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Non-Cartesian Dualism

Whilst all of the theories looked at so far present different pictures of dualism, they at least haveone thing in common in that they treat mental events as non-physical. In other words, they

mental events exist as a completely separate substance (Cartesianism, Occasionalism, Parallelismand Platonism), a by-product of physical substance (Epiphenomenalism) or the property of someother intermediate substance (Double Aspect theory). As such, all of the above theories representmodifications of Cartesian dualism. However, there remain other theories that, whilst beingdualistic, present a different view of the substances or properties involved in the relation of mindand body.

An example of such a theory is that of the philosopher E. J. Lowe who attempts to show in whatway a non-Cartesian dualism can exist. He does this by redefining the nature of the mental,arguing that the concept of an immaterial substance does not make sense (for traditional reasons- problem of interaction, etc.).

However, to understand the rest of the theory it is necessary to analyse the concepts of "self" and"identity". Let us, for instance, take the idea of a car. I may replace certain engine parts, wheels,etc., and yet still say that it is the same car as it was. The collection of parts that make up the carmay have changed slightly, but the car is still a car. On the other hand, if take all of the original

parts and make a completely different type of machine out of it - such as a petrol-drivenelectricity generator - although the parts are exactly the same, the car no longer exists. Therefore,Lowe concludes, the thing that gives something its "identity" or "self" is not collection of parts -or any one part - of which it is made up.

When we relate these ideas to the concept of an individual, we discover that similar analogies

can be drawn. A person is not the mere collection of limbs and organs that constitute it, nor is it asingle part - such as the brain. Therefore, the person or self, although it is material - in that itrelies on the existence of a body - is not identical with it.

This rather subtle and ingenious form of dualism is quite a long way from that of Descartes andPlato.

Firstly, the notion of self is not independent of the physical body and although Lowe might callthe self a material substance, it is only in as much as it is another way of looking at the physical(i.e. there is no special independent substance or material soul).

Secondly, this notion of dualism seems to deny the possibility of immortality or existence of theself before or after birth - ideas that were so important to Descartes and Plato.

Thirdly, this theory seems to imply a form of determinism in that, since there is no overridingcentre of decision making - such as the mind or the "I" - the material self is open to the samematerial influences as any other material substance (and therefore arguably determined by them).Lowe's counter-argument to this tries to show that it is possible that the will is a complexinteraction of social and physical processes whereby no one cause is responsible for events. So,

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because the self contains all of these "parts" - social, physical, mental, emotional, etc. - decisionsand actions are brought about by the arrangement of these parts in a certain way (in the sameway that a spider's web allows the spider to move by both restricting and facilitating itsmovements).