Upload
others
View
2
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques
G 2016 / 06
Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model
Benoît CAMPAGNE et Aurélien POISSONNIER
Document de travail
Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES
Série des documents de travail de la Direction des Études et Synthèses Économiques
JUILLET 2016
The authors would like to thank Jean-Guillaume SAHUC for his fruitful discussion and advice on a first version of this paper, as well as all participants to the D2E seminar at the Insee and to the 2015 ICMAIF conference.
_____________________________________________
* Département des Études Économiques - Division « Études Macroéconomiques » Timbre G220 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX Crest - LMA
** Commission européenne. L’auteur était en poste à l’Insee et affilié au Crest-LMA et École Polytechnique au moment de la rédaction de ce document.
Département des Études Économiques - Timbre G201 - 15, bd Gabriel Péri - BP 100 - 92244 MALAKOFF CEDEX - France - Tél. : 33 (1) 41 17 60 68 - Fax : 33 (1) 41 17 60 45 - CEDEX - E-mail : [email protected] - Site Web Insee : http://www.insee.fr
Ces documents de travail ne reflètent pas la position de l’Insee et n'engagent que leurs auteurs. Working papers do not reflect the position of INSEE but only their author's views.
G 2016 / 06
Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model
Benoît CAMPAGNE* et Aurélien POISSONNIER**
2
Courbes de Laffer et multiplicateurs budgétaires à partir du modèle Mélèze
Résumé
Cet article utilise une modélisation DSGE de la zone euro développée à l’Insee dans un but d’évaluation ex ante de réformes budgétaires. Les principales caractéristiques de ce modèle sont comparables aux modèles standards utilisés dans les principales organisations internationales et banques centrales. À l’aide de courbes de Laffer généralisées, nous constatons que les niveaux effectifs de taxation sont en deçà de ceux maximisant les revenus du governement. Toutefois, ce résultat dépend du niveau de compétition monopolistique sur le marché des biens. Nous étudions aussi les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court- et long-terme pour divers instruments budgétaires. Nos résultats sont comparables avec ceux obtenus dans d’autres modèles DSGE mais aussi avec ceux obtenus dans le modèle macroéconométrique Mésange. Néanmoins, selon le comportement des autorités monétaires et budgétaires et l’instrument considéré, les multiplicateurs budgétaires de court-terme varient substantiellement de 0,2 à 1 point autour du multiplicateur moyen dans les cas les plus extrêmes. De manière plus générale, il existe une marge de manœuvre importante pour des politiques budgétaires dites mixtes.
Mots-clés : multiplicateur budgétaire, courbe de Laffer, modèle DSGE, union monétaire
Laffer curves and fiscal multipliers: lessons from Mélèze model
Abstract
We use the two country DSGE model of the Euro area Meleze developed at Insee to perform ex ante fiscal reforms evaluations. The main features of the model compare with standard tools developed in international institutions and central banks. In practice, tax rates are below the government revenues maximizing rate identified by generalized equilibrium Laffer curves in the model. The extent of this result nevertheless depends on the degree of monopolistic competition on the goods market. We also analyse short and long term multipliers for numerous fiscal tools. These compare to standard DSGE simulations as well as to the macroeconometric model Mésange. However, depending on the behaviour of fiscal and monetary authorities, short-term fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case. All in all, there exists room of manoeuvre for so called mixed-strategies fiscal policy.
Keywords: fiscal multiplier, Laffer curve, DSGE model, monetary union
Classification JEL : E10, E62, F45
1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the great recession, fiscal policy has either been investigated as a short term
solution out of the crisis or now through the scope of fiscal consolidation.
Fiscal reforms or consolidation have already been assessed through DSGE models. In the European
context many works were conducted on the Quest III model (D’Auria et al., 2009; Roeger and in’t Veld,
2010; Vogel, 2012; Annicchiarico et al., 2013; in’t Veld, 2013). Coenen et al. (2008b) investigate fiscal con-
solidation in the New Area Wide Model (NAWM). Clinton et al. (2011) provide similar insights in the
case of an international model (GIMF). Coenen et al. (2012) give an extensive review of the size of fiscal
multipliers in the main institutional models.
Most of these papers plead in favour of so called mixed strategies. Actually, they advocates for fiscal
consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in taxes along with a permanent
but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simultaneously ensure a permanent and
immediate decrease in public deficits but also minimize the negative impact on activity, both in the
short and long run.
However, they also highlight that the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a
straightforward task. Factors such as the monetary environment, the competition level, the international
setting or the heterogeneity of households influence the success of consolidation or stimulation policies.
However, the large number of available fiscal tools allows for some room of manoeuvre in the design
of programs, and fiscal authorities and policy-makers must rely on detailed evaluations of all possible
reform scenarios.
In the present paper, we aim to give a French outlook and compare the effect of transitory or perma-
nent fiscal reforms in a standard feature DSGE model for France within the Euro Area.
First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Con-
trary to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find re-
sponsible for a sizeable increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. Also, French
tax rates are below the revenue maximizing rates.
In a second step, we simulate increases in public spending, transfers or decreases in various tax
rates calibrated to 1% of pre-stimulus output. The resulting fiscal multipliers are compared to the main
existing DSGE models based on the results provided in Coenen et al. (2012), and to the French macroe-
conometric model Mésange developed at Insee (Klein and Simon, 2010). We find that our model gives
comparable multipliers for transitory shocks but highlight that these measures of the fiscal multipliers
crucially depend on their timing and the way both fiscal and monetary authorities commit or react to
3
the stimulus. Short-term fiscal multipliers variations range from 0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline
in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications in terms of policy-making.
It is noteworthy that for transitory measures, public spending fiscal multipliers can range from 0.7 to
1.3; cuts on distorting tax rates provides lower multipliers; coordination across countries in a monetary
union leads to larger fiscal multipliers. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending
multiplier as presented in Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and
following a one quarter shock, they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding
simulation.
The model Meleze used in this paper stems from Campagne and Poissonnier (2016) and features the
standard modelling choices of the two country monetary union literature. The modelling elements are
those generally embedded in large scale models developed in central banks and international institu-
tions among which are GEM at the IMF (Bayoumi et al., 2004), NAWM at the ECB (Coenen et al., 2008a)
or in open economy EAGLE (Gomes et al., 2012), QUEST III at the European Commission (Ratto et al.,
2009) and its R&D version (Roeger et al., 2008).
Regarding the behaviour of fiscal authorities, the government uses public spending to stimulate and
monitor economic activity. It can also exogenously modify its fiscal policy along different axes: lump-
sum transfers and taxes on consumption, labour, capital income or dividends. As detailed below, we
implement a traditional budget rule with government expenditures reacting to the output gap and past
deficits. We also propose an alternative to traditional budget rules used in the literature, and derive a
forward-looking optimizing behaviour for the government.
In Meleze, we replicate two different settings: France against the rest of the Eurozone, and a sym-
metric calibration for the Euro area.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives a short presentation of the model and its
calibration. Section 3 analyses long term fiscal properties of the model through Laffer curves. Section 4
and 5 study transitory and permanent fiscal reforms respectively. The technical reader may refer to the
companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).
2 Outline of the model: Meleze
This section gives a short presentation of the main features of the model, namely: a model of two
countries in monetary union, comparing with standard tools developed in international institutions
and central banks (Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003). A more detailed description of the
model, the first order conditions, their steady state and linearisation is given in the companion paper
(Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).
4
2.1 General framework
The model consists of two countries where continuum of firms and households interact on the goods,
labour and capital market. Both firms and households are consider immobile across countries.
As advocated by Mankiw (2000) in the context of fiscal analysis, we distinguish between two types
of households. A fraction of these households is Ricardian, that is not financially constrained. They hold
financial asset (or debt), own capital which they lend to firms in their country (once installed capital
is assumed to become immobile) and also own financial intermediation firms. Therefore, they receive
interests and dividends. These Ricardian households also choose their investment each period by arbi-
trating between capital and the risk free asset. Non Ricardian households on the contrary are financially
constrained and do not hold any asset.
Both types of households also provide labour on a monopolistically competitive market. For this
reason, households are paid with a mark-up over their marginal disutility. Wage rigidities are added
over the cycle following Erceg et al. (2000), and each household can only reset its wage in adequateness
with his optimal consumption-leisure arbitrage with an exogenous probability. In this framework, there
is no involuntary unemployment and labour adjusts only at the intensive margin (hours worked).
Households finally consume both domestic and imported goods which are also partial substitutes.
For the Ricardian households, being non financially constrained allows them to smooth their consump-
tion over time. Non Ricardian households on the contrary cannot. Once their wage level is set, their
labour supply is given by firms demand, their income ensues which they consume entirely within the
same quarter.
Firms produce partially substitutable goods from a standard constant returns to scale production
function. Production factors are labour and capital. Total factor productivity is exogenous and growing
at the same pace across countries. At each period firms optimize their relative demand in capital and
labour to minimize their production cost, taking the aggregate wage and capital rental cost as given.
Partial substitutability across goods allows firm to price a mark-up over their marginal cost. Over the
cycle, with an exogenous probability each firm can reset its price to maximize its expected discounted
profits, while internalising its market power. Those price rigidities lead to a New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
The modelling of governments’ behaviour is conducted along two lines. First, we implement a tradi-
tional budget rules with government consumption reacting to the output gap and past deficits. Second,
and as an alternative to these rules, we also consider here forward-looking optimizing governments.
Their objective is to maximize households’ intertemporal utility derived from public spending in partial
information as an approximation for the exact Ramsey problem. We consider public consumption as
a proxy for actual public spendings, public investment, public employment and production of public
5
services altogether. For this reason public spendings are purchased from domestic producers only. In
a discretionary manner, governments collect taxes on wages, capital interests, dividends, consumption
and investment. They can distribute transfers to both types of households. They also hold debt both at
the steady state and over the cycle.
In addition to the production of real goods by the firms, a union wide financial market produces
financial intermediation services for both households and governments. Financial intermediaries deduct
from the interest rate set by the central banker a fee under the form of a debt elastic spread which is
akin to fisim. There are no risk or agency issues in our model so that this fee is not to be interpreted as
a risk premium of any kind. In practice, these financial intermediaries ensure the closing of the model
as exposed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and have a very small production compared to NFCs.
2.2 A focus on fiscal authorities
By and large, the purpose of governments is to stimulate domestic production, labour and individual
consumption, as well as to provide with public and collective goods and services. In the real world,
fiscal policy is implemented through a large number of instruments summarized here into exogenous
taxes on consumption, labour and capital incomes, exogenous lump-sum transfers to households and
endogenous public expenditures encompassing all dimensions of public intervention in the absence of
public production or employment in the present model.1
Lump-sum transfers are endogenised in Section 5.2 to ensure the long-run convergence of public
debt when public consumption does not.
Public consumption dimmed endogenous is modelled in two alternative ways. We either follow
a traditional modelling with the implementation of budget rules or we propose an alternative to the
Ramsey problem and model a welfare-optimizing government under bounded rationality.
2.2.1 Budget rule
Budget rules can be implemented in different ways all relying on the ad hoc description of govern-
ments’ spendings as a function of observable endogenous variables. Following Corsetti et al. (2010), we
implement a resembling contra-cyclical budget rule in the following form:
Git = 0.9Gi
t−1 −0.01gyi yi
t−1 + 0.02pai
gyi pait−1 (2.1)
where Git, pai
t and yit respectively denote the deviation of public consumption, the public asset to GDP
ratio, and production from their steady state value. In addition, pa denotes the long-term debt to GDP
1A complete and detailed description of fiscal authorities is given in Campagne and Poissonnier (2016)
6
ratio target and gy the share of public consumption in GDP.2 This approach is standard in the institu-
tional modelling literature and taken on in models such as Quest III, GIMF, NAWM, etc.
2.2.2 Optimizing government: a simplified approach to the Ramsey problem
Rationale The introduction of rationality in DSGE models historically and naturally leads to the defini-
tion of an optimal government behaviour as a normative benchmark, namely the Ramsey policy. Indeed,
in a internally consistent DSGE approach, governments seek to maximize the welfare of their domestic
households, and it is therefore natural to define the objective of fiscal authorities as the maximization
of the utility of households. In the presence of rationality, this maximisation is indeed subject to the
public budget constraint but also to the full set of model constraints. In particular, when choosing the
optimal level of public expenditures Gt, the government internalizes its indirect impact on households’
consumption and labour supply, and therefore households’ utility. One strength of this standard Ram-
sey approach is its robustness to the Lucas critique as it defines a structural behaviour consistent with
the hypotheses of the model. In addition, as we introduce government spending in the utility function
in MELEZE, this Ramsey approach appears to be even more strongly justified.
However, solving a Ramsey problem is both analytically and numerically complex (when not infea-
sible) in large models, especially within the business cycle, as well as unrealistic as it does not embody
political choices observed in the real world that may depart from optimality. This reason underlies the
classical choice of ad hoc budget rules in DSGE models.
As an alternative to these rules, we propose a new approach based on a simplified version of the
Ramsey problem where the government still maximizes households’ utility subject to its transfers/tax
revenues budget constraint, however not taking into account all other constraints. Concretely, the gov-
ernment solves the Ramsey problem taking endogenous variables other than public expenditures (such
as CiT(τ) and Li
T(τ) here) as given. As a result, such a government focuses only on the utility derived
by households through the direct action of the government rather than through second turn effects on
other endogenous variables. As for budget rules, this remains inconsistent with the DSGE approach of a
full knowledge of economic mechanisms by agents. However, this may also be interpreted as a difficulty
for fiscal authorities to exactly assess the impact of its policies on the economy.
Closer to the full Ramsey problem, we believe this approach to be more robust to the Lucas critique
than traditional budget rules as it partially micro-found the behaviour of the government. However, both
approaches suffer from the same paradoxes when embedded in a general equilibrium model solved
under rational expectations. First, in order to solve for such a model, expectations of all agents are
assumed formed through the entire model. It is then paradoxical to assume that either the government
maximizes its objective under a subset of constraints or maximizes an implicit objective through a rule
2As pa, the long-term value of the public asset to GDP ratio, is negative, this indeed implies that public spendings decreasewhen public debt increases so as to ensure the long-term solvency of the government.
7
defined outside the model. Second, both modelling are only simple descriptions of fiscal authorities
and do not encompass real-world phenomena such as the will of authorities to get reelected that may
induce sub-optimal behaviours.3
Program and objective of the government As the government now seeks to maximise the intertem-
poral flow of utility of households, the analytical government’s program at date t is as follows:
maxGi
T ,PAiT
Et
∞
∑T=t
βig
T−tU (CR,iT , CNR,i
T , LR,iT , LNR,i
T , GiT) (2.2)
s.t. PAit =
(Rt−1 − ψg(
PAit−1
Pit−1YiTrt−1
)
)PAi
t−1 + νw,it Wi
t Lit + νk,i
t rk,it CPIi
tKit−1
+ νc,it CPIi
t(Cit + Ii
t) + νD,it Di
t + νFD,it FDi
t − Pit Gi
t −Φit
(2.3)
where U is a weighted average of households’ utility based on Ricardian (CR,i) and non Ricardian house-
holds (CNR,i) consumptions, labour supplies (LR,i and LNR,i) and public consumption (Gi). In addition,
PAit denotes the nominal public assets of country i at the end of period t, Ri
t the nominal interest rate,
Wit real hourly wages, ri,k
t the interest rate paid on physical capital, Kit−1 the capital stock available
at the end of period t− 1, CPIit the relative price of consumption, Ci
t consumption, Iit investment, Di
t
dividends paid by non financial firms, FDit financial intermediation dividends, Pi
t the production price,
and Φit are nominal transfers to households. νc,i, νw,i, νk,i, νD,i and νFD,i respectively denote the tax rate
level on consumption, wages, capital revenues, dividends and financial dividends. βig is the government
discount factor and ψg is a financial intermediation spread paid by the government depending on its
real past net financial position.
Solving for the previous program yields a Euler equation for government consumption that define
the behaviour of fiscal authorities in MELEZE.
2.3 Steady state and calibration
In the present quarterly model, growth is exogenous. In the long run, all real variables grow at the same
rate, that of TFP common to both countries. A full description of the steady state, the associated rela-
tionships and the calibration is also given in the companion paper (Campagne and Poissonnier, 2016).
Taking into account all these relationships imposes crucial restrictions on structural parameters,
endogenous ratios to GDP, as well as on endogenous variables in level. We calibrate our model as to
match the situation of France within the Eurozone over the period 1995-2007, and as to stay coherent
with the traditional DSGE literature4 for structural parameters. Tables 1 and 2 in the companion paper
3See for instance, the public choice theory literature.4Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), Roeger et al. (2008), Martin and Philippon (2014), Smets and Wouters (2002), Annicchiarico et al.
(2013), Vogel (2012), Coenen et al. (2012), Eggertsson et al. (2014), Ratto et al. (2009), Everaert and Schule (2008), Bayoumi et al.(2004), Hø j et al. (2007), Kaplan et al. (2014), Bussiere et al. (2011), European Commission’s Quest III R&D model for France
8
present actual data for France and the Euro Area and their corresponding values at steady state, along
with the values of the corresponding structural parameters.
3 Laffer curves
First highlighted by Laffer at the end of the 70’s, the homonymous curves linking financial revenues
to the level of taxation appear as a good outlook of the room for manoeuvre for raising tax revenues
in order to reduce indebtedness. As such, we perform a standard analysis of the Laffer curves gener-
ated by the model in line with the general equilibrium approach of Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) (T&U
henceforth). Their general equilibrium approach has the advantage of taking into account the full model
setting when computing tax revenues.
More precisely, to allow comparability with T&U, variations in one tax rate are conducted at con-
stant public transfers. In Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), this type of simulations is referred as g-Laffer curves
(as opposed to s-Laffer curves where tax variations are conducted at constant government spending).
Meanwhile, other tax rates are left unchanged, and therefore, the clearing of the government budget
constraint is ensured through endogenous public expenditures and debt level modelled in a budget
rule. This choice corresponds to the standard behaviour of our model.
VAT Labour income tax Capital income anddividend tax
Tax base (= TB) RPC(C + I) RPC(1+ νc)(1+ νw)RWL RPCrkK + dYTax revenues νcTBVAT νw
1+νw TBLabourνkTBCapital
∗ Tax on financial dividends are in practice negligible as the tax base is very small.Real values are expressed with respect to the deflator of public consumption that is the production price.X indicates steady state values and TBX the steady state tax base for tax X. RPC stands for relative price of consumption, C andI for consumption and investment, RW for purchasing power of wages VAT included, L for hours worked, K for the capital stock,Y for production and d for the profit ratio (non financial dividends). νc corresponds to the consumption tax rate, whereas νw andνk are the labour and capital revenues tax rates.
Table 1: Tax bases and associated tax revenues at steady state
Analytically, at the steady state, tax bases and their associated tax revenues are given by Table 1.
Note that as VAT, our model allows the labour tax rate νw to be higher than 100%. This directly reflects
the fact that νw is actually paid by firms and represents the tax rate on net wages.5 In terms of compen-
sation of employees RPC(1 + νw)(1 + νc)RWL, the labour tax rate will therefore be νw
(1+νw)and indeed
strictly lower than one. To allow comparison with T&U, labour income tax Laffer curves plotted below
are expressed on compensation of employees.
5That is after-tax wages paid by firms and actually received by households.
9
Initial tax rates in both models are given in Table 2, showing comparable calibrations. The large
difference in capital income tax rate between the two models is a consequence of different tax bases.
