LIM VS. PONCE DE LEONG.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975FACTS:On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke’s Point, Palawan a motor launch named M/L “San Rafael”. A year later, Timbangcaya filed a complaint alleging that Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him. Without a search warrant and in the absence of consent, fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon ordered the impound of the motor launch from Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon explained in his request that the subsequent sale of the motor launch to a third party cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. In his defense, fiscal de Leon claimed that “he was in good faith, without malice and without the slightest intention of inducing injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha” when he ordered the seizure of the motor launch. ISSUE: Is the defense of good faith enough to clear the liability of fiscal de Leon in violating a right provided under Article 32 of the Civil Code?HELD: No. The Court citing Dr. Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission stated that the very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defect the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith.

ABERCA VS. VER G.R. L-69866

April 15, 1988FACTS:This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, members of the TFM violated several rights of former: (1) Raiding several places and emplying in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; (2) that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; (3) that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts;(4) that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; (5) that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; (6) that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; (7) that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit

for acts done in the performance of official duties or function 

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 2. In case such civil actions may be brought, whether or not the military personnel, or the superiors, or both are liable for such violations.HELD:The respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for

violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at

several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.  For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

ABERCA VS. VER G.R. L-69866 April 15, 1988Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They conducted raids against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca, etc), claiming that they were communists. In doing so, Ver, et al, used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al, took the personal belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them without warrants.

Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are immune from suit.

Issue: Whether or not Aberca, et al can recover damages for the violation of their constitutional rights?

Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private citizens can be held liable for damages for infringing upon the rights of others.

Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.PEOPLE vs CONSINGG.R. No. 148193January 16, 2003

FACTS:Sometime in 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name

of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu.

Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot. In 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.

PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13, 369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

Consing filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for "Injunctive Relief" against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does.

Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599. PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for "Damages and Attachment," with the Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case.

In 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

ISSUE:Whether or not the pendency of Civil Cases for Injunctive Relief, and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, against Consing and his mother.

HELD:No. The resolution of the issues in the civil actions present will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts. If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In this case, there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.

BERNALDES, SR., ET AL. V. BOHOL LAND TRANS., INC. G.R. L-18193February 27, 1963 FACTS: Due to the driver’s reckless imprudence, a bus passenger was killed and his brother seriously injured. A criminal case was filed against said driver, but he was

acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Subsequently, a civil action for damages was filed against the bus company. The latter alleged that the action could not prosper because: (a) it was barred by a prior judgment (in the criminal case); (b) the plaintiffs had already intervened in the criminal case through private prosecutors; and (c) the plaintiffs had not reserved the civil case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Case against the may still prosper.HELD: Yes. First, because the suit is based on culpa contractual, not the alleged criminal offense (and under Art. 31, an independent civil action is allowed). Secondly, because, if at all, the intervention in the criminal case amounted inferentially to submitting in said case the claim for civil liability, the claim could have been only that against the driver, and not against the bus company, which was not a party therein. (c) Lastly, because, while there was no express reservation made, still such reservation is already implied in the law which declares the civil action to be independent and separate from the criminal action. (As a matter of fact, the duty of the offended party to make such reservation applies only when the civil action arises from the criminal case, but in this case it is against persons pursuant to article 31).

YAKULT PHILS. V. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 91856October 5, 1990Gancayco, J.FACTS:In 1982, five-year old Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la FuenteStreet, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee,

Larry Salvado. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila.

In 1984, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants Yakult and Salvado to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.ISSUE:Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action

HELD: Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party:1. waives the civil action2. reserves his right to institute it

separately, or3. institutes the civil action prior to the

criminal action.xxxA waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.xxThe reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the

offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.Although the incident in question and the actions arising there from were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case.In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that upon the termination of the criminal action no damages was awarded.The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party

from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil action brought before it.

Te vs CA (Te v. Choa)G.R. 126746November 29, 2000

FACTS:Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after marriage although they would meet each other regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation of engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2nd wife of Arthur). Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.

RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a prejudicial question and had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered judgment?

HELD: NO. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it cannot be used as a prejudicial question to the prior criminal case and administrative case against the petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage was clearly a

void ab initio. Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Pimentel vs PimentelG.R. No. 172060September 13, 2010

FACTS:In 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

In 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner then filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

HELD:The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated

parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”

ZAPANTA VS MONTESAG.R. No. L-14534February 28, 1962

FACTS:

Olimpia Yco(Yco) filed before the Judge Agustin Montesa in the Court of First Instance(CFI) of Bulacan a criminal case of Bigamy against Merardo Zapanta (Zapanta), as he contracted marriage with her when he was still validly married to a certain Estrella Guarin.

Zapanta subsequently filed in CFI of Pampanga a civil case against Yco, for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Yco filed motion to dismiss but was denied.

Zapanta filed motion in criminal case of Bigamy to suspend proceedings therein on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in civil case was a prejudicial question. Motion was denied, and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration denied.

After pleading not guilty in the criminal case, Zapanta filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force, and intimidation is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal.

HELD: Yes. If there is an issue/question in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal, then there is a prejudicial question.There is a prejudicial question in the case at bar. As seen in the rule, a prejudicial question has two elements: (1) question must be determinative of the case before the court and (2) jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. Here, determination of the use of duress, force, and intimidation will prove that his act of

contracting a second marriage while there was a subsisting one was involuntary. On the second element, the annulment case was filed in Pampanga.

READ and Digest Mendiola vs Macadaeg