DORF KETAL SPECIALITY CATALYSIS P LTD. …environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/FormB/EC/Risk...DORF-RA-2016 HELPS 2 The Risk Assessment is prepared on the basis of information

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The Risk Assessment is prepared on the basis of information and details provided

by M/s. Dorf Ketal Speciality Catalysis (P) Ltd, Plot No. Z/108, Dahej, Dist. Bharuch

to HELPS during their course of the study. The assessment has been formulated by

team of qualified, experienced and competent persons.

The industrial emergency / disaster resulting from the accidental release of huge

quantity of volatile substances having toxic, flammable or explosive chemical

properties are not new to the chemical units. Therefore, the process of the chemical

industries have been continuously updating and developing its design and operating

techniques to overcome such problems. Further, a technique known as “Risk

Assessment” has been developed to assess the risk associated in the handling the

plants, storage areas and its consequences on human environment etc, if involves

either due to fire, explosion or toxic gas release.

For HELPS

Date : 25.08.2016

Vadodara

(J. J. VAGHELA) B.E.(Mech), LL.B., Sr. Factory Inspector (Retrd.), Industrial Safety & Health Professional, Expert & adviser

(MAYOOR J. VAGHELA) B.E., DIS, PGDIEM, MISNT, FIV Competent Person, Chartered Engineer, Industrial Safety Consultant, Valuer.

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INDEX

CHAPTER SUBJECT PAGE NO.

Preface --- 2

Index --- 3-4

DESCRIPTION SECTION:

1 Objective --- 6

2 Profile of Plant --- 10

3 Hazard Identification --- 14

4 Consequences Modelling --- 28

5 Risk Level --- 61

6 Suggestion and Recommendation --- 69-70

ANNEXURE SECTION:

Annexure 1 to 4 --- 71-79

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ANNEXURE INDEXANNEXURE INDEXANNEXURE INDEXANNEXURE INDEX

Annexure Annexure Annexure Annexure No.No.No.No.

SubjectSubjectSubjectSubject Page Page Page Page No.No.No.No.

1 Location Plan 72

2 Layout Plan 73

3 Storage of Hazardous Chemicals 74-75

4 Salient Properties Of Certain Hazardous Chemicals

76-79

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1.11.11.11.1 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

Chemical Process industr ies have undergone tremendous changes

dur ing the last f ive decades. Process Condit ions such as Pressure &

Temperature have become severe, concentrat ion of stored energy has

increased. P lants have grown in s ize and are often s ing le st ream. The

Scale of possible F i re, Explosion, Tox ic Release, Body Injur ies, and

Occupat ional Diseases has grown considerably. These Factors have

great ly increased the r isk for major industr ia l disasters, involv ing loss of

human l ives, plant & property and environmental degradat ion.

1.21.21.21.2 OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES OBJECTIVES

The overal l object ives considered for R isk Assessment study are as

fol lows:

�� To ident ify var ious hazards in the storage and associated area of

the unit .

�� Assessing the var ious r isks involved

�� To consider the consequentia l impact on nearby areas,

populat ion, etc. in case of any accidental emergency s ituat ion

aris ing f rom the factory premises.

�� To evaluate and quanti fy the avai lable measures and resources

for contain ing any eventual i ty .

�� To study and suggest safety and control measure.

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1.31.31.31.3 METHODOLOGYMETHODOLOGYMETHODOLOGYMETHODOLOGY

The R isk Assessment as presented in the report is prepared based on

the Maximum Credible Accident Scenario (MCA) for cr it ical areas

where potent ia l of r isks are h igher. The var ious models are used to

quanti fy ing the loss of containment scenar io by est imat ing discharge

rate, the total quanti ty released, durat ion, extent of f lash and

evaporat ion etc. Methodology of QRA at a g lance given below ;

Sequence of R isk Assessment is g iven below

1. Gather required informat ion and documents

2. L ist out hazardous inventor ies and storage tank/ vessels detai ls

3. Def ine the fa i lure scenar ios and ident ify probable hazards

associated with them

4. Def ine parameters for each of the chemicals and each of hazards.

Identify

Hazards

/Risks

Analyse

Risks

Consequence

Analysis

Evaluate

and

Rank Risks

Control

Measures

(Manage

Risk)

Information

Collection

RISK

ASSESSMENT

PROCESS

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5. Def ine release type (cont inuous/ instantaneous) and determine

release rates.

6. Simulate selected cases for consequence of fa i lure scenar ios.

7. Summarize the consequences.

8. Superimpose vulnerable zones on the plot plan.

9. Appraise the extent of damage to plant and personnel .

10. Recommendat ion addit ional control measures/ remedial measured

required

1.41.41.41.4 Study are under this qraStudy are under this qraStudy are under this qraStudy are under this qra

This Quanti tat ive R isk Assessment is carr ied out for proposed storage

of C lass A chemicals which includes EO, Acetone, Toluene, Methanol

and Methy l Ethy l Ketone at the premise.

1.51.51.51.5 Software used Software used Software used Software used

Phast L ite software vers ion 7.1 from DNV GL is used for Consequence

Analys is during th is R isk Assessment.

Phast is the world's most comprehensive process industry hazard

analys is software tool for a l l stages of design and operat ion. Phast

examines the progress of a potent ia l incident f rom the in it ia l release to

far-f ie ld dispers ion including model l ing of pool spreading and

evaporat ion, and f lammable and tox ic effects.

Phast L ite is a user-f r iendly and powerful software tool with extensive

model l ing capabi l i t ies for hazard analys is , examining the progress of a

potent ia l incident f rom the ini t ia l re lease to far-f ie ld dispers ion. At its

core l ies the extensively val idated and ver i f ied UDM (Unif ied

Dispers ion Model) that enables r igorous model l ing of var ious release

types (jet , heavy and passive gas).

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1.61.61.61.6 ReferencesReferencesReferencesReferences

Some of the references which were used for QRA are i l lustrated as

under;

1. The Factor ies Act 1948 (1987) and Gujarat Factor ies Rules – 1963

(2004)

2. Manufacture, Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules

1989 (2000)

3. Environmental (Protect ion) Act – 1986 (2004)

4. World Bank Technical papers “Techniques for assess ing Industr ia l

Hazards – A Manual” .

5. Methods for calculat ion of Physical effects (Yel low Book) by TNO

6. The Guidel ines for Chemical Process Quanti tat ive R isk Analys is,

Second Edit ion by CCPS

7. DNV Phast Software Manual

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2.12.12.12.1 INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

Dorf Ketal, a special ty chemicals manufacturer and serv ices provider

with a global presence, offers i ts customers innovative chemical

solut ions and quick, decis ive response to solve the most dif f icult

problems. The company has two divis ions: Dorf Ketal Chemicals and

Dorf Ketal Specia l i ty Catalysts.

Dorf Ketal Chemicals is the leader in new chemistr ies for process

chemical solut ions in the crude oi l ref in ing and petrochemical

industr ies. Chemicals a lso serves the g lobal fuel addit ives market with

a broad portfol io of products and services and the grease and

lubr icant market with component addit ives.

Dorf Ketal Special i ty Catalysts is the market leader in organic t itanate

and zirconate technologies. I ts Tyzor® catalysts and crossl inkers

del iver value across a broad range of markets and appl icat ions.

Uni l ink™ and Clear l ink™ aromat ic and al iphat ic chain extenders serve

the g lobal polyurethane and Polyurea markets.

Dorf Ketal chemical experts, manufacturing plants and warehouses are

found in key industr ia l centers in the U.S. , India, China, Brazi l ,

Argent ina, Netherlands, U.A.E. , Bahrain, S ingapore and Malaysia. Our

global presence al lows us to serv ice cl ients in a l l major markets with

local expert ise and g lobal perspect ive.

Holding more than 300 patents, including 50 U.S. patents, Dorf Ketal

develops new chemistr ies that solve our customer’s most dif f icult

technical problems, add value and deliver rel iable results.

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2.22.22.22.2 Location of the unit Location of the unit Location of the unit Location of the unit

The Unit is located at Plot No.Z/108, Dahej, D ist. Bharuch.

The surroundings of the unit are descr ibed as below;

♦ North Side : Main Entry of the Unit and 30 Mtr

Wide Road

♦ South Side : 35 Mtr Power Corridor

♦ East Side : Plot No. Z/107

♦ West Side : Other unit

The locat ion plan is given at Annexure-1.

