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Master’s Thesis of International Studies

Disaster Capacity Building in Climate Related Natural Disasters Comparative Study of Post-Tsunami Indonesia

and Sri Lanka

정부 역량 강화와 자연재해 복원력의 관계에 대한 연구: 인도네시아와 스리랑카 사례 비교분석

February 2016

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University

International Cooperation Major

GyuWon Sohn

Disaster Capacity Building in Climate Related Natural Disasters Comparative Study of Post-Tsunami Indonesia

and Sri Lanka

Examiner Jiyeoun Song

Submitting a master’s thesis of International Studies

February 2016

Graduate School of International Studies

Seoul National University International Cooperation Major

GyuWon Sohn

Confirming the master’s thesis written by

GyuWon Sohn February 2016

Chair Chong-Sup Kim (Seal)

Vice Chair Taekyoon Kim (Seal)

Examiner Jiyeoun Song (Seal)

Abstract

DisasterCapacityBuildinginClimateRelatedNaturalDisasters:ComparativeStudyofPost-TsunamiIndonesiaandSriLanka

GyuWonSohnInternationalStudies,InternationalCooperationTheGraduateSchoolSeoulNationalUniversityThisthesisexaminesthevariousdomesticcapacitybuildinginitiativesaswellasdisastermanagementstrategiesofpost-2004IndonesiaandSriLanka,thetwomostaffectednationsoftheIndianOceantsunami.Despitesimilarlevelsofdamageaswellasprogressofshort-termrecoveryprocesses,thesetwocountriesinquestionhavedivergedintermslong-termdisasterresiliencebuilding.Giventhis,thisthesisinvestigateshowtheshort-termandlong-termresiliencebuildingprocessvariousdependingonagovernment'scapacity,focusingontheimpactsofinstitutionalcoordination.Coordinationabilityofthegovernmentwasassessedthroughthedegreeinwhichinformationsharingandagencycollaborationwereoperative.

Analysisrevealedthatwhileinsufficientgovernmentcapacitycanbecompensatedthroughinternationalaidefforts,governmentcapacitytoappropriatelycoordinatedisasterresiliencebuildingstrategiesisessentialinlong-termdevelopmentplans.SriLankaandIndonesiahadcontrastinglevelsofprogressinlong-termresiliencebuildingstrategies.WhileIndonesiatooktheapproachofslowlyfusingdisastermanagementinitiativesintoexistingnationaldevelopmentplans,SriLanka'slackofinstitutionalarrangementaswellasfundsforeconomicandurbanplanningmeasureshinderedthecountryfromdoingso.Asaresult,SriLankashowedlessprogressincomparisontoIndonesia.

Keywords:naturaldisasters,capacitybuilding,2004tsunamiStudentNumber:2014-24224

TableofContentsListofTablesListofAcronyms1 Introductionžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž11.1 ResearchQuestions1.2 StructureofThesis2 LiteratureReviewžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž92.1 DisasterManagement2.2 PerspectivesofDisasterResilience3 ComparisonofShort-TermResponsesandRecovery

Processesžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž183.1 SriLanka3.1.1 Damage3.1.2 Stage1:EmergencyRelief3.1.3 Stage2:ImmediateRecoveryandReconstruction3.2 Indonesia3.2.1 Damage3.2.2 Stage1:EmergencyRelief3.2.3 Stage2:ImmediateRecoveryandReconstruction3.3 Variation3.3.1 DifferentExperienceswithOngoingCivilConflicts

4 ComparisonofLong-TermCapacityandResilienceBuildingStrategiesžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž364.1 StructureofCapacityElements:SriLanka4.1.1 DisasterLegislature4.1.2 ControlCenter4.1.3 DataCollectionMechanismandInstitutions4.1.4 PublicEducationandDistributionofResiliencePolicies4.2 CoordinationAmongCapacityElements:SriLanka4.2.1 ResourcesandInformationSharing4.2.2 AgencyCollaboration4.3 StructureofCapacityElements:Indonesia4.3.1 DisasterLegislatureandControlCenter4.3.2 DataCollectionMechanismandInstitutions4.3.3 PublicEducationandDistributionofResiliencePolicies4.4 CoordinationAmongCapacityElements:Indonesia4.4.1 ResourcesandInformationSharing4.4.2 AgencyCollaboration4.5 Variations4.5.1 GovernmentCompetence4.5.2 VaryingExtentofIncorporationofDisasterManagementStrategiesinNationalDevelopmentPlanning4.5.3 EarlyWarningSystems:DifferencesofSriLankaandIndonesia4.5.4 ImplicationofVariations

5 Conclusionžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž72Bibliographyžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž76AbstractinKoreanžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžžž83

ListofTablesTable1 VariationsinShort-TermRecoveryProcesses(SriLanka)Table2 VariationsinShort-TermRecoveryProcesses(Indonesia)Table3 HyogoFrameworkforActions(2005-2015)Indicatorsof ResiliencetoDisasters

ListofAcronyms AHA : ASEANCoordinatingCenterforHumanitarianAssistance onDisasterManagementBAPPENAS : NationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(Indonesia)BRR : Aceh/NiasRehabilitationandReconstructionAgency (Indonesia)DMC : DisasterManagementCenter(SriLanka)GAM : GerakanAcheMerdekaHFA : HyogoFrameworkforActionIOTWS : IndianOceanTsunamiWarningSystemLTTE : LiberationTigersofTamilEalamNDMCC : NationalDisasterManagementCoordinatingCommittee (SriLanka)RADA : ReconstructionandDevelopmentAgency(SriLanka)RPJMN : NationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan(Indonesia)TAFOR : TaskForceforRelief(SriLanka)TAFREN : TaskFormforRebuildingtheNation(SriLanka)TAP : TransitionalAccommodationProject(SriLanka)TEW : TsunamiEarlyWarning

1 INTRODUCTION Disastermanagement,climatechangeadaption,environmentalmanagementandpovertyreductionhavebeendealtwithandstudiedindependently,butrecenteffortstoengagetheseresearchareashaveaimedtowardsreducingsocio-economicvulnerabilitytonaturaldisasters1.Nevertheless,sucheffortshavenotbeenfruitfulsofar,asanincreasingnumberofpeoplearebeingexposedtolargervulnerabilityandeconomiclosses.Whatismore,thenumberofthehumancasualtiesoccurringasaresultofnaturaldisastersinincreasinglybeingconcentratedindevelopingcountries.Thus,theescalatingconcernsregardingclimatechangeandclimate-relatednaturaldisastersareincreasingtheneedforlong-termadaptationanddamagereducingmeasuresinvulnerableregions.Whileextremetemperaturehighs,seasonalstorms,excessiveprecipitationandassociatedflooding,andlackofprecipitationandassociateddroughtareallextremeweathereventsthatcanleadtonaturaldisasters,thisresearchintendstofocusonextremestormsandfloodingforthesetendtohavethemostimmediateandobviousimpactsintermsofhumancasualtiesand 1 Thomalla,Frank,etal."Reducinghazardvulnerability:towardsacommonapproachbetweendisasterriskreductionandclimateadaptation."Disasters30:1(2006).pp.39-48.

severeinfrastructuredestruction2. Morespecifically,thisresearchwillexaminethevariousdomesticcapacitybuildinginitiativesaswellasdisastermanagementstrategiesrevolvingaroundSoutheastAsiancountriesaffectedbythe2004tsunami(IndonesiaandSriLanka,thetwomostaffectednations)forthistopicmayberelevanttodevelopingnationsintermsofsocioeconomicdevelopment.Asmostnationsinaffectedregionsarecategorizedasdevelopingcountries,anactiveresponsetotheincreasingriskofnaturaldisastersthroughsuchinitiativesseemscrucialinbothpreventingeconomiclossesandprotectingpopulations. Inthecontextofthe2004tsunami,IndonesiaandSriLankahadsignificantsimilaritiesinregardingtheirdomesticatmospheres.Geographically,bothareislandnations,makingthemespeciallyvulnerable.Indeed,thesetwocountrieswerethemostseverelyaffectedamongalldamagedcountriesbythe2004tsunami.Whatismore,thelivelihoodsoftheseaffectedareaswerealsosimilar;inbothcountries,theeconomicallyworseoffregionswerethemostheavilydamaged.TheeasterncoastallinesofSriLanka,whichwerethemostheavilyhit,contributetheleasttothe 2 Anderson,Jason,andBausch,Camilla."ClimateChangeandNaturalDisasters:Scientificevidenceofapossiblerelationbetweenrecentnaturaldisastersandclimatechange."PolicyDepartmentEconomicandScientificPolicy(2006).

nationalGDP.TheAcehprovinceisoneofIndonesia'spoorestregions,withcloseto1/3ofthepopulationlivingunderthepovertyline3.Andduetothecatastrophicconsequencesofthedisasterin2004,bothcountrieshaveundergonesignificantinvestigationandlong-termeffortstowardsdisasterresiliencebuilding.Inotherwords,SriLankaandIndonesiacanbeconsideredastwocountrycasesinwhichthe2004tsunamiservedasamajormotivationforinstitutionalchange4.IndonesiaandSriLanka,beingrespectivelythefirstandsecondmostdamagedcountrybythe2004tsunami,bothcountrieshaverecognizedtheneedtosystematicallyprepareforpossiblefuturenaturaldisasters.Nevertheless,theactualprogressofthesetwocountriesseemquitediverging.InthecaseofIndonesia,thereareongoingeffortstodealingwithandemphasizingpost-managementofdisasterswithinitsnationaldevelopmentplans,characteristicallythroughmulti-levelinstitutionalarrangements5.InSriLankaontheotherhand,disastermanagementstrategies,includinglong-termdisasterresiliencebuilding,arenotsufficientlyaccountedforinurbanplanning,letalone 3 Statistik,BadanPusat."ProvincialHumanDevelopmentReportAceh2010:HumanDevelopmentandPeopleEmpowerment."UNDP.4 Seng,DenisStanleyChang."Tsunamiresilience:Multi-levelinstitutionalarrangements,architecturesandsystemofgovernancefordisasterriskpreparednessinIndonesia."EnvironmentalScience&Policy29(2013):57-70.5 NationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan(RPJMN)2010-2014.MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning.GovernmentofIndonesia.

nationaldevelopmentplans6.ThedifferingpathsofthesetwocountriesarousequestionstowhySriLanka'spost-tsunamicapacitybuildinghaslessfocusonmacroscopicandlong-termresiliencebuilding,whilethatofIndonesiahasreachedaconsiderablelevelofinstitutionalchangedespitesimilarpost-disasterconditions. Giventhis,thepurposeofthisresearchistoinvestigatehowtheshort-termrecoveryandlong-termresiliencebuildingvariesdependingonagovernment'scapacity.Morespecifically,itwillfocusontheimpactsofinstitutionalcoordination(oritslacking)onbuildinggovernmentcapacity. Short-termandlong-termresiliencebuildingwillbedividedastheyshouldbedealtastwodifferentprocesses.Short-termresilienceisindicativeofelasticrecovery;immediatereliefandrecoveryactspertaintoactivitiesofshort-termresilience.Reconstructionprojectsthataretargetedtowardssimplyrestoringtheoriginalstateofthedamagedareashouldalsobeconsideredintheshort-termtimeframe.Long-termresiliencebuildingactivitieshowever,includepost-disasteractionsthatleadtotransformationandimprovementcomparedtothedamagedarea'soriginalstate.Governmentprojectsorinitiativesthataimtoenhancepre-disaster 6 Ratnasooriya,HarshaA.R.,etal.“PostTsunamiRecoveryProcessinSriLanka.”Journal

ofNaturalDisasterScience29:1(2007).pp.21-28.

resistancetowardsnaturaldisasters(e.g.mitigateanticipateddamage,increasepreparedness)shouldbetakenaslong-termresiliencebuilding.Thus,reconstructionprojectsthatincorporatedisasterriskreductionmeasurescanberegardedaslong-termresiliencebuilding. Thedividebetweenshort-termandlong-termresiliencedoesnotonlypertaintotimebutalsototheinstitutionalcapacityrequiredfortheirreinforcement.Unlikeshort-termresiliencebuildingwhichmostlyinvolvesphysicalrebuilding,long-termfurtherdemandssocialandeconomicresiliencebuilding.Extensiveinfrastructuredevelopmentaswellaspubliceducationarealsoimportantelementsoflong-termresilience.Therefore,thespecificagendaoftheresearchquestionscanbeseparatedintotwotimeframes:1)theeffectsofgovernmentcoordinationduringtheearlystagesofrecovery,and2)itseffectsinthelong-termduringresilienceandcapacitybuildingstages.Twocasesofbeenselectedforcomparison. Datacollectedthroughgovernmentreports,community-levelassessments,agencyevaluationreports,aswellasacademicpaperssuggestthatintheshort-term,lackofgovernmentcoordinatingcapacitycanbecompensatedbytheinfluxofinternationalaid.CasesfrombothSriLankaandIndonesiashowthatthegapingovernmentalcontrolofaffectedareascanbefilledviatheinstitutionalcapacitiesofinternationalorganizations.

