Upload
others
View
6
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Digital-First Strategies in Legacy Newsrooms:
Exploring the tipping point
by
Sherry Aske
A research essay submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral
Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Communication
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
© 2016, Sherry Aske
Aske 2
Digital-First Strategies in Legacy Newsrooms: Exploring the tipping point
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
The Digital Dilemma
Defining Digital-First
Methods
PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12
Challenge 1: Technological Innovation: Turning experiments routine
Challenge 2: Journalistic Culture: The journalist is no longer king
Challenge 3: Organization: Too many goats to feed
PART 2: CANADIAN LEGACY MEDIA & DIGITAL STRATEGIES………………………………………………….35
The Toronto Star
The CBC
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….46
Strategy Recommendations
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………50
Aske 3
INTRODUCTION
Legacy news organizations are at a turning point. Subscribers and viewers that were
once loyal to traditional distribution platforms are drifting away to consume news online. In a
digital news world, companies such as Buzzfeed, Vice, and the Huffington Post have a head
start providing constant, up-to-the-minute-coverage for online news consumers. While the shift
to digital news consumption did not happen overnight, legacy media outlets have begun to
adopt digital-first strategies in an effort to catch up, and survive in an increasingly dispersed
media environment. This shift has been messy and problematic. No two organizations have the
same approach. With no blueprint and no concept of best practices, the move to prioritize
digital platforms has been a process of trial and error. Those within the media industry have
both embraced and resisted these changes. To understand the scope of these challenges and to
identify the best way to proceed, this paper looks outwards at the documented experiences of
legacy news organizations so far, and inwards at the ongoing efforts of some of Canada's main
media outlets. It examines how two Canadian legacy news organizations are approaching digital
strategies. The goal is to identify common challenges and offer a series of recommendations
legacy news organizations can consider when implementing digital-first strategies. This is not
meant to present a one-size-fits-all approach, but to offer advice newsrooms can consider in
conjunction with their own business models, audience demographics, available resources and
distribution requirements.
THE DIGITAL DILEMMA
The shift to digital is not an overnight phenomenon. News organizations and news
consumers have been moving online for more than two decades. What is changing, however, is
Aske 4
the number of news consumers who are getting content exclusively from digital platforms.
Lifestyle changes, widespread Internet access and the increased affordability of handheld
devices such as smartphones and tablets, mean that the news audience is, literally, on the
move. Many organizations find that more than half of their audience members access content
exclusively through digital platforms (Sharma, 2015). The Pew Research Centre first reported in
2008 that the Internet had overtaken newspapers as the main source used to access
international and national news in the United States (Pew, 2008). While monitoring media
consumption during that year’s the presidential election campaign, researchers found that 40
per cent of news consumers were getting their news online, compared to 35 per cent turning to
newspapers. The numbers for young people were even higher, with 59 per cent of those under
the age of 30 heading online for national and international news (Pew, 2008). The number of
online news consumers has steadily increased. In 2012, the number of people who reported
getting their news from digital forms rose to 50 per cent. At the time, online numbers were just
below the 55 per cent of people who reported getting news from television, but well above the
29 per cent of people reportedly getting their news from print papers and the 33 per cent of
people relying on radio (Pew, 2013).
Today, online news consumers represent a majority of the market. In the Reuters 2015
Digital News Report, two-thirds of smartphone users said they use the devices for news on a
weekly basis (Newman, 2015). The 2015 State of the Media report describes the current
landscape as a "mobile majority,” referring not only to the trend of more people consuming
news on cell phones, but also to the fact that mobile phones are driving more traffic to news
from social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter (Mitchell, 2015, p. 4). A recent Pew
Aske 5
survey suggests 63 per cent of Facebook and Twitter users use social media networks to get the
news (Barthel et al., 2015). While legacy platforms have not been abandoned, newspaper and
cable news consumption continues to decline. In the United States, prime time viewing of cable
news dropped by eight per cent in 2014, according to the Pew 2015 State of the Media report.
The same report suggests weekday newspaper circulation fell by 19 per cent between 2004 and
2014 (Mitchell, 2015, p. 5). Legacy media outlets are not blind to these changes.
As researchers at Pew point out, changing news habits have a tremendous impact on
how news organizations produce and distribute news on a daily basis (Mitchell, 2015, p. 4).
Despite business models built on print and television distribution, legacy news organizations
are attempting to move with their audience. This involves changing how news is gathered and
written (Franklin, 2013, p. 1). It involves tailoring the format of content for digital platforms and
adapting to a new speed of news delivery: now. Such changes raise important questions about
the quality of journalism being produced, and the potential impact on a robust, informed
society (Franklin, 2013, p. 1).
In Canada, the federal government has taken notice of the "shifting information
consumption habits of Canadians," (Ditchburn, 2016). Heritage Minister Melanie Joly has
announced a sweeping review of Canada's cultural industries in an effort to update policies for
the digital age (LeBlanc, 2016). While the review will focus on various sectors, this project
focuses specifically on news production and delivery, and the technical, cultural and
organizational impact digital strategies create for those involved. In the past, news production
centered on industrial-style methods that favoured expediency and division of labour. It is
perhaps dishonest to suggest that news gathering was ever neat and orderly, but it is
Aske 6
impossible to ignore the disorder of an increasingly digital industry characterized by continuous
change and disagreement about what news should look like and how and when it should be
delivered. In examining the present moment in the industry, this paper suggests that legacy
news organizations, their staff and their journalistic priorities, are split between traditional
formats and production methods, and catering to the insatiable, complex demands of a
digital news world.
DEFINING DIGITAL-FIRST
Researchers have noted the lack of consensus in the industry about how to define digital
journalism. “Digital” has become synonymous with a sprawling domain that includes online
media, social media, the blogosphere, data journalism, and interactive journalism (Franklin,
2013, p. 2). There is also disagreement about who can produce digital journalism, what it looks
like, and what it SHOULD look like (Franklin, 2013, p. 2). This project is not immune from the
above debate, but it is simplified in that it deals specifically with digital platforms as they relate
to legacy media outlets. For instance, a digital platform for a legacy media organization is any
form of news delivery that makes use of online or wireless technology and that differs from its
original business model. For example, the Toronto Star, which started as a newspaper, now also
publishes content using mobile and tablet applications, social media networks and a website. It
is the decisions regarding these additional platforms which make up its digital strategy. The
CBC, which began as a radio and television broadcaster, now has similar digital offerings.
In general, a digital-first strategy refers to an organization's commitment to prioritize
the needs of digital distribution platforms, such as websites, mobile applications and social
media networks, ahead of traditional distribution platforms, such as printed papers and radio
Aske 7
and television newscasts. Material should appear on a newsroom’s website, mobile and tablet
applications and social media pages as soon as it is ready (Sharma, 2015). The specifics of the
strategy vary widely from organization to organization depending on the number of digital
platforms an organization has, the audience it hopes to reach, and the nature of the content
itself. This project deals primarily with three aspects of digital-first strategies. These are:
1. Changes to newsroom workflow and organization to favour instantaneous reporting
2. Changes to which delivery platforms receive priority
3. Changes to the format in which news is presented
The third category is not universally applied. For example, some news organizations emphasize
packaging content specifically for particular platforms. This is based on the understanding that
digital users consume information differently than a television audience or newspaper
subscriber. At the BBC, reporters are encouraged to move away from two-minute story
packages to produce shorter segments that can be viewed quickly, while on the go (Thordar,
2015). Bullet point summaries, fact boxes and interactive features are also increasingly popular,
as well as writing that takes a more conversational tone (Garcia, 2015; Sharma, 2015). At other
organizations, a digital-first strategy may simply involve posting a newspaper article online or
on a tablet application, even if it has yet to appear in the printed paper. This shift in priorities
goes against decades of ingrained practices and challenges a journalistic culture in which
information comes from a single, centralized source. Taken together, these changes have
resulted in technical, cultural and organizational challenges for legacy news organizations and
their employees.
Aske 8
METHODS
This paper will proceed in two parts.
In the first, a qualitative meta-analysis is used to establish key challenges legacy
newsrooms experience as they implement digital-first strategies. As a research method, a meta-
analysis provides a systematic and comprehensive review of the information available on
digital-first strategies. Other researchers have used this method to establish patterns in the
field. Andrea Miller and Amy Reynolds employed a similar technique to explore economic
models and business strategies in the digital media environment in New Orleans (Miller &
Reynolds, 2014, p. 94) Qualitative meta-analysis is typically applied to research in academic
journals, however given the rapidly changing nature of the journalism industry, this analysis
also includes reports by established and knowledgeable leaders within the journalism
profession. It draws on news articles, industry statistics and reports from research organizations
such as the Nieman Journalism Lab, the Poynter Institute and the Pew Research Centre. These
organizations are known in the industry for their efforts to chronicle change, track trends and
offer instruction and resources to news organizations.
The reports discussed in this paper were gathered casually over a one-year period
stretching from April 2015 to April of 2016. Many were accessed directly through daily digest
emails published by the organizations listed above. Others were found through specific Internet
searches pertaining to digital-first strategies and digital journalism. The accumulated research
was organized into three areas where digital-first strategies have met resistance. The
challenges relate to innovation, journalistic culture and newsroom organization. It should be
noted that this paper does not address in depth, the economic challenges media organizations
Aske 9
are facing in the digital news world. The erosion of funds from traditional print and broadcast
advertising has crippled the size of many newsrooms and obliterated others (CBC News, 2015;
Canadian Press, 2015). While digital advertising revenue is growing, it still represents only a
fraction of funding at most media organizations (Pew Research Centre, 2014, p. 3; Barthel,
2015). This paper is not trying to ignore the elephant in the room. There is little doubt digital
methods also challenge the very lifeblood legacy news organizations have survived on for
decades. The focus here is on challenges to news production and reporting. The financial
consequences of a shifting industry warrant their own analysis, one that done correctly, would
not fit into the scope of this paper. While the challenges addressed here do not encompass all
of the obstacles legacy newsrooms face, they do outline three key areas of concern that guide
the questions asked in the second section of the paper.
