

AMIR

AIIM

ADI

Edite

d by

Ho

osha

ng A

mira

hmad

i an

d Na

der E

ntes

sar

Lon

don

and

New

Yor

k

Part

I

Pers

ian

Gulf

in tu

rmoi

l: po

litic

al a

nd e

cono

mic

di

men

sion

s

Intro

duct

ion

Hoos

hang

Am

irahm

adi a

nd N

ader

Ent

essa

r

The

Pers

ian

Gul

f is

argu

ably

the

mos

t vol

atile

and

mili

tariz

ed

regi

on in

the

Third

Wor

ld. T

he c

ombi

natio

n of

pol

itica

l vol

atili

ty

and

mili

tariz

atio

n ha

s mad

e th

e G

ulf s

usce

ptib

le to

out

side

inte

r-ve

ntio

n an

d re

gion

al p

ower

pla

ys. T

he e

ight

-yea

r war

bet

wee

n Ir

an a

nd Ir

aq, I

raq'

s in

vasi

on a

nd o

ccup

atio

n of

Kuw

ait o

n 2

Aug

ust 1

990

and

the

US-

led

war

aga

inst

Iraq

in d

efen

ce o

f Am

eri-

can

inte

rest

s, th

e Sa

udi m

onar

chy

and

the

al-S

abah

rule

in K

uwai

t ar

e co

ncre

te e

xam

ples

of t

he a

fore

men

tione

d re

ality

. T

he c

risi

s in

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f gen

erat

ed b

y Ir

aqi P

resi

dent

Sa

ddam

Hus

sein

's ga

mbl

e on

Kuw

ait h

as p

rovi

ded

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es w

ith a

win

dow

of o

ppor

tuni

ty to

est

ablis

h, in

the

wor

ds o

f on

e an

alys

t, `s

trate

gic

brid

gehe

ads,

sec

ure

the

Gul

f, an

d en

sure

th

at it

reta

ins

a vi

rtual

mon

opol

y on

glo

bal v

iole

nce'.

' US

troop

de

ploy

men

t in

the

regi

on u

nder

the

rubr

ic o

f Ope

ratio

n D

eser

t Sh

ield

, and

thei

r suc

cess

ful u

se a

gain

st Ir

aq in

Ope

ratio

n D

eser

t St

orm

, will

test

the

prin

cipl

es o

f the

em

ergi

ng B

ush

Doc

trine

. Thi

s do

ctrin

e en

visio

ns a

pos

t-Col

d W

ar g

loba

l arra

ngem

ent d

omin

ated

by

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es, w

ith w

este

rn E

urop

e, Ja

pan

and

the

form

er

Sovi

et U

nion

act

ing

as ju

nior

par

tner

s. A

s sta

ted

mor

e bl

untly

by

Mic

hael

Vla

hos,

dire

ctor

of t

he U

S St

ate

Dep

artm

ent's

Cen

ter f

or

the

Stud

y of

For

eign

Affa

irs:

If w

e m

arch

ed ri

ght i

nto

Bag

hdad

, bro

ught

Sad

dam

Hus

sein

ba

ck in

a c

age

and

para

ded

him

dow

n Pe

nnsy

lvan

ia A

venu

e,

the

wor

ld w

ould

take

not

ice.

We

wou

ld h

ave

grea

t fre

edom

of

actio

n in

the

wor

ld fo

r the

nex

t 10

to 2

0 ye

ars,

... P

eopl

e w

ould

tru

ly re

spec

t us,

and

if w

e sa

id th

at w

e di

dn't

like

wha

t the

y di

d, th

ey'd

sit

up a

nd ta

ke n

otic

e.'

Far f

rom

cre

atin

g a

wor

ld su

bmis

sive

to th

e w

ill o

f Was

hing

ton,

4 Pe

rsia

n G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l In

trod

ucti

on 5

this

hege

mon

ic c

once

ptio

n of

the

USA

's re

-em

ergi

ng g

loba

l rol

e co

uld,

in th

e lo

ng ru

n, le

ad to

law

less

ness

, cha

os a

nd in

stabi

lity.

Th

is is

esp

ecia

lly tr

ue in

the

vola

tile

regi

on o

f the

Mid

dle

East

. Th

eref

ore,

it is

impe

rativ

e th

at th

e lit

tora

l sta

tes o

f the

Per

sian

G

ulf t

ake

serio

us st

eps t

o fo

rm re

gion

al se

curit

y ar

rang

emen

ts to

gu

aran

tee

the

secu

rity

and

terri

toria

l int

egrit

y of

all

state

s in

the

area

, and

to o

bvia

te th

e ne

ed fo

r any

futu

re o

utsi

de m

ilita

ry

inte

rven

tion

whi

ch in

varia

bly

will

lead

to d

isastr

ous c

onsq

uenc

es

for t

he re

gion

. W

hen

Pres

iden

t Geo

rge

Bus

h di

spat

ched

US

troop

s to

Saud

i A

rabi

a in

Aug

ust 1

990,

he

iden

tifie

d fo

ur g

oals

for U

S po

licy

in

the r

egio

n:

1 un

cond

ition

al w

ithdr

awal

of I

raqi

forc

es fr

om K

uwai

t 2

resto

ratio

n of

the

al-S

abah

fam

ily a

s the

legi

timat

e go

vern

men

t of

Kuw

ait

3 pr

otec

tion

of th

e liv

es o

f Am

eric

an c

itize

ns in

Kuw

ait a

nd Ir

aq

4 de

fenc

e of

Sau

di A

rabi

a an

d a

com

mitm

ent t

o th

e se

curit

y an

d sta

bilit

y of

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f reg

ion.

' A

long

with

oth

er U

S of

ficia

ls, h

e al

so sp

oke

of S

adda

m's

dang

er

to w

orld

pea

ce a

nd 'A

mer

ican

way

of l

ife'.

It is

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f sec

urity

obj

ectiv

e th

at m

ay h

ave

far-

reac

hing

and

unp

redi

ctab

le im

plic

atio

ns fo

r reg

iona

l sta

bilit

y. A

s Pr

esid

ent B

ush

has m

ade

it cl

ear,

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es p

lan

to u

se

its m

ilita

ry v

icto

ry in

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f to

just

ify e

stab

lishi

ng a

lo

ng-te

rm a

nd p

erm

anen

t mili

tary

pre

senc

e in

the

regi

on. T

hus,

the

first

am

ong

the

four

obj

ectiv

es h

e ou

tline

d fo

r the

pos

t-war

M

iddl

e Ea

st w

as 't

o cr

eate

shar

ed se

curit

y ar

rang

emen

ts in

the

regi

on', w

hich

in P

resid

ent B

ush's

wor

d m

eans

'Am

eric

an p

artic

i-pa

tion

in jo

int e

xerc

ises i

nvol

ving

bot

h ai

r and

gro

und

forc

es', a

nd

'mai

ntai

ning

a ca

pabl

e US

nava

l pre

senc

e in

the r

egio

n'. T

he o

ther

th

ree o

bjec

tives

incl

uded

`to

cont

rol t

he p

rolif

erat

ion

of w

eapo

ns o

f m

ass d

estru

ctio

n an

d th

e m

issile

s use

d to

del

iver

them

', `to

cre

ate

new

opp

ortu

nitie

s for

pea

ce a

nd st

abili

ty in

the

Mid

dle

East

by

endi

ng th

e A

rab-

Isra

eli c

onfli

ct a

nd so

lvin

g th

e Pa

lesti

nian

pro

b-le

m b

ased

on

the

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

Sec

urity

Cou

ncil

Res

olut

ions

24

2 an

d 33

8 an

d th

e pr

inci

ple

of te

rrito

ry fo

r pea

ce', a

nd to

'fos

ter

econ

omic

dev

elop

men

t for

the

sake

of p

eace

and

pro

gres

s and

ec

onom

ic fr

eedo

m a

nd p

rosp

erity

for a

ll pe

ople

of t

he re

gion

':' W

hate

ver t

he fo

rm an

d co

nten

ts of

the r

egio

nal s

ecur

ity sy

stem

, th

e pl

ayer

s in

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f will

hav

e to

incl

ude

such

cou

ntrie

s

as Ir

an, I

raq

and

the

Gul

f Co-

oper

atio

n C

ounc

il (G

CC

) sta

tes.