Inthelong-termresiliencebuildingprocesshowever,centralgovernmentcoordinationwasrevealedtobeanimportantfactor.1.1 ResearchQuestions DespitethefactthatnumerousSoutheastAsiannationsexperiencedseveredamagesinpopulationandinfrastructureduetothe2004tsunami,thesystematicresponsesfollowingtheincidentaswellaseffortstowardsadditionalcapacitybuildingaftertheincidentseemstodifferbygovernment.Thus,inadditiontoanalyzinghowtheimmediateresponseandrecoveryprocessdifferedinSriLankaandIndonesia,thisresearchwillalsoattempttostudyhowdisastermanagementstrategiesareintegratedintokeysocialinstitutionsaswellasstudythereasonsbehindpossibledifferentapproachestodisasterresiliencebetweenthetwocountries.Furthermore,thisresearchwillattempttoanalyzewhyIndonesiaiscurrentlyreceivingpositiveattentionfortheirdomesticandinternationalinitiativestowardlong-termdisasterresilience.Indoingso,thereasonstowhySriLankaisfailingtoreceivesuchattentionaswellasthepossiblefactorsorobstaclespreventingSriLankafromconstructinganeffectivedisastercoordinationmechanismwillbeexamined. Thisresearchwillmostlyutilizequalitativeanalysisinorderto

comparetheprocessesandoutcomesofvariousresponsestothe2004tsunami.First,comparativeanalysisontheimmediateaftermathofthisnaturaldisasterwillbedonebasedontwotimeframes:emergencyrelief,andimmediatereconstruction.Apartfromlong-termresiliencebuilding,theeffectivenessoftheshort-termreliefandrecoveryprocessesofthetwocountrieswillbeseparatelyevaluated. Secondly,theHyogoFrameworkforAction(HFA)willbeusedtoassessIndonesia'sandSriLanka'sprogressinlong-termriskmanagement.TheHFAisaplandraftedbytheUnitedNationsInternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction(UNISDR)inordertospecifytheworkthatisnecessaryfromvariousinstitutionalactorstoreducedisasterdamageandincreasedisasterresilience.NationalProgressReportspublishedbythegovernmentsofIndonesiaandSriLankawillbestudiedtoanalyzetheprogressinimplementingdisastermanagementinitiativesoutlinedbytheHFA.Foreachnation,progressreportsfortwocyclesselectedandcomparedforanalysis.

1.2 StructureofThesis Theremainingpartofthisthesisislargelydividedintothreeparts.Chapter2willbealiteraturereviewcoveringthegeneralnaturaldisaster

managementprocessandtheoriesondisasterresiliencebuildinginrelationtotheresearchquestionsoutlinedabove.Previousworkconcerningthelinkagebetweeneffectiveinstitutionalcoordinationandpolicymakingwillalsobereviewed. Inchapter3,thedetailsoftheshort-termandlong-termmanagementprocessesofthetwocaseswillbediscussed.BoththeIndonesianandtheSriLankacasewillshowthatlackofinstitutionalcoordinationcanbeovercomebyinternationalreliefaidanddomesticemergencyreliefmeasuresduringtheveryearlystagesofdisasterrecovery.TheIndonesiacasewilldemonstratetheimportanceandnecessityofgoodqualitycoordinationbasedonaneffectivecentralagencyandfluentinformationsharingamongvariousgovernmentinstitutionsinlong-termdisastercapacitybuilding. Lastlyinchapter4,twoexamplesofpost-disasterresiliencebuildingmeasures(oneforeachcountry)willbeexamined.ForIndonesia,disasterresiliencebuildingpoliciesincorporatedintourbanplanningwillbereviewed.Inaddition,SriLanka'semphasisandextendedoutcomesinearlywarningsystemwillbeexaminedasacaserepresentingcurrentSriLanka'snationaldirectionalityregardingdisastercapacitybuilding.

2 LITERATUREREVIEW Thischapterwillprovidealiteraturereviewontwomajorthemesdealtwithinthisthesis.Thefirst(section2.1)isdisastermanagement;asthisthesisattemptstoanalyzethedisastermanagementprocessinshort-termandlong-termtimeframes,theliteraturereviewwilloutlinewhichseparatephasesofthedisastermanagementsystempertaintoshortandlong-termapproaches.Section2.2oftheliteraturereviewwillcovervariousviewpointtowardsdisasterresilience.2.1 DisasterManagement Disastermanagement,oremergencymanagementiswidelydescribedintermsof"phases"bypolicymakersandresearchers.Thetheoreticalapproachconcerningphaseshasbeenusedformorethan80yearsnow;theconceptwasfurtherorganizedbyDavidNealin1997asheclassifiedthedifferentapproachesofvariousresearchers7.Whiledifferentapproacheseachoutlineddifferentnumbersofphases,thestandardnowusedtodescriberiskmanagementisthefivephasessystem:prevention,mitigation,preparedness,responseandrecovery.Inthecontextofnatural

7 Neal,David."ReconsideringthePhasesofDisaster."InternationalJournalofMassEmergenciesandDisasters15:2(1997).pp.239-264.

disastershowever,thephase"prevention"isomittedaspreventingnaturaldisastersisinalmostallcasesnotafeasiblestrategytoadopt.Theremainingfour(mitigation,preparedness,response,andrecovery)ontheotherhand,areoftenreferredtoasacycleinwhichadjoiningphasesareoverlapping8.Thisviewnotesthatseparateriskmanagementinitiativesarenotapplicableatsinglephasesonly,butcanalsoberelevanttomorethanone,orbeattheboundaryinbetweenphases. Dependingontheactorandemergency,eachofthefourphasescaninvolvedifferentfunctions.Intermsofnaturaldisasterssuchasearthquakes,floods,andtsunamis,themitigationphaseinvolvesassessingpossiblerisksinordertominimizeavoidabledangers.Examplesincludeintroducing"earthquakevalves"thatautomaticallycutoffgasandelectricitysupplyinordertoavoidfiresorexplosions.Mitigationmeasurescanalsobeincorporatedintoregulatingconstructionplanssothatresidentialandcommercialbuildingsaswellasfurniturearedurableinearthquakes.Inaddition,improvingdrainagesystemsonthestreetsaswellasinsidebuildingsisalsoamitigationmeasurepertainingtoareaspronetoflooding.Likewise,mitigationfocusesonpre-disastermeasuresthat 8 Baird,MalcomE."The'Phases'ofEmergencyManagement."BackgroundPaper(2010).IntermodalFreightTransportationInstitute(IFTI),UniversityofMemphis.

minimizerisks.Allinall,mitigationatthenationallevelishighlyrelevantwiththenationalbudgetandlegislativeinitiatives. Preparednessisconcernedwithhavingequipmentandpersonnellinedupforimmediateusewhentheemergencyoccurs.Themaintargetofthisphaseistoreactefficientlyandeffectivelyinthecaseofanaturaldisastersothattheimpactsarefurtherreducedandvulnerabilitiesattendedto.Measuresofpreparednessexistatdifferentlevels;planningcanoccuratnational,local,andsometimesfamilylevels.Theimportanceofschoolbasedpreparednessplansarealsocommonlyemphasized(e.g.classroomemergencykits,responseteams,training,etc.)Atthegovernmentallevel,intricateevacuationplans,rescueequipmentandpersonnel,andreadymedicalsystemsareemphasized.Insum,preparednessatthegovernmentallevelheavilyrequirescomprehensiveriskplanning,publicinformationdissemination,andwidepublictrainingactivities. Thefourthphase,response,requiresspeedyprovidingofbasichumanitarianneedstothedamagedregionandpopulation.Incasesdealingwithseverenaturaldiseases,theresponsephaseismostlikelytobeginwithsearchandrescueoperations,followedbyemergencymedicaltreatmentandtemporaryshelterinstallations.Ideally,thisstageofdisaster

managementcanberealizedviaeffectivenationwidecoordinationamongrelevantagencies;however,donations,financialaid,andothertypesofhumanitarianassistancefrominternationalorganizationsareaccompanied. Thelaststageofdisastermanagementistherecoveryphase.Atthispoint,immediatethreatshavediminished,andthemainobjectivesremainingareretainingdamagedregions,andrecoveringthepopulation'ssocioeconomiclivelihoods.Likethefirstphase(mitigation),therecoveryphasealsorequiresasignificantdegreeofstatebudgetplanningandlegislativeinitiatives.Statewidecoordinationofimplicatednationalagenciesandtheirprogramsisalsoimportantforproductiveandcompetentrebuilding. Theconceptofrecoveryhowever,canbediscussedintwoseparateways;first,recoverycanbedescribedasprocessof"restoration,"inthatlivingstandards,infrastructure,communitystructure,aswellaseconomiclivelihoodsreturntothesamelevelpriortothenaturaldisaster(MaguireandHagan,2007)9.Recently,themodeofoptimalrecoveryisshiftingfrom"restoration"to"transformation."Whatismore,thisconceptof"transformation"insinuatesthatoptimalrecoveryisinfactimproved 9 Maguire,BrigitandHagan,Patrick."DisastersandCommunities:UnderstandingSocialResilience."AustralianJournalofEmergencyManagement22:2(2007).

resiliencetonaturaldisasters. Thisthesisfocusesandexpandsonthisaspectthatlong-termresiliencebuildingisatransformationprocessthatishighlydependentontheleadershipandcapacityofthegovernment.Whiletheaboveapproachofanalyzingdisastermanagementintermsofphasesislogical,itdoesnottakeintoconsiderationthefactthatmitigationandpreparednessmeasures(closelyrelatedtolong-termdisastermanagement)canbeclosetononexistentbeforeacountryisattackedbyanaturaldisaster.Thecountriesstudiedinthisthesisaresuchcases.Forsuchcountries,theaboveapproachthatemphasizesastep-by-stepcourseofactioncanbelesspractical.2.2 PerspectivesofDisasterResilience Thenotionofimprovedresilienceasoptimalrecoverypreviouslymentionedinsection2.1hasbeenstudiedinvariouscontextsandperspectives.Butingeneral,comprehensiveresilience(inotherwords,atransformingandimprovingprocessratherthanarestoringprocess)encompassesthepsychologicalandbehavioralnotionthatpeoplethathavebeenexposedtoadverseeventstendtogrowinpreventingandcoping

capacity(McMillen,1999)10. Inasimilarrespect,ithasbeenarguedthatbuildingresiliencecanalsobevieweddifferentlyfromsimpleabilitytophysicalrecover.MaguireandCartwright(2008)writeaboutsocialresilience,inwhichtheycategorizetherecentperspectivesintothreemajorviews:resilienceasstability,resilienceasrecovery,andresilienceastransformation.AccordingtoMaguireandCartwright,themostrecentperspectiveonresilience,resilienceastransformation,stressesthatoptimalresiliencerequires"changingtoanewstatethatismoresustainable,"ratherthansimplybouncingbacktotheoriginalstateassuggestedbyresilienceasrecoveryandstability11.Whiletheseauthorstalkmainlyabouthowastrugglingsocietycanrespondtochangingatmospheres(e.g.economichardship)throughinnovationanddevelopment,thetransformationviewofresilienceshouldalsobeofsignificancetonaturaldisasterresilience.Moreover,thedifferentiationofresilienceasrecoveryandresilienceastransformationcanalsobeappliedinrelationtothetimelineofdisastermanagement.Inotherwords,theconceptofresilienceasrecovery(orbouncingbacktothe 10 McMillen,J.Curtis."Betterforit:HowPeopleBenefitfromAdversity."SocialWork44:5(1999).pp.455-468.11 Maguire,BrigitandCartwright,Sophie."AssessingaCommunity'sCapacitytoManageChange:AResilienceApproachtoSocialAssessment."CanberraBureauofRuralSciences(2008).