2.32.32.32.3 layoutlayoutlayoutlayout

The land occupied by Unit is i rregular shape, hav ing area of about

86565 Sq. mtr. The Unit wi l l have fol lowing Sheds/ Bui ldings / Sect ions

at its premises;

(1) Plant -1 Phase- 1

(2) Plant -2 Phase-2

(3) RMU

(4) Reveiv ing Water Tank

(5) WB Cabin

(6) Admin. Bui lding

(7) Amenties QC & OHC

(8) Ware House Phase 1 & 2

(9) CCOE Tankfarm (TF-3) Phase -1

(10) RM Tankfarm (TF-1) Phase -1

(11) Product Tankfarm (TF-2) Phase -1

(12) Product Tankfarm (TF-7) Phase -2

(13) EO Tankfarm (TF-4) Phase -2

(14) Intermediate Tankfam Phase -2

(15) Hydrogen Trol ley Parking Phase-1

(16) Uti l i ty , Substat ion & MCC Room Phase1 & 2

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(17) Breaker Room

(18) Transformer Yard

(19) Cool ing Tower Phase – 1 & 2

(20) Workshop

(21) Store

(22) Boi ler + TFH

(23) Coal Yard

(24) Scrap Yard

(25) Fi re Water Tank

(26) ETP

(27) Contractor Shed

(28) RM Tankfarm (TF-5) Phase-2

(29) Secur ity Cabin-1

(30) Secur ity Cabin-2, etc.

The Layout P lan of the Unit is g iven at Annexure- 2.

2.42.42.42.4 STORAGE STORAGE STORAGE STORAGE detailsdetailsdetailsdetails

The Company wi l l storage var ious chemicals as per their requirement,

proposed storage detai ls are given in Annexure -3.

2.52.52.52.5 Safety MeasuresSafety MeasuresSafety MeasuresSafety Measures will be will be will be will be PROVIDEDPROVIDEDPROVIDEDPROVIDED totototo EO EO EO EO TankTankTankTank

1. Safety Valves (2 Nos.)

2. Double Earth ing to tanks

3. Pressure Gauge

4. Temperature Gauge

5. EO stored under Nit rogen B lanket ing

6. Coi l for cool ing water circulat ion

7. Isolat ion Valves

8. Vent pipel ine with Scurbber

9. Explosion Resistance wall (RCC) toward plant s ide

10. L ightening Arrestor

11. Earth ing & bonding for pipel ine

12. Water Spr inkler on Tanks

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13. Provis ion of F i re Hydrant & Water Monitor

14. Fi re Ext inguishers

15. Dyke Wal l around the tank

16. Flame arrestor on valve vent ing

17. Isolated locat ion of Tank Farm with wire fencing.

18. Emergency instruct ion wi l l be displayed

19. Wind Indicator and s i ren wi l l be provided.

20. Smoking wi l l be str ict ly prohibited

21. Only author ised persons wi l l be al low to enter ins ide the area

2.62.62.62.6 Safety Measures will be PROVIDED to Safety Measures will be PROVIDED to Safety Measures will be PROVIDED to Safety Measures will be PROVIDED to

flammable chemicals storage tanksflammable chemicals storage tanksflammable chemicals storage tanksflammable chemicals storage tanks

1. Double Earth ing to tanks

2. Dyke Wal l around the tank

3. Isolat ion Valves

4. L ightening Arrestor

5. Earth ing & bonding for pipel ine

6. Provis ion of F i re Hydrant & Water Monitor

7. Fi re Ext inguishers

8. Flame arrestor

9. Isolated locat ion of Tank Farm with wire fencing.

10. Emergency instruct ion wi l l be displayed

11. Wind Indicator and s i ren wi l l be provided.

12. Smoking wi l l be str ict ly prohibited

13. Only author ised persons wi l l be al low to enter ins ide the area

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3.13.13.13.1 INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

A hazard is an inherent physical or chemical character ist ic that has the

potent ia l for causing harm. A hazard Ident i f icat ion study is an

organized effort to ident ify and analyze the signif icance of hazardous

si tuat ions associated with a process or act iv i ty. Specif ical ly , Hazard

Ident if icat ion studies are used to pinpoint weaknesses in the design

and operat ion of faci l i t ies that could lead to accidental chemical

releases, f i res, or explosions. These studies provide organizat ions with

informat ion to help them to improve the safety and manage the r isk of

their operat ions.

Hazard Identi f icat ion studies usual ly focus on storages, process safety

issues, l ike the acute effects of unplanned chemical re leases on plant

personnel or the publ ic. These studies complement more tradit ional

industr ial health and safety act iv it ies, such as protect ion against s l ips

or fa l ls, use of personal protect ive equipment, monitor ing for

employee exposure to industr ia l chemicals, etc. Although Hazard

Ident if icat ion studies typical ly use qual itat ive methods to analyze

potent ia l equipment fa i lures and human errors that can lead to

accidents, the studies can also highl ight gaps in the management

systems of an organizat ion's process safety program.

3.23.23.23.2 TECHNIQUES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONTECHNIQUES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONTECHNIQUES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONTECHNIQUES OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Dif ferent techniques are adopted for Hazard Ident i f icat ion based on

hazardous substances, quant ity, type of process, gravi ty of hazards

etc.

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The var ious techniques can be i l lust rated as below;

1. Personal Vis its & Inspect ion of P lant by Team members

2. Safety Audits

3. On - S ite Emergency Plan

4. Check l ists

5. Feed back f rom plant personnel

6. Accident records

7. Safety Reports

8. Safety Manuals

9. Hazard & Operabil i ty Study (HAZOP)

10. Fault Tree Analys is (FTA)

11. Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

12. Prel iminary hazard Analys is (PHA)

13. Fai lure Modes and Ef fects Analys is (FMEA), etc.

3.33.33.33.3 Present Present Present Present RISK RISK RISK RISK Assessment of the Unit Assessment of the Unit Assessment of the Unit Assessment of the Unit

Dorf Ketal Specia l i ty Catalys is (P) Ltd is stor ing and handl ing EO,

Acetone, Toluene, Methanol and Methyl Ethyl Ketone, which is hav ing

Fi re, Explosion & Toxic hazard. Present R isk Assessment is carr ied out

for consider ing the storage & handling of EO, Acetone, Toluene,

Methanol and Methy l Ethy l Ketone.

3.43.43.43.4 Development of various scenariosDevelopment of various scenariosDevelopment of various scenariosDevelopment of various scenarios

The chart on next page is showing al l potentia l incident outcomes from

the release ( loss of containment) of a hazardous chemical. Further, the

propert ies of chemical, condit ions of release etc. a l l inf luence, which

of the logical paths shown in the chart. Though, i t is not detai led

enough to cover a l l possible permutat ions of phenomena that can

immediately result f rom a hazardous materia ls release.

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Chart showing development of various scenarios

Incident

Release

No Release No Impact

Tanker Explosion or

BLEVE or Fire

Gas Liquid and/or liquefied Gas

Liquid Flashers to vapour

Gas Vents

Pool Slowly Evaporates

Pool Fire Occurs

Vapour Cloud Travels Downwind

(if not ignited)

Vapour Plume Travels

Downwind Liquid

Rainout

Flame Jet Forms

(if ignited)

No Ignition – Toxic Vapour

Exposure

Plume Ignites, Explosion and/or Flash Fire Occurs

Pool Fire Occurs

No Ignition Toxic Vapour

Exposure

Vapour Cloud Ignites – Flash

Fire Occurs

Vapour Cloud Ignites –

Explosion

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3.53.53.53.5 Type of HType of HType of HType of Hazards azards azards azards

3.5.1 Pool Evaporation

The released f lammable materia l which is a l iquid stored below

its normal boi l ing point, wil l col lect in a pool. The geometry

of the pool wi l l be dictated by the surroundings. I f the

l iquid is stored under pressure above i ts normal boi l ing

point, then a f ract ion of the l iquid wi l l f lash into vapor

and the remaining port ion wi l l form a pool in the vicin i ty of

the release point. Once susta ined combustion is achieved,

l iquid f ires quick ly reach steady state burning. The heat

release rate is a function of the l iquid surface area exposed to

air. An unconf ined spi l l wi l l tend to have thin fuel depth

(typical ly less than 5 mm) which wi l l result in slower

burning rates. A conf ined spil l is l imited by the boundaries

(e.g. a dyked area) and the depth of the result ing pool is

greater than that for an unconf ined spi l l .

Vaporization scenarios

Vaporizat ion can occur when there is a leak in any of

the fol lowing S ituat ions:

• A l iquid at atmospheric temperature and pressure.

• A l iquid under pressure and above normal boi l ing point.

• The rates of vapourisat ion of the l iquid are different for

each of the two cases. In the case

• The l iquid after spi l lage is approximately at equi l ibr ium

and evaporates relat iv ity s lowly.

• In the case, the l iquid f lashes off when released, and the

l iquid remaining then undergoes s low evaporat ion.

Evaporat ion of a l iquid at atmospheric

temperature and pressure.

Evaporat ion f rom a pool of l iquid is essentia l ly a mass transfer

process that depends on the vapour pressure of the l iquid,

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wind velocity across the surface of the pool and ambient

weather condit ion.