How

ever

, the

initi

al p

ropo

sals

for t

he P

ersia

n G

ulf s

ecur

ity sy

stem

di

d no

t env

isio

n an

y ro

le fo

r Ira

n or

Iraq

. Whi

le Ir

aq m

ay n

ot

be an

impo

rtant

pla

yer f

or th

e im

med

iate

futu

re, I

ran

has e

mer

ged

stron

ger f

rom

the

crisi

s as i

ts ol

d ne

mes

is be

cam

e m

ilita

rily

neu-

traliz

ed. A

dditi

onal

ly, I

ran

is a c

ount

ry w

ith si

gnifi

cant

reso

urce

s an

d po

tent

ials,

incl

udin

g a

larg

e po

pula

tion

of 5

7 m

illio

n, a

size

-ab

le m

ilita

ry fo

rce,

the

long

est c

oast

line

with

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f th

an a

ny si

ngle

stat

e in

the

area

and

a u

niqu

e ge

ogra

phic

pos

ition

in

the

stra

tegi

c St

rait

of H

orm

uz. I

f pas

t exp

erie

nce

is o

f any

in

dica

tion,

Iran

will

con

tinue

to p

rese

rve

its n

atio

nal s

ecur

ity

inte

rests

in th

e ar

ea. T

hus,

it is

likel

y th

at Ir

an w

ill re

-em

erge

as

a pi

vota

l cou

ntry

in sh

apin

g th

e co

ntou

rs o

f reg

iona

l pol

itics

in

the

twen

ty-fi

rst c

entu

ry. I

t is f

or th

ese

reas

ons t

hat t

his b

ook

has

an Ir

an-c

entre

d ap

proa

ch to

the

issue

s of r

egio

nal d

iplo

mac

y an

d po

st-w

ar ec

onom

ic re

cove

ry.

The

book

focu

ses o

n fo

ur m

ajor

them

es: I

slam

and

revo

lutio

n,

econ

omic

des

truct

ion

and

reco

nstru

ctio

n, Ir

ania

n-A

rab

rela

tions

an

d th

e su

perp

ower

s and

Iran

. The

con

tribu

tors

hav

e pr

esen

ted

diffe

ring

pers

pect

ives

to an

alys

e the

se is

sues

and

indi

cate

pos

sible

fu

ture

dev

elop

men

ts. T

he fo

llow

ing

conc

lusi

ons e

mer

ge: f

irst,

influ

ence

of t

he Ir

ania

n Re

volu

tion

has g

one

wel

l bey

ond

Iran

to

effe

ct in

tern

al d

evel

opm

ents

in o

ther

nat

ions

in th

e re

gion

; suc

h in

fluen

ce, h

owev

er, h

as n

ot p

rodu

ced

any

signi

fican

t per

man

ent

polit

ical

-eco

nom

ic ch

ange

in th

e reg

ion.

Sec

ond,

des

pite

its e

con-

omic

dec

line i

n th

e pos

t-rev

olut

iona

ry p

erio

d, Ir

an m

ay em

erge

as

a re

gion

al e

cono

mic

pow

er in

the

near

futu

re a

s it c

hang

es it

s po

licie

s tow

ard

a m

ore

outw

ard-

look

ing

strat

egy.

Thi

rd, I

rani

an

postu

re v

is-à-

vis t

he li

ttora

l sta

tes

of th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf h

as h

ad

little

con

siste

ncy

in th

e pa

st; m

ore

rece

ntly

, how

ever

, ele

men

ts of

pr

agm

atis

m h

ave

begu

n to

dom

inat

e Ir

ania

n re

gion

al p

olic

y.

Four

th, t

he Ir

ania

n fo

reig

n po

licy

prin

cipl

e of

'Nei

ther

Eas

t Nor

W

est'

had

the

effe

ct o

f ant

agon

izin

g bo

th su

perp

ower

s, al

thou

gh

in p

ract

ical

term

s it h

ad a

lim

ited

appl

icat

ion.

In sh

ort,

gaps

hav

e ex

iste

d be

twee

n th

e ac

tual

per

form

ance

and

the

pote

ntia

l in

the

real

m o

f eco

nom

ics a

s wel

l as b

etw

een

polic

y pr

onou

ncem

ents

and

the

prac

tice

of re

gion

al d

iplo

mac

y in

the

Isla

mic

Rep

ublic

. The

re

sulti

ng c

ontra

dict

ions

hav

e be

com

e m

ajor

cau

ses f

or th

e re

cent

ch

ange

s in

Iran

tow

ard

mor

e pr

agm

atism

and

con

vent

iona

lism

in

both

econ

omic

and

fore

ign

polic

y ar

enas

. In

Par

t II o

f the

boo

k, th

e ro

le o

f Isla

m a

nd th

e sig

nific

ance

of

6 Pe

rsia

n G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l In

trod

uctio

n 7

Iran

's Is

lam

ic R

evol

utio

n ar

e exa

min

ed. N

ikki

Ked

die i

dent

ifies

hi

storic

al re

ason

s for

the e

mer

genc

e and

cont

inua

tion

of re

volu

tion-

ary

thou

ght a

nd a

ctio

n in

mod

ern

Iran

and

trea

ts Ir

ania

n R

evo-

lutio

n in

hist

oric

al p

ersp

ectiv

e. K

eddi

e's c

hapt

er a

lso p

rovi

des a

su

ccin

ct o

verv

iew

of t

he h

istor

ical

role

of t

he u

lama

(Mus

lim cl

eri-

cal s

chol

ars)

in o

ppos

ing

fore

ign

dom

inat

ion

of th

e cou

ntry

. The

18

90-2

Tob

acco

Rev

olt i

s illu

stra

tive

of h

ow th

e Sh

i'a c

leri

cs

led

a m

ass-

base

d re

belli

on a

gain

st N

asse

r ed-

din

Shah

's to

bacc

o co

nces

sions

to th

e Bri

tish.

The

197

8-9

Isla

mic

Rev

olut

ion

agai

nst

the

Pahl

avi m

onar

chy

shou

ld p

ot b

e in

terp

rete

d as

an

isola

ted

case

but

as t

he lo

gica

l con

tinua

tion

of m

ass-

base

d re

volts

aga

inst

op

pres

sion

and

the

fore

ign

dom

inat

ion

of Ir

an fo

r m

uch

of th

e tw

entie

th ce

ntur

y.

Amon

g th

e pol

itica

l ulam

a in

cont

empo

rary

Iran

, Aya

tolla

h K

ho-

mei

ni o

ccup

ies a

ver

y sp

ecia

l pla

ce: h

e was

not

onl

y th

e lea

der o

f th

e Isla

mic

Rev

olut

ion

in Ir

an b

ut a

lso th

e ide

olog

ue o

f the

Isla

mic

R

epub

lic. G

eorg

e Lin

abur

y's c

hapt

er ex

amin

es A

yato

llah

Kho

m-

eini

's le

gacy

and

the i

mpa

ct o

f his

teac

hing

s on

Isla

mic

resu

rgen

ce

thro

ugho

ut th

e Mid

dle E

ast.

Exte

rnal

ly, K

hom

eini

's le

gacy

con-

tinue

s to

be fe

lt in

the

Isla

mic

wor

ld th

roug

h w

ord

of m

outh

, jo

urna

ls an

d pe

riod

ical

s, an

d Is

lam

ic g

roup

s of d

iver

se p

oliti

cal

mak

e-up

and

ideo

logi

cal o

rien

tatio

n. A

s Lin

abur

y no

tes,

Kho

m-

eini

's Sh

i'ism

did

not

dim

inish

the r

elev

ance

of t

he Ir

ania

n R

evo-

lutio

n fo

r th

e Su

nni A

rabs

. Thi

s was

so b

ecau

se th

e sig

nific

ance

of

Iran

's Is

lam

ic R

evol

utio

n di

d no

t lie

in

Kho

mei

ni's

relig

ious

ex

eges

is bu

t in

the

polit

ical

mes

sage

of t

he R

evol

utio

n co

nvey

ed

to th

e A

rab

mas

ses:

that

Isla

m c

an b

e us

ed a

s an

effe

ctiv

e to

ol

by th

e mo

staza

ftn

(the

opp

ress

ed) a

gain

st th

e mo

stakb

arin

(th

e op

pres

sors

). H

owev

er, t

he p

oten

cy o

f thi

s mes

sage

may

be d

imin

-ish

ing

as h

is su

cces

sors

in Ir

an m

ove i

ncre

asin

gly

away

from

the

ideo

logy

tow

ard

conv

entio

nal p

olic

ies a

nd a

ttem

pt to

rein

tegr

ate

Iran

into

wes

tern

capi

talis

m.

