BATCH 2

UYGUANGCO VS CA G.R. No. 76873October 26, 1989CRUZ, J.

Facts: In the year 1975, Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco claims that he is an illegitimate son of Apolinario and filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners because he was left out in the extrajudicial settlement of Apolinario’s estate. Graciano alleged he is the son of Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. Here He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. During the course of the trial, the petitioners alleged that Graciano failed to present any documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. . The petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code because .

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is allowed to prove his alleged filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the problem of the private respondent is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.

Petition Granted.

LEUTERIO VS CA G.R. No. 84647 May 23, 1991Narvasa, J.

Facts: Maria Alicia Leuterio claimed that she is the natural daughter of Ana Maglanque and Pablo Leuterio and she presented by her before the Probate Court after her natural father's death, was adequate basis for judicial declaration of the compulsory recognition of her status as said Pablo Leuterio's natural child. She further claimed that she must be deemed to have been legitimated by the marriage of her parents some nine years after her birth. However, the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals pronounce Maria Alicia's evidence as insufficient to establish her cause, "unhesitatingly" rejecting in the process certain documents introduced by Maria Alicia Leuterio as "being forged . . . and incompetent . . .," and also declared that "there are facts and circumstances established by the evidence on record which consistently and clearly indicate that the late Pablo Leuterio desisted to acknowledge Maria Alicia Leuterio as his own child with Ana Maglanque. This is the third attempt of Maria Alicia to persuade the Court to accept of her theory.

Issue: Whether or not Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code should be given a retroactive effect in this case.

Ruling: The Sumpreme Court ruled that whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety—as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious—petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence, sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was properly denied.

Petition Denied.

MENDOZA VS CA G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991Cruz, J.

Facts: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. Teopista averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child under Article 283 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Teopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology.

Petition Denied.

REPUBLIC VS CA G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992Regalado, J.

Facts: Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat on February 2, 1988. Jason was then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old. The trial court granted the petition for adoption and the same was affirmed by the Court Of Appeals. The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption.

Ruling: According to Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Petition Denied.

TAYAG VS CA G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992Regalado, J.

Facts: Chad Cuyugan, son of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, the fruit of his illicit amorous relationship with EMILIE, the plaintiff and legal guardian, was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff. CORITO, the daughter of the deceased and herein defendant, is the known administratrix of the real and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles City on September 28, 1983. The defendant contended that the suit as barred by prescription and Cuyugan has no legal and judicial personality to bring the suit. Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Issue: Whether or not Article 175 of the Family Code should be given a retroactive effect.

Ruling: Article 256 of the Family Code states that "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right or not.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The court adopts the ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., “the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.” The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Petition Denied.

ILANO VS CA G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994Nocon, J.

Facts: On April, 1962, Leoncia De Los Santos and Artemio G. Ilano eloped to Guagua, Pampanga and stayed at La Mesa Apartment. In June 1962, Leoncia conceived and delivered a still-born female child in October 1962 at the Manila Sanitarium whose death certificate was signed by Artemio. On December 30, 1963, Merceditas was born at the Manila Sanitarium whose birth was recorded as the daughter of Artemio and Leoncia. Petitioner lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home. Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and Merceditas. After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus, bringing us to this case.

Issue: Whether or not an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition and support.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil Code. Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283. The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation and as a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support.

Petition Denied.

MARQUINO VS CA G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994Cruz, J.

Facts: Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi, Dumaguete City, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino, who is single during that time. Bibiana became personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic helper in their household and she always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family. The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could finish presenting her evidence, she and on March 23, 1979, her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. On August 20, 1983, Eutiquio Marquino died while the case was pending appeal. Petitioners averred that the action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case but the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) remand the case to the Court of origin. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1985.

Issue: Whether or not after the death of the putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be continued against the heirs of the former.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled against the continuance of recognition of a natural child against the heirs of the former after the death of the putative father. Article 285 provides only two (2) exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the putative parent. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench. Furthermore, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. "Vested right" is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action.

Judgement Reversed and Set Aside.

ARUEGO VS CA G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996Hermosisima, Jr., J.

Facts: Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego were born out of this relationship. A compaint was filed praying that Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr. and that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego. Furthermore they are praying that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children".

Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code is applicable in this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the phrase "vested or acquired rights" under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. "The Committee did not define what is meant by a 'vested or acquired right,' thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise in the future." The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.

