Dworkin - The Model of Rules

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The Model of RulesAuthor(s): Ronald M. DworkinSource: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 14-46Published by: The University of Chicago Law Review

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The Model of RulesRonald M. DworkinI. EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS

Lawyers ean heavily on the connectedconceptsof legal rightandlegalobligation.We say that omeonehasa legal right rduty, nd wetake that statements a sound basisfor making laimsand demands,and for criticizinghe actsof public officials. ut our understandingofthese oncepts s remarkablyragile, nd we fall into troublewhenwe try o say what egal rights nd obligations re. We say glibly hatwhether omeonehas a legal obligation s determinedby applyingthelaw to theparticular acts f his case, but this s not a helpfulanswer, ecause we have thesame difficultiesith the conceptof law.We areused to summing p our troubles n theclassicquestionsofjurisprudence:What is the law ? When twosidesdisagree, s oftenhappens,about a proposition of law, what are theydisagreeingabout,and how shallwe decide whichside is right?Why do we callwhat the aw says matter f egal obligation ?s obligation herejust a termof art, meaningonly what the law says ?Or does legalobligationhave something o do withmoralobligation?Can we saythatwe have, n principle t least,the samereasonsformeeting urlegal obligations hat we have for meeting ur moral obligations?

These are notpuzzlesforthecupboard, o be takendown on rainydaysforfun.Theyare sources fcontinuingmbarrassment,nd theynag at our attention.They embarrass s in dealingwithparticularproblems hatwe mustsolve,one way or another.Suppose a novelright-of-privacyase comesto court, nd there s no statute r prece-dent eithergranting r denyingthe particularrightof anonymityclaimedbytheplaintiff.What role in the court'sdecision shouldbeplayedby the fact thatmostpeople in the community hinkthatprivate ndividuals re morally ntitled o thatparticular rivacy?Suppose the SupremeCourt orders omeprisonerfreed because thepolice used procedures hat the Court now saysare constitutionallyforbidden, lthoughthe Court's earlier decisionsupheld thesepro-Ronald Dworkin s Professor f Law at Yale University. opyright? 1967 by the author.This article is adapted froma chapter in a forthcoming ook.

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The Model of Rules 15cedures.Must the Court, to be consistent, ree all otherprisonerspreviouslyconvicted throughthese same procedures?'Conceptualpuzzlesabout the law and legal obligation becomeacute whenacourt s confronted itha problem ike this.These eruptions ignala chronicdisease.Day in and day out wesend people to jail, or takemoneyaway fromthem,or make themdo things heydo not want to do, under coercionof force, nd wejustify ll of thisby speakingof such persons s havingbrokenthelaw or havingfailedto meet their egal obligations, r having nter-feredwithotherpeople's egal rights. ven in clearcases a bankrob-ber or a willfulbreach of contract),when we are confident hatsomeonehad a legal obligation nd broke t,we are not able to givea satisfactoryccountofwhatthatmeans, rwhythatentitles hestatetopunishorcoercehim.We mayfeel onfidenthatwhatwe aredoingis proper,but untilwe can identifyhe principleswe are followingwe cannotbe surethatthey re sufficient,r whetherwe are applyingthemconsistently.n less clear cases,when the issue of whether nobligationhas been broken s for omereasoncontroversial,hepitchofthesenagging uestions ises, nd ourresponsibilityo find nswersdeepens.Certain awyerswemay all them nominalists ) rgethatwe solvetheseproblems yignoring hem. n theirviewtheconcepts f legalobligation and the law are myths, nventedand sustainedbylawyers or dismalmix ofconscious nd subconsciousmotives.Thepuzzleswe find n these concepts re merely ymptomshattheyaremyths. heyareunsolvablebecauseunreal, nd our concernwiththemis just one feature f our enslavement.We would do better o flushawaythe puzzles nd theconcepts ltogether,ndpursueourimportantsocialobjectiveswithout his excessbaggage.This is a tempting uggestion, ut it has fataldrawbacks.Beforewe can decide thatour conceptsof law and of legal obligationaremyths,we mustdecidewhat they re. We mustbe able to state, tleastroughly,whatit is we all believe that s wrong.But thenerveofour problem s thatwe have greatdifficultyn doing ust that. n-deed,whenwe askwhat aw is and what egal obligations re,we areaskingfora theory f how we use thoseconceptsand of the con-ceptual commitmentsur use entails.We cannot conclude,beforewehavesucha general heory,hatourpractices re stupidor supersti-tious.Of course, the nominalists hinktheyknow how the rest of us

1 See Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).



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1967] The Model of Rules 17But theirmodeldiffers ainly n emphasis rom hetheory irstmadepopular by the nineteenth enturyphilosopherJohn Austin, andnowaccepted n one form r anotherbymostworking nd academiclawyerswho hold views on jurisprudence. shall call this theory,with some historicalooseness, positivism. want to examine thesoundness f positivism, articularlyn the powerful orm hat Pro-fessor . L. A. Hartof Oxfordhas givento it. I choosetofocus n hisposition, ot onlybecauseof tsclaritynd elegance, ut becausehere,as almosteverywherelse in legal philosophy, onstructivehoughtmust tartwith considerationfhisviews.

II. POSITIVISMPositivismhas a few central and organizingpropositions s itsskeleton,nd thoughnot everyphilosopherwho is called a positivistwouldsubscribe o these n the way present hem, hey o define hegeneralposition want to examine.These keytenetsmaybe stated sfollows:(a) The law of a communitys a set of special rules used by the

community irectlyor indirectly or the purpose of determiningwhichbehaviorwill be punishedor coercedby the public power.These special rules can be identified nd distinguished y specificcriteria, y testshaving to do not with theircontentbut with theirpedigree or themanner n which theywere adopted or developed.These testsof pedigreecan be used to distinguish alid legal rulesfrom purious egal rules (ruleswhichlawyers nd litigantswronglyargueare rulesof law) and also from thersorts f social rules (gen-erally umpedtogethers moral rules ) thatthecommunityollowsbutdoesnot enforce hrough ublicpower.(b) The set of thesevalid legal rules is exhaustive f the law,so that f someone's ase is notclearly overedbysucha rule (becausethere s none that seems appropriate, r thosethatseemappropriateare vague,or for ome otherreason)then thatcase cannotbe decidedby applyingthe law. It must be decided by some official,ike ajudge, exercisinghis discretion,whichmeansreachingbeyondthelaw for omeother ortof standard o guide him in manufacturingfreshegalrule or supplementingn old one.(c) To saythat omeonehas a legal obligation s to saythathiscase falls undera valid legal rule thatrequireshim to do or to for-bearfrom oingsomething. To sayhe hasa legalright, r hasa legalpowerof some sort, r a legal privilege r immunity,s to assert, na shorthandway,thatothershave actual or hypotheticalegal obliga-



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18 The Universityf ChicagoLaw Review [Vol.35:14tions oactornottoact ncertainways ouching im.) In theabsenceofsucha valid legalrule there s no legal obligation; t follows hatwhenthe udgedecides n issuebyexercising isdiscretion,e is notenforcing legal obligation s to that ssue.This is onlytheskeleton fpositivism.he fleshs arranged iffer-entlybydifferentositivists,nd someeven tinkerwiththe bones.Different ersionsdiffer hieflyn theirdescription f the funda-mental est f pedigree rulemustmeetto countas a rule oflaw.Austin,for example,framedhis versionof the fundamentalestas a seriesof interlockingefinitionsnd distinctions.2e definedhaving n obligation s lyingundera rule,a rule as a general om-mand, nd a command s an expression f desirethat othersbehavein a particularway,backedby thepowerand will to enforce hatexpressionn theeventof disobedience.He distinguishedlassesofrules legal,moralorreligious) ccording owhichperson r group sthe uthor fthe general ommand herulerepresents.n eachpoliti-cal community,e thought,ne will find sovereign-a personor adeterminate roupwhomthe rest obey habitually, ut who is notin thehabitofobeying nyone lse.The legal rulesof a communityare thegeneral ommandstssovereign as deployed.Austin'sdefini-tionoflegalobligation ollowed rom hisdefinitionf law. One hasa legalobligation, e thought,fone is amongtheaddressees fsomegeneral rder f thesovereign,nd is in danger f sufferingsanctionunlesshe obeysthatorder.Of course, the sovereigncannot provide for all contingenciesthroughnyscheme forders,nd someof hisorderswill inevitablybe vague or have furrydges.Therefore according o Austin)thesovereign rants hosewhoenforcehe aw (judges)discretionomakefreshorderswhen novel or troublesome ases are presented.Thejudges thenmake new rules or adapt old rules,and the sovereigneitheroverturnsheircreations, r tacitly onfirmshemby failingtodo so.Austin'smodel squitebeautifuln itssimplicity.t asserts hefirsttenetof positivism,hatthe law is a set of rules specially elected ogovernpublic order, nd offers simplefactualtest-whathas thesovereign ommanded?-as the sole criterionfor identifyinghosespecialrules. n time,however,hosewhostudied nd triedto applyAustin'smodel found it too simple.Many objectionswere raised,amongwhichweretwothat seemedfundamental.irst,Austin'skeyassumption hat n each community determinateroupor institu-