Actually, we choose to tax profits in MELEZE as we are unable to distinguish between dividends (D)
and revenues from physical capital (rKK) in the data. Absent of dividends in T&U, their capital tax base
is therefore smaller and requires a higher tax rate to match data.
MELEZE Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)Consumption tax 20.3% 18.0%Labour income tax 39.1% 46.0%Capital income tax 21.0% 35.0%
Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on compensation of employees. In MELEZE, this rate is given by νw/1 + νw.
Table 2: Tax rates in France
Figure 1 and Table 3 present and describe the steady state Laffer curves in MELEZE. Our calibration
shows that France is evolving far from the maximum of the Laffer curves. All tax rates stand on the
left side of the maximum, that is increasing the tax rate will yield higher tax revenues. The Laffer max-
imum threshold on the labour tax rate on compensation of employees is around 72%, with additional
revenues up to 17%. For capital income taxes, the maximum tax rate is 43% with potential additional tax
revenues of 3%. For VAT, as demand for goods persists even at high tax-included prices, tax bases de-
crease at a moderate pace so that the Laffer curve does not reach a maximum for reasonable values of νc.
Comparing with Laffer curves derived for France in T&U’s neoclassical exogenous growth model,
they find a flatter labour Laffer curve with maximum additional revenues of 5% corresponding to a
threshold tax rate of 44%. On the contrary, for capital income tax, their calibration shows a maximum
tax threshold with additional revenues close to zero.
These differences across models may arise from two different potential causes, namely the choice of
calibration and the structure of the model.
Calibration of the models First, the authors stress the importance of the Frisch elasticity, that is the
elasticity of hours worked to the wage rate, on the shape of the Laffer curves. They show that a de-
creased Frisch elasticity, that is a more inelastic labour supply, leads to higher potential maximum tax
rates. In MELEZE, the Frisch elasticity is equal to 1/2, that is equal to T&U baseline calibration. As such,
this cannot explain the differences across models.
Similarly, T&U explicit a, yet minor, influence of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of con-
sumption. Recalibrating our model as to match σc = 1 as in T&U does not lead to major changes in our
results.
10
(a) Consumption tax (b) Consumption tax
(c) Labour income tax on gross wages (d) Labour income tax on gross wages
(e) Capital income tax (f) Capital income tax
Figure 1: Laffer curves - Tax bases and revenues in France
11
Model Variation Maximumtax rate
Maximumadditionalrevenues
Labour income tax
T&U baseline 63% 5%
MELEZE
baseline 72% 17%θ1 = ∞ 77% 27%θ1
w = ∞ 72% 17%µ1 = 0 72% 16%σ1
c = 1 75% 17%
Capital income tax
T&U baseline 44% 0%
MELEZE
baseline 43% 3%θ1 = ∞ 24% 0%θ1
w = ∞ 43% 3%µ1 = 0 43% 4%σ1
c = 1 43% 3%
T&U refers to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).In both models, the inverse Frisch elasticity (σl) is equal to 2. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption iscalibrated to σc = 1 in T&U against 1.13 in MELEZE.Labour income tax corresponds to the tax rate on gross wages. In MELEZE, this rate is given by νw/1 + νw.The maximum tax rate and additional revenues correspond to the rate at the maximum of the Laffer curve, and to the revenuesat this maximum in comparison to initial calibration revenues.The case θ1 = ∞ (resp. θ1
w = ∞) corresponds to the absence of real rigidities on prices (resp. on wages), that is the absence ofmark-ups. The case µ1 = 0 corresponds to a zero share of non Ricardian agents.
Table 3: Laffer curves comparison for changes in the structure of MELEZE
(a) Labour income tax on gross wages (b) Capital income tax
Figure 2: Laffer curves - Revenues’ sensibility to the structure of the model
12
Concerning the rest of the calibration, MELEZE and T&U compare in terms of the share of public
consumption or transfers in GDP, the depreciation rate, the inflation rate, the TFP growth rate, the
interest rate and the share of capital in the production function. Debt to GDP ratios differ substantially
but are explicitly not identified by T&U as a factor influencing the Laffer curves.
Structure of the models One differentiation between MELEZE and T&U is the introduction of a fully-
fledged open economy framework. T&U introduce open economy effects in a simplified way and stress
themselves the weakness of their model in this regard. However, Auray et al. (2011) extends T&U
framework in a two country setting and show no major differences in Laffer curves induced by trade
openness.6
An other point of differentiation is the neoclassical structure of T&U model. T&U model is a neo-
classical framework with firms trading on perfectly competitive markets. In Meleze, the neo-Keynesian
structure with the introduction of monopolistic competition leads to a distorted steady state.
As depicted on Figure 2a, the existence of price mark-up distorsions at steady state in MELEZE
implies considerable changes for the Laffer curves, increasing observed differences with T&U. With
perfectly substitutable goods (θi = ∞), price mark-ups disappear and we observe an increase in the
maximum labour income tax rate and additional revenues, as well as a decrease for the maximum
capital income tax rate and additional revenues. Indeed, as distortions decrease, profits and dividends
disappear resulting in a smaller tax base for capital and therefore a lower tax potential. Simultaneously,
labour supply increases leading to higher fiscal labour income tax revenues.
On the contrary, monopolistic competition on the labour market (wage mark-up), and the presence
of non Ricardian agents are of minor influence on the results.
One should also be cautious about the interpretation of these Laffer curves for policy analysis. In-
deed, in our model, (installed) capital is considered immobile across countries and therefore no tax
base evasion and international fiscal competition takes place. Though to a lower extent, the same phe-
nomemon for labour is also excluded from our model. In addition, DSGE models including MELEZE
rarely model tax evasion to the grey economy. In all, these Laffer curves may reflect more favourable
tax environments than reality with larger maximum thresholds and potential tax revenues.
Lastly, Fève et al. (2013) highlight the importance of market completeness for the previous results
to hold. Indeed, in an incomplete market setting with heterogeneous agents and a government budget
constraint adjusted through debt, they obtain S-shaped Laffer curves arising for crowding out effects
of private assets by public ones. In this case, identical tax revenues can be associated to up to three
different tax rates with concrete implications for policy decisions.6Note that this is mainly conditional to the fact that both MELEZE and Auray et al. (2011) models assume internationally
immobile factors of production.
13
4 Transitory stimuli and fiscal multipliers
We perform a second standard policy exercise, namely the simulations of fiscal reforms focusing in
particular on the size of fiscal multipliers. To better understand the mechanisms at work, we compare
our model to other institutional DSGE models for Europe developed at the IMF, the OECD, the ECB and
the European Commission. Based on these models, Coenen et al. (2012) implement and compare various
fiscal stimulus packages and measure instantaneous fiscal multipliers for these models, concluding to
strong similarities across models. However, and although our model is in line with these benchmarks,
this section aims at giving a deeper understanding of factors influencing the size of fiscal multipliers.
4.1 Fiscal multipliers dependency to the model class
We implement a two-years increase in public spendings amounting to 1% of ex-ante output, with no
monetary accommodation. Classically, we define the instantaneous fiscal multiplier as the ratio of the
change in output to the 1% increase ex ante.
Following this stimulus, we find that the fiscal multiplier is lower than one both for our model and
the R&D version of QuestIII (Figure 3a). This result is in line with other DSGE models (Figure 3b) with
multipliers ranging from 0.8 to 0.9 in all European models (namely OECD’s Fiscal, EC’s Quest, ECB’s
NAWM and IMF’s GIMF).
With the macroeconometric model Mésange (Klein and Simon, 2010) however, the instantaneous fis-
cal multiplier is larger than one making this model more Keynesian than the otherwise neo-Keynesian
DSGEs. First of all, the smaller size of the fiscal multiplier in DSGE models compared to Mésange model
comes from the central bank’s response (interest rates being exogenous in Mésange). In traditional DSGE
models, an increase in final demand by the government represents a potentially inflationary pressure
and the central bank’s Taylor rule advocates an increase in the nominal interest rate that mitigates the
favourable effects of the public spendings stimulus. As we show in the next section, in the presence
of monetary accommodation, that is when the nominal interest rate is kept temporarily constant, fiscal
multipliers increase further in our model (and in other DSGE models) and compare to the size observed
in the Mésange model.
More generally, the backward structure of macroeconometric models7 does not allow the design of
complex Taylor rules based on inflation expectations. However one can implement rules similar to the
one in Meleze based on contemporary inflation. In the case of Mésange and as France shares a common
monetary policy with other Eurozone members, the absence of economic spillovers and feedbacks with
other members limits the impact of a Taylor rule as France represent only a fifth of the Eurozone.
7With the exception of a few hybrid models such as the FRB-US at the FED including expectations.
14
(a) ... in Meleze, QuestIII R&D, and Mésange
(b) ... in QuestIII, NAWM, GIMF and OECD’s Fiscal
Government spendings increase for 2 years by 1 percent of ex ante output. In the upper figure, fiscal multipliers are plotted forFrance only in Meleze and Mésange, and both France and the Euro Area for QUEST III R&D. The lower figure is taken fromCoenen et al. (2012). Note that for Quest III, responses are annualized in the bottom panel.
Figure 3: Instantaneous fiscal multipliers for a two-year increase in government consumption
15
4.2 Policy implementation sensitivity of fiscal multipliers
We now turn to a sensitivity analysis of the size of fiscal multipliers with respect to the policy imple-
mentation of the shock. In particular, we focus on the dependency to the duration of the shock and the
behaviour of both the government and the central bank.
Monetary and fiscal accommodation Fiscal multipliers depend on the way both the fiscal and mone-
tary authorities respond to the stimulus, that is the way they are modelled. We consider three different
variants for a two years increase in public spendings equal to 1% of pre-stimulus output:(i) the bench-
mark case where the government and the central bank set their decisions as usual (no accommodation),
(ii) the case where monetary policy accommodates the fiscal authority’s decision by keeping its interest
rate at the steady state level and (iii) the case where the government also commits to its decision by not
reacting to the transitory increase in public debt. We run these simulations with either our forward look-
ing optimizing government or with an acyclic budget rule taken from Corsetti et al. (2010) (Figure 4a).
Monetary accommodation, by not raising the interest rate following an inflationary increase in fi-
nal demand, magnifies the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4a). Indeed, as the nominal interest rate remains
unchanged, the increase in inflation expectations lowers the real interest rate therefore fostering pri-
vate consumption and investment. When the government commits to the increase in public spendings
and the central bank is accommodative, the fiscal multiplier is now larger than one with an order of
magnitude comparable to the Mésange model but with a different timing likely due to the absence of
expectations in Mésange In particular, and up until the end of the transitory shock, the fiscal multiplier
remains high in Mésange, whereas it decreases before the end of the shock in Mélèze due to the antici-
pated recession by households.
Moreover, when the government is modelled as forward looking and with our calibrations, it com-
pensates its own spending shock through the endogenous level of public spending more rapidly than
with a budget rule, which mitigates the fiscal multiplier. It does so by anticipation of higher future debt.
Duration The duration of the shock mitigates the size of the fiscal multiplier (Figure 4b). With a one
quarter (unexpected) increase in public spendings, the fiscal multiplier is larger than one. The longer
is the fiscal stimulus, the smaller is the multiplier and the larger is the after effect when the reform is
abrogated. This compares to empirical work on the French public spending multiplier as presented in
Cléaud et al. (2013). Estimating an SVAR over the period 1980-2010, and following a one quarter shock,
they exhibit a 1.1 instantaneous multiplier, close to our corresponding simulation.
This stems from both the need for the government to decrease spendings after the end of the stim-
ulus to reimburse past deficits, and from today’s expectations of households about this changes in the
fiscal stance.
16
Coenen et al. MELEZEUS EU EA FR
Government consumption 1.55 1.52 1.66 0.99Targeted Transfers (to non Ricardians) 1.30 1.12 1.58 0.68Consumption taxes 0.61 0.66 0.46 0.53General transfers 0.42 0.29 0.66 0.27Corporate income taxes 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.04Labour income taxes 0.23 0.53 0.59 0.58
We assume that fiscal stimuli of 1 percent of ex ante output are implemented for 2 years. The first two columns correspond toCoenen et al. (2012, Table 3).
Table 4: Average first-year instantaneous multipliers from different types of fiscal stimulus
All in all, we stress that one should be particularly cautious to identify the underlying policy im-
plementation when referring to fiscal multipliers. Indeed, the mere quantification of fiscal multipliers
is hard to directly transpose into policy evaluations, timeliness and the political context being crucial
determinants of their size.
4.3 Fiscal multipliers of other policy instruments
We evaluate the fiscal multipliers of other fiscal stimulus with the same method as for government
spendings: we implement a fiscal stimulus (decrease in tax rate or increase in transfers) equal to 1% of
ex ante output for two years. Results presented in Table 4 are compared with equivalent simulations for
Europe presented in Coenen et al. (2012). As Coenen et al. did, we average out the fiscal multipliers
of the first year over the different simulations we have run (accommodative fiscal and/or monetary
policy, budget rule or forward looking optimizing government). We also perform equivalent stimulus
in the Euro Area as a whole by implementing the same shock in the two countries of our symmetric
calibration. The comparison of the fiscal multipliers in this case and in the France only case measure
the benefits of coordination of fiscal stimuli in a monetary union.8
By and large, fiscal multipliers for the Euro Area computed with Meleze compare with the results
from Coenen et al. (2012) presented in the Table, as well as with Roeger and in’t Veld (2010). A first
result robust through the models is that only the fiscal multipliers to government spendings or transfers
can be larger than one. This is only the case when the central banker accommodates the demand shock
by temporarily keeping its interest rate unchanged. An other robust result is the low impact of fiscal
stimuli targeted on capital (corporate income tax) relative to other stimuli directly affecting households.
When implemented in the Euro Area as a whole (closed economy) the fiscal multipliers are systemat-
ically larger than when the fiscal stimulus is implemented only in France (except for VAT). Coordination
is thus an important aspect of fiscal policies to improve their efficiency.
8The results remain conditional to the immobility of labour and capital throughout the monetary union.
17
(a) ... depending on monetary policy accommodation and government’s behaviour
(b) ... lasting from one quarter to 3 years
We assume that government spendings are increased by 1 percent of ex ante output. In the upper figure, we compare the fiscalmultiplier in Meleze for France, in the cases where the ECB maintain its interest rate constant or not and whether the governmentis forward looking or follows a budget rule. We also consider a transitory perfect commitment to public expenditures in whichcase the government does not react to its spending shock. In the lower figure, we compare the fiscal multiplier in our model forFrance for 1 quarter, 1,2 or 3 years stimuli.
Figure 4: Instantaneous fiscal multiplier to a transitory increase in government spending by 1% of initialoutput
18
However these numbers hide large disparities across simulations. Without considering a deeper
sensitivity analysis (with respect to elasticity parameters in particular) there is already a 0.2 to 1 point
variability around the baseline for each multiplier.
5 Permanent fiscal reforms
Having looked at transitory fiscal stimuli, we now turn to the effect of permanent fiscal reforms on the
economy.
5.1 Tax hikes
In this first part, we look at three different tax hikes, namely, permanent increases in the labour income
tax rate, the value added tax rate and the capital income tax rate. We calibrate the reforms to an increase
in ex ante tax receipts of 1% of initial GDP. In order to allow comparison with the standard macroecono-
metric model for France Mésange, simulations are conducted at constant public expenditures.9
Labour income tax In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the labour income tax of
1% of initial GDP. In MELEZE, we name labour income tax, the only taxation that applies to labour
and paid by firms. As such, unable to actually distinguish between income tax, or social contributions,
we compare the results to a weighted combination of four different simulations obtained in Mésange
regarding permanent increases in the labour income tax, employers’-, employees’- or generalized social
security contributions. Results are presented in Table 5.
Following the increase in the labour income tax, households’ revenues decrease and therefore pri-
vate consumption. This decrease affects production and decrease imports relatively more than exports
as foreign demand is only affected by second round price effects. As such, the trade balance temporar-
ily improves. Moreover, this increased taxation of compensations paid by firms to workers transmits
negatively to wages, decreases labour supply, and further weights on production.
In the long run, the increased taxation of labour revenues permanently distorts the consumption-
leisure arbitrage and depletes labour supply, consumption and production. Spillover effects are negligi-
ble.
All in all, the impact on the economy compares with the econometric model Mésange. Nevertheless,
we observe differences in the magnitude of responses with stronger recessionary effects in the short run
but weaker ones in the long run.
9This corresponds to simulations in the budget rule version of MELEZE, where the budget rule is shut down for a large numberof period. As a consequence of this choice, we approach permanent shocks by the No Terminal Condition method described inRoeger (1999). Indeed we simulate a quasi permanent shock to allow intermediary convergence to the new after reform steadystate.
19
in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR
MELEZEGDP (France) -0.95 -1.05 -0.82 -0.62 -0.60 -0.62GDP (RoE) 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02Consumption -1.47 -1.60 -1.36 -1.23 -1.25 -1.29Net real wages -0.88 -1.47 -1.73 -1.89 -1.92 -1.95Hours worked -1.44 -1.52 -1.06 -0.66 -0.60 -0.59Return on capital -0.44 -0.94 -0.59 -0.16 -0.07 0.00Investment -1.38 -2.16 -1.85 -1.04 -0.74 -0.69Euribor 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Inflation 0.08 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00Trade balance 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.17
MésangeGDP (France) -0.36 -0.74 -0.89 -0.98 -1.04 -1.27Consumption -0.72 -1.49 -1.73 -1.75 -1.73 -1.92Net real wages -0.86 -1.08 -1.25 -1.40 -1.50 -1.79Investment -0.49 -0.90 -1.04 -1.08 -1.05 -1.34Trade balance 0.19 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.18 0.10
Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.SSC stands for Social Security Contributions.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is notensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.Some lines are kept unreported for Mésange as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with MELEZE (e.g.labour supply).In MELEZE, the distinction between labour income taxes, employers’, employees’ and generalized social contributions beingimpossible, we report a linear combination of all the corresponding simulations in Mésange. Weights are as follows: employer’sSSC (44.4%), employees’ SSC (23.7%), generalized SC (15.3%) and labour income tax (16.6%), corresponding to their share in totalrevenues in 2007. Disaggregated simulations results for Mésange are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).
Table 5: Responses to a permanent labour income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP
20
VAT In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the value added tax of 1% of initial GDP.
Comparison with Mésange is here straightforward. Results are presented in Table 6.
As VAT increases, households’ revenues decreases as net real wages drop. Hence, private consump-
tion, labour supply and production decreases. The VAT hike also negatively affects imports (relatively
to exports) and therefore the trade balance improves in the short and long term.
In the long run, the reform remains recessionary as labour supply, consumption and investment are
permanently decreased. Spillover effects are negligible.
Again, the results compare qualitatively to Mésange. More generally, the recessionary impact of the
reform is stronger in MELEZE.
in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR
MELEZEGDP (France) -0.76 -0.58 -0.50 -0.53 -0.63 -0.93GDP (RoE) 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03Consumption -1.41 -1.10 -0.97 -1.03 -1.14 -1.51Net real wages -1.12 -1.29 -1.39 -1.50 -1.58 -1.85Hours worked -1.14 -0.77 -0.52 -0.39 -0.36 -0.29Return on capital -1.10 -0.70 -0.34 0.04 0.31 1.12Investment -1.71 -2.62 -2.65 -2.43 -2.31 -2.13Euribor 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00Inflation -0.28 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00Trade balance 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.24
MésangeGDP (France) -0.33 -0.54 -0.76 -0.96 -0.95 -0.84Consumption -0.54 -0.94 -1.25 -1.39 -1.43 -1.45Net real wages -0.81 -0.65 -0.99 -1.43 -1.88 -1.98Investment -0.61 -0.80 -0.99 -1.21 -1.13 -1.18Trade balance 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.25
Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence is notensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.Some lines are kept unreported for Mésange as they do not exist (e.g. foreign GDP) or do not easily compare with MELEZE (e.g.labour supply).Simulations results for Mésange are presented in Klein and Simon (2010).