A se

cond

impo

rtan

t leg

acy

of A

yato

llah

Kho

mei

ni h

as b

een

the

inst

itutio

naliz

atio

n of

vela

yat-e

faqi

h (g

over

nmen

t of j

ust j

urisp

ru-

denc

e). T

his i

nstit

utio

n, ei

ther

in it

s one

-man

dom

inan

t for

mat

or

in a

ny fu

ture

colle

ctiv

e for

mat

, has

till

now

def

ined

the

raiso

n d'êt

re

of th

e Is

lam

ic R

epub

lic. I

ts m

ajor

eff

ect i

s to

subo

rdin

ate

the

wisd

om o

f a w

hole

nat

ion

to th

e w

isdom

of a

sing

le p

erso

n or

a

smal

l col

lect

ive.

Even

whe

n th

e Aya

tolla

h w

as a

live,

som

e rel

igio

us

auth

oriti

es to

ok is

sue

with

the

inst

itutio

n an

d qu

estio

ned

its v

al-

idity

in Is

lam

. Eve

n its

def

ende

rs h

ad a

t tim

es d

efin

ed it

diff

eren

tly

from

the

Aya

tolla

h. W

heth

er th

e in

stitu

tion

will

surv

ive

in it

s pr

esen

t for

m fo

r an

y lo

ng p

erio

d of

tim

e re

mai

ns to

be

seen

; as

the

gove

rnm

ent c

lose

s its

gap

s with

the

wes

t and

the

secu

lar

Iran

ians

, pre

ssur

e for

som

e kin

d of

mod

ifica

tion

in th

e ins

titut

ion

has i

ncre

ased

. Pe

rhap

s no

singl

e A

rab

coun

try

has b

een

mor

e in

fluen

ced

by

Aya

tolla

h K

hom

eini

's te

achi

ng a

nd th

e Isla

mic

Rev

olut

ion

than

Le

bano

n. A

ugus

tus R

icha

rd N

orto

n's c

hapt

er a

naly

ses t

he im

pact

of

Iran

's Is

lam

ic re

viva

l on

the S

hi'a

com

mun

ity o

f Leb

anon

. As

Nor

ton

argu

es, t

he S

hi'a

com

mun

ity, t

he si

ngle

larg

est g

roup

in

Leba

non,

had

bee

n ig

nore

d. b

y m

ost w

este

rn o

bser

vers

of t

hat

coun

try

until

the v

ictor

y of

the I

rani

an R

evol

utio

n. T

he a

wake

ning

of

Leb

anon

's Sh

i'a c

omm

unity

cat

apul

ted

its m

embe

rs fr

om a

n ig

nore

d re

ligio

us a

nd et

hnic

min

ority

into

an

obje

ct o

f sen

satio

nal

repo

rtin

g. In

the

wes

t, th

e Sh

i'a a

lso b

ecam

e sy

nony

mou

s with

te

rror

ism. N

orto

n se

ts ou

t to

rebu

ke a

num

ber o

f myt

hs a

ssoc

iate

d w

ith p

opul

ar r

epor

ting

abou

t and

per

cept

ion

of th

e Sh

i'a in

the

west.

He t

race

s the

dev

elopm

ent o

f the

pol

itica

l ide

olog

y of

Shi

'ism

in

its L

eban

ese c

onte

xt. T

he ro

le of

the t

radi

tiona

l zu

'am

a (p

oliti

cal

boss

es) a

nd th

e su

bseq

uent

dec

line

of th

eir

influ

ence

am

ong

the

Shi'a

mas

ses p

aved

the

way

for

the

esta

blis

hmen

t of t

wo

non-

trad

ition

al S

hi'a

pol

itica

l gro

upin

gs —

AM

AL

and

Hiz

b A

llah

(P

arty

o

f G

od

). •

Both

of t

hese

org

aniz

atio

ns st

arte

d w

ith Ir

ania

n as

sista

nce a

nd

lead

ersh

ip, b

ut H

izb

Alla

h is

toda

y m

ore

clos

ely

alig

ned

than

A

MA

L w

ith Ir

an's

fore

ign

polic

y ob

ject

ives

in th

e M

iddl

e Ea

st.

Alth

ough

the I

rani

an R

evol

utio

n ga

lvan

ized

the S

hi'a

com

mun

ity,

Isra

el's

inva

sion

of L

eban

on in

198

2 ha

d a

grea

t im

pact

on

the

polit

iciz

atio

n an

d ra

dica

lizat

ion

of L

eban

ese S

hi'a

s. Th

is w

as p

ar-

ticul

arly

true

in th

e cas

e of t

he S

hi'a

s of S

outh

ern

Leba

non

whe

re

thei

r liv

elih

ood

and

com

mun

al li

fe w

ere t

otal

ly d

isrup

ted

by th

e Is

rael

i atta

cks a

nd p

erio

dic

raid

s on

the

Shi'a

vill

ages

. Des

pite

sa

crifi

ces,

the L

eban

ese S

hi'a

s are

no

bette

r off

in th

e ear

ly 1

990s

th

an th

ey w

ere

back

in, s

ay, 1

980;

as I

ran

chan

ges i

ts fo

reig

n po

licy

dire

ctio

n, th

ey w

ill b

ecom

e inc

reas

ingl

y iso

late

d in

Leb

anon

an

d in

the

Mid

dle

East

. A

maj

or co

nseq

uenc

e of t

he Is

lam

ic R

evol

utio

n in

Iran

was

the

Iran

-Iraq

War

, whi

ch le

ft a

deva

statin

g im

pact

on

the I

rani

an a

nd

Iraq

i eco

nom

ies.

In P

art I

II Ir

an's

econ

omic

pro

blem

s, im

pact

of

the

Iran

-Ira

q w

ar, a

nd th

e co

untr

y's r

econ

stru

ctio

n pl

an a

re •

exam

ined

. Inc

lusio

n of

sim

ilar c

hapt

ers o

n Ir

aq b

ecam

e und

esir

-

8 Pe

rsia

n G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l

able

as t

he im

pact

of t

he su

bseq

uent

US-

led

war

aga

inst

Iraq

m

akes

the

Iraqi

loss

es fr

om th

e pr

evio

us w

ar lo

ok in

signi

fican

t. A

ccor

ding

to a

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

' rep

ort p

repa

red

by M

artti

A

htisa

ari,

the U

nder

-Sec

reta

ry-G

ener

al:

The

rece

nt c

onfli

ct h

as w

roug

ht n

ear a

poca

lypt

ic re

sults

upo

n th

e ec

onom

ic in

fras

truct

ure

of w

hat h

ad b

een,

unt

il Ja

nuar

y 19

91, a

rath

er u

rban

ized

and

mec

hani

zed

soci

ety.

Now

, mos

t m

eans

of m

oder

n lif

e su

ppor

t hav

e be

en d

estro

yed

or re

nder

ed

tenu

ous.

Iraq

has,

for s

ome

time

to c

ome,

bee

n re

lega

ted

to a

pr

e-in

dustr

ial a

ge, b

ut w

ith 'a

ll th

e disa

bilit

ies o

f pos

t-ind

ustri

al

depe

nden

cy o

n an

inte

nsiv

e use

of e

nerg

y an

d te

chno

logy

. 3

The

Iran

-Ira

q W

ar w

as 'd

emon

stra

bly

diff

eren

t fro

m o

ther

in

tra-T

hird

Wor

ld w

ars i

n te

rms o

f its

des

truct

iven

ess a

nd it

s un

ique

alli

ance

form

atio

ns'.°

Iraq

, sup

porte

d by

the

pro-

wes

tern

A

rab

stat

es, p

artic

ular

ly S

audi

Ara

bia,

Egy

pt a

nd K

uwai

t, po

r-tra

yed

its w

ar a

gain

st Ir

an a

s a 'h

isto

ric d

efen

se o

f Ara

b so

ve-

reig

nty

and

right

s aga

inst

the

mar

audi

ng P

ersia

ns'.?