A spi l lage of this k ind const i tutes a steady cont inuous

source of vapour. Unless the rate of evaporat ion due to

the combinat ion of vapour pressure and wind velocity is

high enough, i t is usual ly assumed that the heat t ransfer

from the a ir and the ground is suf f ic ient to provide the

latent heat of vapourisat ion.

Evaporat ion of a l iquid under pressure and above normal

boi l ing point When a pressur ized l iquid is re leased f rom

containment, a port ion f lashes off. This heat is obtained by

cooling the remain ing l iquid to i ts boi l ing point thus reaching

a state of equi l ibr ium f rom the high in equi l ibr ium

prevalent immediately on loss of containment. In practice, it

frequently happens that there is a s ignif icant amount of

spray format ion caused by the sudden release of

pressure and the v iolent boi l ing of l iquid. This spray

vaporizes rapidly by taking heat for vaporizat ion f rom air.

This spray l iquid format ion is assumed to equal to the gas

fract ion generated by f lash. The proport ion of l iquid ai rborne

is thus considerably high. Fol lowing f lashing, the res idual l iquid

is at i ts boil ing point. Vaporizat ion then cont inuous by

gain ing heat f rom surrounding as an essent ia l ly heat or

mass transfer l imited process.

This secondary stage of rate l imited vaporizat ion is usual ly

relat ively less important compared with the f lash off,

part icular ly with respect to format ion of f lammable gas clouds.

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3.5.2 Vapour Cloud dispersion

Following a cont inuous leak and formation of gas cloud, if

c loud does not ignite i t undergoes atmospheric dispersion in

accordance with the prevalent wind direction, speed, and

stabil i ty category. The object ive of carry ing out analys is of

cloud dispers ion is two fold. F i rst , i t provides the distance

(f rom the leak) at which the concentrat ion of f lammable

mater ia l fa l ls below the lower f lammabi l i ty l imit (LEL). Second

it provides the concentrat ion of the toxic substance to which

people may be exposed for short t ime, at vary ing distance

(f rom the leak).

3.5.3 JET FIRE

A Jet F ire, a lso referred to as a f lame jet, occurs when a

f lammable chemical is rapidly released from an opening in a

container and immediately catches on f i re—much l ike the f lame

from a blowtorch. A two-phase Jet F ire occurs when a gas that

has been l iquef ied under pressure is released. Because the

l iquid evaporates as it escapes, the chemical is released as an

aerosol spray—that is, a mixture of gas and t iny l iquid

droplets. Software assumes the Jet F ire release is or iented

vert ical ly , a lthough the wind can t i l t the f lames in the

downwind direct ion. Thermal radiat ion is the pr imary hazard

associated with a Jet F i re. Other potent ia l Jet F i re hazards

include smoke, tox ic by products f rom the f i re, and secondary

f i res and explosions in the surrounding area.

3.5.4 Pool fire

A pool f i re occurs when a f lammable l iquid forms a puddle on

the ground and catches on f ire. Thermal radiat ion is the

pr imary hazard associated with a pool f i re. Other potent ia l

pool f ire hazards include smoke, toxic by products f rom the

f i re, and secondary f i res and explosions in the surrounding

area. In some cases, heat f rom the pool f i re may weaken a

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leaking tank and cause i t to fa i l completely—in which case, a

BLEVE may occur. Typical ly , a BLEVE poses a greater threat than

a pool f ire. I f the chemical ins ide the tank is l ikely to BLEVE (for

example, i f the tank contains a l iquef ied gas).

3.5.5 BLEVEs

BLEVE stands for Boi l ing L iquid Expanding Vapour Explosion.

BLEVEs typical ly occur in closed storage tanks that contain a

l iquef ied gas, usual ly a gas that has been l iquef ied under

pressure. A gas can be l iquef ied by either cool ing

(refr igerat ing) it to a temperature below its boi l ing point or by

stor ing it at a h igh pressure. Both f lammable and non f lammable

l iquef ied gases may be involved in a BLEVE. Propane is an

example of a chemical that has been involved in many BLEVE

accidents. Most propane tanks at service stat ions contain

l iquid propane. These tanks are neither insulated nor

refr igerated, so the tank contents are at ambient temperature.

Since the ambient temperature is a lmost a lways signif icant ly

above propane's boi l ing point of -43.7 ºF, the tanks are h ighly

pressurized.

A common BLEVE scenar io happens when a container of

l iquef ied gas is heated by f i re, increasing the pressure with in

the container unt i l the tank ruptures and fai ls. When the

container fa i ls, the chemical is re leased in an explosion. I f the

chemical is above i ts boil ing point when the container fai ls ,

some or a l l of the l iquid wil l f lash-boi l—that is, instantaneously

become a gas. I f the chemical is f lammable, a burning gas

cloud cal led a f i rebal l may occur i f a s ignif icant amount of the

chemical f lash-boi ls. Software assumes that any l iquid not

consumed in the f i rebal l wi l l form a pool f i re. Software

est imates the thermal radiat ion hazard f rom a f i rebal l and/or a

pool f ire. Other potentia l BLEVE hazards include overpressure,

hazardous f ragments, smoke, and tox ic by products f rom the

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f i re. Software focuses on the thermal radiat ion because in

most BLEVEs thermal radiat ion impacts a greater area than the

overpressure and is the more s igni f icant threat.

3.5.6 Fireball

When you model a BLEVE, software assumes that a f i rebal l wi l l

form. The f i rebal l is made up of both the chemical that f lash-

boi ls when the tank fa i ls and the chemical that sprays out as an

aerosol dur ing the explosion. Software est imates that the

amount of chemical in the f i rebal l is three t imes the amount of

chemical that f lash boi ls. Any l iquid that does not part ic ipate

in the f i rebal l wi l l form a pool f i re. When you choose to

model a BLEVE s ituat ion, the program est imates the thermal

radiat ion f rom both f i res; it is not necessary to run an

addit ional Pool F i re scenar io. The pr imary hazard associated

with a f i rebal l is thermal radiat ion. However, i f there are other

chemicals near the f i rebal l , i t can t r igger addit ional f i res and

explosions. Explosion and hazardous f ragments. In a BLEVE, a

high-pressure explosion typical ly causes the container to

fragment. As the container breaks apart, i t may st r ike objects in

the surrounding area and create addit ional debris. The

container fragments and other debris—hazardous f ragments—

are swept up in the explosion and rapidly propel led by the

explosion over a wide area.. I f a BLEVE is l ikely to occur, f i rst

responders must take the necessary precaut ions to protect

themselves and others f rom the overpressure and hazardous

fragments.

3.5.7 Flash fires (flammable area)

When a f lammable vapour cloud encounters an ignit ion source,

the cloud can catch f i re and burn rapidly in what is cal led a

f lash f ire. Potent ial hazards associated with a f lash f i re include

thermal radiat ion, smoke, and tox ic by products f rom the f ire.

The f lammable area of the vapour cloud—that is, the area

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where a f lash f ire could occur at some t ime after the release.

The f lammable area is bounded by the Lower Explosive L imit

(LEL) and the Upper Explosive L imit (UEL). These l imits are

percentages that represent the concentrat ion of the fuel—that

is, the chemical—vapour in the air. I f the chemical vapour

comes into contact with an ignit ion source, it wi l l burn only if

i ts fuel-a ir concentrat ion is between the LEL and the UEL,

because that port ion of the cloud is al ready pre-mixed to the

r ight mixture of fuel and air for burning to occur. I f the fuel-a i r

concentrat ion is below the LEL, there is not enough fuel in the

air to susta in a f i re or an explosion—it is too lean. I f the fuel-

a ir concentrat ion is above the UEL, there is not enough oxygen

to susta in a f i re or an explosion because there is too much

fuel—it is too rich. (This is s imi lar to an engine that cannot start

because i t has been f looded with gasol ine.) I f a f lash f i re

occurs, the part of the cloud where the fuel-a i r concentrat ion

is above the UEL may cont inue to slowly burn as ai r mixes with

the cloud. You might expect that the LEL could be used as the

LOC to determine the areas in which a f i re might occur.

However, the concentrat ion levels est imated are t ime-

averaged concentrat ions. In an actual vapour cloud, there wi l l

be areas where the concentrat ion is h igher than the average

and areas where the concentrat ion is lower than the average.

This is cal led concentrat ion patchiness. Because of

concentrat ion patchiness, there wi l l be areas, cal led pockets,

where the chemical is in the f lammable range even though the

average concentrat ion has fa l len below the LEL. Some

experiments have shown that f lame pockets can occur in

places where the average concentrat ion is above 60% of the

LEL.

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23

3.5.8 Vapour cloud explosions

When a f lammable chemical is re leased into the atmosphere, it

forms a vapour cloud that wi l l disperse as i t t ravels downwind.

