Document Qazaf (1)

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SYNOPSIS FOR PHD

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

SUBMITTED TO

SHRI VENKATESHWAR UNIVERSITY ( GAJRUALA AMROHA U.P )

TOPIC

ISRAEL AND PALESTINE CONFLICT THREAT TO HUMANITY

RESEARCHER SHIEKH QAZAFEE HASSAN

ISRAEL PALESTINE CONFLICT

CLASH OF TITANS



INTRODUCTION

You will explore the root causes of the Israeli Palestinian conflict from the

creation of Israel after World War II to present day. You will examine each side’s claims

to the land and explore the history of Judaism and Islam in the area. When you are

finished with your research, you should be able to present a sensible argument either for

the Israeli Jews or Palestinian Muslims and support your opinion with evidence

Starting with the lines of Ralph Waldo Emerson “Peace cannot be achieved

through violence; it can only be attained through understanding.” There are two sides to

any argument, but the key to discussing real prospects for peace is by truly understanding

the other side’s opinions, perspectives, and concerns without using volatile language,

demonizing your adversary, or unfairly dominating the debate. Keeping an open mind

and open ear can be extremely difficult when it comes to controversial topics, such as the

Israel - Palestine conflict, but no solution will ever succeed unless we all try to step

outside of our comfort zones and listen to opinions and ideas we may not agree with. We

might then discover common ground we would not have found if the discussion had not

taken place, and it can start with one person, one idea, one discussion, and one



acknowledgement, just one.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an ongoing dispute between the State of Israel

and the Palestinians and is part of the wider Arab–Israeli conflict. At present, major polls

show the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians agree a two-state solution is the best

way to end the conflict. Most Palestinians view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as their

future state, and most Israelis agree. The negotiating parties have been the Israeli

government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The official negotiations

are mediated by an international contingent known as the Quartet on the Middle East (the

Quartet) represented by a special envoy that consists of the United States, Russia, the

European Union, and the United Nations. The Arab League, another important actor, has

proposed an alternative peace plan. Egypt, a founding member of the Arab League, has

historically been a key participant. The United States has been an ardent supporter of

Israel often taking positions against UN Resolutions condemning the actions of Israel.

Since 2006, the Palestinian side has been fractured by conflict between the two

major factions: Fatah, the largest party, and Hamas. As a result, the territory controlled by

the Palestinian National Authority (the Palestinian interim government) is split between

Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza strip. Hamas is considered a terrorist

organization by Israel and the United States although it won the Palestinian elections of

2006; therefore, it has not been allowed to participate in official negotiations. The

Palestinians are an occupied people living in refugee camps often without sufficient food,

potable water, electricity, adequate medical care, or work. Peace negotiations began at

nnapolis, Maryland, United States, in November 2007. No final solution occurred. The

parties agree there are six 'final status' issues which need to be resolved: Jerusalem,

refugees, settlements, security, borders and water.

Causes of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The Palestinian--Israeli conflict stems from competing Jewish and Arab claims to the

land in Palestine (the Zionist occupation of Palestinian land), conflicting promises by the

British in the forms of the Hussein McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour

Declaration of 1917, and several outbreaks of violence between Jewish and Arab

residents of the region of Palestine. The roots of the conflict can be traced to the late 19th



century, which saw a rise in national movements, including Zionism and Arab

nationalism. Zionism, the Jewish national movement, was established as a political

movement in 1897, largely as a response to Russian and European anti-Semitism. It

sought the establishment of a Jewish Nation-State in Palestine so that they might find

sanctuary and self determination there. The World Zionist Organization and the Jewish

National Fund encouraged immigration and funded purchase of land under Ottoman rule

and under British rule in the region of Palestine. In the 1870s, a wave of anti-Semitism

spurred a new migration from central Europe, and in 1898, Theodore Hertzl organized a

Zionist international movement to establish in Palestine a home for the Jewish People

secured by public law. Thousands of Palestinians were already living in Palestine as their

descendants had done so for centuries. In 1917, Arthur James Balfour, as Foreign

Secretary, authored the Balfour Declaration, which supported the establishment of a

Jewish homeland in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration pledged England’s support of

Zionist goals in order to win support of international, especially American, Jews to the

Allies during World War I. In 1916, one year prior to the Balfour Declaration, a secret

agreement was made between the British War Cabinet and Zionist leaders promising the

latter a “national home” in Palestine in consideration of their efforts to bring the United

States into World War I on the side of Great Britain. Following World War I and the

dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine came under the control of the United

Kingdom through the Sykes-Picot Agreement and a League of Nations mandate. During

the mandatory period, the British made conflicting promises to both populations in the

forms of the Hussein McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

The Paris Peace Conference and subsequent conferences made Palestine a British

mandate. The League of Nations approved, and more Jews entered Palestine. Palestine

Arabs resented this “immigration” into their homeland. Tensions between Arab and

Jewish groups in the region erupted into physical violence--the 1920 Palestine riots, the

1921 Palestine riots, the 1929 Hebron massacre and the 1936-1939 Arab revolt in

Palestine. The British tried to maintain a precarious peace, but Hitler’s anti-Semitic

policy increased the influx of Jews into Palestine and caused further Arab resentment.

The Jewish population rose to nearly half a million in 1935. The Arab rebellion started in

1936 and continued to expand until a major British Military effort suppressed it two years



later. The British proposed a failed partition plan, while the White Paper of 1939

established a quota for Jewish immigration set by the British in the short-term and by the

Arab population in the long-term. Both Arab and Jewish groups directed violence against

the British in order to expel the mandatory government, which was held in contempt by

both sides. In 1942, Zionist leaders met in New York’s Biltmore Hotel to devise the

Biltmore Program which called for unlimited immigration of Jews to Palestine which,

after the war, would become a Jewish commonwealth state. In May 1945, after the

German surrender, the Jewish Agency wrote Prime Minister Churchill demanding the full

and immediate implementation of the Biltmore resolution, the cancellation of the White

Paper, the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish state, Jewish immigration to be an

Agency responsibility, and reparation to be made by Germany in kind beginning with all

German property in Palestine. The Palestinians seemed to have no say in any of this.

