DSA Alert July-2012

7/30/2019 DSA Alert July-2012

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The Wakhan Corridor connects India to Afghanistan. That is on the maps that India claims to represent itspost-1947 boundaries. Until independence in 1947 India and Afghanistan were neighbours, just as with Iran. Allthat changed on 14 August with the creation of Pakistan, thereby leaving the Wakhan Corridor as the only Indian

border with Afghanistan. This too changed when the Pakistan army launched the rst of its many operations to wrest

Jammu and Kashmir from India. The subsequent ceasere and the later recognition of a Line of Control between thetwo countries has altered the boundaries between India and Afghanistan. Between Jammu and Kashmir, India and theWakhan Corridor now lies the Northern Areas, or Gilgit-Balitstan as the area is now referred to ofcially.

There are a number of activists from Gilgit-Baltistan who accuse India of ignoring their plight. The accusation revolvesaround the well documented fact that India has long been focused on what is referred to as Kashmir, under Pakistanioccupation or areas that comprise the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India. The activists believe that the tragedy thathas befallen the people of Gilgit-Baltistan remains far removed from public discourse and policy formulation. 'If youbelieve this area to be under the illegal occupation of Pakistan and have a claim on us as Indians, then there is everyreason for you to raise your voice in our favour', said one recently in a seminar in New Delhi. It was a compellingargument, for if India claims Gilgit-Baltistan to be a part of Jammu and Kashmir state, which it once was, there is every

reason for it to pay greater attention to the people of this area and what has been happening to them.

Since the Siachen battles began in April 1984 the people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been at the receiving end of a brutalpolicy of subjugation forced through sectarian programmes unleashed by the Pakistan army. Repeated attempts by thePakistan army to wrest the initiative on Siachen failed. But as the failures mounted so did the atrocities on the haplesspeople of Gilgit-Baltistan. The well-documented is of course the massacre of Shi'a Baltis in 1988 when the Pakistanarmy's Brigade Commander was a certain Pervez Musharraf. It is no coincidence that his failure to dislodge the Indianarmy from its gains on Saltoro and Siachen led to the massacres and his subsequent attempt to take the heights ofKargil and Drass. That too came a cropper and then began the diplomatic attempts to evict India from Siachen. Thelatest round of talks has just ended in another stalemate in Islamabad.

This only highlights that there is more than a geographical connection between the heights of Siachen and thehappenings in Gilgit-Baltistan. Sectarian violence raised its head once again viciously in April when a bus load ofShi'a pilgrims was attacked. This caused a shutdown in Kargil, once again pointing out the deep linkages between thepeople of this area. It is those linkages that beckon a more informed Indian policy on Gilgit-Baltistan. As the judiciousclaimant the onus is on India to renew its links with the area and its people. Anything that improves their lives is abetter policy than not having one at all. China has quietly stepped into the vacuum that currently exists, raising thestakes for India. If India wants to be a global player it should rst begin to play the game in its neighbourhood.

manvendra singh

doh

July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert 1


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pbh vw

Sino-Pak Perfidy: Alarm for India

Not many in India and even in Pakistan know muchabout Gilgit and Baltistan.

Team DSA decided to highlight the strategicimportance, role of Pakistan and the baleful shadow of Chinaon this region which together are directly going to affectthe geopolitics of not only India but the entire South-eastAsia and prove deleterious in the times to come. We need tounderstand the emerging game plan of both to understandtheir motives to destablise India and create conditions that

will severely curtail Indias role and importance in the region.

Since Gilgit and Baltistan are sparsely-populated barren lands, then what is thereason that China has been showing so much interest in this region over the pastseveral decades. Let us recollect the historical facts to understand Chinas interest inthe region. Historically, the area has been a ashpoint of political and military rivalriesamongst the Russian, British and Chinese empires. Rudyard Kipling described it asThe Great Game. Immediately after the end of British rule in the sub-continent in1947, the Muslim-dominated population was instigated by British agents to revoltagainst the government of the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir. Since then this region wasunder the control of Pakistan government who later gifted away the Shaksgam segmenton the north to China under the guise of a lease in 1963.

Nonetheless the immutable fact remains that Gilgit-Baltistan was an integralpart of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir which acceded to India in 1948; thatPakistan has no sovereign rights over Gilgit-Baltistan as conrmed by the PakistanSupreme Court itself and therefore the transfer of Shaksgam to China and Chinaspresence in Gilgit-Baltistan is a violation of international agreements, Indo-Pak bilateralagreements as well as the Sino-Pak provisional border agreement of 1963.

Since 1963 Chinas involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan has increased multifold and itconstructed the Karakoram Highway through this region. China is now planning toimprove the infrastructure by constructing a railway and gas and oil pipelines noneof which appear to benet the people of the region but these devlopments are inthe interests of the Chinese business groups who are largely involved in the miningbusiness of gold and uranium. Chinese have been building many dams on theIndus River and it is very much evident that the Chinese army personnel disguised ascivilians are involved in these activities as they are unable to get the local support fromthe people of Gilgit and Baltistan. At the Gomal Zam dam site two Chinese engineerswere kidnapped and killed.

The main reason for such Chinese interest in this region is the huge deposits ofminerals, metals and uranium which Pakistan does not have the technology to exploit.Thus they are completely dependent on their all-weather friend China. So in anutshell, Pakistan is parlaying the assets of the portion of Jammu and Kashmir which it

has occupied by subterfuge for Strategic support from China to keep India conned byforeign instigated insurgencies within its homeland.

