Dissemination of Combat Information 29 August 1952

8/3/2019 Dissemination of Combat Information 29 August 1952

1/28

2t QJOJ 11# OJ 1A 2_ UNCLASSIFIED --:Zll':OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES

F o r t Monroe, Virgin iaATTNG-26 350. 05/56(DOCI)(C)(29 Aug 52} 29 August 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemina t ion of Combat Informat ion

L l B , ~ A ; { ' { --;-\ ARMY WAf{ C ~ S C See dis t r ibut ion PERIODICALS S S C T 1 0 ~ \ ) :.::: !,' l :232

SE? 2S 1952 \ \ l I/, 'o,;i L' lc ;.LfGEcopy, ... \ ..... 1. ' ,lIn accordance with SR 525-85-5 , Pr ocess i ng of Combat In" : ' _ ' : ' ; " - ~ ~ O r : r l ' T l n i 1 ~ a : : r h l c o n , the inc losed EXTRACTS a re forwarded to Depar tmen t of

the Army, Army F ie ld Forces and the serv ice schools for evaluat ion and necessary action. I t m ay be appropr ia te , in cer ta in cases , for these agencies to take act ion upon a single ex t rac ted i t em; in others , i t m ay be desi rable to develop a cross -sec t ion of accumula ted ext rac t s on a par t i cu lqr subjec t before init iating act ion; and often, the ex t rac ted i tem serves to reaf f i rm our doctr ines and techniques .

2. Copies a re furnished to othe r mil i tary agencies to keepthem in fo rmed concerning thea ter prob lems f rom the front l ine through thelogist ical command .

3. These EXTRACTS a re der ived f rom repor t s which a re c l a s sif ied S EC R ET. F o r the grea t e r convenience of the use r , th is Officedowngrades each extended i tem to the lowest classi f icat ion compat iblewith secur i ty . No effort i s made to par aphr ase o r delete any port ionof the extracted r emarks , so tha t none 0f the orig inal intent is los t .

4. Combat informat ion E.XTRACTS here in which a re applicableto t ra in ing at the company-bat tery leve l also appear in A r m y FieldFor ces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:r . ' , , ' ~ ' ~ ( , ' < H . l : " : ~ ~ ' \ ; ) ~ / ~ , : : ~ ' ; ' ~ ; ' ~ ~ ~ ~ " " ' i .~ ~ a i ; ; i 7 ~ : \ ! ,/ ~ l l I C l B Y ~ ~ . - A. B. CHATHAM

Ext rac t s f rom sources Lt Col, AGC440 thru 455 A s s t Adjutant Genera l

DISTRIB UTION: CN 26635(Over).'- .QV7JWal'rp;; tUNCLASSIFIED ~ " f i t ' " N r ' ( ' e. c


2/28

iilIGFWAiA'Rj tt6ii,,?'." ;UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION:3 ACOFS, G- l , DA 2 Execut i ve for Reserve3 ACOFS, G-2, DA and ROTC Affair s

15 ACOFS, G-3, DA 10 Chief Signal Offic er20 ACOFS, G-4, DA 10 The Surgeon General2 The Adjutant Genera l 4 Chief of Transporta t ion2 Chief of Chaplains Comdt

10 Chief Chemical Off icer 2 The Armored School10 Chief of Engineers 2 The Art i l le ry School2 Chief of Finance 2 The Infantry School2 Chief of Information 2 Army War College2 The Inspector General 2 CGSC2 The Judge Advocate Genera l 2 Ar my General School2 Chief of Military History 2 Ass t Comdt, The Arti l lery2 Chief, National Guard School, AA&GM BranchBureau 1 ea Pres , AFF Boards

10 Chief of Ordnance 1 CO, Arct ic Tes t Branch2 The Provos t Marsha l 1 ea Chiefs, A FF Human R e-

Genera l search Units No 110 The Quar te rmas te r and 2

Genera lCopies furnished:

70 TAG (10 ea CINC's and CG's , Major Oversea Commands)CG's

2 ea Continental Armies4 Army AA Command2 Mili tary Dist r ic t of Washington2 Tact ical Air Command2 Chief of Naval Operat ions, Dept of the Navy1 CO, Mountain & Cold Weather Tng Command2 Chief, Army Advisory Gp, A ir Command and Staff

School, Air University2 Comdt of Cadets , US Mili tary Academy

Comdt2 Armed Forces Staff College2 Marine Corps School2 USAF Air-Ground Operat ions School2 Counter Intel l igence Corps School2 The Provost Marsha l Genera l ' s School1 Off icer in Charge , Atlantic Flee t Intel l igence Cen,

Attn: Ground Forces Officer

[email protected]\'jQit


3/28

+liVM Nln"r)Y INFORMATIONUNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - 223d Infantry RegimentDATE: March 1952 Source No 440

(RESTRICTED)FINDING WIRE LINE BREAKS. - The osci l lator , built by the Radio Sec

t ion, has proven ext remely helpful in finding a l ine break with minimurr: dif ficulty and t ime. When wire i s out, the switchboard opera tor plugs the osci l lato r into tha t par t icu lar jack. A l ineman in checking the line will hear the osci l lato r tone . When he no longer hea r s the tone, he has the break bracketed .

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 40th Inf Div ArtyDATE: Apri l 1952 Source No 441

(CONFIDENTIAL)PREPARATION FOR ATOMIC ATTACK. - This Headquar t e rs was one of

those selected to part ic ipate in "Exerc ise MUSHROOM, " a program designedto dete rmine the capabili ty of a unit engaged in operat ions against an enemy toprepare instal lat ions adequate for pass ive defense against atomic bombing; tofami l iar ize personnel with the effects of atomic weapons and the m eans ofdefense against them; and to dispel the fear of atomic attack by education.

Construc t ion of shel ters to include adequate overhead cover for all vitalinstal lat ions, roof high walls and reve tment s for nonvital instal lat ions, andsuitable shel ters providing al l - round and overhead protect ion for all personnelw as under taken, and the ent i re projec t comple ted on 30 Apri l . Although theexercise was successful ly comple ted within the t ime prescr ibed and cu r ren ttact ical and administ ra t ive functions were conducted without impai rment , i tis obvious that an insta l la tion as e laborate as this would not be possible in afast moving s i tua t ion nor und er condit ions l ess stat ic than the present .

A solution, when threatened by atomic attack, would be to ass ign highprior i ty to const ruct ion of, f irst , the minimum vital instal lat ions and, sec0ndly, the necessary personnel she l te rs and to continue l e s s vital const ruct ionas t ime and the tact ical situation pe rmi t .

UNCLASSIFIED Over'." . -....,.",,,,....... ~ ~ . ~ ~ ' < " " , , , , , , .. ,,.

.. 63;Q'JSGme'/Mrf358"'" JMbAM'JJbJO F


4/28

HE-wry 11tE99'UNCLASSIFIED 2

A port ion of the f inal stat i s t ics on the exerc i se follows: ~ a n - h o u r s required 13,797

56,384Sandbags used 3,278 (average 6" x 16 1 )Logs used Steel pickets used 574 Bulldozer operator I I I hours

I t is apparent tha t construc t ion of a complete defensive ins ta l la t ion affordsexcel lent training opportunit ies, and in many cases has permi t ted the demonst rat ion of noteworthy examples of ingenuity.