pre-disasterstate)pertainstoshort-termresiliencebuilding,andtheconceptofresilienceastransformationislinkedtolong-termresiliencebuilding.Thedivisionbetweenshort-termandlong-termresiliencebuildingwillbere-visitedinlaterdiscussions. Meanwhile,inrelationtothegeneraldiscussionofresilience,Winkworth(2007)12 identifiesthreeelementsthatarerequiredforitsbuilding:capacitytopredictdisasters,abilitytorecoverfromtheshockanddamage,andthecapabilityto"innovateandimprovisetoreachimprovedlevelsofsocialfunctioning"(Aguirre,2006)13. Whilethesediscussionspertaintoawiderrangeofdisasters(e.g.actsofterrorsuchasschoolshootings),thesamethreeelementscandefinitelyapplytolargescalenaturaldisasters.Atthesametime,thesestudiesdonotexplicitlymentiontheimportanceofasinglecomprehensiveactorthatcaneffectivelylookovertheholisticprocessofbuildingsocialresiliencetodisastersthatcancoordinateallthreeelementsintoanationwideproject. Variousdiscussionsofsocialcapitalhavealsoarguedthatthehigherdegreetowhichcommunitiesturntoself-helpandeachotherpoint 12 Winkworth,Gail."DisasterRecovery:AReviewoftheLiterature."InstituteofChildProtectionStudies(2007).13 Aguirre,BenignoE."OntheConceptofResilience."DisasterResearchCenter(2006).

tobettersocialresilience.Thesediscussionsonsocialcapitalalsoarguefortheimportanceofvariousinter-communityrelationshipsinthecommunityrecoveryprocess.Suchrelationshipscanincludeindividualbonds,civilnetworks,aswellaslinksinbetweencivilinstitutions(HealyandHampshire,2002)14.Nevertheless,eveninthecommunitysphere,theroleofthecentralgovernmentcannotbeunderminedinthesensethatgovernmentpoliciescanworktobothenforceandstrengthensuchlinksorunderminethem. Anotherstudythathaspointedtokeyelementstosuccessfuldisasterrecoveryandresiliencebuildingdiscussestheroleoflocalknowledge(A.R.Kahn,A.Kahn&Razzaq,2013)15.Inthecontextofcommunityrecovery,theseauthorsarguethatlocalknowledge(e.g.traditionalknowledge,indigenousknowledge)regardinghealth,watermanagement,soilmanagement,agriculturalpractices,fishingmethods,foodconservationtechniques,andmeteorologicallocalknowledgecanfunctionasdecidingfactorsofasuccessfulrecoveryprocess.Inthisstudy,theauthorsspecifythatlocalknowledgelistedaboveisnotequalto 14 Healy,KarenandHampshire,Anne."SocialCapital:AUsefulConceptforSocialWork?"

AustralianSocialWork55:3(2002).pp.227-238.15 Khan,AbdulRazzaq,etal."ConceptualizingLocalKnowledgeandDisasterManagement."MunichPersonalRePEcArchivePaperNo.63355(2013).

scientificknowledgeinthatlocalknowledgeisintuitive,communicatedhistoricallythroughsubjectivemethods(insteadofliterature),learnedthroughhandsonexperience,andmostimportantly,qualitative.Nevertheless,theyemphasizethattheappropriateuseandunderstandingoflocalknowledgeisimportantinimplementingdisastermanagementanddevelopmentalprojectsincommunitiesthatarelessexposed,orlessaccessibletomoderntechnologiesandlifestyles. However,aswithsocialcapital,theroleoflocalknowledgealsoseemstobeasubordinateelementtobetakenintoaccountwithinthecentralgovernment'sstrategicdisastermanagementframework.Inotherwords,socialcapitalandlocalknowledgedonotseemtobethefundamentalelementleadingtosuccessfulrecoveryandincreasedresilience.Whilethesefactorscanbeconsiderablyhelpfulinlocalcontexts,anationwideprojectofnaturaldisasterrecoveryandlong-termresiliencebuildingcannotrelyonsolelysocialcapitalandlocalknowledge.Incontrast,thisthesis,throughacomparativeanalysisoftwocountrycases,attemptstoidentifygovernmentcoordinationcapacityasthefundamentalvariablebehindsuccessfulnaturaldisasterresiliencebuilding.

3 COMPARISONOFSHORT-TERMRESPONSESAND

RECOVERYPROCESSES

3.1 SRILANKA

3.1.1 Damage 16 Asidefromsporadictyphoons,seasonalmonsoons,andrandomlandslides,SriLankahadbeenrelativelyfarfrommassivenaturaldisasters.However,whenthetsunamistruckonDecember2004,itwasrecordedastheseverestnaturaldisasterthatSriLankaeverexperienced.Thedamageofthe2004tsunamiontheislandofSriLankawasunlikethatofothercountriesinthatitaffectedmorethantwothirdsoftheisland'sshores.Themostheavilyaffectedcoastalboarderswerethenorthernandeastern,startingfromtheJaffnapeninsuladownuntiltheDondraHead(southernendoftheisland).However,eventherelativelyguardedwesternandsouthwesterncoastlineexperiencedflooding.Hence,whenthewavesstrucktheshorelines,thecountrywascompletelyunprepared;becausetherewasnowarningsystemworkinginplace,peoplewereleftextremely 16 Section3.1.1.waswrittenlargelybasedoninformationprovidedbythefollowinggovernmentdocument:SriLankanMinistryofFinanceandPlanning.Post-TsunamiRecoveryandReconstruction.PreparedbytheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningandtheReconstruction&DevelopmentAgency(RADA)inconsultationwithDevelopmentPartners,RepresentativeoftheINGOs&NGOs,PrivateSectorandtheCivilSociety(2006).

vulnerablewithnearlyzeromitigationefforts. Asaresult,morethan35,000peoplediedand20,000wereinjured.Thousandswentmissing,andmorethan1,500childrenwereorphaned.Evenmorewerewidowed.Moreover,nearly100,000homesweredestroyed,leavingapproximately500,000removedfromtheirhomes.Inadditiontotheinfrastructuredamage(houses,roads,watersupply,railways,hospitals,communication,electricity,etc.)theenvironmentalsoencounteredseveredamageduetothesuddenandmassiveintrusionofsaltwater.Soilwassubjecttoerosion(about10,000haoflandwassalinated),andmangrovesaswellascoralreefsweresignificantlyharmed.Damagetothetouristindustrywasconsiderable,asmanyhotelsnearthecoastlineweredestroyedalongwithrelatedtouristbusinesses. Thecostsofdamagestotheenvironmentaswellasthecountry'sinfrastructurewasestimatedtoexceed900millionUSD,anditwasestimatedthatitwouldrequireroughly2.2billionUSDtorehabilitateandreconstructthecountry.Aminimumofthreetofiveyearswouldbeneeded.TheAsianDevelopmentBankannouncedin2005thattheeconomiclossduetothetsunamiaccountedfornearly5%ofthecountry'sGDP,whilepredictingthatthecostsofrehabilitationandreconstructionwouldhinderthecountry'sgrowthbyapproximately1%.

3.1.2 Stage1:EmergencyRelief 17 Foracountrywithclosetononepriorexperiencewithanaturaldisastersosevere,immediatereliefefforts(emergencymedicalaid,food,water,othersupplies)werereasonablysuccessful.Inmostaffectedareas,requiredsuppliesandmedicalteamsweredispatchedbyinternationalrelieforganizationswithinoneday,andremainingschoolandotherpublicbuildingswerequicklytransformedintotemporaryshelters.Thereafter,paymentsincashbythegovernmentwereprovidedtofamiliesalongwithweeklyrations,andfuneralexpenseswerealsodistributedsystematicallyinattempttocontributetopreventingdiseaseoutbreaks.Althoughsomedegreeoflackofcoordinationcausedsmalltroubles,theinitialresponseturnedouttobemostlysuccessful.Coordinationproblemsinthisinitialresponsestageincludedregionaldifferencesinavailabilityoffoodrations,assomecommunitiesarguedthatthedistributiveprocessofgrantsandfoodwasapplieddifferentlyindifferentregions.Thenextstageafterrelief(recoveryandreconstruction)however,weretoexhibitevenmorechallengesincoordination. 17 Section3.1.2waswrittenlargelybasedoninformationprovidedbythefollowinggovernmentdocument:SriLankanGovernment,PostTsunamiRecoveryandReconstruction.JointReportoftheGovernmentofSriLanka(GoSL)andDevelopmentPartners(2005).

3.1.3 Stage2:ImmediateRecoveryandReconstruction Immediaterecoveryofthe2004tsunamiwasdoneheavilythroughforeignfinancialcontributionsfromtheprivatesectorandNGOs.Thecontributionsofbilateraldonors,multilateralagencies,NGOs,andtheprivatesectorreachedapproximately2,229millionUSD18.However,mostofsucheffortswerefocusedonsimpleassetreplacementandrecoveryratherthanacomprehensivecommunitydevelopmentstrategy.Asaresult,thepre-existingvulnerabilitieswerenotattendedto,leavingdamagedcommunitiesassusceptibletoriskastheywerebefore.Manyprojectscarriedoutatthenationallevelwererushedandpoorlyplannedout,whichresultedinseverelong-termconsequencesforaffectedcommunities.Competitiveaidagenciesespeciallyrushedconstructionprojects.Whatismore,someaidagenciesaswellasNGOsshowedcompetitiveattitudestowardsrecoveryprojects,furtherdisorganizingthecoordinationamongsuchgroupsandthegovernmentofSriLanka19.Duetopoorcoordination,financialproblemsalsoappeared.Althoughatfirstthecontractedforeignfinancialaidseemedtosuffice,mismanagementofsuchfundsresultedin 18 Cooray,S."Donor,Support,Pledges,CommitmentsandExpenditure."SriLankaDevelopmentForum:BackgroundPapers(2005).19 Jayasuriya,S.,etal."Post-TsunamiRecovery:IssuesandChallengesinSriLanka."ADBInstituteResearchPaperSeries,No.71(2006).

complicationsindistribution,reliefpayments(whichwerecutfromthepromisedamount),andcoordinationofprojects20. Foreffectiverecoveryafterthetsunami,coordinationwithinthegovernment(localandcentral),wasalsorequiredinadditiontocoordinationamongNGOs.Inmostoftheaffecteddistricts,committeeswereformedforthepurposeofcoordinatingbetweenthecentralandlocalgovernment.However,thereexistedambiguitiesregardingthepreciseamountofauthoritythatthelocalgovernmentshad.Asaresult,whilethelocalgovernmenthadstructuresestablishedforrebuildinghousingandreconstructinglivelihoods,theywerenotabletooperateproperly.Forexample,ProvincialCouncilswhicharethelocallyelectedinstitutions,weregrantedlimitedaccesstorecoveryactivitiesinthefirstyearafterthedisaster.Asaresult,localpeoples'interestswerenotwellincludedintherecoveryplans,andtheaidworkers(oftencommunicatingwiththecentralgovernment)thuslackedunderstandingofthepre-existingvulnerabilities.Similarly,newsettlementprojectsgavelittlethoughttobasicinfrastructure(watersupply,spatialarrangements,etc.),letaloneimprovedresilience.Moreover,contributionsmadebyrelieforganizationsandlocalpeoplewere 20 SriLankaTaskForceforRebuildingtheNation(TAFREN)."RebuildingSriLanka:Post-tsunamiReconstructionandRehabilitation."(2005).

notwellrecordedalthoughdisaster-proneareascanbenefitsignificantlyviapriordocumentationifmadeavailable.ExceptionallyintheKudilnilamarea,theSriLankanPeople'sChurchtookcharge(inplaceofthenationalgovernment)ofscreeningthequalityofnewhousingandcommunities21.Underthechurch'sleadership,houseswereallocatedbeforeconstruction,andprospectiveresidentswerebriefedonconstructionplans,creatingroomfornegotiationbetweencontractorsandlocalresidents.Thechurchfurthersawtopreventcontractorsbeingpaidinthecasethatkeyspecificationswerenotmet. ThecentralgovernmentofSriLankaontheotherhand,utilizedTAFREN(TaskFormforRebuildingtheNation)asthemaininstitutionoverlookingthereconstructionofkeyinfrastructure.However,TAFRENshowedthatitlackedabilitytocoordinatekeygovernmentagenciesrelevanttorecoveryactivities.TheoriginalintentofestablishingTAFRENwassothatitcouldworkasa"one-stop"agencyencompassingacomprehensivelineofkeyministries;however,sucharolewasnotsufficientlyfulfilled.Ingovernmenteffortstoimproveuponsuchweaknesses,theSriLanka'sReconstructionandDevelopmentAgency 21 Mulligan,M.,andNadarajah,Y."SharingandElaboratingPost-tsunamirecoveryResearchOutcomes,"ReportontheHamabantotaSymposium,MonashUniversityandRMITUniversity.(2010).