2 J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).



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1967] The Model of Rules 19tion can be found,which s in ultimate ontrolof all other groups,seemednotto hold in a complex ociety. olitical control n a modernnation is pluralistic nd shifting, matterof more or less, of com-promise nd cooperation nd alliance, o that t is often mpossible osay that any person or group has thatdramatic ontrolnecessary oqualifyas an Austiniansovereign.One wants to say, in the UnitedStates forexample, thatthe people are sovereign.But this meansalmostnothing, nd in itselfprovidesno test for determiningwhatthe people have commanded,or distinguishingheir legal fromtheir ocialor moralcommands.Second,criticsbegan to realize thatAustin's analysisfails entirelyto account for, even to recognize, ertain striking acts about theattitudeswe taketoward the aw. We make an important istinctionbetween aw and even the general ordersof a gangster.We feel thatthe law's strictures-and ts sanctions-are differentn that theyareobligatoryn a way that the outlaw's commandsare not. Austin'sanalysishas no place for any such distinction, ecause it defines nobligationas subjectionto the threatof force, nd so founds theauthority f law entirely n the sovereign's bilityand will to harmthosewhodisobey.Perhapsthedistinctionwe make is illusory-per-haps our feelings f some special authority ttaching o the law isbased on religioushangoveror anothersort of mass self-deception.But Austin does not demonstratehis,and we are entitledto insistthat n analysis f our concept f aw either cknowledgend explainourattitudes,r showwhy hey re mistaken.H. L. A. Hart's version fpositivismsmorecomplexthanAustin's,in two ways.First,he recognizes,s Austin did not, thatrules are ofdifferentogicalkinds (Hart distinguisheswo kinds,which he callsprimary nd secondary ules). Second,he rejectsAustin'stheorythata rule is a kind of command, nd substitutes more elaborategeneralanalysis fwhatrules are. We mustpause over each of thesepoints, nd thennote howtheymerge n Hart'sconceptoflaw.Hart's distinction etweenprimarynd secondary ules is of greatimportance.8rimary ulesare those thatgrantrights r imposeob-ligationsupon members fthecommunity.he rulesof thecriminallaw that forbid s to rob,murder r drivetoo fast re good examplesofprimaryules.Secondary ules are thosethat tipulatehow,and bywhom,such primary ules may be formed, ecognized,modifiedorextinguished. he rulesthat tipulatehowCongress s composed, ndhowit enacts egislation,re examplesofsecondary ules. Rules aboutformingontractsnd executingwills are also secondary ulesbecause

3 See H. L. A. HART, HE CONCEPT OF LAw 89-96 (1961).



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1967] The Model of Rules 21have been created n a manner tipulatedby somesecondary ule arecalled valid rules. Thus we can record Hart's fundamental istinc-tion this way: a rule may be binding a) because it is accepted or(b) because it is valid.Hart's concept f aw is a constructionf thesevariousdistinctions.6Primitive ommunities ave onlyprimary ules, nd these re bindingentirely ecause of practices f acceptance. uch communities annotbe said to have law, because there s no way to distinguish set oflegal rules from mongst ther social rules,as thefirst enet of posi-tivismrequires.But when a particular ommunity as developedafundamental econdary ule thatstipulateshow legal rules are to beidentified,heidea of a distinct et of legal rules,and thus of law, isborn.Hart calls such a fundamental econdary ule a rule of recogni-tion. The ruleof recognition fa givencommunitymay be relativelysimple ( What the king enacts s law ) or it may be very complex(the United StatesConstitution,with all its difficultiesf interpre-tation,maybe considered singlerule of recognition). he demon-stration hat a particular ule is valid may therefore equire tracinga complicated hain of validityback fromthat particular ule ulti-mnatelyo thefundamentalule. Thus a parking rdinance f the cityofNew Haven is valid because it is adopted bya citycouncil, pursu-ant to the procedures nd withinthe competence pecifiedby themunicipal law adopted by the state of Connecticut,n conformitywiththeprocedures nd withinthecompetence pecified y the con-stitution f the stateofConnecticut,which was in turnadopted con-sistently iththerequirementsfthe United StatesConstitution.

Of course, rule of recognition annot itselfbe valid, because byhypothesist is ultimate, nd so cannot meet tests stipulatedby amorefundamentalule. The rule ofrecognitions the sole rule in alegal systemwhose binding forcedepends upon its acceptance. f wewishto know whatrule of recognition particular ommunity asadopted or follows,we mustobservehow itscitizens, nd particularlyits officials,ehave.We mustobservewhat ultimatearguments heyacceptas showing hevalidity fa particular ule,and whatultimatearguments heyuse to criticize therofficialsr institutions.We canapply no mechanicaltest,but there is no dangerof our confusingtherule ofrecognitionfa community ith ts rules ofmorality. herule of recognitions identified y the fact that its province s theoperationof thegovernmentalpparatusof legislatures,ourts, gen-ries. nolicemen. nd the rest.6 Id. passim, particularlych. VI.



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22 The Universityf Chicago Law Review [Vol. 35:14In this way Hart rescuesthe fundamentalsf positivism romAustin'smistakes. art agreeswithAustin hatvalidrulesof awmaybe createdthrough heacts of officialsnd public institutions.utAustin houghthat he uthorityfthese nstitutionsayonly n theirmonopoly fpower.Hart finds heir uthorityn the background fconstitutionaltandards gainstwhichtheyact, constitutionaltan-dardsthathavebeenaccepted, n the form f a fundamentalule ofrecognition,y the community hichtheygovern.This backgroundlegitimateshedecisions fgovernmentnd givesthem thecastandcall of obligationthat the naked commands f Austin'ssovereignlacked.Hart's theory iffersromAustin's lso, in recognizinghatdifferentommunities se differentltimatetestsof law, and thatsome allow othermeansof creatingaw thanthe deliberate ct of alegislativenstitution. art mentions long customaryractice ndthe relation of rule]to udicialdecisions s other riteria hat reoften sed, though enerallylong with nd subordinateo thetest flegislation.So Hart'sversion f positivisms morecomplex hanAustin's, ndhis testfor valid rulesof law is moresophisticated.n one respect,

however,hetwomodels re very imilar.Hart, ikeAustin, ecognizesthat egal ruleshave furrydges he speaksof them s having opentexture ) nd, again like Austin,he accountsfor troublesomeasesbysaying hat udgeshaveand exercise iscretionodecidethese asesby freshegislation.7I shall latertryto showwhyone who thinksoflaw as a specialsetof rules s almost nevitably rawn to accountfordifficultases n terms f someone's xercise fdiscretion.)III. RULES,PRINCIPLES,NDPOLICIESI want to make a generalattackon positivism,nd I shall useH. L. A. Hart'sversion s a target, hen particular argets needed.My strategy ill be organized round the fact thatwhen lawyersreasonor disputeabout legal rights nd obligations, articularlynthosehardcases whenour problemswiththeseconcepts eemmostacute,theymakeuse of standards hatdo not functions rules,butoperatedifferentlys principles, olicies, nd other orts fstandards.

Positivism, shallargue, s a modelofand for systemfrules, ndits centralnotionof a singlefundamentalestfor aw forcesus tomisstheimportantolesof these tandardshatare not rules.I just spokeof principles, olicies, nd other orts f standards.Most often shalluse the term principle enerically,o refer o the7 Id. ch. VII.



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1967] The Model of Rules 23whole set of these standards ther than rules; occasionally, owever,I shall be more precise, and distinguishbetween principles andpolicies. Althoughnothing n the present rgumentwill turn on thedistinction, should state how I draw it. I call a policy thatkindof standard hat sets out a goal to be reached,generally n improve-ment n some economic,political,or social feature f the community(though some goals are negative, n that they stipulate that somepresent feature s to be protectedfrom adverse change). I call aprinciple a standard that is to be observed,not because it willadvance or secure an economic,political,or social situationdeemeddesirable, but because it is a requirement f justice or fairness rsome otherdimension f morality. hus the standard hat automobileaccidents re to be decreased s a policy, nd the standard hatno manmay profitby his own wrong a principle. The distinction an becollapsed by construing principle as stating social goal (i.e., thegoal of a society n which no man profits y his own wrong), r byconstruing policy as stating principle i.e., the principlethat thegoal the policy embraces s a worthy ne) or by adopting the utili-tarian hesis hatprinciples f ustice are disguised tatementsf goals(securing he greatest appiness f the greatest umber). n some con-texts he distinction as uses which re lost f t is thuscollapsed.8My immediate urpose,however, s to distinguish rinciples n thegeneric ensefrom ules, nd I shall start y collecting ome examplesof the former. he examples offer re chosen haphazardly; lmostany case in a law school casebookwould provide xamplesthatwouldserve s well. n 1889 a New York court, n the famous aseofRiggsv.Palmer,9had to decide whether n heir named in the will of hisgrandfatherould inheritunder that will, even thoughhe had mur-deredhis grandfathero do so. The courtbegan its reasoningwiththis admission: It is quite truethatstatutes egulating hemaking,proof nd effect fwills, and thedevolutionof property,f literallyconstrued,nd if theirforce nd effect an in no wayand undernocircumstances e controlledor modified, ive this property o themurderer. ''0ut the court continuedto note that all laws as wellas all contractsmaybe controlled n theiroperationand effect ygeneral,fundamentalmaximsof the common aw. No one shall bepermitted o profitby his own fraud,or to take advantageof hisown wrong, r to foundanyclaim upon his own iniquity, r to ac-

8 See Dworkin, Wasserstrom:The Judicial Decision, 75 E-mICs47 (1964), reprinted asDoes Law Have a Function?, 74 YALE L.J. 640 (1965).9 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).10 Id. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.