Petition Denied.

Synthesis:

The Supreme Court has decided 8 cases on the retroactive effect under Article 256 of the Family Code.

In the case of UYGUANGCO VS CA, G.R. No. 76873, the Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation pursuant to Article 172 of the Family Code and the same cannot be given a retroactive effect for the simple reason that the alleged is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.

In LEUTERIO VS CA G.R. No. 84647, the Supreme Court ruled that whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety—as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious—petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio.

In MENDOZA VS CA G.R. No. 86302, the Supreme Court gave effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology.

In REPUBLIC VS CA G.R. No. 92326, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions and subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.

In TAYAG VS CA G.R. No. 95229, the Supreme Court ruled the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

In the case of ILANO VS CA G.R. No. 104376, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 283 of the Civil Code shall be given a retroactive effect. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph of Article 283. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation and as a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support.

In MARQUINO VS CA G.R. No. 72078, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. "Vested right" is a right in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. It expresses the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action.

In ARUEGO VS CA G.R. No. 112193, the Supreme Court ruled that he action brought by private respondent for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.

From these 8 previous cases, the Supreme Court made it clear when to give a subsequent law a retroactive effect. Article 256 of the Family Code states, “This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws”, the Supreme Court in order for a appropriate relevant provisions be given retroactive effect it must be subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder (UYGUANGCO case, MENDOZA case, REPUBLIC case, TAYAG case, ILANO case, MARQUINO case, ARUEGO case). It is as well important that a sufficient and persuasive evidence both oral and documentary bearing must be presented before the court (LEUTERIO case).

BATCH 3

People v. Alison G.R. No. L-30612 April 27, 1972 44 SCRA 522

Facts: Bonifacio Alison was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch IV, for robbery in band with double murder. On February 14, 1972, the Administrative Officer of the Bureau of Prisons informed the Clerk of Court of the death of prisoner [Bonifacio Alison] on January 26, 1972 at the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital, Bureau of Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. On March 27, 1972, the Court received a comment from the Solicitor General stating: "On March 15, 1972, the Director of Prisons, pursuant to the letter-request of the undersigned, submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of the certificate of death of Bonifacio Alison, Prisoner No. 9486, 45 years old, male, with address at Bo. Pasig, Claveria, Masbate; The data appearing in the aforesaid death certificate and those in the records of the case (handwritten notes of the proceedings by the Presiding Judge of the trial court, pp. 320-321, rec.) show that the Bonifacio Alison mentioned therein are one and the same person; The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971. Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People vs. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed."

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in line with the prayer of the then Solicitor General, this case against appellant, the late Bonifacio Alison, is dismissed with costs de oficio.

People v. Jaime Jose, et al. G.R. No. L-28397 June 17, 1976 71 SCRA 272

Facts: In the morning of July 4, 1966, Zenaida de la Cruz was forcibly taken by five armed men riding in a Mercedes Benz car while riding a Golden Taxicab driven by Osmundo de la Cruz. One of the five culprit divested her of her wrist watch, ring and necklace and that she was brought to the "Golden Gate" Motel, but there was no vacancy, so she was taken to the "Queen's Court" Motel. Inside room no. 3 of said motel she was raped by four of the accused, one at a time and that during the time three of the accused left the place and when they returned they brought with them Araceli Sy who was also taken by force by three of the group from a Golden Taxi while on her way home to Makati, Rizal. She was likewise divested of jewelry and cash by the "short fellow" sitting beside her. The two (Zenaida and Araceli) was then taken by the five men to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue from the "Queen's Court" Motel in the Mercedes Benz car from where a taxi was hailed for them; that the alleged kidnapping was immediately reported to the Pasay City Police by the taxi driver, Osmundo de la Cruz. Zenaida de la Cruz and Araceli Sy immediately reported the crime to the authorities after they were released by the accused. On the other hand, the accused contented that it was Zenaida and Araceli who joined them in the Mercedes Benz car of Jaime Jose and that that there was no abduction nor rape because Zenaida de la Cruz and Vincent Crisologo were the only ones who entered the room at the "Queen's Court" Motel. Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch VII, Pasay City) finding Jaime Jose and George Tillman guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing them to the penalty of death and during the pendency of the case at bar, the accused-appellant, Jaime Jose, died.

