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 Asia's military spending goes up

Increased military spending may

shift power dynamics in East Asia,

namely between the US, Japan and

China

EAST ASIANSECURITY AND DEFENCE

DIGEST

EDITOR’S NOTE - TIAGO MAURÍCIOResearcher at Kyoto University and Orient Institute

Last week's most relevant news must

have been the findings of huge deposits of

Rare Earth Elements (REE) off the coast of

Minamitorishima, Japan's eastern most

island, located to the Southeast of Tokyo

(see map). According to preliminary figures,

the abundance of these minerals would

provide Japan self-sufficiency for a

staggering 230 years, and more findingsare yet to be confirmed. More probes have

been undertaken within the island's

Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) as well as

in international waters between the main

archipelago and this remote island,

indicating the existence of equally massive

deposits. The consequences are obvious.

China is currently the major producer

and export of REE, holding approximately

98% of world's output in the sector. As the

minerals are key materials in the high-

technology industry, being incorporated in

LCD monitors, electric batteries, car

components and so forth, Japan has

witnessed a growing dependence on the

Chinese market to meet its requirements.

Furthermore, this dependence has had a

clear impact in the country's foreign policy

toward China, as the Senkaku/Diaoyu

Islands incident of September 2010 well

demonstrated. Briefly put, China decided

to halt its exports of rare earth minerals to

Japan as its Coast Guard arrested anddetained a Chinese fisherman who rammed

two the coast guard's vessels, promptly

causing a bilateral crisis between the

world's major trading partners.

With these findings, there remain

doubts regarding the best way to exploit

these resources. There are important

technological limitations which need be

overcome as well as financial investment

into the corporate. But if successful, this

venture could well represent a shift in

Japan's foreign policy toward China and

contribute to its economic revamping at

the same time.

!

!

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What's the status in China's space

quest?

“There is a condescending tone to

much of the international reportage on

China's recent space docking and

expedition to its first space laboratory,

Tiangong 1. Commentators applaud

China's progress in space exploration but

claim they are decades behind the USand Russia, who achieved similar feats in

the 1970s.

These reports fail to account for the

'leapfrog' effect of technological

advances, and the benefit of experience

from other nations. Such effects are

propelling much of Africa from being

disconnected from telecommunications

to enjoying broadband wireless services

in just a few years. The effects are just as

significant for China's space missions.”

“China's quickening pace in

space” (Morris Jones - The Lowy

Interpreter).

 A non-military, Swiss-type Japan

“China is not a military threat to

Japan, and even if it were the US cannot

and will not go to war with China to

protect Japan. The notion that the US–

Japan military alliance is a form of

deterrence is nonsense. The right wayforward for Japan is to abrogate the

defence treaty with the US. US military

bases in Japan should be closed and

military personnel sent home. Japan

should use diplomacy to achieve ‘win-

win’ resolutions of disputes with China,

including territorial disputes.

Japan should aim to become an

‘Asian Switzerland’. This concept, which

was widely endorsed immediately after

the war, is now barely mentioned at a

time when East Asia is gradually

descending into military competition.

Japan should return to the peace spirit

that characterised the aftermath of the

war, when the nation decided to work

toward world peace.”

“US–China collusion and the way forward

for Japan” (Susumu Yabuki - East Asia

Forum).

China's strategic moderation may prevent

conflict in South China Sea

“Encounters of the kind that has just

concluded safely, after two months of

tension, are only going to become more

and more frequent in the overfished

South China Sea; and as the region’s

fishermen grow ever angrier, as they find

their living increasingly difficult to come

by, those encounters will unavoidably

become potential flashpoints.

By adopting the Scarborough Model and

expanding its white-hull fleet, China

deserves credit for furnishing itself with a

toolkit with which to deal with these

disputes forcefully, but non-militarily. That

reduces the likelihood of conflict. But at

the same time, the countries confronting

China at sea must remember that the

nationalistic gallery that Beijing plays to

has no love for not-so-hard power

solutions. They must not give Chinacause to abandon them.”

“China’s Not-So-Hard Power

Strategy” (Trefor Moss - The Diplomat).

Obama's failure to turn Russia into an ally

“ "The b igges t p rob lem o f t h i s

administration's policy was their attempt

to separate different issues," Kozlovsky,

the opposition activist, put it to me. "They

said that you could cooperate on, say,

nonproliferation and disagree on humanrights, and it's OK. It didn't work because

Moscow doesn't think or act this way --

and also because all these things are

connected."