I f the cloud encounters an ignit ion source, the parts of the

cloud where the concentrat ion is with in the f lammable range

(between the LEL and UEL) wi l l burn. The speed at which the

f lame front moves through the cloud determines whether i t is a

def lagrat ion or a detonat ion. In some s ituat ions, the cloud wi l l

burn so fast that it creates an explosive force (blast wave). The

sever ity of a vapour cloud explosion depends on the

chemical, the cloud size at the t ime of ignit ion, the type of

ignit ion, and the congest ion level ins ide the cloud. The pr imary

hazards are overpressure and hazardous f ragments. Some

people may prefer to use the terms Lower F lammable L imit

(LFL) and Upper F lammable L imit (UFL), part icular ly i f they are

only concerned with f i res.

3.5.9 Overpressure

A major hazard associated with any explosion is overpressure.

Overpressure, a lso cal led a blast wave, refers to the sudden

onset of a pressure wave after an explosion. This pressure

wave is caused by the energy released in the in i t ia l

explosion—the bigger the ini t ia l explosion, the more damaging

the pressure wave. Pressure waves are near ly instantaneous,

travel l ing at the speed of sound. Although a pressure wave

may sound less dangerous than a f ire or hazardous f ragments,

it can be just as damaging and just as deadly. The pressure

wave radiates outward l ike a g iant burst of a ir , crashing into

anything in its path (generat ing hazardous fragments). I f the

pressure wave has enough power behind it , i t can l i f t people

off the ground and throw them up against nearby bui ldings or

trees. Addit ional ly , blast waves can damage bui ldings or even

knock them f lat—often injuring or k i l l ing the people ins ide

them. The sudden change in pressure can also affect pressure-

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

24

sensit ive organs l ike the ears and lungs. The damaging effects

of the overpressure wi l l be greatest near the source of the

explosion and lessen as you move farther from the source.

3.63.63.63.6 Thermal Radiation Levels Thermal Radiation Levels Thermal Radiation Levels Thermal Radiation Levels

A Thermal Radiat ion Level is a threshold level of thermal radiat ion,

usual ly the level above which a hazard may ex ist.

The thermal radiat ion effects that people experience depend upon the

length of t ime they are exposed to a specif ic thermal radiat ion level.

Longer exposure durat ions, even at a lower thermal radiat ion level, can

produce serious physiological effects.

Thermal damage

The ef fect of thermal radiat ion on people is main ly a function

of intensity of radiat ion and exposure t ime. The ef fect is

expressed in terms of the probabi l i ty of death and different

degrees of burn. The fol lowing tables g ive the effect of var ious

levels of heat f lux.

DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY

Radiation intensity

(kW/m2) Observed effect

1.2 Solar heat at noon

1.6 Minimum level of pain threshold

2.0 PVC insulated cables damaged

4.0

Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to

reach cover within 20 Seconds.

however blistering of the skin (second degree

burns) is likely; 0% lethality

6.4 Pain threshold reached after 8 Seconds

Second degree burns after 20 Seconds

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DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY

Continue..

Radiation intensity

(kW/m2) Observed effect

12.5

Minimum energy to ignite wood with a

flame; Melts plastic tubing.

1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns in

10 Seconds

16.0 Severe burns after 5 Seconds

25.0

Minimum energy to ignite wood at

identifying long exposure without a flame.

100% lethality in 1 minute.

Significant injury in 10 Seconds

37.5

Sufficient to cause damage to process

equipment, Severe damage to plant

100% lethality in 1 minute.

50% lethality in 20 Seconds

1% lethality in 10 Seconds.

3.73.73.73.7 OVERPRESSURE Levels OVERPRESSURE Levels OVERPRESSURE Levels OVERPRESSURE Levels

The most basic def ini t ion of an explosion is a sudden, intense release

of energy that often produces a loud noise, h igh temperatures, and

f ly ing debris, and generates a pressure wave. There are many types of

explosions and the causes and effects wi l l vary. Intent ional explosions

wi l l general ly—but not always—result in greater hazard damage.

Consider three pr imary hazards when deal ing with an explosion:

thermal radiat ion, overpressure, and hazardous f ragments (f ly ing

debris). Al l three of these hazards are not present in every explosion

and the sever ity of the hazard wi l l depend on the explosion. These

hazards typical ly last only for a br ief per iod direct ly fol lowing the

explosion. However, it is important to consider the potent ia l for

secondary explosions and f i res to occur before deciding that these

hazards no longer ex ist .

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26

Large objects ( l ike t rees and buildings) in the path of the pressure

wave can af fect its st rength and direct ion of travel. For example, i f

many bui ldings surround the explosion s ite, expect the actual

overpressure threat zone to be somewhat smal ler. But at the same

t ime, more hazardous f ragments could be generated as the blast

causes st ructural damage to those bui ldings. An Overpressure Level is

a threshold level of pressure f rom a blast wave, usual ly the pressure

above which a hazard may ex ist.

The overpressure values to the st ructural and physiological ef fects

produced and taken from Clancey, VJ, Diagnost ic Features of Explosion

Damage, 6th Internat ional Meet ing on Forensic Sciences, Edinburgh,

Scot land, 1972.

Explosion Overpressure Damage estimates

Pressure (psig)

Level of Damage

0.02 Annoying noise (137 dB), if of low frequency (10-15 Hz)

0.03 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain

0.04 Loud noise (143 dB). Sonic boom glass failure

0.1 Breakage of small windows under strain

0.15 Typical pressure for glass breakage

0.3 “Safe distance” (probability 0.95 no serious damage beyond this value) Missile limit Some damage to house ceilings; 10% window glass broken

0.4 Limited minor structural damage

0.5 - 1.0 Large and small windows usually shattered

0.7 Minor damage to house structures

1.0 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable

1 - 2 Corrugated asbestos shattered Corrugated steel or aluminium panels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling Wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in

1.3 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted

2 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses

2 - 3 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shattered

2.3 Lower limit of serious structural damage

2.5 50% destruction of brickwork of houses

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Explosion Overpressure Damage estimates

Continue..

Pressure (psig)

Level of Damage

3 Heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building suffered little damage Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from foundations

3 - 4 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished Rupture of oil storage tanks

4 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured

5 Wooden utility poles snapped Tall hydraulic press (40,000 lb) in building slightly damaged

5 - 7 Nearly complete destruction of houses

7 Loaded train wagons overturned

7 - 8 Brick panels 8-12" thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing/flexure

9 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished

10 Probable total destruction of buildings Heavy machines tools (7000 lb) moved and badly damaged Very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survived

300 Limit of crater lip

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4.14.14.14.1 CONSEQUENCE MODELLINGCONSEQUENCE MODELLINGCONSEQUENCE MODELLINGCONSEQUENCE MODELLING

Consequence analys is and calculat ions are performed by computer

software us ing various models val idated over a number of appl icat ions.

Consequence model l ing is carr ied out in Phast L i te.

4.24.24.24.2 WORST CASE & WORST CASE & WORST CASE & WORST CASE & MAXIMUM CREDIBLE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE SCENARIOSCENARIOSCENARIOSCENARIO

Fol lowing scenario are considered for th is QRA study ;

1. Catastrophic fa i lure of EO, Acetone, Methanol and MEK Tank

2. Leak from EO, Acetone, Methanol and MEK Tank

Radiat ion Heat, Over pressure Level and Gas concentrat ion due to

above scenarios are calculated and summary of the same is tabulated

in next page ;

29 HELPS

4.34.34.34.3 SummarySummarySummarySummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

a) Thermal Radiation Distance

Thermal Radiation effect Distance in meter at

Thermal Radiation Intensity Sr. No. For

Scenario plotting on map look at

Failure Case Consequence Chemical Weather Condition

4 (Kw/m2)

12.5 (Kw/m2)

37.5 (Kw/m2)

Category 1.5/F 210.32 130.54 74.54

Category 1.5/D 208.55 129.13 73.36 1 4.4.1 Catastrophic Rupture Late Pool Fire EO

Category 5/D 216.64 142.02 95.52

Category 1.5/F 72.67 59.39 48.94

Category 1.5/D 73.00 59.66 49.16 2 4.4.4 Leak from EO Tank Jet Fire EO

Category 5/D 64.83 51.06 42.05

Category 1.5/F 50.26 34.28 20.50

Category 1.5/D 50.37 34.42 20.66 3 4.4.5 Leak from EO Tank Early Pool Fire EO

Category 5/D 51.79 37.74 23.40

Category 1.5/F 133.31 85.38 49.99

Category 1.5/D 130.45 83.68 49.05 4 4.4.6 Leak from EO Tank Late Pool Fire EO

Category 5/D 123.88 83.87 56.97

30 HELPS

4.34.34.34.3 S S S Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS






4 (Kw/m2)