Table 6: Responses to a permanent VAT increase for 1% of initial GDP
Capital income tax In this paragraph, we look at a permanent increase in the capital income tax of
1% of initial GDP. No comparison with Mésange is conducted due to the absence of such a simulation
21
in Klein and Simon (2010). Results are presented in Table 7.
Following an increase in the taxation of capital, investment is logically strongly penalized both in the
short and long run. In the short run, the increase in the capital income tax translates into consumption
and labour supply decreases. Given sluggish adjustments in wages and in the stock of capital, this fall
in the labour (supply) implies a fall in the return on capital (as the marginal productivity of capital
falls). All in all, labour, consumption, investment and output decrease.
Moreover, the decrease in investment implies a permanent decrease in revenues for Ricardian house-
holds. As such, in the long run, consumption decreases and labour supply stagnates. As a result the
impact of the reform is strongly recessive. Spillover effects are still small but stronger than for labour
income tax and VAT hikes.
in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR
MELEZEGDP (France) -0.83 -0.82 -0.79 -0.98 -1.27 -2.26GDP (RoE) 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.07Consumption -1.04 -0.69 -0.53 -0.72 -1.07 -2.24Net real wages -0.11 -0.45 -0.71 -1.02 -1.27 -2.12Hours worked -1.21 -0.95 -0.59 -0.30 -0.21 0.00Return on capital -1.22 -0.83 -0.13 0.90 1.75 4.34Investment -4.06 -6.89 -7.48 -7.28 -6.99 -6.46Euribor -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.00Inflation -0.41 -0.21 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00Trade balance 0.36 0.53 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.28
Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. As such, debt convergence isnot ensured and public liabilities diverge, so that we set ψ = ψg = 0 to avoid feedbacks through explosive financial spreads. Inaddition, we set ry = 0 to implement a strict inflation-targeting rule.
Table 7: Responses to a permanent capital income tax increase for 1% of initial GDP
5.2 Increase in public spendings
We now turn to the response of the economy to a permanent increase in government spendings by
1% of ex ante output. Contrary to a transitory fiscal stimulus financed by debt (but leaving the long
term debt target unchanged), a permanent stimulus raises the question of long-term financing. This
can be achieved either by raising taxes, increasing the long-term debt to GDP ratio or decreasing lump-
sum transfers to households. In the present section and to allow comparison with Coenen et al. (2012),
the long-term additional cost induced by higher public spendings is financed through lower lump-
sum transfers. These transfers adjust following an ad hoc rule inspired by Quest III (R&D) model, and
22
in % deviation from steady state1Y 2Y 3Y 5Y 10Y LR
MELEZEGDP (France) 0.80 0.51 0.44 0.54 0.78 0.77GDP (RoE) -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01Consumption -0.12 -0.52 -0.78 -1.02 -0.84 -0.62Net real wages -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.19 -0.06 0.07Labour supply 1.24 0.79 0.69 0.81 0.88 0.75Return on capital 1.16 0.74 0.60 0.58 0.23 0.00Investment -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.91 1.56 0.82Euribor 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04Inflation -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04Trade balance -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Y stands for year and LR for long run. RoE means Rest of the Eurozone.For these simulations, public expenditures (increase included) are kept exogenous and growing at the rate of TFP. Debtconvergence is ensured through endogenous public transfers such as specified in the text.
Table 8: Responses to a permanent increase in public expenditures for 1% of initial GDP
respond to changes in the debt gap from its long-term target and changes in growth rate of deficit.10
φ1(φ1t − φ1
t−1) =0.01pa1 pa1
t−1 +0.1pa1 ( pa1
t − pa1t−1) (5.1)
where pat represents public assets, and φt lump-sum transfers to households, deviations from their
steady-state values. φ and pa respectively are the steady state transfers to GDP and public assets to
GDP ratios.
Responses of the economy are given in Table 8, whereas instantaneous and cumulative11 fiscal mul-
tipliers computed in Coenen et al. (2012) are given in Figure 5.
Following an increase in government spendings, production increases. The mechanism is identical
to the one presented in Baxter and King (1993). Indeed, as government expenditures increases, transfers
are reduced creating a negative wealth effect. This in turn creates an incentive for households to con-
sume less and to supply more labour. As labour supply increases, so does both labour and the marginal
productivity of capital, also leading to an increase in investment/capital. In the long-run, output de-
mand increases as government demand increases more than households consumption decreases (in
part due to the shape of the marginal utility of consumption). Also, as labour and capital also increase,
output supply increases. All in all, at equilibrium, this implies a permanent increase in production.
10However, and contrary to Quest III, we do not include an additional adjustment through endogenous variations in the labourincome tax rate.
11See Uhlig (2010).
23
As exposed in Baxter and King (1993), this mechanism crucially relies on the financing of govern-
ment spendings. Indeed, in the present case, as expenditures are financed through lump-sum taxes,
the decrease in transfers only leads to a wealth effect but does not distort the economy. Financing ex-
penditures by increases in the income tax rate, as is also common in the DSGE literature, introduces
distortions in the labour supply that decrease employment. As such, labour can decrease at equilibrium,
but also investment and capital as the marginal productivity of capital will be lower. All in all, the effect
on output can turn to be negative in the long-run.
Quantitatively, we obtain an instantaneous first quarter fiscal multiplier of 0.9, close to that of a two-
year stimulus (see Figure 4a). However, due the previously mentioned negative wealth effect induced
by lower transfers in the medium and long-run, the average first-year multiplier decreases to 0.8. In the
long-run, a positive fiscal multiplier of 0.77 remains. Those results are close to simulations for Europe
presented in Coenen et al. (2012) and for France presented in Kilponen et al. (2015) with a long-run
multiplier of 0.82.
Additional simulations financing public expenditures with an increase in the income tax rate leads
to an adverse outcome with a long-run multiplier of -1.30 close to -1.28 obtained for France in Kilponen
et al. (2015). In addition, the presence of public consumption in the utility function tends to mitigate
the short-run multiplier but with no effect on the long-run one.
5.3 Implications for fiscal consolidation
As public debt levels remain high in the Eurozone, one can naturally wonder what are the implications
of previous simulations for the design of fiscal consolidation programs. Indeed, we can easily compare
Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 and see that different fiscal adjustment tools have different short-term and long-term
effects. For instance, increasing labour income taxes is more detrimental to short- and medium-term ac-
tivity than a consumption tax increase.12
More generally, a large number of papers shows short-term weaker but long-term stronger reces-
sionary effect of distortionary tax increases in comparison to expenditure-based fiscal consolidations.
As such, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in’t Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013), Coenen et al. (2008b),
Annicchiarico et al. (2013), D’Auria et al. (2009) all plead in favour of so called mixed strategies. Actu-
ally, they advocate for fiscal consolidations based on an immediate, sharp but transitory increase in
taxes along with a permanent but gradual decrease in government spendings. Such packages simulta-
neously ensure a permanent and immediate decrease in public deficits (and therefore long-term debt)
but also minimize the negative impact on activity. On top of that such a design allows to benefit from
the long-term positive impact of debt service reduction, without the detrimental effect of permanent
12However, in MELEZE and as opposed to larger models, this results is inverted after 10 years. This relies to the fuzzy definitionof labour taxes in our model that are ultimately borne by both firms and households. Larger models usually introduce a distinctionbetween households and firms labour taxation. As such, an increase in labour taxes fully weights on households with a strongerrecessionary effect.
24
(a) Instantaneous multipliers
(b) Cumulative multipliers
Coenen et al. (2012) assume a permanent increase in government spendings by 1 p.p. of ex ante output. The increase in governmentexpenditures is financed through either a decrease in lump-sum transfers to households or labour taxes depending on theadjusting fiscal tool in each model.
Figure 5: Fiscal multiplier for a permanent increase in government expenditures
25
higher distortionary taxes.
However, Clinton et al. (2011), Roeger and in’t Veld (2010), Erceg and Lindé (2013) also insist on the
importance of government credibility for the implementation of mixed strategies. Indeed, fiscal consol-
idation packages relying on transitory increase in taxes need to be perceived as such, and households
must expect a decrease in taxation in the long-run. However, data tends to show that this might not
always be the case, and the potential lack of public commitment might severely hinder the benefits of
mixed strategies.
As an additional and concluding remark, the two country setting of MELEZE also shows that
spillovers from fiscal consolidation within the Eurozone are relatively small, corroborating Forni et al.
(2010) results. However, these results might differ when considering a full international model as in
Clinton et al. (2011) extended to non-euro countries, as global reduction in public debt levels can lead
to a permanent decrease in the real interest rate generating strong spillovers. As such, the international
dimension of policy coordination should not be overlooked.
6 Conclusion
In a neo-Keynesian model for France within the Euro-Area, we analyse the impact of fiscal reforms.
Our model includes the traditional ingredients of modern large-scale institutional DSGE models such as
real and nominal rigidities, capital adjustment costs, non Ricardian agents, and a detailed public finance
block, and therefore easily compares to the existing literature.
First, we derive generalized equilibrium Laffer curves as specified in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
Contrary to their paper, our model includes monopolistic imperfections which we find responsible for
a slight increase in the potential additional revenues from capital taxation. In the end, French tax rates
are found to be below the revenue maximizing rates.
In a second step, we simulate both transitory and permanent shocks for various fiscal instruments.
The fiscal multipliers are comparable to existing institutional DSGEs as summarized in Coenen et al.
(2012) but also to the macroeconometric model Mésange (Klein and Simon, 2010). However, depending
on the specification of fiscal and monetary authorities, fiscal multipliers variations are substantial, from
0.2 up to 1 point around the baseline in the most extreme case, with therefore very different implications
in terms of policy-making.
All in all, the evaluation and the design of efficient fiscal packages is not a straightforward task. The
monetary environment, the competition level, the international setting or the heterogeneity of house-
holds are only a few of the factors influencing the success of different policies. However, the large
26
number of fiscal tools within the scope of policy-makers allows for some room of manoeuvre in the
design of better programs, as advocated in the mixed strategies literature.
References
B. Annicchiarico, F. Di Dio, and F. Felici. Structural reforms and the potential effects on the Italian
economy. Journal of Policy Modeling, 35(1):88–109, Jan. 2013. ISSN 01618938.
S. Auray, A. Eyquem, and P. Gomme. A Tale of Tax Policies in Open Economies. Working Paper GATE,
2011-38(December), 2011.
M. Baxter and R. G. King. Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. The American Economic Review, pages
315–334, 1993.
T. Bayoumi, D. Laxton, and P. Pesenti. Benefits and Spillovers of Greater Competition in Europe: A
Macroeconomic Assessment. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance
Discussion Papers, 803(April), 2004.
M. Bussiere, G. Callegari, and F. Ghironi. Estimating trade elasticities: Demand composition and the
trade collapse of 2008-09. NBER Working Paper Series, 17712(December), 2011.
B. Campagne and A. Poissonnier. MELEZE, a DSGE model for France within the Euro Area. Document
de travail Insee - Dese, G2016/05, 2016.
L. J. Christiano, M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans. Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a
Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy, 113(1):1–45, Feb. 2005. ISSN 0022-3808.
G. Cléaud, M. Lemoine, and P.-A. Pionnier. Which size and evolution of the government expenditure
multiplier in france (1980-2010)? Documents de travail de la DESE - INSEE, G2013/15, 2013.
K. Clinton, M. Kumhof, D. Laxton, and S. Mursula. Deficit reduction: Short-term pain for long-term
gain. European Economic Review, 55(1):118–139, Jan. 2011. ISSN 00142921.
G. Coenen, P. McAdam, and R. Straub. Tax reform and labour-market performance in the euro area: A
simulation-based analysis using the New Area-Wide Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
32(8):2543–2583, Aug. 2008a. ISSN 01651889.
G. Coenen, M. Mohr, and R. Straub. Fiscal consolidation in the euro area: Long-run benefits and short-
run costs. Economic Modelling, 25(5):912–932, Sept. 2008b. ISSN 02649993.
G. Coenen, C. J. Erceg, C. Freedman, D. Furceri, M. Kumhof, R. Lalonde, D. Laxton, J. Lindé,
A. Mourougane, D. Muir, S. Mursula, C. de Resende, J. Roberts, W. Roeger, S. Snudden, M. Tra-
bandt, and J. in’t Veld. Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models. American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, 3(4):22–68, Jan. 2012. ISSN 1945-7707.
27
G. Corsetti, A. Meier, and G. Müller. Cross-border spillovers from fiscal stimulus. International Journal
of Central Banking, 6(March):5–37, 2010.
F. D’Auria, A. Pagano, M. Ratto, and J. Varga. A comparison of structural reform scenarios across
the EU member states-Simulation-based analysis using the QUEST model with endogenous growth.
European Commission Economic Papers, 392(December), 2009.
G. Eggertsson, A. Ferrero, and A. Raffo. Can Structural Reforms Help Europe ? Journal of Monetary
Economics, 61(January):2–22, 2014.
C. Erceg, D. Henderson, and A. Levin. Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price con-
tracts. Journal of monetary Economics, 46, 2000.
C. J. Erceg and J. Lindé. Fiscal consolidation in a currency union: Spending cuts vs. tax hikes. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(2):422–445, Feb. 2013. ISSN 01651889.
L. Everaert and W. Schule. Why It Pays to Synchronize Structural Reforms in the Euro Area Across
Markets and Countries. IMF Staff Papers, 55(2):356–366, Apr. 2008. ISSN 1020-7635.
P. Fève, J. Matheron, and J.-G. Sahuc. The Laffer Curve in an Incomplete-Market Economy. Technical
report, 2013.
L. Forni, A. Gerali, and M. Pisani. The macroeconomics of fiscal consolidations in euro area countries.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(9):1791–1812, Sept. 2010. ISSN 01651889.
S. Gomes, P. Jacquinot, and M. Pisani. The EAGLE. A model for policy analysis of macroeconomic
interdependence in the euro area. Economic Modelling, 2012.
J. Hø j, M. Jimenez, M. Maher, G. Nicoletti, and M. Wise. Product Market Competition in the OECD
Countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, (575), 2007.
J. in’t Veld. Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core. European Commis-
sion Economic Papers, 506(October), 2013.
G. Kaplan, G. L. Violante, and J. Weidner. The Wealthy Hand-to-Mouth. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, (Spring):77–153, 2014.
J. Kilponen, M. Pisani, S. Schmidt, V. Corbo, T. Hlédik, J. Hollmayr, S. Hurtado, P. Júlio, D. Kulikov,
M. Lemoine, M. Lozej, H. Lundvall, J. F. Maria, B. Micallef, D. Papageorgiou, J. Rysanek, D. Sideris,
C. Thomas, and G. de Walque. Comparing fiscal multipliers across models and countries in europe.
ECB Working Paper, (1760), March 2015.
C. Klein and O. Simon. Le modèle MÉSANGE réestimé en base 2000. Tome 1-Version avec volumes à
prix constants. document de travail Insee, 2010.
N. Mankiw. The savers-spenders theory of fiscal policy. NBER Working Paper Series, 2000.
28
P. Martin and T. Philippon. Inspecting the Mechanism: Leverage and the Great Recession in the Euro-
zone. NBER Working Paper Series, 20572(October), 2014.
M. Ratto, W. Roeger, and J. in’t Veld. QUEST III : An estimated open-economy DSGE model of the euro
area with fiscal and monetary policy. Economic Modelling, 26(1):222–233, 2009. ISSN 0264-9993.
W. Roeger. The Sensitivity of Solutions to Terminal Conditions: Simulating Permanent Shocks with
Quest II. Analyses in Macroeconomic Modelling, 1999.
W. Roeger and J. in’t Veld. Fiscal stimulus and exit strategies in the EU: a model-based analysis. European
Commission Economic Papers, 426(September):1–36, 2010.
W. Roeger, J. Varga, and J. in’t Veld. Structural Reforms in the EU: A simulation-based analysis using
the QUEST model with endogenous growth. European Commission Economic Papers, 2008.
S. Schmitt-Grohé and M. Uribe. Closing small open economy models. Journal of International Economics,
61(1):163–185, Oct. 2003. ISSN 00221996.
F. Smets and R. Wouters. An estimated Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of the Euro
area. Working paper series, European Central Bank, (171), 2002.
F. Smets and R. Wouters. An estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the euro area.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5):1123–1175, 2003.
M. Trabandt and H. Uhlig. The Laffer curve revisited. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(4):305–327, May
2011. ISSN 03043932.
H. Uhlig. Some Fiscal Calculus. American Economic Review, 100(2):30 – 34, 2010.
L. Vogel. Structural reforms, fiscal consolidation and external rebalancing in monetary union: A model-
based analysis. Economic Modelling, 29(4):1286–1298, July 2012. ISSN 02649993.
29
G 9
001
J. F
AY
OLL
E e
t M
. F
LEU
RB
AE
Y
Acc
umul
atio
n, p
rofit
abili
té e
t end
ette
men
t des
en
trep
rises
G 9
002
H. R
OU
SS
E
Dét
ectio
n et
effe
ts d
e la
mul
ticol
inéa
rité
dans
les
mod
èles
liné
aire
s or
dina
ires
- U
n pr
olon
gem
ent
de la
réf
lexi
on d
e B
ELS
LEY
, KU
H e
t WE
LSC
H
G 9
003
P. R
ALL
E e
t J. T
OU
JAS
-BE
RN
AT
E
Inde
xatio
n de
s sa
laire
s : l
a ru
ptur
e de
198
3
G 9
004
D. G
UE
LLE
C e
t P. R
ALL
E
Com
pétit
ivité
, cro
issa
nce
et in
nova
tion
de p
rodu
it
G 9
005
P. R
ALL
E e
t J. T
OU
JAS
-BE
RN
AT
E
Les
cons
éque
nces
de
la d
ésin
dexa
tion.
Ana
lyse
da
ns u
ne m
aque
tte p
rix-s
alai
res
G 9
101
Équ
ipe
AM
AD
EU
S
Le m
odèl
e A
MA
DE
US
- P
rem
ière
par
tie -
Pré
sent
atio
n gé
néra
le
G 9
102
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
Le m
odèl
e A
MA
DE
US
- D
euxi
ème
part
ie -
Pro
prié
tés
varia
ntie
lles
G 9
103
D. G
UE
LLE
C e
t P. R
ALL
E
End
ogen
ous
grow
th a
nd p
rodu
ct in
nova
tion
G 9
104
H
. RO
US
SE
Le
mod
èle
AM
AD
EU
S -
Tro
isiè
me
part
ie -
Le
com
mer
ce e
xtér
ieur
et l
'env
ironn
emen
t in
tern
atio
nal
G 9
105
H. R
OU
SS
E
Effe
ts d
e de
man
de e
t d'o
ffre
dans
les
résu
ltats
du
com
mer
ce e
xtér
ieur
man
ufac
turé
de
la F
ranc
e au
co
urs
des
deux
der
nièr
es d
écen
nies
G 9
106
B. C
RE
PO
N
Inno
vatio
n, ta
ille
et c
once
ntra
tion
: cau
salit
és e
t dy
nam
ique
s
G 9
107
B. A
MA
BLE
et D
. GU
ELL
EC
U
n pa
nora
ma
des
théo
ries
de la
cro
issa
nce
endo
gène
G 9
108
M. G
LAU
DE
et M
. MO
UT
AR
DIE
R
Une
éva
luat
ion
du c
oût d
irect
de
l'enf
ant d
e 19
79
à 19
89
G 9
109
P. R
ALL
E e
t alii
F
ranc
e -
Alle
mag
ne :
perf
orm
ance
s éc
onom
ique
s co
mpa
rées
G 9
110
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
Mic
ro-D
MS
N
ON
PA
RU
G 9
111
A. M
AG
NIE
R
Effe
ts a
ccél
érat
eur
et m
ultip
licat
eur
en F
ranc
e de
puis
197
0 : q
uelq
ues
résu
ltats
em
piriq
ues
G 9
112
B. C
RE
PO
N e
t G. D
UR
EA
U
Inve
stis
sem
ent e
n re
cher
che-
déve
lopp
emen
t :
anal
yse
de c
ausa
lités
dan
s un
mod
èle
d'ac
célé
-ra
teur
gén
éral
isé
G 9
113
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T,
H.