But perhaps this assessment of the reset

is too harsh. It has, after all, resulted in

one undisputed achievement -- the

disillusionment of the liberal intelligentsia,

the one Russian group traditionally a

stalwart American ally. Lilia Shevtsova, asenior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow

Center argued in a recent essay in the

 American Interest that today's equivalent

of the Soviet dissident isn't looking to

Washington for moral or intellectual

support anymore. Shevtsova expanded

on her thesis to me via email. The new 

orientation, she wrote, "is not anti-

 Americanism in its traditional form. This is

criticism of connivance regarding the

Kremlin and rejection of the normative

dimension in dealing with Putin. Thisattitude is becoming very popular among

the liberals."

In other words, the reset has achieved the

worst of all possible outcomes: It has

made a renewed enemy of Putin, and it's

alienated the best and brightest of our

would-be allies too.”

“Putin's Got America Right Where He

Wants It” (Michael Weiss - Foreign

Policy).

Further tensions will emerge in South

China Sea

“Over the weekend, the China National

Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) quietly

announced that nine new blocks in the

South China Sea were now open to

foreign oil companies for exploration and

development. This move reflects one of

the starkest efforts by China to assert its

maritime rights in these disputed waters –and constitutes a direct challenge to

Vietnam’s own claims.”

“The South China Sea Oil Card” (Taylor

Fravel - China Power).

What can one make of the US Congress'

handling of defence?

“I mention this because I've just

been reading Towell's essay in a fairly

new book, Congress and the Politics ofNational Security. I covered the military

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for decades, but I didn't realize it until

reading the essay that the Armed

Services Committees are anomalies,

having unique and far more intrusive

powers than do other committees. "The

Constitution assigns Congress a degree

of authority over the organization and

equipage of the armed services that has 

no parallel in terms of the relationship of

the legislative branch with other executivebranch agencies," he writes. "The Senate

 Armed Serv ices Commit tees draws

particularly strong leverage from the fact

that promotions for military officers-unlike

those for civil servants-require Senate

confirmation."”

“Congress and defense: Somebody finally

steps up to explain how this thing

works” (Thomas Ricks - Foreign Policy).

Looking back into the Korean War

“The ‘fourth Korean War’, which

started on 25 June 1950 with a surprise

attack from the North against the South,

was an attempt to unify the country, butsoon escalated to the level of a proxy

World War III, involving some 20

countries. After three years of fratricidal

conflict , and despite the strong

opposition from the ROK President Rhee

Syngman, delegates from North Korea,

China and the United Nations Command

signed the Armistice Agreement on 27

July 1953. Six decades later, a peace

treaty has not yet been formalised.

The first step toward ending thisfourth Korean War would be for the

regional neighbours to formally recognise

the two Korean states. Both China and

Russia have already establ ished

diplomatic and trade relations with South

Korea, while continuing to provide

economic aid and security assurances to

keep North Korea afloat. It is now time for

the US and Japan to recognise North

Korea, assuage its security concerns and

lift economic sanctions.”

“The Korean War and East Asia” (Leonid

Petrov - East Asia Forum).

Dealing with North Korea

“Last Tuesday, U.S. Congressman

Hank Johnson and his adviser Jonathan

Ossoff criticized what they described as a

“dangerous provision” in this year’s house

version of the National Defense

 Authorization Act (NDAA). The provision,

which calls for the Obama administrationto consider deploy ing addit ional

conventional and nuclear forces to the

Western Pacific, isn’t near ly as

“dangerous” as Johnson and Ossoff

make it out to be. It is, instead, a

reasonable effort to pursue U.S. policy

goals in Northeast Asia.

Johnson and Ossoff don’t give it a fair

shake. For starters, one can’t help but

wonder if they have actually read the

provision, whose language, which they

describe as “Dr. Strangelove-esque,” isanything but. Congress, the provision

reads, “encourages further steps,

including such steps to deploy additional

conventional forces of the United States

and redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to

the Western Pacific region.””

“ A big stick for North Korea?” (Michael

Mazza - American Enterprise Institute).