(RADA)wasformedthroughthemergerofTAFRENwithtwoothertasksforces:TaskForceforRelief(TAFOR),andTransitionalAccommodationProject(TAP).RADAaimstoreducefuturevulnerabilitytonaturaldisastersbyimprovingphysicalinfrastructure.Nonetheless,thegovernmentofSriLankafailedtodeliverappropriatelevelsofperformanceintherecoverystage22,whichsuggestsalackofinstitutionalcapacitydespitetherepeatedinitiatives.Nevertheless,theroleofinternationalhumanitarianagencies(despitesomeproblemsmentionedabove)cannotbeignored,astheirreconstructionaid,grants,andmaterialsupplycontributedmajorlytoSriLanka'sinitialrecoveryprocess.Inotherwords,rudimentarylevelsofre-buildingandlivelihoodrestorationweremadepossibleviainternationalaid.

3.2 INDONESIA

3.2.1 Damage InIndonesia,tsunamisamounttoonly6.4%ofthedisastersthatinfluencethecountry.Nevertheless,tsunamishavethehighestimpactintermsofbothhumancasualtiesandeconomicloss23.Accordingtothe 22 Keraminiyage,K.,etal."PostTsunamiRecoveryCapacityGapsinSriLanka."ResearchInstitutefortheBuiltandHumanEnvironment,UniversityofSalford.(2008).23 MinistryofResearchandTechnology(RISTEK)."GrandScenarioofIndonesian

officialstatisticsissuedbythegovernmentofIndonesiaafterthe2004incident,atotalof128,728peopledied,500,970weredisplaced,and179,312housesweresweptaway.Moreover,approximately4,270millionUSDwereestimatedasthetotaleconomicloss.Sumatra(islandlocatedatthewesternpartofIndonesia)wasthemostaffected,withitswesternandnortherncoastalbordersnearlydemolished. TheAcehprovinceinparticularexperiencedthemostseveredamages,asmostofthehumanfatalitiesinIndonesiaoccurredinthisprovince24.Residentialareasnearthecoastlineswerelargelysweptaway;eventhevillagesthathadwithstoodtheshakingduetotheearthquakepriortothewavesweresusceptibletothetsunamiwaves.Andwhileelectricityplantsweresurprisinglyundamaged,initialassessmentsdeterminedthattheyweredownsimplybecausetherewasnodemandforelectricityasmostconstructionswereinnoconditionforelectricitysupply.Aconsiderableportionoftheelectricitydistributionsystemwasblownaway.Inaddition,thedamagedareassufferedfromfuelshortageduetothedamagethatthestate-ownedpetroleumcompany'sfuelstorages TsunamiEarlyWarningSystem."GovernmentofIndonesia.(2005).24 Rofi,Abdur,etal."TsunamimortalityanddisplacementinAcehprovince,Indonesia."Disasters30:3(2006).pp.340-350.

experienced25.Inrelation,theAcehpopulation'slivelihoodswereseverelydamagedastheoilandgasindustrycomprisedmorethan40%oftheprovince'sregionalGDP.Thesecondmostcontributingeconomicsectorwasagriculture,anothersectorthatexperienceddestruction.Fisheries,livestock,andlandcropsweremostlydestroyed,furtherjeopardizingtheAcehpopulation'slivelihoods.Inwhole,theWorldBankcalculatedthattheAcehprovincelost4.45billionUSDduetothisdisaster,whichisalmostequivalentto100%ofthisprovince'sGDPoneyearpriororabout2.3%ofIndonesia'stotalGDP.3.2.2 Stage1:EmergencyRelief ComparedtoSriLanka,Indonesia'semergencyreliefandrescueprocesswasprolonged.WhileSriLankawasabletoreachtheaffectedareaswithindays,theseverityofthesituationintheAcehprovincewasinformedtomostIndonesians(andtherestoftheworld)twodaysafterthewavesstruck.DuetotheinternalconflictsbetweentheFreeAcehMovementandtheIndonesiangovernment,informationdisseminationwasheavilylimited.Aidandreliefwasabletoreachtheprovinceonlybythe

25 Cluff,LloydS."Effectsofthe2004Sumatra-AndamanEarthquakeandIndianOceanTsunamiinAcehProvince."TheBridge:LinkingEngineeringandSociety(2007).NationalAcademyofEngineering.

28thofDecember(twodaysafterthedisaster),theFreeAcehMovementannouncedceasefire.Ultimately,tsunamiendedthewarintheAcehprovince,asthecivilwarbetweentheFreeAcehMovementandtheIndonesiangovernmentunexpectedlydeceleratedafterthetsunami,andeventuallyendedshortlyafter26. OncethedamageattheAcehprovincebecamepublic,emergencyreliefeffortsreactedimmediately.Healthandhygienesupport,emergencyshelters,aswellasbasicnecessitiessuchasfoodandwaterweresuppliedthroughvariouschannelsincludingUNagencies,foreigndonations,andinternationalNGOS.3.2.3 Stage2:ImmediateRecoveryandReconstruction InthecaseofIndonesia,theshiftfromemergencyrelieftorecoverywasasroughasthecaseofSriLanka.Followingtheimmenseamountofdonationsfromreliefagenciestargetedatbasicmedicalcare,food,andwater,thefocuswassoonshiftedtorestoringthelivelihoods.NGOssuchastheTerredesHommes(Italian)intandemwiththeUNDPworkedonreconstructionofmajorincome-generatingindustriesintheAcehProvince.

26 Billon,Philippe."PeaceintheWakeofDisaster?SecessionistConflictsandthe2004IndianOceanTsunami."TransactionsoftheInstituteofBritishGeographers.32:3(July2007).pp.411-427.

Rebuildingfisheriesandotheraquacultureplantswerethefocusofsuchdevelopmentalprojects.Reconstructionofschools,majorhealthcarefacilities,aswellasotherbasicinfrastructureswerealsoimmediatelytargetedforreplacements. ButjustlikeSriLanka,rebuildinghouseswereamongthemajorchallenges;IntheAcehprovinceoneyearafterthedisaster,morethan80%ofthedisplacedresidentsremainedwithoutpermanenthousing.Themainreasonforthiswasarguedtobethegovernment'sintentionstoactasthecontrollingcenterofvillageplanning27.Thegovernmentaimedforimprovementindisasterresiliencevialong-termdevelopmentandthoroughvillageplanning,whichshowedslowprogress.Mostimportantly,thecentralauthorityinregardstorehabilitationandreconstructionwaspassedaroundinthemiddleofplanningduringitsearlystages.Originally,thenationwidereconstructionprocesswastobecoordinatedbytwogovernmentalagencies,theNationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency(BAPPENAS)andtheMinistryofPublicWorks.However,likethecaseinSriLanka,themaincomplaintwasthatcentralgovernment-ledrebuildinginitiativesfailedtotakeintoconsiderationthespecificlocaldemands.Only 27 Kaplan,Eben."TsunamiRebuildingEfforts,OneYearLater."CouncilonForeignRelations(Dec.2005).

monthsaftertheincident(inMayof2005),theAcehandNiasRehabilitationandReconstructionAgency(BRR)wasinstalledtoincorporatelocalinputtotherecoveryprocess28.Theintroductionofthisnewcommunity-basedcontrolcenternaturallyprolongedthereconstructionprocessasmuchofthecommunity'spersonnelandmaterialresourceswerecompromised. AndduetodisagreementsbetweentheBRRandBAPPENASregardingthedetailsoftherecoveryplans,thegeneraldomesticagenciesexhibitedlimitedoperationalpower,leavingmostofthetangibleachievementstointernationalNGOsandforeignaid.Forexampleinthemeantime,NGOssuchastheTerresdesHommestooktheleadinprovidingaffectedpopulationswithfinancialassistanceintheformofmicroeconomicinitiatives.Smallcashpaymentswereallocatedsothataffectedcommunitiescouldreadilyreturntoeconomicactivities. Tables1and2summarizethedifferencesaswellasstrengthsandweaknessesoftheshort-termresponseandrecoveryprocessesofSriLankaandIndonesiadiscussedinsections3.1and3.2. 28 Steinberg,Florian."HousingReconstructionandRehabilitationinAcheandNias,Indonesia--RebuildingLives."HabitatInternational31(2007).pp.150-166.

Stage1:EmergencyReliefStage2:Immediate

RecoveryandReconstruction

SriLanka

STRENGTHSž quickinitialresponse(withinasingleday)ž medicalassistance,foodandwatersupply,emergencysheltersprovidedbyNGOsandforeigndonations(aid)ž cashpaymentsforlivelihoodrestorationdistributedbythegovernment

WEAKNESSES

ž regionaldifferencesinavailabilityoffoodrationsandfinancialgrants

STRENGTHSž importantroleoflocalandcommunitybasedgroups(e.g.churches)

WEAKNESSESž heavilyreliedonforeignfinancialcontributionsfromtheprivatesectorandNGOsž simpleassetreplacement,ratherthancomprehensivecommunityre-developmentž rushedrecoveryprojects(NGOcompetition),mismanagementofforeignfundsž coordinationproblemsbetweenthecentralandlocalgovernmentsž inabilityofTAFRENincoordinatingkeygovernmentagenciesž reconstructionactivitylimitedincertainareasduetocivilconflictwithLTTE

Table1:VariationsinShort-TermRecoveryProcesses(SriLanka)

Stage1:EmergencyReliefStage2:Immediate

RecoveryandReconstruction

Indonesia

STRENGTHSž medicalassistance,foodandwatersupply,emergencysheltersprovidedbyNGOsandforeigndonations(aid)

WEAKNESSES

ž delayedinitialresponseduetointernalconflictintheAcehregionwhichlimitedinformationflow(severityofdamageinAcehprovincenotacknowledgeduntiltwodaysaftertheincident)

STRENGTHSž successfulNGOinfluenceinrestoringmajorincome-generatingindustries(fisheries,aquaculture)ž localagencyestablishedforhousingreconstruction

WEAKNESSES

ž heavyrelianceoninternationalagenciesž extremelyslowprogressinrestoringpermanenthousingintheAcehProvincež mismanagementduetoshiftsincontrolcenters

Table2:VariationsinShort-TermRecoveryProcesses(Indonesia)

3.3 VARIATION Inadditiontothedifferencesinimmediateresponseandrecoveryexperiencesoutlinedintheprevioussection,anothercommondomesticfactorcontributedtotheshort-termprocess.Coincidentally,bothIndonesiaandSriLankaweredealingwithseparatistmovements;nevertheless,theseinternalconflictsledtoconsiderablydifferentoutcomes.