ER
KE
L-R
OU
SS
E,
J. T
OU
JAS
-B
ER
NA
TE
"F
ranc
e-A
llem
agne
Cou
plée
s" -
Deu
x éc
onom
ies
vues
par
une
maq
uette
mac
ro-é
cono
mét
rique
G 9
201
W.J
. A
DA
MS
, B
. C
RE
PO
N,
D.
EN
CA
OU
A
Cho
ix te
chno
logi
ques
et s
trat
égie
s de
dis
suas
ion
d'en
trée
G 9
202
J. O
LIV
EIR
A-M
AR
TIN
S,
J.
TO
UJA
S-B
ER
NA
TE
Mac
ro-e
cono
mic
impo
rt fu
nctio
ns w
ith im
perf
ect
com
petit
ion
- A
n ap
plic
atio
n to
the
E.C
. Tra
de
G 9
203
I. S
TA
PIC
Le
s éc
hang
es in
tern
atio
naux
de
serv
ices
de
la
Fra
nce
dans
le c
adre
des
nég
ocia
tions
mul
tila-
téra
les
du G
AT
T
Jui
n 19
92 (
1ère
ver
sion
) N
ovem
bre
1992
(ve
rsio
n fin
ale)
G 9
204
P. S
EV
ES
TR
E
L'éc
onom
étrie
sur
don
nées
indi
vidu
elle
s-te
mpo
relle
s. U
ne n
ote
intr
oduc
tive
G 9
205
H. E
RK
EL-
RO
US
SE
Le
com
mer
ce e
xtér
ieur
et l
'env
ironn
emen
t in-
tern
atio
nal d
ans
le m
odèl
e A
MA
DE
US
(r
éest
imat
ion
1992
)
G 9
206
N. G
RE
EN
AN
et D
. GU
ELL
EC
C
oord
inat
ion
with
in th
e fir
m a
nd e
ndog
enou
s gr
owth
G 9
207
A. M
AG
NIE
R e
t J. T
OU
JAS
-BE
RN
AT
E
Tec
hnol
ogy
and
trad
e: e
mpi
rical
evi
denc
es fo
r th
e m
ajor
five
indu
stria
lized
cou
ntrie
s
G 9
208
B.
CR
EP
ON
, E
. D
UG
UE
T,
D. E
NC
AO
UA
et
P. M
OH
NE
N
Coo
pera
tive,
non
coo
pera
tive
R &
D a
nd o
ptim
al
pate
nt li
fe
G 9
209
B. C
RE
PO
N e
t E. D
UG
UE
T
Res
earc
h an
d de
velo
pmen
t, co
mpe
titio
n an
d in
nova
tion:
an
appl
icat
ion
of p
seud
o m
axim
um
likel
ihoo
d m
etho
ds to
Poi
sson
mod
els
with
he
tero
gene
ity
G 9
301
J. T
OU
JAS
-BE
RN
AT
E
Com
mer
ce in
tern
atio
nal e
t con
curr
ence
impa
r-fa
ite :
déve
lopp
emen
ts r
écen
ts e
t im
plic
atio
ns
pour
la p
oliti
que
com
mer
cial
e
G 9
302
Ch.
CA
SE
S
Dur
ées
de c
hôm
age
et c
ompo
rtem
ents
d'o
ffre
de
trav
ail :
une
rev
ue d
e la
litté
ratu
re
G 9
303
H. E
RK
EL-
RO
US
SE
U
nion
éco
nom
ique
et m
onét
aire
: le
déb
at
écon
omiq
ue
G 9
304
N. G
RE
EN
AN
- D
. GU
ELL
EC
/ G
. B
RO
US
SA
UD
IER
- L
. M
IOT
TI
Inno
vatio
n or
gani
satio
nnel
le, d
ynam
ism
e te
ch-
nolo
giqu
e et
per
form
ance
s de
s en
trep
rises
G 9
305
P. J
AIL
LAR
D
Le tr
aité
de
Maa
stric
ht :
prés
enta
tion
jurid
ique
et
hist
oriq
ue
G 9
306
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
Mic
ro-D
MS
: pr
ésen
tatio
n et
pro
prié
tés
G 9
307
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
Mic
ro-D
MS
- v
aria
ntes
: le
s ta
blea
ux
G 9
308
S. J
AC
OB
ZO
NE
Le
s gr
ands
rés
eaux
pub
lics
fran
çais
dan
s un
e pe
rspe
ctiv
e eu
ropé
enne
G 9
309
L. B
LOC
H -
B. C
ŒU
RE
P
rofit
abili
té d
e l'i
nves
tisse
men
t pro
duct
if et
tr
ansm
issi
on d
es c
hocs
fina
ncie
rs
G 9
310
J. B
OU
RD
IEU
- B
. C
OLI
N-S
ED
ILLO
T
Les
théo
ries
sur
la s
truc
ture
opt
imal
e du
cap
ital :
qu
elqu
es p
oint
s de
rep
ère
List
e de
s do
cumen
ts d
e tr
avail de
la
Direc
tion
des
Étu
des
et S
ynth
èses
Éco
nomique
s ii
G 9
311
J. B
OU
RD
IEU
- B
. C
OLI
N-S
ED
ILLO
T
Les
déci
sion
s de
fina
ncem
ent d
es e
ntre
pris
es
fran
çais
es :
une
éval
uatio
n em
piriq
ue d
es th
éo-
ries
de la
str
uctu
re o
ptim
ale
du c
apita
l
G 9
312
L. B
LOC
H -
B. C
ŒU
RÉ
Q
de
Tob
in m
argi
nal e
t tra
nsm
issi
on d
es c
hocs
fin
anci
ers
G 9
313
Équ
ipes
Am
adeu
s (I
NS
EE
), B
anqu
e de
Fra
nce,
M
étric
(D
P)
Pré
sent
atio
n de
s pr
oprié
tés
des
prin
cipa
ux m
o-dè
les
mac
roéc
onom
ique
s du
Ser
vice
Pub
lic
G 9
314
B. C
RE
PO
N -
E. D
UG
UE
T
Res
earc
h &
Dev
elop
men
t, co
mpe
titio
n an
d in
nova
tion
G 9
315
B. D
OR
MO
NT
Q
uelle
est
l'in
fluen
ce d
u co
ût d
u tr
avai
l sur
l'e
mpl
oi ?
G 9
316
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
- C
. BR
OU
SS
E
Deu
x ét
udes
sur
l'âg
e de
la r
etra
ite
G 9
317
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
R
épar
titio
n du
trav
ail d
ans
une
popu
latio
n hé
té-
rogè
ne :
deux
not
es
G 9
318
D. E
YS
SA
RT
IER
- N
. PO
NT
Y
AM
AD
EU
S -
an
annu
al m
acro
-eco
nom
ic m
odel
fo
r th
e m
ediu
m a
nd lo
ng te
rm
G 9
319
G.
CE
TT
E -
Ph.
CU
NÉ
O -
D.
EY
SS
AR
TIE
R -
J. G
AU
TIÉ
Le
s ef
fets
sur
l'em
ploi
d'u
n ab
aiss
emen
t du
coût
du
trav
ail d
es je
unes
G 9
401
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
Le
s st
ruct
ures
par
âge
impo
rten
t-el
les
?
G 9
402
J. G
AU
TIÉ
Le
chô
mag
e de
s je
unes
en
Fra
nce
: pro
blèm
e de
fo
rmat
ion
ou p
héno
mèn
e de
file
d'a
ttent
e ?
Que
lque
s él
émen
ts d
u dé
bat
G 9
403
P. Q
UIR
ION
Le
s dé
chet
s en
Fra
nce
: élé
men
ts s
tatis
tique
s et
éc
onom
ique
s
G 9
404
D. L
AD
IRA
Y -
M. G
RU
N-R
EH
OM
ME
Li
ssag
e pa
r m
oyen
nes
mob
iles
- Le
pro
blèm
e de
s ex
trém
ités
de s
érie
G 9
405
V. M
AIL
LAR
D
Thé
orie
et p
ratiq
ue d
e la
cor
rect
ion
des
effe
ts d
e jo
urs
ouvr
able
s
G 9
406
F.
RO
SE
NW
ALD
La
déc
isio
n d'
inve
stir
G 9
407
S. J
AC
OB
ZO
NE
Le
s ap
port
s de
l'éc
onom
ie in
dust
rielle
pou
r dé
finir
la s
trat
égie
éco
nom
ique
de
l'hôp
ital p
ublic
G 9
408
L. B
LOC
H, J
. B
OU
RD
IEU
,
B.
CO
LIN
-SE
DIL
LOT
, G
. LO
NG
UE
VIL
LE
Du
défa
ut d
e pa
iem
ent a
u dé
pôt d
e bi
lan
: les
ba
nqui
ers
face
aux
PM
E e
n di
fficu
lté
G 9
409
D. E
YS
SA
RT
IER
, P.
MA
IRE
Im
pact
s m
acro
-éco
nom
ique
s de
mes
ures
d'a
ide
au lo
gem
ent -
que
lque
s él
émen
ts d
'éva
luat
ion
G 9
410
F.
RO
SE
NW
ALD
S
uivi
con
jonc
ture
l de
l'inv
estis
sem
ent
G 9
411
C. D
EF
EU
ILLE
Y -
Ph.
QU
IRIO
N
Les
déch
ets
d'em
balla
ges
mén
ager
s : u
ne
anal
yse
écon
omiq
ue d
es p
oliti
ques
fran
çais
e et
al
lem
ande
G 9
412
J. B
OU
RD
IEU
- B
. C
ŒU
RÉ
-
B.
CO
LIN
-SE
DIL
LOT
In
vest
isse
men
t, in
cert
itude
et i
rrév
ersi
bilit
é Q
uelq
ues
déve
lopp
emen
ts r
écen
ts d
e la
théo
rie
de l'
inve
stis
sem
ent
G 9
413
B. D
OR
MO
NT
- M
. PA
UC
HE
T
L'év
alua
tion
de l'
élas
ticité
em
ploi
-sal
aire
dép
end-
elle
des
str
uctu
res
de q
ualif
icat
ion
?
G 9
414
I. K
AB
LA
Le C
hoix
de
brev
eter
une
inve
ntio
n
G 9
501
J. B
OU
RD
IEU
- B
. C
ŒU
RÉ
- B
. S
ED
ILLO
T
Irre
vers
ible
Inve
stm
ent a
nd U
ncer
tain
ty:
W
hen
is th
ere
a V
alue
of W
aitin
g?
G 9
502
L. B
LOC
H -
B. C
ŒU
RÉ
Im
perf
ectio
ns d
u m
arch
é du
cré
dit,
inve
stis
se-
men
t des
ent
repr
ises
et c
ycle
éco
nom
ique
G 9
503
D. G
OU
X -
E. M
AU
RIN
Le
s tr
ansf
orm
atio
ns d
e la
dem
ande
de
trav
ail p
ar
qual
ifica
tion
en F
ranc
e
Une
étu
de s
ur la
pér
iode
197
0-19
93
G 9
504
N. G
RE
EN
AN
T
echn
olog
ie, c
hang
emen
t org
anis
atio
nnel
, qua
-lif
icat
ions
et e
mpl
oi :
une
étud
e em
piriq
ue s
ur
l'ind
ustr
ie m
anuf
actu
rière
G 9
505
D. G
OU
X -
E. M
AU
RIN
P
ersi
stan
ce d
es h
iéra
rchi
es s
ecto
rielle
s de
sa-
laire
s: u
n ré
exam
en s
ur d
onné
es fr
ança
ises
G 9
505
D. G
OU
X -
E. M
AU
RIN
B
is
Per
sist
ence
of i
nter
-indu
stry
wag
es d
iffer
entia
ls: a
re
exam
inat
ion
on m
atch
ed w
orke
r-fir
m p
anel
dat
a
G 9
506
S. J
AC
OB
ZO
NE
Le
s lie
ns e
ntre
RM
I et c
hôm
age,
une
mis
e en
pe
rspe
ctiv
e N
ON
PA
RU
- ar
ticle
sor
ti da
ns É
cono
mie
et
Pré
visi
on n
° 12
2 (1
996)
- pa
ges
95 à
113
G 9
507
G.
CE
TT
E -
S.
MA
HF
OU
Z
Le p
arta
ge p
rimai
re d
u re
venu
C
onst
at d
escr
iptif
sur
long
ue p
ério
de
G 9
601
Ban
que
de F
ranc
e -
CE
PR
EM
AP
- D
irect
ion
de la
P
révi
sion
- É
rasm
e -
INS
EE
- O
FC
E
Str
uctu
res
et p
ropr
iété
s de
cin
q m
odèl
es m
acro
-éc
onom
ique
s fr
ança
is
G 9
602
Rap
port
d’a
ctiv
ité d
e la
DE
SE
de
l’ann
ée 1
995
G 9
603
J. B
OU
RD
IEU
- A
. DR
AZ
NIE
KS
L’
octr
oi d
e cr
édit
aux
PM
E :
une
anal
yse
à pa
rtir
d’in
form
atio
ns b
anca
ires
G 9
604
A. T
OP
IOL-
BE
NS
AÏD
Le
s im
plan
tatio
ns ja
pona
ises
en
Fra
nce
G 9
605
P.
GE
NIE
R -
S.
JAC
OB
ZO
NE
C
ompo
rtem
ents
de
prév
entio
n, c
onso
mm
atio
n d’
alco
ol e
t tab
agie
: pe
ut-o
n pa
rler
d’un
e ge
stio
n gl
obal
e du
cap
ital s
anté
?
Une
mod
élis
atio
n m
icro
écon
omét
rique
em
piriq
ue
G 9
606
C. D
OZ
- F
. LE
NG
LAR
T
Fac
tor
anal
ysis
and
uno
bser
ved
com
pone
nt
mod
els:
an
appl
icat
ion
to th
e st
udy
of F
renc
h bu
sine
ss s
urve
ys
G 9
607
N. G
RE
EN
AN
- D
. GU
ELL
EC
La
théo
rie c
oopé
rativ
e de
la fi
rme
iii
G 9
608
N. G
RE
EN
AN
- D
. GU
ELL
EC
T
echn
olog
ical
inno
vatio
n an
d em
ploy
men
t re
allo
catio
n
G 9
609
Ph.
CO
UR
- F
. R
UP
PR
EC
HT
L’
inté
grat
ion
asym
étriq
ue a
u se
in d
u co
ntin
ent
amér
icai
n : u
n es
sai d
e m
odél
isat
ion
G 9
610
S.
DU
CH
EN
E -
G.
FO
RG
EO
T -
A.
JAC
QU
OT
A
naly
se d
es é
volu
tions
réc
ente
s de
la p
rodu
cti-
vité
app
aren
te d
u tr
avai
l
G 9
611
X. B
ON
NE
T -
S. M
AH
FO
UZ
T
he in
fluen
ce o
f diff
eren
t spe
cific
atio
ns o
f wag
es-
pric
es s
pira
ls o
n th
e m
easu
re o
f the
NA
IRU
: the
ca
se o
f Fra
nce
G 9
612
PH
. C
OU
R -
E.
DU
BO
IS,
S.
MA
HF
OU
Z,
J.
PIS
AN
I-F
ER
RY
T
he c
ost o
f fis
cal r
etre
nchm
ent r
evis
ited:
how
st
rong
is th
e ev
iden
ce?
G 9
613
A. J
AC
QU
OT
Le
s fle
xion
s de
s ta
ux d
’act
ivité
son
t-el
les
seul
e-m
ent c
onjo
nctu
relle
s ?
G 9
614
ZH
AN
G Y
ingx
iang
- S
ON
G X
ueqi
ng
Lexi
que
mac
roéc
onom
ique
Fra
nçai
s-C
hino
is
G 9
701
J.L.
SC
HN
EID
ER
La
taxe
pro
fess
ionn
elle
: él
émen
ts d
e ca
drag
e éc
onom
ique
G 9
702
J.L.
SC
HN
EID
ER
T
rans
ition
et s
tabi
lité
polit
ique
d’u
n sy
stèm
e re
dist
ribut
if
G 9
703
D. G
OU
X -
E. M
AU
RIN
T
rain
or
Pay
: D
oes
it R
educ
e In
equa
litie
s to
En-
cour
age
Firm
s to
Tra
in th
eir
Wor
kers
?
G 9
704
P. G
EN
IER
D
eux
cont
ribut
ions
sur
dép
enda
nce
et é
quité
G 9
705
E. D
UG
UE
T -
N. I
UN
G
R &
D In
vest
men
t, P
aten
t Life
and
Pat
ent V
alue
A
n E
cono
met
ric A
naly
sis
at th
e F
irm L
evel
G 9
706
M.
HO
UD
EB
INE
- A
. T
OP
IOL-
BE
NS
AÏD
Le
s en
trep
rises
inte
rnat
iona
les
en F
ranc
e : u
ne
anal
yse
à pa
rtir
de d
onné
es in
divi
duel
les
G 9
707
M. H
OU
DE
BIN
E
Pol
aris
atio
n de
s ac
tivité
s et
spé
cial
isat
ion
des
dépa
rtem
ents
en
Fra
nce
G 9
708
E. D
UG
UE
T -
N. G
RE
EN
AN
Le
bia
is te
chno
logi
que
: une
ana
lyse
sur
don
nées
in
divi
duel
les
G 9
709
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
Ana
lyzi
ng a
sm
all F
renc
h E
CM
Mod
el
G 9
710
J.L.
BR
ILLE
T
For
mal
izin
g th
e tr
ansi
tion
proc
ess:
sce
nario
s fo
r ca
pita
l acc
umul
atio
n
G 9
711
G.
FO
RG
EO
T -
J.
GA
UT
IÉ
Inse
rtio
n pr
ofes
sion
nelle
des
jeun
es e
t pro
cess
us
de d
écla
ssem
ent
G 9
712
E. D
UB
OIS
H
igh
Rea
l Int
eres
t Rat
es: t
he C
onse
quen
ce o
f a
Sav
ing
Inve
stm
ent D
iseq
uilib
rium
or
of a
n in
-su
ffici
ent C
redi
bilit
y of
Mon
etar
y A
utho
ritie
s?
G 9
713
Bila
n de
s ac
tivité
s de
la D
irect
ion
des
Étu
des
et S
ynth
èses
Éco
nom
ique
s -
1996
G 9
714
F.
LEQ
UIL
LER
D
oes
the
Fre
nch
Con
sum
er P
rice
Inde
x O
ver-
stat
e In
flatio
n?