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24 The UniversityfChicago aw Review [Vol.35:14quirepropertyyhisowncrime. 1l he murderer idnot receivehisinheritance.

In 1960,a New Jerseyourtwas faced, n Henningsenv. Bloom-fieldMotors,nc.,12withthe mportantuestionof whetheror howmuch)an automobilemanufacturer ay imithis liabilityn case theautomobile s defective.Henningsenhad boughta car, and signeda contractwhich aid thatthemanufacturer'siability ordefectswaslimitedto makinggood defective arts- thiswarranty eingex-presslyn lieu ofall otherwarranties,bligations r liabilities. Hen-ningsenrgued hat, t least n thecircumstancesf hiscase,themanu-facturerughtnottobe protectedythis imitation,nd ought o beliablefor hemedical ndother xpenses f personsnjured n a crash.He wasnotable to pointto any statute, r to any established uleoflaw,thatpreventedhemanufacturerrom tanding n thecontract.The courtneverthelessgreedwithHenningsen.At variouspoints nthecourt's rgumenthefollowingppealsto standardsremade: (a)[W]emustkeep nmind thegeneralprinciple hat,n theabsenceoffraud, ne whodoes not chooseto read a contract efore igning tcannot aterrelievehimself f its burdens. 13b) In applying hatprinciple, hebasictenet f freedomfcompetent arties o contractis a factor f importance.14 (c) Freedomofcontracts not suchanimmutable octrine s to admitof no qualificationn the area inwhichwe are concerned.15 (d) In a societyuchas ours,wheretheautomobiles a commonnd necessarydjunct fdaily ife, ndwhereits use is so fraughtwithdangerto the driver,passengersnd thepublic,themanufacturers undera special obligation n connectionwith he onstruction,romotionnd saleof hiscars.Consequently,hecourtsmustexaminepurchase greementslosely o see if consumerand public nterestsre treated airly. '16e) '[I]s there nyprinciplewhich s morefamiliar r morefirmlymbedded n the history fAnglo-Americanaw than thebasic doctrine hatthe courtswill notpermitthemselves o be used as instrumentsf inequityand in-justice?' '7 (f) 'More specifically,hecourts enerallyefuse o lendthemselveso theenforcementfa bargain n whichone partyhasunjustlyaken dvantage f theeconomic ecessitiesfother . 18

11 Id. at 511, 22 N.E. at 190.12 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).13 Id. at 386, 161 A.2d at 84.14 Id.15 Id. at 388, 161 A.2d at 86.16 Id. at 387, 161 A.2d at 85.17 Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86 (quoting Frankfurter, ., in United States v. Bethlehem

Steel, 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942)).18 Id.



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1967] The Model of Rules 25The standardsetoutin these uotations renot thesortwe think fas legal rules. They seemverydifferentrompropositionsike Themaximum egal speedon the turnpike s sixtymilesan hour or Awill is invalidunless ignedbythreewitnesses. hey are differente-cause they re legal principles ather han egal rules.The differenceetween egal principles nd legal rules is a logicaldistinction. oth setsof standards oint to particular ecisions boutlegal obligation n particularcircumstances,ut they differ n thecharacter f the direction heygive.Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing ashion.f the facts rule stipulates re given, heneither herule is valid, n whichcase theanswer t suppliesmustbe accepted, r

it isnot, n which ase itcontributes othing o thedecision.This all-or-nothings seenmost plainly f we look at thewayrulesoperate, ot n law, butin someenterpriseheydominate-a game,forexample. In baseball a rule provides hat f the batterhas had threestrikes, e is out. An officialannotconsistentlycknowledge hatthisis an accurate tatementfa baseballrule, nddecide that batterwhohashad three trikes s not out.Of course, rule may haveexceptions(thebatterwhohas takenthree trikess not out if the catcherdropsthe third trike).However,an accuratestatement f the rule wouldtakethisexception nto account, nd any that did not would be in-complete.fthe istofexceptionssvery arge, t wouldbe too clumsy orepeatthem ach timethe rule is cited;there s,however, o reason ntheorywhy hey ould notall be added on,and themorethat re,themoreaccurate s the statementftherule.If we take baseballrules as a model,we find hatrulesof law, liketherule that will is invalid unlesssignedby threewitnesses, it herm-odelell. If the requirement f threewitnesses s a valid legalrule,then t cannotbe thata will has been signedby only twowitnessesand is valid.The rulemighthaveexceptions, ut if it does then t isinaccurate nd incomplete o state heruleso simply,without numer-atingthe exceptions. n theory,t least,the exceptions ould all belisted, nd the moreofthemthatare,the morecomplete s thestate-mentoftherule.But this is not the way the sample principles n the quotationsoperate.Even those which ook most ike rules do not set out legalconsequences hatfollow utomaticallywhenthe conditionsprovidedare met.We saythatour law respects heprinciple hat no man mayprofit rom is ownwrong, ut wedo not mean that he aw neverper-mitsa man to profit romwrongshe commits. n fact,people oftenprofit, erfectlyegally,from heir egal wrongs.The mostnotoriouscase is adversepossession-if I trespass n your land long enough,someday willgaina right o crossyour and whenever please.There



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26 The Universityf ChicagoLaw Review [Vol. 35:14aremany ess dramatic xamples. f a manleavesone job, breakingcontract, o take a much higherpaying ob, he may have to paydamages o hisfirstmployer,uthe is usually ntitled o keephis newsalary. f a man umpsbail and crosses tate inestomake a brilliantinvestmentn another tate,he maybe sentbackto jail, but he willkeephis profits.We do not treat hese-and countless thercounter-instanceshatcan easilybe imagined-as showing hatthe principle boutprofitingfrom ne'swrongss nota principle f our legal system,r that t isincompletend needsqualifyingxceptions.We do not treat ounter-instancess exceptionsat least notexceptionsn theway n whichcatcher's ropping he third trikes an exception) ecausewe couldnot hopeto capture hese ounter-instancesimply y a more xtendedstatementf the principle.They are not,even in theory, ubjecttoenumeration,ecausewe wouldhave to includenot onlythesecases(likeadverse ossession)nwhich ome nstitutionasalready rovidedthatprofit an be gainedthrough wrong, utalso thosenumberlessimaginaryases nwhichwe know nadvance hat heprinciplewouldnothold.Listing omeof thesemight harpen ur senseofthe princi-ple's weightI shallmentionhat imensionna moment),ut t wouldnotmakefor more ccurate r complete tatement f theprinciple.A principleike No manmayprofitrom isownwrong oesnotevenpurport oset outconditionshatmake ts applicationnecessary.Rather, t states reason that argues n one direction, ut does notnecessitate particular ecision. f a manhas or is about to receivesomething,s a direct esult f somethingllegalhe did to get t,thenthat is a reasonwhichthe law will take into account n decidingwhether e shouldkeepit.Theremaybe otherprinciples r policiesarguingn theotherdirection-a policy f securing itle, or xample,or a principle imiting unishmentowhatthe egislature as stipu-lated. fso, ourprinciplemaynot prevail, ut thatdoes notmeanthatitis nota principle f ourlegal system,ecause n thenextcase,whenthese ontraveningonsiderationsre absent r lessweighty,heprinci-ple maybe decisive.All that s meant,whenwe saythat particularprinciple s a principle f our law,is thattheprinciple s one whichofficials ust ake nto account,f it is relevant,s a considerationn-clining nonedirection ranother.The logicaldistinction etween ules and principlesppearsmoreclearlywhenwe consider rincipleshatdo not even look likerules.Consider heproposition,et out under (d) in theexcerpts rom heHenningsen pinion,that themanufacturers under a specialobli-gationin connectionwiththe construction,romotion nd sale of



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1967] The Model ofRules 27his cars. This does not evenpurport o define hespecific utiessucha special obligationentails, r to tell us what rights utomobilecon-sumers cquire as a result. t merely tates-and thisis an essentiallink in the Henningsen argument-thatautomobilemanufacturersmustbe held to higher tandards hanothermanufacturers,nd arelessentitled o rely n thecompeting rinciple ffreedom f contract.It does notmean thattheymayneverrelyon thatprinciple, r thatcourtsmayrewrite utomobilepurchasecontracts t will; it meansonlythat if a particular lause seemsunfairor burdensome, ourtshave less reasonto enforce he clause than f it were for thepurchaseofneckties. he specialobligation counts n favor, ut does not initselfnecessitate, decisionrefusing o enforce he terms f an auto-mobile purchase ontract.This first ifferenceetweenrules and principles ntails another.Principleshave a dimensionthat rules do not-the dimensionofweightor importance.When principles ntersectthe policyof pro-tecting utomobileconsumersntersecting ithprinciples f freedomofcontract,or xample), newhomustresolve he conflict as to takeinto account therelativeweightof each. This cannotbe, of course,an exactmeasurement,nd the judgmentthata particularprincipleor policy s more mportanthananotherwill oftenbe a controversialone. Nevertheless,t is an integralpartof the conceptof a principlethat t has thisdimension, hat t makes sense to ask how importantor how weightyt is.Rules do not have thisdimension.We can speakof rules as beingfunctionallymportant r unimportantthe baseball rule thatthreestrikes re out is more important han the rule that runnersmayadvance on a balk, because thegamewould be much more changedwiththe first ule alteredthan the second). In this sense, one legalrulemaybe more mportanthan anotherbecause it has a greater rmoreimportant ole in regulating ehavior.But we cannotsay thatone rule is moreimportanthan anotherwithinthe system f rules,so thatwhentwo rulesconflictne supercedes he otherbyvirtueofitsgreaterweight. f tworulesconflict,ne of themcannot be a validrule.The decision s towhich s valid,and whichmustbe abandonedor recast,must be made by appealing to considerations eyondtherulesthemselves. legal systemmight egulate uch conflictsyotherrules,whichprefer he rule enacted by the higher uthority,r theruleenacted ater, r the morespecific ule,or somethingf that ort.A legal systemmayalso prefer he rule supportedby the more im-portantprinciples. Our own legal system ses both of these tech-niques.)