The British stalled, and the Haganah (the Jewish voluntary militia organized in

local units primarily for local defense) engaged in extensive smuggling. In October 1945,

Haganah’s clandestine radio station, Kol Israel, declared the beginning of “The Jewish

Resistance Movement”. On October 31, 1945 the Jews in Palestine engaged in an

extensive “terrorist” campaign and attacked three small naval craft, wrecked railway

lines, and attacked a railway station and an oil refinery. In June 1946, Jewish terrorists

committed more sabotage in Palestine. They destroyed twenty-two RAF planes at one

airfield. The Haganah agreed to an Irgun (terrorist group offshoot of Haganah) attack on

British headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. The bombings killed ninety-

one British, Arab, and Jewish people and wounded forty five. The British retaliated by

raiding the Irgun headquarters in Tel Aviv. By the end of 1946 the Irgun Sternist groups

had killed 373 persons. The Haganah and the terrorists continued to operate with at least

tacit support of a large part of the citizenry. This violence and the heavy cost of World

War II led Britain to turn the issue of Palestine over to the United Nations. In 1947, the

U.N. approved the partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into two states: one

Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish leadership accepted the plan, but Palestinian Arab

leaders, supported by the Arab League, rejected the plan, and a civil war broke out. Israel

quickly gained the upper hand in this inter-communal fighting, and on May 14, 1948

declared its independence. Five Arab League countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria,



Transjordan and Iraq), then invaded Palestine, starting the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The

war resulted in an Israeli victory, with Israel capturing additional territory beyond the

partition borders, but leaving Jerusalem as a divided city. The territory Israel did not

capture was taken over by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan (now Jordan).

The war also resulted in the 1948 Palestinian exodus, known to Palestinians as Al-

Naqba. For decades after 1948, Arab governments had refused to recognize Israel and in

1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded with the central tenet that

Palestine, with its original Mandate borders, is the indivisible homeland of the Arab

Palestinian people. In turn, Israel refused to recognize the PLO as a negotiating partner.

In the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Gaza Strip

from Egypt, and East Jerusalem including the Old City and its holy sites, which Israel

annexed and reunited with the Western neighborhoods of Jerusalem. The status of the city

as Israel's capital and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip created more

conflict between the parties. In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan, in what was

known as the Black September. Large numbers of Palestinians moved into Lebanon after

the Black September, joining the thousands already there. In 1973 a coalition of Arab

states led by Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War against Israel. The Egyptians

and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to

swing in Israel's favor. Eventually a cease-fire took effect that ended the war. This war

paved the way for the Camp David Accords in 1978, which set a precedent for future

peace negotiations.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has raged for many years, contributing to the violence

and unrest within the region. Nations have lined up on varying sides of the issue, setting

would-be allies at odds with one another. Though no resolution has come despite periodic

perceived progress, the actors involved remain committed in their beliefs and allegiances

towards the Palestinians and Israelis. This thesis will explore the potential impact of

religious motivations on political decision-makers regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. It

will examine the presence of religious beliefs and their implementation as foreign policy

through elite personal conviction and popular input in democratic politics. This thesis

will explore the pattern of preference nation’s show to one side of the conflict more than

the other. For example, why do the EU and the U.S. frequently end up on opposite sides



of matters involving Israel and the Palestinians? Does the contrasting modern secularism

of parts of the EU and the continuing Christian influence in the U.S. account for any part

of this difference? These common associations will be analyzed based upon documented

religious association and belief survey data from the Pew Research Center and upon the

philosophical or religious values and morals represented in their policies. This study will

examine the association within democratic nations (or groups of nations in the case of the

EU) between the religious beliefs of a nation’s leaders and citizens and the foreign policy

of that nation in regard to the conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis. In

democracies where governmental policy reflects the will of the people, it is essential to

evaluate the association between the beliefs of citizens and a nation’s policies. Therefore,

this thesis will explore the influence religious beliefs have on the foreign policy of the

democratic nations of the United States, Israel, and those that make up the European

Union. The study will show that, though the nations of the European Union may pursue

individual policies, the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aggregates

the national policies to create a single foreign policy actor in the context of this conflict.

The varied national religious situations will be examined to determine whether the CFSP

can be regularly and repeatedly associated with any religious belief system or whether

there is an observable absence of religion within the policy institutions of the Union.

Discussions of political matters often under appreciate the influence of religious

belief under the guise of neutrality and to uphold the separation of church and state.

However, it will be demonstrated that belief is unavoidable and may affect policy in a

variety of ways. Jennifer Jefferis states in her study of religion’s influence on violence,

“In an age of secularization, it is critical to assess the significance of belief, if only

because it is that which is most likely to be overlooked, as it is not a variable traditionally

understood to be rational or predictive.”Though all belief may not be termed “religious,”

every person acts and forms opinions based upon what he thinks is best, right, or fair.

Other things contribute to a person’s decisions, but his perspective of the world, as

defined in his beliefs, colors his approach. Therefore, this thesis will examine the

alternative national policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict to evaluate how religious

belief has and continues to shape policymakers’ decisions. In order to evaluate the

potential influence of religious belief, this key term will be examined in greater depth to



understand how belief may lead to actions. This thesis will examine how and why

alternative sets of religious beliefs may be associated with corresponding perspectives on

this conflict. By examining citizen groups with varied religious beliefs and backgrounds

within democratic structures, this thesis will explore the association between religious

beliefs and foreign policY

ARCHAELOGY

As in many contested regions, the past is always present in the MiddleEast conflict. Here,

however, the past has far greater weight than anyother region, and archaeologists are

those that give the distan t pasta palpable, physical expression. In this sense, archaeology

and politics

have always been intertwined. If Jewish and Israeli archaeology has been characterized,

at times, by its national-historical mission, the same is true for its Palestinian counterpart.