In keeping with the design of the ins ta l la t ion to permi t opera t ions duringor immedia te ly following an atomic at tack, i t was neces sary to instal l allwire ci rcui ts underground. Di tches were dug to cover all local wire l ines aswell as incoming and outgoing l ines: the swi tchboard was placed in a bunkerand all wire heads p laced underground. The radio s ta t ions were placed under ground with only the antenna exposed, and a remote relay s ta t ion es tabl ishedone and one half mi le s from the FSCC.

~ a i n t e n a n c e of wire ci rcui ts required 89 1 man-hours during the per iodexclusive of the specia l r equi rements of Exerc i se MUSHROOM.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US CorpsDATE: January 1952 Source No 442

(RESTRICTED)BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION. - 5-gallon f lare. This expedient consists

of a 5-gallon lubr ica t ing oil can filled with 6% napalm; and M15 incendiary gre nade, W P; pr ima cord; and two elect r ic blas t ing caps , No 8. Put the 5-gal lonoil can (filled with 4-1/2 gal napalm) in a hole which permi t s the can to prot rudeapproximate ly 2 inches above the ground level. Wind single st rand of pr imacord ins ide the lip of the 5-gal lon oil can with one end free; attach to this looseend a No 8 elect r ic blasting cap. Remove the fuze from the M I5 Incendiarygrenade , WP and i n se r t a No 8 elect r ic blas t ing cap into the fuze wel l in the gre nade. Secure the blas t ing cap to the grenade by making a half -hi tch around thegrenade with the wire a t tached to the blas t ing cap. Secure the grenade and blas t ing cap "to the 5 -gal lon oil can carrying handle with wire . Join one end of the

UNCLASSIFIED

U;fCruspS,,'


5/28

wire from the blast ing cap in the grenade to one end of the wire of the blast ingcap that is attached to the pr ima cord. Attach the remaining two wires to thedouble strand detonating wire . When connected with W 130 detonating wire andbat tery BA70 or 10-cap blast ing machine as an e lec t r ica l source , the munitioni s . r eady for detonation. This expedient will burn approximately 30 minutesand will i l luminate an a r ea 50 yards in diameter .

Other sui table containers util izing the procedure outl ined above include:Signal Corps , Sp i ra l Wire , No 4 Can; C:b..emical Corps , Chlor ide of Lime Can;60 -mm mor ta r shel l cans .

These f lares should be emplaced a minimum of 10 0 yards forward of theMLR so as to s i lhouet te enemy t roops and not blind friendly groups .

(RESTRICTED)DEMONSTRATION OF VT OVER BUNKERS AND TANKS. - A f ir ingdemonst:rat ion was presented by the 3d Infantry Di vision to show the negati veeffect of VT fuze against personnel in tanks and bunkers . Purpose was toemphasize that our own f i res can be brought down on our own t roops when theenemy s torms our posi t ions. This permits us to remain in our posi t ions. I tis felt that a s imi la r exerc ise should be added to the batt le indoctrinat ion oncourses used in t ra ining in the United States .(CONFIDENTIAL)

TANK FINAL DRIVE OUTPUT SHAFTS. - Two exper:imental type f inaldrive output shafts are to be field tes ted in the near future by the 64th TankBattal ion. Four M46 t anks having the new type output shafts were is sued tothe 3d Division 30 January for field test ing by this tank battal ion.

Two tanks have output shafts which have been "shot peened . " This proces scompres ses the molecular s t ruc ture of the shaft which should make i t moreres is tan t to fatjg ue cracks which usual ly radia te inward from the outside splinedsur faces .

The remaining two tanks have hollow output shaf ts . A hole one-inch indiameter has been dril led in the center of the shaf t to a depth of 18 inches . Thisshaf t is being tes ted on the theory that hollow shafts will have more torque whichshould reduce the failures of this unit .

The 64th Tank Battal ion is to give the tanks normal Korean usage and per formrout ine prevent ive maintenance of t hem. Records on length of t ime operated anddistance t ravel led are to be kept by the battal ion. Monthly inspect ions a re to

OverUNCLASSIFIED 3


6/28

. 5 l F i ' - l 4 ' 5 W E ' ; f } i j ~ t't.gWTU WSG? ( - -.UNCLASSIFIED 4

be pulled by the 703d Ordnance Company (3 d Di v) . This ir .cludes tear ingdown the final drive assembl ies and inspecting the shafts for indicat ions offatigue cracks or fai lures.

Output shaft failures have been one of th e major t roubles exper iencedwith M46 tanks operat ing in the Korean theater .

SOURCE: Command Report I US CorpsDATE: February 1952 Source No 443

(CONFIDENTIAL)MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF M46 TANK. - The following points

about maintenance, and operation of the M46 tank are presented for informa t ion:1. Fina l dr ive gear teeth shea r or break ..2. Fina l drive output shafts develop radial cracks and shear . Replace

ment output shafts are received without the output shaft spacers . Thesespacers a re a press fit and it is virtual ly impossible for using units to removethe spacers from broken output shafts without damaging the spacers . Replace ment output shafts complete with spacers should a r r i ve at the units.

3. Maste r junct ion boxes fail to operate because of sticking reversecur ren t re lays . st icking c ircu i t b reakers , and burning out of bal las t bulbs.4. Muffler exhaust pipe clamps break because of the intense heat to

which they are subjected. When clamps break, f lames escape from mufflerpipes and increases danger of engine f ires .

5. Gas tanks develop cracks along one or m ore of the i r too numerousseams .

6. Track center guides are too narrow. too. pointed. and too shor t toprevent thrown t r acks on rough or hilly t er ra in .

7. Auxil iary generators develop rod and piston failures par t icular lyduring cold weather . In static si tuat ions the auxiliary genera tor i s run agrea t deal to keep the bat tery charged. Since the speed of the auxiliary

UNCLASSIFIEDt n ; 5 1 ' i G ~ I ' R itt


7/28

UNCLASSIFiEDgenera tor is governor controlled. i t speeds up to the governor RPM uponstar t ing and takes over the load of the main genera tor . This high init ialRPM is hard on a cold engine. It is recommended that a hand throt t le beins ta l led on the auxiliary genera tor to keep down the RP M during the warmup period.(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMPARISON OF CENTURIAN III AND M46.POWER

CENTURIAN III. - Engines are considered good but not powerful enoughfor the weight of the tank; however. i t has been noted that this tank does havea good cruising speed on hard surface roads and has been able to climb steephil ls .

M46. - The power of the engine is adequate to propel the tank at relat ivelyhigh speeds on flat or gently roll ing t er ra in . When climbing steep hil ls orwhen towing another M46 tank the power of the engine is not fully util izedbecause of the gear rat io in the final drive and sl ippage in the t r ansmiss ion .

MOBILITYCENTURIAN III.1. The tank has adequate speed on flat or gently rol l ing t er ra in .2. The hill climbing abil i ty of the tank is excellent .3. The tank has forded water approximately 4 feet deep. Rice paddies

with mud 10 inches deep were easi ly t raversed . Four tanks were seen tomaneuver over an ear th dyke with a ver t ica l face 4 feet high. The top of thedyke was 7 feet wide with a gully 2 feet deep running through the middle. Thefar side of the dyke was approximately 12 feet high with a 65 0 slope leadinginto a soft r ice paddy 10 inches deep. The four tanks in t race negotiatedthis obstacle with no difficulty.