The second portion of the project involves a series of interviews with those involved in
the implementation of digital-first strategies. The goal is to explore how Canada's legacy news
organizations are addressing the technological, cultural, and organizational challenges
identified in the literature review. It examines how these organizations are serving an
increasingly digital audience and what that means for their legacy platforms. The original plan
was to interview senior staff at the Toronto Star, CBC and La Presse. These three legacy news
organizations were selected to shed light on the Canadian media industry at large. The selected
organizations represent the country's largest newspaper, its public broadcaster and a major
French-language newspaper. While the values and intended audience of each organization
differ, choosing a mix of legacy media outlets allows the project to identify potential solutions
that can cross organizations and serve the industry as a whole. Interview requests were sent by
Aske 10
email to senior staff at all three media organizations in May, 2016. Senior staff were chosen,
rather than reporters, assignment or production staff, for their ability to speak publically about
their organization's strategy and for their insight into the direction their organization is taking.
After discussing potential candidates with publishers or the organization’s communication
department, a 30-minute phone interview was conducted with the head of strategy for CBC
News and centres and the chief operating officer of digital at the Toronto Star. Numerous
attempts were also made to find an available candidate at La Presse. After approaching the
publisher and the director of continuous improvement, a company spokesperson said all staff
dedicated to the organization’s digital operations were unavailable for interviews within the
time frame of the project. As a result, an in-depth analysis of La Presse’s digital strategy had to
be eliminated from the paper. Publically available information about the company’s digital
strategy is included as supporting material as it showcases a legacy news organization which
has almost completely abandoned its traditional distribution platform.
In a final section, key points from the accumulated research and interviews are used to
form recommendations legacy news organizations can consider as they adopt digital-first
strategies. It should be noted that while this paper is the product of a Master’s research
project, the author is also employed as a journalist at the CBC, one of the organizations
discussed here in depth. To avoid a conflict of interest, all of the included information is
publically available or was obtained through interviews, in which the subjects were informed in
advance of the author's employment. While the author has an inside understanding of the
challenges facing the journalism industry, this paper is not intended to document personal
Aske 11
experience, but to provide insight into a specific moment in the industry, supported with
statistical and anecdotal evidence from others in the field.
Aske 12
PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
CHALLENGE 1: Technological Innovation: Turning experiments routine
Digital-first strategies require technological innovation on two fronts. First, they require
newsrooms to adopt new platforms and applications to reach their audience. This can be
anything from a daily tablet publication, to a weekly podcast, to a profile on a photo and video-
sharing application such as Instagram. As new distribution platforms emerge, media
organizations have to make decisions about which ones they will adopt and where those
platforms fall in terms of priority. Second, many of these platforms require a rethinking of how
news is presented. This second form of innovation requires news organizations to consider how
their audience consumes news. For example, given the large percentage of people who now
consume news on their phones, shorter articles, graphics and video overlaid with text are
common methods used to serve an on-the-go, often distracted audience (BBC Academy, 2015).
Some forms of digital innovation are more challenging to adopt than others. This section will
explore some of the simpler ways newsrooms have tweaked traditional reporting methods by
focusing on methods adopted by the BBC. These methods are slowly becoming common
practice at other organizations as well. The BBC was chosen as it was an early adopter, and
because it has publicly documented its shift to digital reporting through its educational
journalism website, the BBC Academy. It will then turn to the murkier aspect of digital
innovation: the experiments and large scale projects that legacy newsrooms dabble in as they
play with what is possible and try to understand what works, and what does not.
Perhaps because of its size and available resources, the BBC has emerged as a leader in
repackaging video for digital audiences. Its staff are experimenting with a range of formats,
Aske 13
including 15-second stories that can be distributed on Instagram or Twitter. These bite-sized
stories take one or two punchy clips from an interview and subtitle them so mobile users can
watch with or without audio (Thordar, 2015). Another format, labelled Go Figure, consists of an
image that gets Tweeted out with a key statistic and a link to the full story. Using text over still
images, graphics, and video has become a go-to format because it gives users the option of
viewing the story with no sound in public settings (Thordar, 2015). Both formats are created
specifically with mobile phone users in mind, with the goal of driving traffic to the BBC’s
website (Albeanu, 2015b).
Digital innovation means the BBC is also shifting its standards for video. This does not
mean eliminating quality. Rather, producers suggest the secret to doing digital well may be to
emphasize quality over quantity (BBC Academy, 2015). It might be more accurate to suggest
that digital news demands a different set of characteristics. News organizations can no longer
assume they have the audience's attention. Content on phones and tablets needs to capture
someone’s interest amid hundreds of other posts, and spark enough of a reaction that it will
hopefully be shared (BBC Academy, 2015). At the BBC, the policy for digital platforms is that
shorter is better. There is more tolerance for personal storytelling. Staff are increasingly using
what the BBC calls the “show-and-tell” format in which a reporter casually addresses viewers
while walking through a location such as city hall, an airport or hospital. Personal narration is
also accepted, particularly when news breaks. A raw, first-person video account of what a
journalist sees as they arrive at the scene can be distributed with no editing (BBC Academy,
2015). Old taboos, including handheld, shaky video, are now characteristics that help drive
view-counts. The BBC’s metrics suggest audiences are drawn to the authenticity and drama of
Aske 14
unpackaged video (BBC Academy, 2015). A digital-first pilot project on the BBC’s international
pages that focused on short, 250-word stories and sharing more audio and video saw web
traffic increase by 20 per cent (Sharma, 2015).
While the BBC was an early adopter of shorter, personalized, sharable news formats,
similar methods are becoming commonplace at other legacy media outlets. Short clips, raw
video, text-over-video, graphics and quotes-over-images are increasingly appearing on the
social media feeds of Canadian media organizations such as Maclean's magazine, the Globe and
Mail and the CBC, although posting a photo and link to a full story remains the dominant form
of social sharing. Short clips, raw video and graphics are also appearing with greater frequency
on newsroom websites to replace packaged video stories. In other cases, individual pieces of
media are combined with text to tell a story through curation. For print-based legacy media
outlets, the methods described above may require innovation in that staff will need training in
photo and video editing. Even in newsrooms familiar with gathering and editing video,
journalists may require training on new publication systems. Finally, new digital platforms will
likely require all journalists to adopt an additional writing style that can be used to cater to the
social, sometimes casual nature of digital platforms.
A greater challenge to innovation may simply be keeping up with the variety of
applications news consumers frequent. It is not enough for a news organization to post raw
material on its own website. Recent studies suggest social media, particularly Facebook, drives
the largest amount of traffic to news websites (Ingram, 2015). This is why media organizations
are using the reporting techniques described above to post to Twitter and Facebook along with
links to their websites. Many newsrooms also run their own mobile and tablet applications.
Aske 15
These applications may feature the same content found on an organization’s website, but apps
require different formatting for smaller screens, and the writing of notification and breaking
news alerts. There are also third-party applications which vary depending on an organization’s
audience. Common choices include photo and video sharing services like Vine and Instagram.
Messaging and chat applications are another growing area, and even they require a different
approach to how information is packaged. Messaging applications go beyond sharing content,
and focus on interaction and dialogue with users (Lloyd & Boggie, 2015). Different apps afford
different levels of conversation, but this style of news delivery is different even from the
reporting done on Twitter and Facebook. Text-over-video and easy-to-read graphics are meant
to grab the attention of people scrolling Facebook and Twitter newsfeeds. Chat applications are
based on a one-to-one or one-to-few communication model. They focus on conversation rather
than broadcasting (Lloyd & Boggie, 2015).
In short, the list of digital platforms legacy media outlets can adopt is never ending, and
each format requires its own writing and formatting-style to be used effectively. The speed of
change combined with the constant shifting of preferred formats and delivery platforms, means
that as soon as a newsroom attempts to train staff and implement a strategy, a new application
or platform is already grabbing hold. In its annual year end list of predictions for journalism, the
directors of the New York Times Research and Development Lab described the hamster-wheel
dilemma of innovation: "the lesson the Internet teaches us again and again is that everything
changes. The biggest mistake a publisher can make is to assume their current approach will
hold, when in fact we must all constantly experiment," (Lloyd & Boggie, 2015). Research
suggests media organizations are experimenting if they have resources available. The additional
Aske 16
challenge comes with integrating these experiments into day-to-day news production,
particularly for legacy media organizations who must also devote resources to traditional
delivery platforms. Furthermore, while many of the methods listed above involve tweaking
current practices or building on a journalist’s existing skills, other forms of digital innovation
require entirely new skill sets and resources. Three examples of such innovation follow. Each
highlights an exciting opportunity for the industry and its own layer of challenges.
Executives at the Wall Street Journal have suggested virtual reality will become a main
storytelling format for the future (Wang, 2015). Using a VR headset allows users to experience
360-degree video. It is described as more realistic than 3D, as whatever is on the screen fills a
user's entire vision, giving the impression of being physically present in an environment (Stein,
2015). The New York Times launched its first virtual reality film, the Displaced, in November of
2015. Staff brought the story of three child refugees to print subscribers by mailing them a
cardboard viewfinder that could be used with a cellphone application (Wang, 2015). The appeal
for journalists is huge. Virtual reality allows news organizations to tell a story by placing the
audience inside a Syrian refugee camp or a Guinea hospital during the Ebola crisis. News
organizations can "tell important stories in an entirely new way...to wring from the audience
the intense emotional reaction that these stories deserve," (Dennis, 2016). Other legacy media
outlets experimenting with virtual reality include the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times,
the BBC and PBS (Doyle et al., 2016, p. 8). But despite the "extraordinary reactions" the
technology is generating, executives note that producing a virtual reality film is an ambitious,
lengthy and costly process (Polgreen, 2014). A report from the Knight Foundation suggests a
basic kit for capturing and assembling a virtual reality film costs about $5,000, in addition to
Aske 17
paying journalists and production staff (Doyle et al., 2016, p. 19). The head of visuals at the Wall
Street Journal notes that there is no shortage of excitement around virtual reality as a new
storytelling format, but that for the time being, it remains an experimental method (Wang,
2015). It may be years before virtual reality is adopted as a mainstream format, however
newsrooms wishing to get ahead of the curve are committed to experimenting now.
