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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 11915 Olivier Donni José Alberto Molina Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence OCTOBER 2018

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Page 1: DICION PAPER ERIEftp.iza.org/dp11915.pdf · 2018. 11. 15. · ATACT ZA DP o. 11915 CTBE 2018 Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 11915

Olivier DonniJosé Alberto Molina

Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence

OCTOBER 2018

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Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

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Phone: +49-228-3894-0Email: [email protected] www.iza.org

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 11915

Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence

OCTOBER 2018

Olivier DonniTHEMA and Université de Cergy-Pontoise

José Alberto MolinaUniversity of Zaragoza and IZA

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ABSTRACT

IZA DP No. 11915 OCTOBER 2018

Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence*

Household collective models celebrate their thirtieth birthday. The collective approach

constitutes, perhaps, the microeconomics topic that has produced the largest number

of papers (both published and in working paper/mimeo formats) during the last three

decades, beginning with the seminal paper published by P.A. Chiappori in Econometrica

(Chiappori, 1988). To add to some excellent surveys of household collective models (Strauss

et al., 2000; Vermeulen, 2002; Donni and Chiappori, 2011; Chiappori and Mazzocco,

2017), we here perform a bibliographic review of the literature, which includes theoretical

contributions, as well as the international empirical evidence related to the collective

approach. With respect to the theoretical papers, the collective framework has been used

to provide theoretical results for a number of household issues; for example, labour supply,

consumption and savings, household production, and intra-household allocation. As for

the empirical papers, the international evidence covers the majority of developed and

developing countries from all continents.

JEL Classification: D10, J22, Y10

Keywords: household, collective models, Pareto efficiency, sharing rule, labor supply, consumption

Corresponding author:José Alberto MolinaDepartment of Economics AnalysisFaculty of EconomicsGran Via 25005 ZaragozaSpain

E-mail: [email protected]

* This document was mainly written while Jose Alberto Molina was Visiting Professor at the Department of

Economics of Boston College (US), to which he would like to express his thanks for the hospitality and facilities

provided. We are very grateful to Pierre-André Chiappori for helpful suggestions. Comments are welcome.

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The collective approach celebrates its thirtieth birthday. On this occasion, we present a bibliography that includes all the papers (or at least most of them) inspired by the seminal paper of Pierre-André Chiappori, the founder of the collective approach, “Rational Household Labor Supply”, published in 1988. The collective approach to household behavior arose from the hypothesis that (i) each individual in the household has specific preferences and (ii) the outcome of the decision process is Pareto efficient. In spite of important earlier contributions that already used Pareto efficiency as the basis of household behavior models (and which we have not included), the aforementioned paper and its sequel, “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare”, published in 1992, introduced original ideas that have opened up new areas of research. We can point out at least three important and original contributions of these two papers:

1. The Pareto efficiency hypothesis is theoretically justified. Efficiency is seen as a fundamental axiom, comparable to the classical axioms of consumer theory. It can be challenged, but it remains the benchmark hypothesis. It also replaces the axioms of the Nash solution used in prior models of household behavior. Consequently, the collective model can be seen as the “true” neoclassical model of household behavior, while the unitary model remains a holistic deviation.

2. Pareto efficiency has two important consequences: a. Testability: Like any other model of household behavior that is susceptible to challenge, the

unitary model must be testable from survey data (in Popper’s sense). The collective model actually generates restrictions on household behavior that are not satisfied by any other model. These restrictions are comparable to the Slutsky conditions in the unitary case.

b. Identifiability: In analogy with the unitary model, for which utility functions can be recovered up to a monotonic transformation, the structural components of the model must be recoverable from observable behavior (e.g., demand equations that are estimated from the usual data). Using the efficiency hypothesis, together with auxiliary hypotheses, it can be shown that individual utility functions and the sharing of resources can be recovered from observed behavior. Consequently, the intra-household distribution of resources can be studied by econometricians.

3. A new technique of proof is proposed. Identifiability and testability is proven, according to a new technique that will be applied in many other papers.

This bibliography also includes papers that are not directly inspired by the two aforementioned papers, but have benefitted from the new interest by the profession in intra-household bargaining, with these including tests of the multi-person income-pooling hypothesis and multi-utility models of household behavior that include equivalence-scale models. We have included not only published papers, but also a number of books, chapters of books, and a number of unpublished papers that are included in reputable working paper collections. We also restrict the bibliography to “neo-classical” economic literature, even if the idea behind collective models may have been burgeoning outside this limited domain of research. Finally, one of our objectives is also to point out original papers that have been overlooked by the profession.