The government of India and the Indian army have taken a strong stand on thePakistan army chiefs suggestion of demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier. India mustalso express its strong protest against the deployment of Chinese army in the name ofso-called development works. The Chinese companies are actually the Chinese armyengineering corps deployed in the region.

Dear readers, team DSA is introducing two columns from this issueon homeland security. One by a highly qualied trainer on all aspectsof homeland security and another by a very senior defence and securitycorporate leader on counter-terrorism and lessons for homeland security. I am sure youwill enjoy the new columns. As new paradigms emerge on the defence and securityhorizonDSA will ensure that you get to read the most incisive and in-depth analyseson the topics of national and global interest.

Jai Hind!

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The rising salience of the Gilgit-Baltistan area stems from Chinas muscular forays into this region.Selig Harrison had sent shockwaves by disclosing that 11,000 Chinese troops had entered thisdisputed region in 2011. Indian military sources place the current Chinese deployment at some

3-4,000 military engineering personnel working feverishly on widening the Karakoram Highway andcreating a rail-road-cum-oil and gas pipeline corridor to the strategic Gwadar Port. This will help Chinabypass the critical Malacca choke point for her energy shipment and shorten the passage from 25 daysto just 48 hours. There is also talk of China acquiring the Gilgit-Baltistan area on lease for 50 years. Willit be any surprise therefore if China simply declares a few years down the line that the Gilgit-Gwadarcorridor is a core interest, even as Tibet, Taiwan and the South China Sea? There is speculation that the PLAAF may seek air basesat Gilgit, Chilas, Skardu etc. in a hot war scenario. In this issue a number of former Generals, Air Marshals and Admirals take aclose look at the Gilgit-Gwadar corridor and the rising strategic salience of the Northern Areas. It is quite apparent that Jammu andKashmir is fast becoming the theatre of choice for China and Pakistan to spark off a two front war with India. It is in this theatrethey can attack India together.

Why this sudden barrage of dovish noises from the Pakistani military establishment? The Pakistani civilians are fed up ofconstant conict and their attempts to usher peace could help them marginalise and remove the stranglehold of the Pakistani armyon its polity. For the time being however, the Pak army has pulled off a soft coup against PM Gilani and clearly shown who is in

charge. What, however, are the motivations of the Pakistani army to seek peace now? The motivations are simple. With the UStroop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the Pak army senses a historic opportunity to reduce Afghanistan to a vassal statusand acquire its dream strategic depth. For this they need a temporary truce on their Eastern Front with India. Hence the Peace Blitz.

On 7th April this year, the Pakistani army suffered a painful disaster in the Siachen Front. A major avalanche-cum-mud slidewiped out the Battalion HQ and Adm Base of the 6 Northern Light Infantry unit at Ghyari. Despite h elp from the Chinese, Americanand European rescue teams, not a single body could be recovered. The entire adm base, helipads and road infrastructure have beenwiped out. The Pakistani forward troops below our Saltoro positions are now in a pitiable state. Their Siachen positions in theCentral Glacier (especially at Bilafond La, Ali Brangsa are fast becoming untenable for the Pakistani army. If the Pakistani armycannot take it anymore, why dont they withdraw unilaterally? Their military and civilian sPoKesmen are claiming repeatedly thatthe area has no strategic signicance whatsoever. Why then did they start the orographic aggression? They started the race forSaltoro and lost it. If this area really has no strategic signicance - they are free to withdraw unilaterally. The insistence that Indiavacate its hard won edge is too clever by half. With the new China-Pak line up in Baltistan, it would be unwise for India to openits anks to this pincer.

Actually, what makes it worse for the Pak army is the fact that the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), which has borne the bruntof the casualties in Kargil and Siachen, has 49 per cent Shias, 23 per cent Ismailis and just 18 per cent Sunnis. 55 per cent ofthe Shias hail from the Gilgit area, 35 per cent from Baltistan. The Shias have been facing relentless persecution. In 1989,Gen Pervez Musharraf had brought in the blood thirsty Sunni Pathans to terrorise the Shias into submission. In the Kargil conictthe Pak army disowned the dead Shia troopers of the NLI and over 600 had to be buried by the Indians. The Anti-Shia pogromcontinues. On 28 February this year, 18 Shia pilgrims were pulled out of buses and massacred in Pakhtunkhwa province. On03 April 15-20 Shias were killed in Chilas and 50 were wounded. This led to riots where more Shias were killed. The Avalanche on07 April therefore came as a climactic nale which shook the Shia troops. The legend of the Teram Shehr town, which was wipedout in a terrible avalanche, lives on in the folklore of Baltistan. The Shia troops are uneasy and restive and their Sunni commandersare deeply worried. That is why Gen Kayani was unnerved by the recent avalanche and the impact it has had on the unfortunateShia troops of the NLI. That explains his smart moves to use the Indian softness in the head to get the Indian army off theSaltoro Ridge, which it had secured at such heavy cost in blood and treasure. Now we have mastered the logistical and environmental

problems and can stay on, if need be, forever. If the Pakistani army has had it, they can withdraw and Indians will not interferewith their retreat in any way. The problem is their over-cleverness and lack of sincerity, based on the quest to gain an upper handin Afghanistan by encouraging peace noises on the Eastern Front. The real problem is, this is a tactical gambit and not a sinceredesire for peace. Hence, it would be foolish for us to get carried away by the gush of the "Aman Ki Asha brigade". We need to lookat the overall geo-political scenario that will emerge in the wake of the US withdrawal in 2014 and the burning desire of some togive Pakistan a free hand to shape outcomes in Afghanistan is suicidal to say the least. Jammu and Kashmir and not Arunachal isthe most likely theatre for the next two front war. Sino-Pak preparations / motivations to attack jointly here are plainly visible. Thetime is most inappropriate to lower our guard and accept that recipe for disaster dished out by our interlocutors.