Long-read interactive pieces are a much more widely adopted form of digital
storytelling. The New York Times’ 2012 “Snow Fall” piece is often held up as an early example of
creative and immersive content. The digital feature tells the story of an avalanche in
Washington’s Tunnel Creek through infographics, audio, video, still photos and text (Briggs,
2013). More recent Canadian examples include the Globe and Mail's piece, Confined: The death
of Eddie Snowshoe, which won an award for best editorial packaging at the Canadian Online
Publishing Awards for 2015 (The Globe and Mail, 2015). The six part feature uses text, images,
original documents, timelines, video and interactive sidebars to tell the story of a 24-year-old
man who died by suicide after spending 162 days in segregation in an Edmonton prison (White,
2014). These pieces favour desktop and tablet users. While they are widely celebrated by
industry professionals for what is possible, digital natives are quick to point out such projects
offer little help to legacy newsrooms, as they lack replicability. As Quartz editor Kevin Delaney
put it, “I’d rather have a Snow Fall builder than a Snow Fall,” (Benton, 2015). Both virtual reality
and long-form interactive pieces require specialized staff who are familiar with the technical
elements these projects require. Newsrooms that want to attempt this form of storytelling
need to hire computer programmers and IT specialists. Likewise, projects based on the
visualization of large data sets require researchers familiar with navigating and sorting through
Aske 18
large swaths of information. Such projects also require staff who can transform the relevant
data so it can be represented visually. In some cases journalists can learn these skills, but often
newsrooms are required to hire new employees if they wish to innovate (Schmitz Weiss &
Domingo, 2010, p. 1164). The other issue regarding some special projects is that they are not
always well suited to capture the attention of a fickle, on-the-go audience. Publishers have
already identified a need to ensure interactive pieces also transfer well onto mobile phones
(Wang, 2016b). That is not to say mobile users will never engage with long-form, interactive
pieces, only to point out that the strength of digital storytelling on a day-to-day basis may lie
more in speed and connectivity. For example, using live feeds such as Twitter to provide up to
the moment chronicling of breaking news, or using chat applications such as WhatsAp so users
can interact and network with journalists and other news consumers in real time. Newsrooms
that wish to produce digital content for all audiences, capturing both casual, social users and
loyal, attentive ones, will need to diversify their staff and skills.
As was previously mentioned, messaging and chat applications are another form of
emerging digital journalism. A report from the Tow Centre for Digital Journalism suggests that
by 2020, mobile apps like WeChat, Snapchat, WhatsApp and Telegram that provide a concierge-
style media service will be the main way audiences consume content. This is significant because
the subscriber-based, pocket-sized audiences these apps cater to require an intimate, personal
approach that is very different from the attention-grabbing style of social media news feeds
that legacy newsrooms are only just becoming accustomed to (Lloyd & Boggie, 2015). In
addition to news gathering and content sharing abilities, messaging apps allow media outlets to
create special channels for small groups of users. These can be used to deliver text messages,
Aske 19
news alerts, stickers, trivia and emojis (Marconi, 2016). The messages are meant to engage
members in a discussion, with a journalist initiating a conversation and then acting as a form of
mediator (Marconi, 2016). The Globe and Mail launched an experiment using WhatsAp during
the federal election campaign. The newsroom used the app to send 46 messages over the 78-
day campaign based on the question, "What’s the one thing you need to know today to help
you make an informed vote" (Whetstone, 2015). About 1,700 people signed up to receive the
messages. Project manager Melissa Whetstone says while the experiment received rave
reviews, it was logistically daunting. WhatsApp restricts the size of a channel to 256 people,
which meant staff had to create six individual groups and repeat the publishing process for each
one. As the Globe and Mail’s WhatsApp account was tied to a single cell phone number, staff
had to pass that phone back-and-forth between editors for the project (Whetstone, 2015). The
BBC has observed similar obstacles in its pilot projects with WhatsApp, but continues to
experiment with the app because of its potential for real-time reporting and two-way
communication. The broadcaster says twenty-five thousand people subscribed to its WhatsApp
channel to receive health alerts during the Ebola crisis. "You know that 100 percent of your
subscription base will review it instantly," the BBC's mobile and apps editor Trushar Barot said
in an interview with Digiday, "They are much more heavily engaged and much more motivated
to respond," (Southern, 2016b).
These last three examples highlight the experimental nature of digital reporting, and
represent only some of the areas legacy outlets are exploring. Other formats gaining popularity
include live video streaming, podcasting, daily digest emails, and interactives based on big data.
The list of possibilities is constantly growing. Likely because of its shifting nature, innovative
Aske 20
digital storytelling often remains a step removed from day-to-day news production (Stencil et
al., 2014). This is partly due to the resources digital projects require and partly due to the
technical expertise required to bring them to fruition. In most cases, media outlets use
innovative formats on special occasions, such as the Globe’s WhatsApp experiment during the
federal election campaign. Familiar methods which allow content to be produced quickly and
efficiently remain the norm. A 2014 Duke Reporters' Lab report concluded "producers still
think of digital tools as extras -- "bells and whistles" that augment traditional story forms rather
than a primary story forms in their own right," (Stencil et al., 2014). In other words, reporters
and editors may be aware of digital tools and formats, but these often get added after-the-fact,
when time and money permits. Funding digital innovation appears to be a significant barrier.
The examples explored above were all carried out by global and international media
organizations. Some of these companies have chosen to invest in innovation labs to ensure
digital projects are getting produced alongside legacy content. The New York Times has a
Research & Development group dedicated to "identifying trends and technologies that will
emerge in the next three to five years," (Nytlabs, 2016). In Canada, the Globe and Mail created
a designated mobile and interactive news team in 2014, assigned to both "push the boundaries
of digital storytelling" with in-depth pieces, and prioritize the daily filing of lists, charts,
graphics, quizzes, comparisons and explainers (Frehner, 2014). The team’s WhatsApp
experiment demonstrates that digital innovation is not always successful. Formats can prove
logistically daunting, too expensive sustain, or can simply fall flat with users. But without a
permanent allocation of resources, legacy media outlets can easily neglect digital storytelling
methods to save time and money. Innovation can also be neglected in breaking-news situations
Aske 21
when staff are used to producing a certain type of story. This suggests that a legacy media
organization attempting to implement a digital-first strategy needs to carve out specific
resources to ensure digital storytelling methods are part of the news production process on a
moment-to-moment basis. To be truly digital-first, this allocation should represent the bulk of a
newsroom’s resources, in order to prioritize digital formats over traditional articles, video packs
and audio stories. Finally, because the rate of innovation vastly outpaces the rate of adoption in
most newsrooms, media organizations need to commit to constant experimentation, despite
the reality that some projects will fall flat. Without this risk, legacy outlets may implement
digital-first strategies only to find themselves, once again, left behind.
CHALLENGE 2: Journalistic culture: The journalist is no longer king
Digital-first strategies disrupt the very practices and attitudes legacy media
organizations are built around. Practices refer to the industrial-style processes that legacy
organizations use as they build towards a final, end-of-day product, whereas attitudes refer to
the notion that journalists and the organizations they work for control the production and
distribution of news. The disruption of journalistic culture is by no means new. Journalists have
adapted their work habits to accommodate each information-distribution technology since the
printing press. In 2002, veteran journalist and author Stephen Quinn was one of several
journalists already arguing for the re-organization of news work to cope with online demands,
dwindling advertising revenue and shrinking newsrooms (Quinn, 2002, p. 53). Quinn suggested
reporters could no longer think of themselves as exclusive to one platform, but must focus
instead on "getting the information out," (Quinn, 2002, p. 36). Ongoing talk of digital-first
strategies suggests this has yet to be fully realized, perhaps because old habits are simply too
Aske 22
hard to break. But industry leaders continue to argue that the industry must undergo a
fundamental shift in culture if legacy organizations wish to compete and survive in a digital
environment (Brandel, 2016; Lloyd, 2015; Anderson, 2013). To achieve this, journalists will likely
need to abandon decades of learned behaviour and see themselves as players in a larger news
ecosystem, one in which the public and different types of journalists are equally important
(Anderson, 2013, p. 5).
Changing Practices
Legacy newsrooms are built around industrial-style production practices that favour
end-of-the-day products. C. W. Anderson likens traditional news production to factory work: “A
reporter went out and reported a story, typed it up, and then sat back and watched it ascend a
labor chain of increasing specialization…until it was placed in the next day’s paper,” (Anderson,
2013, p. 130). This assembly-line model has allowed newsrooms to produce content efficiently
for decades, but it is less effective for digital-first strategies which prioritize immediate
distribution. Today’s news consumers, particularly those using mobile phones for quick
updates, prefer a constant stream of information available at their leisure. News is no longer
consumed at a set time of day, such as in the morning over breakfast, but at multiple intervals
(Sharma, 2015). For this reason, legacy newsrooms need to adopt a culture that embraces a
more fluid form of news consumption, in which end-of-day products are not the end-goal.
Increasingly, today’s journalists are not asked to produce a single version of a story, but a series
of different information “bites” in several different formats (Sharma, 2015; BBC Academy,
2015).
Aske 23
For example, a reporter may be asked to file a brief web update, perform a live radio hit,
Tweet from a press conference and return with video that can be posted in raw chunks online
and in a packaged segment on a television newscast. Independently, these information bites
are unlikely to provide the full picture or context of a story, but provide snapshots of
information as it becomes available. Alexis Lloyd, the creative director at the Times' Research
and Development Lab, has suggested abandoning the news article in its traditional, structured
form in favour of short, tagged, searchable "particles" that can be linked together and
rearranged like pieces in a puzzle (Lloyd, 2015). While this production strategy sounds as
though it might mean less work for time-strapped reporters, it confronts the ingrained habits of
legacy reporters, who are used to a longer period of information gathering that builds towards
a final product. Miniature news bites also confront the journalistic ego. In the assembly-line
model, the routine production of branded news articles is what gets rewarded (Anderson, 2013,
p. 130). Journalists acknowledge that they still judge their own work and the work of their
competitors based on end-of-day products, such as the article that appears in the printed paper
or the broadcast package that airs in the 6 o’clock news (Usher, 2014, p. 90). These are pieces
that their name and face are attached to, and these are the items that companies submit for
awards and industry recognition. There is no Pulitzer Prize for the best Tweet. If legacy
newsrooms wish to implement fully a digital-first strategy, staff at all levels need to recognize
the value of storytelling that does not look like traditional storytelling.