Thus, archaeology has been mobilized either to strengthen the bond between the Jewish

people and the Land of Israel or to deny or ignore such a relationship. Without

detracting from itsobjective scientific value, archaeology contributes to the elaboration of

newcollective identities based on new narratives of the past. In the context of the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, each and every excavation has the potential to acquire political

overtones and to sow the seed of controversy.

The study offered here is a survey of the work conducted by Israeli archaeologists in the

West Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967. The compilation of such a database is of

tremendous importance for bothresearchers and those decision-makers who might be in a

position toinfluence the future relations between Israelis and Palestinians and decide the

fate of archaeological sites and finds in these regions. As Raphael Greenberg and Adi

Keinan emphasize, "[t]he archaeological wealthrevealed here should [also] engender

discussion regarding protection, preservation, future research and development in the

future Palestinian

state.", Greenberg and Keinan focus their attention on the products of Israeli archaeology

in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They do not deal here with the threats posed to the

sites themselves as a result of the conflict: whether it is widespread destruction and

looting of sites by



Palestinian villagers or the damage caused to sites of all kinds— including synagogues,

churches, and monasteries—by rapid development in all parts of the territory. Neither do

they provide a detailed examination of the policies of the Palestinian authorities in the

realm of archaeology or

the activities and discussions of these issues in Palestinian universities. These topics

warrant academic research of their own. With this study we inaugurate the series of

Research Papers of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies.

This series hope to contribute to academic and public discussion on different aspects of

inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts around the world and in our region in particular.

Almost from the very inception of Israeli control over the West Bank and East Jerusalem

in 1967, Israeli archaeologists have been engaged in the study andadministration of the

antiquities of these regions. Research by Israeli academics in the West Bank began soon

after the occupation and reached its peak in the 1980s, until curtailed by the first

Palestinian uprising in 1987. Jerusalem too saw an early wave of intensive research,

mainly under the auspices of the Hebrew University. In later decades the academic effort

was succeeded to a considerable

extent by government-sponsored activitie s related to development and construction,

including— in recent years—the construction of the Separation Barrier and its various

extensions. In 1967, archaeological knowledge of the heartland of historical Palestine

was sketchy and schematic. A preliminary survey of known archaeological sites carried

out by Israeli archaeologists in 1968 covered about 800 sites, of which only a handful

had been excavated (Kochavi 1972). Today, forty years on, the tally of archaeologically

recorded sites is upwards of 5400. Of these, some 900 sites have been excavated, either

as salvage work in advance of construction and development, or as part of research-

oriented academic projects. Virtually all of this archaeological work has been carried

out by Israel, in the context of its

administration of civil life in the occupied territories. All archaeology may be

characterized as cultural production—using material remains of the past—in the social

context of the present. The twofold impact of Israeli archaeological activity within the

context of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict can, therefore, easily be appreciated: At one

level stands the physical appropriation of archaeological sites in contested areas—either



in the short term, prior to excavation and destruction, or in the long term, as permanently

preserved, protected or (as often is the case) neglected domains of the past. At another

stands the emergence of new narratives of the past based on the results of archaeological

surveys and excavations; these narratives impinge

on popular understandings of ancient history and on the creation of ethnic or local

identities. A third level of impact may be characterized as internal to the discipline: the

significance of West Bank and Jerusalem archaeology for the academic and professional

development of Israeli archaeology. These three levels are addressed in the following

study, which is based on the

ongoing work of the West Bank and Jerusalem Archaeological Database Project

conducted at Tel Aviv University. Using a series of Geographic Information System

(GIS) maps generated by superimposing archaeological data on geographical and

administrative layers, we present in the following pages an overview of Israeli

archaeological activity and a discussion of its significance. Following a presentation of

the legal and administrative framework, we look at the extent of excavations, their

locations, their cultural affinities and their impact on Israeli scholarship. This is followed

by a review of the archaeological surveys, which represent both an inventory of the

archaeological potential of the future Palestinian state as well as scientific contributions

to ongoing archaeological debates. In passing, the political context of the excavations

and surveys is noted: their physical relation to Jewish settlements, Palestinian villages

and towns and the Separation Barrier, or their temporal relation to significant events in

Israel and the territories. Lastly, some of the potentials of the GIS database are exhibited,

both as a research tool for archaeologists and as a source of information for decision-

makers. The archaeological data has been culled from a wide variety of sources—

published accounts of surveys and excavations, publicly accessible archive records and

some unpublished administrative and other documents. The resulting superimpositions

represent, of course, only a small sample of the permutations enabled by the GIS

database, the methodological and technical aspects of which are presented in Appendix I.

It is important to note that this publication deals only with the general results of scientific

research carried out since 1967. It is not a compendium of the substantial contributions of

the excavations to the archaeological inventory. Nor do we deal with the current situation



on the ground in areas under Israeli control

or in areas partially or fully administered by the Palestinian National Authority. The

presence of antiquities in a conflict zone raises numerous challenges to any

administrative authority: the preservation and protection of excavated sites, the

prevention of looting, public education and outreach and respect for all past cultures. In

this sense, this work is only preliminary to the urgent task of taking stock of the present

state of cultural heritage within the territory of the area

generally assumed to form the core of the future Palestinian state. This latter issue has

recently been raised by Palestinian intellectuals and archaeologists in various

international venues and, in the most detailed treatment to date, in a review article by

Adel Yahya (forthcoming). The most

pressing issues raised by Palestinians, in order of precedence, are the problem of looting,

the separation of Palestinians from cultural heritage sites caused by the Separation

Barrier and by settler-related development, the incompatibility of Israeli and Palestinian

antiquities laws (especially those that allow trade n antiquities in Israel, seen as an

incentive to looting), and the issue of repatriation of finds removed from the territories.