Pyongyang's "Sea of Fire" Reassessed

“For more than a decade, conventional

wisdom has held that North Korea could

subject the South Korean capital of Seoul

to devastating artillery attack. With a

greater metropolitan population of

24,000,000, Seoul has the largest

population density of all the OECD

countries, eight times more dense than

New York City, and three times more

dense than Tokyo/Yokohama. Aimed at

Seoul, North Korea’s prodigious amount

of artillery, particularly its 170mm Koksan

guns and 240mm multiple rocket

launchers, could kill “millions of people”

the event of war on the Korean peninsula.

The “Sea of Fire” scenario first surfaced

after the Clinton Administration decided

not to attack North Korean nuclear

facilities in 1994. Coincidence? Maybe,

but since then it’s been used to trump

discussion of any military action against

North Korea, for whatever reason.

Uncertainty about how military actionwould play out, as well as the North’s

unpredictability, means that virtually

anything anyone proposed risked the

“Sea of Fire”. This haunting scenario has

played a role in how policymakers and

wonks view engagement with the North.”

“North Korea Can’t Really Turn Seoul Into

a “Sea of Fire”” (Kyle Mizokami - Asia

Security Watch).

The Size of the US Navy Matters

“History is unkind to sea powers that

invent fudge factors – golly-gee

technology, tactical mastery, indomitable

élan – to explain away numerical

shortfalls. The interwar Imperial Japanese

Navy had boundless faith in Japanese

seafarers’ resolve and tactical virtuosity.

Commanders talked themselves into

believing that these intangibles wouldnegate superior U.S. Navy numbers. Their

navy now litters the bottom of the Pacific

– in large part because Rosie the Riveter

and her comrades turned out warships

and merchantmen like sausages during

World War II, overwhelming Japan with

insurmountable numbers. Quantity does

matter. Let’s not succumb to the sort of

thinking that beguiled Tokyo in those

fateful years.”

“U.S. Navy’s Quantity Problem” (James

Holmes - Flashpoints).

Some reasons why China didn't attend

the Shangri-La Dialogue en masse

“Central Asia's magisterial valleys,

like the Fergana or the high plateaus of

the Pamirs, have long been thought to be

the location of the mythical Shangri-La.

This idyllic hidden valley, where

peace-loving people age only ever so

slowly, not only inspired James Hilton towrite his eponymous book but also

Southeast Asian billionaire Robert Kuok

to found the Shangri-La Hotel in

Singapore. And the luxury hotel has lent

its name to the annual Shangri-La

Dialogue, the International Institute for

Strategic Studies' Asia Security Summit,

regularly attended by defence ministers

from the region and the US Secretary of

Defense.”

“China prefers the real Shangri-

La” (Rafaello Pantucci & Alexandros

Petersen- The Lowy Interpreter).

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Breaking free of dependence on

Chin's REE?

“The possible implications are

obvious. Japan's dependence on

Chinese rare earth elements can

soon become a reality of the past,

thusly attaining leverage over its

s t ra teg i c partner over key

elements for its vital industrial

complex. One must recall the

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Incident

of September 2010 and China's

reprisal over Japan's Coast Guard

apprehension of a Chinese trawlerby cutting its exports of REE to

Japan. Due to the Japanese

economy's dependence on these

elements, dealings over territorial

disputes have been continuously

winded down in order to avoid

escalation and major economic

disruptions in the larger bilateral

trade relationship in the world.”

“Digging the Right Hole? Japan,

China and Rare Earth Minerals”

(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).

Further thoughts on Japan's newdefence minister

  “Japanese Pr ime Min ister

Yoshihiko Noda recently reshuffled

his cabinet as a means of courting

the support of the Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) for

legislation related to increasing the

consumption tax. Noda replaced

five of his 18 cabinet members,

including Defense Minister Naoki

Tanaka and Land, Infrastructure,

Transport, and Tourism MinisterTakeshi Maeda, both of whom

were censured in the House of

Councilors. Yet, the change that

has drawn the most attention is

the appointment of Tanaka’s

successor, Satoshi Morimoto. This

is because Morimoto is an

academic, not a politician, making

him the first non-politician to

become Japan’s top defense chief

since World War II. But although

the media and opposition partieshave joined in criticizing his

appointment, Noda’s choice

deserves praise. Finally, Japan hasa d e f e n s e m i n i s t e r w i t h

unquestionable expertise.”

“Japan’s Sensible New Defense

Chief”

(Jeffrey Hornung - The Diplomat).