In the Features section of this issue we also cover the change of guard at the Army HQ. Team DSAwelcomes Gen Bikram Singhand speculates about the agenda that he could / should set for himself - especially in terms of speedily addressing the hollownessin the armys arms and ammunition procurement, as also stemming the distressing frequency of scams that have left us all a bitbewildered. In this onerous task he needs the support of one and all.

xv do

July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert 3


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h odg ga gam GgBaa: 8ida d o agad D Avd Gpa ad D Ahok Bha

h sah mbogo 12l G Avd shama PVsM, AVsM, VsM (d)

h GwadaKaakoamXjag odo 16V Adma Vja shaka PVsM, AVsM, ADc (d)

paapa x PoK 22A V Maha A K twa VsM (d)

d dago ida ohw 27l G Kama Dava PVsM, AVsM (d)

po adaao: a goba pobm 38Pak Dav

h d hadow GgBaa: 41 mpao o idaPaav Ad

wod Gwada ak h o 44oo a maaa o cha?ra Adm (D) s Khha (d)

GgBaaGwada: h va ch a 49n Gokha

sah magam aoh Hmaaa bd? 52co ukah s raho (d)

gopoa da maab 57c Vo

ag mpoa o GgBaa go 60Maj G A Kam AVsM (d)

GgBaa o h bo 63co J P sgh (d)

Gwada po: ida ah h 66rah Mha ad saa Hahm

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Volume 3 Issue 10 July 2012

Gilgit-Baltistan Special Issue July 2012

g ad ov oo 30D rpa Jwa

o om: goba ag 34D Vvk la

C O L U M N S

F E A T U R E S

hag o gad: h ida am 70Maj G (D) G D Bakh sM, VsM (d)

ida am: w oa ha h wok o ... 74Bg Gm Kawa (d)

nAtO mm 2012 oad ahad 77Domka co

6 July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert 7


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Anew great game is beginning to take shape aroundGilgit-Baltistan which is situated in a strategically pivotalarea, at the conuence of central, west, east and south Asia.For China it is a crucial link to the Arabian Sea and a strategicoutpost against regional powers like India. The Chinese effortsto access the Arabian Sea through Gwadar Port by developingroad and railway links are being put under the scanner,especially after media reports since 2010 that the Chinese arestationing their troops and building critical infrastructurefor strategic use. The recent reports of Pakistan consideringproposal to lease out Gilgit-Baltistan to China for a periodof 50 years in a local newspaper Roznama Bang-e-Sahar(13 December 2011) has raised the level of anxieties evenfurther.

AlArMinG DeVelOPMents

Dr Arvind Gupta

Dr Ashok Behuria

riter an IFS ofcer is

tly on deputation to the

te for Defence Studies

Analyses (IDSA), New

India as Lal Bahadur

i Chair in Strategic

Defence Studies. Prior

ning the IDSA, he was

Secretary at the National

ty Council Secretariat.e IDSA he heads the

Asia and Internal

ty Clusters and edits the

tes agship bi-monthly

l Strategic Analysis.

writer is Fellow and

nator, South Asia

at IDSA. He is also

nating the activities

Project on Pakistan

ed Kashmir (PoK) at

The Unfolding Great Gamein Gilgit-Baltistan:

India Needs to Safeguard itsSecurity Interests



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AlArMinG DeVelOPMents



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Is it only our responsibility to try and reduce the trust decitwith Pakistan? Why should resolution of the Siachen issueprecede other issues? Is it to full a personal agenda of someelements in the two countries? Whatever be the case, we mustdeal with this issue with prudence. Any agreement on theSiachen issue must incorporate the following - the AGPL mustbe authenticated on maps related to present deployment ofarmies of both the countries; it must also be unequivocallystated that at no stage in the future,would any of the armiesdeploy on the Saltoro Ridge; adequate implementablesafeguards need to be built into the agreement. Secondly,resolution of Siachen must never be considered in isolation;it must form part of the resolution of entire Kashmir. Inthe absence of resolution of the boundary issue with both

Pakistan and China, vacating posts on the Saltoro Ridgewould be committinghara-kiri. We also need to guard againstthe proclivity of our political leadership to give away at thenegotiating table what has been gained on the battleeld, at thecost of lives of our soldiers. Very sage counsel from a formerGOC of 14 Corps who was subsequently The Army Commanderof Eastern Command.

PArAMOuntcy O nAtiOnAl interest

Lt Gen Arvind Sharma

VSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

writer is a

General Ofcer

anding-in-Chief of the

n Army Command. His

ional responsibility

passed borders

China, Myanmar and

adesh; all troops

ng Assam Ries

ed in the north-eastern

for counter-insurgency

ions were part of his

and. An infantry ofcer,

four decades plus of

e in the Army, he has

with insurgency in

u and Kashmir and the

eastern states.