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that In view of the death of Jaime Jose during the pendency of this case which was imposed as his penalty for another similar capital offense previously committed by him, the case against him is dismissed and said accused is relieved in this case of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to his crime, his death occurring before rendition of final judgment herein. (Art. 89, par. 1, Revised Penal Code)

People v. Satorre GR No. L-26282 August 27, 1976 72 SCRA 439

Facts: On May 2, 1962, the appellants, Benito Satorre and Paulino Rondina, members of the municipal police force of Leyte , were sent by the Chief of Police to Barrio Toctoc in order to maintain peace and order for the celebration of its barrio fiesta. On the eve of the barrio fiesta, the appellants together with Gavino Delantar, Domingo Espina, Santiago Dagandan, and Carlos Espina, were drinking "tuba" in the house of Juan Lucero and later went to the dance at the basketball court. At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of May 3, 1962, Carlos Espina, Gavino Delantar, Dodong Delima, and the appellants went to the place of Carlos Espina and stayed in front of his house for more drinks and they invited Carlos Espina to join them but Domingo Espina, Carlos’ borther, told him to refuse the invitation because he was already drunk, Carlos answered his brother by saying, “Do not be afraid, my brother, anyway the persons taking me are agents of the law.” The appellants then pulled Carlos away from his brother saying, “Come, Ling, let us go and drink a little more”, Domingo Espina held Carlos by the waist and drew him back but Carlos resisted facing the appellants while Domingo dragged him. Then, the appellants pointed their guns at Carlos Espina. Benito Satorre's gun exploded first, followed by the gunfire of Paulino Rondina. Immediately thereafter, Carlos Espina shouted, "I am hit", while Loreto Silva was also hit by the gunfire. Domingo then sought cover inside the house of Carlos Espina and, while inside, he heard another shot. When he came out, he saw Carlos lying on the ground, face down, already dead, while Loreto Silva was on the floor near the door with his breast bleeding. He then send Alfredo Silva to fetch the Barrio Lieutenant, Baltazar Montecillo. When Baltazar arrived, he took Loreto Silva’s testimony and Loreto made a dying declaration that Benito Satorre shot him after shooting Carlos Espina with Paulino Rondina as his companion. This is an appeal from the the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Carigara), Branch VI, in Criminal finding the accused Benito Satorre and Paulino Rondina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder and sentencing them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each the two murders. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant Paulino Rondina died on December 11, 1975 in the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, Muntinglupa, Rizal

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant Paulino Rondina died on December 11, 1975 in the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, Muntinglupa, Rizal, 2 and the case against him was dismissed per Resolution 3 of this Court, dated August 27,1976.

Belamara V. Polinar G. R. No. L-24098 Novemver 18, 1967 21 SCRA 977

Facts: On May 24, 1954, a complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed againts Mauricio Polinar, et al, in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol. Mauricio Polinar was convicted of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. On June 18, 1956, Mauricio appealed and while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and said decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958 wherein said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956. Mauricio Polinar is survived by his wife, Balbina Bongato and his children and the the parties have reserved to present in Court evidence on facts not agreed to herein by the parties.

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

Judgment reversed and set aside. No Cost.

Torrijos v. Court of Appeals GR# L-40336 October 24, 1975 67 SCRA 394

Facts: On May 11, 1968, Wakat Diamnuan and his wife sold their one-fourth share in favor of petitioner Torrijos for P7,493.00. the deed of sale, however, was refused registration because Torrijos, who produced OCT No. O-36, did not have the copies thereof held by the other co-owners, Kangi Erangyas and heirs of Komising Tagle.In 1969, the entire property, together with the share of Wakat Diamnuan and his wife, was sold to Victor de Guia for P189,379.50. Torrijos prosecuted Wakat Diamnuan for estafa before the Baguio Court of First Instance. the trial Judge convicted the accused in a decision dated January 17, 1973 sentencing him to an imprisonment of 3 months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P7,493.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, to indemnify petitioner Lamberto Torrijos in the sum of P7,493.00 and to pay the costs. On August 5, 1973, the accused died, for which reason his counsel moved to dismiss the appeal under paragraph 1 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death of a convict extinguishes, not only the personal penalties, but also the "pecuniary penalties" as long as the death occurs before final judgment. Torrijos opposed the said motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that the term "pecuniary penalty" should not include civil liability in favor of the offended party. The respondent Court of Appeals sustained the motion, which is shared by the Solicitor General, and forth with issued the challenged order dated February 20, 1975 dismissing the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held it should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso factoextinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. The estafa or swindle existed only after the subsequent sale by the accused of the same interest in favor of Victor de Guia. There was no crime of estafa until the accused re-sold the same property to another individual about 5 years after the first sale to Torrijos. If the accused did not comply with the sale he executed in favor of Torrijos in 1964, after his receipt of the purchase price from Torrijos, but before the second sale to Victor de Guia in 1969, there is no question that the accused would be merely civilly liable either through an action by Torrijos for specific performance with damages or for rescission of contract also with damages. If rescission were pursued by the first vendee, the vendor would be liable to refund the purchase price as well as be responsible in damages. Consequently, in the case at bar, the civil liability of the accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations.