Taking the pulse of Japan-EU

relations

 ““Apathy” is a word often used to

describe relations between Europeand Japan. But even though the

two sides are geographically

remote from each other, neither

can afford to neglect these

relations, given the recent changes

in the international environment

and the resulting need to rethink

d ip lomat ic s t ra teg i es . The

opportunities for strengthening

Japan-Europe ties are particularly

r i p e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e

Mediterranean area stretching fromNorth Africa to the Middle East,

JAPAN

HIGHLIGHTSJAPAN FINDS MASSIVE

QUANTITIES OF RARE

EARTH MATERIALS IN

EASTERN MOST ISLAND

!

 Talking about the SDF's role in

Japanese foreign policy is to talk about

hard vs. soft power

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where the Arab Spring has brought

political change to many countries as

well as a desire for economic and

po l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . H o w e v e r ,

cooperation will not bring significant

results unless it is part of a coherent

plan. If Japan can project a global

vision, its ties with Europe will

contribute to significant results.

Japan must convey its own vision,while relying on a multilateral

framework to address a variety of

global problems such as the issue of

the environment, rather than limiting

itself to its separate, bilateral ties with

the United States, China, and

Europe .”

“Partnering with Europe to Expand

Diplomatic Options”

(Sakai Kazunari - Nippon.com).

Insightful accounts of Japan's climate

policy

“The problem is that there are not

e n o u g h p o l i c i e s s u p p o r t i n g

renewables, which currently account

for only 6% of energy mix. The

nuclear power is presented as the

only way to achieve emissions

reduction. The good thing is that

recently Industry Minister Yukio

Edano approved the introduction offeed-in tariffs, which means a boost

in clean energy investments. It is said

that the government will decide its

energy policy in summer this year.

Clearly, Japan is now at a turning

point and it needs a vision for future

both in energy and in environment

policies. ”

“Japan's Climate Change Policy”

(Monika Ostrowska - JFPO).

Settling the textbooks issue dispute?

“In this article I will offer a brief

exposition of the way history

textbooks are currently produced in

Japan and how they are used in

primary and secondary education.

Though the characteristics of Japan’s

textbook system have recently

become well known among Japan

specialists around the world, there

s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a b l emisunderstanding on the subject

among historians not specializing in

Japan and among the public.”

“Japan’s History Textbook System:

Creation, Screening, and Selection”

(Mitani Hiroshi - Nippon.com).

Settling the textbooks issue dispute?“In this article I will offer a brief

exposition of the way history

textbooks are currently produced in

Japan and how they are used in

primary and secondary education.

Though the characteristics of Japan’s

textbook system have recently

become well known among Japan

specialists around the world, there

s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a b l e

misunderstanding on the subject

among historians not specializing inJapan and among the public.”

“Japan’s History Textbook System:

Creation, Screening, and Selection”

(Mitani Hiroshi - Nippon.com).

Understanding Japanese ODA 

“Gaiatsu or the fore igner

pressure on the Japanese ODA 

structure has influenced, specially,

the size of Japanese aid (Monterrey

Consensus) and even, at times, the

allocation of that aid to country

recipients. However, the usage of aid

has been a result of naiatsu or

internal political factors. Three

domestic political factors have been

determinants of these practices:

cultural values, national interest and

institutions. Without enter into so

much details, it can be said that, first,

cu l t u ra l va lues i n Japa nese

government and society is shaped bythe own Japanese experience on

development, that includes a strong

state participating in the market and

business decisions, as well as the

emphasis on growth as a key driver

of development. Second, national

interest in Japanese aid has justified

the engagement of Japanese

business organizations and the use of

tied aid to help expand Japanese

business activities abroad. Japanese

firms have been invo lved inimplementing Japanese aid projects

in fields such as construction or

engineering. Finally, the technical

institutions involve in aid, such as

JICA (merged with JBIC) have

actually little political influence. And,

considering that other organizations

and ministries could also provide its

own grant to developing countries,

coordination among institutions has

been of much concern. Overall,

internal political factors or naiatsubased on national interest is the

ground for the management of aid by

t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t .

Nonetheless, Japan has responded

to external pressures by making

some formal adjustments to the aid

structure. ”

“The Role of Japanese ODA and

International Cooperation the in the

Current Economic Crisis”

(Carla Bringas - JFPO).