Unlike legacy methods, digital-first strategies demand a constant supply of content. In a
digital news environment where journalists can see what competitors are doing in real-time,
being able to quickly match it is considered a success. However industry leaders caution that
Aske 24
such practices can lead to “volume without thought” or what some have labeled the
hamsterization of journalism (Usher, 2014, p. 4; Anderson, 2013, p. 130). This refers to the
practice of constantly churning out content, sometimes to the detriment of quality (Anderson,
2013, p. 146). One possible solution would be to diversify news production strategies so
elements of the assembly line approach can continue to be used in certain circumstances. For
example, an analysis of newsroom workflow suggests legacy newsrooms gravitate towards two
models of news production: an integrated model or a de-converged model. Each has its own
strengths and weaknesses. In an integrated model, reporters gather information and produce
content for more than one platform. At the New York Times, an example would be a journalist
who writes and updates an online story and composes a second-day story that will appear in
print. Digital expectations might include Tweeting, monitoring story comments, posting to
social media, or producing video (Usher, 2014, p. 82). This is also known as the one-man-band
approach. Its greatest fault is that it can lead to an erosion of quality as one person attempts to
provide coverage across platforms. In a de-converged model, reporters are left alone to gather
information and write for a single platform, while multimedia and digital demands are handled
by others (Tameling & Broersma, 2013). In this model, journalists end up specializing in a
particular form of storytelling. It allows them to work using platform-specific language and
style, such as the conversational tone required for broadcast, or the detailed reporting found in
print (Aviles & Carvajal, 2008, p. 230). One downside of the de-converged model is it requires
significant coordination within the newsroom. The production of a single story can involve
multiple meetings between reporters, senior editors, web editors, data journalists,
videographers and computer programmers (Usher, 2014, p. 15). The reality is that most legacy
Aske 25
newsrooms function with some sort of hybrid system, adopting the de-converged model for
larger, non-deadline projects and the integrated model or one-man-band approach for day-to-
day news. This analysis suggests a hybrid system is likely particularly relevant for legacy
newsrooms attempting to focus increasingly on digital platforms, but where some staff are still
required to produce high quality products for traditional platforms. Another reason to adopt a
hybrid system is that some digital projects, such as virtual reality or interactive pieces, will
undoubtedly require collaboration between teams of specialists, and would be best suited by a
de-converged production style. The integrated model may be best for day-to-day stories in
which a single reporter has a firm grasp of the subject matter.
Even with a hybrid production model, the elimination of the daily news cycle remains a
major challenge for legacy newsrooms. Reports suggest even the New York Times, with its
innovation report and experimental lab, remains “stuck in old cultures, slaves to antiquated
daily production schedules,” (Potts, 2014). Part of the challenge is that editors may give two
different stories entirely different treatment. There is nothing routine about what is expected.
An analysis at the New York Times found, “no two journalists shared the exact same role, nor
did any single journalist encounter the same tasks each day,” (Usher, 2014, p. 84). This lack of
certainty is a direct challenge to the workflow legacy journalists are familiar with. Imagine
covering a story without knowing which platform it will be filed for? Legacy journalists are used
to making decisions about how much to gather and how many sources to consult based on time
constraints and the size of the news hole allotted to them. Digital platforms allow more
flexibility, but it means journalists must consider the needs of various platforms as they gather.
The pacing has also changed. The tempo has gone from a “lean back” approach to “now”
Aske 26
(Garcia, 2015). In many cases, gathering and reporting occur simultaneously, or with very little
in between time, unless editors decide in advance that distributing information will be delayed
so a reporter can take an in-depth approach.
The frenzied pace of digital reporting is likely why some legacy newsrooms are
attempting to establish some form of digital news cycle. For instance, newsrooms familiar with
audience habits can still identify peak periods and decide on routine, albeit more frequent
intervals for publishing. In the United Kingdom, The Times of London and the Sunday Times
have a digital strategy which includes a new website and new mobile and tablet apps. In
keeping with industrial-style processes, they plan to publish material four times a day: first
thing in the morning, 9 a.m., noon, and 5 p.m (Lichterman, 2016). The head of the corporation's
digital department said he hoped the hybrid system would better serve the audience, but
would still give staff time for accurate, in-depth reporting. "We recognize that people might
check their smartphones a hundred times per day," Alan Hunter told the Nieman Lab in an
interview, "but they're not checking for news a hundred times per day," (Lichterman, 2016). It
should be noted that establishing a digital news cycle likely depends on the habits of an
organization’s audience and the platform in question. Montreal’s La Presse, which has
eliminated its daily print paper, updates it tablet application with fresh content only once, first
thing in the morning. The publisher has decided its tablet app will serve users looking for in-
depth, interactive reporting, rather than breaking news. The company uses its website and
social media feeds to keep its audience up-to-date during the day (Moses, 2016). For both
organizations, establishing a digital news cycle helps clarify the guidelines for when reporters
Aske 27
are expected to file, and for which platforms. Legacy newsrooms may find clear guidelines are
the difference between the hamsterization of journalism discussed above, and organized chaos.
Changing Attitudes
As was noted at the beginning of this section, journalists have been adapting to new
technologies and production processes for decades. The difference with digital technologies,
and what requires such a drastic shift in culture, is that in the digital news world, news
organizations no longer have a monopoly on the distribution of information. In the old media
model, journalists and journalistic institutions served as information gatekeepers. News was
distributed through a few centralized sources in the mass media system, such as national
newspapers or a handful of established cable networks. These organizations could present
themselves as the authority on the news of the day and decide which topics made the public
agenda. Audiences had few opportunities to talk back or tell their own stories, with the
exception of letters-to-the-editor or radio call-in lines. In the digital environment, however,
individuals and organizations have their own means of publishing. Citizens, politicians,
corporations, and public relations professionals can share information and react in real-time,
blurring the distinction between professional journalist and amateur citizen (Canter, 2014, p. 2).
There are more voices with varying levels of authority. Some have suggested the role of the
journalist is shifting from gatekeeper to gate watcher. This is the idea that the task of the
modern journalist is to sort through the glut of information available online to determine what
is true, but also, what is most relevant to a public audience (Kaul, 2013, p. 138; Canter, 2014, p.
2). While verification and information mining are valuable skills, the journalist-as-gate watcher
Aske 28
approach does not dispel the “we-know-best” mindset that may prove detrimental to legacy
media organizations.
Innovators suggest the current culture of journalism breeds disdain for the very people
journalists are trying to serve (Brandel, 2016). Even as newsrooms experiment with new
platforms and new forms of storytelling, they continue to “toss content down” from their
“mountaintop” with the hope audiences will like, share, and ideally pay for what they receive
(Brandel, 2016). In a plea to fellow reporters, journalist-turned-CEO Jennifer Brandel suggests
news organizations must change this top-down relationship with the audience if the industry is
to survive. She is not alone in this view. In a talk on the death of the mass media business
model, journalist and industry critic Jeff Jarvis argued a change in mindset is equally important
as any change in delivery methods. "We hang on to the idea that we owned the gateway to
information. We owned the advertiser and lastly we owned the distribution,” Jarvis said at the
2015 Newsgeist conference run by Google and the Knight Foundation. “We don't own that
anymore,” he argued, “but yet we still hold on to an entitlement," (Jarvis, 2015). Jarvis argues
that if the industry wishes to remain relevant, newsrooms need to understand that digital
audiences will not come to them, but must be actively sought out. He argues the future of
journalism involves knowing where people live, what they want and what they need, and then
going to there to deliver it (Jarvis, 2015). Jarvis’ analogy applies to both the physical
communities journalists live and work in, and the digital spaces they share with fellow citizens
and reporters.
So how does one transform theory into actual change? To begin, Brandel recommends
debunking an idea circulating in most newsrooms that audiences only want click bait and cat
Aske 29
videos. To serve the public, Brandel argues journalists will need to see audiences as they see
themselves: as curious and engaged citizens with the same questions and concerns (Brandel,
2015). This first step may merely require a refresher in Journalism 101, but cementing a shift in
culture will require newsrooms to embrace interaction and engagement in ways that are
unfamiliar to legacy media outlets. Digital audiences are not satisfied to merely follow along,
but seek out opportunities to participate in the discussion. When given the opportunity, they
will produce content of their own, and will react and share with those who react and share with
them. News organizations must see themselves as enablers of this discussion. As one developer
at the Guardian put it, there "was a realization that we needed to be part of the Internet and
not just on the Internet,” (Aitamurto & Lewis, 2015, p. 323). Another helpful analogy compares
the challenges of reforming legacy journalism, to police reform. Digital spaces require, “moving
from a culture of cops as warriors to cops as members of the communities they’re supposed to
protect and serve,” (Brandel, 2016). In other words, it is not enough for journalists to shift from
gatekeepers to gate watchers. Journalists must go one step further and become gate openers
(Mitchelstein & Boczkowski, 2009, p. 571). In this role, they will continue to gather and
interpret and distribute information, but they will also link, connect, respond and react to
information in conjunction with digital users. To survive in a digital environment, newsrooms
need to change their routines and their mindset, opening information and themselves to the
public. Simply put, they are no longer king of the mountain.
CHALLENGE 3: Organization: Too many goats to feed
A third challenge created by digital-first strategies relates to newsroom organization, as
staff are pulled in multiple directions with reduced resources and unclear goals about which
Aske 30
platforms are actually a priority. As any journalist will tell you, time and resources are in short
supply (Usher, 2014). Continued cuts at legacy media organizations mean that fewer reporters
are being asked to file for more platforms at more frequent intervals (CBC News, 2015;
Canadian Press, 2015). Convergence has reached a point where it is not uncommon for a
reporter to research, pitch, gather, shoot, write and edit multiple versions of a story for print,
radio, television, web, and social media platforms in a single day (Usher, 2014, p. 82). Unlike
staff at digital native companies like BuzzFeed, Vice and Quartz, journalists in legacy newsrooms
are expected to meet digital demands while still producing a final product that will “stand up at
the end of the day,” (Usher, 2014, p. 63).
This means priorities are split. News organizations must try to serve two masters: the
“now” demands of digital users and the traditional needs of their legacy platforms. As the
previous sections indicate, content in one format is not interchangeable across platforms
(Thordar, 2015). A two-minute television package may work in a supper-hour newscast, but will
not keep the attention of a user scrolling social media. But with no time or additional staff to
re-format a story for a specific type of distribution, newsrooms are often forced to share one
version across platforms. An analysis from the Duke Reporters Lab found that, for many
newsrooms, adopting a digital-first strategy quickly becomes posting newspaper copy online
and uploading video and audio packages with ‘webified’ broadcast scripts. There is no energy
left for “unique digital features that can drive as much, or even more, traffic with deeper
engagement and longer shelf-lives,” (Stencil et al., 2014). In short, quality suffers, and the
chances of capturing and keeping an audience lessen. This splintering of priorities is what some
industry experts have christened “the legacy problem,” (Albeanu, 2015a). It is the reason an
Aske 31
increasing number of news outlets have announced plans to "start-over," to "reinvent" and
"reimagine" their entire news production process (Hare, 2016).