THE SIACHENIMBROGLIO



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PArAMOuntcy O nAtiOnAl interest



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In 1963, Pakistan ceded more than ve thousand squarekilometres of territory in the Karakoram region of Pakistanoccupied Kashmir (PoK). This accommodated the constructionof the Karakoram Highway that links Chinas Xinjiang regionthrough the Khunjerab Pass with Pakistans Gilgit-Baltistanand Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions. Started in 1959 andcompleted in 1979, the 1,300 km highway connects Kashgarwith Islamabad and traverses some of the worlds most hostileterrain. This energy channel serves to provide an efcientalternative to the exposed and vulnerable sea passage throughthe Malacca / Sunda / Lombok Straits. At the southern end ofthe Karakoram corridor is Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea.Pakistan has urged China to use and take maximum benetsfrom the Gwadar Port. For China, it is this factor of securingthe right of passage in this troubled region that is of critical

consequence. The Port of Gwadar with all its geostrategicfeatures provides to its nascent blue water navy a reach andcontrol capability that would assure security of its energy linesand sanctuary to its raw materials emanating from Africa. It istowards this end that Chinese strategic policy is directed. Aformer head of Indias Strategic Forces Command takes a closelook at Chinas Malacca Bypass strategy.

strAteGic MOsAic

ce Admiral Vijay Shankar

VSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

riter holds an MSc in

ce Studies and is a

ate of the Naval War

e, Newport, Rhode

USA. He is the former

ander-in-Chief of the

man and Nicobar

and, C-in-C of the

gic Forces Command

ag Ofcer Commanding

rn Fleet. His Command

erational experience are

ehensive and include

and of INS Viraat the

t carrier. He is a member

adjunct faculty of the

al Institute of Advanced

s and he currently

s the Admiral Katari

of Excellence at the

Services Institute.

Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor

Table 1: Chinas top 10 trading partners in Africa. Source: Capital Week

Country Economictype

Average annualtrade, 2006-2010

(US$ million)

Share intotal China-Africa trade

Angola Oil export 18,627 21 per cent

SouthAfrica

Diversiedeconomy

1 66 ,8 6 1 8 p er c en t

Sudan Oil export 6,445 7 per cent

Nigeria Oil export 5,774 6 per cent

Egypt Diversiedeconomy

5,384 6 per cent

Algeria Oil export 4,155 5 per cent

Libya Oil export 4,154 5 per cent

Republic of

the Congo

Oil export 3,241 4 per cent

Morocco Diversiedeconomy

2,548 3 per cent

Benin Agriculture 2,097 2 per cent

Weight of top ten trading partners in totalChina-Africa trade

76 per cent

The



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strAteGic MOsAic

1. Coakley, Robert W. Global Logistics and Strategy Chap 9: The Persian Corridor, Washington 1955.2. Dasgupta, Saibal. Times of India e-newspaper 07 July 2010, China Plans Railway Link with Pakistan.3. Newspaper, Daily Time Islamabad, 03 January 2010.

4. Newspaper, Asia Times, 09 May 2010. 5. LA Times 14 Mar 2012, Chinese bank pulls out of Pakistan-Iran pipeline project.6. All statistics in this section from US Energy Information Administration 2010.7. OMeara, Dina. Calgary Herald, 27 July 2010 US delays decision on Keystone XL. All computations and extrapolations are based on

authors estimates.

Map 1: Chinas Oil Pipeline Import Options. Source: Michael Rodgers PFC Energy 2009-2010



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strAteGic MOsAic

8. Gwadar Fact Sheet, development and operations of the Port of Gwadar 2009. gwadarcity.info9. Shahid, Saleem. Dawn e-news 14 May 2012, Review of Gwadar Port Feasibility Report Urged.

10. Reuters. Dawn e-news 08 Dec 2010, Supreme Court hears challenge to PSA deal.11. Tom Wright, Jeremy Page, The Wall Street Journal 30 Sep 2011, China Pullout Deals Blow to Pakistan. Ali, Kalbe. Dawn e-news

22 May 2011 China Agrees to run Gwadar Port.12. Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Longmans Green and Co. London, 1911, p 88-90.



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Avery incisive article that highlights the possibility ofPakistan handing over its critical airbases of Gilgit,Skardu, Chilas, Chitral and Muzaffarabad to the PLAAF inthe context of a two front war with India. The writer pointsout the existing air power constraints that China suffers inthe Western Sector of Tibet and Jammu and Kashmir becauseit has only two Airbases in this sector. In the western areaopposite Jammu and Kashmir China has airelds at Kashgarand Khotan. These are 800 km and 600 km away from Indianbases. This drawback can be overcome by using the Pakistaniairbases in Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK. This adds a new andvery dangerous dimension to the Sino-Pak nexus in this vitalregion.

sinO-PAK MAcHinAtiOns

Vice Marshal A K Tiwary

VSM (retd)

writer commanded a

9 Squadron in late

His various command

taff appointments like

Operations Ofcer at

or Wing, operational

ng at Command level,

or Concept Studies at

Q, Command of a major

base, Head of the

ng Team (Air) at Defence

es Staff College and

Directing Staff (Air)

ional Defence College

onferred a rich practical

ence. The air staff course

SSC Wellington (TN),

and and Air War Course

Air University, Maxwell

e, Montgomery (USA),

ucted and accelerated

erest in air war studies.

remature retirement he

ies as Commander on

g737-800 NG.

Aircraft / Missiles Quantity Role Remarks

SU-30 MK 100 AD/GA

SU-27/J 11 171 AD/GA 200 more to come

J-10 80 AD/GA Production rate togo up. Indigenous.

JH-7A 70 GA Indigenous

J-8 II 180 AD Indigenous

J-7 471 AD Indigenous

H-6 57 Bomber ALCM armed

Cruis e Mis sil es I n t hou sa nd s Grou nd l aun ch ed

TBMs In thousands Conventionalwarhead

PLAAF-PAFNEXUS in PoK



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2. IDSAs China Report-2011.