12.5 (Kw/m2)

37.5 (Kw/m2)

Category 1.5/F 211.07 130.97 75.04

Category 1.5/D 210.28 130.47 74.74 5 4.4.9 Catastrophic

Rupture of Acetone Tank

Late Pool Fire Acetone

Category 5/D 213.10 138.09 91.59

Category 1.5/F 25.09 15.06 5.87

Category 1.5/D 25.09 15.06 5.87 6 4.4.11 Leak from Acetone Tank Early Pool Fire Acetone

Category 5/D 26.35 17.49 7.07

Category 1.5/F 93.80 57.53 29.95

Category 1.5/D 90.60 55.55 28.76 7 4.4.12 Leak from Acetone Tank Late Pool Fire Acetone

Category 5/D 87.00 56.53 34.63

31 HELPS

4.34.34.34.3 S S S Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS a) Thermal Radiation Distance





4 (Kw/m2)

12.5 (Kw/m2)

37.5 (Kw/m2)

Category 1.5/F 101.51 45.04 -

Category 1.5/D 101.44 45.00 - 8 4.4.13 Catastrophic

Rupture of Toluene Tank

Late Pool Fire Toluene

Category 5/D 123.39 47.00 -

Category 1.5/F 24.27 13.89 4.84

Category 1.5/D 24.27 13.89 4.84 9 4.4.15 Leak from Toluene Tank Early Pool Fire Toluene

Category 5/D 26.07 17.27 5.88

Category 1.5/F 60.32 23.74 -

Category 1.5/D 59.63 23.37 - 10 4.4.16 Leak from Toluene Tank Late Pool Fire Toluene

Category 5/D 72.33 25.31 -

32 HELPS

4.34.34.34.3 S S S Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ummary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS a) Thermal Radiation Distance





4 (Kw/m2)

12.5 (Kw/m2)

37.5 (Kw/m2)

Category 1.5/F 187.69 124.14 79.12

Category 1.5/D 187.27 123.88 78.93 11 4.4.17 Catastrophic Rupture of

Methanol Tank Late Pool Fire Methanol

Category 5/D 190.50 134.04 78.64

Category 1.5/F 24.20 14.51 -

Category 1.5/D 24.20 14.51 - 12 4.4.19 Leak from Methanol Tank Early Pool Fire Methanol

Category 5/D 25.20 17.26 -

Category 1.5/F 68.34 43.34 26.55

Category 1.5/D 67.28 42.65 26.12 13 4.4.20 Leak from Methanol Tank Late Pool Fire Methanol

Category 5/D 67.13 46.52 25.29

33 HELPS

4.34.34.34.3 Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (Continue…)Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (Continue…)Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (Continue…)Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (Continue…)






4 (Kw/m2)

12.5 (Kw/m2)

37.5 (Kw/m2)

Category 1.5/F 187.69 124.14 79.12


Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank

Late Pool Fire Methyl Ethyl Ketone

Category 5/D 190.50 134.04 78.64

Category 1.5/F 24.20 14.51 -

Category 1.5/D 24.20 14.51 - 15 4.4.23 Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Early Pool Fire Methyl Ethyl

Ketone

Category 5/D 25.20 17.26 -

Category 1.5/F 68.34 43.34 26.55

Category 1.5/D 67.28 42.65 26.12 16 4.4.24 Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Late Pool Fire Methyl Ethyl

Ketone

Category 5/D 67.13 46.52 25.29

34 HELPS

4.4.4.4.4444 Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS b) Overpressure Distance

Maximum Distance (m) at Overpressure Level Sr. No.

For Scenario plotting on map look at


0.02068 bar

0.1379 bar

0.2068 bar

Category 1.5/F 554.94 262.00 245.72

Category 1.5/D 556.87 250.70 236.97 17

4.4.2

Catastrophic Rupture of EO

Tank

Vapour Cloud Explosion – Late

Ignition EO

Category 5/D 543.84 190.22 177.75

Category 1.5/F 285.07 155.33 145.08

Category 1.5/D 236.39 150.136 143.32 18

4.4.8

Leak from 12.5 mm dia hole in EO

Tank


Ignition EO

Category 5/D 152.78 91.43 86.59

35 HELPS

4.44.44.44.4 Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS (Continue…)(Continue…)(Continue…)(Continue…) b) Overpressure Distance

Maximum Distance (m) at Overpressure Level Sr. No.



0.02068 bar

0.1379 bar

0.2068 bar

Category 1.5/F 292.47 159.75 150.76


Acetone Tank


Ignition Acetone

Category 5/D 164.03 87.89 83.85

Category 1.5/F 116.19 59.73 55.27


Toluene Tank


Ignition Toluene

Category 5/D 74.09 41.50 41.16

Category 1.5/F 375.29 151.98 86.18


Methanol Tank


Ignition Methanol

Category 5/D 293.53 109.71 48.65

Category 1.5/F 508.97 191.74 102.97


Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank


Ignition

Methyl Ethyl Ketone

Category 5/D 432.20 148.06 57.65

36 HELPS

4.4.4.4.5555 Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Summary OF CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS c) Gas Concentration Distance

Maximum Distance (m) at Toxic Concentration Sr.

No.



800 ppm (IDLH)

15000 ppm(LFL Fraction)

30000 ppm(LFL)

Category 1.5/F 597.21 198.26 141.58

Category 1.5/D 554.00 209.20 143.77 23

4.4.3

Catastrophic Rupture of EO

Tank

Toxic Gas Dispersion EO

Category 5/D 422.27 164.74 110.98

Category 1.5/F 491.84 115.56 84.57

Category 1.5/D 312.79 121.39 75.52 24

4.4.7

Leak from 12.5 mm dia hole in

EO Tank

Toxic Gas Dispersion EO

Category 5/D 233.28 70.38 45.78

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

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Risk Assessment For M/s. Dorf Ketal Speciality Catalysis (P) Ltd

Prepared By HELPS August 2016 Consequence Analysis Work Sheet No.

Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Catastrophic Rupture of EO Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.1 Catastrophic Rupture of EO Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Catastrophic Rupture of EO Tank Late Explosion


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Catastrophic Rupture of EO Tank Toxic Dispersion


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from EO Tank Jet Fire

4.4.4 Leak from EO Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from EO Tank Early Pool Fire


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from EO Tank Late Pool Fire


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from EO Tank Toxic Dispersion


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from EO Tank Late Explosion


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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario

Catastrophic Rupture of Acetone Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.9 Catastrophic Rupture of Acetone Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Acetone Tank Late Explosion

4.4.10 Catastrophic Rupture of Acetone Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Acetone Tank Early Pool Fire

4.4.11 Leak from Acetone Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Acetone Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.12 Leak from Acetone Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Toluene Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.13 Catastrophic Rupture of Toluene Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Toluene Tank Late Explosion

4.4.14 Catastrophic Rupture of Toluene Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Toluene Tank Early Pool Fire

4.4.15 Leak from Toluene Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Toluene Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.16 Leak from Toluene Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Methanol Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.17 Catastrophic Rupture of Methanol Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Methanol Tank Late Explosion

4.4.18 Catastrophic Rupture of Methanol Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Methanol Tank Early Poor Fire

4.4.19 Leak from Methanol Tank

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Weather Condition : 1.5/F Scenario Leak from Methanol Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.20 Leak from Methanol Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.21 Catastrophic Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank

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Catastrophic Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Late Explosion

4.4.22 Catastrophic Rupture of Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank

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Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Early Poor Fire

4.4.23 Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank

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Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank Late Pool Fire

4.4.24 Leak from Methyl Ethyl Ketone Tank

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5.15.15.15.1 PRELIMINARY THREAT IDENTIFICATIONPRELIMINARY THREAT IDENTIFICATIONPRELIMINARY THREAT IDENTIFICATIONPRELIMINARY THREAT IDENTIFICATION

Threat ident if icat ion is the stage where equipment and operat ions

that have the potent ial to do harm are ident if ied. Threats can be to

damage of equipment stor ing or processing hazardous substances or

operat ions that have the potent ia l to lead to a release of hazardous

mater ia l and possible ignit ion result ing in f i re, or explosion. In order

to calculate the effects of incidents, computer based models are

used when the l ikel ihood and consequence of incidents are

evaluated, they can be combined to produce a numerical recantat ion

of the r isk.

The level of r isk can be represented in a number of ways. Two of the

most useful ways in this context are indiv idual and societa l r isk .

5.1.1 Individual Risk :

Indiv idual r isk is the r isk of a nominated adverse effect, usual ly

fata l i ty, i f an indiv idual remained f ixed at a locat ion for a set

t ime, usual ly a year, adjacent to an industr ia l hazard. Indiv idual

r isk contours are der ived by calculat ing at a specif ic locat ion,

the impacts result ing from each fa i lure mode identi f icat ion and

summing the r isk value associated with each fa i lure mode.