3.3.1 DifferentExperiencesDealingwithOngoingCivil

Conflicts Onemajorcontrastbetweenthetwocountries'recoveryprocesseswasmadebyEniaintermsoftheeffectsandoutcomesofcivilwars29.SriLankaandIndonesiawerebothexperiencinginternalconflictswithseparatistgroups:SriLankawiththeLTTEinthenorthernregions,andIndonesiawiththeGAM(GerakanAcheMerdeka)intheAcehprovince.ThetsunamiaidedinendingtheinternalconflictsinIndonesia,whileitaidedinescalatingtheconflictinSriLanka.Thetsunami,byalteringthebargainingpowersoftheseparatistgroups,eitherledpeaceorincreasedconflict. UnlikehowtheconflictbetweentheFreeAcehMovementandtheIndonesiangovernmentendedduetothenationaldisasterin2004,SriLankaexperiencedanoppositeoutcomeregardingitscivilwarwiththeLTTE(LiberationTigersofTamilEelam)30.InIndonesia,althoughtherewasaslightdelayofinitialresponsetotheAcehprovinceduetotheGAMforces(roadblocksandinformationdisconnectionledtothenationalgovernmentbeingunawareofthedamagesinthisareafornearlytwodays)anad 29 Enia,Jason."PeaceinitsWake?The2004TsunamiandInternationalConflictinIndonesiaandSriLanka."JournalofPublicandInternationalAffairs19(2008).30 Yamada,Seijietal."TheSriLankaTsunamiExperience."DisasterManagement&

Response4:2(2006).pp.38-48.

interimpeaceagreementwassignedbetweentheGAMrebelsandthenationgovernmentlessthan1yearafterthetsunamiinDecember200431.Duetothistentativeagreement,reconstructionworkwasreadilyprovidedtothisheavilydamagedprovince;moreover,thistentativeagreementsoonafterdevelopedintoapermanentpeaceagreement,thusendingthecivilconflictinIndonesia. UnliketheIndonesiancase,thetsunamididnotleadtotheendofconflictforSriLanka.Onthecontrary,theconflictslastedsignificantly,andeventuallyhinderedthecountry'srecoveryprocess.Oneexampleparticularlyrelevanttoamajorroadblocktoimmediaterecoveryishowthecivilwarfosteredcommunicationproblemsaswellassecurityproblems;muchdelayinconstructionworkwascausedduetorestrictedaccesstomilitant-controlledareas32.TheLTTEcontrolledregionsincludedthenorthernandnortheasternpartsoftheisland;unfortunately,someoftheseregionswereofthemostseverelyaffectedbythe2004disaster. Essentially,althoughamutualarrangementbetweenthegovernmentandtheLTTEwasrequiredforaneffectiveflowofaid,suchan 31 Aglionby,John."LegacyofTsunamiBringsPeacetoAceh,"TheGuardian,15August,2005.32 Palliyaguru,RoshaniandAmaratunga,Dilanthi."ImprovingInfrastructuretoReduceFutureVulnerabilitiestoNaturalDisasters:ReviewofInfrastructureDevelopmentAssociatedwithPostTsunamiReconstructioninSriLanka."CIBWorldBuildingCongress.(2007).

arrangementwasnotsolidified.OnemainpoliticalreasonwasduetothefactthatasignificantportionofthegovernmentaswellasthepublicrefusedtosignadealwiththeLTTE,worryingthatsuchanagreementwouldgranttheLTTEofficialrecognitionasanindependentadministrativeauthority.TheLTTEaswellrefusedtosigndeals,consideringthemmeansthroughwhichtheircontrolincertainregionscouldbediminished. Nevertheless,anMOUwaseventuallydraftedbetweentheGovernmentofSriLankandtheLTTE.ThisMOU,calledthe"Post-TsunamiOperationManagementStructure"outlinedhowfundsandotherresourceswouldbedeliveredtoregionscontrolledbytheLTTEforces33.TheWorldBankwashopedtoserveasanobjectiveintermediateholderofaseparateRegionalFund,towhichnongovernmentaldonorswoulddirectlydeposittheirdonations.Inthisway,fundsreachingtheLTTEcontrolledregionswouldsomewhatbypasstheSriLankagovernment.However,soonaftertheagreementmade,theSupremeCourtofSriLankaruledagainstitinresponsetoheavyoppositionfromthemajorityofthesociety.Moreover,aconsiderableportionofthedonorsexpressedconcernsregardinga"direct"transferoffundstotheLTTE,whichatthetimewaslabeledasaterrorist 33 Jayasuriya,S.K.andMcCawley,Peter.TheAsianTsunami:AidandReconstructionAftera

Disaster.EdwardElgarPublishing.(2005).

organizationinsomenations. Insum,bothcountrieswereinitiallyexperiencinglimitedphysicalaccesstodamagedareasduetocivilconflicts;however,SriLankaatfirsthadtheadvantageasitwasatleastabletoacquiretimelyinformationregardingtsunamidamage.Indonesiaontheotherhand,wasundermoreseverelimitationsasinformationblockagewassignificant.Thefinaloutcomeshoweverwereopposite:Indonesiawasabletoorganizeaquickceasefire(whichultimatelyledtotheendofthiscivilwar)whichnotonlyfacilitatedgovernmentreconstructionwork,butalsopulledinmoreinternationalemergencyandhumanitarianaid.SriLankaontheotherhandcouldnotreachaproperceasefire.AnMOUwasdraftedinstead.Nonetheless,becausetherewasnotofficialpeaceagreementbetweenthetwoparties,internationalaidwasnotasactivelysupplied.Intheend,therateandqualityofrecoveryinthesetworegionswerehighlydependentoninternationalfinancialaid.Despitebothgovernments'effortstocoordinatereconciliationmostappropriatetothencircumstances,ultimately,theexistenceornonexistenceofforeignhumanitarianaidwasthemajordeterminantfactorinreconstructionprojects.

4 COMPARISONOFLONG-TERMCAPACITYAND

RESILIENCEBUILDLINGSTRATEGIES Followingtheshort-termresponseandrecoveryprocess,thischapterfocusesontheapproachesthatthetwocountriesofinteresthavetakeninbuildinglong-termcapacityandresiliencetowardsnaturaldisasters(especiallytsunamis).Indoingthis,TheHyogoFrameworkforAction(2005-2015):BuildingtheResilienceofNationalandCommunitiesto

Disasterswillserveasamajorreferencepointasitprovidesaholisticandsystematicapproachtodisasterriskmanagement.ThisframeworkwasfirstadoptedattheWorldConferenceonDisasterReductioninJanuary2005andmanycountriesincludingSriLankaandIndonesiahaveworkedtoimplementit. Specifically,thisframeworkaimstoguidevulnerablecountriesintobuildingcapacityin1)governance(organization,legal,andpolicyframeworks),2)riskidentification,assessment,monitoringandearlywarning,3)knowledgemanagementandeducation,4)reducingunderlyingriskfactors,and5)preparednessforeffectiveresponseandrecovery.Biennialprogressreportspublishedfromthetwocountriesininterestwillbeexaminedinordertoassesseachcountry'simprovementbetweenyears

2007and2013.TheindicatorsoutlinedbytheHyogoFrameworkforeachofthefivecategoriesmentionedaresummarizedinthefollowingtable.Goals Indicators Category

Governance(organization,legalandpolicyframeworks)

1) nationalpolicyandlegalframeworksforDRRwithdecentralizedresponsibilitiesandcapacities2) dedicatedandadequateresourcesavailableinimplementingDRRplansatalladministrativelevels3) communityparticipationinducedthroughdelegationofauthorityandresourcestolocallevels4) functioningnationalmulti-sectoralplatformforDRRMitigation/Preparedness

‚Riskidentification,assessment,monitoringandearlywarning

1) nationalandlocalriskassessmentsbasedonhazarddataandvulnerabilityinformationareavailable2) systemsoperatetomonitor,archiveanddisseminatedataonkeyhazardsandvulnerabilities3) earlywarningsystemisoperating4) riskassessmentsconsiderregional/trans-boundaryrisks,andthepossibilityofregionalcooperationMitigation/Preparedness/Recovery

ƒKnowledgemanagementaeducation1) informationondisastersisaccessibletoallstakeholdersthroughdevelopmentofaninformationsharingsystem2) schoolsconducttrainingprogramsregardingDRRandrecoverypractices3) researchmethodsforriskassessmentsandcostbenefitanalysisaredeveloped4) cultureofdisasterresiliencedevelopedthroughcountrywidepublicawarenessstrategies

Mitigation/Preparedness

Table3:HyogoFrameworkforActions(2005-2015)IndicatorsofResiliencetoDisasters

„Reducingunderlyingriskfactors

1) environmentrelatedpoliciesincorporateDRRasanintegralobjective2) socialdevelopmentpoliciesandplansareimplementedtoreducethevulnerabilityofpopulationsmostatrisk3) economicpoliciesareimplementedinordertoreducethevulnerabilityofeconomicactivities4) planningandmanagementofhumansettlementsspecifybuildingcodes5) DRRmeasuresareincorporatedintopost-disasterrecoveryprocesses6) assessmentsofdisasterriskimpactsonmajordevelopmentprojectsaresystematicallyinplace

Mitigation/Preparedness/Recovery

…Preparednessforeffectiveresponseandrecovery

1) stronginstitutionalandtechnicalcapacitiesfordisasterriskmanagementareinplace2) contingencyplansareinplaceatalladministrativelevels,withregulardrillsandrehearsals3) financialreservesareintactforeffectivesupportduringrecovery4) informationexchangechannelsreadyduringdisastersPreparedness/Response

Table3:HyogoFrameworkforActions(2005-2015)IndicatorsofResilienceto

Disasters,cont. AscanbeseenintheTable3,amajorportionoftheHyogoFrameworkconcentratesonbuildinglong-termresiliencethroughenhancedmitigationandpreparednessmeasures.Whendelvedintothespecifics,suchmeasuresaredividedintocriteriaincludinggovernance,risk

identification,education,managingunderlyingrisks,andpreparednessforresponse. HowevertherearefourcommoncapacityelementsthatdeterminethesuccessoftheabovefivecategoriesoutlinedbytheHyogoFrameworkofActionastheseelementscansettheoverallframeworkanddirectionality34.Thesefourelementsare:1)legislature,2)implementationofanumbrellaorganization,3)adatacollectingsystem,and4)apublicdistributionmechanism.Andforthesecomponentstoperformtoeachpurpose,thegovernmentneedscapacitytoeffectivelycoordinatetheelementsviafluentinformationsharingandactiveagencycollaboration.ThischapterwillexaminetheSriLankanandIndonesiangovernment'sprogresspertainingtotheHyogoFramework,aswellasanalyzebasedonhowwellinformationissharedandhowactivelycollaborationisrealizedbetweenthefourcapacityelements(implementation,datacollecting,publicdistributions,legislature).Itwillalsoexaminetheoveralllegalframeworkthatoverseesthemanagementofthegovernment'sumbrellaorganization. 34 Kurita,Tetsushietal."TsunamipublicawarenessandthedisastermanagementsystemofSriLanka."DisasterPreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal15:1(2006).pp.92-110.

4.1 STRUCTUREOFCAPACITYELEMENTS:SRILANKA RatnasooriyaandSamarawickramawritethatthegovernmentofSriLankawentthroughthoroughinvestigationoflong-termeffortstowardspreparednessofthecountrytonaturalemergencies35.Acommitteewithintheparliamentwasestablishedtomakerecommendationstoreducethevulnerabilityandminimizedamageduetofuturesituations.Earlywarningsystemsweresoonafterimplementedaswell.However,accordingtotheseauthors,thereareconcernsregardingtransparency,andcoordinationbetweenmajorstakeholders.ThissectionwillanalyzetheSriLankangovernment'soveralldisastermanagementstructurebasedoncommoncapacity:1)legislature,2)implementationofanumbrellaorganization,3)adatacollectingsystemand4)apublicdistributionmechanism.