Iran

, on

the

othe

r han

d, ju

stifie

d th

e con

tinua

tion

of th

e war

in te

rms o

f def

end-

ing

the

hom

elan

d, p

unis

hing

the

aggr

esso

r, an

d re

plac

ing

the

Ba'a

thi r

egim

e of

Sad

dam

Hus

sein

. Whe

n th

e gu

ns fi

nally

fell

sile

nt, n

eith

er c

ount

ry w

as a

ble

to a

chie

ve it

s st

ated

goa

ls. I

n hu

man

term

s, m

ore

than

600

,000

peo

ple

died

or w

ere

seve

rely

in

jure

d an

d m

aim

ed a

s a re

sult

of th

e w

ar. M

illio

ns w

ere

also

di

spla

ced,

mad

e ho

mel

ess o

r los

t the

ir jo

bs a

nd so

urce

s of l

ivel

i-ho

od. I

n ec

onom

ic te

rms,

dam

age

to e

ach

coun

try's

infra

struc

-tu

res,

plan

ts, an

d ot

her m

eans

of p

rodu

ctio

n ha

ve b

een

stagg

erin

g.8

The

war

, whi

ch st

arte

d w

ith Ir

aq's

sim

ulta

neou

s air

and

land

at

tack

s aga

inst

Irani

an e

cono

mic

and

mili

tary

targ

ets o

n 22

Sep

-te

mbe

r 198

0, e

nded

on

20 A

ugus

t 198

8 w

ith Ir

an's

acce

ptan

ce o

f a

UN

spon

sore

d ce

ase-

fire

(Sec

urity

Cou

ncil

Res

olut

ion

598)

. W

hile

a fo

rmal

pea

ce tr

eaty

has

not

bee

n sig

ned

betw

een

the

two

coun

tries

, ten

sion

betw

een

them

has

dec

lined

des

pite

a re

surg

ence

of

hos

tility

at t

he e

nd o

f the

US-

led

war

aga

inst

Iraq

and

the

subs

eque

nt sh

ort-l

ived

Iraq

i civ

il w

ar. T

hey

esta

blish

ed d

iplo

mat

ic

ties i

n O

ctob

er 1

990

follo

win

g Ira

q's ac

cept

ance

of I

ran's

prin

cipa

l de

man

ds, i

nclu

ding

the

prin

cipl

e of

a

thal

weg

line

for S

hatt

al-A

rab

(mid

-cha

nnel

of t

he ri

ver a

s the

bou

ndar

y de

mar

catio

n be

twee

n th

e tw

o co

untr

ies)

. Thi

s ch

ange

in Ir

aq's

posi

tion

occu

rred

afte

r Sad

dam

inva

ded

and

then

ann

exed

Kuw

ait a

nd

deci

ded

to se

cure

Iraq

's bo

rder

s with

Iran

. 9

Intro

duct

ion

9

Hoo

shan

g A

mira

hmad

i's ch

apte

r on

the I

rani

an ec

onom

y be

gins

w

ith an

anal

ysis

of th

e war

des

truct

ion

whi

ch al

so h

ad fa

r-rea

chin

g im

plic

atio

ns fo

r the

cou

ntry

's oi

l rev

enue

, Ira

n's e

cono

mic

life

bl

ood.

The

offi

cial

ly es

timat

ed to

tal e

cono

mic

dam

age (

dire

ct an

d in

dire

ct) i

s giv

en a

t abo

ut $

870,

000

mill

ion

(at o

ffici

al e

xcha

nge

rate

of R

ls 7

5/U

K fr

ee m

arke

t rat

es fo

r mos

t of t

he p

ost-r

evol

-ut

iona

ry p

erio

d ha

s bee

n ab

ove R

ls 1,

000/

US$

). To

com

pare

, ove

r th

e 19

79-8

9 pe

riod,

Iran

mad

e le

ss th

an $

145,

000

mill

ion

in o

il re

venu

es. A

mira

hmad

i also

pro

vide

s a p

relim

inar

y as

sess

men

t of

the d

amag

e wre

cked

on

the e

cono

my

by th

e Jun

e 199

0 ea

rthqu

ake.

In th

e fin

al p

art h

e foc

uses

on

eigh

t set

s of i

mba

lanc

es fr

om w

hich

th

e ec

onom

y su

ffers

the

mos

t. A

s Am

irahm

adi d

emon

strat

es, t

he

post-

revo

lutio

nary

Iran

ian

econ

omy

has e

xper

ienc

ed si

gnifi

cant

tu

rbul

ence

and

decl

ine a

nd n

eeds

a co

nsid

erab

le in

ject

ion

of m

oney

an

d m

ater

ial t

o re

turn

to n

orm

al a

nd th

en st

art t

o gr

ow a

gain

. In

addi

tion

to th

e war

, he b

lam

es fl

uctu

atio

ns in

oil

reve

nue,

wes

tern

ec

onom

ic em

barg

oes,

the S

hah's

econ

omic

lega

cy, d

omes

tic p

oliti

-ca

l fac

tiona

lism

, and

erra

tic ec

onom

ic p

olic

ies f

or th

e per

form

ance

of

the e

cono

my.

In

Cha

pter

5 A

mira

hmad

i foc

uses

on

the F

irst F

ive-

Yea

r Eco

n-om

ic, S

ocia

l and

Cul

tura

l Dev

elop

men

t Pla

n of

the I

slam

ic R

epub

-lic

of I

ran

(198

9-93

). Th

e pl

an in

tend

s to

stabi

lize

the

econ

omy

and

struc

tura

lly a

djus

t its

imba

lanc

es in

the

hope

of n

orm

aliz

ing

the

war

eco

nom

y an

d th

en le

adin

g it

tow

ard

a gr

owth

pat

h. A

n ac

coun

t of p

olic

y ch

ange

s in

the w

ake o

f the

Per

sian

Gul

f cris

is is

also

giv

en. I

nitia

lly, t

he p

lan

had

envi

sion

ed a

n im

port-

subs

ti-tu

tion

indu

stria

lizat

ion

base

d on

max

imum

util

izat

ion

of th

e exi

st-in

g ca

paci

ties

and

com

plet

ion

of u

nfin

ishe

d pr

ojec

ts. T

his w

as

chan

ged

into

an

expo

rt-pr

omot

ion

indu

stria

lizat

ion

base

d on

ex

tend

ed c

o-op

erat

ion

with

the

wes

t and

the

state

s in

the

regi

on.

The

chap

ter i

s con

clud

ed w

ith a

n as

sess

men

t of p

rosp

ects

for

econ

omic

gro

wth

in Ir

an. W

hile

Iran

is a

reso

urce

-ric

h co

untry

w

ith p

rove

n po

tent

ial f

or g

row

th a

nd e

cono

mic

lead

ersh

ip in

the

Mid

dle

East,

the

succ

ess o

f the

pra

gmat

ists w

ill d

epen

d on

a se

t of

con

ditio

ns in

fore

ign

polic

y, fo

reig

n ex

chan

ge, h

uman

cap

ital,

dom

estic

pol

itics

and

struc

tura

l bot

tlene

cks.

The

Isla

mic

Rev

olut

ion

and

the

Iran

-Ira

q W

ar a

lso

led

to a

co

mpl

ete

rest

ruct

urin

g of

Iran

's re

gion

al d

iplo

mac

y an

d of

its

rela

tions

with

Ara

b co

untri

es.'°

Thu

s, Pa

rt IV

focu

ses o

n re

gion

al

dipl

omac

y an

d ex

plor

es v

ario

us se

curit

y di

men

sions

of I

rani

an-

Ara

b an

d in

ter-A

rab

regi

onal

rela

tions

. Ano

ushi

rava

n Eh

tesh

ami's

10 P

ersi

an G

ulf

in tur

moil

Chap

ter 6

det

ails

Iran's

fore

ign

polic

y to

war

ds th

e Ara

b sta

tes.