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28 The University f Chicago Law Review [Vol. 35:14It is not always lear from he form f a standardwhethert is arule ora principle. A will is invalidunless ignedby threewitnesses

is notvery ifferentn form rom A man maynot profit rom is ownwrong, ut one who knows omethingf American aw knows thathe musttakethe firsts stating rule and the secondas statingprinciple. n manycases thedistinctions difficulto make-it maynot havebeen settled owthe standardhouldoperate, nd this ssuemay itselfbe a focusof controversy.he first mendment o theUnitedStatesConstitution ontains he provision hatCongress hallnot abridge reedom fspeech. s this rule, o that fa particularawdoes abridgefreedom fspeech, t follows hat t is unconstitutional?Thosewhoclaimthat he firstmendments an absolute ay that tmustbe taken n thisway,that s,as a rule. Or does it merely tatea principle, o thatwhen an abridgementf speech s discovered,tis unconstitutionalnlessthecontextpresents omeotherpolicy orprinciplewhich n the circumstancessweightynoughtopermit heabridgement?hat is the positionof thosewho argue for what iscalled the clear and presentdanger testor some otherformofbalancing.Sometimes rule and a principle an play much the same role,and thedifferenceetweenthem s almosta matter f form lone.The first ection f theShermanAct states hatevery ontractn re-straint f tradeshall be void. The SupremeCourthad to make thedecisionwhetherhisprovisionhouldbe treated s a rule in itsownterms striking own every ontract which restrains rade, whichalmostany contract oes) or as a principle, roviding reasonforstrikingowna contractn the absenceof effectiveontrary olicies.The Courtconstruedheprovision s a rule,but treated hatruleascontaininghe word unreasonable, nd as prohibitingnly unrea-sonable restraintsf trade.19his allowedtheprovision o functionlogically s a rule (whenever courtfinds hat herestraints unrea-sonable t is bound toholdthe ontractnvalid) nd substantiallys aprinciplea courtmust ake ntoaccount varietyfotherprinciplesandpolicies ndetermininghether particularestraintnparticulareconomic ircumstancess unreasonable ).Words ike reasonable, negligent, unjust, and significantoften erformustthisfunction. ach ofthese ermsmakesthe appli-cationof the rule which contains t depend to some extent uponprinciples r policies yingbeyondtherule,and in this way makesthatrule itselfmore ike a principle.But they o notquite turnthe

19 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v. AmericanTobacco Co., 221 US. 106, 180 (1911).



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1967] The Model of Rules 29rule intoa principle, ecauseeven the least confiningf these termsrestrictshe kind of otherprinciples nd policieson whichthe ruledepends. fwe are boundbya rule that ays hat unreasonable on-tractsrevoid,or thatgrosslyunfair contracts ill not be enforced,much more judgment is required than if the quoted termswereomitted.But supposea case in whichsomeconsiderationf policyorprinciple uggests hata contract houldbe enforced ven though tsrestraints not reasonable,or even though t is grossly nfair.En-forcing hesecontractswould be forbiddenby our rules,and thuspermittednly f theseruleswereabandonedormodified.f we weredealing,however, otwitha rule butwitha policyagainst nforcingunreasonable ontracts,r a principle hatunfair ontractsughtnotto be enforced,hecontractsould be enforcedwithout lteration fthelaw.

IV. PRINCIPLES AND THE CONCEPT OF LAWOnce we identifyegal principles s separate orts f standards, if-ferent rom egalrules,we are suddenly wareof them ll aroundus.Law teachers each them, awbookscite them, egal historians ele-

brate them.But they eemmostenergeticallyt work, arryingmostweight, n difficultawsuits ike Riggs and Henningsen. n cases likethese,principles layan essentialpart in argumentsupportingudg-ments bout particular egal rights nd obligations.After he case isdecided,wemay ay thatthecasestands or particular ule (e.g.,therule thatone who murders s not eligible to take under thewill ofhisvictim).But therule does not existbefore he case is decided; thecourtcites principles s its ustificationor adoptingand applyinganew rule. In Riggs,thecourt cited the principlethat no man mayprofit romhisownwrong s a background tandard gainstwhich toread thestatute fwillsand in thisway ustified new interpretationofthat tatute.n Henningsen, hecourt iteda variety f intersectingprinciples nd policiesas authority ora new rule respectingmanu-facturer'siabilityfor utomobiledefects.An analysis ftheconcept f egalobligationmust hereforeccountforthe important ole of principles n reachingparticulardecisionsof law. There are twoverydifferentackswe mighttake.(a) We mighttreat egal principlesthe way we treat egal rulesand say that someprinciples re bindingas law and must be takenintoaccountby udgesand lawyerswho make decisionsof legal obli-gation. f we tookthistack,we shouldsaythat n the United States,at least,the law includesprinciples s well as rules.(b) We might, n the otherhand, denythatprinciples an be bind-



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30 The Universityf Chicago aw Review [Vol.5,5:14ingtheway somerulesare. We would say, nstead, hat n caseslikeRiggsor Henningsen he udge reachesbeyondtherulesthathie sbound to apply (reaches, hatis, beyondthe law ) forextra-legalprinciples e is free o follow f he wishes.One might hink hat there s notmuchdifferenceetween hesetwo inesof attack, hat t is onlya verbalquestionofhowone wantsto use the word law. But that s a mistake, ecausethechoicebe-tween hese woaccounts as thegreatestonsequences or n analysisof legal obligation. t is a choice betweentwo concepts f a legalprinciple, choicewe can clarifyy comparingt to a choicewemightmake betweentwo conceptsof a legal rule. We sometimesay ofsomeone hathe makes t a rule to do something, henwe meanthathe has chosento followa certainpractice.We might ay thatsomeonehas made it a rule,for xample, orun a mile before reak-fast ecausehe wants o be healthynd believes n a regimen.We donotmean,whenwe saythis, hathe is boundby therulethathe mustrun a mile beforebreakfast,r even thathe regards t as bindingupon him.Accepting rule as binding s something ifferentrommaking t a rule to do something.f we use Hart's exampleagain,there s a differenceetween aying hatEnglishmenmake it a ruleto see a movieonce a week, nd saying hat theEnglishhave a rulethat nemust ee a movieoncea week.The second mplies hat fanEnglishmanoes notfollow herule,he is subject ocriticismr cen-sure,but thefirst oes not.The first oes not excludethe possibilityofa sort of criticism-wecay saythatone who does not see moviesis neglecting is education-but we do not suggest hathe is doingsomething rongust n notfollowingherule.20

If we thinkof the judges of a communitys a group,we coulddescribe he rulesof law they ollow n these wo differentays.Wecould say,for nstance, hat n a certain tatethe udgesmake it arule notto enforcewillsunlessthere re threewitnesses.his wouldnot imply hattherare udgewho enforcesucha rule is doingany-thingwrongust for thatreason.On the otherhandwe can saythatin that tate rule of law requires udgesnot to enforce uchwills;thisdoes implythata judge who enforces hem s doingsomethingwrong.Hart,Austin nd other ositivists,fcourse,would nsist n thislatter ccount f egalrules;theywouldnotat all be satisfied iththemake ta rule account. t is nota verbalquestion f which ccountis right. t is a questionof whichdescribes he social situationmore