4. The tank makes gradual tu rns as compared with the sharp abruptturns of which the M46 tank is capable.

5. The Centur ian II I Tank has safely t raversed the US M2 TreadwayBridge; however. because of the weight of the tank. the safety factor for thebridge has been mater ia l ly reduced. When a Centur ian II I crosses a pontoonbridge. the bridge almost submerges .

UNCLASSIFIED


8/28

e 6 i i , ? l Q 7 F t l i t ~ 7

6UNCLASSiFIEDM46.1. The tank has cor.siderable speed on flat or gently rol l ing t er ra in .

o2. The tank has cl imbed hills approximately 30 ; however, when negot iating turns on steep slopes all the power is di verted to one t r ack which then spins in place. I t is then necessary to back the tank in a direction tangent to the turn and then s t a r t uphill in the direction of the turn.

3. When climbing long steep hil ls the t ransmiss ion tends to overheat . The t r ansmiss ion is cooled by braking the tank and running the engine for a fe w minutes .

4. Neutral s teer for pivoting the tank in place is seldom used because i t places a severe s tra in on final drives and output shafts and tends to cause thrown t racks .

5. Tract ion is fair on muddy hills , in r ice paddies or in heavy muddy ground. Tract ion would be improved if the per - square- inch ground pressu re were decreased and if the t rack blocks had deeper chev rons .

6. Tracks. are thrown easi ly when t ravers ing la teral s lopes . The centerguides of the t r ack a re considered to be too narrow and too pointed for securingthe t racks .

ARMOR PROTECTIONCENTURIAN I I I . - Unknown but believed to be good.M46. - See page 13 , TM 9-718, Apri l 1951.

FUEL ECONOMY CENTURIAN I I I . 1. Unknown but repor tedly by a Bri t ish Officer to compare favorablywith the M46 tank.M46.1. ,Approximately 3 gallons per mile under average condit ions.2. Because of cold weather warm up per iods and maneuvering over hilly

and difficult t er ra in average gasoline consumption is approximately 4 gallonsper mile . UNCLASSIFlEDft"1 , IEItfljl'

PSrT9?r


9/28

.. ShOll; J J ;;;; d;U IF W zi:.UNCLASSIFIED

3. Because of relatively high ra te of fuel consumption, the range of tank operation is l imited for extensive operat ions . Refueling requi rements for tank units a re high and must be carefully planned and anticipated.

EASE OF MAINT ENANC ECENTURIAN III.1. To replac e a bogie wheel , the bogie wheel rocker arm i s ra ised by

a hydraul ic jack applied from underneath the tank. This method is slower than the s tandard US method of removing bogie wheels .

2. The t r acks are hard to break due to the difficulty in removing the t r ack pin. To expedite maintenance on the t r ack i t has been broken by cutting it with an acetylene torch o r breaking i t by using sma l l demoli t ion charges .

M46.1. In general , testing the main engine or replacing cer ta in accessor ies

to the main engine are bes t accompl ished by removing the engine from i tscompar tment and making the necessary repa ir s while the engine is on theground. I t takes an average crew about 3 /4 of an hour to remove the engineand about one hour to replace the engine . Removal and replacement of theengine requires a wrecker t ruck .

2. The main engine mus t be removed to replace the following accessor iesof the main engine: bevel gears in the oil cooler fan assembly, fa n shaft ofthe oil cooler fan assembly, lower magneto on the lower lef t hand side of theengine compartment , intake manifold clamps on the side next to oil coolerradiators , oil l ines leading from the bot tom of the oil cooler rad ia tors alongthe bottom of the engine to the oil fi l ter , and the t r ansmiss ion .

3. The following maintenance can be accompl ished quicker by removingthe engine: changing the main engine genera tor , 100 hour checks, and changingor adjustment of carbure tors .

4. Spark plugs can be bes t changed by removing the heavy steel gril lwork from the back deck of the tank.

5. After engines a re removed they a re tes ted by "ground hopping. II I fthe engine is defect ive and requires repa ir by Ordnance, the engine mus t bere ins ta l led , the tank del ivered to Ordnance, and then Ordnance m u s t repea tthe process of removing the engine before effecting repai rs .


10/28

UNCLASSIFIED 8MECHANICAL RELIABILITY

CENTURIAN III. - Based on the tank deadline rates. the Centur ian IIITank appears to be as mechanically rel iable as the M46 tank.

M46.1. In general . the tank i s not mechanically reliable; however. the mechan

ical unreliabil i ty can be pinpointed to the following features: final drives. out put shafts, oil cooler fan assemblies , and master junction boxes.

2. Final drive gear teeth shear or break.3. Output shafts develop radial c racks and eventual ly shear . I t is

believed that this shaft is under designed in s t rength .4. Oil cooler fan assemblies a re the most unrel iable assembly of the

tank. The par ts of the oil cooler fan assembly which frequently fail are theshafts, magnet ic clutches, and beveled gear s . Oil cooler fan assemblyfai lures i f not promptly detected cause overheat ing and damage to the mainengine and t r ansmiss ion .

5. Master junction boxes fail frequently. I t is bel ieved that the junctionbox is too complicated and controls too many of the electr ical features of thetank. The chief fai lures in the junction box are st icking reverse curren t re lays .st icking circuit breakers and burning out of bal las t bulbs.

ENGINECENTURIAN III. - UnknownM46. - The engine is the most rel iable major a ~ s e m b l y of the tank.

TRANSMISSIONCENTURIAN III. - Unknown.M46.1. The t r ansmiss ion by i tse lf is general ly rel iable; however . i t tends

to overheat when climbing steep hil ls or when towing other M46 t anks . Thet r ansmiss ion quickly overheats when an oi l cooler fan assembly becomesinoperat ive . This overheating burns out a babbit bear ing in the t r ansmiss ion .

! ttl' ,..1 !II "'''''1'':'tr:'f)" , jo t i ' - ' _ . ..........

.tlt9.J\jc.WS'/rM iSUS::" , ""S b


11/28

C(J}f}'ml?' J}AZSiil:: Z;; 6JI E

UNCLASS\F\ED2. When the shi f t l inkage is out of ad jus tmen t sl ippage and wear of

t r ansmis s ion bands occur because the t ransmiss ion i s t rying to dr ive in m o r ethan one gea r at a t i me .

3. Leaking oil sea ls a re a modera te ly recur r ing defect in the t ransmiss ion .EASE O F HANDLING

CENTURIAN III. - The tank i s r epor ted to handle very well . Turns arerelat i vel y long and gradual .

M46.

1. The manual control dr iv ing l ever m a k e s driving of the tank easy ands imple . New dr ivers lea rn to drive the tank in a relat ively shor t t ime.

2. The dual dri ving controls in the as sistant dri ver s compar t men t a renet neces sa ry . Because of the s implif ied driving control the dr iver i s notsubject to ex t r eme dr ive r fatigue and, therefore , ass i s tan t dr iver controlsa re not needed.

F I R E POWERCENTURIAN III .1. The tank cannon is cons idered an excel lent ant i tank weapon. I t i s

very effective as an ar t i l le ry weapon against personnel and bunkers .2. Lack of a bow machine gun reduc es the effecti venes s of the tank fo r

close in fight ing. This defect can be par t ial ly overcome by mount ing . 30 Calmachine guns on the tank commander s cupola .

3. .The life of the tube is r epor ted to be approximately 10 0 rounds .M46.