“We can’t keep doing all this shit,” one Times reporter said, “...blogging, videos and
writing for the paper. We can’t be great at everything,” (Usher, 2014, p. 4). Still struggling from
the latest round of buyouts, the Los Angeles Times has announced plans to reorganize staff to
focus on digital needs first, abandoning the old model which focused on filling each section of
the printed paper, then using the resulting material to feed the web. An editor explained,
“Freeing desks from having to think about and spend time producing the print paper will enable
editors and reporters to devote more energy to what makes the Los Angeles Times great –
timely, compelling and engaging content of all types,” (Roderick, 2016). Across the Atlantic in
Finland, the editor of the daily paper the Helsingin Sanomat had the most succinct summary of
the legacy problem: "We would be better at digital if we didn't have to produce the paper,"
(Albeanu, 2015a). The saying in journalism is that the goat must be fed (Stencil et al., 2014), but
the digital news world has multiplied the number of goats. Newsrooms are not responsible for
feeding just one goat, but an entire herd.
This begs the question, at what point does a legacy media outlet cut off a limb?
Eliminating legacy efforts altogether has been described as the "nuclear" option (Potts, 2014).
Eventually, however, newsrooms may be forced to amputate to survive. At the moment, many
legacy newsrooms find the bulk of their revenue still comes from advertising in traditional
platforms, such as printed papers and television broadcasts, but that is changing as audiences
and advertising revenue shrink (Pew Research Centre, 2014, p. 3). The Pew Research Centre’s
2015 report on the state of the news media suggests legacy organizations still make very little
Aske 32
from digital advertising (Barthel, 2015). One analysis suggests an advertisement that would
have made a dollar in print only generates 10 or 15 cents online (Miller & Reynolds, 2014, p.
73). This is forcing companies to diversify their revenue options. It is now common for news
organizations to combine advertising revenue with subscriptions, grants, paid events and
sponsored content (Miller & Reynolds, 2014, p. 98). If traditional advertising revenue continues
to decline, the time may come when legacy newsrooms are better off abandoning legacy
efforts.
Some organizations, such as Montreal’s La Presse, have already gone this route. In
January, La Presse stopped printing its weekday editions to focus on its tablet application La
Presse+. Publisher Guy Crevier has said eliminating distribution and printing costs allowed the
company to keep resources that help produce rich, investigative journalism. Crevier has also
warned other legacy organizations to change their own models now if they want to get ahead
of any looming crisis (Albeanu, 2016). Torn between a loyal, if diminished legacy audience and
digital promise, some news organizations have opted for partial amputation. Dailies such as
those owned by Advance Publications in the United States have cut print distribution to just
three days a week to save money (Miller & Reynolds, 2015). The Boston Globe is beginning an
analysis of its operations to see if a similar strategy might be beneficial (Bilton, 2016).
The reality is legacy newsrooms cannot compete with digital natives if they continue to
stretch already reduced resources across multiple platforms. Therefore, it is likely organizations
that wish to implement digital-first strategies successfully will need to decide what they are
good at, or at least what they want to concentrate on, and focus their efforts on producing high
quality content for that area. As Jeff Jarvis explained, “We always go for volume over value.
Aske 33
More content, more audience, more advertising availabilities. Surely we’ll make it up on volume
and it will all come out okay in the end. That model is not going to work anymore,” (Jarvis,
2015). In other words, in a world where anyone can produce content, media organizations will
need to stand out if they want to build and maintain a loyal digital audience. Newspapers in
particular are based on a model that aims to produce a variety show of information. Papers
often offer a mix of news, current affairs, sports, lifestyle and entertainment news, while also
reporting on areas such as real estate and the automotive and technology industries. But as
digital users have the ability to actively seek out the best information available when they are
interested in a topic, newsrooms have less to gain by trying to cover the waterfront. Traditional
television and radio broadcasts face similar dilemmas. It is now plausible to assume that
audiences tuning in may have already heard the news of the day through digital platforms. This
is grounds for legacy news organizations to think carefully about how they are presenting
information on traditional platforms. Newsrooms will likely need to decide based on their
audience whether old methods continue to serve viewers and listeners who may be pre-
informed. In an environment of information abundance, media analysts are calling on legacy
companies to ask themselves what they are good at. The trick to capturing a transient, fickle
audience will likely be to “do what you do best and link to the rest” (Anderson, 2013, p. 126).
This applies not only to the production of content, but also to the selection of platforms.
A digital-first strategy cannot include all digital platforms, particularly because new publishing
methods emerge each day. The secret may be to test new distribution methods, but only fish in
the areas where users are biting back (Southern, 2016a). For example, the Washington Post
experienced an increase in traffic after it began posting content through Facebook's Instant
Aske 34
Articles. Metrics suggested users were reading longer and were sharing more of what they
read. The positive feedback means the company now uses Instant Articles for all of its Facebook
posts (Southern, 2016a). The Guardian, however, began using Instant Articles at the same time
and saw little change in audience engagement. As a result, the Guardian is now looking at other
revenue streams and does not limit its Facebook posts to Instant Articles. This highlights how
an all-platform approach is not necessarily beneficial. Rather than all-platforms, industry
leaders encourage media organizations to focus on “all the platforms that matter to them,”
(Southern, 2016a).
In conclusion, legacy media outlets are trying to serve two masters. Part of their
audience is online, but it is not yet entirely online. Some are still served by traditional
platforms, even if those platforms are no longer producing the revenue necessary to sustain
them. Media outlets that are not ready to stop the presses or pull the plug on television and
radio newscasts will need to manage a very careful balancing act between traditional platforms
and digital distribution methods. As newsrooms adopt digital-first strategies which require
constant, multi-platform production, organization and some division of labour may be the
difference between an effective strategy and one that produces news mayhem.
Aske 35
PART 2:
CANADIAN LEGACY MEDIA & DIGITAL STRATEGIES
Part two of the paper looks at how two of Canada’s legacy media outlets are addressing
the challenges outlined in the literature review. While The Toronto Star and the CBC are two
very different media outlets, both are legacy organizations that continue to operate on
traditional and digital platforms. Both organizations are also taking measures to increase and
prioritize their digital presence. The literature review suggests legacy media outlets are at a
precarious juncture. This is not to predict, as many have done before, the end of television,
radio or newspapers. The goal here is merely to highlight what appears to be a critical moment
of decision making. If audiences are moving and their preferences are changing, at what point
do the scales tip so it is no longer advisable or feasible for legacy media outlets to do all things?
Think of each new platform or device legacy organizations are filing for as a new topping that
has been added to a classic pepperoni pizza. What started as winning recipe is now
overpowered by layers of new sauces, cheeses and whatever vegetable is in season. Arguably,
there comes a point when news organizations will sell more product if they decide to just offer
a meat-lovers pizza or a Hawaiian pizza. If the majority of news consumers have moved online,
away from classic pepperoni, is it time to bake a new pie?
THE TORONTO STAR
The Toronto Star has certainly asked the question. As Canada’s largest daily newspaper,
it was chosen for analysis based on its recent digital initiatives and its continued commitment
to publish a print edition seven days a week (The Toronto Star, 2016b). The “catalyst for
change” in the company’s strategy came in September 2015 when it launched the Star Touch
Aske 36
app designed for a tablet audience (Holland, 2016). The goal was to create a product that would
help offset a continued decline in print advertising, while attracting a wider, younger audience
(Sharp, 2016; Bradshaw, 2015). It would achieve this through what was described as a dramatic
change in storytelling methods: “With Star Touch, readers will be able to expand photo galleries
and video to full-screen, tap into live news and weather, interact with statistical information,
adjust type size and background, explore relevant links to the web and engage with
advertisements," (Cruickshank, 2015). The app’s design is based on the model the French-
language newspaper La Presse rolled out two years earlier (Cruickshank, 2015). Unlike their
colleagues at La Presse, however, the Toronto Star did not develop the app with the intention
of phasing out its print paper.
Chris Goodridge, who has been with the company since 2004 and is now the chief
operating officer of digital, said the scales have yet to tip at the Star. “When we step back and
look at the next horizons, whether it’s five years, seven years, ten years, print is still a part of
our mix,” he said in a May phone interview (C. Goodridge, personal communication, May 12,
2016). The economic incentive for producing a printed paper is still there. After the first quarter
of 2016, media reports suggested print advertising continues to make up 45 per cent of the
company’s overall revenue, even as it steadily declines (Bradshaw, 2016). Goodridge also cited
brand loyalty as a key reason for keeping the print publication. “Our print readership is in many
ways our most loyal readership,” Goodridge said, noting that while La Presse was able to
migrate a large portion of print subscribers to its tablet application, a significant number of
people who interact with the Star continue to choose the paper as their preferred method.
Goodridge said the Star’s print subscriber base remains relatively stable at around 350,000. In
Aske 37
comparison, La Presse had roughly 160,000 print subscribers when it cancelled its weekday
papers to focus on its tablet app (Marowits, 2015). Goodridge added that the revenue from the
Star’s print subscribers, which he said is now roughly equivalent to the revenue from print
advertising, is significant enough that the company plans to continue the print edition as long
as it is economically viable. “We’ll manage the operation and we’ll continue to line up costs and
expenses against the revenues that print is generating, but we don’t have a stated goal of
exiting print,” Goodridge said.
It is also why the Star is pursuing a multi-platform strategy, rather than the digital-first
or tablet-first approach former publisher John Cruickshank described when the Star Touch app
first launched (Bradshaw, 2015). In addition to its daily tablet and print editions, the Star shares
content on social media through Facebook and Twitter. It uploads video to YouTube and posts
to the third-party content sharing apps Instagram and Snapchat. In May, it launched an updated
version of thestar.com, designed specifically for mobile users (Cooke, 2016). In other words, the
current recipe includes five discernible platforms: print, tablet, mobile, desktop, and social
media. Third-party apps could even fall into a sixth category if one accounts for the need to
create original posts. And even this is not the complete recipe. Goodridge noted that the pace
of change in the industry requires constant experimentation with new delivery methods, such
as third-party publishing platforms like Facebook’s Instant Articles, Google AMP and Apple
News. “We need to be there to some degree so that we understand the opportunity and the
threat,” Goodridge said.