20 The distinction s in substancethe same as thatmade by Rawls, Two ConceptsofRules, 64 PHILOSOPHICALREv. 3 (1955).



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1967] The Model of Rules 31accurately.Other importantssuesturn on whichdescriptionwe ac-cept. f udgessimply make t a rule notto enforce ertain ontracts,forexample, thenwe cannot say,beforethedecision, thatanyone sentitled to that result, nd thatproposition annotenter nto anyjustification e might ffer or thedecision.The two inesofattack n principles arallelthesetwoaccounts frules. The first ack treats rinciples s bindingupon judges, so thatthey re wrongnot to applythe principleswhen they re pertinent.The second tack treatsprinciples s summaries f whatmost udgesmake it a principle to do when forced o go beyondthe standardsthat bind them. The choice betweenthese approacheswill affect,perhaps even determine, he answerwe can give to the questionwhether he udge in a hard case like Riggsor Henningsen s attempt-ing to enforce re-existingegal rights nd obligations.f we takethefirst ack,we are stillfree o argue that becausesuch udgesare apply-ing binding egal standardshey re enforcingegal rights nd obliga-tions.But ifwe takethe second,we are out of courton that ssue, ndwe must acknowledge hat the murderer's amily n Riggs and themanufacturern Henningsenwere deprivedof theirproperty y anact of judicial discretion pplied ex post facto. This maynot shockmany eaders-thenotionof udicial discretion aspercolated hroughthe legal community-but t does illustrate ne of the most nettle-some of the puzzles that drive philosophers o worryabout legalobligation. f takingpropertyway n cases ike thesecannotbe justi-fiedby appealing to an established bligation, nother ustificationmustbe found, nd nothing atisfactoryas yetbeen supplied.In myskeletondiagramof positivism, reviously et out, I listedthedoctrine f udicial discretions the second tenet.Positivists oldthatwhena case is not coveredbya clearrule,a judge mustexercisehisdiscretion o decidethatcase bywhat amounts o a fresh iece oflegislation.There may be an importantconnectionbetween thisdoctrine nd the questionof whichof the two approachesto legalprincipleswe musttake. We shall therefore ant to ask whether hedoctrine s correct,nd whether t impliesthe secondapproach, s itseemson its face to do. En route to these ssues,however,we shallhave to polishour understandingf theconceptof discretion. shalltry o showhow certain onfusionsbout thatconcept, nd in particu-lar a failureto discriminatedifferent enses in which it is used,accountforthepopularity f the doctrine f discretion. shall arguethat n the sense in which the doctrinedoes have a bearingon ourtreatmentf principles,t is entirely nsupported y the argumentsthepositivists se to defend t.



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32 The Universityf ChicagoLaw Review [Vol.35:14V. DISCRETION

The concept f discretion as ifted ythe positivistsrom rdinarylanguage, nd to understandt we mustput it back in habitatforamoment.Whatdoes it mean,in ordinaryife,to say thatsomeonehas discretion ? he first hing o notice s thattheconcept s outofplace in all butvery pecialcontexts. or example,youwouldnotsaythat eitherdo or do not havediscretiono choosea houseformyfamily.t is not truethat have no discretion n making hatchoice, ndyet t wouldbe almost quallymisleadingo saythat dohavediscretion.he concept fdiscretions athome nonly nesort fcontext:when omeones ngeneral hargedwithmaking ecisionsub-jecttostandardsetbya particularuthority.t makes ense o speakofthediscretionfa sergeant ho ssubject o orders fsuperiors,r thediscretion f a sports fficialr contestudge who is governedby arule book or the terms f thecontest.Discretion,ike the hole in adoughnut, oesnotexist xcept s an area left penbya surroundingbeltofrestriction.t is therefore relative oncept. t alwaysmakessenseto ask, Discretionunderwhichstandards? r Discretion sto whichauthority? enerally hecontextwill makethe answer othisplain,but in some casestheofficial ayhave discretion rom nestandpointhoughnotfrom nother.Likealmost ll terms,heprecisemeaning f discretion s affectedbyfeatures f the context.The term s alwayscoloredby theback-ground funderstoodnformationgainstwhich t is used.Althoughthe shadings re many, t will be helpfulfor us to recognize omegrossdistinctions.

Sometimeswe use discretion n a weaksense, imply o saythatfor omereasonthestandardsn official ust pplycannotbe appliedmechanicallyut demand heuseof udgment.We use thisweaksensewhenthecontextdoes not alreadymake thatclear,when the back-ground ur audienceassumes oesnotcontain hatpieceof informa-tion.Thus wemight ay, The sergeant'srders efthima greatdealof discretion, o thosewho do not knowwhatthesergeant's rderswereor who do not knowsomethinghat made thoseordersvagueor hard to carry ut. It wouldmakeperfectenseto add, bywayofamplification,hatthe lieutenanthad orderedthe sergeant o takehisfivemost xperiencedmen on patrolbut that t washard todeter-minewhichwerethe most xperienced.Sometimeswe use theterm n a differenteak sense,to sayonlythatsomeofficial as final uthorityo make a decisionand cannotbe reviewed nd reversed y any otherofficial.We speak this way



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1967] The Model of Rules 33when the officials part of a hierarchy f officialstructured o thatsome have higher uthority ut in which the patterns f authorityredifferentor differentlasses of decision. Thus we might ay that nbaseball certaindecisions, ike the decision whether he ball or therunner reached second base first, re left to the discretion f thesecond base umpire, f we mean that on this issue the head umpirehas no power o substitute is own udgment f he disagrees.I call both of these ensesweak to distinguish hemfrom strongersense.We use discretion ometimes ot merely o say that n officialmustuse judgment n applying he standards et him by authority,rthatno one will reviewthat exercise f udgment, ut to say that onsome issue he is simplynot bound by standards et by the authorityin question. n this sense we say that a sergeanthas discretionwhohas been told to pick any fivemen forpatrol he chooses or thatajudge in a dog showhas discretiono judge airedales beforeboxers fthe rules do not stipulate n order of events.We use this sense notto comment n thevagueness r difficultyfthestandards, r on whohas thefinalwordin applying hem,but on theirrange and the de-cisionstheypurport o control. f thesergeants told to take the fivemost experiencedmen, he does not have discretion n this strongsense because thatorderpurports o governhis decision.The boxingrefereewho must decidewhichfighter as been themore aggressivedoes nothavediscretion,n thestrong ense, or hesame reason.2'If anyone said that the sergeant r the refereehad discretion nthese ases,we should have to understand im, fthecontextpermit-ted, s usingthe termnone oftheweak senses. uppose,for xample,the lieutenant rdered he sergeant o select thefivemen he deemedmostexperienced,nd then added that thesergeant ad discretion ochoosethem.Or the rulesprovided hat the referee houldawardtheround to themoreaggressive ighter, ithdiscretionn selecting im.We shouldhave to understand hese statementsn the second weaksense, s speaking o thequestionof reviewof the decision.The firstweak sense-that thedecisions ake judgment-would be otiose,andthethird, trong ense s excludedbythe statementshemselves.We must avoid one tempting onfusion.The strong ense of dis-cretion s not tantamount o license, nd does not exclude criticism.Almost nysituationn which person cts including hose n which

21 I have not spokenof that jurisprudentialfavorite, limited discretion,because thatconceptpresentsno special difficultiesf we rememberthe relativity f discretion.Supposethe sergeant s told to choose from amongst experienced men, or to take experienceinto account. We mightsay either that he has (limited) discretion n pickinghis patrol,or (full) discretionto either pick amongst experienced men or decide what else to takeinto account.



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34 The Universityf ChicagoLaw Review [Vol.35:14there s no questionof decisionunderspecial authority,nd so noquestion f discretion)makes elevant ertain tandardsf rationality,fairness,nd effectiveness.e criticize ach other's cts in terms fthese tandards,nd there s no reasonnot to do so whenthe actsarewithin hecenter ather hanbeyond he perimeterf thedoughnutof specialauthority.o we can say that the sergeantwhowas givendiscretionin the strong ense) to pick a patrol did so stupidly rmaliciouslyr carelessly,r that the udgewhohad discretionn theorder of viewingdogsmade a mistakebecausehe took boxersfirstalthough herewereonlythree iredales nd manymoreboxers.Anofficial'siscretionmeansnot thathe is freeto decide without e-course o standardsf sense nd fairness,utonlythathis decision snot controlled ya standard urnished ytheparticularuthority ehave n mindwhenwe raisethe question fdiscretion. f coursethislatter ortof freedoms important; hat s whywe have the strongsenseof discretion. omeonewho has discretionn thisthird ensecan be criticized,ut notforbeingdisobedient,s in the case of thesoldier.He can be said to have made a mistake, ut not to havede-prived participantfa decisionto whichhe was entitled, s in thecase of a sports fficialr contestudge.We maynow retum,with theseobservationsn hand,to theposi-tivists' octrineof judicial discretion. hat doctrine rguesthatifa case is notcontrolled yan established ule,the udgemustdecideit byexercising iscretion.We wantto examinethisdoctrine nd totest tsbearing n our treatmentfprinciples; ut firstwe must skin which enseofdiscretion e are to understandt.Some nominalistsrgue that udges alwayshave discretion,venwhena clearrule is in point,because udgesare ultimatelyhefinalarbiters fthe aw. This doctrine f discretion ses thesecondweaksense f that erm, ecause tmakes he pointthatno higher uthorityreviews hedecisions fthe highest ourt. t thereforeas no bearingon the ssueofhowwe accountforprinciples,nymore than t bearson howwe accountforrules.The positivistso not mean theirdoctrine his way, becausetheysaythat judgehas no discretion hena clearand establishedule isavailable. If we attendto thepositivists'rgumentsor thedoctrinewe may suspectthattheyuse discretionn the firstweak sense tomean onlythat udgesmust ometimesxerciseudgmentn applyinglegalstandards. heir argumentsall attentiono thefactthat omerulesof awarevague Professor art,for xample, ays hat ll rulesof awhave open texture ),nd that omecases arise likeHenning-sen) in whichno establisheduleseems o be suitable.They emphasize



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1967] The Model of Rules 35that udges must sometimes gonizeover pointsof law, and that twoequally trained nd intelligentudges will oftendisagree.