1. The 90- mm cannon is considered an excel lent weapon against al ltypes of ta rge ts .

2. The coaxia l machine gun, ant ia i rc raf t machine gun, and bow machinegun furnish excel lent sma l l a r m s fire support for close in and distant fir ing.

OverUNCLASSIFIED 9' ~ M r =


12/28

10(CONFIDENTIAL) CNCLASSIFIEOFLAIL TANK.

1. A conference was held in Tokyo on 31 January to decide the m e c ha nical detai l s to be incorporated in f lai l tanks to be const ructed by the Enginee rsRebuild Depot of J LC .

2. The following mechan ica l modif ica t ions will be t r ied and incorpora tedin the flail tank:

a . An auxi l iary engine with a fluid t ransmiss ion . I t is expected tha tthe fluid t ransmiss ion wil l be effect ive in absorbing and counter ing any r eve r serota t ion which might occur when the f lail drum is caused to rotate in reversedirect ion upon detonation of a mine .

b . Rever se type worm gea r s will be used to t r ans fe r power f rom dr iveshaf t to f lai l dr ums . This type gea r can absorb some r eve r se motion i f blas tcauses flail drum to rotate in reverse .

c . Disc- type clutches will be used on ends of f lai l d r u m . The disc swill slip if drum ro ta tes in r eve r se thus helping absorb the reverse drummotion along with the r eve r se type worm gears and fluid t ransmiss ion ofauxi l iary motor

d. A pres tone high pr es su r e cool ing sys tem will be used in auxi l iarymotor s to handle expected high opera t ing t empera ture s .

e . Auxi l ia ry motor will use two a ir c leaners because of excess ivedus t caused by the f lail .

f. The f lai l drum will rotate forward so tha t f lail chains detonatemines in front of the f la i ls . Opposi te rota t ion of drum would have causedmine detonat ion between the f lai l and the tank which w as cons idered unsa t i s factory .

g. The f lai l is to be designed to ca r r y 5-pound pear shaped w eightsa t end of f lai l chains .

h. Round tubing will be used i f avai lable to mount the f lai l drum ontank hull . The tubing will be mounted on the tank hull ra ther than on the tanksuspension. This will al low repa ir s to the tank suspension sys tem withoutin ter ference f rom the flail at t achments . I t was also bel ieved tha t c i rcu lartubing would be l e s s susceptable than box-type b e a m s to damage f rom mineblas t s .

UNCLASSIFIED


13/28

UNCLASSIFIEDi . Recoil springs of 155 guns will be used to absorb shock when

flail system is blown upward by mine blast . j . Fuel for the auxiliary motor will be piped from main fuel tanks of

vehicle. k. Disc-type wire cut ters will be placed on both ends of flail drum to

cut barbed wire and telephone wire which may wind up on the drum. 1. The flai l drum will be built one foot wider on each end than the

width of the M4A3E8 tank.m . The M4A3E8 tank instead of the M-46 will be used to mount the

flail . n. The representat ives of JLC est imated that the f i rst flail tank

would be completed in one month after necessary mater ia l was assembled.Subsequent flail tanks would follow at the rate of one a week.(RESTRICTED)

FIELD EXPEDIENT BRIDGE LAYING TANK. - At the reques t of I CorpsG3 steps were taken to develop a bridge laying tank. Such a tank would beused during an advance to cross blown bridges, or AT ditches. During WW IIa bridge laying tank had been developed from the old M3 1 recovery tank.Presen t plans were to adopt the M32 recovery tank to lay standard engineerM2 steel t readway and it was decided to build a steel adapter for the M32recovery tank. This adapter would be designed to fit and be secured by s teelpins to the two front lifting hooks and the two front towing shackles of thetank. With this pin arrangement the adapter could be easi ly removed when thetank was not needed for laying a br idge . The purpose of the adapter was toserve as the rea r support for the forked ends of the steel t readway when thebridge was in the carry ing posit ion.

To provide stabil i ty to the bridging when being carr ied by the tank an8" I beam was bolted across the t readways approximately seven (7) feet fromthe forward end of the t readways . On the center of this I beam was weldeda l ifting hook to which was attached the winch cable of the tank for lifting thebridge. For use of the bridge carrying tank during a tact ical operation i t wasagreed that the winch cable would have to be attached to the lifting hook bymeans of a quick re lease clevice or pin. The clevice or pin would be releasedby pulling on a str ing or wire from inside the tank. Thus i t would be unnecessary for any crew member to dismount to re lease the winch cable while thebridge was being laid in posit ion. The t readway spacer bars were modified

UNCLASSIFIED Over,_u"ili _iii] d4t'S$tfQ'fU a I 4


14/28

so that they could be pinned securely at each end to the steel t readway; however,i t was agreed that this modification was not necessary .

The plans called for the M32 recovery tank to lift and car ry twenty-fourfeet of double t rack M2 s tee l t readway. Because of the weight of the bridging(about 5 tons) and the leverage exer ted on the boom the front bogie steel volutespr ings compressed considerable and the back end of the tank raised sl ightlyand the r ea r end of the t racks los t f irm contact with the ground. To preventdamage to the volute spr ings , standard plates were bolted to volute springhousing to prevent complete compress ion and failure of the volute spr ings.The tendency of the r ea r end of the t racks to ra i se off the ground was mor epronounced when the tank was going down hill or into depress ions . Thistendency places the ent i re weight on the front par t of the t rack and increasesthe per -square- inch ground pr es su r e of tha t par t of the t rack in contact withthe ground; therefore, i t is believed that the tank carrying the bridging wouldbog down in soft ground. However, the tank could car ry the bridging onfairly level and f i rm roads.

To make the tank more maneuverable , exper iments were conducted withthe tank carrying twenty- four feet of single t rack steel t readway. The twentyfour feet of single t rack t readway was mounted with the r ea r forked ends inthe center of the s tee l adapter . The front end of the t readway was l if ted byattaching the winch cable to a chain fastened to the t readway a t a point aboutseven feet from the front end of the t readway. With the load to be car r iedthus cut in half, the tank became mor e stable and maneuverable and the ent i retank t rack remained in f i rmer contact with the ground. With training andexperience a crew should be able to car ry and place separa te ly , ac ros s aditch or blown bridge, the two separa te twenty- four foot sections of the steeltreadway. Training will enable the tank crew to space the two treadways sothat an M4A3E8 or M46 tank can fit on and cross the bridge.

Although no work was done on car ry ing or placing the center plankingfor the t readway i t w as agreed and deemed advisable to have engineer troopsprepared and ready to instal l center planking on the bridge so that all types ofvehicles could cross the bridge.

CONCLUSIONS1. An M32 recovery tank equipped with an adapter can car ry and layacross a gap twenty-four feet of double t rack M2 steel t readway. The ground

mus t be fairly f irm due to high ground pressure on the forward end of thetank t racks .

UNCLASSIFIED


15/28

1IIIIIiiiIII6iI-;-WOh'Wr tLc:-dJ h f U L 7 y n) 'I3d rTY INRQRtien* .' ...,. ,.

UNCLASSIFIED2. An M32 recovery tank can car ry and lay separate ly , two single

t rack sect ions of M2 s teel t readway each sect ion being twenty-four feet long.3. A recovery tank of the weight and size of an M46 tank could car ry ,with more facil i ty than an M32 recovery tank, twenty-four feet of double

t r ack M2 s teel t readway.(RESTRICTED)

INFANTRY-TANK COMMUNICATION. - Undue re l iance must not beplaced on the SCR 300 radio for Infant ry-Tank Communication. Alternatem eans of communica t ion m us t be provided. A 51 0 radio accompanying theinfant ry could provide di rec t and al ternate means of communica t inn withthe tanks.