The Self-Defense Forces, Soft Power

and Japanese Security

“Wha t is the sof t pow er

dimension of a hard power asset?

Can the Self-Defense Forces exercise

soft power? Does it pertain to the

perception in public opinion as to the

utility and value of the Self-Defense

Forces? Is the performance of its

missions according to legal precepts

or not? And what to say of the

legitimacy of its existence? Is there

leg i t i mac y bey ond the leg a l

framework within which the SDFwork? Does the Constitution still

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stand as a contested institution in

Japanese society insofar as the SDF

are concerned?

First of all, soft power as

conceived by Nye, as well as hard

power, are analytical concepts, not

normative ones, and as such they

entail different epistemological

implications. Due to the legal

constraints that act upon Japan's

armed forces, they cannot be strictly

defined as a 'hard power asset'.

Following Nye, they cannot coerce

threats, potential or otherwise, only

defend or deter. Due to article 9 of

the Constitution, "the Japanese

people forever renounce war as a

sovereign right of the nation and the

threat or use of force as means of

settling international disputes."”

“Riposte: 2012 Tokyo SDF's Military

March”

(Tiago Mauricio - JFPO).

Do the Self-Defense Forces Have

Soft Power?

“It appeared to me that it was in

fact not difficult to make that relation

due to the specificity of the SDFs. As

they are not devoid or destitute ofrelated political values. If we look into

the history of SDF's constitution and

the present values inherent to the

implementation of Japan Security

Policy, principles related to Pacifism

or Legitimacy are definitely there,

otherwise there would be no sense to

debate about the possible SDF's

"normalization".

Therefore my previous post tried

to underline that the character and

uniqueness of the SDFs and itsrelated legitimacy and political values

constitute in fact a Soft Power asset

that describe Japan's ability to attract

and co-opt rather than coerce.”

“Clarifications on Why the SDF or

Other Hard Power Assets May Have

a Soft Power Dimension”

(Rui Faro Saraiva - JFPO).

JFPO INTERVIEW:

Interview with Oscar Gómez -

PostDoc at Doshisha University,

Japan

“Human Security is a hot topic when

it comes to studies in international

security, often providing lively

debates on what it is and is not, as

well as to its relevance to policy-

making and so forth. I know you havefocused on this very topic during your

doctoral level research leading up to

a PhD thesis on the subject. Before

tackling some of the issues of Human

Security, however, I would like to ask

you what is your understanding of

Human Security and what value do

you attach to it insofar as the

academic and policy-making worlds

are concerned. How did you develop

your conceptual framework?

Human security is an idea

with great potential that is

still on a preliminary stage of

its evolution. It was born

during the early days of the

Human Development Reports

by the UNDP, a big surprise

because human development

was also a relatively new

concept in those days and

piling up neologisms is not

sound at the policy-making

level—although that is farfrom unheard of. Authors of

the report echoed several

voices related to security

studies that were feeling the

emptiness left by the Cold

War, and advanced this

enormous and amorphous

idea in order to channelize

the equally enormous peace

dividend that the first world

was expecting in those days.

Thereon, human security hasbeen gradually gaining a

place on the universe of

i d e a s a n d h a s b e e n

discussed among different

epistemic communities.

The basic claim underlying

human security is that, by the

early nineties, what had been

done in the name of security

was not human. This claim

has been followed by several

attempts to sketch what amore human security could

be, the very place from where

the unresolved debates you

mention start. It is natural for

such a question to become a

matter of endless discussion,

but what is important in my

opinion is to note that the

original claim has never been

denied, and so the idea has

survived all kinds of attacks.

There are two relevant issues

about this basic claim of

human security that explain

its resilience, as well as its

slow evolution. First, it comes

in the shape of an advocacy

claim: we know what we do

not want and can urge for

change, even if we are not

sure about what we want and

how to get it. In other words,it is inspiring, motivating, but

at the same time offers you

little clue about where to

start. Here I think it is

important to highlight the

significance of UNDP rolling

human security out first. Not

only does it make the urge for

a n e w s e c u r i t y l e s s

s u s p i c i o u s f o r t h e

international community, but

also moved the discussionout of the traditional circles of

strategic studies and opened

it to a large range of actors.