Indiv idual r isk cr iteria can be presented as a diagram, known as

the “Dagger Diagram”, to faci l i tate understanding. F igure 1

given next page shows the individual r isks of fata l i ty, and some

r isks experienced in day to day l i fe.

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5.1.2 Societal Risk :

Societa l r isk cr i ter ia specify levels of societal r isk that must not

be exceeded by a part icular act iv ity. These cr iter ia ensure that

a hazardous act iv ity / faci l i ty does not impose a r isk on society

that is disproport ionate to other major hazards hav ing regard

to the benef i t the act iv ity or faci l i ty br ings. In part icular,

societal r isk cr iter ia are used to regulate the r isks of an

accident involv ing many fata l i t ies, which indiv idual r isk cr i ter ia

do not address.

Societa l r isk cr iter ia are usual ly expressed in the form of a

chart, with N, the number of fata l i t ies across the bottom and

the frequency of N or more fata l i t ies on the vert ical scale. The

cri ter ia are areas, or zones on the chart, del ineated by

downward s loping l ines.

Risk per year of Fatality

10 -3

10 -6

Unacceptable

Region

Figure – 1 : ALARP Diagram

Tolerable ALARP region

Risk is taken only if a

benefit is required

Broadly Acceptable

Region

Tolerable only if risk reduction is

impracticable of if its cost is

grossly disproportionate to the

improvement gained

Risk cannot be justified

save in extraordinary

circumstances

Tolerable if cost of reduction

would exceed the improvement

Necessary to maintain

assurance that risk remains at

this level

High Risk

Low Risk

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

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The cri ter ia l ines shown slope downwards ref lect ing how the

cri ter ia demands decreasing f requency as sever ity increases.

Refer F igure 2 below :

5.25.25.25.2 OFF OFF OFF OFF ---- SITE ACCIDENT INITIATORS SITE ACCIDENT INITIATORS SITE ACCIDENT INITIATORS SITE ACCIDENT INITIATORS

The method of measur ing the f requency of accidents caused by Off-

Site Events should be f it for purpose. In other words i t should be

proport ionate to the level of r isk. Thus, i f a s ite is located far away

from any ai rport or f l ight path (mil i tary or civ i l ), then i t is acceptable

for the safety report to refer to the background crash rate for the UK.

On the other hand, i f the s ite is located close to a busy a i rport then

a much more detai led assessment of ai rcraft impact should be

carr ied out.

Figure - 2

10 -5

10 -6

10 -4

10 -3

10 -7

10 -8

1 10 100 1000

Number of Fatalities (N)

Fre

quen

cy o

f N o

r m

ore

Fat

aliti

es p

er y

ear

ALARP

Negligible

Unacceptable

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

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5.2.1 Table 1

Initiator Method of Model

Aircraft impact AEA methodology

Seismic event geological survey data

Lightning strike Electricity council data and methodology

Severe environmental conditions:- Abnormal rainfall Abnormal snow fall Very low temperature High temperature Gale force winds

Historical data plus reasoned argument

Flooding Site and met office data plus reasoned argument

Subsidence Historical data plus reasoned argument

Land slip Historical data plus reasoned argument

Fire or explosion at adjoining plant Site environs information plus relevant data where relevant

Missile from Off-Site Site environs information plus relevant data

Hazardous substance pipeline rupture Site environs information plus relevant data

Collapse of high voltage cable Site environs information plus relevant data

Impact by out of control road or rail vehicle Site environs information plus relevant data

5.2.2 Possible Major Accident Scenario

Plant Item Failure Accident Scenarios

Storage or Transport Vessel

Catastrophic failure

Flammable/ Toxic gas cloud

Hole in vessel wall

Flammable/Toxic gas cloud

Filling line

Rupture

Flammable / Toxic gas cloud

Puncture


Small hole


Flange leak

Export line

Rupture


Puncture


Small hole


Flange leak

Process Equipment, Compressors, liquefied, vaporisers Pumps

Disintegration

Toxic gas cloud

Leak

Toxic gas cloud

Loss of control


Explosion

Abatement Equipment

Disintegration

Toxic gas cloud

Leak

Toxic gas cloud

Loss of control


Overload


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5.2.3 Probable Accident Initiators

Off-site Events Operator Error Abnormal Load Arson or Sabotage

Inadequate Management Loss of Service

Aircraft impact system opened impact by vehicle fire corrosion Loss of electricity.

Seismic event filled when not closed

impact by missile explosion erosion loss of cooling water.

Subsidence system overfilled impact by dropped load valve opened vibration failure of

process controls. loss of nitrogen

Extreme environmental

conditions abnormal rain fall abnormal snow

fall very low

temperature high temperature

flooding gale force winds lightening strike

containment degraded.

internal temperature or

pressure outside design limit.

safety system degraded. cyclic load loss of

compressed air

Vehicle/train impact excess load

external temp/ pressure outside

design limit. contamination

inadequate materials or specification.

loss of steam

Land slip failure to respond

correctly to an alarm.

pressurisation. control system degraded.

chemical attack

Explosion incorrect valve action.

under pressure containment system degraded.

hidden defect in containment

system.

Fire Contamination failure to detect

dangerous situation.

Missile Loss of control failure of process controls.

5.35.35.35.3 RISK LEVELRISK LEVELRISK LEVELRISK LEVEL

5.3.1 Interpretation for Risk to Workers :

The quant itat ive r isk assessment depends upon quant ity,

property, physical form, durat ion and frequency of handl ing

and air borne concentrat ion of the main hazardous raw

mater ia ls. R isk Assessment is based on comparison with

acceptable points and r isk formula is g iven in para 5.6.

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

66

5.3.2 Typical Failure Frequencies

Type of Failure Failure Rates per year

Catastrophic failure of EO Tank* 6.0 X 10-6

Leak in EO Tank* (Leak Dia 12.5mm)

1.0 X 10-5

Large Dyke Fire # 6.0 X 10-5

Internal Explosion and Full Surface Fire # 9.0 X 10-5

Ref : * - From Failure rate by HSE.gov.uk, # - OGP-434-3

5.45.45.45.4 RISK MATRIXRISK MATRIXRISK MATRIXRISK MATRIX

Risk assessment should be seen as a cont inual process. Thus, the

adequacy of control measures should be subject to cont inual rev iew

and rev ised if necessary. S imi lar ly , i f condit ions change to the extent

that hazards and r isks are signif icant ly af fected then r isk assessments

should also be reviewed.

R isk levels for fol lowing maximum credible scenar io are calculated;

Sr. No. Failure Mode Scenario Probability Consequence Risk

Vapour Cloud Explosion

ER C High

Jet Fire R CR Mod 1 EO

Tank Failure

Gas Dispersion R CR Mod

Late Pool Fire R M Low

Early Pool Fire R CR Mod 2

Acetone, Toluene, Methanol, Methyl Ethyl

Ketone Tank Failure

Vapour Cloud Explosion

ER C High

Probabi l i ty • F = Frequent • RP = Reasonably probably • O = Occas ional • R = Remote • ER = Extremely Remote • I = Imposs ible

Consequence

•••• C =Catastrophic

•••• CR =Cr it ica l

•••• M = Marginal

•••• N = Negl ig ib le

Risk Rtn. = Routine

Low = Low risk

Mod .= Moderate risk

High = High risk

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

67

Probabil i ty Classification

Frequent (>1.0) : Likely to occur many times during the life cycle of the system

(test/activity/operation).

Reasonably probably (0.1-1.0) : Likely to occur some time during the life cycle of the system

Occasional (0.01-0.1) : Likely to occur some time during the life cycle of the system.

Remote (10-4 -10-2 ) : Not likely to occur in the life cycle of the system, but possible.

Extremely remote (10-6-10-4 ) : Probability of occurrence cannot be distinguished from zero

Impossible (<10-6 ) : Physically impossible to occur.

Hazard Consequence Classification

Catastrophic : May cause death or system loss

Critical : May cause severe injury or occupational illness or minor system damage.

Marginal : May cause minor injury, occupation illness, or system damage.

Negligible : Will not result in injury, occupational illness, or system damage.

Risk Category

Routine: : Risk no different from those experienced by any individual in his or her daily life

Low risk : Events may have impact within a facility but little or no impact to adjacent facilities, public health, or the environment.

Moderate risk: : Events have potential impacts within the facility but at most only minor impacts off site.

High risk : Events have the potential for on-site and off-site impacts to large numbers of persons or major impacts to the environment.

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

68

5.55.55.55.5 HISTORY OF PAST ACCIDENTSHISTORY OF PAST ACCIDENTSHISTORY OF PAST ACCIDENTSHISTORY OF PAST ACCIDENTS

Knowledge and Safety measures are tested when any incident /

happening takes place which teaches us a lessons and we are

compelled to acquire the knowledge of the causes of the accidents

and of preventat ive measures to prevent its reoccurrences.