Judgment set aside.

People v. Sendaydiego GR # L-33252-54 January 20, 1978 81 SCRA 120

Facts: In the year 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. In these cases the provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative and in the middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents and Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. On October 5, 1976, Sendaydiego died and his appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability remained.

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over Sendaydiego’s possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

People v. Bayotas G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 236 SCRA 239

FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. The Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal, however, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. . The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. On the other hand, counsel for the accused-appellant, argued that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties invoking the case of Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

Issue: Whether or not death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability?

Held: The Supreme Court held that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." That the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Judgment Dismissed with costs de oficio.

BATCH 4

EXCONDE V. CAPUNO, G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

On March 31, 1949, Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he committed the crime.

Issue: Whether or not defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent act of his son, Dante Capuno.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). These defendants failed to prove.

Judgement Modified.

MERCADO V CA G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960LABRADOR, J.

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr., the son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor because the two quarrelled over a "pitogo". Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which condemned petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 for medical expenses, for a physical injury caused by the son of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held liable for damages caused by Augusto Mercado.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must be held to be without merit. It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 which states, "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.", does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children.

Judgment Reversed.

PALISOC V. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971TEEHANKEE, J.

Facts: Palisoc and Daffon were classmates at the, non-academic institution, Manila Technical Institute (MTI). While Daffon was working on a machine at the school’s laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc was acting like a foreman and then Palisoc slightly slapped Daffon in the face. Daffon retaliated with a barrage of blows causing Palisoc to retreat. Palisoc, while retreating, Palisoc stumbled on an engine block and fell unconscious and he died after that. The cause of death was internal injuries “probably caused by strong fist blows.” Daffon was sixteen years (16) old during that time. Issue: Whether or not the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that under Article 2180, Civil Code which states, "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.", defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute (defendants Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.

Judgment Modified.

AMADORA V. CA, G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988CRUZ, J.

Facts: Facts: Pabling Daffon fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The victim's parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1.) Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades; 2.) Those students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended; 3.) There was no clear identification of the fatal gun; and 4.) In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation.

Issue: Whether or not Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 2180 which states, "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.” applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers, in general, shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof that shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.” However, in the case at bar, none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector, dean of boys, and high school principal cannot be held liable because they were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher was not negligent. The school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher or head of the school of arts and trades.

Petition Denied.

The Supreme Court has decided 4 cases on liability for damages resulting from injuries caused by the negligence of a minor under Art 2180 of the Civil Code (Articles 154, 155 and 1903 last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code).

In the case of EXCONDE V. CAPUNO, the Supreme Court ruled that the civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). These defendants failed to prove.

In MERCADO V CA, the Supreme Court ruled that the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.

In the case of PALISOC V. BRILLANTES, The Supreme Court ruled that the school head and teacher are liable jointly and severally for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.

In AMADORA V. CA, the Supreme Court ruled that none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector, dean of boys, and high school principal cannot be held liable because they were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher was not negligent. The school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher or head of the school of arts and trades.

From the 4 previous cases, the Supreme Court has laid down the different situation as to when a school is liability for the damages resulting from injuries incurred caused by the negligence of a minor.

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" and the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (EXCONDE case).

The clause "so long as they remain in their custody," under Article 2180, contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over (MERCADO case).

School heads and teachers are liable jointly and severally for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code (PALISOC case).

Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers, in general, shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof that shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices.” However, the rector, dean of boys, and high school principal cannot be held liable because they were not teachers-in-charge. The school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher or head of the school of arts and trades (AMADORA case).