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Airbase RunwayLength

Elevation Remarks

Kashgar 2800 m 1200 m 800 km. POLstorage exists.

Khotan 2860 m 1380 m 600 km.

Shiquanhe 3000 m 4240 m Rw appears asa road. 300 km

Skardu 3600 m 2300 m PAF base

Gilgit 2680 m 1500 m In PoK

Chilas 1500 m 1100 m In PoK

Muzaffarabad 1250 m 800 m In PoK

Chitral 2000 m 1400 m In PoK

Rawalkot 1480 m 1600 m In PoK

Lt Gen Kamal Davar

PVSM, AVSM (retd)

The writer is a distinguished

soldier having served in all

theatres of operations in his

41 years of service. A veteran

of the 65 and 71 operations,

he was wounded in action

in the 1965 ops. He was the

rst armoured corps ofcer

to be specially selected to

be GOC Ladakh where heimplemented many innovative

operational and logistical

innovations. He has been

Chief of Staff of a Corps HQ in

Jammu and Kashmir and then

as GOC 11 Corps responsible

for the defence of Punjab. He

was especially selected by

the Government of India to

raise the Defence Intelligence

Agency after the Kargil war.

After retirement he writes

and lectures on security

issues. He is widely known

to passionately espouse the

cause of jointness in the

Indian Armed Forces. As the

rst DG DIA, many intelligence

initiatives including abroad

were taken by him.

cHinese PlOt

REDDRAGONININDIASNORTH-WEST

South Asia scholar Selig Harrison was the rst to breakthe news in August 2010 in TheNew York Times that anestimated 7,000-11,000 Chinese Peoples Liberation Armysoldiers were deployed in Gilgit-Baltistan in the guise ofengineering personnel and civil labour. Pakistan, of course,unconvincingly stated that China had sent a humanitarianteam to Gilgit-Baltistan to assist in ood relief operations!Harrison succinctly termed this development as the unfoldingof a quiet geopolitical crisis, India will do well to monitor theever enlarging Chinese footprint in its north-west regions fornow India will have to manage another front on its troubledperipheries with both China and Pakistan in unholy concert.

As we delve deeper into the happenings of the last two yearsin Gilgit-Baltistan, it will be amply clear to all that in keepingwith its long-term objectives, Chinas growing assertivenessin South Asia is not only manifesting itself in Afghanistan,awaiting the exit of US troops by 2014, but right across Indiasnorth-west periphery in the area of Gilgit-Baltistan and therest of PoK as also Balochistan which is up in arms against itsown government. Since the last couple of years, the Chinesecentre of gravity in land operations has been increasinglygetting oriented towards Jammu and Kashmir and this is thesector where China and Pakistan could together plan to attackIndia if the need for them ever arises.



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cHinese PlOt



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HOlistic AnAlysis

Insurgencies andCollective Consciousness Dr Rupali Jeswal

th om a ig ad tom Aa, ca Phoog ad ca Hpohap bad

sohea Aa. sh ha ao vd ag pad aa dg oom, g ad aa

opao. sh pa ogv ag po ad a pahwa po ad how h ao app

o pad ag.

sh a xp h d o ovba mo ad mao xpo o dpo ad do ad ao g

ovba a o phooga am ojo wh emooa ig o ha h hma

md, poa, mag ad p.

sh a mmb o icPA (iaoa coo & Po Aoao), iAcsP (iaoa Aoao

o cotom ad s Pooa) ad a mmb o APA (Ama Phooga Aoao),

APP (Aoao o Pooa Phoog), uK cd Hpohap ad Ga Hpohap rg.



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HOlistic AnAlysis



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Effective counter-terrorism strategy

An effective counter-terrorism strategy based on domestic, regional and global threat perception is vital. Such astrategy should be articulated in clear terms to avoid mis-interpretations by stakeholders at the federal as well as at thestate levels. The strategy should incorporate multi-dimensional threats and lay out comprehensive national objectives.A regular review of the strategy should become part of the strategy itself.

Some countries that have succeeded in controlling terroristattacks include France, England, Germany, USA and, nearer

lessOns Or All

Dr Vivek Lall

th om Pd ad ch exv Of, nw V, ra id lmd ad Dghd

ow, Obv rah odao.

ea h wa V Pd ad co Had, Bog D spa ad s ad had ao vd a

Maagg Do o Bog comma Apa ida. Po o Bog h wokd o raho ad wh nAsA

Am rah c vao mdpa gg d. H ha h PhD Aopa egg

om Wha sa uv Kaa ad h MBA om c uv Wahgo. H vd a chama

o h D comm o h Aoao o chamb o comm ad id o ida (AssOcHAM). H

ao vd a h chama, D eqpm comm, AMcHAM ad o h pa o h icci D

tak o. H had h d hoo o pg 2,500 ompa a rgoa Pd o h idoAma

chamb o comm, h o usida baa hamb. i Ap 2012, h ha b appod a chama o h

idous sag Daog b h idoAma chamb o comm.

Global LearningsCounter Terrorism:



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lessOns Or All

36 July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert


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The writer, a former Deputy Inspector General for the New YorkCorrectional System, provides chilling examples of radicalisationof prisoners while serving their prison sentences.He highlights theneed to monitor such prisons and also address the sizable prisonpopulation who are most susceptible to radicalisation. Thosecommon criminals who if left to themselves will only progressfrom bad to worse. Whether this is done by de-radicalisationprogrammes or counter radicalisation programmes is open fordebate.