The management is mainta in ing records in respect of recorded

reportable accident detai ls. Past Accident History is g iven in

Annexure-11.

5.65.65.65.6 LIMITATIONS & UNCERTAINTYLIMITATIONS & UNCERTAINTYLIMITATIONS & UNCERTAINTYLIMITATIONS & UNCERTAINTY

The hazard ident if icat ion procedures are coupled with good

engineer ing judgement, regulat ions, and guidel ines together

const itute a better st rategy to ensur ing safety. The accuracy and

usefulness of r isk assessment are cr it ical ly dependent on the qual ity

of the model assumptions and that of the relevant database. In case

of accident f requency assessment, the sources of errors are a lso

varied. In many instances only very general data are avai lable on

equipment fa i lure, for which stat ist ical accuracy is often poor. In

other cases, these may be very l i t t le data avai lable at a l l . In India, the

databases on equipment fai lure and human error are not readily

avai lable. There is indeed a st rong need to bui ld up a nat ional

rel iabi l i ty database through co-operat ive ef fects between industry

and instrument / equipment manufactures.

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

69

6.16.16.16.1 SUGGESTION & RECOMMONDATIONSUGGESTION & RECOMMONDATIONSUGGESTION & RECOMMONDATIONSUGGESTION & RECOMMONDATION

1. Prevent the creat ion of f lammable or explosive

concentrat ions of vapour in ai r and avoid vapour

concentrat ion higher than the Occupat ional exposure l imits.

2. Do not pressur ize, cut, weld, braze, solder, dr i l l , gr ind or

expose tank to heat or sources of ignit ion, without tak ing

proper care.

3. Non spark ing tools should be used, dur ing maintenance

work.

4. Whole factory premises shal l be declared as no smoking

Zone and board shal l be displayed.

5. To avoid ignit ion of vapours by stat ic electr ici ty

discharge, a l l metal parts of the equipment must be

grounded, and per iodical ly i t shal l be checked.

6. Tanker un- loading checkl ist shal l be prepared and it shal l be

fol lowed for t ruck tanker coming for un loading hazardous

chemicals.

7. Tanker un- loading shal l be carr ied out under str ict

superv ision only.

8. Fi re Hydrant network shal l be always maintained under

pressure.

9. Fi re mock dr i l l shal l be conducted frequent ly.

10. Effect ive grounding and Bonding shal l be maintained at

F lammable hazardous chemicals handl ing and storage area.

11. Cont inuity of earthing and earth Resist iv ity shal l be checked

periodical ly and report shal l be mainta ined.

12. Flameproof f it t ings shal l be used and mainta ined in proper

condit ion.

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

70

13. All operator wear appropriate PPE whi le work ing that shal l be

ensured.

14. Operators should be tra ined for the hazardous propert ies and

control measures of chemicals which are us ing in the

insta l lat ion.

15.15.15.15. INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE

The f requency for various act iv i t ies in the plant, process &

Storage are main l ined with attent ively by the management, as

per fol lowing:

Sr . Sr . Sr . Sr .

No.No.No.No. F requencyFrequencyFrequencyFrequency Inspect ion & Maintenance Act iv i tyInspect ion & Maintenance Act iv i tyInspect ion & Maintenance Act iv i tyInspect ion & Maintenance Act iv i ty

1 Dai ly

Inspect ion

Cr i t ica l equipments, controls, indicators, levels,

switches, sett ings, dra in va lves, leakages, storage tanks

& TLF

2 Week ly Inspect ion & maintenance of Pumps.

3 Monthly Breather Valve, F i re Protect ion System

4 Quarter ly Al l Indicators Alarms, t r ips & Cont rol

5 Hal f Year ly Ult rasonic Thickness Gauge, Earthing check

6 Annual Al l va lves, sa fety va lves, Pa int ing of vesse ls Pipe l ines.

16. Test & Examinat ion of Tanks, Pressure Vessels etc. a re to be

carr ied out & records in prescr ibed forms are mainta ined.

17. The M.S.D.S. of Hazardous Chemicals is to be prepared &

avai lable with the management.

18. Colour code system for pipe l ines shal l adopted as per IS

Colour Code System.

19. Safety t ra ining programmes shal l be organised for a l l level of

workers, superv isors including contract workers.

20. Fi re F ight ing tra in ing shal l be organised for al l employees.

21. SOP, Safety Instruct ion and caut ionary not ice shal l be

displayed at conspicuous locat ion.

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

Annexure 71

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

Annexure 72

Annexure – 1 LOCATION PLAN

DORF KETAL DORF KETAL DORF KETAL DORF KETAL

SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD. Plot No.Z/108, Dahej, Dist. Bharuch

DORF-RA-2016 HELPS

Annexure 73

Annexure – 2 LAY OUT PLAN

DORF KETAL DORF KETAL DORF KETAL DORF KETAL

SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD. Plot No.Z/108, Dahej, Dist. Bharuch

74 HELPS

Annexure – 3 DORF KETAL SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.

STORAGE DETAILS OF RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS

Sr. No. Raw Material Storage Quantity, CUM/MT MOC No. of Vessel /

DRUMS Type of Hazard

1 2 3 4 5 6

1 C9 (Class C) 200 m3 MS 1 Flammable

2 Phosphoric Acid 1 T HDPE 30 drums Corrosive

3 HAR/Garasol-150/ MC10A (Class C) 200 m3 MS 1 Flammable

4 Remax (Class C) 200 m3 MS 1 Flammable

5 Phosphorus Pentasulfide 20 T HDPE lined Fibreboard

Drum 1000 bags Corrosive

6 Sulphur Dioxide 0.5 T MS 5 cylinders Corrosive

7 Di-Ethanol Amine 5 T MS 25 drums Corrosive

8 Potassium Hydroxide 3 T Lined Bags 60 bags Corrosive

9 Hydrogen 5000 m3 MS Trolley Mounted Cylinders Flammable

10 Phosphate Ester 5 T MS 25 drums Corrosive

11 Para Nitro Aniline 30 T Lined Bags 60 Bags Corrosive

12 Platinum. Catalyst 0.3 T Fibre Drums 30 drums None

13 Pentaerythritol 20 T Lined bags 1000 bags Corrosive

14 P-Formaldehyde 15 T Lined bags 600 bags Toxic

15 Alkene 10 T MS 50 Flammable

16 4,4 Methylene Di-Aniline 25 T Lined bags 1250 Toxic

17 Fatty Acid 500 m3 SS304 1 Corrosive

75 HELPS

Annexure – 5 Continue…

DORF KETAL SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.

STORAGE DETAILS OF RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS

Sr. No. Raw Material Storage Quantity, CUM/MT MOC No. of Vessel /

DRUMS Type of Hazard

1 2 3 4 5 6

18 Glycerin 100 m3 SS304 1 None

19 Methyl Ethyl Ketone (Class A) 200 m3 MS 1 Flammable

20 Acetone (Class A) 30 m3 MS 1 Flammable

21 Toluene (Class A) 30 m3 MS 1 Flammable

22 C4 Polymer 100 m3 SS304 1 Flammable

23 Methanol(Class A) 100 m3 MS 1 Flammable

24 Ethylene Oxide (Class A) 32 m3 MS 1 Flammable

25 Nonyl phenol 50 m3 MS 1 Flammable

26 SKO 30 m3 MS 1 Flammable

27 n Butanol(Class B) 30 m3 MS 1 Flammable

28 Mixed xylene (Class B) 30 m3 MS 1 Flammable

29 Caustic Lye (30-45%) 100 m3 MS 1 Corrosive

30 PACM 25 T MS 125 drums Corrosive

31 Maleic Anhydride 25 T Lined Bags 1250 bags Corrosive

32 Butyl Acrylate 20 T MS 100 drums Flammable

33 White Spirit 10 T MS 50 drums Flammable

34 Ethylene CoPolymer 20 T MS 50 drums Flammable

35 MEA 3 T MS 15drums Flammable

76 HELPS

Annexure – 6 DORF KETAL SPECIALITY CATALYSIS (P) LTD.

SALIENT PROPERTIES OF CERTAIN HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS

Physical & chemical composition B.P F.P LEL

UEL

Sp. Gr. (water = 1)at

V.D. at (air = 1)

No. of container & size Sr.