As

he n

otes

, tw

o m

ajor

inte

rrela

ted

them

es d

omin

ated

Ara

b-Ira

nian

re

latio

ns d

urin

g th

e Sh

ah's

reig

n: th

e Sh

ah's

de fa

cto r

ecog

nitio

n of

the n

ewly

-cre

ated

stat

e of I

srae

l, an

d th

e int

ense

riva

lry b

etw

een

the P

ahla

vi m

onar

ch an

d Eg

yptia

n Pr

esid

ent G

amal

Abd

ul N

asse

r fo

r inf

luen

ce in

the

Mid

dle

East,

in g

ener

al, a

nd th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf,

in p

artic

ular

." A

crim

onio

us ti

es b

etw

een

Tehr

an a

nd C

airo

gav

e w

ay to

the d

evel

opm

ent o

f clo

ser r

elat

ions

bet

wee

n Ira

n an

d Eg

ypt

afte

r Anw

ar a

l-Sad

at's

acce

ssio

n to

pow

er in

197

0. S

adat

's ab

an-

donm

ent o

f Nas

ser's

pol

icie

s of p

an-A

rabi

sm a

nd n

on-a

lignm

ent

in fa

vour

of a

n A

mer

ican

-Orie

nted

and

acco

mm

odat

ioni

st fo

reig

n po

licy

even

tual

ly le

d to

the

esta

blish

men

t of a

Teh

ran-

Cairo

-Tel

Av

iv ax

is.

The

foun

datio

n of

this

wes

tern

'pill

ar o

f sta

bilit

y' w

as sh

atte

red

whe

n th

e Sh

ah w

as o

verth

row

n in

197

9. N

otw

ithsta

ndin

g th

e str

i-de

nt rh

etor

ic o

f the

Isla

mic

Rep

ublic

's fo

reig

n po

licy,

pos

t-rev

ol-

utio

nary

Iran

ian

fore

ign

polic

y ha

s disp

laye

d bo

th p

ragm

atic

and

id

eolo

gica

l dim

ensi

ons.

For e

xam

ple,

Iran

's ac

com

mod

atio

nist

po

licie

s tow

ards

Tur

key,

Pak

istan

and

the l

ower

Gul

f sta

tes r

efle

ct

Tehr

an's

prag

mat

ism

in d

ealin

g w

ith so

me

of it

s nei

ghbo

urs.

12 However, Iran's opposition to Saudi Arabia and Egypt until re

cent

ly h

ighl

ight

ed th

e id

eolo

gica

l asp

ects

of th

e Is

lam

ic R

epub

-lic

's fo

reig

n po

licy.

Th

e ba

lanc

e be

twee

n th

e pr

agm

atic

and

ideo

logi

cal d

imen

sions

of

Iran

's fo

reig

n po

licy

has b

een

atta

ined

thro

ugh

the

com

plex

in

terp

lay

of ex

tern

al an

d in

tern

al fa

ctor

s tha

t hav

e sha

ped

polit

ical

dy

nam

ics i

n po

st-r

evol

utio

nary

Iran

. With

the

stre

ngth

enin

g of

Pr

esid

ent H

ashe

mi R

afsa

njan

i's c

oalit

ion

and

the

re-e

stabl

ishm

ent

of d

iplo

mat

ic re

latio

ns b

etw

een

Tehr

an a

nd m

any

of it

s ers

twhi

le

enem

ies,

prag

mat

ism

seem

s to

have

bec

ome

a m

ore

impo

rtant

fa

ctor

than

ideo

logi

cal c

onsid

erat

ions

in sh

apin

g th

e co

ntou

rs o

f Ir

an's

emer

ging

fore

ign

polic

y. T

he K

uwai

ti cr

isis

was

with

out

doub

t a m

ajor

turn

ing-

poin

t: as

Am

irahm

adi h

as s

how

n, th

e le

ader

ship

in T

ehra

n us

ed th

e cr

isis

as a

n op

portu

nity

to c

lose

ga

ps n

ot o

nly

with

its A

rab

neig

hbou

rs • b

ut a

lso

with

the

wes

t. Th

is w

as a

ccom

plis

hed

by a

pol

icy

larg

ely

in a

ccor

d w

ith th

at

of th

e an

ti-Ir

aq c

oalit

ion.

In p

artic

ular

, Ira

n su

ppor

ted

all U

N

reso

lutio

ns a

gain

st Ira

q in

clud

ing

the

one

auth

oriz

ing

the

poss

ible

us

e of

mili

tary

forc

e, d

eman

ded

Iraq

's to

tal a

nd u

ncon

ditio

nal

with

draw

al fr

om K

uwai

t and

cont

inue

d to

reco

gniz

e the

legi

timac

y of

the

al-S

abah

fam

ily ru

le in

Kuw

ait.

Iran

also

rem

aine

d ne

utra

l

Intro

duct

ion

11

durin

g th

e w

ar a

nd re

ject

ed th

e ca

ll by

the

radi

cal I

slam

ic m

ove-

men

ts fo

r a 'h

oly

war

'. At t

he e

nd o

f the

war

, Ira

n al

so su

ppor

ted

the

anti-

Sadd

am u

prisi

ngs b

y th

e Ira

qi S

hi'as

and

the

Kur

ds.'

3 M

. E. A

hrar

i's C

hapt

er 7

exa

min

es th

e ro

le o

f the

Gul

f Co-

oper

atio

n Co

unci

l (G

CC) i

n G

ulf s

ecur

ity. T

he G

CC, w

hich

was

es

tabl

ished

in 1

981

by th

e pr

o-w

este

rn c

onse

rvat

ive

regi

mes

of

Saud

i Ara

bia,

Kuw

ait,

the

Uni

ted

Ara

b Em

irate

s, O

man

, Bah

rain

an

d Q

atar

, was

inte

nded

inte

r alia

to sh

ield

its m

embe

r sta

tes f

rom

th

e spi

ll-ov

er ef

fect

s of t

he Ir

an-Ir

aq W

ar."

Beca

use o

f the

GCC

's he

avy

relia

nce

on th

e w

est i

n ge

nera

l and

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es in

pa

rticu

lar,

the

orga

niza

tion

was

vie

wed

by

Tehr

an a

s a sc

hem

e to

is

olat

e an

d co

ntai

n th

e Is

lam

ic R

epub

lic. T

he G

CC

's pr

o-Ir

aqi

post

ure

thro

ugho

ut th

e Ir

an-I

raq

War

furth

er e

nhan

ced

Iran

's su

spic

ion

of t

he u

ltim

ate

polic

y ob

ject

ives

of t

his o

rgan

izat

ion.

Fr

om th

e ou

tset,

Saud

i Ara

bi's

dom

inat

ion

of th

e G

CC a

nd R

iya-

dh's

hege

mon

ic a

mbi

tions

turn

ed th

is or

gani

zatio

n in

to a

n ex

ten-

sion

of S

audi

Ara

bia's

fore

ign

polic

y in

the r

egio

n, th

ereb

y ex

acer

-ba

ting

grow

ing

tens

ions

bet

wee

n Te

hran

and

Riy

adh.

The

GCC

's in

abili

ty to

def

end

the

mem

ber s

tate

s bec

ame

appa

rent

whe

n Ira

q in

vade

d K

uwai

t. W

hile

the

orga

niza

tion

has s

urvi

ved

the

cris

is

beca

use

of th

e A

llied

inte

rven

tion

on it

s beh

alf,

its v

iabi

lity

as a

de

fens

ive

syste

m is

now

uni

vers

ally

que

stion

ed. T

he G

CC n

ow

look

s on

to th

e w

est a

nd Ir

an fo

r a sh

ared

secu

rity

arra

ngem

ent

for t

he P

ersia

n G

ulf,

a de

velo

pmen

t Ira

n ha

s wid

ely

wel

com

ed.

Nad

er E

ntes

sar's

Cha

pter

8 a

naly

ses t

he d

esta

biliz

ing

effe

cts o

f th

e m

ilita

ry a

sym

met

ry b

etw

een

Iran

and

the

Ara

b co

untri

es o

f th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf.