While all of these issues have

political dimensions, they all testify to the emergence of a Palestinian school of thought

on the cultural importance of antiquities and on the need for a clearly enunciated policy

on antiquities, clearly diverging from that imposed by Israel. Palestinians differ from

Israelis in the technical definition of antiquities (they intend to do away with the 1700 CE

dividing line between antiquities and non-antiquities), indeed, on the very term

antiquities, to which they prefer the

term ‘cultural heritage’. They differ on the definition of sites, including in this definition,

for example, traditional agricultural landscapes. They differ in their use of terminology,

and in the emphasis laid on different periods in the history of the holy land. They do not

differ, however, in the sense of urgency imposed by the evidence for widespread looting

of sites in areas under both Palestinian and Israeli civil control, looting that is associated

with the economic hardships

prevalent since the second intifada and with the sense that archaeology is an organ of the

occupation. The present imbalance of power and academic capacities has led to a



flourishing Israeli archaeological presence in the West Bank and a depleted Palestinian

one. The continued political and ideological implications of the Israeli occupation have

led to the identification, by many in the Palestinian community, of archaeology with

Israeli interests. This can only be seen as detrimental to the physical well being of the

archaeological cultural heritage of the West Bank in the long run. The provision of as

much information as possible on the work of Israeli archaeologists in the West Bank

may therefore be seen as a step toward the closing of the information gap between the

two sides, and as a step towards asserting the independence of archaeology from specific

political agendas. By recognizing our curatorial responsibilities to the past,

responsibilities that go well beyond questions of ownership, and by identifying

the implications that archaeology has for a broad range of stakeholders (Hodder

2003), we take a significant step to protect archaeology from being pressed into the

service of the ongoing conflict. Although our research is not yet complete and the final

publication format of the database has yet to be determined, we believe the manifold

implications of

the data that we have accumulated over the two years of the project merit this preliminary

publication. They contribute a heretofore unrealized intellectual and symbolic dimension

to the ‘implicate relations’ characterizing the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. We thank the

colleagues, too numerous to mention, with whom we consulted at various stages of our

project, and who provided assistance in their official and unofficial capacities. In addition

to these, Hanita Cinamon served as GIS consultant in the early stages of work. Dan

Rothem of the S. Daniel Abraham Center provided detailed political and demographic

GIS layers, Adi Bin-Nun of the GIS center at the Hebrew University provided

background layers, including Digital Terrain Models (DTM), topography, soils and

precipitation isohyets. Last but not least, Raanan Rein, Director of the S. Daniel Abraham

Center at Tel Aviv University, encouraged this publication an Talma Kinarti paved the

way to its completion. To all we offer our gratitude.

Introduction: Excavations in Jerusalem and in the West Bank

As of the writing of this interim report, we estimate the number of different sites



excavated in the West Bank and greater East Jerusalem by Israeli archaeologists since

1967 at about 900, of which approximately 170 are in and near Jerusalem. These

represent approximately 1500 excavation licenses and permits in the two zones. The

information in hand, as will be explained below, concerns only about two thirds of the

estimated excavated West Bank sites. Our estimate regarding the total number of

excavations is based on the occasional mention of Staff

Officer excavation permit numbers in recent preliminary reports and on an extrapolation

of the rate of excavation since the last report by the Staff Officer, in 1997. With legal

proceedings in progress, new information may soon be forthcoming. Looking at these

numbers, the problematic of site-counts should be kept in mind: in particularly large sites

such as Nablus or Jerusalem, the

subdivision into separate excavations will always be arbitrary and contingent. Also,

licensed excavations range from hours-long cave clearances to monthslong full-scale

excavation seasons at multi-layered mounds.

Basic Data on Excavations

The Staff officer is not required to publish a report on excavation licenses and permits

granted in the West Bank, nor does he, in fact, publish such a list. As explained above, the

1986 decree of the Civil Administration does not even require the granting of excavation

licenses to the Staff Officer, much less any consultation with the Advisory Council before

such excavations. In practice, the Staff Officer does appear to issue permits for his own

excavations and to consult with the council in most cases involving outside organizations

such as Israeli universities, foreign schools of archaeology in Jerusalem, or overseas

expeditions. As in Israel, excavation permits are granted for each calendar year, so that

sites excavated over a long period of time or through several excavation seasons will

have more than one permit.

The information released by the Staff Officer on his work and that of his team is spotty

and often of an extremely brief and preliminary nature. Even reports characterized as

final do not always contain all the elements usually associated with a final report. As

regards outside expeditions, the Staff Officer’s record in obtaining final reports appears to

be about on par with that of the IAA for excavations inside Israel. The sources of

information for excavations in the West Bank are therefore partial lists provided by the



Staff Officer to the IAA in 1997,

preliminary reports scattered widely in newsletters, popular or semi-popular publications

(mainly in Hebrew) and some final publications. Excavations in Jerusalem were all

licensed by the Israel Department of Antiquities and Museums and by its successor, the

Israel Antiquities Authority(IAA). While the records pertaining to the conduct of

excavations over the years are accessible, there are several impediments to the creation of

a closed andfinal list of excavations in greater East Jerusalem. The main problem is the

fact that the border between East and West Jerusalem has to be reincarnated and

superimposed on the map of excavations. Furthermore, precise information on the

location of excavations does not appear on the IAA excavation list, and often a good deal

of detective work is needed to match up surveyed sites, excavation reports and permit

numbers (especially as regards multiple permits for contiguous sites and the myriad

tomb-caves in the Roman-period necropolis of Jerusalem). Consecutive contiguous

excavations in some parts of the city (e.g., near the Temple Mount and in Silwan/City of

David) offer a different set of challenges to the creation of an accurate map. There are

hundreds of publications, preliminary and final, on the excavations in and around

Jerusalem. Our main source of information on these publications—and indeed on the

very existence of most of the excavations— has been the considerable bibliographic

effort compiled by Kloner in his

monumental survey of Jerusalem (Kloner 2000-2003).* There is clearly more tobe done

in this province as well.