No. Raw

Materials Chemical Formula State 0 C 0 C %

TLV ppm or

mg/Nm 3

LD50, mg/Kg LC50 mg/l

200 C 200 C

Odor Thresh

old ppm or mg/m 3 MT / CUM

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1 C9 Mixed

Hydrocarbons Liquid 150-270 32-66 1%, 7% NA

LD50- 346mg/kg to 5000, LC50-

18-54000 g/cum

0.9 3-5 NA 1no. x200 M3

2 Phosphoric

Acid H3PO4 Liquid 158 NA NA 1

LD50, 1530 mg/kg, LC50 >850 ppm/1h

1.685 3.4 NA 30 drums x 33kg

3 Garasol-150 NA Liquid 178 62 0.6% 7% NA LD50 > 6000

mg/kg 0.875 NA NA

1no. x 200 M3

4 MC-10A NA Liquid 178 62 0.6% 7% NA LD50 > 6000

mg/kg 0.875 NA NA

1no. x 200 M3

5 Phosphorus Pentasulfide

P2S5 Solid 515 >260 50gm/m

3 1mg/m3

LD50- 389mg/kg to

5000, 2 N.A. NA 1000bags x20kg

6 Sulphur Dioxide SO2 Gas -10 -75 N.A. 2ppm

LD50- 2520 ppm/kg 2.26 2.26 NA

5 cylinders x 0.1MT

7 Di-Ethanol

Amine C4H11NO2 Solid 268 168.9 - - 710 mg/kg 1.1 3.6 - 25 drums x 200kg

8 Potassium Hydroxide

KOH Solid N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. LD50: 273

mg/kg 2.044 N.A. N.A. 60bags x 50kg

9 Hydrogen H2 Gas -253 N.A. 4%, 75% N.A. N.A. 0.069 0.07 N.A.

5000m3 trolley mounted cylinders

, 1 trolley =96/170/200

cylinders)

77 HELPS





UEL


V.D. at (air = 1)


No. Raw


TLV ppm or

mg/Nm 3


200 C 200 C

Odor Thresh


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

10 Para Nitro

Aniline C6H5NH2 Solid 332 199 N.A. 3 ppm 450 mg/kg 1.42 4.77 NA 60bags x 500kg

11 Pt. Catalyst N.A. Solid N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. NA N.A. N.A. N.A. 30drums x 10kg

12 Pentaerythritol C5H12O4 Solid 276 N.A. N.A. 20mg/m3 LD 18500

mg/kg, 1.396 4.7 N.A. 1000bags x 20kg

13 Formaldehyde HCHO Liquid 98 50-60 6 –

36.5% 0.3 ppm

LD50-42 mg/kg,

1.08 1.03 100 ppm

600bags x 25kg

14 Alkene Alkene Liquid 291-302 79 0.9 - NA NA 0.73 4.35 NA 50 drums x 200kg

15 4,4 Methylene

Di-Aniline C13H14N2

Solid 242 230 N.A. 1 ppm

LD50 = 264 mg/kg

1.056 6.8 NA 1250bags x 20kg

16 Fatty Acid NA Liquid >200 200 NA N.A. N.A. 0.905 NA N.A. 1 no. x 500m3

17 Glycerin C3-H8-O3 Liquid 290 160 NA 15 LD50, 4090 mg/kg, LC50 >570 ppm/1h

1.263 3.17 NA 1 no. x 100m3

18 Methyl Ethyl

Ketone C8-H18-O6 Liquid 80 -6 1.9% - 11.5% NA

LD50, 2740-5600 mg/kg, LC50 11700

ppm/4h

0.81 2.41 2-85 1 no. x 200m3

19 Acetone CH3COCH3 Liquid 56.5 -9 2.2 13.0

500 5800 mg/kg, LC50, 50100

mg/m3 0.791 2.0

24-1615

1 no. x 30m3

20 Toluene C6-H5-CH3 or

C7-H8 Liquid 110.6 4.4

1.1%, 7.1%

50ppm LD50, 636

mg/kg, LC50 440 ppm/24h

0.863 3.1 1.6 1 no. X 30m3

78 HELPS





UEL


V.D. at (air = 1)


No. Raw


TLV ppm or

mg/Nm 3


200 C 200 C

Odor Thresh


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

21 C4 Polymer NA liquid NA >100 NA NA LD50

>2000mg/kg 0.87-0.9

NA NA 1 no. x 100m3

22 Methanol CH3OH Liquid 64.5 CLOSED CUP:

12°C

6%, 36.5%

200 PPM LD50, 5628 mg/kg, LC50

64000 ppm/4h 0.7915 1.11

100 ppm

1 no. x 100m3

23 Ethylene

Oxide (Class A)

2(CH2)O Liquid 10.7 <-18 3.% - 100% - 72(LD) 0.87 1.49

900-1260

mg/m3 1 no. x 32m3

24 Nonyl phenol C15H24O Liquid 293 141 NA NA LD50, 580

mg/kg 0.94 NA N.A. 1 no. x 50m3

25 n Butanol (Class B)

CH3(CH2)2CH2OH

Liquid 117.7 28.9 1.4% 11.2%

20 ppm LD50, 790

mg/kg, LC50 8000 ppm

0.81 2.55 1.2

ppm 1 no. x 30m3

26 Remax (Class

C) NA Liquid 165-300 66 1% 6% NA

LD50, <50 mg/kg, LC50

1 ppm/8h 0.91 4.3 NA 1 no. x 200m3

27 HAR (Class C) C10+ Liquid 180 65 NA NA NA 0.995 NA NA 1no.x 200 M3

28 Mixed xylene

(Class B) C8H10 Liquid 136-143 23

1.2% - 7%

NA LD50, 33500 mg/kg, LC50

9.09 mg/l 0.87 3.7 NA 1 no. x 30m3

29 Nitrogen Gas N2 Gas -195.86 N.A. N.A. NA NA 0.808 1.251 NA 1 no. x 5m3

30 Caustic Soda Lye (30-45%)

NaOH Slurry 1388 NA NA 2 LD50, 40

mg/kg 2.13 NA NA 1 no. x 100m3

79 HELPS





UEL


V.D. at (air = 1)


No. Raw


TLV ppm or

mg/Nm 3


200 C 200 C

Odor Thresh


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

31 Butyl Acrylate C7H12O2 Liquid 145 NA 1.3 – 1.7 9.4 -9.9

NA

LD50 1780mg/kg LC50 7800

mg/m

0.889 NA NA 100drums x 200kg

32 Maleic

Anhydride C4H2O3 Solid 202 102 NA 0.25 ppm NA 1.5 3.4 NA 1250bags x 20kg

33 White Spirt NA Liquid 130-144 21-30 0.6-6.5 NA NA 0.78 4.5-5 0.5-5 50drums x 200kg

34 MEA

H2N-CH2CH2OH

Liquid 171 96 5 % 17% 3ppm

LD50 1000mg/kg LC50 2000

mg/kg

1.02 2.1 NA 15drums X 200kg

35 PACM NA Liquid 320 >100 NA NA LD50 625

mg.kg 0.96 7.24 NA 125drums x 200kg

36 Ethylene

CoPolymer Solid N.A. >62

0.6% 6.5%

NA LD50 >2000

mg/kg 0.91 NA NA 50drums x 400kg

N.A. Not Applicable, NA Not Available

AARREEAA OOFF SSPPEECCIIAALLIISSAATTIIOONN

Other Services

Competent Persons Under Factories Act, recognized by Director

Industrial Safety & Health, Gujarat State, For Test, Examination & Certification

• Stability Certificate for Buildings and Plants – Section 6 & 112, Rule 3C

• Pressure Vessels & Plants– Section 31, Rule 61

• Lifts & Hoists – Section 28, Rule58

• Lifting Machines, Ropes and Lifting Tackles – Section 29, Rule 60

• Centrifugal Machines / Power Press – Section 21, Rule54

• Thermic Fluid Heater – Rule 68D

• Oven & Driers – Rule 68G

• Ventilation System(Fume Extraction System) – Section 87, Schedule under Rule 102

Third Party Safety Audit

Fire Audit

Environmental Audit

Energy Audit

Electrical Audit

Specialized Audits

Valuation of Immovable

Properties,

Machineries, Buildings

On-Site Emergency Plan, Off-Site Emergency Plan, Disaster Management Plan

Safety Reports (In Schedule-8)

Schedule – 7

Risk Assessment / Risk Analysis by DNV Phast

HAZOP & HAZAN Studies

Safety Manual

Health, Safety & Environment Policy

Disclosure of Information to Workers, Authorities & General Public

Drawing preparation work for DISH approval

DISH Approved Training Institute under Section 111/A

Need based Industrial Safety Training Programmes

Chartered Engineer’s Certification Work

M.S.D.S.

Investigation Report on Industrial Accidents

Consultancy on Factories Act with Factories Rules

Mock drill / Exercise on Industrial Emergency Plan

Documents

DORF KETAL SPECIALITY CATALYSIS P LTD. …environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/FormB/EC/Risk...DORF-RA-2016 HELPS 2 The Risk Assessment is prepared on the basis of information