G 9
715
X. B
ON
NE
T
Peu
t-on
met
tre
en é
vide
nce
les
rigid
ités
à la
ba
isse
des
sal
aire
s no
min
aux
?
Une
étu
de s
ur q
uelq
ues
gran
ds p
ays
de l’
OC
DE
G 9
716
N. I
UN
G -
F.
RU
PP
RE
CH
T
Pro
duct
ivité
de
la r
eche
rche
et r
ende
men
ts
d’éc
helle
dan
s le
sec
teur
pha
rmac
eutiq
ue
fran
çais
G 9
717
E. D
UG
UE
T -
I. K
AB
LA
App
ropr
iatio
n st
rate
gy a
nd th
e m
otiv
atio
ns to
use
th
e pa
tent
sys
tem
in F
ranc
e -
An
econ
omet
ric
anal
ysis
at t
he fi
rm le
vel
G 9
718
L.P
. PE
LÉ -
P. R
ALL
E
Âge
de
la r
etra
ite :
les
aspe
cts
inci
tatif
s du
rég
ime
géné
ral
G 9
719
ZH
AN
G Y
ingx
iang
- S
ON
G X
ueqi
ng
Lexi
que
mac
roéc
onom
ique
fran
çais
-chi
nois
, ch
inoi
s-fr
ança
is
G 9
720
M. H
OU
DE
BIN
E -
J.L
. SC
HN
EID
ER
M
esur
er l’
influ
ence
de
la fi
scal
ité s
ur la
loca
li-sa
tion
des
entr
epris
es
G 9
721
A. M
OU
RO
UG
AN
E
Cré
dibi
lité,
indé
pend
ance
et
polit
ique
mon
étai
re
Une
rev
ue d
e la
litté
ratu
re
G 9
722
P. A
UG
ER
AU
D -
L. B
RIO
T
Les
donn
ées
com
ptab
les
d’en
trep
rises
Le
sys
tèm
e in
term
édia
ire d
’ent
repr
ises
P
assa
ge d
es d
onné
es in
divi
duel
les
aux
donn
ées
sect
orie
lles
G 9
723
P. A
UG
ER
AU
D -
J.E
. CH
AP
RO
N
Usi
ng B
usin
ess
Acc
ount
s fo
r C
ompi
ling
Nat
iona
l A
ccou
nts:
the
Fre
nch
Exp
erie
nce
G 9
724
P. A
UG
ER
AU
D
Les
com
ptes
d’e
ntre
pris
e pa
r ac
tivité
s -
Le p
as-
sage
aux
com
ptes
- D
e la
com
ptab
ilité
d’
entr
epris
e à
la c
ompt
abili
té n
atio
nale
- A
pa
raîtr
e
G 9
801
H. M
ICH
AU
DO
N -
C. P
RIG
EN
T
Pré
sent
atio
n du
mod
èle
AM
AD
EU
S
G 9
802
J. A
CC
AR
DO
U
ne é
tude
de
com
ptab
ilité
gén
érat
ionn
elle
po
ur la
Fra
nce
en 1
996
G 9
803
X. B
ON
NE
T -
S. D
UC
HÊ
NE
A
ppor
ts e
t lim
ites
de la
mod
élis
atio
n «
Rea
l Bus
ines
s C
ycle
s »
G 9
804
C. B
AR
LET
- C
. DU
GU
ET
-
D. E
NC
AO
UA
- J
. PR
AD
EL
The
Com
mer
cial
Suc
cess
of I
nnov
atio
ns
An
econ
omet
ric a
naly
sis
at th
e fir
m le
vel i
n F
renc
h m
anuf
actu
ring
G 9
805
P. C
AH
UC
- C
h. G
IAN
ELL
A -
D
. G
OU
X -
A.
ZIL
BE
RB
ER
G
Equ
aliz
ing
Wag
e D
iffer
ence
s an
d B
arga
inin
g P
ower
- E
vide
nce
form
a P
anel
of F
renc
h F
irms
G 9
806
J. A
CC
AR
DO
- M
. JL
AS
SI
La p
rodu
ctiv
ité g
loba
le d
es fa
cteu
rs e
ntre
197
5 et
19
96
iv
G 9
807
Bila
n de
s ac
tivité
s de
la D
irect
ion
des
Étu
des
et
Syn
thès
es É
cono
miq
ues
- 19
97
G 9
808
A. M
OU
RO
UG
AN
E
Can
a C
onse
rvat
ive
Gov
erno
r C
ondu
ct a
n A
c-co
mod
ativ
e M
onet
ary
Pol
icy?
G 9
809
X. B
ON
NE
T -
E. D
UB
OIS
- L
. FA
UV
ET
A
sym
étrie
des
infla
tions
rel
ativ
es e
t men
us c
osts
: t
ests
sur
l’in
flatio
n fr
ança
ise
G 9
810
E. D
UG
UE
T -
N. I
UN
G
Sal
es a
nd A
dver
tisin
g w
ith S
pillo
vers
at t
he fi
rm
leve
l: E
stim
atio
n of
a D
ynam
ic S
truc
tura
l Mod
el
on P
anel
Dat
a
G 9
811
J.P
. BE
RT
HIE
R
Con
gest
ion
urba
ine
: un
mod
èle
de tr
afic
de
poin
te à
cou
rbe
débi
t-vi
tess
e et
dem
ande
él
astiq
ue
G 9
812
C. P
RIG
EN
T
La p
art d
es s
alai
res
dans
la v
aleu
r aj
outé
e : u
ne
appr
oche
mac
roéc
onom
ique
G 9
813
A.T
h. A
ER
TS
L’
évol
utio
n de
la p
art d
es s
alai
res
dans
la v
aleu
r aj
outé
e en
Fra
nce
reflè
te-t
-elle
les
évol
utio
ns
indi
vidu
elle
s su
r la
pér
iode
197
9-19
94 ?
G 9
814
B. S
ALA
NIÉ
G
uide
pra
tique
des
sér
ies
non-
stat
ionn
aire
s
G 9
901
S. D
UC
HÊ
NE
- A
. JA
CQ
UO
T
Une
cro
issa
nce
plus
ric
he e
n em
ploi
s de
puis
le
débu
t de
la d
écen
nie
? U
ne a
naly
se e
n co
mpa
-ra
ison
inte
rnat
iona
le
G 9
902
Ch.
CO
LIN
M
odél
isat
ion
des
carr
ière
s da
ns D
estin
ie
G 9
903
Ch.
CO
LIN
É
volu
tion
de la
dis
pers
ion
des
sala
ires
: un
essa
i de
pro
spec
tive
par
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n
G 9
904
B. C
RE
PO
N -
N. I
UN
G
Inno
vatio
n, e
mpl
oi e
t per
form
ance
s
G 9
905
B. C
RE
PO
N -
Ch.
GIA
NE
LLA
W
ages
ineq
ualit
ies
in F
ranc
e 19
69-1
992
An
appl
icat
ion
of q
uant
ile r
egre
ssio
n te
chni
ques
G 9
906
C. B
ON
NE
T -
R. M
AH
IEU
M
icro
sim
ulat
ion
tech
niqu
es a
pplie
d to
inte
r-ge
nera
tiona
l tra
nsfe
rs -
Pen
sion
s in
a d
ynam
ic
fram
ewor
k: th
e ca
se o
f Fra
nce
G 9
907
F.
RO
SE
NW
ALD
L’
impa
ct d
es c
ontr
aint
es fi
nanc
ière
s da
ns la
dé-
cisi
on d
’inve
stis
sem
ent
G 9
908
Bila
n de
s ac
tivité
s de
la D
ES
E -
199
8
G 9
909
J.P
. ZO
YE
M
Con
trat
d’in
sert
ion
et s
ortie
du
RM
I É
valu
atio
n de
s ef
fets
d’u
ne p
oliti
que
soci
ale
G 9
910
C
h. C
OLI
N -
Fl.
LEG
RO
S -
R. M
AH
IEU
B
ilans
con
trib
utifs
com
paré
s de
s ré
gim
es d
e re
trai
te d
u se
cteu
r pr
ivé
et d
e la
fonc
tion
publ
ique
G 9
911
G. L
AR
OQ
UE
- B
. SA
LAN
IÉ
Une
déc
ompo
sitio
n du
non
-em
ploi
en
Fra
nce
G 9
912
B. S
ALA
NIÉ
U
ne m
aque
tte a
naly
tique
de
long
term
e du
m
arch
é du
trav
ail
G 9
912
Ch.
GIA
NE
LLA
B
is
Une
est
imat
ion
de l’
élas
ticité
de
l’em
ploi
peu
qu
alifi
é à
son
coût
G 9
913
Div
isio
n «
Red
istr
ibut
ion
et P
oliti
ques
Soc
iale
s »
Le m
odèl
e de
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n dy
nam
ique
D
ES
TIN
IE
G 9
914
E. D
UG
UE
T
Mac
ro-c
omm
ande
s S
AS
pou
r l’é
cono
mét
rie d
es
pane
ls e
t des
var
iabl
es q
ualit
ativ
es
G 9
915
R. D
UH
AU
TO
IS
Évo
lutio
n de
s flu
x d’
empl
ois
en F
ranc
e en
tre
1990
et 1
996
: une
étu
de e
mpi
rique
à p
artir
du
fichi
er d
es b
énéf
ices
rée
ls n
orm
aux
(BR
N)
G 9
916
J.Y
. FO
UR
NIE
R
Ext
ract
ion
du c
ycle
des
affa
ires
: la
mét
hode
de
Bax
ter
et K
ing
G 9
917
B.
CR
ÉP
ON
- R
. DE
SP
LAT
Z -
J. M
AIR
ES
SE
E
stim
atin
g pr
ice
cost
mar
gins
, sca
le e
cono
mie
s an
d w
orke
rs’ b
arga
inin
g po
wer
at t
he fi
rm le
vel
G 9
918
Ch.
GIA
NE
LLA
- P
h. L
AG
AR
DE
P
rodu
ctiv
ity o
f hou
rs in
the
aggr
egat
e pr
oduc
tion
func
tion:
an
eval
uatio
n on
a p
anel
of F
renc
h fir
ms
from
the
man
ufac
turin
g se
ctor
G 9
919
S.
AU
DR
IC -
P. G
IVO
RD
- C
. PR
OS
T
Évo
lutio
n de
l’em
ploi
et d
es c
oûts
par
qua
li-fic
atio
n en
tre
1982
et 1
996
G 2
000/
01
R. M
AH
IEU
Le
s dé
term
inan
ts d
es d
épen
ses
de s
anté
: un
e ap
proc
he m
acro
écon
omiq
ue
G 2
000/
02
C. A
LLA
RD
-PR
IGE
NT
- H
. GU
ILM
EA
U -
A
. Q
UIN
ET
T
he r
eal e
xcha
nge
rate
as
the
rela
tive
pric
e of
no
ntra
bles
in te
rms
of tr
adab
les:
theo
retic
al
inve
stig
atio
n an
d em
piric
al s
tudy
on
Fre
nch
data
G 2
000/
03
J.-Y
. FO
UR
NIE
R
L’ap
prox
imat
ion
du fi
ltre
pass
e-ba
nde
prop
osée
pa
r C
hris
tiano
et F
itzge
rald
G 2
000/
04
Bila
n de
s ac
tivité
s de
la D
ES
E -
199
9
G 2
000/
05
B. C
RE
PO
N -
F.
RO
SE
NW
ALD
In
vest
isse
men
t et c
ontr
aint
es d
e fin
ance
men
t : le
po
ids
du c
ycle
U
ne e
stim
atio
n su
r do
nnée
s fr
ança
ises
G 2
000/
06
A. F
LIP
O
Les
com
port
emen
ts m
atrim
onia
ux d
e fa
it
G 2
000/
07
R. M
AH
IEU
- B
. SÉ
DIL
LOT
M
icro
sim
ulat
ions
of t
he r
etire
men
t dec
isio
n: a
su
pply
sid
e ap
proa
ch
G 2
000/
08
C. A
UD
EN
IS -
C. P
RO
ST
D
éfic
it co
njon
ctur
el :
une
pris
e en
com
pte
des
conj
onct
ures
pas
sées
G 2
000/
09
R. M
AH
IEU
- B
. SÉ
DIL
LOT
É
quiv
alen
t pat
rimon
ial d
e la
ren
te e
t sou
scrip
tion
de r
etra
ite c
ompl
émen
taire
G 2
000/
10
R. D
UH
AU
TO
IS
Ral
entis
sem
ent d
e l’i
nves
tisse
men
t : p
etite
s ou
gr
ande
s en
trep
rises
? in
dust
rie o
u te
rtia
ire ?
G 2
000/
11
G. L
AR
OQ
UE
- B
. SA
LAN
IÉ
Tem
ps p
artie
l fém
inin
et i
ncita
tions
fina
nciè
res
à l’e
mpl
oi
G20
00/1
2 C
h. G
IAN
ELL
A
Loca
l une
mpl
oym
ent a
nd w
ages
v
G20
00/1
3 B
. CR
EP
ON
- T
h. H
EC
KE
L -
Info
rmat
isat
ion
en F
ranc
e : u
ne é
valu
atio
n à
part
ir de
don
nées
indi
vidu
elle
s -
Com
pute
rizat
ion
in F
ranc
e: a
n ev
alua
tion
base
d on
indi
vidu
al c
ompa
ny d
ata
G20
01/0
1 F
. LE
QU
ILLE
R
- La
nou
velle
éco
nom
ie e
t la
mes
ure
d
e la
cro
issa
nce
du P
IB
- T
he n
ew e
cono
my
and
the
mea
sure
men
t of
GD
P g
row
th
G20
01/0
2 S
. AU
DR
IC
La r
epris
e de
la
croi
ssan
ce d
e l’e
mpl
oi p
rofit
e-t-
elle
aus
si a
ux n
on-d
iplô
més
?
G20
01/0
3 I.
BR
AU
N-L
EM
AIR
E
Évo
lutio
n et
rép
artit
ion
du s
urpl
us d
e pr
oduc
tivité
G20
01/0
4 A
. BE
AU
DU
- T
h. H
EC
KE
L Le
can
al d
u cr
édit
fonc
tionn
e-t-
il en
Eur
ope
? U
ne
étud
e de
l’h
étér
ogén
éité
de
s co
mpo
rtem
ents
d’
inve
stis
sem
ent
à pa
rtir
de
donn
ées
de
bila
n ag
régé
es
G20
01/0
5 C
. AU
DE
NIS
- P
. BIS
CO
UR
P -
N
. F
OU
RC
AD
E -
O.
LOIS
EL
Tes
ting
the
augm
ente
d S
olow
gro
wth
mod
el:
An
empi
rical
rea
sses
smen
t usi
ng p
anel
dat
a
G20
01/0
6 R
. MA
HIE
U -
B. S
ÉD
ILLO
T
Dép
art à
la r
etra
ite, i
rrév
ersi
bilit
é et
ince
rtitu
de
G20
01/0
7 B
ilan
des
activ
ités
de la
DE
SE
-
2000
G20
01/0
8 J.
Ph.
GA
UD
EM
ET
Le
s di
spos
itifs
d’
acqu
isiti
on
à tit
re
facu
ltatif
d’
annu
ités
viag
ères
de
retr
aite
G20
01/0
9 B
. CR
ÉP
ON
- C
h. G
IAN
ELL
A
Fis
calit
é, c
oût
d’us
age
du c
apita
l et
dem
ande
de
fact
eurs
: un
e an
alys
e su
r do
nnée
s in
divi
duel
les
G20
01/1
0 B
. CR
ÉP
ON
- R
. DE
SP
LAT
Z
Éva
luat
ion
des
effe
ts
des
disp
ositi
fs
d’al
lége
men
ts
de c
harg
es s
ocia
les
sur
les
bas
sala
ires
G20
01/1
1 J.
-Y. F
OU
RN
IER
C
ompa
rais
on d
es s
alai
res
des
sect
eurs
pub
lic e
t pr
ivé
G20
01/1
2 J.
-P. B
ER
TH
IER
- C
. JA
ULE
NT
R
. C
ON
VE
NE
VO
LE -
S.
PIS
AN
I U
ne
mét
hodo
logi
e de
co
mpa
rais
on
entr
e co
nsom
mat
ions
int
erm
édia
ires
de s
ourc
e fis
cale
et
de
com
ptab
ilité
nat
iona
le
G20
01/1
3 P
. BIS
CO
UR
P -
Ch.
GIA
NE
LLA
S
ubst
itutio
n an
d co
mpl
emen
tarit
y be
twee
n ca
pita
l, sk
illed
an
d le
ss
skill
ed
wor
kers
: an
an
alys
is
at
the
firm
le
vel
in
the
Fre
nch
man
ufac
turin
g in
dust
ry
G20
01/1
4 I.
RO
BE
RT
-BO
BE
E
Mod
ellin
g de
mog
raph
ic b
ehav
iour
s in
the
Fre
nch
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n m
odel
D
estin
ie:
An
anal
ysis
of
fu
ture
cha
nge
in c
ompl
eted
fert
ility
G20
01/1
5 J.
-P. Z
OY
EM
D
iagn
ostic
su
r la
pa
uvre
té
et
cale
ndrie
r de
re
venu
s :
le
cas
du
“Pan
el
euro
péen
de
s m
énag
es »
G20
01/1
6 J.
-Y.
FO
UR
NIE
R -
P.
GIV
OR
D
La
rédu
ctio
n de
s ta
ux
d’ac
tivité
au
x âg
es
extr
êmes
, une
spé
cific
ité fr
ança
ise
?
G20
01/1
7 C
. AU
DE
NIS
- P
. BIS
CO
UR
P -
N. R
IED
ING
ER
E
xist
e-t-
il un
e as
ymét
rie d
ans
la t
rans
mis
sion
du
prix
du
brut
aux
prix
des
car
bura
nts
?
G20
02/0
1 F
. M
AG
NIE
N -
J.-
L. T
AV
ER
NIE
R -
D. T
HE
SM
AR
Le
s st
atis
tique
s in
tern
atio
nale
s de
P
IB
par
habi
tant
en
st
anda
rd
de
pouv
oir
d’ac
hat
: un
e an
alys
e de
s ré
sulta
ts
G20
02/0
2 B
ilan
des
activ
ités
de la
DE
SE
- 2
001
G20
02/0
3 B
. SÉ
DIL
LOT
- E
. WA
LRA
ET
La
ces
satio
n d’
activ
ité a
u se
in d
es c
oupl
es :
y a-
t-il
inte
rdép
enda
nce
des
choi
x ?
G20
02/0
4 G
. BR
ILH
AU
LT
- R
étro
pola
tion
des
série
s de
FB
CF
et
calc
ul d
u ca
pita
l fix
e en
S
EC
-95
dans
le
s co
mpt
es
natio
naux
fran
çais
-
Ret
ropo
latio
n of
the
inv
estm
ent
serie
s (G
FC
F)
and
estim
atio
n of
fix
ed
capi
tal
stoc
ks
on
the
ES
A-9
5 ba
sis
for
the
Fre
nch
bala
nce
shee
ts
G20
02/0
5 P
. B
ISC
OU
RP
- B
. C
RÉ
PO
N -
T.