4.1.1 DisasterLegislature Inthedomesticlevel,legislativeprogresshavebeenmadeastheDisasterManagementActwassubmittedandtheDisasterManagementCenter(DMC)isnowemployingpermanentstaffequippedwith 35 Ratnasooriya,HarshaA.R.,etal.“PostTsunamiRecoveryProcessinSriLanka.”Journal

ofNaturalDisasterScience29:1(2007).pp.21-28.

comprehensivefacilities36.InadditiontotheestablishmentoftheDMC,thislegislaturealsoprovidesforthe"appointmentoftechnicaladvisorycommittees;[and]thepreparationofdisastermanagementplans.37"Furthermore,theDisasterManagementActhasrequiredallstateagenciestopreparetheirowndisastermanagementplans;howeverthisprocesshasbeendelayedduetoanabsentofapprovalfromtheNationalCouncil38. Inshort,thislegislationprovidesthelegalframeworkfortheumbrellaorganizationrequiredforagovernment-ledpost-disastermanagementandlong-termresiliencebuildingprocess.OneofthegoalsthattheSriLankangovernmentisseekingisacertaindegreeofregionalautonomyindisastermanagementplanning(theDMActrequiresthatstateagenciesoperatetheirownmanagementplans);however,duetolackofresources(financial,personnel,etc.)suchdecentralizationisyettoberealized.Macroscopicmanagementandlong-termresiliencebuildingisevenyettobeincorporatedintothenationallevelofdisastermanagementpolicies.Thiswillbefurtherelaboratedinlaterpartsofthischapter. 36 Kurita,Tetsushietal."TsunamipublicawarenessandthedisastermanagementsystemofSriLanka."DisasterPreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal15:1(2006).pp.92-110.37 SriLankaDisasterManagementAct,No.13of2005.ParliamentoftheDemocraticSocialistRepublicofSriLanka.38 Jayawardane,A.K.W."DisastermitigationinitiativesinSriLanka."Facultyof

Engineering,UniversityofMoratuwa,SriLanka(2006).

4.1.2 ControlCenter SriLanka'snationlevelcontrolcenteristheDisasterManagementCentre,establishedbytheDMActoftheparliamentofSriLanka.Thisorganizationismeanttooversee,centrallyplan,andatthesametimetakechargeofdispersingpost-disastermanagementandlong-termresiliencebuildingplansatregionallevels. Resourcesnecessaryforthegovernment'soperationanditsvariousprojectscomeinthroughdiversechannels.TheWorldBankisfundingtheDamSafetyandWaterManagementProject,andtheSriLankangovernmentisalsocooperatingwiththeNetherlandsthroughtheEmergencyResponseandCapacityDevelopmentProjectthattookoffin201039.However,theNationalBudgetDepartmentlacksmechanismsofaccountingforallofthediverseinvestmentsrelatedtodisasterriskreduction.Initsplace,theDMCistakinginitiativebutitscapacityislimited,beingafairlyneworganization.Moreover,investmentsfromnon-governmentalorganizationsaswellasinternationalnon-governmentalorganizationsarenoteffectivelyreachinglocallevels40. Thus,disastermanagementandlong-termresiliencebuildingplans 39 HyogoNationalProgressReport2009-2011.40 Mitchell,Tometal."AssessingProgressonIntegratingDisasterRiskReductionandClimateChangeAdaptationinDevelopmentProcesses."(2010).

intheregionalandcommunityhasbeenencouragedthroughamorecommunalmethod:theJanaSaba41.Thislocalorganizationconsistsofcommunityleaderswhoconvenetodiscussandproposedevelopmentfortheirvillages.However,thecapacityoftheselocalpseudo-governmentsarelimitedinthattheydonotreceiveregularbudgetallocationsfromthecentralgovernmentforthepurposeofDRR.The2011-13HyogoProgressReportestimatesthatmerely3%ofthelocalbudgetisallocatedtothisorganizationforDRR.Whatismore,thefinancialstatusofthemostvulnerableregionsaregenerallyweak,andthusdonothaveanautonomouscapacitytoimproveitscommunity'sresilience. Butatthenationallevel,SriLankaasmanagedtobuildadomesticmulti-sectoralplatformfordisasterriskmanagementthatconsistscivilsocietymembers,nationalfinanceinstitutions,sectoralorganizations,andscience/academicinstitutions.ThisplatformiscalledtheNationalDisasterManagementCoordinatingCommittee(NDMCC),whichmeetsbiannually42.However,thereisalowawarenesslevelonHFAprioritiesaswellasterminology,whichslowsdownitsimplementationprocess.Moreover, 41 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.42 Kurita,Tetsushietal."TsunamipublicawarenessandthedisastermanagementsystemofSriLanka."DisasterPreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal15:1(2006).pp.92-110.

thereisagenerallynegativeattitudeconcerninginformationsharingamonginstitutions,despitethefactthattheyhavemembershiptothesamecommittee43.Thisfurtherobstructseffectivecoordination.4.1.3 DataCollectionMechanismandInstitutions TherehasbeennosignificantprogressinsystematicdisasterriskassessingasSriLankadoesnotyethaveacommonhazardriskassessmentmethodologyprovidedatthenationallevel.Forexample,riskassessmentsareneitherledbyacentralagency,nordotheyhaveacommoncustomizedformat(protocol).Hence,suchassessmentsrequiredindevelopmentdecisionslackcoherency.Hazardprofiles,however,beencompiledviavariousuniversities.Profiledhazardsincludedrought,cyclones,flooding,tsunamis,andlandslides.TheNationalAquaticResourcesandDevelopmentAgencyhasalsocompletedatsunamiinundationmapforresearchpurposes(althoughthismapdoesnotcovertheentireterritoryofSriLanka). Accordingtothe2011-2013ProgressReport,theDMChasthusstartedaregularupgradingprocessforthenationaldatabasefordisaster

43 Bitter,Patrizia."HowtheTsunamiTriggeredaChangeProcessintheEducationSectorofSriLanka:LessonsLearntforIntroducingDisasterSafetyEducation."RecoveryfromtheIndianOceanTsunami.SpringerJapan.(2015).pp.451-467.

losses.Nationwidedataondisasterreliefaswellasrecoveryandrehabilitationarealsorecordedintothisdatabase.Inaddition,theMinistryofHealthhasimplementedarunningdatabaseforroutinelyshrivelinginfectiousandcontagiousdiseases.However,therecordeddataisnotregularlypublished,andtherecordsoneconomiclossandrecoveryresourcedistributionwereperiodical(alsolackedsystematicmechanism)44.Moreover,someofthedataoriginatingfromregionallevelswerefoundunreliableduetoineffectiveinformationflowbetweenrelevantinstitutions.Itwasalsofoundthatresponsibleofficerswerenotproperlytrainedtoretrieveandanalyzetherecordeddata.

4.1.4 PublicEducationandDistributionofResiliencePolicies IncollaborationwiththeMinistryofEnvironmentSecretariatofClimateChange,theMinistryofDisasterManagement,andtheDisasterManagementCommittee,SriLankahasdevelopeda"one-stop"websiteconcerningadaptationtoclimatechanges.OtherwebsitessuchastheDisasterManagementCommittee'sofficialwebsiteproviderelevant 44 Tschoegl,Lizetal.Ananalyticalreviewofselecteddatasetsonnaturaldisastersand

impacts.Brussels,Belgium:CentreforResearchontheEpidemiologyofDisasters,(2006).

informationanddatatothepublic45.Ontheotherhand,somechallengesremaininbuildingandmaintainingmodernresourcecentersduetoproblemsrelatedtothegovernment'srecruitmentprocess. Inadditiontoonlineinformationdistribution,SriLankaalsoconductsconceptualeducationondisasterriskresilience,commencingfromthesecondaryschoolcurriculum;thecurriculumincludeseducationonnaturalhazardsthatarepronetoSriLankaandfirstaideducation46.Publicationsandteachingmaterialarepreparedinseverallocallanguages,anddistributionofimportantpublicationssuchasbrochuresareconcentratedinvulnerableareasalongthecoastalborders.However,sucheducationalprogramstargetedatteenagerswereevaluatedtoberatherpassiveandlackingactivitybasedlearning47.DRRisalsoincorporatedinuniversitytraining,especiallyinurbanplanning,engineering,earthandenvironmentalsciences,andgeographicalstudies.TheUniversityofColomboandtheUniversityofPeradeniyahavealsodevelopedaMaster'sofScienceprogramonDisastermanagement.Themainissueconcerningtheaboveprofessionallevelprogramsistheabsenceofself-assessment 45 DisasterManagementCenterOfficialWebsite,http://www.dmc.gov.lk/index_english.htm.46 Donga,MarioandBitter,Patrizia."TeachingDisasterRiskManagementinSriLanka'sSchools,"DeauscheGesellschaftfurTechnischeZusammenarbeit(GTZ)GmbH(GermanTechnicalCooperation).(2008).47 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2009-2011

procedures.Andapartfromtrainingthrougheducationalinstitutions,SriLankawasevaluatedtogenerallylackguidelines,modules,visualadvertisements,andmanualstargetedtowardsthepublic48.Asaresult,thesustainabilityofknowledgemanagementatthelocallevelhasnotreachedoptimallevelsasof2013. Furthermore,publiceducationcampaignsinselectvulnerablecommunitiesincludeprogramsthattargetenhancingdisasterawareness.Theseprograms,however,areheldrathersporadically49.Managementshouldbeimprovedsothattheseawarenessprogramsareregularlycontinued.Otherinitiativeshavebeenincorporatedinordertoencourageawidespreadcultureofdisasterresilience."NationalSafetyDay"hasbeenestablishedonthe26thofDecembertocommemoratevictimsandstimulateattention50.Acultureofdisasterresilienceisalsofosteredviaexhibitionsatthecommunityandnationallevels;theseexhibitionsaimtotransmitmessagesondisasterresilience.Inaddition,accordingtotheprogressreport,localgovernmentsareprovidedwithtrainingconcerningsuchpubliccampaignssothatinformationonriskreductionproceedings 48 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.49 Kurita,Tetsushietal."TsunamipublicawarenessandthedisastermanagementsystemofSriLanka."DisasterPreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal15:1(2006).pp.92-110.50 Ha,Huong,R.etal.StrategicDisasterRiskManagementinAsia.NewDelhi:SpringerIndia.(2015).

areaccessibleatlocallevels. TheHyogoFrameworkemphasizesthatcomprehensivecontingencyplanningandregulardrillsneedtobeimplementedatalladministrativelevels.Elementsofsuccessfulcontingencyplansincludeaconcreteoperationalandcommunicationscenter,organizedsearchandrescueteams,steadystocksofemergencyreliefequipmentandtemporaryshelters51.AlthoughthegovernmentofSriLankahasshownprogressinestablishingacontrolcenterreadywithrescuepersonnel,itlacksrelativelyinmaterialresources. Insum,SriLankahasagenerallackofcoordinationbetweenthelegislativebranchandtheimplementingagenciesastheongoingrevisionsontheDisasterManagementActaswellastheNationalDisasterManagementPlanbythelegislaturearenoteffectivelytransmitteddowntoimplementingagencies52.Therefore,whileimplementingagencieshavenecessarydrillsdesignedandprogrammed,theyhavenotyetbeensystematicallycarriedoutduetolackofenforcementvialaw.

51 Kennedy,Jim,etal."Themeaningof‘buildbackbetter’:evidencefrompost-tsunamiAcehandSriLanka."Journalofcontingenciesandcrisismanagement16:1(2008).pp.24-36.52 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.