Despite that we have attempted to be complete and exhaustive, we are conscious that this bibliography does not do justice to some important papers (e.g., on risk sharing, or marriage) that, although they focus on the multiplicity of individuals in the household, are far from the collective approach.

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TABLE OF CONTRIBUTIONS RELATE TO COLLECTIVE MODELS (1988- OCTOBER 2018)

Year Authors Journal Theoretical/

Survey/Empirical Country Data/Years Keywords JEL Codes

1988 Chiappori Econome-

trica Theoretical NA NA

Labor Supply Intra-Household Nonparametric

NA

1989 Deaton Book NA NA NA Household

Surveys Microeconometric

NA

1989 Lommerud JOLE Theoretical NA NA Marital Contracts

Divorce Allocation of Time

NA

1990 Chiappori AES Theoretical NA NA Demand

Collective Good Pareto Efficiency

NA

1990 Haddad & Kanbur EJ Empirical Philippines 1984-5 Intra-Household

Inequality NA

1990 Kooreman & Kapteyn JHR Empirical Netherlands DLMS/1982 Two-Person

Games Labor Supply

NA

1990 McElroy JHR Theoretical NA NA Nash-Bargained

Household Decisions

NA

1990 Schultz JHR Empirical Thailand Socioeconomic

Survey/1981 Labor Supply

Fertility NA

1990 Thomas JHR Empirical Brazil Survey/1974-75 Intra-Household

Resource Allocation

NA

1990 Woolley PhD

Thesis NA NA NA

Family Decisions Non-Cooperation Intergenerational

NA

1992 Bourguignon & Chiappori

EER Survey NA NA Collective Models

Household Behavior

NA

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1992 Chiappori JPE Theoretical NA NA Labor Supply

Altruism Welfare

NA

1992 Haddad & Kanbur EER Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Inequality NA

1992 Lloyd AEP Theoretical NA NA Rationality

Intra-Household NA

1992 Ott Book NA NA NA Intra-Household

Bargaining NA

1993 Haddad & Kanbur AES Empirical Philippines Household Survey Intra-Household

Nutritional Program

NA

1993 Bourguignon et al. AES Empirical France INSEE/1984-85 Intra-Household

Consumption Income Pooling

NA

1993 Lundberg & Pollak JPE Theoretical NA NA Separate Spheres Bargaining Model

Intra-Marriage NA

1993 Thomas AES Empirical Brazil ENDEF/1974-75 Intra-Household

Income Expenditures

NA

1994 Browning et al. JPE Empirical Canada FAMEX/

1978, 82,84, 1986

Intra-Household Income Outcomes

Efficiency NA

1994 Chiappori Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Collective Household

NA

1994 Haddad & Hoddinot WD Empirical Côte d’Ivore CILSS/1986-87 Intra-Household

Child Status Anthropometrics

NA

1994 Jerison RES Theoretical NA NA Optimality

Income Distribution

NA

1994 Kanbur & Haddad OEP Theoretical NA NA Cooperation Household Production

NA

1994 Kawaguchi AE Empirical Australia AIDS/1986 Household Labor

Supply NA

1994 Kooreman JAEcon Empirical Denmark NA Simultaneously

Non-Cooperation Labor Supply

NA

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1994 Lundberg & Pollak AERP&P Theoretical NA NA Non-Cooperation