HE
CK
EL
- N
. R
IED
ING
ER
H
ow
do
firm
s re
spon
d to
ch
eape
r co
mpu
ters
? M
icro
econ
omet
ric e
vide
nce
for
Fra
nce
base
d on
a
prod
uctio
n fu
nctio
n ap
proa
ch
G20
02/0
6 C
. AU
DE
NIS
- J
. DE
RO
YO
N -
N. F
OU
RC
AD
E
L’im
pact
de
s no
uvel
les
tech
nolo
gies
de
l’i
nfor
mat
ion
et
de
la
com
mun
icat
ion
sur
l’éco
nom
ie
fran
çais
e -
un
bouc
lage
m
acro
-éc
onom
ique
G20
02/0
7 J.
BA
RD
AJI
- B
. SÉ
DIL
LOT
- E
. WA
LRA
ET
É
valu
atio
n de
tro
is r
éfor
mes
du
Rég
ime
Gén
éral
d’
assu
ranc
e vi
eille
sse
à l’a
ide
du
mod
èle
de
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n D
ES
TIN
IE
G20
02/0
8 J.
-P. B
ER
TH
IER
R
éfle
xion
s su
r le
s di
ffére
ntes
not
ions
de
volu
me
dans
les
com
ptes
nat
iona
ux :
com
ptes
aux
prix
d’
une
anné
e fix
e ou
au
x pr
ix
de
l’ann
ée
préc
éden
te, s
érie
s ch
aîné
es
G20
02/0
9 F
. H
ILD
Le
s so
ldes
d’o
pini
on r
ésum
ent-
ils a
u m
ieux
les
ré
pons
es
des
entr
epris
es
aux
enqu
êtes
de
co
njon
ctur
e ?
G20
02/1
0 I.
RO
BE
RT
-BO
BÉ
E
Les
com
port
emen
ts
dém
ogra
phiq
ues
dans
le
m
odèl
e de
m
icro
sim
ulat
ion
Des
tinie
-
Une
co
mpa
rais
on
des
estim
atio
ns
issu
es
des
enqu
êtes
Je
unes
et
C
arriè
res
1997
et
H
isto
ire
Fam
ilial
e 19
99
G20
02/1
1 J.
-P. Z
OY
EM
La
dyn
amiq
ue d
es b
as r
even
us :
une
ana
lyse
des
en
trée
s-so
rtie
s de
pau
vret
é
G20
02/1
2 F
. H
ILD
P
révi
sion
s d’
infla
tion
pour
la F
ranc
e
G20
02/1
3 M
. LE
CLA
IR
Réd
uctio
n du
tem
ps d
e tr
avai
l et
ten
sion
s su
r le
s fa
cteu
rs d
e pr
oduc
tion
G20
02/1
4 E
. WA
LRA
ET
- A
. VIN
CE
NT
-
Ana
lyse
de
la r
edis
trib
utio
n in
trag
énér
atio
nnel
le
dans
le s
ystè
me
de r
etra
ite d
es s
alar
iés
du p
rivé
- U
ne a
ppro
che
par
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n -
Intr
agen
erat
iona
l di
strib
utio
nal
anal
ysis
in
th
e fr
ench
pr
ivat
e se
ctor
pe
nsio
n sc
hem
e -
A
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n ap
proa
ch
vi
G20
02/1
5 P
. CH
ON
E -
D. L
E B
LAN
C -
I. R
OB
ER
T-B
OB
EE
O
ffre
de
trav
ail
fém
inin
e et
ga
rde
des
jeun
es
enfa
nts
G20
02/1
6 F
. MA
UR
EL
- S
. GR
EG
OIR
Le
s in
dice
s de
co
mpé
titiv
ité
des
pays
: in
ter-
prét
atio
n et
lim
ites
G20
03/0
1 N
. RIE
DIN
GE
R -
E.H
AU
VY
Le
coû
t de
dép
ollu
tion
atm
osph
ériq
ue p
our
les
entr
epris
es f
ranç
aise
s :
Une
est
imat
ion
à pa
rtir
de
donn
ées
indi
vidu
elle
s
G20
03/0
2 P
. BIS
CO
UR
P e
t F.
KR
AM
AR
Z
Cré
atio
n d’
empl
ois,
de
stru
ctio
n d’
empl
ois
et
inte
rnat
iona
lisat
ion
des
entr
epris
es
indu
strie
lles
fran
çais
es :
une
anal
yse
sur
la
pério
de
1986
-19
92
G20
03/0
3 B
ilan
des
activ
ités
de la
DE
SE
- 2
002
G20
03/0
4 P
.-O
. B
EF
FY
- J
. D
ER
OY
ON
-
N.
FO
UR
CA
DE
- S
. G
RE
GO
IR -
N.
LAÏB
-
B.
MO
NF
OR
T
Évo
lutio
ns d
émog
raph
ique
s et
cro
issa
nce
: un
e pr
ojec
tion
mac
ro-é
cono
miq
ue à
l’ho
rizon
202
0
G20
03/0
5 P
. AU
BE
RT
La
situ
atio
n de
s sa
larié
s de
plu
s de
cin
quan
te
ans
dans
le s
ecte
ur p
rivé
G20
03/0
6 P
. AU
BE
RT
- B
. CR
ÉP
ON
A
ge, s
alai
re e
t pro
duct
ivité
La
pro
duct
ivité
des
sal
arié
s dé
clin
e-t-
elle
en
fin
de c
arriè
re ?
G20
03/0
7 H
. B
AR
ON
- P
.O.
BE
FF
Y -
N.
FO
UR
CA
DE
- R
. M
AH
IEU
Le
ral
entis
sem
ent
de l
a pr
oduc
tivité
du
trav
ail
au
cour
s de
s an
nées
199
0
G20
03/0
8 P
.-O
. B
EF
FY
- B
. M
ON
FO
RT
P
atrim
oine
des
mén
ages
, dy
nam
ique
d’a
lloca
tion
et c
ompo
rtem
ent d
e co
nsom
mat
ion
G20
03/0
9 P
. BIS
CO
UR
P -
N. F
OU
RC
AD
E
Peu
t-on
m
ettr
e en
év
iden
ce
l’exi
sten
ce
de
rigid
ités
à la
ba
isse
de
s sa
laire
s à
part
ir de
do
nnée
s in
divi
duel
les
? Le
cas
de
la F
ranc
e à
la
fin d
es a
nnée
s 90
G20
03/1
0 M
. LE
CLA
IR -
P. P
ET
IT
Pré
senc
e sy
ndic
ale
dans
les
firm
es :
quel
im
pact
su
r le
s in
égal
ités
sala
riale
s en
tre
les
hom
mes
et
les
fem
mes
?
G20
03/1
1 P
.-O
. B
EF
FY
-
X.
BO
NN
ET
-
M.
DA
RR
AC
Q-
PA
RIE
S -
B.
MO
NF
OR
T
MZ
E: a
sm
all m
acro
-mod
el fo
r th
e eu
ro a
rea
G20
04/0
1 P
. AU
BE
RT
- M
. LE
CLA
IR
La
com
pétit
ivité
ex
prim
ée
dans
le
s en
quêt
es
trim
estr
ielle
s su
r la
situ
atio
n et
les
per
spec
tives
da
ns l’
indu
strie
G20
04/0
2 M
. DU
ÉE
- C
. RE
BIL
LAR
D
La
dépe
ndan
ce
des
pers
onne
s âg
ées
: un
e pr
ojec
tion
à lo
ng te
rme
G20
04/0
3 S
. RA
SP
ILLE
R -
N. R
IED
ING
ER
R
égul
atio
n en
viro
nnem
enta
le
et
choi
x de
lo
calis
atio
n de
s gr
oupe
s fr
ança
is
G20
04/0
4 A
. NA
BO
ULE
T -
S. R
AS
PIL
LER
Le
s dé
term
inan
ts d
e la
déc
isio
n d’
inve
stir
: un
e ap
proc
he
par
les
perc
eptio
ns
subj
ectiv
es
des
firm
es
G20
04/0
5 N
. RA
GA
CH
E
La d
écla
ratio
n de
s en
fant
s pa
r le
s co
uple
s no
n m
arié
s es
t-el
le fi
scal
emen
t opt
imal
e ?
G20
04/0
6 M
. DU
ÉE
L’
impa
ct d
u ch
ômag
e de
s pa
rent
s su
r le
dev
enir
scol
aire
des
enf
ants
G20
04/0
7 P
. AU
BE
RT
- E
. C
AR
OLI
- M
. RO
GE
R
New
Tec
hnol
ogie
s, W
orkp
lace
Org
anis
atio
n an
d th
e A
ge S
truc
ture
of
the
Wor
kfor
ce:
Firm
-Lev
el
Evi
denc
e
G20
04/0
8 E
. DU
GU
ET
- C
. LE
LAR
GE
Le
s br
evet
s ac
croi
ssen
t-ils
les
inc
itatio
ns p
rivée
s à
inno
ver
? U
n ex
amen
mic
roéc
onom
étriq
ue
G20
04/0
9 S
. RA
SP
ILLE
R -
P. S
ILLA
RD
A
ffilia
ting
vers
us S
ubco
ntra
ctin
g:
the
Cas
e of
Mul
tinat
iona
ls
G20
04/1
0 J.
BO
ISS
INO
T -
C. L
’AN
GE
VIN
- B
. MO
NF
OR
T
Pub
lic D
ebt
Sus
tain
abili
ty:
Som
e R
esul
ts o
n th
e F
renc
h C
ase
G20
04/1
1 S
. AN
AN
IAN
- P
. AU
BE
RT
T
rava
illeu
rs â
gés,
nou
velle
s te
chno
logi
es
et c
hang
emen
ts o
rgan
isat
ionn
els
: un
rée
xam
en
à pa
rtir
de l’
enqu
ête
« R
EP
ON
SE
»
G20
04/1
2 X
. BO
NN
ET
- H
. PO
NC
ET
S
truc
ture
s de
rev
enus
et
prop
ensi
ons
diffé
rent
es
à co
nsom
mer
-
Ver
s un
e éq
uatio
n de
co
nsom
mat
ion
des
mén
ages
pl
us
robu
ste
en
prév
isio
n po
ur la
Fra
nce
G20
04/1
3 C
. PIC
AR
T
Éva
luer
la r
enta
bilit
é de
s so
ciét
és n
on fi
nanc
ière
s
G20
04/1
4 J.
BA
RD
AJI
- B
. SÉ
DIL
LOT
- E
. WA
LRA
ET
Le
s re
trai
tes
du
sect
eur
publ
ic :
proj
ectio
ns
à l’h
oriz
on
2040
à
l’aid
e du
m
odèl
e de
m
icro
sim
ulat
ion
DE
ST
INIE
G20
05/0
1 S
. BU
FF
ET
EA
U -
P. G
OD
EF
RO
Y
Con
ditio
ns d
e dé
part
en
retr
aite
sel
on l’
âge
de f
in
d’ét
udes
: an
alys
e pr
ospe
ctiv
e po
ur
les
géné
ratio
ns 1
945
à197
4
G20
05/0
2 C
. AF
SA
- S
. BU
FF
ET
EA
U
L’év
olut
ion
de l’
activ
ité fé
min
ine
en F
ranc
e :
une
appr
oche
par
pse
udo-
pane
l
G20
05/0
3 P
. AU
BE
RT
- P
. SIL
LAR
D
Dél
ocal
isat
ions
et r
éduc
tions
d’e
ffect
ifs
dans
l’in
dust
rie fr
ança
ise
G20
05/0
4 M
. LE
CLA
IR -
S. R
OU
X
Mes
ure
et u
tilis
atio
n de
s em
ploi
s in
stab
les
da
ns le
s en
trep
rises
G20
05/0
5 C
. L’A
NG
EV
IN -
S. S
ER
RA
VA
LLE
P
erfo
rman
ces
à l’e
xpor
tatio
n de
la F
ranc
e
et d
e l’A
llem
agne
- U
ne a
naly
se p
ar s
ecte
ur e
t de
stin
atio
n gé
ogra
phiq
ue
G20
05/0
6 B
ilan
des
activ
ités
de l
a D
irect
ion
des
Étu
des
et
Syn
thès
es É
cono
miq
ues
- 20
04
G20
05/0
7 S
. RA
SP
ILLE
R
La
conc
urre
nce
fisca
le :
prin
cipa
ux
ense
igne
-m
ents
de
l’ana
lyse
éco
nom
ique
G20
05/0
8 C
. L’A
NG
EV
IN -
N. L
AÏB
É
duca
tion
et c
rois
sanc
e en
Fra
nce
et d
ans
un
pane
l de
21 p
ays
de l’
OC
DE
vii
G20
05/0
9 N
. FE
RR
AR
I P
révo
ir l’i
nves
tisse
men
t des
ent
repr
ises
U
n in
dica
teur
de
s ré
visi
ons
dans
l’e
nquê
te
de
conj
onct
ure
sur
les
inve
stis
sem
ents
da
ns
l’ind
ustr
ie.
G20
05/1
0 P
.-O
. BE
FF
Y -
C. L
’AN
GE
VIN
C
hôm
age
et b
oucl
e pr
ix-s
alai
res
: ap
port
d’u
n m
odèl
e «
qual
ifiés
/peu
qua
lifié
s »
G20
05/1
1 B
. HE
ITZ
A
tw
o-st
ates
Mar
kov-
switc
hing
mod
el o
f in
flatio
n in
F
ranc
e an
d th
e U
SA
: cr
edib
le
targ
et
VS
in
flatio
n sp
iral
G20
05/1
2 O
. BIA
U -
H. E
RK
EL-
RO
US
SE
- N
. FE
RR
AR
I R
épon
ses
indi
vidu
elle
s au
x en
quêt
es
de
conj
onct
ure
et p
révi
sion
mac
roéc
onom
ique
s :
Exe
mpl
e de
la
pr
évis
ion
de
la
prod
uctio
n m
anuf
actu
rière
G20
05/1
3 P
. AU
BE
RT
- D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
D. B
LAU
The
lab
our
mar
ket
afte
r ag
e 50
: so
me
elem
ents
of
a F
ranc
o-A
mer
ican
com
paris
on
G20
05/1
4 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
T.
DE
BR
AN
D -
P
. D
OU
RG
NO
N -
P.
PO
LLE
T
L’en
quêt
e S
HA
RE
: pr
ésen
tatio
n et
pr
emie
rs
résu
ltats
de
l’édi
tion
fran
çais
e
G20
05/1
5 M
. DU
ÉE
La
m
odél
isat
ion
des
com
port
emen
ts
dém
ogra
-ph
ique
s da
ns
le
mod
èle
de
mic
rosi
mul
atio
n D
ES
TIN
IE
G20
05/1
6 H
. RA
OU
I - S
. RO
UX
É
tude
de
sim
ulat
ion
sur
la p
artic
ipat
ion
vers
ée
aux
sala
riés
par
les
entr
epris
es
G20
06/0
1 C
. B
ON
NE
T -
S.
BU
FF
ET
EA
U -
P.
GO
DE
FR
OY
D
ispa
rités
de
re
trai
te
de
droi
t di
rect
en
tre
hom
mes
et f
emm
es :
quel
les
évol
utio
ns ?
G20
06/0
2 C
. PIC
AR
T
Les
gaze
lles
en F
ranc
e
G20
06/0
3 P
. AU
BE
RT
- B
. CR
ÉP
ON
-P
. ZA
MO
RA
Le
ren
dem
ent
appa
rent
de
la f
orm
atio
n co
ntin
ue
dans
les
ent
repr
ises
: ef
fets
sur
la
prod
uctiv
ité e
t le
s sa
laire
s
G20
06/0
4 J.
-F. O
UV
RA
RD
- R
. RA
TH
ELO
T
Dem
ogra
phic
cha
nge
and
unem
ploy
men
t:
wha
t do
mac
roec
onom
etric
mod
els
pred
ict?
G20
06/0
5 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
J.-
F. O
UV
RA
RD
In
dica
teur
s d’
enga
gem
ents
im
plic
ites
des
syst
èmes
de
re
trai
te :
chiff
rage
s,
prop
riété
s an
alyt
ique
s et
ré
actio
ns
à de
s ch
ocs
dém
ogra
phiq
ues
type
s
G20
06/0
6 G
. B
IAU
- O
. B
IAU
- L
. R
OU
VIE
RE
N
onpa
ram
etric
For
ecas
ting
of t
he M
anuf
actu
ring
Out
put G
row
th w
ith F
irm-le
vel S
urve
y D
ata
G20
06/0
7 C
. AF
SA
- P
. GIV
OR
D
Le
rôle
de
s co
nditi
ons
de
trav
ail
dans
le
s ab
senc
es p
our
mal
adie
G20
06/0
8 P
. SIL
LAR
D -
C. L
’AN
GE
VIN
- S
. SE
RR
AV
ALL
E
Per
form
ance
s co
mpa
rées
à
l’exp
orta
tion
de
la
Fra
nce
et d
e se
s pr
inci
paux
par
tena
ires
Une
ana
lyse
str
uctu
relle
sur
12
ans
G20
06/0
9 X
. BO
UT
IN -
S. Q
UA
NT
IN
Une
m
étho
dolo
gie
d’év
alua
tion
com
ptab
le
du
coût
du
capi
tal d
es e
ntre
pris
es f
ranç
aise
s :
1984
-20
02
G20
06/1
0 C
. AF
SA
L’
estim
atio
n d’
un c
oût
impl
icite
de
la p
énib
ilité
du
trav
ail c
hez
les
trav
aille
urs
âgés
G20
06/1
1 C
. LE
LAR
GE
Le
s en
trep
rises
(in
dust
rielle
s)
fran
çais
es
sont
-el
les
à la
fron
tière
tech
nolo
giqu
e ?
G20
06/1
2 O
. B
IAU
-
N.
FE
RR
AR
I T
héor
ie d
e l’o
pini
on
Fau
t-il
pond
érer
les
répo
nses
indi
vidu
elle
s ?
G20
06/1
3 A
. KO
UB
I - S
. RO
UX
U
ne
réin
terp
réta
tion
de
la
rela
tion
entr
e pr
oduc
tivité
et
in
égal
ités
sala
riale
s da
ns
les
entr
epris
es
G20
06/1
4 R
. RA
TH
ELO
T -
P. S
ILLA
RD
T
he
impa
ct
of
loca
l ta
xes
on
plan
ts
loca
tion
deci
sion
G20
06/1
5 L.
GO
NZ
ALE
Z -
C. P
ICA
RT
D
iver
sific
atio
n, r
ecen
trag
e et
poi
ds d
es a
ctiv
ités
de s
uppo
rt d
ans
les
grou
pes
(199
3-20
00)
G20
07/0
1 D
. SR
AE
R
Allè
gem
ents
de
co
tisat
ions
pa
tron
ales
et
dy
nam
ique
sal
aria
le
G20
07/0
2 V
. ALB
OU
Y -
L. L
EQ
UIE
N
Les
rend
emen
ts n
on m
onét
aire
s de
l’é
duca
tion
: le
cas
de
la s
anté
G20
07/0
3 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
T.
DE
BR
AN
D
Asp
iratio
n à
la r
etra
ite,
sant
é et
sat
isfa
ctio
n au
tr
avai
l : u
ne c
ompa
rais
on e
urop
éenn
e
G20
07/0
4 M
. BA
RLE
T -
L. C
RU
SS
ON
Q
uel
impa
ct d
es v
aria
tions
du
prix
du
pétr
ole
sur
la c
rois
sanc
e fr
ança
ise
?