(RESTRICTED)RADIO T /O&E CHANGE, MP COMPANY.1. Radio equipment current ly authorized by T /O&E 19-37, for the most

part , (SCR 610 and SCR 619) i s inadequate because:a. Limited range in miles . The road net now pat rol led extends well

over one hundred and fifty miles .b. All roads in the a r ea a re extremely rough, making i t impossible

to keep the SCR 610 and SCR 619 in al ignment . I t is normal to have a radiofail af ter less than an hour on the road, although severa l hours may have beenspent gett ing the radio into operat ion.

c. The excess ive amount of maintenance required in keeping the SCR610 and SCR 619 in al ignment and adjustment l imits their availabi l i ty for useand t ies up unit and higher echelon repa ir facil i t ies.

2. In view of the above, i t is requested that the eleven SCR-610 and thesix SCR-6l9 current ly on hand in this organizat ion be replaced by Radio SetAN/GRC-9 and the 622d Mil i tary Pol ice Company be authorized to draw anadditional six AN/GRC-9 Is for instal lat ion in those patrol vehicles not nowauthorized any communica t ions equipment .

3. Approval of the reques t contained in paragraph 3 above would authorizethe 622d MP Company to have a total of twenty-e ight AN/GRC -9 's . Since thecompany already has authorizat ion for five AN/GRC-9 ' s al l twenty-eight pat ro lvehicle s would be similar ly equipped with a radio which has already proveni ts dependabili ty in this organizat ion.

OverUNCLASSiFlED 13., ~ f d F ~ ' r m z ..,. . S5,,? i ' ... '?)trti2'*'


16/28

-C6\\jS.A9&_'R 1L"SS!(ICH "'PUNCLASSIFIED 14

(CONFIDENTIAL) .F AlLURE OF OIL COOLER FAN ASSEMBL Y ON M46 TANK.1. The principal cause for deadlined M46 tanks in units of this head

quar te r s is fa i lure of par ts of the oil cooler fa n assembly .2. Contrary to the repor t to GHQ Ordnance Officer by Mr F . Blai r ,

Technical Representative of Allison Divis ion GMC, and Mr L. Casso TechnicalRepresenta t ive of Continental Motors Corp. fa i lures are also occuring in theoil cooler fan assembly of the M46Al tank.

3. As an example of the l a rge number of fa i lures of the oil cooler fanassembly, the following f igures a re quoted:

UNIT Number of Fai lures NOV DEC JAN64th Tank Battal ion 23 22 3273d Tank Battal ion 16 27 35

4. The par ts of the oil cooler fan assembly which fail most frequentlyare the magnetic clutches, fan shafts , and beveled gears .

5. I t is the ansida-ed opinion of staff officers and the using units of thisheadquar te rs that the present performance and design of the oil cooler fanassembly for the M46 and M46AI tanks are unsat isfactory .

6. I t is recommended that:a. Urgent s teps be taken to redesign the present oil cooler fan

assembly and that redesigned assembl ies be shipped prompt ly to Korea .b. That s teps be taken to insure an adequate supply for Korea of

the principal par ts of the oil cooler fan as sembly now in use.(RESTRICTED)

2-INCH CHEVRON BLOCKS AS TRACK GROUSERS. - I t was finallydecided that spacing 2-inch s tee l chevron blocks every fourth block into aregular s teel t r ack offered the bes t solution to the problem of more t ract ion.The battal ion was i ssued two complete sets of T-80E4 s teel t r acks with 2inch chevrons . The t racks were taken apar t and the t r ack blocks were spacedinto the regular s tee l t r acks . The battal ion repor ts that the 2 - inch chevronsserve as t r ack grousers and the t ract ion has been mater ia l ly increased . I twas pointed out, however , that the 2-inch chevron blocks do cause a vibrat ionin the suspension system i f the tank is driven on a hard surface road .

UNCU\SS\F\EDl % \ \ j r j ~ " A M l

.r. 3d 2


17/28

(CONFIDENTIAL)IMPROVING HILL-CLIMBING ABILITY OF M46 TANK. - The following

notes , for improvement of the hill c l imbing abili ty of the M46 tank, arerecommended:

1. Final Drive .a . The f inal drive gear:5 should be geared lower to give grea te r driving

power but at s lower speeds. The present final drive gear ratio gives the tankspeed on flat or gently rol l ing t er ra in but does not give ideal or maximumpower for climbing hil ls .

b. Final dr ive gears have sheared or st r ipped while climbing hil lsor making turns in rough te r ra in . A lower final drive gear ra t io as mentionedin paragraph a above and s t ronger final drive gears are recommended .

c . The output shafts of the final drive develop radia l cracks andshear . The output shaft has been known to shear when the tank is climbinga hil l o r rol l ing along a level road. I t is virtual ly impossible to drive thetank if one of the output shafts breaks . The exact cause for fai lure of theoutput shaft is not known. A stronger output shaft is recommended.

2. Tracks .a . The t r ack blocks should have chevrons 2" deep. A 2-inch chevron

will dig or scoop deeper into the ground and give bet ter t rac t ion. About fivesets of 2-inch chevron t racks have been received to date . Units are d isassembling these t racks and spacing individual blocks in their old I- inch chevront r acks . A la rger supply of t racks with Z-inch chevrons is recommended .

b . The M46 tank has a tendency to throw t racks when making turnson hil ls or when t ravers ing the la te ra l slopes of hi l ls . The t rack center guidesare too narrow, too pointed, and too shor t to prevent the toad wheels fromr iding over them when the t racks dig in or sl ip on la te ra l slopes.

3. Transmiss ion . - The t ransmiss ion oil tends to overhea t when cl imbinglong steep h ins . The oil can be cooled by stopping the tank and running enginein neutra l for 2-5 minutes . Crews in combat can not afford to stop and waitthat long. A more efficient oil cooling system than the present t roublesomeoil cooler fan assembly i s recommended .

Over15

UNCLASSIFIEDe f J ; \ j r M l J l ' j ~ A L

3iSS" ii ! 6!I.iI j[)$


18/28

4@@16fZAMt!n\ 1tus h" 6;;;;ft

UNCLASSIFIED 164. Oil Cooler Fan Assembly . - The shaft , beveled gears , and

magnet ic clutch of the oil cooler fan assembly frequently fail especially whenthe engine is "revved up" to negotiate obstacles or h i l ls . When these par tsfail on an M46Al tank, the tank can not be driven under i ts own power and mustbe towed; when these par ts fail on an M46 tank, the tank can be driven for shor tdis tances and a t slow speeds only i f extreme caution i s exerc ised . A redesignof the oil cooler fan assembly to co r rec t the weakness in the shaft, beveledgears , and magnetic clutch is recommended .

.5. Driving. - When making tu rns on steep hills much of the power ist ransmi t ted to one t r ack which ei ther spins in place .-:>r digs into the ground. It isthen necessary for the dr iver to back the tank in a direct ion tangent to the tu rnand then s t a r t climbing straight into the turn with both t r acks pulling. Amodified t r ansmiss ion to keep power in both t racks when making tu rns onsteep hil ls is recommended .