The second characteristic is

that human security moves

primarily on the realm of

ethics. Attaching human to

security is meant to make a

fundamental difference; it is

not a simple modifier as

economic in economic

security, and thus it is moredemanding when treating it

rigorously is the aim. This is

not to say that it has no

policy implications, but that

the modus operandi is not

the typical one: human

security is not something you

straightforwardly implement;

instead, initially it may serve

to improve evaluation of

existing practices, then it can

also allow ideas from theperiphery at the technical or

normative levels to become

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policy options, and later

those ideas may interbreed

and become new policy tools

and practices even without

using human security in the

rhetoric. It is similar to what

David Miller has said about

po l i t ica l ph i losophy in

general: it invites to deeper

changes that take time butnot because of that are less

relevant.

 As for the way I developed

my framework, I thought that

the PhD was the ideal time

fo r em bar k in g on b i g

questions and so attempted

a fresh start. On the one

hand, acknowledged that

t h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a

cons ide rab le grou p ofpractitioners and scholars

that had given a try to the

concept, so I selected and

analysed two cases of

implementation in depth, in

order to understand what

were the challenges behind—

those were research on

several initiatives in the

P h i l i p p i n e s a n d t h e

experience of the UN Trust

Fund for Human Security. So

one half of my view comes

from reflecting on some of

the experiences so far.

On the other hand, I was

fascinated to find how under

investigated the concept of

security is and, finding

neither input in the existent

human security literature, I

a l s o e m ba rk e d o n a n

exploration of the basic

issues that talking aboutsecurity and humans involve.

This resulted in some basic

questions I consider any

human security analysis

should deal with, some

factors modifying those

questions, and (I believe)

improved understanding

about the position of the

concept in relation to other

r e l a t e d c o n c e p t s — bu t

explaining all those would notfit the interview format, so I

leave it there.

I have to admit that joining

these two branches has not

been a successful story, but

the resulting collection of

findings has served to leave

some byzantine discussions

aside, and propose some

ways forward.

Picking up from the first question,

there is indeed a great fuss being

made about the utility of the concept

to policy-making, especially to

foreign policy. With Japan and

Canada having featured Human

Security as a key concept in their

approaches toward international

security, how can the concept be

incorporated as an instrument of

policy?

 As I mentioned, human

security was an appealing

idea without a clear path for

realization, so the following

decade and a half was a

laboratory for politicians,

bureaucrats, academics and

some practitioners who paid

heed to the calling. The

results of this first generation

of initiatives have not been all

that successful, but the

e x p e r i e n c e s l e f t h a v e

become the base for future

initiatives and that is a great

contribution.

In Europe, Mary Kaldor has

lead efforts to use human

security in order to reframe

the European Union defence

policy. She and her team

have been c rea t ing a

framework of principles in

order to serve as a basis forthat reform. One of the main

implications is renewing the

EU capabilities in order to

response to the kind of crisis

of our days, and so it is

closely linked to the reform of

the t radi t ional secur i ty

apparatus. In my opinion this

can hurt the image of the

concept elsewhere, but it is a

valid policy option and a

much needed reflection.

Sectors in Japan and in

Europe have advanced other

possible application: they

have proposed using human

security to help framing a

r e p l a c e m e n t t o t h e

Millennium Development

Goals, in these days under

discussion on Rio+20. I think

this is an attractive option

that can well help reachingthe kind of agreement

pursued through the MDGs

(some of that here: http:// 

www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/ 

HumanSecurityFinal.pdf )

But foreign policy is just one

of possible application of

ideas gathered through

human security—and far from

an ideal one since that sector

is very resistant against theevaluations that are required

for a sound evolution, not to

mention its instability.

In domestic policy, human

security has been used to

support peace processes, to

support security sector

reform initiatives, to discuss

t h e p r o b l e m s o f

unsustainable development,

t o a s s e s s t h e f u t u r e

challenges of a society and

so. The Human Development

Reports are a good start for

further reading. Here the

most pressing obstacle is the

actual occurrence of change:

human security entails a

change on the situations

citizens recognize as security,

and if change is not attained

t h r o u g h t h e p o l i c i e s

proposed, the possibility of a

wider support is drasticallyreduced.

One of the themes that has arisen in

our conversations on the subject

deals with the limitations of thinking

about Human Security along the lines

of territorial states. How important is

it to understand this state-centred

framework and to develop a fuller

understanding of Human Security by

overcoming such limitations?

The place of the state inside

human security theorizing

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has always been problematic.