These points are easily made; they are commonplace to anyonewho has any familiarity ith law. Indeed, that is the difficultyithassuming hatpositivistsmean to use discretion n thisweak sense.The proposition hatwhen no clear rule is available discretion n thesense of judgmentmust be used is a tautology. t has no bearing,moreover, n the problem of how to account for egal principles. tis perfectlyonsistent o say thatthe udge in Riggs,for example,hadto use judgment, nd that he was bound to followthe principlethatno man may profit romhis own wrong.The positivists peak as iftheirdoctrine f udicial discretions an insight ather han a tautol-ogy, nd as if it does have a bearingon the treatment f principles.Hart, for xample, ays hatwhenthe udge's discretion s in play,wecan no longer peak of his being bound by standards, ut mustspeakrather of what standardshe characteristicallyses. 22Hart thinksthat when judges have discretion, he principles hey cite must betreated n our secondapproach, s what courts make it a principleto do.It therefore eems that positivists,t least sometimes, ake theirdoctrine n the third, trong enseof discretion. n that sense t doesbear on the treatmentf principles; ndeed, n that ense t is nothingless than a restatementf our second approach. t is the same thingto say that when a judge runsout of rules he has discretion, n thesense that he is not bound by any standards romthe authority flaw, as to say thatthe egal standardsudges cite otherthan rulesarenot bindingon them.So wemust xaminethe doctrine f udicial discretionn the strongsense. (I shall henceforth se the term discretion n that sense.)Do theprinciplesudgescite n cases ikeRiggsorHenningsen ontroltheirdecisions, s the sergeant's rders o take themostexperiencedmenor thereferee's uty o choosethe moreaggressive ighterontrolthe decisionsof these officials?What arguments ould a positivistsupply o showthattheydo not?(1) A positivistmight rgue thatprinciples annotbe bindingorobligatory.hat would be a mistake.t is always question, fcourse,whether ny particularprinciple s in fact binding upon some legalofficial. ut there s nothing n the logical character f a principlethatrenders t incapableof bindinghim. Suppose that the judge inHenningsenhad failedto takeanyaccount of theprinciple hat uto-mobile manufacturers ave a special obligationto theirconsumers,

22 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF IAW 144 (1961).



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36 The Universityf Chicago Law Review [Vol. 35:14or the principle hat he courts eek to protect hosewhosebargainingposition sweak, but had simply ecided forthe defendant y citingthe principle f freedomf contractwithoutmore.His criticswouldnot havebeen content o pointout thathe had not taken ccountofconsiderationshat ther udgeshave beenattending ofor ome time.Mostwouldhave saidthat t was his duty o takcthemeasure f theseprinciples nd thatthe plaintiff as entitled o havehim do so. Wemean nomore,whenwe say that rule is binding pona judge,thanthathemustfollov t if t applies, nd that fhe does not he will onthat ccounthavemadea mistake.

It willnot do to saythat n a case likeHenningsen thecourt s onlymorally bligated o take particular rinciplesnto account, r thatit is institutionally bligated, r obligated s a matter f judicialcraft, r somethingf that ort.The questionwill stillremainwhythis ype f obligation whatever e call it) is differentrom heobli-gation thatrules impose upon judges, and why t entitlesus to saythatprinciples nd policiesare not partof the law but are merelyextra-legaltandardscourts haracteristicallyse.(2) A positivistmight rguethat even though ome principles rebinding,n the ense hat he udge must akethem ntoaccount, heycannotdetermine particular esult.This is a harder rgument oassessbecause t is not clear what t means fora standard o deter-mine a result. erhaps t means thatthe standard ictatestheresultwhenevert appliesso thatnothing lse counts. f so, then t is cer-tainly rue hat ndividual rinciples o notdetermineesults, utthatis only notherwayofsaying hatprinciplesre not rules.Onlyrulesdictate esults,omewhatmay.When contraryesult asbeenreached,therule hasbeen abandonedor changed.Principles o not work hatway;theyncline decision neway, hough otconclusively,ndtheysurvive ntactwhenthey o notprevail.This seemsno reasonfor on-cluding hatudgeswhomust eckonwithprinciples avediscretione-causea setofprinciplesan dictate result.fa judgebelieves hat rin-cipleshe is boundtorecognize oint nonedirectionnd that rinciplespointingntheother irection,fany, re not ofequal weight,henhemust ecide ccordingly,ust ashe must ollowwhathe believes obe abinding ule.He may, f ourse, e wrong n his ssessmentftheprinci-ples,buthe may lsobe wrong nhis udgment hat herule s binding.The sergeantnd thereferee,we might dd, are often n the sameboat.No one factor ictateswhich oldiers re the mostexperiencedorwhichfighterhemoreaggressive.hese officials ustmake udg-ments f the relativeweights f thesevariousfactors; hey o notonthat ccounthavediscretion.



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1967] The Model of Rules 37(3) A positivistmightargue thatprinciples annot count as lawbecause theirauthority,nd even more so theirweight, re congen-itally controversial.t is true thatgenerallywe cannotdemonstratethe authorityrweight f a particular rinciple s we can sometimesdemonstratehevalidity fa rule by locating t in an act ofCongressor in theopinionof an authoritativeourt. nstead,we makea casefora principle, nd forits weight,by appealing to an amalgamofpractice nd otherprinciples n whichthe implications f legislativeand judicial history igure longwithappeals to community racticesand understandings.here is no litmuspaper fortesting he sound-nessof sucha case-it is a matter f judgment, nd reasonablemen

may disagree.But again this does not distinguish he judge fromotherofficials hodo not havediscretion. he sergeant as no litmuspaper forexperience, he refereenone for aggressiveness.eitherofthesehas discretion, ecausehe is bound to reachan understanding,controversial r not, of what his ordersor the rules require, andto act on thatunderstanding.hat is the udge'sduty s well.Of course, fthepositivistsre right n another f theirdoctrines-the theory hat n each legal systemhere s an ultimate estforbind-ing law like ProfessorHart's rule of recognition-it followsthatprinciples re not binding aw. But the incompatibilityf principleswiththepositivists'heory an hardlybe taken as an argument hatprinciplesmustbe treated ny particularway.That begsthequestion;we are interestedn the status f principles ecausewe wantto evalu-ate the positivists'model.The positivistannotdefendhis theory farule of recognition y fiat; f principles re not amenable to a testhe mustshowsomeotherreasonwhythey annotcount as law. Sinceprinciples eem to play a role in arguments bout legal obligation(witness,gain,RiggsandHenningsen), modelthatprovides or hatrole has some initial advantageover one that excludes it, and thelatter annotproperly e inveighedn itsown support.These are themostobviousof thearguments positivistmightuseforthedoctrine fdiscretionn thestrong ense, nd forthe secondapproachto principles. shall mentionone strong ounter-argumentagainst hatdoctrine nd in favor f thefirstpproach.Unlessat leastsome principlesare acknowledged o be bindingupon judges, re-quiringthemas a set to reachparticular ecisions, henno rules,orveryfewrules, an be said to be bindingupon them ither.In most American jurisdictions,nd now in England also, thehigher ourtsnot infrequentlyejectestablished ules.Commonlawrules-those developedbyearlier ourtdecisions-are sometimesver-ruled directly, nd sometimes adicallyalteredby further evelop-



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38 The Universityf Chicago aw Review [Vol.35:14ment. tatutoryules re subjected o interpretationndreinterpreta-tion, ometimesvenwhentheresult s nottocarry ut what s calledthe legislativentent. 23f courts addiscretionochange stablishedrules, hen hese uleswouldof coursenotbe binding ponthem,ndso would not be law on the positivists'model.The positivistmustthereforergue that thereare standards, hemselves indinguponjudges,thatdeterminewhena judgemay overrule r alteran estab-lishedrule, nd whenhe maynot.When,then, s a judge permitted o changean existing ule oflaw?Principles iguren theanswern twoways.First,t is necessary,thoughnot sufficient,hatthe udge find hatthechangewould ad-vancesomepolicyor serve omeprinciple,whichpolicyor principlethus ustifieshechange. n Riggsthe change a newinterpretationfthestatute f wills)was ustified ytheprinciple hatno man shouldprofit romhis ownwrong; n Henningsen ertain ulesabout auto-mobilemanufacturer'siabilitywere ltered n thebasis of theprinci-plesand policies quotedfrom heopinionofthecourt.But not anyprinciplewilldo to ustify change, r no rule wouldeverbe safe.Theremustbe someprincipleshat ount ndothers hatdo not, and theremustbe someprinciples hatcountformore thanothers.t couldnotdependon the udge'sownpreferencesmongstsea of respectablextra-legaltandards,nyone in principle ligible,becauseif thatwere the case we could not saythat anyruleswerebinding.We couldalwaysmagine judgewhosepreferencesmongstextra-legaltandardsweresuchas would ustify shift r radical re-interpretationfeven themostentrenchedule.Second, ny udge who proposes o changeexisting octrinemusttake account of some important tandards hat argue against de-partures rom stablished octrine,nd these standards re also forthemostpartprinciples. hey includethe doctrine f legislativeu-premacy, set of principles nd policiesthatrequirethe courts opaya qualifieddeferenceo theactsof thelegislature. hey also in-cludethe doctrine fprecedent,nother etofprinciplesnd policiesreflectingheequities nd efficienciesfconsistency.he doctrines flegislative upremacynd precedentnclinetowardthe statusquo,eachwithin tssphere, ut theydo not command t. Judges re notfree, owever,o pickand chooseamongstheprinciplesnd policiesthatmakeup thesedoctrines-iftheywere, gain,no rule could besaid to be binding.Consider, herefore,hatsomeone mplieswho says hata particu-

23 See Wellington & Albert, Statutory nterpretationand the Political Process: ACommenton Sinclairv. Atkinson, 2 YAzU L.J. 1547 (1963).