Goodridge acknowledged the consequences of all-platform publishing, pointing to the
success La Presse has had by focusing on digital. The LaPresse+ app gets around 250,000 unique
Aske 38
device views every day, and it brings in more than three quarters of the organization's total
advertising revenue. About 100,000 of those new devices have come since La Presse
announced plans to cancel its weekday print edition (Albeanu, 2016). The Star Touch app has
not experienced the same degree of rapid growth. After nine months in operation, Goodridge
said the app gets about 26,000 unique device views a day. The company had hoped that
number would reach 180,000 by the end of 2016, but a spokesperson recently lowered that
goal to 100,000 daily unique device views (Hazard Owen, 2016). “I think we would all like to be,
at some point, at that point where there’s a little more certainty in our model and a digital
strategy would give you that feeling that there was more predictability potentially in your
future,” Goodridge said in reference to La Presse’s strategy, but maintained that an all-digital
approach is not yet in the cards.
When asked about what consequences a multi-platform approach has on workload,
Goodridge noted that the Star added journalists and production staff who could focus solely on
the tablet app when it added the additional platform. The Star’s own coverage of the app’s
launch reported that more than 70 people were hired to produce the daily tablet edition,
including reporters, editors, designers and multimedia experts (Cruickshank, 2016). Although in
January, the company laid off 13 newsroom staff, including 10 from its tablet team and three
from digital, according to an internal memo from the editor (Watson, 2016). Goodridge could
not provide exact numbers, but suggested the majority of journalists file material for all of the
Star’s platforms. Small pools of staff - he described each group as a small handful of people -
focus exclusively on the tablet, the printed paper, or the remaining digital platforms. “A
Aske 39
journalist’s life has changed a little bit, but probably not a ton because we have added a lot of
design resources to help them package a story,” he said.
It is worth noting that Goodridge can only speak to the issue of workload from a
managerial position. Reporters and production staff may in fact feel added pressure from
having to produce digital content in addition to written articles. The app alone promises
subscribers “videos, photographs and interactive graphics… photo galleries, maps, audio clips,
fact boxes and more,” (Cruickshank, 2016). If the majority of staff are producing all of these
formats, as Goodridge suggested, interviews with journalists would need to be conducted to
determine whether or not a multi-platform workload is sustainable.
While the Toronto Star may not be ready to cut a platform, the decision to produce a
daily print edition and a daily tablet edition does suggest the company is making decisions
about the audience it is trying to attract. “We really like the tablet as a storytelling media,
particularly as a curated package that we can produce for readers every day,” Goodridge
explained. “It’s really geared towards news lovers. The percentage of our population that will
dedicate a certain amount of time in their day to news and information.” This suggests that
while the Star is following a multi-platform approach, management is pursuing platforms that
mirror legacy habits, both in terms of production and audience consumption. The description
Goodridge gave of a subscriber to the Star Touch is very different from an on-the-go mobile
user who checks for updates or snippets of information throughout the day. The tablet edition
is delivered once a day, at 5:30 a.m. The average Star Touch user spends an average of 25
minutes a day on the app, Goodridge said. If the Star is able to tap into and maintain a digital
audience that follows similar habits to those it is used to, it may be able to focus its strategy
Aske 40
without a significant disruption to traditional production processes. As the literature review
suggested, surviving in the future may depend less on who a news organization chooses as an
audience, as long as they define and focus their efforts. If the Star is not willing to give up on
tradition, or their traditional audience, a plausible strategy might be to serve those readers and
digital users with similar habits, rather than chase after new ones.
“We’ve always had a willingness to invest in the future, Star Touch is a great example…
but we always try and think about the longer term and it’s so different with our traditional
brand,” Goodridge said. “We’re the Star. A lot of the people who work at the organization,
certainly at the senior level, one of the main reasons they’re there is because they want to see
that brand survive and thrive long into the future.”
THE CBC
An analysis of the Toronto Star suggests it has yet to settle on a single type of pizza.
Instead, it appears to have divided the pie in two. One half is for people who favour the
traditional printed paper, and the other half serves those who prefer digital access. At the CBC,
however, chefs appear to be splitting the pie into even smaller sections. CBC released a new
strategic plan in the summer of 2014 titled Strategy 2020: A Space for Us All. The five-year
strategy commits to prioritizing digital and mobile distribution methods, with the end goal of
doubling the public broadcaster's digital reach by 2020. "At the heart of the plan is flipping
content priorities from a traditional approach to mobile-first," the document reads, with an
adjacent chart demonstrating how the broadcaster’s legacy platforms of television and radio
will move from the top two priorities, to third and fourth place after mobile and online
distribution (CBC, 2014, p. 14). At the time the plan was created, research suggested television
Aske 41
remained the primary source of news for Canadians at 46 per cent, with internet second at 30
per cent (CBC, 2014, p. 5). Those numbers have already shifted. Andrew Cochran, the head of
strategy for CBC News and the person tasked with overseeing the implementation of Strategy
2020, confirmed in a May phone interview that more than 50 per cent of CBC users now access
content using digital methods (A. Cochran, personal communication, May 13, 2016). The CBC’s
mobile audience in particular has experienced dramatic growth over the last two years, he said.
Cochran did not provide exact figures, but said mobile traffic to CBC local news pages has more
than doubled since the strategy's implementation. But when asked if there is a point when CBC
might be better poised to serve Canadians and survive in the digital environment by giving up
one or both of its legacy platforms, Cochran’s response was resolute.
“No, I don’t think that,” he said. “We’re seeing the audience growth (digitally) but at the
same time, we have audience success in our radio programs, particularly the morning radio
programs right across the country. And we know people still look to and rely on television as an
important source of local news.” CBC radio leads the market in 13 of the 23 markets where
ratings are taken, he said. Cochran's numbers were less specific for television, but he said
audience levels “remain stable in most markets,” despite new start times and show durations
that came into effect in the fall of 2015. Cochran acknowledged the challenge of needing to
grow where the audience is growing. While the strategy suggests moving from "broad to
focused" choices about services and content (CBC, 2014, p. 9) it also calls for the broadcaster to
provide Canadians with “more engagement, more information, more often, on more screens,"
(CBC, 2014, p. 4). A list of CBC’s legacy news offerings include local, national and 24-hour
television programs, as well as radio newscasts, documentaries and current affairs programs.
Aske 42
Digital offerings include a news website, mobile site, a mobile and tablet application, digitally
accessible podcasts, news digest emails and a YouTube channel. The national and regional
centres also manage their own mix of social media accounts, including Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram. While digital platforms did not appear overnight, the fact remains that CBC is filing
content in more formats and in more places than ever before. To add to the challenge, within a
year of releasing Strategy 2020, CBC announced plans to cut 244 jobs to save money while
adding 80 new positions in digital news (Houpt, 2015). Rather than eliminate a platform to free
resources, Cochran described a solution based on changing workflow and the culture
surrounding news production. He recognized that to produce for all platforms, the format of
traditional content will likely need to change.
“Trying to do all the things the way we’ve always done them is probably difficult to
sustain,” he said, when asked whether resources could feasibly stretch to so many places. "If
we are trying to do a television report for the 6 p.m. show in the same way it's been done for
the last 40 or so years, and at the same time do a different piece for distribution on mobile, and
a different version for something that’s going to go on Facebook or Twitter or wherever, that
becomes pretty impossible pretty quickly." What was less clear in Cochran’s response, is what a
sustainable form of radio and television news looks like if the broadcaster is prioritizing digital
storytelling. Cochran was adamant that there is a future for local television news, but
questioned whether a television newscast will continue to be a collection of two-minute
packages. He acknowledged the CBC is still searching for different ways to tell stories on legacy
platforms to help make the system sustainable. The current approach involves crafting stories
using what Cochran called “building blocks” that can be easily adapted to work on different
Aske 43
platforms and devices. He listed these building blocks as solid journalism, compelling visuals
and compelling audio. “With those three building blocks, almost like atoms, we can make a
compelling story for any platform,” Cochran said, explaining that once gathered, individual
elements can be lengthened or shortened, or augmented with video, audio or photographs
depending on the platform. The flaw in this strategy may be that the routine production of the
solid journalism Cochran described may depend on time and resources staff no longer have.
The shift to digital means they must now gather the fundamental elements and also work to
shorten, lengthen, tweak and reformat the same material for other platforms. The formula in
itself puts additional strain on journalists who are used to focusing on just two elements, such
as solid journalism and visual storytelling, or solid journalism and compelling audio. Cochran
was not ignorant of the demands created by having all staff consider the needs of all platforms.
“That in itself is a significant and challenging transition to make and we’re in the midst of that
now,” he said.
The heartening aspect of the strategy, in Cochran’s opinion, was that individual shows
have begun to embrace the potential benefits of the changes. Regional centres have begun to
shift from what he called a program culture to a story culture. In a program culture, staff
allocated resources to fill the needs of a particular program, such as a television newscast or a
current affairs radio show. As a story culture takes hold, Cochran said the focus has become
how to treat an individual story, and then asking which platforms or devices that treatment
might work for. He added that a story culture makes programs and platforms dependent on
each other, as opposed to the isolated silos associated with legacy news production. To
describe the emerging system, Cochran used the metaphor of a news river:
Aske 44
“If you think of the news we are now gathering and getting ready to publish on mobile
and desktop through the day, all day long, think of that as a river that runs through the
day. And then on the river banks are all the different programs... And each of those
programs can, and we expect will, increasingly, be taking material from the river, adding
the content that they develop for their own particular shows… And then all of the
combined output goes back to the river after it goes on air and continues on.”
Cochran recently held meetings to discuss the strategy with employees from different
departments, and said staff have commented that they are seeing the benefits of working more
closely with their colleagues in other programs and other platforms. “They see that they will be
more successful if they can help digital and radio be successful,” he said, as evidence of the
news river in action.
Cochran, like Goodridge, can only speak to the strategy’s implementation from a
managerial perspective. Interviews with journalists would need to be conducted to determine
whether the shift from a program culture to a story culture Cochran described has been
achieved, and to determine whether staff feel this shift in workflow makes a digitally focused
four-platform strategy manageable. A Space for Us All is a five-year plan, but when asked where
the broadcaster stands in terms of its implementation, Cochran paused. He did not speculate
on where the bulk of newsroom resources are currently directed, but replied only that “more
and more” journalists are no longer considered just radio reporters or television reporters. “We
increasingly think about everybody over time being that much more fluent in the craft skills in
all of the platforms,” he said. This suggests there may still be a few dams interrupting the flow
of Cochran’s news river.