He

prop

oses

thre

e sp

ecifi

c w

ays t

hrou

gh w

hich

re

gion

al st

abili

ty c

an b

e en

hanc

ed:

1 bu

ildin

g a c

ompr

ehen

sive r

egio

nal c

omm

on se

curit

y sy

stem

2

redu

cing

off

ensi

ve c

apab

ilitie

s of t

he c

ount

ries o

f the

regi

on

whi

le en

hanc

ing

thei

r def

ensiv

e cap

abili

ties

3 en

hanc

ing

the

peac

ekee

ping

role

of t

he U

nite

d N

atio

ns

Clea

rly, r

egar

dles

s of w

hich

form

is se

lect

ed an

d fo

llow

ed, r

egio

nal

secu

rity

wou

ld h

ave

to b

e ul

timat

ely

tied

to d

omes

tic c

ondi

tions

in

the

stat

es o

f the

regi

on. O

ften,

regi

onal

con

flict

s hav

e be

en

root

ed in

dom

estic

inad

equa

cies

and

diff

icul

ties o

f the

regi

mes

to

cope

with

them

. Int

ra- a

nd in

ter-

stat

e in

equa

litie

s an

d la

ck o

f po

litic

al d

emoc

racy

hav

e of

ten

play

ed a

maj

or d

esta

biliz

ing

role

in

the

Mid

dle

East

. Su

perp

ower

s an

d ex

tern

al in

terv

entio

ns h

ave

also

pla

yed

12 P

ersia

n G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l In

trod

uctio

n 13

signi

fican

t rol

es in

regi

onal

conf

licts

and

insta

bilit

y. P

art V

disc

usse

s th

e po

licie

s of t

he tw

o su

perp

ower

s tow

ards

Iran

and

exa

min

es

the i

mpa

ct o

f the

se p

olic

ies o

n re

gion

al st

abili

ty. M

ohse

n M

ilani

's C

hapt

er 9

ana

lyse

s the

USA

's co

nfro

ntat

ion

with

Iran

's Is

lam

ic

Revo

lutio

n. A

s Mila

ni c

onte

nds,

activ

e an

imos

ity to

war

ds re

vo-

lutio

ns h

as b

een

one

of th

e m

ost e

ndur

ing

char

acte

ristic

s of U

S fo

reig

n po

licy

in th

e Th

ird W

orld

. Was

hing

ton'

s obs

essio

n w

ith

reve

rsin

g th

e co

urse

of e

vent

s in

Iran

was

in li

ne w

ith th

e an

ti-re

volu

tiona

ry a

nd st

atus

quo

orie

ntat

ion

of U

S fo

reig

n po

licy.

'' Iro

nica

lly, t

his p

olic

y, M

ilani

indi

cate

s, le

d to

insti

tutio

naliz

atio

n of

radi

calis

m in

the

coun

try; a

diff

eren

t cou

rse,

he

impl

ies,

wou

ld

have

bee

n m

ore

help

ful t

o th

e m

oder

ates

and

the

liber

als.

In a

bro

ader

sens

e, W

ashi

ngto

n's s

abre

-rat

tling

and

con

fron

-ta

tiona

l pol

icie

s tow

ards

Iran

refle

cted

a 'n

ew m

ood

of a

larm

and

an

ger'

tow

ards

Thi

rd W

orld

revo

lutio

nary

regi

mes

.' 6 T

he c

oncr

ete

man

ifesta

tion

of th

is be

llico

se m

ood

has b

een

the a

larm

ing

negl

ect

of th

e ar

t of d

iplo

mac

y in

favo

ur o

f 'qu

ick

fix' m

ilita

ry so

lutio

ns

to T

hird

Wor

ld c

rises

. The

USA

's co

mbi

ned

strat

egy

of m

ilita

ry

stren

gth

and

polit

ical

wea

knes

s has

led

to W

ashi

ngto

n's '

regu

lar

need

to re

sort

to v

iole

nce'

whe

n it

inte

rven

es in

Thi

rd W

orld

ar

eas."

As M

ilani

stat

es, s

hort

of m

ilita

ry so

lutio

ns, t

he U

SA's

fore

ign

polic

y in

stitu

tions

hav

e yet

to d

evel

op an

y co

here

nt m

ech-

anism

s for

dea

ling

with

revo

lutio

nary

soci

etie

s. U

S-Ir

ania

n re

latio

ns c

ontin

ue to

be

susp

ende

d at

the

star

t of

1992

. Tw

elve

yea

rs af

ter t

he h

osta

ge cr

isis a

nd th

ree y

ears

afte

r the

`ta

nker

s war

' in

the P

ersia

n G

ulf,

the t

wo

gove

rnm

ents

cont

inue

to

susp

ect e

ach

othe

r. Th

e U

S ho

stag

es in

Leb

anon

(eve

ntua

lly

rele

ased

in D

ecem

ber 1

991)

and

the

Irani

an fr

ozen

ass

ets i

n th

e U

SA w

ere

the

rem

aini

ng st

icky

issu

es. O

n ba

lanc

e, h

owev

er, a

nd

as A

mira

hmad

i writ

es in

Cha

pter

5 o

n re

cons

truct

ion,

'rel

atio

ns

impr

oved

as t

he tw

o go

vern

men

ts' v

iew

s con

verg

ed d

urin

g th

e K

uwai

ti cr

isis'.

Som

e Ira

nian

gov

ernm

ent o

ffici

als h

ave e

ven

calle

d fo

r a 'm

arria

ge o

f con

veni

ence

' bet

wee

n th

e tw

o co

untri

es. 1

9 Whi

le

the

USA

has

rem

aine

d co

ol to

such

invi

tatio

ns, t

he B

ush

adm

inis-

tratio

n is

exp

ecte

d to

be

mor

e re

spon

sive

in th

e fu

ture

as

the

lead

ersh

ip in

Teh

ran

repu

diat

es m

any

of it

s pa

st a

nti-U

nite

d St

ates

pol

icie

s and

dev

elop

s a fr

ee m

arke

t eco

nom

y op

en to

the

capi

talis

t wor

ld m

arke

t. In

the

final

cha

pter

, Moh

iadd

in M

esba

hi e

xam

ines

cha

nge

and

cont

inui

ty in

Sov

iet-I

rani

an re

latio

ns w

ithin

the

cont

ext o

f the

So

viet

Uni

on's

dive

rse

inte

rests

in th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf a

nd th

e In

dian

Oce

an. H

istor

ical

ly, S

ovie

t-Ira

nian

rela

tions

hav

e bee

n in

fluen

ced

by a

set o

f com

plex

fact

ors t

hat h

ave i

nclu

ded

'Rus

sian

prox

imity

to

Iran

, gre

at p

ower

pol

itics

, the

stat

e of

inte

rnat

iona

l pol

itics

, an

d do

mes

tic c

ondi

tions

in b

oth

Russ

ia a

nd Ir

an'.'

9 Fur

ther

mor

e,

Russ

ian

fore

ign

polic

y be

havi

our t

owar

ds Ir

an h

as d

ispla

yed

two

char

acte

ristic

s, th

e `m

axim

'alist

goa

l of d

omin

atin

g Ira

n an

d th

e m

inim

alist

goa

l of p

reve

ntin

g its

dom

inat

ion

by a

riva

l pow

er, o

r at

leas

t sec

urin

g a

shar

e fo

r itse

lf'.2

0 Ira

q's a

ttack

on

Iran

in S

epte

mbe

r 198

0 an

d th

e re

sulti

ng e

ight

-ye

ar w

ar b

etw

een

thes

e tw

o co

untri

es g

reat

ly c

ompl

icat

ed S

ovie

t po

licie

s in

the

regi

on a

s ref

lect

ed in

Mos

cow

's sh

iftin

g be

havi

our

durin

g th

e Gul

f War

. As M

esba

hi o

bser

ves,

the p

erio

d 19

80-2

was

m

arke

d by

'stri

ct n

eutra

lity'

