11. BELTRAN VS SEC. OF HEALTH

FACTS: These are consolidated cases. Petitioners are operating as commercial blood banks, the largest supplier of blood needs in the Philippines other than the government and Phil. National Red Cross. Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of RA 7719 or the National Blood Service Act and Admin Order No. 9. These provisions of law provide the phasing-out of Commercial Blood Banks after 2 years of the effectivity of such laws. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said provision on the ground, among others, that such represents undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state, it violates the equal protection clause and the phasing out of Commercial Blood Banks amounts to deprivation of property without due process an unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of RA 7719 (Sec 7)-is not within the State’s police power -violated the equal protection clause -amounts to deprivation of property without due process ad unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty

Held: NO! Petitions dismissed. The court upholds the validity of RA 7719.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern. RA 7719 was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. It is a valid response from the alarming international incident of blood transfusion which resulted to the transmission of AIDS. Based from the evaluations of the government and private agencies, the blood from commercial banks are unsafe compared from the blood donated by voluntary donors of the Red Cross and the government. It is unsafe because the donors give their blood out of compensation and they will not be honest in their medical history since they only wanted the compensation.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

It is a valid exercise of Police power because1. It was based on substantial dinstiinctions.2. The phasing out is germane to the purpose of law3. It is intended for the general application of law4. The applies to ALL Commercial Banks, without exception

The State is mandated to protect the health of the public by ensuring adequate blood supply in the country by voluntary donations. Attaining this objective, requires the interference of the State. In serving the interest of the public, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out all commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the business of the commercial blood banks but ther interests must give way to serve a higher end for the public’s interest

The State in order to promote the general welfare , may interfere with personal liberty . property and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subject to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to its fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.

12. PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. HONORABLE PRADO

Facts: Petitioners are members of the lower courts who are questioning the validity of the laws in issue. The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privileges from judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents

counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause and the withdrawal is necessary because there is a considerable volume of frank mails in the judiciary.FYI =) The Franking Privilege is a 'privilege' granted and permits them to mail all of their OFFICIAL (not personal) business correspondence FREE - NO POSTAGE REQUIRED.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is violative of equal protection clause.

Held: Yes, RA 7354 violates equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

SC: we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving

13. FARINAS VS. EXEC. SEC.

Facts: This is a case as regards Sec. 67 of BP 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) expressly repealing Sec 14 of RA 9006. Petitioners contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an ELECTIVE OFFICIAL who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.Respondents aver that it does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former.

Issue: Whether the RA violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials

Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all

persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed

14. MENDOZA VS PEOPLE (2014)

FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner is Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, for qualified theft and estafa against Petitioner, Alfredo Mendoza because there were discovered anomalies during partial audit (Non remittance of payments, sale of cars withput permission from the supervisor). Mendoza countered that Juno Cars failure to prove ownership over the cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage. Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa. Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but denied. While MR is still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the RTC, Mandaluyong City. Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause and a motion to defer arraignment before the TC. TC dismissed the complaint finding no probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa.Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA .It argued that "the determination of probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor.CA reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case stating that TC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence this petition

ISSUE: whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

HELD : YES! There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of discretion in the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause, the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until such appeal is resolved.In this case, While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid, Judge Capco-Umali of the TC still had the discretion to make her own finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with trial.Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused for arraignment and trial.Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to "immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record fails to establish probable cause." Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the

prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. The case lies on the 1st option. It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court."In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence ,Specifically, she found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent evidence" that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the accused," which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa. He even ordered private complainant to file documents to support its claim and order to set clarificatory hearing. TC judge correctly dismissed the case.

15. LIM VS FELIX

FACTS: The case started when an incident happened at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 9405457), (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused .The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime in that the ruled that ". . . all of the accused should not only be charged with Multiple Murder With Frustrated Murder" but for a case of MURDER for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound on the buttocks of Dante Siblante. Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.The Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by the prosecution.The petitioners then filed these consolidated petitions questioning the Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: A judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause.

The Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of arrest. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined

probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest. We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

16. BACHE VS RUIZ

FACTS: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Petitioner Bache on three grounds. Petition Granted.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the

existence or non-existence of a probable cause. The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue

but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant

“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

17. MICROSOFT VS MAXICORP

FACTS: National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants against Maxicorp. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.

Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorp’s motion .RTC also denied Maxicorp’s motion for reconsideration.

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners’ products.

Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1) WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;2) WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS."

HELD: 1. Yes , There was probable causeProbable cause means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper.[19] Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.[

The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or

his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.[21] The applicant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient.Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,[24] not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.[25] Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.[26] Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners software.[27] Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit.[28] Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners software on the same computer unit.[29] There was a comparison between petitioners genuine software and Maxicorps software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.[30] Even if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of Joel Diaz, which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses.[31] For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.[32] Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.

2. A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed

It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.[38] The description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of concern.[39] Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners software. This language meets the test of specificity.

In the case at bar, The items were described validly in the warrant, However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states:

c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or unfair competition.

Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant.[44] A search warrant is severable, the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.[45] The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

18. UY vs BIR

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof. On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the BIR that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging illegal activities (fraudulent acts) being practiced by the said

company among others, selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing receipt, the sales of unused

cans and the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its processing of canned tuna for export.On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several search warrants.The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish. attempt to evade or defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control the

following: 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;5. Sales Records, Job Order;6. Corporate Financial Records; and7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks There were 3 Search warrants issued. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional mandates.

HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants.

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and comprehensively discussed each and every defect alleged by petitioners. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.[12]

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be construed strictly without,

however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions. One of which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated on said warrants, the Court ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. It was not established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner corporation, hence, inconsistency in identifying the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.

The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched—one warrant was directed only against Uy while the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled that where the warrant was issued not for search of the persons occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of the inconsistencies in stating their name. Furthermore, the Court said that where the apparent intent in issuing another warrant was to supersede an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked by the former. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge as she used generic terms. As a rule, the use of a generic term or a generic description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. But where, however, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must rather be general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean no warrant could issue. As regards the terms“unregistered delivery receipts” and “unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the Solicitor General correctly argued that these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are unregistered. Lastly, general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire warrant void—the search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of “unregistered delivery receipts” and “unregistered purchase and sales invoices”, the warrants remain valid.

19. ESPANO VS. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Petitioner was accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams .The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. Petitioner posted bail and was released. By way of defense, petitioner testified that on said evening, he was sleeping in his house and was awakened only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was instead brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.

The trial court rejected petitioner's, defense . TC convicted the petitioner of the crime chargedThe marijuana is declared forfeited in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible and his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.

HELD: The issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,

therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control.

The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner.

20. PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE

Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.

A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy street on mere unexplained suspicion.Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.