Publication Record of Excavators Since 1967

There is no straightforward way of calculating the number of final publications of

excavations in the West Bank and Jerusalem since 1967. The distinction between

preliminary and final publications is often blurred, and there may be preliminary

mentions of excavations buried in publications that bear a different name. By way of a

preliminary indication, a review of 368 identified excavated sites in the West Bank

(mainly those excavated in 1967-1997) revealed that just under half (177) had no

publication data, and that the remainder were nearly

* We have begun to collate this list with the Tubinger Atlas des vorderen Orients

Gazetteer (Bieberstein andBloedhorn 1994)venly split between final (93) and preliminary



(98) reports. In Jerusalem, IAA policy requires preliminary reporting on all excavations,

so that the overall

publication ratio for both zones together is about 50% preliminary reports, nd the

remainder split between no reports at all and final reports. The rate of approximately 25%

final reports (for excavations over ten years old) is not significantly different from the

typical rate in Israel proper. ‘Finally published’ ites include numerous minor sites (such

as dozens of caves cleared in

Operation Scroll) with rather sketchy reports, as well as major site s with

multivolume publications (e.g., Shiloh’s City of David excavation, Avigad’s Jewish

Quarter excavations, Netzer’s Herodium and Jericho excavations). Virtually unpublished

sites also include many minor and some major excavations (Hebron, Nebi Samwil), and

there are multi-seasonal excavation s that have produced only limited topical reports

(Mt Gerizim, Nablus).\ While the general trend of publication in West Bank archaeology

appears similar to that of mainstream Israeli archaeology, it is important to point out that

the present Staff Officer has followed an increasingly isolationist stance with regard to

the work of his unit. An independent publications section has been established within the

unit, headed by the Staff Officer himself. The result

is that the Staff Officer not only issues licenses to his own unit and regulates ts

excavation procedures; he also receives, approves, edits and publishes the scientific

report. In view of the absence of any form of public accountability, we believe that there

is room for concern over the quality and thoroughness of the scientific reporting in the

Staff Officer’s unit.

FINDS

Enormous quantities of artifacts have been recovered in the excavations conducted since

1967. The Staff Officer has established extensive storerooms for all artifacts excavated

under his jurisdiction. These storerooms are located in the main headquarters of the unit,

in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, and in a facility located near the inn

of the Good Samaritan on the Jerusalem-Jericho road. Some artifacts of West Bank origin

are on exhibit within Israel proper. These are on long-term loan from the Staff Officer

who, we have

been informed (D. Mevorakh, pers. comm.), is waging a vigorous campaign to retrieve



such artifacts that are no longer on view. Countless artifacts excavated since 1967 in East

Jerusalem are exhibited both within the Old City and in other parts of Israel (mainly,

however, in the Israel

Museum, Jerusalem). As these are registered as IAA artifacts, they cannot be easily

separated from the main body of antiquities registered in the IAA stores.

Table 1.1. Relative quantity of academic excavations,

West Bank and Jerusalem.

1967–1977 1978–1992 1993–1998

West Bank 14% 33% 5%

Jerusalem 25% 16% 13%

Total 18% 29% 8%

Another way of looking at the significance of Israeli academic involvement in the West

Bank and East Jerusalem is through a review of the subjects covered by Ph.D.

dissertations (Table 1.2). In the years 1967–2006 a total of 108 dissertations were

received in the IAA library. Of these, 24 (22 %) are on issues directly related to Israeli

research east of the Green Line. The first such dissertation appeared in 1977, representing

a natural lag between the first opportunities for research and their culmination in

postgraduate degrees. The proportion of West Bank/East Jerusalem dissertations in the

1977–2006 range is 26%. Within this time frame,

the 1988–1998 interval represents the high-water mark of relevant dissertations, showing

a nice correlation with the peak in academic excavations one decade

earlier.

Table 1.2. Relative proportion of dissertations in Israel

devoted to West Bank or East Jerusalem archaeology.

2. Cultural Affiliation of Excavated Sites

One of the ways in which excavations create a cultural impact is by establishing physical

points of contact between the present and the past. More often than not, excavated sites

are either partially preserved in their original state (that is, only the excavated part is

destroyed, but other, unexcavated portions of

1967–1977 6%



1978–1982 25%

1983–1987 25%

1988–1992 33%

1993–1998 29%

1999–2006 12.5%

the site remain intact), or the excavated remains themselves may be protected,preserved,

or even maintained as a historical monument. In each of these cases the archaeological

narrative endows the site with some form of cultural significance that it did not have

before the excavation. The site is set apart from other parts of the landscape and becomes

part of a cultural cognitive map. Table 2.1 and Maps 2.1-2.2 present an attempt to

delineate the way in

which excavated sites in the West Bank may be ascribed cultural significance, according

to the most common ethnic/cultural divisions. We attempt to show here which sites might

be regarded as ‘ours’ by Jews (Israelis or others), Christians (Palestinians or others) and

Muslims (Palestinians or others). In addition, we show which sites would be most

significant for those (Jewish or Christian) for whom the Bible forms the core of their

cultural cognitive map of

the West Bank. Neutral sites are those for which no immediate ethnic, national or

religious bond with living people is likely.

3. Few sites were excavated with the intent of studying Islamic remains, but the atter are

prominent in the most recent levels at many sites. In the absence of detailed reports, we

have noted I (Islamic) affiliation in those cases where excavated sites are known to

include mosques, sheikh’s tombs or a sizable post-classical occupation. This does not

always mean that these remains were.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

Present study will be carried to study the following objectives

To study the picking sides of Arab Israel conflict

To study the impact of the conflict on Arab economy

LITERATURE REVIE



Current scholarship has identified various causes for the Arab-Israeli conflict, allowing

religion varying degrees of influence over actions and policy. However, few draw direct

correlations between the specific beliefs of citizen groups and policy. Even in the face of

widespread religious political activism in the U.S., many marginalize the use of religion

in political dialogue, emphasizing strategic, political, and economic concerns. On the

other extreme, those studying the secularist environment that pervades much of the

European Union limit the discussion of religion to its generic cultural influence. Only

within the context of Middle East policy issues do European Muslims’ beliefs appear to

offer the possibility of influencing policy.