Patrick Dunleavy

writer is the former

y Inspector General for

ew York Correctional

m and author of

Fertile Soil of Jihad.

s also written for the

ngton Times and

New York Post and

s a class at the

States Military Specialions School. Following

mber 11, 2001, at

request of various

ational agencies he

een a speaker on the

of terrorist recruitment

ganisations such as

BI, CIA, Scotland Yard

Canadian Intelligence

es.

JiHADi tentAcles

Prison Radicalisation:A Global Problem

1. http://intelwire.egoplex.com/padilla011104.html2. http://www.justice.gov/usao/ilc/press/2009/09September/24Finton.html3. http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo052009.htm4. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1783237.stm



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5 . http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/email_news/6634901.stm6 . http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-174565417 . h t t p : / / w w w . jam e s t o w n . o r g / pr o g r am s / g t a/ s i n g l e / ? t x _t t n e w s % 5b t t _

news%5d=853&tx_ttnews%5bbackPid%5d=181&no_cache=18 . http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a02wtcbombersencourageqihad#a0

2wtcbombersencourageqihad

JiHADi tentAcles

Chinas increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistanregion will complicate the Kashmir dispute for India,changing it from a bilateral concern into trilateral one.In the future, given the proximity Pakistan enjoys withChina, it might demand a seat at the discussion table forChina, on the Kashmir issue. Indian ofcials need to starttaking these developments in Gilgit-Baltistan seriously asChinas presence in the region has long term strategic andsecurity implications for India. China is jockeying to be amajor power in the region due to the strategic location ofGilgit-Baltistan which would give China a shorteraccess route to Middle-East and Africa, where most ofits oil-resources come from. This would reduce Chinasdependency on the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)which pass through the narrow Malacca Strait.

Pallavi Ade

The writer is currently the

Publications Manager at

Centre for Land Warfare

Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

Before joining CLAWS, she

has worked with Royal United

Services Institute for Defence

and Security (RUSI), London.

At RUSI, she researched on

India and its neighbourhoodand also worked as project

manager for projects related

to India. She has completed

her MA in International

Studies and Diplomacy from

School of Oriental and African

Studies (SOAS) in London. Her

current research interests lie

in strategic aspects of Indian

Defence, India's defence

modernisation and study

of India's relations with its

neighbours.

DeViOus GAMe PlAn

The Red Shadow in Gilgit-Baltistan:Security Implications for India



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DeViOus GAMe PlAn



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Oil tankers from Gulf transit about 6,000 nm and thosefrom the African coast transit about 10,000 nm beforethey discharge their energy cargo at Chinese ports. Both thetanker routes have to pass through Malacca Straits in additionto problem zones in their respective routes. If tankers canunload at Gwadar, they would have to travel only about680 nm from the Gulf and about 3,000 nm from Africancoast. To overcome this major strategic vulnerability, Chinais making major investments in the Karakoram-Gwadarcorridor. This explains the upsurge of Chinese activity inthe Gilgit- Baltistan region and the Gwadar Port. In2008 the then chief of Naval Staff, Indian navy AdmiralSureesh Mehta said Gwadar could be used by Pakistan

to take control over the world energy jugular. Thisport and corridor pose a major threat to Indias energysecurity and would have grave implications in any twofront war.

neW el DOrADO?

Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha

(retd)

writer has held the

of Director General

Armament Inspection

e NHQ prior to his

annuation. He is an ardent

ent of indigenisation

lf-reliance in the eld of

y weapon systems and

ent.

1. Robert D. Kaplan, Pakistans Fatal Shore, The Atlantic ,May 2009 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/pakistan-

8217-s-fatal-shore/7385/

2. Bulent Gokay, Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines Journal of International Affairs, Ankara, Volume, 3, No. 1, 1998, p. 49

3. Alam Shah. Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Basin. Strat Analysis, January-March 2002, p. 8

4. Shah Alam, Pipeline Politics in the Caspian Basin Strategic Analysis, January-March 20 02,

WOULD GWADAR SLACKEN THE SLOCNOOSE AT MALACCA FOR CHINA?

5. Ibid.



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6. Ziad Haider, Balochis, Beijing and Pakistan's Gwadar Port, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 2005, 9 5-112, 95

7. ibid

8. Robert D. Kaplan, Pakistans Fatal Shore, The Atlantic ,May 200 9 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/pakistan-

8217-s-fatal-shore/7385/

9. Saleem Shahid, Gwadar Project Launched: Musharraf Lauds China's Assistance, Dawn, March 23, 2002.

10. Nirupama Subramanian, Musharraf cites Bhindranwale's killing, The Hindu, October 12, 2006.

neW el DOrADO?

11. Abdus Sattar Ghazali, India Alarmed as Chinese Built Gwadar Port of Pakistan Becomes Operational, Countercurrents.org,

February 8, 2008

12. Ni Lexiong: Sea Power and Chinas Development, the Liberation Daily, 17, April, 2005



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13. Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2007,(Washington, DC: Ofce of the Secretary of Defence,

2007).

14. Corey S. Johnston, Transnational Pipelines And Naval Expansion: Examining Chinas Oil Insecurities In The Indian Ocean, Naval

Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2008.

neW el DOrADO?

GilGitBAltistAnGWADAr:tHe VitAl cHinese Artery

New York Times columnist Selig Harrison has arguedthat it takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers toreach the Gulf through the circuitous sea route whereasif there is a high speed rail or road link, the time takento transport cargo across the Karakoram Highway is48 hours. The aim would be to get to the Chinese-builtPakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, justeast of the Gulf, within 48 hours. Chinas immediate

access and permanent presence in the Persian Gulfis a serious security concern for India which imports70 per cent of oil from the Gulf. It is this ChineseMalacca Bypass strategy that explains the rising strategicsalience of the Gilgit-Baltistan region. It is this regionwhich serves to provide China with an opening to the Gulf.It is amazing that segments of the Indian state are nowgetting so keen to offer Pakistan major concessions inthis vital region.