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1967] The Model of Rules 39lar rule is binding.He mayimplythatthe rule is affirmativelyup-portedbyprinciples hecourt s notfree o disregard,nd whicharecollectivelymore weightythan other principlesthat argue for achange. f not,he impliesthatany change would be condemnedbya combination f conservativerinciples f legislative upremacyndprecedent hatthe court is not freeto ignore.Veryoften,he willimplyboth,forthe conservative rinciples, eingprinciples nd notrules, re usuallynotpowerful noughto save a common aw rule oran agingstatute hat s entirely nsupported ysubstantiverinciplesthe court s bound to respect.Eitherof these mplications,f course,treats bodyof principles nd policiesas law in the sensethat rulesare; it treats hemas standards indingupon the officialsf a com-munity, ontrolling heirdecisionsof legal right nd obligation.We are leftwith this ssue. f thepositivists'heory f judicial dis-cretion s eithertrivialbecause it uses discretion n a weak sense,or unsupported ecause the variousargumentswe can supply n itsdefensefall short,whyhave so manycareful nd intelligentawyersembraced t? We can have no confidencen our treatment f thattheory nlesswe can deal with thatquestion. t is notenough to note(althoughperhaps t contributeso the explanation)that discretionhas differentensesthatmay be confused.We do not confusethesesenseswhenwe are not thinking bout law.Part of the explanation, t least, ies in a lawyer's atural tendencyto associate aws and rules,and to thinkof the law as a collectionor systemfrules.Roscoe Pound,who diagnosedthistendency ongago,thoughthatEnglish peaking awyersweretrickednto it bythefact hatEnglishuses thesame word, hanging nlythearticle, or alaw and the law. 24 Other languages,on the contrary, se twowords: loi and droit, ' or example, and Gesetz and Recht. )This mayhave had its effect, ith the Englishspeakingpositivists,becausetheexpression a law certainly oes suggest-a ule. But theprincipalreason for associatingaw withrules runsdeeper,and lies,I think,n thefact hat egal educationhas fora long timeconsistedof teaching nd examining hoseestablished ulesthat form he cut-ting edge of law.

In anyevent, fa lawyer hinks flaw as a systemfrules, nd yetrecognizes, s he must,that judges change'old rules and introducenew ones,he will comenaturally o the theory f judicial discretionin thestrong ense. n thoseother ystemsf rules with whichhe hasexperience like games),therules are the onlyspecial authorityhat24 R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTIONTO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 56 (rev. ed. 1954).



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40 The University f ChicagoLaw Review [Vol. 35:14govern fficialecisions,o that fan umpire ould change rule, hewouldhavediscretions tothe subjectmatterfthat ule.Anyprinci-plesumpiresmightmentionwhenchangingheruleswouldrepresentonly their characteristic references.ositivists reat aw like base-ball revised n thisway.There is another,moresubtleconsequence f this nitialassump-tionthat aw is a systemf rules.When the positivistso attendtoprinciplesnd policies, hey reat hem s rulesmanque. Theyassumethat f they re standardsf law theymustbe rules, nd so they eadthem s standardshat re tryingo be rules.Whena positivist earssomeone rgue that legal principles re partof the law, he under-stands this to be an argument or what he calls the higher awtheory,hat heseprinciples re therulesofa law above the aw.25Herefutes histheory y pointing ut thatthese rules are sometimesfollowednd sometimes ot,thatforevery rule like no manshallprofit romhis own wrong there s another ompeting rule likethe aw favors ecurityf title, nd thatthere s no wayto testthevalidity f rules ike these.He concludes hattheseprinciplesndpolicies renot valid rulesof a law abovethe aw,which s true,be-cause they re notrules at all. He also concludes hatthey re extra-legal standardswhicheach judge selects ccording o his own lightsin the exercise fhisdiscretion, hich s false. t is as ifa zoologisthad proved hatfish re notmammals,nd thenconcludedthattheyare really nly plants.

VI. THE RULEOF RECOGNITIONThis discussionwas provokedby our two competing ccountsoflegal principles.We have been exploring he secondaccount,whichthepositivistseem to adopt through heirdoctrine f judicial dis-cretion,nd we havediscovered ravedifficulties.t is timeto returnto thefork n theroad.What if we adopt the firstpproach?Whatwould theconsequences f thisbe for the skeletal tructuref posi-tivism? f coursewe shouldhave to drop the secondtenet, he doc-trine f udicial discretionor, n thealternative,o makeplain thatthedoctrines to be readmerelyosaythatudgesmust ften xercise

judgment).Wouldwe also haveto abandon ormodifyhefirstenet,thepropositionhat aw is distinguishedy tests f thesortthatcanbe setout in a master ule ikeProfessor art'srule ofrecognition?fprinciples ftheRiggsandHenningsen ort re to countas law,and25 See, e.g., Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (pts. 1 &e ), 29 COLUM.L. REV. 112,254(1929).



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1967] The Model ofRules 41we are neverthelesso preserve he notionof a masterrule for aw,then we must be able to deploy some testthat all (and only) theprinciples hatdo countas law meet.Let us beginwith the testHartsuggests or dentifyingalid rules of law, to see whether hesecanbe madeto workforprinciples swell.Mostrulesof aw, according oHart, are valid becausesomecompe-tent nstitutionnacted them.Somewere createdby a legislature,nthe form f statutorynactments. therswerecreatedby udgeswhoformulated hem o decide particular ases, nd thus established hemas precedents or the future.But this testof pedigreewill not workfortheRiggsand Henningsenprinciples. he originof these s legalprinciples iesnot in a particular ecisionofsome egislature r court,but in a senseof appropriatenesseveloped n the professionnd thepublic over time.Their continuedpower depends upon thissense ofappropriateness eing sustained. f it no longer seemed unfairtoallow people to profit ytheirwrongs, r fairto place specialburdensupon oligopoliesthat manufacture otentiallydangerousmachines,theseprincipleswould no longer playmuch of a role in new cases,eveniftheyhad neverbeen overruled r repealed. Indeed, it hardlymakessense to speak ofprinciplesike these as being overruled orrepealed. When they ecline they reeroded,nottorpedoed.)True, if we were challenged o backup our claimthat someprinci-ple is a principle f law,we would mention ny priorcases in whichthatprinciplewas cited,or figuredn theargument.We would alsomentionany statutethat seemed to exemplify hatprinciple evenbetter ftheprinciplewas cited in thepreambleof thestatute, r inthecommitteeeports rother egislative ocumentshat ccompaniedit). Unlesswe could findsome such institutionalupport,we wouldprobablyfailto makeout our case,and the moresupportwe found,themoreweightwe could claim fortheprinciple.Yetwe couldnotdevise nyformula ortesting owmuchand whatkind of institutionalupport s necessaryo make a principle legalprinciple, till ess to fix tsweight t a particular rderofmagnitude.We arguefor particular rincipleby grapplingwitha whole setofshifting,eveloping nd interactingtandards themselves rinciplesratherthan rules) about institutional esponsibility,tatutorynter-pretation,hepersuasive orceof varioussortsofprecedent, herela-tion of all theseto contemporary oralpractices, nd hostsof othersuch standards.We could not bolt all of these togethernto a singlerule, even a complexone, and if we could the result would bearlittlerelationto Hart'spictureof a rule ofrecognition,which s thepictureof a fairly table masterrule specifying some featureor



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42 The Universityf ChicagoLaw Review [Vol. 35:14features ossession f whichby a suggested ule is taken as a con-clusive ffirmativendication hat t is a rule ... 26

Moreover,he techniquesweapply n arguing or nother rincipledo not stand (as Hart's rule of recognitions designedto) on anentirely ifferentevelfrom heprinciples hey upport.Hart's sharpdistinction etween cceptance nd validity oes not hold. If we arearguing or heprinciple hat manshouldnotprofit romhis ownwrong,wecouldcitetheacts ofcourts nd legislatureshat xemplifyit,butthis peaks s muchto theprinciple's cceptance s itsvalidity.(It seemsodd to speakof a principle s beingvalid at all, perhapsbecausevalidity s an all-or-nothingoncept, ppropriate orrules,but inconsistent itha principle's imension f weight.) f we areasked aswe mightwell be) todefend he particular octrine fprece-dent,or the particular echnique f statutorynterpretation,hatweused in thisargument, e should certainlyitethepractice f othersin usingthatdoctrine r technique.But we should also cite othergeneralprinciples hatwe believesupport hatpractice, nd this n-troduces note of validitynto thechordof acceptance.We mightargue, or xample, hat heuse we makeof earlier asesand statutesis supported ya particular nalysis f the pointof the practiceoflegislationr thedoctrine fprecedent,r bythe principles fdemo-cratictheory,r by a particular ositionon the properdivisionofauthority etweennationaland local institutions,r somethinglseof that ort.Nor is thispathof support one-way treet eadingtosomeultimateprinciple esting n acceptance lone. Our principlesof legislation, recedent, emocracy, r federalismmightbe chal-lengedtoo; and iftheywere we shouldargueforthem,not only nterms fpractice, ut in terms f eachother nd in terms f the m-plications f trends f udicial and legislative ecisions, ven thoughthis astwouldinvolve ppealingto those ame doctrines f interpre-tationwe justified hrough heprincipleswe are now tryingo sup-port.At this evel of abstraction,n other words,principles atherhangtogetherhanlink together.So eventhough rinciplesraw upport rom he officialctsof egalinstitutions,heydo not have a simpleor direct noughconnectionwiththese cts to frame hatconnectionn terms f criteria pecifiedbysomeultimatemaster ule ofrecognition.s there nyotherroutebywhichprinciplesmight e brought nder uch a rule?Hart does saythat master ulemightdesignate s law not onlyrulesenactedby particularegal institutions,ut rules established y

26 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 92 (1961).