SOURCE: Command Repor t - I US CorpsDATE: March 1952 Source No 444

(RESTRICTED)SKID FOR TANK RECOVERY. - To faci l i tate tank recovery, the 245th

Tank Bat tal ion bui l t a metal skid to replace a tank t r ack which had beenbroken by an enemy mine. Ini t ia l exper iments in towing a disabled tank onthe skid have proved successful . This method of recover ing tanks with onet rack broken is apparent ly fas ter than at tempting to repai r the tank on thebatt lefield. The use of a skid also prevents additional damage to the suspensionsys tem.

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps , Arti l leryDATE: March 1952 Source No 445

(RESTRICTED)ARTILLERY-AIR FIRE COORDINATION. - The concept of a Fi re SupportCoordinat ion Cente r has been put into pract ice within the divisions and corpsin Korea; however, the idea is re la t ively new and many problems are yet tobe solved. Infantry and art i l lery fire coordinat ion has had a long background

UNCLASSIFIED"."C'61WlQii"R t l'Wry "'sec" 'P2"


19/28

!i!c.SlYli2,UNCLASSIFIEDof successfu l operat ing exper ience. This is not the case , however , withar t i l le ry and a ir coordinat ion . The problems of planning ai rs t r ikes , dete r mining a flak suppression program, safe flying areas for ai rcraf t operat ingin conjunction with ar t i l le ry concentrat ions, and a r eas being shel led withVT fuzed project i les , the t iming and durat ion of silencing ar t i l lery fire topermit a i r s t r ikes , a ll these and others a re problems which have presenteddifficulties and which have l imi ted the degree of effective coordinat ion f rombeing as effi cient as des i red between ar t i l lery and the A ir For ce .

RECOMMENDATION. - That a program of prac t ica l r esearch and ins t ruct ion be under taken by the Army Fie ld For ces together with the Air Force .toproduce prac t ica l teaching doctr ine in a ir and ar t i l lery coordinat ion in conjunc tion with the activi t ies of Fi re Suppor t Coordinat ion 's Cen te r s . Fur the r thatthe inst ruct ion in Fi re Suppor t be included in the cur r icu lum of The Art i l le rySchool . The idea of Fi re Suppor t is presented to students in conferences atThe Art i l le ry School , but i t is felt that more emphas i s on the practical appl ica t ion of a funct ioning Fi re Support Coordination Center should be included in theSchool 's cur r icu lum. It is fur ther recommended tha t Ai r For ce - Ar t i l l e r yt eams be t ra ined to serve as ins t ruc tors in this subject both at Service Schoolsand at di vision t raining in the field.

* * *(RESTRICTED)

DEBRIEFING OF AR TILLER Y AIR OBSERVERS. - The Corps Art i l le ryA ir Section maintains continuous daylight survei l lance of the corps front.Adjusting ar t i l lery is i ts p r imar y miss ion; however , i t is also an excel lentintell igence gather ing source . Cor ps G2 personnel also fly regular ly, thoughnot continuous, r econnai ssance miss ions over por t ions of the front .

RECOMMENDATION. - I t is r ecommended tha t Corps G2 coordinate withthe Corps Art i l le ry Air Off icer on establ ishing a routine debriefing programfor ar t i l le ry a ir observers . Having t ra ined debriefing personnel a t the CorpsArt i l le ry A ir Str ip would make avai lable a wealth of additional informat ionass i s t ing mater ia l ly in forming the intelligence picture. I t is fur ther r ec ommended that more emphas i s be placed on t raining within the Zone of theIn te r ior in in te l l igence collect ion and coordinat ion between ar t i l lery a ir sect ions and division and corps intel ligence sect ions on the extract ion of suchinformat ion f rom a ir observers .(RESTRICTED)

SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS ON A STABILIZED FRONT.I t is r ecommended tha t al lowances of Quar te r mas te r cleaning and preserv ingmater ia ls be grea t ly increased to mor e near ly approach gar r ison standards.

Over17UNCLASSIFIED t a J ) ~ ' " v a

QSG"S;7


20/28

"-. - "'"$ ED{WJU}, ]i); tUNCLASSIFIED ftSJiIJ' it! s::lti II.8

Because all organizat ions a re more s tabi l ized and are c loser to garr isonl iving than is normal in combat , the allowances of Quar te rmas te r cleaningand preserving expendable supplies for combat conditions have proved tobe great ly inadequate. In most cases , unit messes now occupy prefabr icatedbuildings, many with concrete floors. The i ssue of soaps, brushes , s teelwool, t r isodium phosphate and other cleaning mater ia ls cannot meet therequi rements .

Also, because of the stabil ized situation, all organizat ions are usingequipment not authorized by per t inent tables of organizat ion and equipment,such as squad tents , electr ic generators , etc. This equipment is authorizedon an individual case bas is .

I t is also recommended that tables of allowances be established by higherheadquar te rs , to standardize such issues and prescr ibe the al lowances.

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 14th Infantry RegimentDATE: March 1952 Source No 446

(CONFIDENTIAL)PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. - Psychological Warfarer in our present

situation, is worthwhile. I t i s difficult to determine if the propaganda leafletis the main reason for the number of North Korean pr isoners taken for theperiod; however , in terrogat ion of PW's revealed that leaflets are being readand have produced the des i red resu l ts . PW's have informed us that i t is veryr isky to be caught with our propaganda leaflet ; therefore , any leaf le ts resembling"Script , " would be m o r e effect ive. Suggest something that looks on one sidel ike the money used to pay North Korean or Chinese t roops . Continued useof this type of warfare is defini tely des i red by the regiment .

Apparent ly the enemy feels that the u se of propaganda leaflets has mer i t ,for during the per iod the 14th Infantry received approximately 410 enemypropaganda shel ls . Some enemy leaflets were well written and some werevery poorly written. The only effect these leaf le ts had on our t roops was tokeep them amused , and possibly to make them a l i t t le more cautious of theenemy 's cunning.

UNCLASSIFIED..." t 61l)S;%%i\'j{Z tl

. , HC!fS'Tr 'UngMep?"


21/28

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 140th Antiaircraf t Art i l lery AW Battal ion (SP) DATE: March 1952 Source No 447

(RESTRICTED)WIRE COMMUNICATION. - In the present static si tuat ion to insure posi t ive

communication, telephone l ines are laid to all gun posi t ions. In addition, l inesare laid from individual t racks to supported infantry-ar t i l lery units . TheT /O&E authorizat ion is eighteen per l ine battery which is ent irely inadequateunder present conditions. A minimum of eight more telephones per line batteryare needed.

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 40th Antiaircraf t Arti l lery BrigadeDATE: January 1952 Source No 44 8

(RESTRICTED)COST CONSCIOUSNESS. AAA. - Supply economy measures continued tobe s t ressed in this command.Organizat ions are conducting campaigns to salvage and effect turn- in of

ferrous, as well as nonferrous, strategic mater ia ls to appropr ia te d isposalofficers . Continued emphasis and constant surveil lance is being maintainedto assure prompt re turn of scrap brass and serviceable ammunit ion packingcontainers . Operat ions a re continually analyzed with a view to reducing costof operations, and returning to appropr ia te supply channels those i tems whichare not required for performance of the present mission.