Nitin Gokhale

The writer, a journalist with

28 years of experience

behind him in various conict

theatres, is currently NDTV's

Security and Strategic Affairs

Editor.

inDiAn security cOncerns



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inDiAn security cOncerns



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Votaries of peace at any cost with Pakistan tend to forgetthat Siachen means convergence of strategic interestsof Pakistan and China against India. Like Pakistan, Chinaalso considers its boundary issue with India in the samesector as unsettled. Indian withdrawal from Siachen withoutiron-clad guarantees would mean linking up of Chinese-heldShaksgam Valley with Pakistan-held Gilgit-Baltistan through atrans-Karakoram movement of troops. Today the Indian armyis deployed on Saltoro Range and controls major passes suchas Turkistan La (connecting Shaksgam Valley with Siachen),Indira Col, Sia La, Bilafond La. Downgrading Siachens strategicimportance just to facilitate demilitarisation will not onlynullify Indian armys hard-fought advantage over Pakistan andChina but also jeopardise defence of Aksai Chin, Turtuk andLeh sectors in the long-term. Indians have a knack of throwingaway advantages.

BeWAre sinO-PAK AniMus

Utkarsh S Rathore (retd)

riter was commissioned

Maratha Light Infantry

80. He has served in

altitude areas and

t e r - i n s u r g e n c y

ions. He commanded

antry battalion during

ions Rakshak and

am. He is a defence and

ty expert and threat andalyst.

SIACHEN MAGNANIMITYANOTHER HIMALAYAN BLUNDER?

Map-1



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Map-2 Showing India and Pakistan Positions Along Actual Ground Position Line in Siachen Sector



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Geo-politicaldancemacabreThe situation in Gilgit-Baltistan attained such alarmingproportions for the Pakistan-China entente cordiale thatBeijing insisted that the security of the Karakoram Highwaybe transferred to the Peoples Liberation Army. Thishappened when the local population began to refuse to workon the Chinese aided project of expansion and upgradationof the Karakoram Highway with plans unveiled for railwayline and gas and oil pipelines to run along it. Increasinglyfrequent demonstrations have blocked trafc on portions ofthe highway that are not affected by the landslide of 2010

that created a huge lake north of Gilgit at Attabad. Chinadeployed (by US Central Intelligence Agency estimates)up to 9,000 personnel into the Northern Areas along theKarakoram Highway disguised as labourers and engineers.The situation in Baltistan is turning serious and merits a closewatch by all those concerned with security in South Asia.

Cecil Victor

The writer has covered

all wars with Pakistan as

War Correspondent and

reported from the conict

zones in Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia in South East Asia

as well as from Afghanistan.

He is author of India: The

Security Dilemma.

sinO-PAK PlAyGrOunD



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sinO-PAK PlAyGrOunD



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reGiOnAl PersPectiVe

Maj Gen Afsir Karim

AVSM (retd)

riter is a well known

Indian army general

military scholar who has

ed several books on

gic affairs and military

s. He is a graduate of

efence Services Staff

e, Wellington and the

al Defence College.

The writer, a reputed military analyst, provides a regional perspective tothe Gilgit-Baltistan issue. The Gilgit-Baltistan region is the next doorneighbour of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Tibet. China has nointention of settling the border issue in a hurry and if our troops are pulledout from the glacier area it will make a link between China and Pakistan

across the Karakoram Pass much easier. In these circumstances we cannotafford to vacate our positions from the Saltoro Ridge or base areas under anyagreement to earn Pakistans goodwill; we will in fact need to strengthen theentire Shyok Valley sector from Daulat Beg Oldi to Turtuk and the entireLadakh range particularly the Khardungla Pass to safeguard our areas.It is essential that India evolves a policy process that provides it a viablesolution for safeguarding its national interests in view of the aggressiveChinese-Pakistani postures in this region.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF

GILGIT-BALTISTAN REGION



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GILGIT-BALTISTANON THE BOILAn interesting article on the Gilgit-Baltistan region.The writer provides an essential historical perspectiveand highlights the sharp sectarian fault lines that haveriven this region. He recounts how till 1988 the people ofGilgit-Baltistan boldly fought for their democratic

rights. Gen Zia-ul-Haq subverted their campaignby clamping martial law and dividing them onsectarian lines. Gen Zia posted Brig Musharraf(the architect of Kargil and later President of Pakistan) tosuppress this regional uprising. Killing and vandalising theminorities is getting institutionalised in Pakistan. People havebeen attacked and butchered in mosques, schools, hospitals,in buses and other public places. Administration is paralysedin various towns and cities which emboldens brutalities andbenets terrorists and further creates unrest in the region.Sectarian killings in Gilgit-Baltistan have evoked reactions inKargil and many places of Pakistan.

reGiOnAl PersPectiVe

Col J P Singh (retd)

The writer was commissioned

in 4 BIHAR on 13 June 1971

from IMA Dehradun. He took

part in 1971 war in Poonch

sector of Jammu and Kashmir

and later served in IPKF in

Sri Lanka. On ERE, as a Capt

served in Infantry School

Mhow in the Weapons Wing,

as a Major in NDA Khadakwaslaas Squadron Commander and

as Lt Col in Infantry School

Belgaum as Senior Instructor

and staff of HQ 26 Inf Div.