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1967] The Model of Rules 43custom s well. He has in minda problemthatbothered therposi-tivists,ncludingAustin.Many of our mostancient egal ruleswereneverexplicitly reatedbya legislature r a court.When theymadetheir firstppearance n legal opinionsand texts, heywere treatedas alreadybeing part of the law because theyrepresented he cus-tomary ractice fthecommunity,r some specializedpartof it, ikethe business ommunity.The examplesordinarily ivenare rulesofmercantile ractice,ike the rulesgoverningwhatrights riseundera standardformof commercialpaper.)27 ince Austinthought hatall law was the commandof a determinate overeign, e held thatthesecustomaryracticeswerenot law until the courts as agentsofthe sovereign) ecognized hem, nd thatthe courtswere indulgingin a fictionn pretending therwise.But that seemed arbitrary.feveryone houghtustommight n itself e law,thefact hatAustin'stheoryaid otherwisewas not persuasive.Hartreversed ustinon thispoint.The master ule,he says,mightstipulate hat omecustom ounts s law evenbefore he courts ecog-nize it. But he does not face the difficultyhisraisesforhis generaltheory ecausehe doesnot attempt oset out the criteria master ulemightuse forthis purpose. t cannotuse, as its onlycriterion, heprovision hatthecommunityegard he practice s morally inding,for thiswould not distinguishegal customaryulesfrommoralcus-tomary ules, nd of course not all of the community'song-standingcustomary oralobligationsre enforcedt law. If,on theotherhand,the test s whether he communityegards hecustomary ractice slegallybinding,thewhole point of the masterrule is undercut, tleast forthisclass of legal rules. The masterrule, saysHart, marksthetransformationrom primitiveociety o one with aw, becauseit provides testfordeterminingocial rules of law otherthanbymeasuring heiracceptance.But if the masterrule saysmerely hatwhatever therrules the community cceptsas legallybindingarelegallybinding, hen tprovidesno such test t all, beyond he testweshoulduse werethereno master ule. The master ule becomes forthese ases)a non-rule f recognition;we might s well saythateveryprimitiveocietyhas a secondary ule ofrecognition, amely herulethat whatevers accepted s binding s binding.Hart himself,n dis-cussing nternationalaw,ridicules he idea that sucha rule could be

27 See Note, Custom and Trade Usage: Its Application to Commercial Dealings andthe CommonLaw, 55 COLUM.L. Rxv. 1192 (1955), and materials cited thereinat 1193n.l.As that note makes plain, the actual practices of courts in recognizingtrade customsfollowthe patternof applying a set of general principles and policies rather than a testthat could be captured as part of a rule of recognition.



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44 The Universityf Chicago Law Review [Vol. 35:14a rule of recognition,ydescribingheproposed ule as an emptyrepetitionof the mere fact that the societyconcerned . . . observescertain tandardsfconduct s obligatoryules. 28Hart's treatmentf custom mounts,ndeed,to a confessionhatthere re at leastsome rulesof law that re not bindingbecausetheyare valid under tandardsaid down bya master ule but are binding-like the master ule-because they re accepted s bindingby thecommunity.his chips t the neatpyramidalrchitecturee admiredin Hart's theory:we can no longer aythat onlythe master ule isbindingbecauseof ts acceptance,ll other ulesbeingvalidunder tsterms.This is perhaps nlya chip,becausethecustomaryulesHart hasin mindare no longer very ignificantart of the aw. But it doessuggesthatHartwouldbe reluctantowidenthedamageby bringingunder heheadof custom ll those rucialprinciplesnd policieswehave been discussing.f he were to call thesepartofthe aw and yetadmit hat heonlytest ftheir orce ies in thedegree o whichtheyareaccepted s lawbythecommunityr somepartthereof,ewouldvery harply educe thatarea of the law overwhichhis master uleheld anydominion. t is not ust that ll theprinciples nd policieswouldescape tssway, hough hatwouldbe bad enough.Once theseprinciples nd policies are acceptedas law, and thus as standardsjudgesmustfollow n determiningegal obligations,t would followthatrules ike those nnouncedforthefirst ime n Riggsand Hen-ningsen we theirforce t least n partto the authorityfprinciplesand policies, nd so notentirelyo the master ule of recognition.So we cannot dapt Hart's version f positivism ymodifyingisrule of recognitiono embraceprinciples.No testsof pedigree, e-latingprinciples o acts oflegislation,an be formulated,orcan hisconcept fcustomaryaw, tselfn exception o the first enet f posi-tivism, e made to serve without bandoningthat tenetaltogether.One morepossibility ustbe considered, owever.f no rule ofrecog-nitioncan provide testfor dentifyingrinciples,whynot saythatprinciplesre ultimate,nd form herule ofrecognitionf our law?The answer o thegeneral uestion What is valid law in an Amer-ican jurisdiction? ould thenrequireus to state all the principles(as well as ultimate onstitutionalules) n force n that urisdictionat thetime, ogether ith ppropriatessignmentsfweight.A posi-tivistmight hen egard hecomplete et of these tandardss theruleofrecognitionf the urisdiction. his solutionhas the attractionf

28 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 230 (1961).



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1967] The Model ofRutles 45paradox,but ofcourse t is an unconditional urrender.f we simplydesignate ur rule of recognition y the phrase the complete et ofprinciples n force, we achieveonly the tautology hat law is law.If, nstead,we tried ctually olistall theprinciplesn forcewewouldfail. They are controversial,heirweight s all important,heyarenumberless,nd they hift nd change o fast hatthestart f our listwouldbe obsoletebeforewe reached hemiddle.Even ifwe succeeded,we wouldnothavea key for aw becausetherewouldbe nothingeftfor ur keytounlock.I conclude that if we treatprinciples s law we mustreject thepositivists' irst enet,thatthe law of a communitys distinguishedfrom ther ocialstandards y sometest n the form f a master ule.We havealreadydecidedthatwe mustthen bandonthesecondtenet-the doctrine f udicialdiscretion-orclarifyt intotriviality.Whatofthethird enet, he positivists'heory f egalobligation?This theoryholds that a legal obligationexistswhen (and onlywhen)an establishedule of aw imposes uchan obligation. t followsfrom histhat n a hardcase-when no such established ule can befound-there s no legal obligationuntilthe udge creates newruleforthefuture. he judge mayapplythat new rule to the parties nthe case,but this s ex postfacto egislation, ot the enforcementfanexisting obligation.The positivists'octrine f discretionin thestrong ense)requiredthisview of legal obligation,because if a judge has discretion herecan be no legal rightor obligation-no entitlement-thathe mustenforce. ncewe abandonthatdoctrine, awever, nd treatprinciplesas law,we raise thepossibilityhat a legal obligationmightbe im-posedbya constellationfprinciples s well as byan established ule.We mightwantto saythat legalobligation xistswhenever hecasesupportinguchan obligation,n terms fbinding egal principles fdifferentorts,s strongerhanthe caseagainst t.Of course,manyquestionswould have to be answeredbeforewecould acceptthatviewoflegal obligation. f there s no rule of recog-nition,no testfor aw in that ense,howdo we decidewhichprinciplesare to count,and how much, in makingsuch a case? How do wedecide whether ne case is betterthan another? f legal obligationrestson an undemonstrableudgmentof that sort,how can it pro-vide a justificationora judicial decisionthatone partyhad a legalobligation?Does thisviewofobligation quarewith the waylawyers,judgesand laymen peak, nd is it consistent ithour attitudes boutmoralobligation?Does thisanalysishelp us to deal with theclassicaljurisprudential uzzlesabout the natureof law?



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46 The Universityf Chicago Law ReviewThese questionsmustbe faced, ut eventhe questions romisemorethanpositivismrovides.ositivism,n its own thesis,tops

short f ust hose uzzling,ard ases hat end s to ookfor heoriesof aw. Whenwe reach hese ases, hepositivistemits s toa doc-trine fdiscretionhat eadsnowherend tellsnothing. is pictureof awas a systemfrules as xercised tenaciousoldon our magi-nation, erhaps hroughtsvery implicity.f we shakeourselvesloosefrom hismodel frules, e may e able to build model ruertothe omplexityndsophisticationfourownpractices.

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Dworkin - The Model of Rules