A number of scholars evaluate the significance of Israel’s “Jewish” designation as

it relates to their democratic system, but frequently the religiosity of the Ultra-Orthodox

and settlers’ movement are marginalized and Jewishness in Israel becomes primarily a

cultural matter of identity, which the state enforces in the public realm. Within the

research already done on this and similar subjects relating to the association between

religious beliefs and foreign policy, three themes emerge with various amounts of

evidence and theory to support them. First, scholars find that other things have the

capacity to influence foreign policy to a greater extent than religious beliefs. Strategic,

economic, and political interests weigh more heavily in the decisions of policymakers

than an adherence to religious beliefs. Second, some find that religious beliefs can

influence foreign policy, but they are never the sole impetus in any policy creation.

Instead, religious beliefs often have an indirect effect by shaping the morality of

people and the culture and society in general, so that foreign policies address strategic,

political, and economic interests within an accepted moral framework. Third, others see

that religious belief can create a strong, unwavering support for a certain side of an issue

and for any policies that support that side. Such support may cause a person to act as an

idealist in one circumstance and a realist in another, all in the context of a single religious

belief. The justification that unites the apparent contradictions stems from faith placed in

causes that religious beliefs substantiate. Looking at the first of the themes, many find

that other things, such as strategic, economic, or political interests, have the capacity to

influence foreign policy far more than religious beliefs. Despite the role religion played

in the American Revolution and formation of the United States, Leo Ribuffo states that



the U.S. could have risen to its place of power without the influence of the Reformation.

Its revolution would simply have been more similar to that of France. Religion was not

the cause of its success.

Charles Krauthammer sees no place for religion or the Scriptures of the Bible to

lead to collective action in policy. It is not meant to guide in such ways. Though J. Bryan

Hehir disagrees with Krauthammer’s complete dismissal of religion from the equation, he

agrees with Ribuffo’s judgment that “no major diplomatic decision has turned on

religious issues alone, ”stating “no tradition nor any representative of a tradition, has the

capacity to translate religious convictions or even moral principles directly into the policy

process.” Vaughn Shannon states that domestic religion is one of many factors that will

define U.S. policy towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. The strategic nature of the

regional environment of the Middle East will often outweigh any religious concerns for

leaders. Constanza Musu identifies a similar pattern among the EU member states,

observing that economic and security needs are the primary cause for their policies and

involvement in the Middle East region.

In addition, Ribuffo states that President Truman chose to recognize Israel as a

consequence of his political considerations of the Jewish voters, rather than being

motivated by a religious conviction. Though Abraham Ben-Zvi disagrees with Ribuffo

and argues that Truman was acting based upon religious reasons, he still sees the basis of

the U.S.-Israel alliance as based primarily on strategic regional interests. The

developments during the second Eisenhower Administration and the Kennedy

Administration reinforced this view, permanently creating an exclusively strategic vision

of the region for the U.S.12 Uri Bialer adds an example to this from Israel’s side,

discussing how in the early years of the country David Ben-Gurion discriminated against

the Arab Christians because they were a threat as Arabs rather than because of their

religion. The security interests of his new nation drove his policy. Bialer also notes a

significant warming of relations between Israel and the Catholic Church in the aftermath

of the 1967 war.

Accordingly, in the wake of such a geostrategic victory, the Israeli government

felt more secure and capable of allowing more Christian pilgrims to come to the holy

sites. Even when religion seems to be involved, scholars find a political or strategic core



at the heart of the policy. If policymakers have strategic, economic, and political

considerations in mind when making policy, one must still account for the fact that at

times such policies do seem to reflect the particular religious beliefs of certain groups.

Stephen Sizer accounts for this potential contradiction in that politicians tend to reflect

the views of their electorate or of lobby groups because of the power they hold. Political

considerations rather than the actual beliefs being advanced by a group can cause

politicians to support policies. Indeed, Paul Burstein states that interest groups or party

activists can prevail against the public opinion on issues because of the power they wield

within the governmental system. Sizer observes that politicians may be unwilling to voice

public criticism in certain foreign policy circumstances because of the strength of an

advocacy group. Stephen Spector substantiates Sizer’s points by drawing upon research

done by the Pew Research Center to demonstrate that within these groups that seem to

promotereligiously inspired policies multiple non-religious motivations or justifications

for their support of such policies may still exist.

In nations such as France where governmental secularism is an absolute rule and

religion remains a private affair, politicians may not justify policies on religious grounds,

even if such connections may appear evident. Rather, politicians must rationalize every

decision in accordance with reason and patriotism. Turning to the second theme, it is

often proposed that religious beliefs can influence foreign policy, but they never solely

influence policy. They often have an indirect effect by shaping the morality of people and

society in general, so that foreign policies address strategic, political, and economic

interests within an accepted moral framework. Unlike the first theme that focuses on the

strategic, economic, or political considerations that lie behind policy decisions that could

appear religiously influenced, this second theme acknowledges a role for religion to

create a basic moral foundation, though it still guards against a one-to-one correlation

between religious convictions and foreign policy decisions. In his introduction to The

Influence of Faith, Elliott Abrams states that it is futile to search for a direct cause-and-

effect relationship between religion and foreign policy. Rather, he sees religion’s larger

role being elsewhere, as ethical rather than political.