* * *

(RESTRICTED)All motor pools in this command a re consolidated to effect maximum

uti l izat ion of motor vehicles . This program continues to result in more econom ical operation and increases the effect iveness of organizational maintenance.During the pas t month a total decrease of 32,211 miles was effected in th is com mand as compared to the average month pr ior to consolidat ion. This was accom plished without decreasing effect iveness of organizations in their assigned mission,and amounted to a monetary savings of $685.30 in POL supplies alone.

OverUNCLASSIFIED 19.: ..,e.


22/28

..

. @ l \ j ~ n / n ; 12SU F ttt' li t T C21

UNCLASSIFIED 20* * *

(RESTRICTED)In fur therance of the supply economy program, the above mentionedcourse includes a four-hour period devoted exclusively to supply economy,

i ts objective being to teach methods of conservat ion and economy.(RESTRICTED)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF AAA BRIGADE. - That responsibil i ty fort raining AAA special is ts be placed on ei ther the theater commander or theZone of the Inter ior and that the means , materiel , personnel and accommodations essent ia l for the purposes intended, be furnished to the authorityde signated.

Additional spaces and personnel be authorized to provide a central izedAAA school for the t raining of AAA special is ts , not now available throughpipeline sources .

Considerat ion be g iven to a review of T /O&E of AAA units to insurecapabili ty of 24-hour operat ions.

That cel lular type units , s imi la r to current ly authorized Signal Maintenance Radar Units, be provided each AAA battalion by Engineer and Ordnance.

Field maintenance capabil i t ies for Engineer gasoline generators (MS,M7, MIS, and MIS) be improved immediately to prevent fur ther reductionin operat ional effectiveness.

That a die sel- type mobile generator be furnished each AAA unit to replacecurrent gasoline-type mobile genera tors , and that insofar as pract icable onetype replace the severa l types now issued.(RESTRICTED)

SUPPORT DIFFICULTIES. AAA ON AIR FORCE BASES. - AAA unitsstationed on or deployed in defense of A ir Force bases have exper iencedconsiderable difficulty in operat ions due to lack of adequate logist ical support .Support responsibi l i t ies of both Army and A ir For ce toward tenant Army unitshave not been c lear ly defined. Direct ives should be amplified to clear ly establish AF responsibi l i ty towards tenant Army uni ts . Local AIO's should be furnished funds to support AAA units at the required levels .

UNCLASSIFIEDv s n [ ~ , ~ : : * {


23/28

SRPJ;llZtlmf*--UNCLASSIFlED

SOURCE: Command Report-Moji Por t , 8156th Army UnitDATE: March 1952 Source, No 449

(RESTRICTED)COST CONSCIOUSNESS. - In our economy program, savings of over$10,000 has been effected by use of salvage dunnage. The pooling of sedanshas l ikewise conserved gas, oil, and wear and t ea r . In one month we wereable to save 30 0 gallons of gas alone. Our management program has beenmaking continual surveys , and resu l ts in reduced manpower has been effected.

SOURCE: Command Report - 21st Inf RegtDATE: January 1952 Source No 450

(RESTRICTED)PATROLS. - For ty-e ight securi ty patrols were conducted during the

8 -14 January. Six l ight engagements were fought by the secur i ty pat ro lswith enemy squad to platoon s ize uni ts . The most significant action occuredon 13 January. A Colombian Battalion patrol in posi t ion forward of Hill

observed an enemy pat ro l approaching at 2115 hours . The Colombian-.,--.....pat ro l leader ordered his m en to hold their fire unti l the enemy was withintwenty yards of the i r posit ion. When the enemy closed the distance, thepatrol delivered simultaneous concentrated f i res which resul ted in an es t i mated 5 KIA and 10 WIA.

SOURCE: Command Report - 45th Infant ry Di visionDATE: February 1952 Source No 451

(RESTRICTED)ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN. - Recommend that the t remendous pressu re

of repor ts and paper work be held to a minimum. All repor ts requi rementsshould be careful ly considered per iodical ly to ascer ta in i f the resul ts of therepor t justify the requi rement .

OverUNCLASSIFIED 21. it 6) 'F J b ~ ' l " 1 M l

CJiM2JJOPr


24/28

7 e6i''''W8i'J'l'Ztz.j j "51 6iI UP

22UNCLASSIFIEDSOURCE: Command Repor t - 40th Infantry DivisionDATE: March 1952 Source No 452

(CONFIDENTIAL)CONDITION O F EQUIPMENT. - When the 40th Division re l ieved the 24th

Division in place. i t exchanged m ost of the weapons and equipment in place .This had the disadvantage that equipment which was battle worn and in a verypoor state of repa ir was turned over to this Division. I t was found necessaryto devote m ajor attent ion to repair ing and replacing numerous i tems of equipment which were found to be entirely unserviceable . By the end of Februarymuch progress had been made as a result of concentrated efforts but even thena t remendous job still remained to be done to approach a sat isfactory over all condition. Fortunate ly the stable defensive tac t ica l si tuat ion allowed t imefor rehabili tat ion program. Had an enemy offensive been launched in Januaryor Fe bru ary 1952 much equipment would have been inoperat ive and might havebeen lost to the enemy.(RESTRICTED)

SCOUT DOGS. - On the f i r s t of March. the 26th US Infantry Scout DogPlatoon (-) was attached to the Division for operations and support . Divisionthen at tached squads of this unit to the 223d and 224th Infantry R egiments .Dogs worked effectively with pat ro ls of these units and i t is felt that the useof dogs on pat ro ls offers increased securi ty without hampering activi ty. Bestresults are obtained when dogs work with member s of patrol at lease tw o dayspr ior to actual patro1. Some ambush patrols experienced difficulty due tonervousness when the enforced inact ivi ty neces sar i ly exceeded 3 hours .(RESTRICTED)

GENERATOR FOR AVIATION SECTION. - The T/O&E makes no provIsIonfor genera tors for the aviat ion sect ion, but i t does authorize power tools.Genera tors are also necessary to provide l ighting facil i t ies for the sect ion.The aviat ion sect ions work does not end with sunset . Planning m u s t be donefor the next days operat ion; photo studies must be made; adminis t ra t ion andrepor ts m u s t be kept up to date . The T /O&E needs to be revised to takecognizance of this .(RESTRICTED)

QUARTERMASTER COMPANY ORGANIZATION. - Approximately threemonths observat ion indicates that the scope of operations of a Quar te rmas te r

UNCLASSIFIED

~ - -


25/28

; 8J'ITllJltJ&J'ifiUNCLASSIFIffi'bU;;; "OJ bJI)j) !i 2 _company in a thea te r of th is nature requires a d ~ i t i o n a l operat ing and adminstrat ive personnel . Following are th ree examples:

a . In view of the high morale factor result ing from the i s sue of icec ream, i t is probably safe to assume this product will continue to be issuedand distributed by Quar te rmas te r companies at di vis ion level . The T /O&E(10-l7N) does not provide personnel for this operat ion, i t had been neces sa ryto draw personnel f rom other sect ions, who can i l l afford such loss , in orderto provide suff ic ient amounts of ice cream to supply division t roops.

b. The communicat ion sect ion of the Quar te rmas te r company lackssufficient personnel to proper ly operate the normal Quar te rmas te r establ ishment in this theater , which in turn requi res the drawing of personnel fromother sect ions .

c. In order to adequate ly per form i t s own securi ty mission additionalf i l ler personnel should be added to the existing T /O&E. With operat ions on atwenty-four hours basis , guard duty cannot be proper ly car r ied on and efficientoperat ion mainta ined at the same t ime.

d. I t is recommended that study be given to present T /O&E (10-17)relat ive to the foregoing examples .