Aske 45
When asked what one of the biggest challenges is of operating in the digital news world,
both Cochran and Goodridge cited the pace of change. Both identified constant
experimentation as essential to surviving and competing in a digital environment. “Things like
text-on-video,” Cochran said as an example. “Five or six months ago, text-on-video didn’t exist…
Everybody is coming up with the next new thing, so it’s how do we constantly adapt to those
forms of storytelling.” This suggests that as CBC shifts its culture and workflow away from
legacy habits, part of the solution may be to not form new habits at all, but to remain in a
continuous stage of reinvention. Indeed, while Cochrane said he sees no end to legacy media
platforms at the CBC, he did extend the need to adapt to television and radio. “We need to be
constantly re-evaluating, reinventing how we provide these services to audiences,” Cochran
said. “(TV and radio) are not going to go away. Is it a time of opportunity to be thinking about
new ways of doing things? It absolutely is.”
Aske 46
CONCLUSION
This paper set out to make a series of recommendations for legacy newsrooms to
consider when implementing digital-first strategies. While an analysis of two media outlets,
especially two varyingly different organizations, cannot offer concrete evidence, the findings
can be used to better understand the current moment legacy news organizations find
themselves in. Neither of the featured organizations felt their audience had shifted enough to
abandon a legacy platform. Based on the research discussed in the literature review and the
cited interviews, here are three recommendations legacy newsrooms can consider if their
digital strategy also features traditional methods of news delivery.
STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS
Focus your efforts.
There is undoubtedly wisdom, especially given the financial uncertainty in the industry,
in not becoming dependant on one platform. However, by trying to be everything to everyone,
legacy newsrooms sour their own recipe. This is the “too many toppings on the pizza”
argument. It is a cheesy analogy, but an effective one for legacy organizations attempting to
produce traditional and digital content, as a pizza can have more than one topping. What it
cannot have, at least if wants to maintain its appeal, is every topping. Consumers can shop
around for where they get their news. Doing a few things well or standing out for offering the
best source of something is recommended over trying to find a way to do everything. This is
likely the biggest flaw with CBC’s attempt to try to make content work for all platforms. As the
literature review demonstrated, the most effective content is tailored and customized for the
audience and platform it is intended for (Thordar, 2015; BBC Academy, 2015). Legacy
Aske 47
newsrooms should experiment, but they must also be decisive, despite the risk. When La Presse
stopped its weekday print edition, it decided it would no longer serve the 160,000 subscribers
who were still getting the paper delivered each day. The ability to focus on fewer products, to
direct virtually all of its resources at providing the highest quality tablet experience, must be
seen as at least partially responsible for the success of the La Presse+ app. Even eliminating
some legacy products, such as a certain sections of a printed paper, publication on certain days
of the week, or a television or radio program that consumes resources yet reaches few, might
provide employees with the time and energy needed to enhance the content they create.
Adopt new production methods.
If a legacy media outlet is not willing to abandon a platform, it will at the very least have
to operate differently to keep workloads manageable. At the Toronto Star, this involved hiring
additional staff, including those specialized in multimedia and visual presentation, who could
take care of needs specific to the tablet edition. It is not possible for this project to determine if
the added resources were enough to offset the demands of a new platform, but the effort
ensures at least some degree of support for Star journalists who must meet traditional and
digital demands. At the CBC, management is attempting to switch from legacy production
practices based on a creating a final product to a continuous cycle of content generation. Again,
this will not eliminate the challenge of having to produce more content, but it may lessen the
burden on previously isolated programs if they can now draw from a shared pool of resources.
Be prepared for legacy media not to look like legacy media.
This is the result of resources being stretched over a continuously increasing number of
platforms. For an organization to be in all places, digitally packaged content will undoubtedly
Aske 48
appear on and influence legacy platforms. Cochran spoke of television newscasts that may
feature fewer two-minute packages. Goodridge suggested the Star's print edition has become
more visual since the adoption of the tablet app, as some maps and graphics also work as still
images in print. Legacy audiences may embrace or reject these alterations depending on the
type of news they want to consume. The nature of the changes may also attract new viewers,
listeners or readers. Regardless of the outcome, it is unrealistic to expect traditional products to
remain unchanged while drawing from the same resources to create digital content.
This project revealed similar challenges faced by legacy organizations, such as their
ability to follow a shifting audience and to keep up with the speed of change. Pew's 2015 State
of the Media report noted that new platforms and new players continue to emerge at a rapid
pace. The report summarized that "with each new pathway or platform, the old ones continue
to be used, posing a nearly unattainable challenge to an industry in financial difficulty,"
(Mitchell, 2015, p. 8). It is possible legacy platforms will be around for years, even decades. Yet
with so many options available, legacy news organizations will have to make difficult decisions
about who their future audience will be and what they are realistically able to provide. As Jeff
Jarvis suggested, a strategy that pursues volume over value may not be the best option,
depending on an organization’s end goal (Jarvis, 2015). Is that goal to make the most money?
To produce the highest quality product? To reach a specific group of people? To reach the most
people? This paper maintains that legacy news organizations need to come up with a definitive
answer about who they will serve and how, if they wish to survive in the digital news industry.
Organizations that continue to operate with one foot in each camp will likely continue to
grapple with the technological, cultural and organizational challenges this paper discuses.
Aske 49
News consumers can go anywhere to order pizza. Why should they order yours?
Aske 50
REFERENCES
Research Interviews
Cochran, A. (2016, May 13). Telephone interview.
Goodridge, C. (2016, May 12). Telephone interview.
Works Cited
Albeanu, C. (2015a). A legacy problem: The Helsingin Sanomat approach to digital news.
Journalism.co.uk. Retrieved from https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/a-legacy-
problem-the-helsingin-sanomat-approach-to-digital-news-
/s2/a578883/?utm_source=Daily%20Lab%20email%20list&utm_campaign=a552ef2205-
dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-a552ef2205-
395947745
Albeanu, C. (2015b). 5 formats BBC uses in the hunt for new audiences.’ Journalism.co.uk.
Retrieved from https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/5-ways- bbc-experiments- in-the -
hunt-for- new-audiences-/s2/a565131/?utm_source=Daily%20Lab%20email%20
list&utm_campaign=d34c9f5495-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&
amp;utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-d34c9f5495-395947745
Albeanu, C. (2016). For La Presse, the tablet is the future as it leaves print behind.
Journalism.co.uk. Retrieved from https://www.journalism.co.uk/news/for-la-presse-the-
tablet-is-the-future-as-it-leaves-print-behind/s2/a616429/?utm_source=Daily%20Lab%
20email%20list&utm_campaign=4e9ee1b162-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email
&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-4e9ee1b162-395947745
Anderson, C. (2013). Rebuilding the News: Metropolitan Journalism in the Digital Age. Temple
Aske 51
University Press.
Avilés, J. G., & Carvajal, M. (2008). Integrated and Cross-Media Newsroom Convergence: Two
Models of Multimedia News Production - The Cases of Novotécnica and La Verdad
Multimedia in Spain. Convergence: The Journal of Research into New Media
Technologies, 14(2), 221-239.
Barthel, M. (2015, April 29). 5 Key takeaways from State of the News Media 2015. Pew
Research Centre. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/29/5-
key-takeaways-from-state-of-the-news-media-2015/
Barthel, M., Shearer, E., Gottfried, J. & A. Mitchell. (2015, July 14). The Evolving Role of News
on Twitter and Facebook. Pew Research Centre. Retrieved from
http://www.journalism.org/2015/07/14/the-evolving-role-of-news-on-twitter-and-
facebook/
BBC Academy. (2015). Video on mobile: How to file great digital content. The BBC Academy
College of Journalism. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/journalism/
skills/digital-journalism/article/art20150422133004202
Benton, J. (2014, May 15). The leaked New York Times innovation report is one of the key
documents of this media age. The Nieman Lab. Retrieved from
http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/05/the-leaked- new-york- times-innovation- report-is-
one-of-the- key-documents- of-this- media-age/
Bilton, R. (2016, April 7). The Boston Globe, facing "irreversible revenue declines," is launching a
Aske 52
"reinvention initiative. The Nieman Lab. Retrieved from http://www.niemanlab.org/
2016/04/the-boston-globe-facing-irreversible-revenue-declines-is-launching-a-
reinvention-initiative/
Bradshaw, J. (2016, May 4). Digital transition hurting Torstar as expenses rise, ad revenue falls.
The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/torstar-loss-climbs-as-revenue-falls-expenses-rise/article29851463/
Bradshaw, J. (2015, September 15). Toronto Star aims for younger audience with new tablet
app. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/toronto-star-aims-for-younger-audience-with-new-tablet-
app/article26361488/
Brandel, J. (2016, April 19). A serious problem the news industry does not talk about. Medium
Corporation. Retrieved from https://medium.com/we-are-hearken/a-serious-problem-
the-news-industry-does-not-talk-about-346caaa6d1cd#.hhq2br7uq
Briggs, M. (2013, March 15). What makes journalism ‘innovative’? Lessons from this year’s
Scripps Howard Awards. The Poynter Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.poynter.org/news/media-innovation/207335/what- makes-journalism-
innovative-lessons-from-this- years-scripps-howards-awards/
Canadian Press. (2015, September 24). La Press Layoffs Hit 158 Workers as Paper Shutters
Weekday Print Edition. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015 /09/24/la-
presse- laying-off- 158-workers- as-it- ends-weekday-printed-
edition_n_8190016.html?ncid=fcbklnkcahpmg00000001
Canter, L. (2014). From traditional gatekeeper to professional verifier: how local newspaper
Aske 53
journalists are adapting to change. Journalism Education: The Journal of the Association
of Journalism Education, 3(1), 102-119.
CBC. (2014). Strategy 2020: A Space for Us All. CBC/Radio-Canada. Retrieved from
http://www.cbc.radio-canada.ca/_files/cbcrc/documents/explore/transforming/a-
space-for-us-all-summary-v12-en.pdf
CBC News (2015, November 18). Bell Media cuts claim high-profile people at TSN, CTV.
Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/bell-media- layoffs-1.3324301
Cooke, M. (2016, May 3). Toronto Star website redesigned for growing mobile audience. The
Toronto Star. Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2016/05/03/toronto-
star-website-redesigned-for-growing-mobile-audience.html
Cruickshank, J. (2015, September 15). Toronto Star makes news with innovative Star Touch
tablet app. The Toronto Star. Retrieved from https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015
/09/15/toronto-star-makes-news-with-innovative-star-touch-tablet-app.html
Dennis, D. (2016, January 21). Where Virtual Reality Takes Us. American Bison. The Opinion
Pages. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/
opinion/sundance-new-frontiers-virtual-reality.html
Ditchburn, J. (2016, Feb. 17). Panel of MPs to examine issue of local news crisis, media
concentration. The Canadian Press. Retrieved from: http://www.j-
source.ca/article/panel-mps-examine-issue-local-news-crisis-media-concentration
Doyle, P., Gelman, M. & S. Gill (2016, March). Viewing the Future? Virtual Reality in Journalism.
The Knight Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.knightfoundation.org/media/
uploads/publication_pdfs/VR_report_web.pdf
Aske 54
Franklin, B. (2013). Editorial. Digital Journalism, 1(1), p. 1-5.
Frehner, M. (2014, October 14). Meet the Globe's mobile and interactive news team. The Globe
and Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/community/digital-
lab/meet-the-globes-mobile-interactive-news-team/article21095449/
Garcia, M. (2015, May 12). A multi-platform initiative for McClatchy. Garcia Media. Retrieved
from http://garciamedia.com/blog/mcclatchy_multi_platform?utm_source=Daily+Lab
+email+list&utm_campaign=c1dbc1b46d-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm
_term=0_d68264fd5e-c1dbc1b46d-395947745
The Globe and Mail. (2015, November 19). The Globe wins the most Canadian Online Publishing
Awards. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/awards/the-globe-receives-
most-wins-overall-at-canadian-online-publishing-awards/article27384720/
Hare, K. (2009). At the Dallas Morning News, becoming truly digital means starting over.
Poynter. Retrieved from http://www.poynter.org/2016/at-the-dallas-morning-news-
becoming-truly-digital-means-starting-over/400041/?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+
list&utm _campaign=52e1f84486-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term
=0_d68264fd5e-52e1f84486-395947745
Hazard Owen, L. (2016, March 16). The publisher of The Toronto Star, which is betting big on an
expensive tablet edition, is stepping down. The Nieman Lab. Retrieved from
http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/03/the-publisher-of-the-toronto-star-which-is-betting-
big-on-an-expensive-tablet-edition-is-stepping-down/
Holland, D. (2016). Message from our President. Torstar Corporation. Retrieved from
http://www.torstar.com/html/our-company/President/index.cfm
Aske 55
Houpt, S. (2015, March 26). CBC cuts 244 jobs as part of plan to eliminate 1,500 positions. The
Globe and Mail. Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/cbc-
announces/article23632735/
Ingram, M. (2015, August 18). Facebook has taken over from Google as a traffic source for
news. Fortune Magazine. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/2015/08/18/facebook-
google/
Jarvis, J. (2015, November 30). Newsgeist 2015 Ignite Talk by Jeff Jarvis. The Knight Foundation.
[Video File]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFIuBKFi9_U
Kaul, V. (2013). Journalism in the Age of Digital Technology. Online Journal of Communication
and Media Technologies, 3(1), 125-143.
LeBlanc, D. (2016, April 25). 'Everything's on the table.' The Globe and Mail. Retrieved from
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/exclusive-canadian-heritage-
announces-sweeping-canconreview/article29722581/
Lichterman, J. (2016, March 30). The U.K.’s Times and Sunday Times are structuring their new
apps and website around peak traffic times. The Nieman Lab. Retrieved from
http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/03/the-uks-times-and-sunday-times-are-structuring-
their-new-apps-and-website-around-peak-traffic-times/
Lloyd, A. (2015, October 20). The Future of News is Not an Article. The New York Times
Research & Development Lab. Retrieved from
http://nytlabs.com/blog/2015/10/20/particles/
Lloyd, A. & Boggie, M. (2015). Behind closed doors: The new social media. The Nieman Lab.
Aske 56
Retrieved from http://www.niemanlab.org/2015/12/behind-closed-doors-the-new-
social-media/
Marconi, F. (2016, January 7). Messaging apps meet Journalism. Tow Center for Digital
Journalism. Columbia Journalism School. Retrieved from
http://towcenter.org/messaging-apps-meet-journalism/
Marowits, R. (2015, September 16). La Presse to end weekday printed paper in new year. The
Canadian Press. Retrieved from http://montrealgazette.com/business/local-
business/montreal-la-presse-to-end-weekday-printed-paper-in-new-year
Miller, A. & A. Reynolds. (2014). News Evolution or Revolution? The Future of Print Journalism in
the Digital Age. Peter Lang Publishing Inc.
Mitchell, A. (2015, April 29). State of the News Media 2015. Pew Research Centre. Retrieved
from http://www.journalism.org/2015/04/29/state-of-the-news-media-2015/
Mitchelstein, Eugenia, and Pablo J. Boczkowski. (2009). “Between Tradition and Change: A
Review of Recent Research on Online News Production.” Journalism, 10(5): 562–586.
Moses, L. (2016, April 19). Who said tablets are dead? Montreal daily La Presse's betting its
future on them. Digiday. Retrieved from http://digiday.com/publishers/montreals-la-
presse-bet-tablets-paid-off/
Nettleford, W. (2014). Multimedia newsroom: BBC London. BBC Journalism Academy. Retrieved
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/journalism/skills/multimedia-journalism/article
/art20140305121733049
Newman, N. (2015). Executive Summary and Key Findings of the 2015 Digital News Report.
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Retrieved from
Aske 57
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2015/executive-summary-and-key-findings-
2015/
Nytlabs. (2016). New York Times Research & Development Lab. The New York Times. Retrieved
from http://nytlabs.com/
Pew Research Centre (2008, December 23). Internet Overtakes Newspapers as News Outlet.
The Pew Research Centre. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2008/12/23/
internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-outlet/
Pew Research Centre (2013). Digital: As Mobile Grows Rapidly, the Pressures on News Intensify.
The State of the News Media 2013. Retrieved from
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2013/digital-as-mobile-grows-rapidly-the-pressures-
on-news-intensify/
Pew Research Center. (2014). Paying for News: the Revenue Picture of American Journalism
and How it is Changing. State of the News Media 2014. Retrieved from
http://www.journalism.org/files/2014/03/Revnue-Picture-for-American-Journalism.pdf
Polgreen, E. (2014). Virtual reality is journalism's next frontier. Columbia Journalism Review.
Retrieved from http://www.cjr.org/innovations/virtual_reality_journalism.php
Potts, M. (2014, May 19). What the New York Times Innovation Report Says About the State
(and Future) of Digital News. American Journalism Review. Retrieved from
http://ajr.org/2014/05/19/new-york- times-innovation- report-digital- news/
Quinn, S. (2002). Knowledge Management in the Digital Newsroom. CRC Press.
Roderick, K. (2016, February 15). Next step into digital news age by LA Times. LA Observed.
Aske 58
Retrieved from http://www.laobserved.com/archive/2016/02/next_step_
into_digital_ne.php?mc_cid=9e1bf99a8c&utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_cam
paign=d0e97354b9-dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-
d0e97354b9-395947745
Schmitz Weiss, A. & Domingo, D. (2010). Innovation Processes in Online Newsrooms as Actor-
networks and Communities of Practice. New Media and Society, 12(7), 1156–1171.
Sharma, R. (2015). Mobile journalism strategy: Ramaa Sharma. The BBC Academy College of
Journalism. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/journalism/skills/digital-
journalism/article/art20141203154212371
Sharp, A. (2016, March 2). Toronto Star publisher ups bets on tablet app, online forums.
Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-torstar-results-
idUSKCN0W41AZ?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=4e9ee1b162-
dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-4e9ee1b162-
395947745
Southern, L. (2016a, March 24). Cosmo, The Washington Post and The Guardian on the
platforms that matter to them. Digiday. Retrieved from http://digiday.com/publishers/
cosmo-washington-post-guardian-platforms-matter/
Southern, L. (2016b, March 3). How the BBC is stepping up its use of chat app with Viber and
WhatsApp. Digiday. Retrieved from http://digiday.com/publishers/bbc-stepping-use-
chat-apps-viber-whatsapp/
Stein, J. (2015, August 6). Why Virtual Reality Is About to Change the World. Time. Retrieved
Aske 59
from http://time.com/3987022/why-virtual-reality-is-about-to-change-the-
world/?pcd=hp-magmod
Stencil, M. Adair, B. & P. Kamalakanthan. (2014). The Goat Must Be Fed. Duke Reporters' Lab.
DeWitt Wallace Center for Media & Democracy. Retrieved from
http://www.goatmustbefed.com/
Tameling, K., & Broersma, M. (2013). De-converging the newsroom: Strategies for newsroom
change and their influence on journalism practice. International Communication
Gazette, 75(1), 19-34.
Thordar, I. (2015). Digital innovation: Producing video for online and TV. The BBC Academy
College of Journalism. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/academy/journalism/
article/art20150220141927538
Toronto Star Inc. (2016). Toronto Star Touch - free every day from Toronto Star. Retrieved from
https://www.thestar.com/about/star-touch-promo.html
Toronto Star Inc. (2016b). About: History of the Toronto Star. Retrieved from
https://www.thestar.com/about/aboutus.html
Usher, N. (2014). Making News at the New York Times. University of Michigan Press.
Wang, S. (2016). Small screens, full art, can't lose: Despite their size, phones open up new
opportunities for interactives. The Nieman Lab. Retrieved from
http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/03/small-screens-full-art-despite-their-size-
smartphones-open-up-new-opportunities-for-interactives/?utm_source=
Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=43c51a45c8-dailylabemail3&utm _medium=
email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-43c51a45c8-395947745
Aske 60
Watson, H.G. (2016, January 15). Toronto Star closes printing plant, axes 13 newsroom jobs. J-
Source. Retrieved from http://www.j-source.ca/article/toronto-star-closes-printing-
plant-axes-13-newsroom-jobs
Whetstone, M. (2015, October 26). Creating informed voters through WhatsAp: A Canadian
election experiment. Medium Corporation. Retrieved from https://medium.com/
@melwhetstone/creating-informed- voters-through- whatsapp-a-
canadian-election- experiment-abd0aeab4fff#.l3nsjc4k9
White, P. (2014, December 5). Confined: The death of Eddie Snowshoe. The Globe and Mail.
Retrieved from http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/confined-the-death-
of-eddie-snowshoe/article21815548/%20/