G20
07/0
5 C
. PIC
AR
T
Flu
x d’
empl
oi e
t de
mai
n-d’
œuv
re e
n F
ranc
e :
un
réex
amen
G20
07/0
6 V
. ALB
OU
Y -
C. T
AV
AN
M
assi
ficat
ion
et
dém
ocra
tisat
ion
de
l’ens
eign
emen
t sup
érie
ur e
n F
ranc
e
G20
07/0
7 T
. LE
BA
RB
AN
CH
ON
T
he
Cha
ngin
g re
spon
se
to
oil
pric
e sh
ocks
in
F
ranc
e: a
DS
GE
type
app
roac
h
G20
07/0
8 T
. C
HA
NE
Y -
D. S
RA
ER
- D
. TH
ES
MA
R
Col
late
ral V
alue
and
Cor
pora
te In
vest
men
t E
vide
nce
from
the
Fre
nch
Rea
l Est
ate
Mar
ket
G20
07/0
9 J.
BO
ISS
INO
T
Con
sum
ptio
n ov
er
the
Life
C
ycle
: F
acts
fo
r F
ranc
e
G20
07/1
0 C
. AF
SA
In
terp
réte
r le
s va
riabl
es
de
satis
fact
ion
: l’e
xem
ple
de la
dur
ée d
u tr
avai
l
G20
07/1
1 R
. RA
TH
ELO
T -
P. S
ILLA
RD
Z
ones
F
ranc
hes
Urb
aine
s :
quel
s ef
fets
su
r l’e
mpl
oi
sala
rié
et
les
créa
tions
d’
étab
lisse
men
ts ?
G20
07/1
2 V
. ALB
OU
Y -
B. C
RÉ
PO
N
Alé
a m
oral
en
sa
nté
: un
e év
alua
tion
dans
le
ca
dre
du m
odèl
e ca
usal
de
Rub
in
G20
08/0
1 C
. PIC
AR
T
Les
PM
E
fran
çais
es :
rent
able
s m
ais
peu
dyna
miq
ues
viii
G20
08/0
2 P
. BIS
CO
UR
P -
X. B
OU
TIN
- T
. V
ER
GÉ
T
he E
ffect
s of
Ret
ail R
egul
atio
ns o
n P
rices
E
vide
nce
form
the
Loi G
alla
nd
G20
08/0
3 Y
. BA
RB
ES
OL
- A
. BR
IAN
T
Éco
nom
ies
d’ag
glom
érat
ion
et
prod
uctiv
ité
des
entr
epris
es :
est
imat
ion
sur
donn
ées
indi
vidu
elle
s fr
ança
ises
G20
08/0
4 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
F. L
E G
ALL
O
Les
proj
ectio
ns
dém
ogra
phiq
ues
: pr
inci
paux
m
écan
ism
es e
t ret
our
sur
l’exp
érie
nce
fran
çais
e
G20
08/0
5 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
F. T
OU
TLE
MO
ND
E
Évo
lutio
ns
dém
ogra
phiq
ues
et
défo
rmat
ion
du
cycl
e de
vie
act
ive
: que
lles
rela
tions
?
G20
08/0
6 M
. BA
RLE
T -
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
- L
. CR
US
SO
N
Inte
rnat
iona
lisat
ion
et f
lux
d’em
ploi
s :
que
dit
une
appr
oche
com
ptab
le ?
G20
08/0
7 C
. LE
LAR
GE
- D
. SR
AE
R -
D. T
HE
SM
AR
E
ntre
pren
eurs
hip
and
Cre
dit
Con
stra
ints
-
Evi
denc
e fr
om
a F
renc
h Lo
an
Gua
rant
ee
Pro
gram
G20
08/0
8 X
. BO
UT
IN -
L. J
AN
IN
Are
Pric
es R
eally
Affe
cted
by
Mer
gers
?
G20
08/0
9 M
. BA
RLE
T -
A. B
RIA
NT
- L
. CR
US
SO
N
Con
cent
ratio
n gé
ogra
phiq
ue
dans
l’i
ndus
trie
m
anuf
actu
rière
et
dans
les
ser
vice
s en
Fra
nce
: un
e ap
proc
he p
ar u
n in
dica
teur
en
cont
inu
G20
08/1
0 M
. BE
FF
Y -
É. C
OU
DIN
- R
. RA
TH
ELO
T
Who
is
co
nfro
nted
to
in
secu
re
labo
r m
arke
t hi
stor
ies?
Som
e ev
iden
ce b
ased
on
the
Fre
nch
labo
r m
arke
t tra
nsiti
on
G20
08/1
1 M
. RO
GE
R -
E. W
ALR
AE
T
Soc
ial
Sec
urity
and
Wel
l-Bei
ng o
f th
e E
lder
ly:
the
Cas
e of
Fra
nce
G20
08/1
2 C
. AF
SA
A
naly
ser
les
com
posa
ntes
du
bien
-êtr
e et
de
son
évol
utio
n
Une
ap
proc
he
empi
rique
su
r do
nnée
s in
divi
duel
les
G20
08/1
3 M
. BA
RLE
T -
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
-
T.
LE B
AR
BA
NC
HO
N
Mic
rosi
mul
er le
mar
ché
du tr
avai
l : u
n pr
otot
ype
G20
09/0
1 P
.-A
. PIO
NN
IER
Le
par
tage
de
la v
aleu
r aj
outé
e en
Fra
nce,
19
49-2
007
G20
09/0
2 La
uren
t CLA
VE
L -
Chr
iste
lle M
INO
DIE
R
A
Mon
thly
In
dica
tor
of
the
Fre
nch
Bus
ines
s C
limat
e
G20
09/0
3 H
. ER
KE
L-R
OU
SS
E -
C. M
INO
DIE
R
Do
Bus
ines
s T
ende
ncy
Sur
veys
in
Indu
stry
and
S
ervi
ces
Hel
p in
For
ecas
ting
GD
P G
row
th?
A
Rea
l-Tim
e A
naly
sis
on F
renc
h D
ata
G20
09/0
4 P
. GIV
OR
D -
L. W
ILN
ER
Le
s co
ntra
ts t
empo
raire
s :
trap
pe o
u m
arch
epie
d ve
rs l’
empl
oi s
tabl
e ?
G20
09/0
5 G
. LA
LAN
NE
- P
.-A
. P
ION
NIE
R -
O.
SIM
ON
Le
par
tage
des
fru
its d
e la
cro
issa
nce
de 1
950
à 20
08 :
une
appr
oche
par
les
com
ptes
de
surp
lus
G20
09/0
6 L.
DA
VE
ZIE
S -
X.
D’H
AU
LTF
OE
UIL
LE
Fau
t-il
pond
érer
?…
O
u l’é
tern
elle
qu
estio
n de
l’é
cono
mèt
re c
onfr
onté
à d
es d
onné
es d
’enq
uête
G20
09/0
7 S
. QU
AN
TIN
- S
. RA
SP
ILLE
R -
S. S
ER
RA
VA
LLE
C
omm
erce
in
trag
roup
e,
fisca
lité
et
prix
de
tr
ansf
erts
: un
e an
alys
e su
r do
nnée
s fr
ança
ises
G20
09/0
8 M
. CLE
RC
- V
. MA
RC
US
É
last
icité
s-pr
ix d
es c
onso
mm
atio
ns é
nerg
étiq
ues
des
mén
ages
G20
09/0
9 G
. LA
LAN
NE
- E
. P
OU
LIQ
UE
N -
O.
SIM
ON
P
rix d
u pé
trol
e et
cro
issa
nce
pote
ntie
lle à
lon
g te
rme
G20
09/1
0 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
J. L
E C
AC
HE
UX
-
V. M
AR
CU
S
Adj
uste
d ne
t sa
ving
s an
d ot
her
appr
oach
es
to
sust
aina
bilit
y: s
ome
theo
retic
al b
ackg
roun
d
G20
09/1
1 V
. B
ELL
AM
Y -
G.
CO
NS
ALE
S -
M.
FE
SS
EA
U -
S
. LE
LA
IDIE
R -
É. R
AY
NA
UD
U
ne d
écom
posi
tion
du c
ompt
e de
s m
énag
es d
e la
co
mpt
abili
té
natio
nale
pa
r ca
tégo
rie
de
mén
age
en 2
003
G20
09/1
2 J.
BA
RD
AJI
- F
. T
ALL
ET
D
etec
ting
Eco
nom
ic
Reg
imes
in
F
ranc
e:
a Q
ualit
ativ
e M
arko
v-S
witc
hing
In
dica
tor
Usi
ng
Mix
ed F
requ
ency
Dat
a
G20
09/1
3 R
. A
EB
ER
HA
RD
T
- D
. F
OU
GÈ
RE
-
R.
RA
TH
ELO
T
Dis
crim
inat
ion
à l’e
mba
uche
: co
mm
ent
expl
oite
r le
s pr
océd
ures
de
test
ing
?
G20
09/1
4 Y
. BA
RB
ES
OL
- P
. GIV
OR
D -
S. Q
UA
NT
IN
Par
tage
de
la
va
leur
aj
outé
e,
appr
oche
pa
r do
nnée
s m
icro
écon
omiq
ues
G20
09/1
5 I.
BU
ON
O -
G. L
ALA
NN
E
The
Effe
ct o
f th
e U
rugu
ay r
ound
on
the
Inte
nsiv
e an
d E
xten
sive
Mar
gins
of T
rade
G20
10/0
1 C
. MIN
OD
IER
A
vant
ages
com
paré
s de
s sé
ries
des
prem
ière
s va
leur
s pu
blié
es
et
des
série
s de
s va
leur
s ré
visé
es -
Un
exer
cice
de
prév
isio
n en
tem
ps r
éel
de la
cro
issa
nce
trim
estr
ielle
du
PIB
en
Fra
nce
G20
10/0
2 V
. ALB
OU
Y -
L. D
AV
EZ
IES
- T
. D
EB
RA
ND
H
ealth
Exp
endi
ture
Mod
els:
a C
ompa
rison
of
Fiv
e S
peci
ficat
ions
usi
ng P
anel
Dat
a
G20
10/0
3 C
. KLE
IN -
O. S
IMO
N
Le m
odèl
e M
ÉS
AN
GE
rée
stim
é en
bas
e 20
00
Tom
e 1
– V
ersi
on a
vec
volu
mes
à p
rix c
onst
ants
G20
10/0
4 M
.-É
. CLE
RC
- É
. CO
UD
IN
L’IP
C,
miro
ir de
l’é
volu
tion
du c
oût
de l
a vi
e en
F
ranc
e ?
Ce
qu’a
ppor
te
l’ana
lyse
de
s co
urbe
s d’
Eng
el
G20
10/0
5 N
. CE
CI-
RE
NA
UD
- P
.-A
. CH
EV
ALI
ER
Le
s se
uils
de
10,
20 e
t 50
sal
arié
s :
impa
ct s
ur la
ta
ille
des
entr
epris
es fr
ança
ises
G20
10/0
6 R
. AE
BE
RH
AR
DT
- J
. PO
UG
ET
N
atio
nal
Orig
in
Diff
eren
ces
in
Wag
es
and
Hie
rarc
hica
l P
ositi
ons
- E
vide
nce
on F
renc
h F
ull-
Tim
e M
ale
Wor
kers
fro
m a
mat
ched
Em
ploy
er-
Em
ploy
ee D
atas
et
G20
10/0
7 S
. BLA
SC
O -
P. G
IVO
RD
Le
s tr
ajec
toire
s pr
ofes
sion
nelle
s en
déb
ut d
e vi
e ac
tive
: que
l im
pact
des
con
trat
s te
mpo
raire
s ?
G20
10/0
8 P
. GIV
OR
D
Mét
hode
s éc
onom
étriq
ues
pour
l’é
valu
atio
n de
po
litiq
ues
publ
ique
s
ix
G20
10/0
9 P
.-Y
. CA
BA
NN
ES
- V
. LA
PÈ
GU
E -
E
. P
OU
LIQ
UE
N -
M.
BE
FF
Y -
M.
GA
INI
Que
lle
croi
ssan
ce
de
moy
en
term
e ap
rès
la
cris
e ?
G20
10/1
0 I.
BU
ON
O -
G. L
ALA
NN
E
La r
éact
ion
des
entr
epris
es fr
ança
ises
à
la b
aiss
e de
s ta
rifs
doua
nier
s ét
rang
ers
G20
10/1
1 R
. RA
TH
ELO
T -
P. S
ILLA
RD
L’
appo
rt d
es m
étho
des
à no
yaux
pou
r m
esur
er la
co
ncen
trat
ion
géog
raph
ique
-
App
licat
ion
à la
co
ncen
trat
ion
des
imm
igré
s en
Fra
nce
de 1
968
à 19
99
G20
10/1
2 M
. B
AR
AT
ON
- M
. B
EF
FY
- D
. F
OU
GÈ
RE
U
ne é
valu
atio
n de
l’e
ffet
de l
a ré
form
e de
200
3 su
r le
s dé
part
s en
re
trai
te
- Le
ca
s de
s en
seig
nant
s du
sec
ond
degr
é pu
blic
G20
10/1
3 D
. B
LAN
CH
ET
- S
. B
UF
FE
TE
AU
- E
. C
RE
NN
ER
S
. LE
MIN
EZ
Le
m
odèl
e de
m
icro
sim
ulat
ion
Des
tinie
2
: pr
inci
pale
s ca
ract
éris
tique
s et
pre
mie
rs r
ésul
tats
G20
10/1
4 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
E. C
RE
NN
ER
Le
blo
c re
trai
tes
du m
odèl
e D
estin
ie 2
:
guid
e de
l’ut
ilisa
teur
G20
10/1
5 M
. B
AR
LET
-
L.
CR
US
SO
N
- S
. D
UP
UC
H
- F
. PU
EC
H
Des
se
rvic
es
écha
ngés
au
x se
rvic
es
écha
n-ge
able
s : u
ne a
pplic
atio
n su
r do
nnée
s fr
ança
ises
G20
10/1
6 M
. B
EF
FY
- T
. K
AM
ION
KA
P
ublic
-priv
ate
wag
e ga
ps:
is c
ivil-
serv
ant
hum
an
capi
tal s
ecto
r-sp
ecifi
c?
G20
10/1
7 P
.-Y
. C
AB
AN
NE
S
- H
. E
RK
EL-
RO
US
SE
-
G.
LALA
NN
E -
O.
MO
NS
O -
E.
PO
ULI
QU
EN
Le
mod
èle
Més
ange
rée
stim
é en
bas
e 20
00
Tom
e 2
- V
ersi
on a
vec
volu
mes
à p
rix c
haîn
és
G20
10/1
8 R
. AE
BE
RH
AR
DT
- L
. DA
VE
ZIE
S
Con
ditio
nal
Logi
t w
ith o
ne B
inar
y C
ovar
iate
: Li
nk
betw
een
the
Sta
tic a
nd D
ynam
ic C
ases
G20
11/0
1 T
. LE
BA
RB
AN
CH
ON
- B
. OU
RLI
AC
- O
. SIM
ON
Le
s m
arch
és d
u tr
avai
l fra
nçai
s et
am
éric
ain
face
au
x ch
ocs
conj
onct
urel
s de
s an
nées
19
86
à 20
07 :
une
mod
élis
atio
n D
SG
E
G20
11/0
2 C
. MA
RB
OT
U
ne
éval
uatio
n de
la
ré
duct
ion
d’im
pôt
pour
l’e
mpl
oi d
e sa
larié
s à
dom
icile
G20
11/0
3 L.
DA
VE
ZIE
S
Mod
èles
à
effe
ts
fixes
, à
effe
ts
aléa
toire
s,
mod
èles
mix
tes
ou m
ulti-
nive
aux
: pr
oprié
tés
et
mis
es
en
œuv
re
des
mod
élis
atio
ns
de
l’hét
érog
énéi
té d
ans
le c
as d
e do
nnée
s gr
oupé
es
G20
11/0
4 M
. RO
GE
R -
M. W
AS
ME
R
Het
erog
enei
ty
mat
ters
: la
bour
pr
oduc
tivity
di
ffere
ntia
ted
by a
ge a
nd s
kills
G20
11/0
5 J.
-C.
BR
ICO
NG
NE
- J
.-M
. F
OU
RN
IER
V
. LA
PÈ
GU
E -
O.
MO
NS
O
De
la
cris
e fin
anci
ère
à la
cr
ise
écon
omiq
ue
L’im
pact
des
per
turb
atio
ns f
inan
cièr
es d
e 20
07 e
t 20
08 s
ur la
cro
issa
nce
de s
ept p
ays
indu
stria
lisés
G20
11/0
6 P
. C
HA
RN
OZ
- É
. C
OU
DIN
- M
. G
AIN
I W
age
ineq
ualit
ies
in F
ranc
e 19
76-2
004:
a
quan
tile
regr
essi
on a
naly
sis
G20
11/0
7 M
. CLE
RC
- M
. GA
INI -
D. B
LAN
CH
ET
R
ecom
men
datio
ns
of
the
Stig
litz-
Sen
-Fito
ussi
R
epor
t: A
few
illu
stra
tions
G20
11/0
8 M
. BA
CH
ELE
T -
M. B
EF
FY
- D
. BLA
NC
HE
T
Pro
jete
r l’i
mpa
ct d
es r
éfor
mes
des
ret
raite
s su
r l’a
ctiv
ité d
es 5
5 an
s et
plu
s :
une
com
para
ison
de
troi
s m
odèl
es
G20
11/0
9 C
. LO
UV
OT
-RU
NA
VO
T
L’év
alua
tion
de
l’act
ivité
di
ssim
ulée
de
s en
tre-
pris
es s
ur l
a ba
se d
es c
ontr
ôles
fis
caux
et
son
inse
rtio
n da
ns le
s co
mpt
es n
atio
naux
G20
11/1
0 A
. SC
HR
EIB
ER
- A
. VIC
AR
D
La
tert
iaris
atio
n de
l’é
cono
mie
fr
ança
ise
et
le
rale
ntis
sem
ent
de l
a pr
oduc
tivité
ent
re 1
978
et
2008
G20
11/1
1 M
.-É
. C
LER
C -
O.
MO
NS
O -
E. P
OU
LIQ
UE
N
Les
inég
alité
s en
tre
géné
ratio
ns d
epui
s le
bab
y-bo
om
G20
11/1
2 C
. M
AR
BO
T -
D.
RO
Y
Éva
luat
ion
de l
a tr
ansf
orm
atio
n de
la
rédu
ctio
n d'
impô
t en
cré
dit
d'im
pôt
pour
l'em
ploi
de
sala
riés
à do
mic
ile e
n 20
07
G20
11/1
3 P
. GIV
OR
D -
R. R
AT
HE
LOT
- P
. SIL
LAR
D
Pla
ce-b
ased
ta
x ex
empt
ions
an
d di
spla
cem
ent
effe
cts:
A
n ev
alua
tion
of
the
Zon
es
Fra
nche
s U
rbai
nes
prog
ram
G20
11/1
4 X
. D
’HA
ULT
FO
EU
ILLE
-
P.
GIV
OR
D
- X
. B
OU
TIN
T
he E
nviro
nmen
tal
Effe
ct o
f G
reen
Tax
atio
n: t
he
Cas
e of
the
Fre
nch
“Bon
us/M
alus
”
G20
11/1
5 M
. B
AR
LET
-
M.
CLE
RC
-
M.
GA
RN
EO
-
V.
LAP
ÈG
UE
- V
. M
AR
CU
S
La
nouv
elle
ve
rsio
n du
m
odèl
e M
ZE
, m
odèl
e m
acro
écon
omét
rique
pou
r la
zon
e eu
ro
G20
11/1
6 R
. A
EB
ER
HA
RD
T -
I.
BU
ON
O -
H. F
AD
ING
ER
Le
arni
ng,
Inco
mpl
ete
Con
trac
ts
and
Exp
ort
Dyn
amic
s:
The
ory
and
Evi
denc
e fo
rm
Fre
nch
Firm
s
G20
11/1
7 C
. KE
RD
RA
IN -
V. L
AP
ÈG
UE
R
estr
ictiv
e F
isca
l Pol
icie
s in
Eur
ope:
W
hat a
re th
e Li
kely
Effe
cts?