4.2 COORDINATIONAMONGCAPACITYELEMENTS:SRILANKA Section4.1discussedthefourcommoncapacityelementsrequiredforasuccessfulimplementationofthegoalsoutlinedbytheHyogoFramework.Howeverinadditiontosimpleoperationofthecommoncapacityelements,appropriategovernmentcoordinationlinkingtheelementsisequallyimportantinenhancingtheeffectivenessoftheresiliencebuildingprocess.Effectivecoordinationcanbeseenthrough1)fluentresourcesandinformationsharingamongthecapacityelements,and2)activeagencycollaboration.4.2.1 ResourcesandInformationSharing Accordingtothe2011-2013ProgressReport,informationsharingamonginterrelatedagenciesisnotfluent,andcurrentscientificandeconomicresearchfacilitieslackafollow-upapparatusafterpreliminaryresearchsubmissionstofundingorganizations. Forinstance,mostundergraduateandpost-graduateeducationalinstitutionsintheirnaturalandappliedsciencedepartmentsadministerdiplomaprogramsthatincorporatedisasterriskresilienceresearch.JointresearchprojectsonDRR,climateadaptation,andnaturaldisastermodelingarealsoongoingwithinternationalorganizationsandforeign

universities.ThemajorconstraintassessedbythegovernmentofSriLankahowever,is1)thelackofmonitoringandevaluatingmechanismsfortheresearchoutcomesand2)thelackofresearchintheregionallevel53.Moreover,thefindingsareratherinaccessibleandtothegeneralpublicaswellasagenciesresponsibleforimplementation.Duetosuchlackofcommunicationbetweenresearchfacilitiesandimplementingagencies,financialfundingisalsoratherlimited. Readyinformationsharingduringdisastersisalsoavaluablecapacityelement.Hence,wellcoordinatedgovernmentsrequireforanationwideprocedureofexchanginginformationforthepurposeofassessingdamagelevelsandminimizingcasualtiesduringhazardousevents.CurrentlyinSriLanka,theDamageandLossAssessmentmethodhasbeenbenchmarkedfromLatinAmericanpractices54.Thisprogram,whichassessesthedamageandpost-disasterneedsbycommunity,hasbeenmodifiedtofitlocalcircumstances.TheprogramhasbeenpilotedinWesternandSouthernprovincesoftheisland.Thetestrunshaveuncoveredthatdespitemeaningfulassessments,thereportingmechanism 53 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013. 54 AsianDevelopmentBank,JapanBankforInternationalCooperation,WorldBank."SriLanka2005Post-TsunamiRecoveryProgram:PreliminaryDamageandNeedsAssessment."(2005).

aswellasdatamaintenanceproceduresarequiteweak55,56.Inaddition,partnerorganizationstendtobereluctantinsharingthecollectedinformation.Insum,whilethereisanetworkestablishedtolinkagenciesthatassessthedamageandagenciesthatattendtonecessaryneeds,thisreluctancetoexchangeinformationresultsindelayedaction.4.2.2 AgencyCollaboration AgencycollaborationiscoordinatedmainlybytheNationalDisasterManagementCoordinationCommittee(NDMCC).AccordingtoathegovernmentofSriLanka'sDisasterManagementCentre,theNDMCC(operatingundertheInter-AgencyCoordinationCommittee)categorizesallrelevantprivateandpublicagenciesintothreecategories57.ThisCommitteeaimstocoordinateministeriallevelagenciesinordertoprovidepolicyrecommendationstotheNationalCouncil.Italsorequiredtoprovidepersonnelandadministrativeassistancetodomesticagenciesforthepurposeofincreasingtheefficiencyofresiliencebuildingactivities. Regionalandsub-regionalcollaborationinriskassessmentaswell

55 AsianDevelopmentBank,JapanBankforInternationalCooperation,WorldBank."SriLanka2005Post-TsunamiRecoveryProgram:PreliminaryDamageandNeedsAssessment."(2005).56 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.57 Hettiarrachchi,Gamini."NationalDisasterManagementCoordinationCommittee."DisasterManagementCentre.

asearlywarningcoordinationisalsoroughlyinplace.Protocolsforinformationsharingareestablished,andseveralregionalframeworksareestablishedforeffectiveresourcingofpersonnelandnecessaryfundsandstrategies58.SriLankaisalsoattemptingtocoordinatewithinternationalinstitutionssuchastheUN;itparticipatedinthetsunamiearlywarningdrillconductedintheAsianregionbytheUNsince201159.However,thegovernmentofSriLankaevaluatedthatSriLanka'sparticipationinSouthAsianregionalcooperationmechanismswereratherweakwithmorenominalcharacteristicsinitsNationalProgressReport.Moreover,thelackofITfacilitiesinvariousgovernmentinstitutionscontributedtothedifficultiestoconnectwiththeglobalnetworkduringpeakbusinesshours.4.3 STRUCTUREOFCAPACITYELEMENTS:INDONESIA Indonesiaiscurrentlyreceivingattentionforitseffortstowardsbuildingmulti-levelarrangementsfordealingwithmajornaturaldisasters.AccordingtoDenisSeng,the2004tsunami,unlikepreviousnaturaldisastersthatIndonesiahasexperienced,actedasatriggerforinstitutional

58 SouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation."RegionalCooperationonCoastalandmarineRiskMitigationPlanforSouthAsia:Roadmap,"SAARCWorkshopPaper(2008).59 Singh,David."IndianOceanTsunamiEarlyWarningSystemsPassTest,"NewsArchive,RegionalOfficeforAsiaandPacific,TheUnitedNationsOfficeforDisasterRiskReduction(UNISDRAP).(2012).

changeandreorganization60.Followingsuchatrigger,therehavebeenconsiderableeffortstodealwithnaturaldisastersandrisksthroughmulti-levelinstitutionalarrangementsandgovernance.Sucheffortsparticularlytargettsunamis,andthedesignedarchitectureistheoreticallyexpectedtoassistwithbuildingdisasterresilienceatregionalaswellastrans-boundarylevels.Withtheaboveinitiativesalreadyinplace,thenextstepchallengethatIndonesianowfacesisthoroughimplementation. Sengfurtherwritesthatatthemoment,thefocusofIndonesia'sdisastermanagementstrategiesandrelevantgovernmentspendingisstilltootiltedtowardspost-disastermanagementratherthanpreventionandpreparedness.Nevertheless,anticipatedfusionofregionalinstitutionalstructuressuchastheCoastalandSmallIslandManagementlaw(althoughthereareconcernsregardingthepossibilityofcommercializationofpartsofthecoastalzones)andtheDisasterManagementlawisexpectedtocontributetopre-disasterresilienceatthenationallevel61.Takingintoconsiderationtheabove,thissectionwillanalyzetheIndonesiangovernment'soveralldisastermanagementstructurebasedoncommon 60 Seng,DenisStanleyChang."TsunamiResilience:Multi-LevelInstitutionalArrangements,ArchitecturesandSystemofGovernanceforDisasterRiskPreparednessinIndonesia."EnvironmentalScience&Policy29(2013).pp.57-70.61 AlAfghani,MohamadMova."CoastalManagementLawReview?"TheJakartaPost,April15,2008.

capacity:1),legislature,2)implementationofanumbrellaorganization,3)adatacollectingsystemand4)apublicdistributionmechanism.

4.3.1 DisasterLegislatureandControlCenter WhilethegovernmentofIndonesiahaspassedmanylawsandactsregardingdisastermanagementandriskreduction,muchofithasnotyetreachedlocal(district,city)levelsasof201362.Inotherwords,mostofthenewlywrittenlegislationsdonotyethavetheeffectsofdecentralizingriskmanagement.Ingeneral,theNationalProgressReportassessesthattheupmostchallengeincarryingoutdisasterriskreductionatalllevelsisthelackofunderstandingoftheconceptitself.Essentialdisastermanagementpoliciesareadministeredbythecentralgovernment;however,therespectiveframeworksarenoteffectivelydisseminatedregionally63. Asoneoftheworld'smostvulnerablecountrytonaturaldisasters,thegovernmentofIndonesiaasgreatlyemphasizedcontrolandpost-managementofnaturaldisasterrisksitsNationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan(RPJMN2010-2014).The2004TsunamihasactedasamajortriggerforchangeandreorganizationofIndonesia'sdisasterrisk 62 HyogoProgressReport:2011-2013.63 UNDPIndonesia."LessonsLearned:DisasterManagementLegalReform,theIndonesianExperience."(2015).

institutions.ThementionedDevelopmentPlaninadditiontotheIndonesiangovernment'sNationalActionPlanforDRRshowsthatsignificanteffortsandprogresshavebeenmadeinconstructingmulti-levelinstitutionalarrangements,architecturesandgovernancetodealwithnaturaldisasters(especiallytsunamis).Althoughcomprehensiveimplementationsofthesearchitecturesarecurrentlyhinderedby1)proceduraldifficulties(allocationoffundsandresources,etc.)inthelocallevelsand2)overemphasisonpost-disastermanagementasopposedtopre-disastercapacitybuilding,themulti-leveleffortsmayunfoldtobeeffectiveinbuildingresilience64.Particularly,institutionalarrangementssuchastheDisasterManagementLawcanactasimportantvariablesinenhancingnationalresiliencetotsunamidisasters. ThisframeworkprovidedbyRPJMN2010-2014alsoemphasizescapacitybuildinginpreparednessoftheIndonesiangovernmentaswellasthatoflocalcommunities;inparticular,scientificresearchregardingtheupgradeoftheTsunamiEarlyWarning(TEW)SystemandtheWeather 64 Tjiptoherijanto,Prijono."CapacityManagementforDisasterRiskReduction:LessonsLearnedfromTsunamiinIndonesia,"[PowerPointslides],retrievedfromhttp://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan030040.pdf.(2008).

EarlyWarningSystemisoneofitstopprioritiesinadditiontodisasterrecoveryactionplans65.AlthoughaTEWchainreachingfromnationalleveltolocallevelsiscrucialfordisasterearlypreparedness,currentlyIndonesiadoesnotyethaveanofficialnationalwarningchain,andisintheprocessofmaking66.AsystemsofgovernanceapproachalsoshowsthatIndonesiaisshowingafairlybalancedgrowthinpolitical,economic,andsocialdisastermanagementcapacity.Theemergenceofactivecivilassociationsalsoiscontributingtothenetworkofongoingefforts. Moreover,accordingtoRPJMN2010-2014,theIndonesiangovernmentseekstoincreasethecapacitytoovercomenaturaldisastersthrough(1)capacitybuildingofthegovernmentapparatusandofthecommunityintheeffortstomitigaterisksand(2)formingtherapidactionteamforhandlingnaturaldisasters67. Meanwhile,Indonesia'sgovernmentcontrolcenterstilllacksmanagementcapacityondisasterresponseaswellasanunderstandingin 65 MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning,NationalDevelopmentPlanningAgency."RegulationofthePresidentoftheRepublicofIndonesiaNumber5of2010RegardingtheNationalMedium-TermDevelopmentPlan(RPJMN)2010-2014:Book1(NationalPriorities),"GovernmentofIndonesia.(2010).66 Seng,DenisStanleyChang."TsunamiResilience:Multi-levelInstitutionalArrangements,ArchitecturesandSystemofGovernanceforDisasterRiskPreparednessinIndonesia."EnvironmentalScience&Policy29(2013).pp.57-70.67 RPJMN2010-2014.MinistryofNationalDevelopmentPlanning.GovernmentofIndonesia.

disasterriskreduction68.However,alackof,despitetheimportanceof,sophisticatedurbanplanningexplainsIndonesia'sslowprogress.Withrapidurbanization,factorssuchasriskresilientspatialplanning,strategicinfrastructureandurbanservicesareinplanning,butnotyetsufficientlyreachedthestageofactualimplementation.Nevertheless,withthehelpoftheresearchcapacityandfundsofinternationalorganizations,theIndonesiangovernmentisworkingonbuildingsuchcapacity.4.3.2 DataCollectionMechanismandInstitutions RiskassessmentsregardingtsunamisinIndonesiaareledbytheAgencyforMeteorology,ClimateandGeophysics.RiskspertainingtofloodsareassessedprimarilybytheMinistryofPublicWorks;likewise,specificleadingagenciesareassignedtospecificnaturaldisasters69.Theassessmentsincludevaluableinformationonregionalvulnerability,communitycapacity,aswellaspotentialdamagessothatcomprehensiveriskmapcanbedrawn.However,thetechnicalcapacitiesofmostlocaldisastermanagementagenciesfallbehindstandardsandthereisalackof

68 Tjiptoherijanto,Prijono."CapacityManagementforDisasterRiskReduction:LessonsLearnedfromTsunamiinIndonesia,"[PowerPointslides],retrievedfromhttp://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan030040.pdf.(2008).69 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2009-2011.

commonmethodologyamongthevariouslocalagencies70.Financialresourcesmustalsobetransmittedfromthecentraltothelocalgovernmentsforbetteroutcomes. Unlikeriskassessments,damageassessmentsarecarriedoutmoreefficientlyinIndonesia.AccordingtotheNationalProgressReportsin2011-2013,lossesduetodisastersaresystematicallyupdateontothedatabase,monitoredandanalyzed.Insomeprovinces,thecollecteddatahavealreadybeenutilizedforvillageplanningobjectivesalthoughthispracticeisnotwidespreadyet.Improvementsarerequiredintermsofcoordinationamongthevariouslocalagencies.Inparticular,coordination(e.g.establishingacommonmethodology)betweenriskassessingagenciesanddamageassessingagenciesisdesirablesotheresearchesdonotproduceunnecessaryredundancies.Again,challengesexistintermsofbudget,technicalcapacity,andlackofadequatepersonnel71.4.3.3 PublicEducationandDistributionofResiliencePolicies Indonesia'spublicinformationandwarningdisseminationsystem