Bargaining Marriage

NA

1994 Thomas JHR Empirical US Brazil Ghana

NLS/1986 GLSS/1987-88

ENDEF/1974-75 1986

Intra-Househod Parental

Education Child Height

NA

1994 Thomas & Chen Working

Paper Empirical Taiwan PSID/1980

Intra-Household Income

Demand NA

1995 Alderman et al. WBRO Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Preferences Policy Analysis

NA

1995 Browning RiE Empirical Canada FES/

1982-84-86-90-92

Intra-Household Savings

Retirement D13, D91

1995 Haddad et al. OBES Empirical Philippines 455 households Intra-Household

Inequality Welfare

NA

1995 Hoddinott & Haddad OBES Empirical Côte d’Ivoire Survey Female Income

Household Expenditures

NA

1995 Konrad & Lommerud SJE Theoretical NA NA Non-Cooperation Time Allocation

Public Good NA

1995 Phipps & Burton CJE Empirical Canada FES/1982, 1986,

1992

Poverty Intra-Household

Financial Resources

NA

1995 Phipps & Burton FE Empirical Seven countries LIS Intra-Household

Labor Supply Gender Power

NA

1995 Strauss & Thomas Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Human Resources Empirical Decisions

NA

1996 Apps & Rees JPubE Empirical Australia IDS/1985-86

Labor Supply Household

Production Intra-family Inequality

D11, D12, D13, J22

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1996 Bradbury Working

Paper Empirical Australia HES/1988-89

Household Income Consumption

NA

1996 Doss WD Survey NA NA Intra-Household

Resource Allocation

NA

1996 Lundberg & Pollak JEP Survey NA NA Bargaining

Intra-Household Marriage

NA

1996 Phipps & Burton CPP Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Policy Makers Transfers Taxation

NA

1996 Udry JPE Empirical Burkina Faso ICRISAT/ 1981-1985

Gender Agricultural

Pareto Efficiency NA

1996 Wells & Maher Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Time Surplus Allocation

Intra-Marriage NA

1997 Apps & Rees JPE Theoretical NA NA Household Production

Labor Supply NA

1997 Agarwal FE Survey NA NA Bargaining Models

Gender Social Norms

NA

1997 Behrman Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Intra-Household Consensus Models

Non-Consensus NA

1997 Bruce & Lloyd Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Female-Headed Household Developing Countries

NA

1997 Carter & Katz Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Separate Spheres Gender

NA

1997 Chiappori JPE Theoretical NA NA

Household Production

Labor Supply Intra-Household

NA

1997 Chiuri & Simmons EJ Theoretical NA NA Decentralization Demand System

Public Goods NA

1997 Deaton Book NA NA NA Household Survey Microeconometric

Policy NA

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1997 Dey Abbas Chapter

Book Empirical

Sub-Saharian Africa

NA Gender

Intra-Household Policy

NA

1997 Folbre Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Gender Coalitions Inequality

NA

1997 Fortin & Lacroix EJ Empirical Canada CCPH/1986

Labor Supply Income Pooling

Slutsky Restrictions

NA

1997 Gittelsohn & Mookherji Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Anthropological Methods

Intra-Household NA

1997 Guyer Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Endowments Anthropology

Whealth NA

1997 Harris-White Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Gender Nutrition

Intra-Household NA

1997 Hoddinott et al. Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Testing Models Intra-Household

NA

1997 Katz FE Survey NA NA

Gender Bargaining Theory

Household Production

NA

1997 Lundberg et al. JHR Empirical UK FES/1973-1990 Income-pooling Intra-Household

Experiment NA

1997 McElroy Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Policy Family Bargaining

Marriage NA

1997 Seaton AEL Empirical UK FES/1984 Labor Supply

Revealed Preference

NA

1998 Behrman & Rosenzweig Working

Paper Empirical US MTR/1994

In-Law Resources Transfers Bequests

NA

1998 Brett JPubE Theoretical NA NA Optimal Taxation

Tax Reform D10, D61, H21, H31

1998 Browning & Chiappori Econome-

trica Empirical Canada

FAMEX/1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992

Efficiency Bargaining

Slutsky Matrix NA

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1998 Fafchamps Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Efficiency Rural Households

NA

1998 Gray AER Empirical UA Census/1960-70-80

CPS/1968-79 PSID/1970-1980

Divorce-Laws Bargaining

Labor Supply NA

1998 Klassen JEH Survey NA NA Sex-Mortality Gender-Bias

Intra-Household NA

1998 Phipps & Burton Economica Empirical Canada FES/1992 Income Pooling Consumption Gender Power

NA

1999 Apps & Rees JPubE Theoretical NA NA Tax Reform

Domestic Production

NA

1999 Biswal CPP Empirical Canada FES/1986-92 Income-Pooling

Immigrants Married-Women

NA

1999 Bourguignon JOPE Theoretical NA NA Consumption

Intra-Household Cost of Children

D10, J13, J15

1999 Chiappori Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Labor Supply Risk Sharing

NA

1999 Chiappori & Ekeland Econome-

trica Theoretical NA NA

Aggregation Consumer Theory Market Demand

NA

1999 Gersbach & Haller Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Multi-Members Consumption

Equilibria NA

1999 Lundberg Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Retirement Bargaining Models

NA

1999 Lundberg & Rose Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Specialization

Marriage NA

1999 Snyder JPubE Theoretical NA NA

Pareto Optimality Public Goods

Revealed Preference

NA

1999 Tiefenthaler JOPE Empirical Brazil NSS/1989 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Income pooling

D1, J2

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2000 Blundell & Robin Econome-