What the original claim of

1994 was opposing was

prec ise ly s ta te-cent red

security, but that never meant

t h e S t a t e n o t b e i n g

necessary anymore.

From the promotion of a

fresh start in the study ofsecurity—others call it “an

opening”—it is necessary to

recognize that “who the

provider(s) of security is(are)”

is only one of several basic

security questions—six in my

count—and the state is a

conspicuous but not the only

answer to that question.

 A human security analysis

thus usually starts by definingother questions, principally

understanding the threat at

hand or describing the

populat ion endangered.

Then, the analysis moves on

t o po n de r t h e m e a n s

available to deal with the

causal web of the situation

resulting from the analysis

and just then the state may

a pp e a r a s a po s s i b l e

provider. Most probably it will

play a leading role, but it

might not be able to provide

security by itself.

Perhaps, in practice the

clearest example of what this

means is explained in the

Latvian Human Security

Report of 2003. Posed with

the challenge of making a

human security analysis, the

team forego for a while the

issue of defining a threat orlist of threats, and instead

made emphasis on what

made the citizens actually

feel and be secure. They

c a l l e d t h e r e s u l t a

“constellation of security

providers” and it describes

the ways in which security is

attained at different levels,

from the psychological to the

international.

Moving on to a more specific case

study, I am aware of your research in

the context of the Tohoku disasters of

11/3. In this regard, can you tell us

exactly what is the interplay between

Human Security and the way that the

d i s a s t e r r e l i e f e f f o r t s w e re

conducted? Additionally, can you

advance some of the earlier results of

your findings?

For me it is important to keepalways one foot on the

ground, and thus I think

i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t e s t

whatever ideas emerge from

theoretical analysis on real

situations. Therefore, after

the disaster I wanted to

check if the findings of the

P h D y e a r s h a d a n y

applicability. I got my PhD

from Tohoku University and

was in Sendai city during thedisaster, so that gave me the

opportunity to experience

closely many of the situations

triggered then, starting point

of my work nowadays.

The first thing that impacted

me after the earthquake was

the role played by grocery

stores in sustaining a basic

influx of food to the city. This

shock me as an amazing

fact, given that these shops

tend to disappear, and so, in

c o m p a n y w i t h s o m e

professors and students of

Tohoku University and Miyagi

University, carried out a small

survey in order to understand

t h e r e s i l i e n c e o f t h e

greengrocers. The research

hints that, as suggested in

the previous question, during

a large emergency in a city

neither the government norc i t i ze ns a re the most

adequa te p rov ide rs o f

secur i ty. Inhabitants of

modern cities depend on

companies to get food and

only those companies are

capable to protect the city

from emergencies. Because

of its flexibility and closeness

to the people—among others

—grocery stores are capable

of getting rid of populationf e a r s r i g h t a f t e r a n

e a r t h q u a k e , b u t t h e i r

subsistence in normal times

cannot be taken for granted.

The second issue about

which I have been working is

international relations and the

disaster , main ly about

foreigners in Sendai and

M i y a g i . M a n y e m o t i v e

discussions on the issuehave been around since last

year but very few academic

analyses are present—and

less so focusing on ground

zero. Three factors are of my

i n t e r e s t : i n f o r m a t i o n

provision/demand, issues of

identity during the emergency

and organizations providing

relief. Now I am in the

process of analysing the

primary data, but cancomment on a couple of

findings.

Safety confirmation is a great

challenge for future mega-

disasters, but not in the way

it is usually talked about. The

i n f o r m a t i o n a n d

communication technologies

we are used to are of great

utility to bridge distances but

are dangerously prone to

spread the over reaction of

e x t e r n a l o b s e r v e r s ,

something in many ways

destabilizing. Most of the

persons in Sendai were able

to confirm safety with their

beloved ones in two days,

but thereon the same means

were used to distribute

information without context

and pressure persons to

leave the city. Channels of

information created forf o r e i g n e r s d u r i n g t h e

emergency were clogged by

p e o p l e o u t s i d e t h e

emergency area, while the

information that people in

ground zero needed was

mainly available on local

media, nowhere else, but the

outside pressure prevented

them from reaching it. This

can trigger the movement of

large numbers of persons inmoments when calm is

needed.