As Col served in the NCC in

Odisha and Maharashtra and

in the staff at HQs Northern

Command.

HistOricAl PersPectiVe



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HistOricAl PersPectiVe



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Gwadar Port:Indias Achilles Heel

No other place has created as much anxiety in Indiancorridors of power as the Gwadar Port. India maintainsthat the port is a further step to strengthen the so-calledSino-Pakistan alliance. It has also been argued that motivesbehind the construction of the Gwadar Port were not simplyeconomic but they have concealed expansionist, politicaland militaristic reasons behind the construction of suchstrategically important port. Strategic community in Indiareckons this to be a potential threat for Asias security.Indias recent decision to withdraw from Vietnam had pureeconomic reasons, it would still be called a strategicallymisplaced decision. India could very well use its presenceon Vietnams coast as a counter to Chinese presence inPakistan occupied Kashmir.

HiDDen AGenDA

Rahul Mishra

Sana Hashmi

writer is a researcher

stitute for Defence

s and Analyses (IDSA),

elhi, India.

riter is associated with

for Air Power Studies

er area of interest is

and its neighbourhood.



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HiDDen AGenDA



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CHANGE OF GUARD: THE INDIAN ARMY

VisiOn Or suPreMAcy

The Change of Guard has taken place at the Army HQ.The task of the new Army Chief is well cut out for him.He will need to calm down frayed nerves and tempers in thehigher military echelons and try his bit to restore synergybetween the civil military interface. The bureaucracy willhave to shed its adversarial outlook and stop arrogating toitself the job of civilian control. In a democracy these controlsare vested in the political authority and cannot be entirelyusurped by the bureaucrats. Genuine integration of theService HQs with the MoD will go a long way to redress thissystemic problem. The New Chief must make the speedingup of the Arms acquisition process his key result area andprimary focus. Moral Health of the upper echelons is also aconcern that will also need the urgent attention of the newChief.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi

SM, VSM (retd)

writer is a combat

n of many skirmishes

e Line of Control and

er-terrorist operations

mmu and Kashmir and

b. He subsequently

anded the reputed

o Force during intensive

er-terrorist operations in

ajouri-Poonch districts.s served two tenures

e highly prestigious

orateGeneral of Militaryions. He is a prolic

on matters military

non-military and has

hed 24 books and

100 papers in many

gious research journals.

also Executive Editor of

ce and Security Alert

magazine.



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VisiOn Or suPreMAcy



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The writer presents a European perspective on the recentConference on Afghanistan and is pessimistic about theoutcome. Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to amodied version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summitin 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead securityrole in three-quarters of the country before the end of this yearand the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. Thesummit, she says only highlighted the weakness of NATO asan alliance - especially its failure to get the logistical routes viaPakistan, reopened.

Indian Army:New COAS has his Work Cut Out

Urgent action needed to restore moral health

and make up critical defciencies

General Bikram Singh has taken over the reins of theIndian army at a time when it is passing through a roughpatch in its history. The higher leadership of the army hasbeen facing criticism for putting self before service. Adispassionate SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities,threats) analysis reveals that up to the level of combat unitsthe army continues to remain a force to reckon with. However,a number of ofcers comprising the armys leadership ranksfrom Brigadier onwards appear to have lost their moralcompass. The new COAS also has to simultaneously takestock of the armys preparedness for war and internal securitychallenges. The previous army chief, General V K Singhsleaked letter to the Prime Minister and the CAGs recentreport have revealed that the state of defence preparedness isa cause for serious concern. Stocks of several critical varietiesof ammunition for tanks and artillery guns have fallen toas low as less than 10 days war reserves. Also, ammunitionhas a shelf life of about 12 to 15 years, at the end of whichit is no longer usable for combat but can still be used fortraining. Hence, the shortages continue to increase every year.Consequent to the leakage of the chiefs letter and the majoruproar in Parliament that resulted, the Defence Minister isreported to have approved the 12th Defence Plan 2012-17 andthe LTIPP 2012-27 in early-April 2012. The new COAS has hiswork cut out for him. The government will do well to appointa National Security Commission to take stock of the lack ofpreparedness of the countrys armed forces.

g Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

mechanised forces in the

are still partly night blind,

ability to launch offensive

ons in the mountains

ues to remain inadequate

r conict. The capability

unch precision strikes

round and air-delivered

wer, which will pave the

r the infantry to win future

is much short of the

es that will be required.

oD must immediately ask

itional funds to kick-start

mys stalled modernisation

s

writer is a Delhi-based

ce analyst.

AGenDA AnD PriOrities



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NATO SUMMIT- 2012

Road Ahead

The writer presents a European perspective on the recentConference on Afghanistan and is pessimistic about theoutcome. Mr Obama and the other 27 NATO leaders agreed to amodied version of the plan coming out of the Lisbon summitin 2010. The aim is for Afghan forces to take the lead securityrole in three-quarters of the country before the end of this yearand the other, most congested areas by the middle of 2013. Thesummit, she says only highlighted the weakness of NATO asan alliance - especially its failure to get the logistical routes viaPakistan, reopened.

Dominika Cosic

The writer is a journalist

and political correspondent

based in Brussels. She

specialises in NATO and

European Union affairs. She

is correspondent (Europe) of

Defence and Security Alert

(DSA) magazine.

eurOPeAn PersPectiVeAGenDA AnD PriOrities



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eurOPeAn PersPectiVe

78 July 2012 Deence AnD security Alert


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Documents

DSA Alert July-2012