in S

ovie

t beh

avio

ur to

war

ds th

e tw

o be

llige

rent

stat

es. M

osco

w h

ad h

oped

that

Iran

's su

cces

s in

repe

l-lin

g th

e Ir

aqis

from

Iran

ian

terr

itory

wou

ld le

ad to

a p

eace

ful

polit

ical

settl

emen

t of t

he c

onfli

ct. W

hen

Iran

refu

sed

to a

ccep

t Ir

aq's

peac

e of

fers

, the

Sov

iet's

stan

ce sh

ifted

to o

ne o

f 'ac

tive

neut

ralit

y'. F

rom

198

2 to

198

6 th

e So

viet

Uni

on u

rged

bot

h sid

es

to te

rmin

ate

hosti

litie

s whi

le a

t the

sam

e tim

e M

osco

w e

mba

rked

up

on a

pol

icy

of st

reng

then

ing

Iraq's

mili

tary

cap

abili

ties t

o pr

e-ve

nt it

s col

laps

e. F

rom

198

6 to

198

8 th

e So

viet

s tilt

ed h

eavi

ly

tow

ards

Iraq

3s M

osco

w b

ecam

e con

vinc

ed th

at o

nly

Iraqi

vic

tor-

ies o

n th

e ba

ttlef

ield

wou

ld fo

rce

Iran

to a

ccep

t a c

ease

-fire

.' In

the

post-

ceas

e-fir

e pe

riod,

the

Sovi

ets s

ough

t, al

beit

unsu

c-ce

ssfu

lly, t

o m

edia

te b

etw

een

Iran

and

Iraq

and

offe

r the

ir go

od

offic

es. T

he S

ovie

t Uni

on's

polic

y w

as p

redi

cate

d on

the

prem

ise

that

Iran

wou

ld h

elp

Gor

bach

ev ex

trica

te h

imse

lf fro

m th

e Afg

han-

ista

n qu

agm

ire. M

oreo

ver,

Mos

cow

had

toye

d w

ith th

e id

ea o

f cr

eatin

g a

`com

mon

Cen

tral A

sian

hom

e' w

here

by th

e So

viet

U

nion

wou

ld st

reng

then

its p

oliti

cal a

nd e

cono

mic

link

s with

the

Gul

f cou

ntrie

s. Th

is id

ea se

ems t

o ha

ve b

een

drop

ped

for t

he ti

me

bein

g as

Mos

cow

stru

ggle

s with

its m

yria

d of

dom

estic

uph

eava

ls an

d as

the

Gul

f reg

ion

tries

to a

djus

t to

the

vaga

ries o

f the

Gul

f cr

isis. The

incr

easi

ng ro

le o

f Isl

am a

nd Is

lam

ic re

viva

lism

, cou

pled

w

ith se

cess

ioni

st m

ovem

ents

in C

entra

l Asi

a an

d th

e C

auca

sus

also

had

an u

nset

tling

impa

ct o

n lo

ng-ra

nge S

ovie

t pol

icie

s tow

ards

th

e G

ulf r

egio

n. A

s the

upr

isin

gs in

Sov

iet A

zerb

aija

n de

mon

-str

ated

, Mos

cow

bec

ame e

xtre

mel

y un

easy

abou

t the

pro

spec

ts .o

f su

stai

ned

cont

acts

bet

wee

n So

viet

and

Iran

ian

Aze

ris. W

hile

it

was

true

that

bot

h Te

hran

and

Mos

cow

shar

ed c

omm

on a

ims i

n

14 P

ersia

n G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l

mai

ntai

ning

stab

ility

alo

ng th

eir s

hare

d bo

rder

s, th

e se

cess

ioni

st

tend

enci

es a

mon

g th

e So

viet

Aze

ris w

ere

subs

tant

ially

stro

nger

th

an th

ey w

ere

amon

g th

eir I

rani

an c

ount

erpa

rts. C

onse

quen

tly,

the

Sovi

ets w

ere

relu

ctan

t to

allo

w u

nhin

dere

d co

ntac

ts b

etw

een

the

Iran

ian

and

Sovi

et A

zeris

. Afte

r tw

o m

onth

s of

neg

otia

tions

w

ith Ir

ania

n au

thor

ities

, in

Nov

embe

r 199

0 M

osco

w s

igne

d an

ag

reem

ent a

llow

ing

the

esta

blis

hmen

t of p

erm

anen

t bor

der o

pen-

ings

nea

r Ast

ara

city

in n

orth

-wes

t Ira

n an

d pe

rmitt

ing

visi

ts

last

ing

no m

ore

than

fifte

en d

ays b

etw

een

Iran

and

Sov

iet A

zer-

baija

n."

Fina

lly, t

he re

perc

ussio

ns o

f Ira

q's i

nvas

ion

of K

uwai

t, th

e ch

an-

ging

regi

onal

bal

ance

of p

ower

, the

pre

senc

e of

US

troop

s so

clos

e to

Sov

iet b

orde

rs, a

nd th

e st

ill-e

volv

ing

post

-Col

d W

ar in

ter-

natio

nal o

rder

will

con

tinue

to s

hape

the

cont

ours

of M

osco

w's

Gul

f pol

icie

s. A

lthou

gh th

e So

viet

Uni

on s

uppo

rted

the

Uni

ted

Stat

es' p

ostu

re to

war

ds S

adda

m H

usse

in, m

any

Sovi

et o

ffic

ials

ex

pres

sed

grav

e.. c

once

rn a

bout

the

ultim

ate

aim

of U

S m

ilita

ry

obje

ctiv

es in

the

regi

on."

How

the

Rus

sian

s m

anag

e to

bal

ance

th

eir d

esir

e to

mai

ntai

n go

od re

latio

ns w

ith th

e U

nite

d St

ates

w

hile

max

imiz

ing

thei

r lon

g-te

rm in

tere

sts i

n th

e G

ulf w

ill la

rgel

y de

term

ine

Mos

cow

's fo

reig

n po

licy

post

ure

in th

e re

gion

. To

sum

up,

this

boo

k de

mop

stra

tes

the

com

plex

intri

caci

es o

f Ir

an's

dom

estic

pro

blem

s an

d po

licie

s as

wel

l as

its e

xter

nal

rela

tions

. The

pos

t-rev

olut

iona

ry p

erio

d in

Iran

has

witn

esse

d an

ex

traor

dina

ry tu

rn o

f eve

nts,

mos

t of t

hem

unf

avou

rabl

e fo

r Ira

n's

long

-term

dev

elop

men

t and

sta

ndin

g am

ong

the

com

mun

ity o

f na

tions

. The

Rev

olut

ion

has

also

had

sig

nific

ant i

mpa

ct o

n th

e ne

ighb

ourin

g st

ates

but

suc

h in

fluen

ces

have

not

pro

duce

d an

y la

sting

pos

itive

resu

lts in

the

regi

on. T

he m

ove

away

from

ideo

logy

an

d ra

dica

lism

and

tow

ards

a m

ore

prag

mat

ic a

nd c

onve

ntio

nal

dom

estic

and

fore

ign

polic

y is

hop

ed to

reve

rse

thes

e un

favo

urab

le

resu

lts fo

r bet

ter.

Iran

is a

reso

urce

-ric

h na

tion

with

gre

at p

ros-

pect

s for

eco

nom

ic g

row

th a

nd p

oten

tial f

or p

oliti

cal l

eade

rshi

p in

th

e M

iddl

e Ea

st. W

heth

er th

e na

tion

will

be

able

to fu

lly m

ater

ial-

ize

its p

oten

tial u

nder

the

pres

ent p

ragm

atis

t lea

ders

hip

will

la

rgel

y de

pend

on

a co

mpl

ex o

f fac

tors

that

orig

inat

e fro

m d

omes

tic

and

inte

rnat

iona

l pol

itics

and

the

econ

omic

reco

nstru

ctio

n pl

an.

Mea

ning

ful r

efor

ms i

n bo

th o

f the

se a

reas

are

pre

cond

ition

s for

a

bette

r fut

ure

for I

ran

and,

by

exte

nsio

n, it

s ne

ighb

ours

.

Intr

oduc

tion

15

NO

TE

S

1 M

. Wal

ker,

'The

U.S

. and

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f Cris

is',

Wor

ld P

olicy

Jour

nal

7 (4

) Fal

l 199

0: 7

96.

2 Q

uote

d in

Insig

ht 2

4 D

ecem

ber 1

990-

7 Ja

nuar

y 19

91: 1

4.