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In the same line, focusing on

mega-disasters in globalized

terr i tor ies, i t might be

convenient for nation-states

to forgo their entrenched duty

towards compatriots, and let

the official providers in

charge do their job. There are

many reasons for that: duringthe emergency there is no

evidence that foreigners were

d i s c r i m i n a t e d o r n o t

protected by their peers or

the people around, and any

additional help for a group of

people that is not particularly

in danger would be better

reoriented to those who really

need help. Other reason is

that not all the states, almost

none I would say, have thecapacity to actually offer the

help they are dreaming of

providing. Sometimes, it

might rather add to the

problems of the persons they

try to help. And for those

states that eventually have

the capacity to do their

heroic part, they should

reflect that with their actions

they would affect negatively

the stability of the disaster

area. It is common to hear

t h a t m a n y o f t h e

displacements that followed

the disaster in Sendai were

m o t i v a t e d b e c a u s e

somebody else did it. If the

safety of people is what

matters, they better try to

keep their constituencies on

c h e c k a n d h e l p

d i s s e m i n a t i n g r e l i a b l e

sources of information not

trying to politically profit fromthe disaster. However, I am

afraid that doing cheap

po l i t i cs abroad i s too

tempting an option for

governments.

Looking back into the way that

Human Security has been introduced

to the discourse on security at large,

what is the present trend insofar as

its ability to promote an alternative

framework for both the study andpractice of security is concerned?

Human security thinking is

entering into a second

generation. This is mainly

motivated by new initiatives

and reflections of what

happened so far, as well as

the entertaining but unfruitful

discussion on which threats

are human security and

which not fading gradually.

I already mentioned Kaldor

and also about the future of

the MDGs. About the latter I

would like to add that human

s e c u r i t y m a y g a i n

prominence as a way to think

of global priorities in a more

general scope. Last year was

the first time that most of the

world poor populations were

living in countries that werenot poor. This can mean that

the end of development

a g e n d a s i s i n s i g h t .

Development as a category is

useful whi le you could

differentiate developed and

developing countries, and

make the whole international

system work around the logic

of this division. But were this

division stop making sense,

other kinds of agendas would

become necessary. Human

security has been tried in this

way through the APEC, no

minor achievement given the

economies there gathered,

and the example could be

reproduced in other forums.

The lat ter impl ies that

development practitioners/ 

scholars are also starting to

become more active in this

scholarship—even the WorldBank give it a try last year.

Besides, more scholars from

international relations have

started to feel the heat, and

there is an increas ing

p r o d u c t i o n o f t r a n s -

disciplinary studies of human

security.

The main challenge is to keep

elaborating on the best ways

t o r e a l i z e t h e b a s i cprinciple(s) in the field, and

trial and error might well be

the on ly opt ion . Bo th

theoretical and practical

approaches are welcomed,

but necessarily reflecting on

what has been done so far.

Lastly, this is an investigative field

very much alive in Japan. To illustrate

it, the Japan Association of Human

Security Studies has been foundedrecently, and you are a distinct

member of that organisation. Would

you care to explain to us the

objectives of this initiative and

perhaps inform us on what are the

scheduled activities for those with an

interest in Human Security?

The Association (JAHSS) was

created last year following

the work of a consortium of

universities interested indeve loping educat iona l

programs related to human

security. Hence, the main

objective is to support these

efforts through forums for

sha r ing ou tcomes and

generating discussion while

testing students’ presentation

skills—this is so because we

work mainly in English but

our members are not only

foreigners.

We plan to have annual

c o n f e r e n c e s e v e r y

September, this year in Aichi

University, during which we

have a thematic day for key

speakers, and another day of

general presentations in

order to strengthen our

network. We also plan to

publish two times a year a

peer-reviewed electronic

 journal, for young scholars togain visibility and established

ones to get in touch with our

readership.

 All the information is in the

h o n e p a g e (  h t t p : / /  

www.janp.sfc.keio.ac.jp/ 

JAHSS/index.html ). If readers

are interested, June 30 is the

dea d l i ne fo r bo th the

conference and the journal,

and we may have a call forposters later as well.”

7/31/2019 East Asian Security and Defence Digest 30

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EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE DIGESTEditor: TIAGO MAURICIO

Editor’s Mailbox: mauricio.tiago.47x(at)st.kyoto-u.ac.jp

Kyoto, Japan

East Asia Security and Defence Digest covers expert analysis

and news highlights on East Asian Security and Defence Affairs.

 The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of JFPO.

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