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 89th Tank Battal ion (Med) DATE: March 1952 Source No 453

(CONFIDENTIAL)USE OF TANKS ON MLR. - Of par t icu la r in te res t i s the locat ion of tanks

in the present division sec tor . Out of thir ty-four f ir ing posit ions on the MLR,nineteen a re located on the tops of r idges, in saddles between mounta in peaks,and on ground general ly considered inacc essible to tanks. Four teen tanks a reposi t ioned on the r idges forming the west , north, and eas t edges of the Punchbowl and th ree tanks are in posi t ion on the nor thern ex t remi t ies of HearthbreakRidge.

In the present tact ical si tuat ion the tanks a re being used almost exclusivelyas a r m o r protected, direc t fire weapons to re inforce other f i repower on the MLR.The mob ili ty of the tank has been ut i l ized only to the extent of plac ing the tankin a fi ring posi t ion in some very difficult t er ra in . Although l i t t le if any maneuver

OverUNCLASSIFIED 23

w ; ; . l f l ~ l '


26/28

eg"va wil lS' i qTlWtTUNCLASSIFIED 24

is involved, the tank- infant ry t eam st i l l exists with the t anker s positionbeside the doughboy on the MLR. The tanks I fire su pport can thus be placedin a rninirnurn arnount of t i rne and w ith rnuch grea te r accuracy than ar t i l l e ry .

The tanks have become pr ior i ty ta rge ts for enerny counterbat tery f i re ,and fr iendly infantry in vicini ty of the tanks rnus t be wel l dug in and be par t ic ular ly carefu l about exposing thernselve s when the tanks a re actual ly f ir ing.To date , the bes t solution has been for the tanks to have tw o posi t iOns; aposi t ion which is out of s ight of the enemy and a f ir ing position. The f ir ingposi t ion should be well sand-bagged on the front and s ides if it i s a t a ll possible.This will mater ia l ly reduce the arnount of damage to the suspension systernby en em y f i re . The tank should have no OVM o r other equipment on the outside of the hull while actually fir ing since i t is invar iably des t royed by shel lf ragrnents . I t is also des i r ab le to sand-bag the r ea r deck, the tu r ren t and theforward por t ion of the tank. In spi te of thes e precaut ions darnage wil l be sus tained by di rec t hi t s . Recent ly a l20-rnm rnor tar shel l penetrated into theengine compartrnent of a tank which had two l aye r s of sandbags on the backdeck. In severa l posi t ions the tank rnust r emain constant ly in f ir ing posi t ionand in these cases it has been found advisable to cons t ruc t a t r ench under thetank in orde r that i t m ay be entered by the escape hatch . In these posi t ionsmaintenance is accornpl ished dur ing the hour s of darkne s s .

Dur ing the month all tanks on the MLR have establ ished a night f i! lngschedule . Range ca rds a r e p repa red dur ing the day and f ir ing is conductedwith or without use of f lares at var ious per iods dur ing the night. This prograrnwas begun in an effor t to ha r a s s enerny working par t ies since the vast rnajor i tyof thei r const ruct ion work takes place during the hours of darkness . Judgingfrorn PW repor t s and the unusually heavy volurne of re turn fire the prograrnis proving very effect ive.

The t e r r a in and weather has crea ted unusual d i f f icul t ies in log i s t i cs .Transpor t ing the neces sa ry amounts of am rnuni t ion, fuel, food, and waterto the surnrni t of a rnountain some twelve hundred mete r s high has presenteda formidable problem a t t ime s . This has been par t icu lar ly t ru e during thepas t few weeks of the spr ing thaw. Dur ing much of this per iod the vast majo r i ty of the tanks in posi t ion had to be supplied ei ther by hand car ry or in a fewins tances by use of the M39 as a cargo car r ie r . In these cases the M39 hauledsuppl ies for adjacent infantry uni ts as wel l as for the t anks . At one t ime anent i re infantry bat ta l ion p lus the at tached tanks were supplied for a per iod offive days by two M39 ' s . With the aid of the engineers and by use of tank dozer sthe various tank posi t ions were kept operable during the per iod .

UNCLASSIFIED


27/28

< ......... . t);'I,sJtJii'lrl'1!lL.. aolflrr fNfOS:MATION

UNCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 2 13th Field Ar t i l le ry Battal ionDATE: February 1952 Source No 454

(RESTRICTED)HOWITZER TUBES AND HC AMMUNITION. - In view of re la t ive large

number howi tzer tubes changes necessi tated by volumn of fi re being del iveredunder combat condi t ions, i t i s s t rongly recommend ed that Ordnance TechnicalServ ices determine a re la t ive cal ibrat ion of tubes furnished as replacementsin orde r that organizat ion may m aintain an equitable dist r ibut ion of howitzershaving s imi la r charac te r i s t ic s .

It is also recommended that considerat ion be given to product ion of projec t i les uti l ized for delivering HC smoke, manufactured with a fuze recess whichwill accommoda te present type fuzes to include the varible t ime M96 fuze. Atpresent , project i les commonly known as "smoke shel l , " will accommoda teonly fuzes not having boos ters or supplementa l burst ing charges .(RESTRICTED)

VAN FO R SIGNAL REPAIR. - F or purposes of providing an adequate placefor proper repa ir and adjustment of delicate s ignal communica t ion equipment,and for providing adequate s torage faci l i t ies for such equipment when not inuse and for necessary spa re par ts and spare ba t te r ies for signal equipment,i t is st rongly recommended that present T /O&E' s for a ll types of Field Art i l l e ry Battal ions be modif ied to provide for one van, Ordnance repa ir type, tobe available to the Headquar t e rs and Headquar ters Bat te r ies of a ll Field Art i l lery Bat tal ions.

SOURCE: Command Repor t - 98 1 s t Field Art i l le ry Battal ionDATE: March 1952 Source No 455

(RESTRICTED)REPLACEMENTS. - A problem exis ts due to the loss and anticipated lossduring the next two months of approximately 80% of the present st rength. P e r sonnel received to date a re not t ra ined or of the ca l iber to t r a in rapidly to fillkey posi t ions such as c le rks , personnel special is ts , f i re di rect ion, survey,mess steward, supply, motoT. mechanics , and other technical qual i f ications.

OverUNCLASSIFIED 25


28/28

=C Q A ~ W i 1 l Q SECu,'ry "'ws"oncrUNCLASSIFIED 26

The policy of not assigning personnel until the physical loss of personne lser iously handicaps the t raining of the new man. An untrained special is tshould have a t l eas t on e month training on the job pr io r to his rel ieving theass igned man. Also semiqual i f ied personnel should have a t leas t 2 weeks onthe job t ra ining. Replacements have been received for cr i t ica l MOS posi t ions,with an ETS date less than 30 days af ter the ETS of the m an presently holdingthe posit ion. This does not allow the organizat ion to consider such rep lace ment as a fully qualif ied or a suitable rep lacement because he will not be ableto serve sufficient t ime in this thea te r . This si tuation me ans that anotherreplacement mus t be requisit ioned for the MO S immediate ly . The policy ofsending such personnel overseas in March 1952 with an ETS date in September1952 is ex t remely wasteful , and gives a fa lse impress ion of replacementsbeing received.

Documents

Dissemination of Combat Information 29 August 1952