3 Se

e 'A

mer

ica'

s St

ake

in th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf',

U

S D

epar

tmen

t of S

tate

Di

spat

ch

I (2)

10

Sept

embe

r 199

0: 7

0.

4 Q

uote

d in

New

Yor

k Ti

mes

, 7

Mar

ch 1

991:

A8.

5

Repo

rt to

the S

ecre

tary

-Gen

eral

on

Hum

anita

rian

Need

s in

Kuwa

it an

d Ir

aq in

th

e Im

med

iate

Pos

t-Cris

is En

viro

nmen

t by a

Miss

ion

to th

e Are

a le

d by

Mr.

Mar

tti A

htisa

ari,

Unde

r-Sec

reta

ry-G

ener

al fo

r Adm

inist

ratio

n an

d Man

agem

ent,

date

d 20

Mar

ch 1

991

(New

Yor

k: U

nite

d N

atio

ns S

ecur

ity C

ounc

il S/

22

366,

20

Mar

ch 1

991)

. 6

N. E

ntes

sar,

'Ext

erna

l Inv

olve

men

t in

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f Con

flic

t',

Conf

lict Q

uarte

rly 4

(4) F

all 1

984:

41.

. 7

G. S

ick,

'Tria

l by

Erro

r: R

efle

ctio

ns o

n th

e Ir

an-I

raq

War

', in

R. K

. Ra

maz

ani (

ed.)

Iran

's Re

volu

tion:

The

Sea

rch

for C

onse

nsus

, (B

loom

ingt

on,

Ind:

Indi

ana

Uni

vers

ity P

ress

, 199

0), p

. 105

. 8

See

the

follo

win

g pu

blic

atio

ns o

n th

e ec

onom

ic im

pact

of t

he Ir

an-I

raq

War

: on

Iraq

and

Iran

see

A. A

l-Nas

raw

i, 'E

cono

mic

Con

sequ

ence

s of

the

Iran

-Ira

q W

ar',

Third

Wor

ld Q

uarte

rly

8 (3

) Jul

y 19

86: 8

69-9

4; o

n Ir

aq s

ee K

. Mof

id, '

Econ

omic

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

of Ir

aq: F

inan

cing

the

Peac

e', T

hird

Wor

ld Q

uarte

rly

12 (1

) Jan

uary

199

0: 4

8-59

; on

Iran

(for

ea

rlier

dam

age

estim

ates

and

exp

erie

nces

with

reco

nstru

ctio

n) se

e H

. A

mira

hmad

i, 'E

cono

mic

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

of Ir

an: C

ostin

g th

e W

ar

Dam

age',

Thi

rd W

orld

Qua

rterly

12

(1) J

anua

ry 1

990:

26-

47; H

. Am

ir-ah

mad

i, 'D

estru

ctio

n an

d R

econ

stru

ctio

n: A

Stra

tegy

for t

he W

ar-

Dam

aged

Are

a of

Iran

', D

isaste

rs: T

he In

tern

atio

nal j

ourn

al o

f Disa

ster

Stud

ies a

nd P

ract

ice 1

1 (2

) 198

7: 1

34-4

7; a

nd H

. Am

irahm

adi,

'War

D

amag

e an

d R

econ

stru

ctio

n in

the

Isla

mic

Rep

ublic

of I

ran'

, in

H.

Am

irah

mad

i and

M. P

arvi

n (e

ds)

Post-

Revo

lutio

nary

Iran

(B

ould

er,

Col

o: W

estv

iew

Pre

ss, 1

988)

, pp.

126

-49.

9

H. A

mira

hmad

i, 'Ir

an a

nd th

e Pe

rsia

n G

ulf C

risis

', in

H. A

mira

hmad

i an

d N

. Ent

essa

r (ed

s) I

ran

and

the A

rab

Wor

ld

(New

Yor

k: S

t Mar

tin's

Pres

s, 19

92.

10 F

or a

n an

alys

is o

f rec

ent t

rend

s in

Iran

ian

fore

ign

polic

y, s

ee th

e ex

celle

nt c

olle

ctio

n of

arti

cles

in N

. R. K

eddi

e an

d M

. J. G

asio

row

ski

(eds

) N

eith

er E

ast N

or W

est:

Iran

, the

Sov

iet U

nion

, and

the U

nite

d St

ates

(N

ew H

aven

, Con

n: Y

ale

Uni

vers

ity P

ress

, 199

0). S

ee a

lso

R. K

. R

amaz

ani,

'Iran

's Fo

reig

n Po

licy:

Con

tend

ing

Orie

ntat

ions

', in

R. K

. R

amaz

ani (

ed.)

Iran

's Re

volu

tion:

The

Sea

rch

for C

onse

nsus

(B

loom

ingt

on,

Ind:

Indi

ana

Uni

vers

ity P

ress

, 199

0), p

p. 4

8-68

. 11

For

a d

etai

led

stud

y of

Isra

el's

rela

tions

with

the

Shah

's re

gim

e, s

ee

S. S

obha

ni,

The P

ragm

atic

Ent

ente

: Isr

aeli-

Iran

ian

Rela

tions

, 194

8-19

88

(New

Yor

k: P

raeg

er, 1

989)

, pp.

1-1

39.

12 S

ee A

. Kap

ur, 'R

elat

ions

with

Pak

istan

and

Indi

a', in

M. R

ezun

(ed.

) Ir

an a

t the

Cro

ssro

ads:

Glo

bal R

elat

ions

in a

Tur

bule

nt D

ecad

e (B

ould

er,

Colo:

Wes

tvie

w P

ress

, 199

0), p

p. 7

1-9;

F. B

orov

ali,

'Iran

and

Tur

key:

16 P

ersi

an G

ulf i

n tu

rmoi

l

Perm

anen

t Rev

olut

ion

or Is

lam

ism

in O

ne C

ount

ry',

in R

eam

(ed.

), pp

. 81-

93.

13 H

. Am

irahm

adi,

'Iran

and

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f Cris

is'.

14 F

or a

revi

ew o

f var

ious

pol

icy

stat

emen

ts o

f the

GC

C, s

ee R

.K.

Ram

azan

i, Th

e Gul

f Coo

pera

tion

Coun

cil: R

ecor

d an

d An

alys

is (C

harlo

ttes-

ville

, Va:

Uni

vers

ity P

ress

of V

irgin

ia, 1

988)

. 15

H. A

mira

hmad

i, Re

volu

tion

and E

cono

mic

Tran

sitio

n: T

he Ir

ania

n Ex

perie

nce

(Alb

any,

NY

: Sta

te U

nive

rsity

of N

ew Y

ork

Pres

s, 19

90),

pp. 2

8-42

. 16

F. H

allid

ay,

Beyo

nd Ir

anga

te: T

he R

eaga

n D

octri

ne a

nd th

e Thi

rd

f l'or

ld (A

mst

erda

m: T

rans

natio

nal I

nstit

ute,

198

7), p

. 12.

17

N. C

hom

sky,

The

Cul

ture

of T

erro

rism

(B

osto

n, M

ass:

Sou

th E

nd P

ress

, 19

88),

p. 1

31.

18 H

. Am

irahm

adi,

'Iran

and

the

Pers

ian

Gul

f Cris

is'.

19 S

. T. H

unte

r, Ir

an a

nd th

e Wor

ld: C

ontin

uity

in a

Rev

olut

iona

ry D

ecad

e (B

loom

ingt

on, I

nd: I

ndia

na U

nive

rsity

Pre

ss, 1

990)

, p. 7

9.

20 Ib

id.

21 F

or a

suc

cinc

t rev

iew

of G

orba

chev

's po

licie

s to

war

ds th

e G

ulf W

ar,

see

R. 0

. Fre

edm

an, '

Gor

bach

ev, I

ran,

and

the

Iran

-Ira

q W

ar',

in

Ked

die

and

Gas

ioro

wsk

i (ed

s), p

p. 1

15-4

1.

22 I

ran

Tim

es,

16 N

ovem

ber 1

990,

p. 1

6.

23 S

ee, f

or e

xam

ple.

, A. G

resh

, 'C

ontin

uity

and

Cha

nge

in S

ovie

t Pol

icy'

, M

iddl

e Eas

t Rep

ort

20 (6

) Nov

embe

r/Dec

embe

r 199

0: 5

.