70 Alexander,Bob,etal."Sustainablelivelihoodconsiderationsfordisasterriskmanagement:implicationsforimplementationofthegovernmentofIndonesiatsunamirecoveryplan."DisasterPreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal15:1(2006).pp.31-50.71 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.

isquitesuccessfullyorganizedatthenationallevel72.InformationoriginatingfromprimarydatacollectingagenciessuchastheAgencyofMeteorology,ClimateandGeophysicsiseffectivelyprocessedandproactivelydeliveredtothepublicviapublicinformationbroadcasts,andtheinternet.Inadditiontonationallevelaccomplishments,therealsoexistlocallevelachievementsofteninitiatedbylocalgovernments,universitiesandothernon-governmentalactors.Nevertheless,thephysicalproblemssuchaspoorinternetavailabilityinsomesecludedareasremainaschallenges73.TheProgressReportsalsoinsinuatethatinsuchremoteareas,therealsoexistculturalbarriersaspeopledonotaggressivelyseekforrisk-relatedinformation. Moreover,likeSriLanka,disastermanagementstrategiesareincorporatedintotheIndonesianeducationsystem.Specifically,primary,secondaryanduniversitycurriculumallincludedisasterriskreductionlearningprograms74.Duetothecommitmentofvariousgovernmental 72 Hanka,W.,etal."Real-timeearthquakemonitoringfortsunamiwarningintheIndianOceanandbeyond."NaturalHazardsandEarthSystemSciences10:12(2010).pp.2611.73 Lauterjung,Joern,etal."ThechallengeofinstallingatsunamiearlywarningsysteminthevicinityoftheSundaArc,Indonesia."Nat.HazardsEarthSyst.Sci10:4(2010).pp.641-646.74 Morin,Julie,etal."Tsunami-resilientcommunities'developmentinIndonesiathrougheducativeactions:Lessonsfromthe26December2004tsunami."Disaster

PreventionandManagement:AnInternationalJournal17:3(2008).pp.430-446.

agencies(MinistryofEducationandCulture,NationalAgencyforDisasterManagement),numerouspilotcurriculahavebeenexperimentedbutatthecurrentstage,educationalprogramsareyettobeimplementeddowntolocallevels75.4.4 COORDINATIONAMONGCAPACITYELEMENTS:INDONESIA

4.4.1 ResourcesandInformationSharing Whilelocalgovernmentsadministertheirownbudgetsfordisasterriskreductionpolicies,itwasrevealedintheProgressReportsthatthecentralgovernmentdoesnotallocatebudgetsfordisastermanagementtolocalgovernmentsonaregularbasis.Intermsofriskresponsibilities,theIndonesiangovernmenthasaspecificlegislation(inpartoftheDisasterManagementAct)thatmandateslocalgovernmentstomanagetheirownregions76.Inotherwords,governancepertainingtodisasterriskisdecentralizedinthesensethateachlocalgovernmentisrequiredtotakeappropriateresponsibility.However,communityparticipationisnotyetrealizedaslocalgovernmentsarestillstrugglingwithfinalizingnecessary 75 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.76 Djalante,Riyanti,etal."BuildingresiliencetonaturalhazardsinIndonesia:progressandchallengesinimplementingtheHyogoFrameworkforAction."Natural

Hazards62:3(2012).pp.779-803.

legalframeworks77.Thisconnectsbacktothefirstindicatorinthatpracticaldecentralizationofriskmanagementisnotyetreachedduetotheunclearlegalframeworkthatshouldbeprovidedbythecentralgovernment. Moreover,therearefurtherdifficultiesofadministeringadecentralizedresiliencebuildingmechanismasatthelocalgovernmentlevel,disastermanagementisyettobecomeapriorityinbudgetallocation78.Butinthenationallevel,agreatdealofthedisastermanagementprogramshavestartedoffasbeingincorporatedintopre-existingdevelopmentalprogramsasopposedtohavingseparatebudgetsandadministrativeprocedures.Therefore,thereislessnecessityforarearrangementofcentralandlocalgovernmentagenciesfittedforanexclusivepurposeofdisasterresiliencebuildingprograms;hencethereislessneedforanewsystemofresourceandinformationallocationasmostprojectsarerunbyagenciesthathavepriorexperienceandsufficientresources.Inotherwords,disasterrelatedresiliencebuildingprojectshavebeenabsorbedbypre-existingdevelopmentalplanningagenciesthatalreadypossessinformationsharingchannels.Andononehand, 77 Djalante,Riyanti,etal.,(2012).78 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.

contingencyfundsarepreparedandsharedatthenationallevelaswellasinmostlocaladministrations79.Inregardstoadministeringthedisastermanagementprograms,themainchallengestemsfromthefactthatpersonnelresourcespertainingtothesenewresiliencebuildingprojectsarequitenewandlessexperienced,ratherthanthefactthatthereisalackofcommunicationamongrelevantagencies80.

4.4.2 AgencyCollaboration Asof2008,theIndonesianPlatformforDRRhasbeencreatedtofacilitateinter-agencycollaboration.Thismulti-stakeholderplatformincorporatesthegovernment,theprivatesector,membersofthecivilsocietyandothernon-governmentalbodies.However,thisplatformhasnotbeenoperatingsystematically;ithasnotbeenreceivingregularbudgets,andmostlyprivatecompanieshavetakenfinancialresponsibilitywhenitisvisible.Inorderforthismulti-sectoralplatformtohaveequalinfluenceandsayindisastermanagementstrategiesasthegovernment,morework 79 GlobalFacilityforDisasterReductionandRecovery."Indonesia:AdvancingaNationalDisasterRiskFinancingStrategy-OptionsforConsideration,"TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment,TheWorldBank.(2011).80 Djalante,Riyanti,etal."BuildingresiliencetonaturalhazardsinIndonesia:progressandchallengesinimplementingtheHyogoFrameworkforAction."Natural

Hazards62:3(2012).pp.779-803.

regardingpublicityoftheorganizationisneeded81.Moreover,meetingsamongthevarioussectors(private,public)mustberegularlyscheduledforincreasedinfluence. Inregionalagencycollaborationefforts,IndonesiahastakenaleadingroleinimplementingtheIndianOceanTsunamiWarningSystem(IOTWS).TheIOTWSmembersareallASEANcountriesinadditiontoseveralothernationalsinthePacificregion;itaimstotackletrans-boundaryrisksinrelationtotsunamis.ApartfromtheIOTWS,IndonesiaalsohasaleadingroleintheASEANCoordinatingCenterforHumanitarianAssistanceonDisasterManagement(AHACenter)82.Meanwhile,themainchallengeinfullyappropriatingthebenefitsoftrans-bordercooperationremaintobetrans-borderinformationsharing.Moreover,amongtheparticipatorycountries,thereisagenerallackofawarenessontheimportanceofregionalarrangementsfordisastermanagement.Inthisrespect,morejointprojectsneedtobeplannedandadministeredinordertofacilitateinformationflowandenhanceawareness.

81 Djalante,Riyanti."Adaptivegovernanceandresilience:theroleofmulti-stakeholderplatformsindisasterriskreduction."(2012).82 Lai,AllenYuhung,etal."AproposedASEANdisasterresponse,trainingandlogisticcentreenhancingregionalgovernanceindisastermanagement."TransitionStudiesReview16:2(2009).pp.299-315.

4.5 VARIATIONS

4.5.1 SriLanka'sOverallGovernmentCompetence SriLanka'staxadministrationhasbeenweakenedbytheexistenceoftheseparatistmilitantgroup(LTTE)83.Furthermore,thequalityofpublicadministrationhasbeendroppingoverthepastdecadesduetonumerousissuesincludingpoliticalpatronage,overstaffing,andseveresalarycompression.Thegovernment'simplementationcapacity,particularlyatthelocallevelisalsosubstantiallyoverstretchedbyreconstructionactivitiesrelatedtothetsunami. SimilarlyaccordingtotheNationalProgressReports,thegovernmentofSriLankashowsparticularweaknessinthepublicfinancialsector84.Inshort,thisgovernment'sfinancialstructurelackscapacitytodealwithlargenaturaldisasters.Firstofall,thereisnocalamityfundestablishedatthenationallevel.Insteadofoperatingacalamityfund,thecurrentpracticeissothatthegovernmentfilerequeststovariousUNagenciesforsporadicdonationsandassistanceinthecasethatasevere 83 Shaw,JudithandMulligan,Martin,etal."LessonsfromTsunamiRecoveryinSriLankaandIndia:Community,Livelihoods,TourismandHousing."MonashUniversity,RMITUniversity.(2012).84 Koria,Mikko."Managingforinnovationinlargeandcomplexrecoveryprogrammes:TsunamilessonsfromSriLanka."InternationalJournalofProject

Management27:2(2009).pp.123-130.

naturaldisasteroccurs85.Whilethegovernmentdoesprovidefinancialreliefassistanceforfamiliesbelowacertainincomelevel,thelackoffinancialcapacityresultsinaconsiderableportionofeligiblefamiliesleftout.Secondly,theProgressReportinsinuatesthatthereisnoindependentgovernmentagencydedicatedtodealingwithfinancialarrangementspertainingtodisasterrecoveryandmanagement.Withoutsuchproperfinanciallysupportinginstitutions,thedisasterriskmanagementprogrammaybequiteunsustainableinthelongrun86.

4.5.2 VaryingExtentofIncorporationofDisaster

ManagementStrategiesinNationalSocialandEconomic

DevelopmentPlanning Onecrucialelementoflong-termdisasterresiliencebuildinginvolvesreducingunderlyingriskfactorsthroughmeasurebeyondrecoveryandreconstruction.Mosteffectively,riskfactorscanbeeliminatedorreducedwhendisastermanagementstrategiesareincorporatedintonationaldevelopmentplanning(socialsecurity,economicgrowth,etc.). Inthecaseofpost-2004Indonesia,thecountryhaschangedstatus 85 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2013-2015.86 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2013-2015.

tomiddle-incomecountryfromlow-income,whichindicatesthatitsdevelopmentplansintandemwithpost-disasterrecoveryprocessareyieldingtangibleresults.Nationalleveldevelopmentprograms(ledbytheRPJMN2010-2014)thataimforfoodsecurity,socialsecurity,anddisabled/seniorcitizenssupporthavebeenintroducedaspartofanefforttoreducethegeneralpopulation'svulnerabilitytoseverenaturaldisasters.Economically,theMinistryofFinancehadpilotedanincentiveprogramforprivatebusinessesthatfusedisasterriskreductioninitiativesintheirregularprofit-makingactivities87. OntheotherhandinSriLanka,diverseprogramsexisttoincreasethesocialresilienceofthevulnerablepopulationtonaturaldisasters.Suchprogramsincludepropertyinsurance(cropinsurance),(un)conditionalcashtransfers,provisionalemploymentplans,andmicrofinancing88.CropinsuranceplanshavebeenintroducedbytheMinistryofAgricultureviacooperationoftheSanasaBankandtheAgricultureInsuranceBoard.OtherpropertyinsuranceplanshavealsobeenschemedbytheNationalCouncil 87 HyogoNationalProgressReport:2011-2013.88 Esham,Mohamed,andGarforth,Chris."Agriculturaladaptationtoclimatechange:insightsfromafarmingcommunityinSriLanka."MitigationandAdaptation

StrategiesforGlobalChange18:5(2013).pp.535-549.

forDisastermanagementaswellasprivateinsurancecompanies89. Theseinsuranceplanshowever,arenotineffectandthusdonotproducetangiblebenefitstothetargetedpopulation.Themainreasonforthisisthegapbetweentheeconomiccapacitiesofthetargetedfamiliesandthefinancialrequirementsfortheinsuranceschemes.Inotherwords,suchinsuranceplansarenotappealingtothemostneededfamiliesastheplansrequireregularfinancialcontributionsbeyondtheirearningcapabilities.Moreover,informationregardingsuchsocialsafetynetplansisnotadequatelymadeavailabletoneededcommunitiesduetolackofinformationsharingbetweenthecentralandlocalgovernmentagencies90. Managinghumansettlementisalsoakeyfactorverifyingdeterminingwhetherornotth