G20
12/0
1 P
. G
IVO
RD
- S
. Q
UA
NT
IN -
C. T
RE
VIE
N
A L
ong-
Ter
m E
valu
atio
n of
the
Firs
t G
ener
atio
n of
the
Fre
nch
Urb
an E
nter
pris
e Z
ones
G20
12/0
2 N
. CE
CI-
RE
NA
UD
- V
. CO
TT
ET
P
oliti
que
sala
riale
et p
erfo
rman
ce d
es e
ntre
pris
es
G20
12/0
3 P
. FÉ
VR
IER
- L
. WIL
NE
R
Do
Con
sum
ers
Cor
rect
ly
Exp
ect
Pric
e R
educ
tions
? T
estin
g D
ynam
ic B
ehav
ior
G20
12/0
4 M
. GA
INI -
A. L
ED
UC
- A
. VIC
AR
D
Sch
ool
as a
she
lter?
Sch
ool
leav
ing-
age
and
the
busi
ness
cyc
le in
Fra
nce
G20
12/0
5 M
. GA
INI -
A. L
ED
UC
- A
. VIC
AR
D
A s
carr
ed g
ener
atio
n? F
renc
h ev
iden
ce o
n yo
ung
peop
le e
nter
ing
into
a to
ugh
labo
ur m
arke
t
G20
12/0
6 P
. AU
BE
RT
- M
. BA
CH
ELE
T
Dis
parit
és
de
mon
tant
de
pe
nsio
n et
re
dist
ribut
ion
dans
le s
ystè
me
de r
etra
ite fr
ança
is
G20
12/0
7 R
. AE
BE
RH
AR
DT
- P
GIV
OR
D -
C. M
AR
BO
T
Spi
llove
r E
ffect
of
the
Min
imum
Wag
e in
Fra
nce:
A
n U
ncon
ditio
nal Q
uant
ile R
egre
ssio
n A
ppro
ach
x
G20
12/0
8 A
. EID
ELM
AN
- F
. LA
NG
UM
IER
- A
. VIC
AR
D
Pré
lève
men
ts
oblig
atoi
res
repo
sant
su
r le
s m
énag
es :
des
can
aux
redi
strib
utifs
diff
éren
ts e
n 19
90 e
t 201
0
G20
12/0
9 O
. BA
RG
AIN
- A
. VIC
AR
D
Le
RM
I et
son
suc
cess
eur
le R
SA
déc
oura
gent
-ils
cer
tain
s je
unes
de
trav
aille
r ?
Une
ana
lyse
sur
le
s je
unes
aut
our
de 2
5 an
s
G20
12/1
0 C
. MA
RB
OT
- D
. R
OY
P
roje
ctio
ns
du
coût
de
l’A
PA
et
de
s ca
ract
éris
tique
s de
ses
bén
éfic
iaire
s à
l’hor
izon
20
40 à
l’ai
de d
u m
odèl
e D
estin
ie
G20
12/1
1 A
. MA
UR
OU
X
Le
créd
it d’
impô
t dé
dié
au
déve
lopp
emen
t du
rabl
e : u
ne é
valu
atio
n éc
onom
étriq
ue
G20
12/1
2 V
. CO
TT
ET
- S
. QU
AN
TIN
- V
. RÉ
GN
IER
C
oût
du t
rava
il et
allè
gem
ents
de
char
ges
: un
e es
timat
ion
au
nive
au
étab
lisse
men
t de
19
96
à 20
08
G20
12/1
3 X
. D
’HA
ULT
FO
EU
ILLE
-
P.
FÉ
VR
IER
-
L. W
ILN
ER
D
eman
d E
stim
atio
n in
the
Pre
senc
e of
Rev
enue
M
anag
emen
t
G20
12/1
4 D
. BLA
NC
HE
T -
S. L
E M
INE
Z
Join
t m
acro
/mic
ro e
valu
atio
ns o
f ac
crue
d-to
-dat
e pe
nsio
n lia
bilit
ies:
an
ap
plic
atio
n to
F
renc
h re
form
s
G20
13/0
1-
T.
DE
RO
YO
N -
A. M
ON
TA
UT
- P
-A P
ION
NIE
R
F13
01
Util
isat
ion
rétr
ospe
ctiv
e de
l’e
nquê
te
Em
ploi
à
une
fréq
uenc
e m
ensu
elle
: ap
port
d’
une
mod
élis
atio
n es
pace
-éta
t
G20
13/0
2-
C. T
RE
VIE
N
F13
02
Hab
iter
en
HLM
: qu
el
avan
tage
m
onét
aire
et
qu
el im
pact
sur
les
cond
ition
s de
loge
men
t ?
G20
13/0
3 A
. PO
ISS
ON
NIE
R
T
empo
ral
disa
ggre
gatio
n of
sto
ck v
aria
bles
- T
he
Cho
w-L
in m
etho
d ex
tend
ed to
dyn
amic
mod
els
G20
13/0
4 P
. GIV
OR
D -
C.
MA
RB
OT
Doe
s th
e co
st o
f ch
ild c
are
affe
ct f
emal
e la
bor
mar
ket
part
icip
atio
n? A
n ev
alua
tion
of a
Fre
nch
refo
rm o
f chi
ldca
re s
ubsi
dies
G20
13/0
5 G
. LA
ME
- M
. LE
QU
IEN
- P
.-A
. P
ION
NIE
R
In
terp
reta
tion
and
limits
of
sust
aina
bilit
y te
sts
in
publ
ic fi
nanc
e
G20
13/0
6 C
. BE
LLE
GO
- V
. DO
RT
ET
-BE
RN
AD
ET
La p
artic
ipat
ion
aux
pôle
s de
com
pétit
ivité
: qu
elle
in
cide
nce
sur
les
dépe
nses
de
R&
D e
t l’a
ctiv
ité
des
PM
E e
t E
TI ?
G20
13/0
7 P
.-Y
. CA
BA
NN
ES
- A
. MO
NT
AU
T -
P
.-A
. P
ION
NIE
R
É
valu
er
la p
rodu
ctiv
ité g
loba
le d
es f
acte
urs
en
Fra
nce
: l’a
ppor
t d’
une
mes
ure
de l
a qu
alité
du
capi
tal e
t du
trav
ail
G20
13/0
8 R
. AE
BE
RH
AR
DT
- C
. MA
RB
OT
Evo
lutio
n of
In
stab
ility
on
th
e F
renc
h La
bour
M
arke
t Dur
ing
the
Last
Thi
rty
Yea
rs
G20
13/0
9 J-
B. B
ER
NA
RD
- G
. CLÉ
AU
D
O
il pr
ice:
the
nat
ure
of t
he s
hock
s an
d th
e im
pact
on
the
Fre
nch
econ
omy
G20
13/1
0 G
. LA
ME
Was
the
re a
« G
reen
span
Con
undr
um »
in
the
Eur
o ar
ea?
G20
13/1
1 P
. CH
ON
É -
F. E
VA
IN -
L.
WIL
NE
R -
E.
YIL
MA
Z
In
trod
ucin
g ac
tivity
-bas
ed p
aym
ent
in t
he h
ospi
tal
indu
stry
: E
vide
nce
from
Fre
nch
data
G20
13/1
2 C
. GR
ISLA
IN-L
ET
RÉ
MY
Nat
ural
Dis
aste
rs: E
xpos
ure
and
Und
erin
sura
nce
G20
13/1
3 P
.-Y
. C
AB
AN
NE
S -
V.
CO
TT
ET
- Y
. D
UB
OIS
-
C.
LELA
RG
E -
M.
SIC
SIC
F
renc
h F
irms
in th
e F
ace
of th
e 20
08/2
009
Cris
is
G20
13/1
4 A
. PO
ISS
ON
NIE
R -
D. R
OY
Hou
seho
lds
Sat
ellit
e A
ccou
nt f
or F
ranc
e in
201
0.
Met
hodo
logi
cal
issu
es
on
the
asse
ssm
ent
of
dom
estic
pro
duct
ion
G20
13/1
5 G
. CLÉ
AU
D -
M. L
EM
OIN
E -
P.-
A. P
ION
NIE
R
W
hich
si
ze
and
evol
utio
n of
th
e go
vern
men
t ex
pend
iture
mul
tiplie
r in
Fra
nce
(198
0-20
10)?
G20
14/0
1 M
. BA
CH
ELE
T -
A. L
ED
UC
- A
. MA
RIN
O
Le
s bi
ogra
phie
s du
mod
èle
Des
tinie
II
: re
basa
ge
et p
roje
ctio
n
G20
14/0
2 B
. GA
RB
INT
I
L’ac
hat
de l
a ré
side
nce
prin
cipa
le e
t la
cré
atio
n d’
entr
epris
es s
ont-
ils f
avor
isés
par
les
don
atio
ns
et h
érita
ges
?
G20
14/0
3 N
. CE
CI-
RE
NA
UD
- P
. CH
AR
NO
Z -
M. G
AIN
I
Évo
lutio
n de
la v
olat
ilité
des
rev
enus
sal
aria
ux d
u se
cteu
r pr
ivé
en F
ranc
e de
puis
196
8
G20
14/0
4 P
. AU
BE
RT
Mod
alité
s d’
appl
icat
ion
des
réfo
rmes
des
ret
raite
s et
pré
visi
bilit
é du
mon
tant
de
pens
ion
G20
14/0
5 C
. GR
ISLA
IN-L
ET
RÉ
MY
- A
. KA
TO
SS
KY
The
Im
pact
of
Haz
ardo
us I
ndus
tria
l F
acili
ties
on
Hou
sing
Pric
es:
A C
ompa
rison
of
Par
amet
ric a
nd
Sem
ipar
amet
ric H
edon
ic P
rice
Mod
els
G20
14//0
6 J.
-M. D
AU
SS
IN-B
EN
ICH
OU
- A
. MA
UR
OU
X
Tur
ning
th
e he
at
up.
How
se
nsiti
ve
are
hous
ehol
ds
to
fisca
l in
cent
ives
on
en
ergy
ef
ficie
ncy
inve
stm
ents
?
G20
14/0
7 C
. LA
BO
NN
E -
G. L
AM
É
Cre
dit
Gro
wth
and
Cap
ital R
equi
rem
ents
: B
indi
ng
or N
ot?
G20
14/0
8 C
. GR
ISLA
IN-L
ET
RÉ
MY
et C
. TR
EV
IEN
T
he I
mpa
ct o
f H
ousi
ng S
ubsi
dies
on
the
Ren
tal
Sec
tor:
the
Fre
nch
Exa
mpl
e
G20
14/0
9 M
. LE
QU
IEN
et A
. MO
NT
AU
T
Cro
issa
nce
pote
ntie
lle
en
Fra
nce
et
en
zone
eu
ro :
un
tour
d’
horiz
on
des
mét
hode
s d’
estim
atio
n
G20
14/1
0 B
. GA
RB
INT
I -
P. L
AM
AR
CH
E
Les
haut
s re
venu
s ép
argn
ent-
ils d
avan
tage
?
G20
14/1
1 D
. AU
DE
NA
ER
T -
J. B
AR
DA
JI -
R. L
AR
DE
UX
-
M.
OR
AN
D -
M.
SIC
SIC
W
age
Res
ilien
ce
in
Fra
nce
sinc
e th
e G
reat
R
eces
sion
G20
14/1
2 F
. A
RN
AU
D -
J.
BO
US
SA
RD
- A
. P
OIS
SO
NN
IER
-
H. S
OU
AL
Com
putin
g ad
ditiv
e co
ntrib
utio
ns t
o gr
owth
and
ot
her
issu
es fo
r ch
ain-
linke
d qu
arte
rly a
ggre
gate
s
G20
14/1
3 H
. F
RA
ISS
E -
F.
KR
AM
AR
Z -
C.
PR
OS
T
Labo
r D
ispu
tes
and
Job
Flo
ws
xi
G20
14/1
4 P
. G
IVO
RD
-
C.
GR
ISLA
IN-L
ET
RÉ
MY
-
H.
NA
EG
ELE
H
ow
does
fu
el
taxa
tion
impa
ct
new
ca
r pu
rcha
ses?
A
n ev
alua
tion
usin
g F
renc
h co
nsum
er-le
vel d
atas
et
G20
14/1
5 P
. AU
BE
RT
- S
. RA
BA
TÉ
D
urée
pa
ssée
en
ca
rriè
re
et
duré
e de
vi
e en
re
trai
te :
que
l pa
rtag
e de
s ga
ins
d'es
péra
nce
de
vie
?
G20
15/0
1 A
. PO
ISS
ON
NIE
R
The
wal
king
dea
d E
uler
equ
atio
n A
ddre
ssin
g a
chal
leng
e to
m
onet
ary
polic
y m
odel
s
G20
15/0
2 Y
. D
UB
OIS
- A
. M
AR
INO
In
dica
teur
s de
ren
dem
ent
du s
ystè
me
de r
etra
ite
fran
çais
G20
15/0
3 T
. M
AY
ER
- C
. TR
EV
IEN
T
he
impa
cts
of
Urb
an
Pub
lic
Tra
nspo
rtat
ion:
E
vide
nce
from
the
Par
is R
egio
n
G20
15/0
4 S
.T.
LY -
A. R
IEG
ER
T
Mea
surin
g S
ocia
l Env
ironm
ent M
obili
ty
G20
15/0
5 M
. A. B
EN
HA
LIM
A -
V. H
YA
FIL
-SO
LELH
AC
M
. K
OU
BI
- C
. R
EG
AE
RT
Q
uel
est
l’im
pact
du
sy
stèm
e d’
inde
mni
satio
n m
alad
ie s
ur l
a du
rée
des
arrê
ts d
e tr
avai
l po
ur
mal
adie
?
G20
15/0
6 Y
. D
UB
OIS
- A
. M
AR
INO
D
ispa
rités
de
rend
emen
t du
sys
tèm
e de
ret
raite
da
ns
le
sect
eur
priv
é :
appr
oche
s in
terg
énér
a-tio
nnel
le e
t int
ragé
néra
tionn
elle
G20
15/0
7 B
. CA
MP
AG
NE
- V
. ALH
EN
C-G
ELA
S -
J.
-B.
BE
RN
AR
D
No
evid
ence
of f
inan
cial
acc
eler
ator
in F
ranc
e
G20
15/0
8 Q
. LA
FF
ÉT
ER
- M
. PA
K
Éla
stic
ités
des
rece
ttes
fisca
les
au
cycl
e éc
onom
ique
: é
tude
de
troi
s im
pôts
sur
la p
ério
de
1979
-201
3 en
Fra
nce
G20
15/0
9 J.
-M.
DA
US
SIN
-BE
NIC
HO
U,
S.
IDM
AC
HIC
HE
, A
. LE
DU
C e
t E
. P
OU
LIQ
UE
N
Les
déte
rmin
ants
de
l’attr
activ
ité d
e la
fon
ctio
n pu
bliq
ue d
e l’É
tat
G20
15/1
0 P
. AU
BE
RT
La
mod
ulat
ion
du m
onta
nt d
e pe
nsio
n se
lon
la
duré
e de
car
rière
et
l’âge
de
la r
etra
ite :
que
lles
disp
arité
s en
tre
assu
rés
?
G20
15/1
1 V
. DO
RT
ET
-BE
RN
AD
ET
- M
. SIC
SIC
E
ffet
des
aide
s pu
bliq
ues
sur
l’em
ploi
en
R&
D
dans
les
petit
es e
ntre
pris
es
G20
15/1
2 S
. G
EO
RG
ES
-KO
T
Ann
ual
and
lifet
ime
inci
denc
e of
the
val
ue-a
dded
ta
x in
Fra
nce
G20
15/1
3 M
. PO
ULH
ÈS
A
re
Ent
erpr
ise
Zon
es
Ben
efits
C
apita
lized
in
to
Com
mer
cial
Pro
pert
y V
alue
s? T
he F
renc
h C
ase
G20
15/1
4 J.
-B. B
ER
NA
RD
- Q
. LA
FF
ÉT
ER
E
ffet
de l’
activ
ité e
t de
s pr
ix s
ur le
rev
enu
sala
rial
des
diffé
rent
es c
atég
orie
s so
ciop
rofe
ssio
nnel
les
G20
15/1
5 C
. G
EA
Y -
M.
KO
UB
I -
G d
e LA
GA
SN
ER
IE
Pro
ject
ions
de
s dé
pens
es
de
soin
s de
vi
lle,
cons
truc
tion
d’un
mod
ule
pour
Des
tinie
G20
15/1
6 J.
BA
RD
AJI
- J
.-C
. B
RIC
ON
GN
E -
B
. C
AM
PA
GN
E -
G.
GA
ULI
ER
C
ompa
red
perf
orm
ance
s of
Fre
nch
com
pani
es
on th
e do
mes
tic a
nd fo
reig
n m
arke
ts
G20
15/1
7 C
. BE
LLÉ
GO
- R
. DE
NIJ
S
The
red
istr
ibut
ive
effe
ct o
f on
line
pira
cy o
n th
e bo
x of
fice
perf
orm
ance
of
A
mer
ican
m
ovie
s in
fo
reig
n m
arke
ts
G20
15/1
8 J.
-B. B
ER
NA
RD
- L
. BE
RT
HE
T
Fre
nch
hous
ehol
ds
finan
cial
w
ealth
: w
hich
ch
ange
s in
20
year
s?
G20
15/1
9 M
. PO
ULH
ÈS
Fe
nêtre
sur
Cou
r ou
Cha
mbr
e av
ec V
ue ?
Le
s pr
ix h
édon
ique
s de
l’im
mob
ilier
par
isie
n
G20
16/0
1 B
. G
AR
BIN
TI
- S
. G
EO
RG
ES
-KO
T
Tim
e to
sm
ell t
he r
oses
? R
isk
aver
sion
, the
tim
ing
of in
herit
ance
rec
eipt
, and
ret
irem
ent
G20
16/0
2 P
. CH
AR
NO
Z -
C. L
ELA
RG
E -
C. T
RE
VIE
N
Com
mun
icat
ion
Cos
ts
and
the
Inte
rnal
O
rgan
izat
ion
of M
ulti-
Pla
nt B
usin
esse
s: E
vide
nce
from
the
Impa
ct o
f the
Fre
nch
Hig
h-S
peed
Rai
l
G20
16/0
3 C
. B
ON
NE
T -
B.
GA
RB
INT
I -
A. S
OLA
Z
Gen
der
Ineq
ualit
y af
ter
Div
orce
: T
he F
lip S
ide
of
Mar
ital
Spe
cial
izat
ion
- E
vide
nce
from
a F
renc
h A
dmin
istr
ativ
e D
atab
ase
G20
16/0
4 D
. B
LAN
CH
ET
-
E.
CA
RO
LI
- C
. P
RO
ST
-
M.
RO
GE
R
Hea
lth c
apac
ity to
wor
k at
old
er a
ges
in F
ranc
e
G20
16/0
5 B
. C
AM
PA
GN
E -
A.
PO
ISS
ON
NIE
R
ME
LEZ
E:
A D
SG
E m
odel
for
Fra
nce
with
in t
he
Eur
o A
rea
G20
16/0
6 B
. C
AM
PA
GN
E -
A.
PO
ISS
ON
NIE
R
Laffe
r cu
rves
and
fis
cal
mul
tiplie
rs:
less
ons
from
M
élèz
e m
odel