Mark Amstutz agrees with this position stating, “Although religious

organizations may become involved in the political process, their main contribution to



international affairs and U.S. foreign policy is not political but ethical. They help to

develop and sustain political morality by promoting moral reasoning and by exemplifying

values and behaviors that are conducive to human dignity.” Hehir sees religious

institutions as a key factor in facilitating foreign policy debates, setting the foundational

groundwork to bring issues up for debate. This confirms Amstutz’s view that religious

values play an indirect rather than a direct role in the creation of foreign policy. Paul

Charles Merkley asserts that there can be no compelling proof that belief will cause

anything, but our experience demonstrates that belief grounds action and so will grant

meaning to the study of history. Within such debates, Sizer sees religious institutions and

beliefs contributing to that which is acceptable and meaningful in policy discussions. Pre-

existing religious beliefs may validate or repudiate new sentiments and opinions based

upon the compatibility of the new with the existing. For example, Sizer asserts that the

pre-existing antipathy of some Evangelical Christians towards Islam confirmed the new

anti-Arab and Islamophobia that arose in the wake of September 11th. Their religious

beliefs lay the foundation to allow such antipathy to become acceptable within the

general political debate about new policies in the post-September 11th world. While

research has documented increased negative stereotyping of Muslims after September

11th, Sizer’s direct correlation between Christian antipathy to Islam and the recent anti-

Arabism remains undocumented and implies an indiscriminate fear of Islam, which is not

necessary to explain the treatment of Muslims after the terrorist attack.

Though religious institutions may strongly influence their followers, they are still

considered to be on the edge of the political sphere. Ezra Kopelowitz and Yael

IsraelShamsian observe that scholars evaluating the sociology of religion in the United

States compared to that which has developed in Israel and Europe tend to limit their

thinking about religion in the United States to private, individual contexts, with the

general populace often embracing such thinking. In contrast, the sociology of religion in

Israel and Europe has established religion in the public sphere where the state may

legislate its place. Citizens participate in the rituals of the institutions based upon state

sanctioned usages without reference to personal belief or morality. Kenneth Wald and

Michael Martinez find that those from the same religion will act differently in a nation

where religion is an acknowledged part of the government versus where it is thought to



reside primarily in the private sphere. The privatization of religion within most

democracies maintains an indirect relationship between religious beliefs and foreign

policy.Yet this privatization creates foreign policies that Habib Malik believes cannot

address the religious effects of Islam in the world and will not be able to stop the violence

perpetrated in its name. In the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, where Islamic

beliefs frequently justify pro-Palestinian actions among civilians and leaders, one may

not neglect this direct relation without limiting the effect of a nation’s policy. Turning to

the final theme, some see that religious belief can create a strong, unwavering support for

a certain side of an issue and for any policies that support that side. This can cause a

person to act as an idealist in one circumstance and a realist in another, all in the context

of a single religious belief. Idealism emphasizes how people ought to behave in the

international sphere. Idealists stress “international legal rights and obligations, the natural

harmony of national interests…as a regulator for the preservation of international peace,

a heavy reliance upon reason in human affairs, and confidence in the peace-building

function of the ‘world court of public opinion.’”

In contrast to this Realists…stress power and interest, rather than ideals in

international relations. Realism is basically conservative, empirical, prudent, suspicious

of idealistic principles, and respectful of the lessons of history….Realists regard power as

the fundamental concept in the social sciences, although they admit that power

relationships are often cloaked in moral and legal terms.” Within the Middle East one

finds a combination of these two competing philosophies in the U.S. approach to the Iraq

War in 2003 where President George W. Bush sent military forces to protect against

perceived threats to national security and regional balance while also promoting the

idealism of freedom, democracy, and compliance to international law. In his 2003 State of

the Union Address, he attributed America’s mission of spreading freedom as God-

ordained. He stated, “The liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s

gift to humanity.” For Bush, God gave America the mission to spread liberty in the

Middle East. Alternatively, in the midst of starvation in Somalia in 1992, President

George H.W. Bush drew together U.S. forces to lead a coalition that would stabilize the

situation and bring the food supplies to the people.

In his address on Somalia, Bush was explicit that this was meant as a



humanitarian effort to restore the basic human right to food, but it was also “doing God’s

work.” Within these idealistic justifications, Bush still expected the coalition forces to

address the original physical causes of the problem and remove the threat they posed to

the nation of Somalia. Various scholars note religiously motivated decisions leaders have

made. Malcolm Magee points to President Wilson, demonstrating that one cannot

understand Wilson’s foreign policy without having an awareness of the religious

convictions that informed his worldview and his ideas of progress and reform. Wilson

worked towards the Covenant of Nations or League of Nations because he believed that

bringing the world into a covenantal pattern was the purpose that directed all of human

history. His theological mindset infused his ideals with what the world should look like

and what America’s role should be in that world. Ben-Zvi adds Truman’s decision to

recognize and support the new nation of Israel as an example supporting this point.

Ribuffo disagrees with Ben-Zvi and attributes Truman’s decision to support the UN

partition plan of 1947 and Israel’s nationhood in 1948 to political considerations of

gaining the Jewish vote in the upcoming 1948 election. Ben-Zvi discards the argument

that Truman made such a decision for the sake of political advancement among Jewish

voters because it is clear Truman acted based upon moral, cultural, and religious

premises. His religious beliefs compelled him to take the side of the Israeli state. Paul

Charles Merkley examines Truman’s religious beliefs in the biblical promise of the

restoration of the Jews to Israel and his acceptance of the role as the modern Cyrus in

Truman’s personal papers and recorded comments to Jewish leaders.