trica Theoretical NA NA

Consumer Separability

Price Aggreation NA

2000 Browning SJE Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Saving Consumption

D1, D7

2000 Chiuri Labour Empirical Italy SHIW/1993 Child Care

Female Labor Supply

D1, J2

2000 Chiuri RE Survey NA NA Consumption Labor Supply

Intra-Household D1, D7

2000 Dercon JPE Empirical Ethiopia NA Nutrition

Consumption Intra-Household

NA

2000 Donni PhD

Thesis NA NA NA

Collective Models Consumption

NA

2000 Hallberg Working

Paper Empirical Sweden STUS/ 1984-93

Time Use Unitary Model

NA

2000 Konrad & Lommerud CJE Theoretical NA NA Bargaining

Human Capital Non-Cooperation

D13, J24

2000 Maitra & Ray Mimeo Empirical South Africa

Pakistan NA

Intra-Household Labor

Income I32, I38, D12,C32

2000 Moreau EP Empirical France INSEE/1994-96 Labor Supply

Divorce Threat NA

2000 Pavoni Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Dynamic Decisions

Labor Supply NA

2000 Rubalcava & Thomas Working

Paper Empirical US PSID/1968-92

Aid to Families Dependent Children

NA

2000 Snyder SEJ Empirical US NLS/1969-1971

Bargaining Revealed

Preference Pareto Efficiency

D11, D12

2000 Sprumont JET Theoretical NA NA Collective Choices

Revealed Preference

C72, C92

2000 Strauss et al. JAE Survey NA NA Intra-Household

Theories Empirical

NA

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2001 Aronsson et al JOPE Empirical Sweden HUS/1984-1993 Time Use

Home Production Intra-Household

D13, J22

2001 Barmby & Smith AE Empirical Denmark/UK DLS/1986 FES/1984

Labor Supply Pareto Behavior Intra-Household

NA

2001 Beblo Book NA NA NA Bargaining

Time Allocation NA

2001 Beegle et al. SFP Empirical Indonesia ILFS/1997-98 Women’s Power

Reproductive Decisions

NA

2001 Browning & Lechene Working

Paper Empirical Canada FAMEX/1969-92

Caring Income Pooling Intra-Household

NA

2001 Bustreel RevE Theoretical NA NA Non-Cooperation Time Allocation

D1, J22

2001 Chen & Woolley EJ Theoretical NA NA Two-Person Family

Bargaining Cournot-Nash

NA

2001 Dauphin & Fortin EL Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Polygamy Pareto Optimality

D11, D70

2001 Fong & Zhang JPE Theoretical NA NA Identification

Marriage Spousal Leisure

NA

2001 Gersbach & Haller RES Theoretical NA NA

General Equilibrium Intra-

Household Efficiency

NA

2001 Seaton AEL Empirical UK FES/1984

Labor Supply Bargaining Revealed

Preference

NA

2002 Angrist QJE Empirical US Census

IPMUS/1910-20-40

Sex Ratios Immigrants Experiment

NA

2002 Apps & Rees LE Empirical Australia AustraliaTUS/1992 Child Costs

Time Allocation Home Production

J13, J22, D13

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2002 Attanasio & Lechene RED Empirical Mexico PROGRESA/