Merkley asserts an unambiguous connection between religious faith and public

action. Truman saw the great characters that filled the pages of history, including him, as

instruments of the purposes of God. He believed he was God’s instrument to bring

Israel’s rebirth as a nation, fulfilling what the prophets had foretold. While Truman

reveled in his role as a fulfiller of biblical prophecy, he was also an American politician

who wished to remain in office. Therefore, while there appears to be an association

between his biblical belief system and his actions towards the Jewish people, his political

aspirations are not irrelevant. Wilson and Truman made key decisions that set a particular

policy direction in U.S. dealings in the Middle East. Their compelling religious beliefs

existed alongside the concerns of remaining faithful to an ally, in Wilson’s case, and of



helping a downtrodden people and gaining favor from a key voting group, in Truman’s

case. This co-existence points to the fact that religious beliefs do not remain in the

background but can influence how one creates and supports certain policy. In response to

Ribuffo’s statement that “no major diplomatic decision has turned on religious issues

alone,” Nathan Tarcov contends that “the mere fact that there is no observable correlation

between the religious convictions of American Christians and their foreign policy

positions does not necessarily mean that those religious convictions are unimportant to

their thinking about foreign policy.”Religious beliefs may motivate leaders within the

government to sustain certain policies, but religious beliefs of the general populace also

create strong support for certain policies. Colin Chapman states that politics have come to

be bound up with religion today and cannot be easily separated.

Sizer points to the specific convictions of Christian Zionism, which he defines as

a political form of philo-Semitism held by Christians who support the Jewish Zionists’

goals for the sovereign State of Israel. He observes that their beliefs based upon certain

biblical texts regarding the importance of Israel as God’s eternal people drives Christian

Zionists to throw all their support behind the Israeli cause.James Jordan points to Jerry

Falwell as one with strong convictions that lead him to support a particular side. Falwell

states that the theological, historical, and legal rights of Jews make the State of Israel the

most important political question there is. These rights compel all who believe in the

Bible to support Israel politically. Jody Baumgartner, Peter Francia, and Jonathan Morris

find that such biblical interpretation shapes political attitudes, thus allowing religion to be

a significant factor in predicting the support of certain religious groups for particular

policies, especially those focused within the region of the Middle East.

In Israel, members of the Gush Emunim settlers’ movement see the land as a

means to redemption and endeavor to transform their nation’s national dialogue from one

about political strategy to one about religious covenants. These convictions have driven

their continuous efforts over the past forty years to settle the territories occupied after the

War of 1967. They believe all Jews remain God’s chosen people and that the land

remains God’s promised redemption to them. Chaim Waxman believes that every Jew

retains this promise. In his view, Judaism is not just a religion but defines its adherents

from their birth. In this way, every Jew is born into the chosen people and should claim



this salvation. Those who embrace this view of Eretz Yisrael (“Land of Israel”) see Israeli

domestic and foreign policy as a tool of Jewish redemption. Within the United States,

Jews are one step removed from this direct struggle to solidify Jewish redemption

through the land. However, Wald and Martinez assert that their identity as a single people

creates a religious imperative for American Jews, which requires their support for the

political State of Israel as a part of their identity. This worldwide identity among Jews

reaches back into history. Despite the Diaspora that scattered the Jews, the historical

alienation and suffering the Jews have endured in Christian societies drew Jewish

communities together to retain their religious identity.

Their initial religious unity grew into a social and cultural identity, which

frequently isolated them from the Christian societies in which they lived. With the rise of

Zionism in the late nineteenth century, their enduring separateness as a people brought

them together in the political realm to advocate a single policy to fulfill their religious,

political, and cultural need for a homeland. Religious belief and identity can influence the

way a person thinks and what that person values. Beliefs may generate a strong support

for one side and a strong antipathy for all those who oppose that side, creating a clearly

defined conflict between the “right” and the “wrong” side, the light and the darkness.54

Christian Zionists rely on biblical texts to validate the need to support modern Israel,

while Jewish identity as a people group compels them to offer support. These three

themes present positives and negatives when considering the use of religion in foreign

policy making. Each takes a different approach to the same facts and circumstances. The

first minimizes the role of religious belief within the political process by attributing

policymaking to strategic, economic, or political interests. Even when religion appears to

influence politicians, this theme presents an alternative explanation in the form of

political interests. However, excluding religion as a factor within the policy process

produces the possibility to miss a significant motivation behind policy. Simply because

political interests may explain a policy decision, such policy decisions do not preclude

additional explanations. Both Wilson and Truman expressed religious motivations

underlying decisions that were strategically justified, thus intertwining religion and

strategy. The second theme makes similar arguments to the first, but approaches the issue

from a different angle. Rather than seeking to devalue the role that religious beliefs may



play in the policy process, it speaks of the tendency of many to segregate religion into a

distinct sphere. Religion is granted the domain of ethics and morality and should teach

such things to hold back the moral decay of society. Religious beliefs therefore can still

influence politics, but only as people choose to carry those teachings from religious

institutions into the political sphere. As a consequence, such separation may downplay

the effects of ethics and morality within the political sphere, for it becomes a private and

individual matter.

Though this theme rightly acknowledges the need for religious institutions to

teach ethics and morality, it neglects the fact that religious organizations can play a part

in the political process through lobbies and interest groups. It also overlooks the various

leaders who state that they made major decisions based upon their religious beliefs. The

third theme takes a different approach from the other two, identifying religion as a key

reason leaders make certain decisions and people support certain foreign policies.

Religious convictions can create solidarity among groups and cement joint ventures

around common goals. This approach demonstrates a general predictable correspondence

between certain religious beliefs and certain foreign policies. Overall, it balances the

other two, as it accounts for observable influences in the political sphere that the other

two themes downplay or dismiss. Yet it is good to consider this theme in the context of

the other two, for not all groups that act with strength of conviction are driven by

religious beliefs. Within a secular or culturally religious society, citizens may still support

or oppose a policy with the same conviction found among religious groups. Even within

religious groups, there may still be a large minority that is motivated by other things or

may have mixed motivations, marrying religious beliefs with strategic interests.

Therefore, this thesis study will examine the influential beliefs among the polities of the

United States, the European Union, and Israel without any preconceived restrictions on

the spheres in which they do or do not belong.

In order to do so, the definition of religious beliefs will be established to allow a

greater variety of situations and practices to fall within the scope of the study.

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