1998-2000

Income-pooling Intra-Household Gender Power

J12, D13, H31

2002 Chiappori et al. JPE Empirical US PSID/1989 Labor Supply

Marriage Divorce Children

NA

2002 Hallberg Ph.D. Thesis

NA NA NA Household Behavior Time Use

NA

2002 Koolwal & Ray Working

Paper Empirical Nepal NLSS

Female’s Share Wage Earnings

Welfare NA

2002 Ligon Working

Paper Empirical Bangladesh NA

Dynamic Pareto Efficiency Intra-Household

NA

2002 Lundberg Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Specialization

Policy NA

2002 Luo JBES Empirical Canada SFE/

1978, 1982, 84, 86

Preferences Heterogeneity

Quadratic PIGLOG

NA

2002 Moreau & Donni AES Empirical France ECHP/1994 Labor Supply

Taxation Divorce

NA

2002 Ray & Basu Working

Paper Empirical Nepal NLSS/1995

Balance of Power Child Labor

Woman’s Power NA

2002 Rubalcava et al. Working

Paper Empirical Mexico PROGRESA

Woman’s Power Consumption Time

Welfare NA

2002 Thomas et al. Mimeo Empirical Indonesia IFLS/1993-97 Relative Power

Intra-Household Child Health

NA

2002 Vermeulen JES Survey NA NA Collective Models Principles Results

NA

2002 Wirl & Feichtinger Economica Theoretical NA NA Non-Cooperation

Dynamic Intra-Household

NA

2003 Andreoni et al. JHR Empirical US Gallup

Organization/ 1992-94

Charitable Giving Bargaining

Relative Power NA

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2003 Arias et al. Working

Paper Empirical Italy IHBS/1999

Sharing Rule Clothing

Equivalence Scales NA

2003 Blacklow & Ray ER Empirical Australia AHS/1975-1999 Sharing Rule

Intra-Household Demand System

NA

2003 Donni JPubE Theoretical NA NA Labor Supply Income Tax

Corner Solutions H31, J22

2003 Duflo WBER Empirical South Africa SALDRU/1993 Grandparents Age Pension

Intra-Household H55, O15, I12, D13

2003 Fernandez-Val IE Empirical Spain ECHP/1994-97 Labor Suppy

Intra-Household Unitary/Collective

J22, D1

2003 Lakshmanasamy JSED Empirical India NA Unitary/Collective

Income Pooling Female’s Power

NA

2003 Lewbel JEcon Empirical US Consumer

Expenditure Survey

Equivalence Scales Consumer Demand

Bargaining K1, D1, J17, C30, I31

2003 Lich-Tyler Mimeo Empirical US PSID/1976-86 Intertemporal

Bargaining Euler Equations

D91, D19, J12

2003 Lundberg & Pollak REHO Theoretical NA NA Marriage Efficiency Bargaining

D10, J12, J61

2003 Lundberg et al. JPubE Empirical US PSID/1979-86,

1989-92

Consumption Married Couples

Retirement D1, D91, E21

2003 Maitra & Ray Mimeo Empirical Australia AHES/1998-99 Spousal Power

Expenditure Intra-Household

D13, C31

2003 Quisumbing & Maluccio OBES Empirical Bangladesh, SA

Ethiopia, Indonesia,

Various/1996-1998 Marriage

Intra-Household Bargaining Power

NA

2004 Adam et al. Chapter

Book Empirical Canada

Time Series/ 1960-96

Intra-Household Bargaining

Divorce D10, J12

2004 Beblo et al. AEQ Empirical Germany GSOEP/1998 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Tax Reform

D11, D12, D13, D31, J12, J22

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2004 Borelli & Perali Working

Paper Empirical Djibouti

African Society/ 1996

Intra-Household Sharing Rule Drug

Consumption NA

2004 Bradbury CESifo Empirical UK HES/1988-89, 93-94, 98-99

Intra-Household Consumption Experiment

J10, J12, I38

2004 Carvajal & Gonzalez JME Theoretical NA NA Nash Bargaining

Revealed Preferences

NA

2004 Clark et al. RevE Empirical UK BHPS/1997 Labor Supply Sharing Rule

Marriage Market C31, C71, D10, J22

2004 Lewel Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Equivalence Scales Household

Demand K1, D1, J17, C30, I31

2004 Lundberg & Ward-Batts Working

Paper Empirical US HRS/1992

Bargaining Spouses’ Control

Net Worth NA

2004 Maitra & Ray Chapter

Book Empirical South Africa NA

Household Composition Budget Share

NA

2004 Mazzocco AER Empirical US HRS/1992 Intertemporal Risk Sharing

HARA Preferences NA

2004 Michaud & Vermeulen LE Empirical US HRS/1992-2008 Intra-Household

Labor Supply Retirement

D13, H310, J22, J26

2004 Moehling JEH Empirical US BLSCLS/1917-19 Working Children

Clothing Expenditures

NA

2004 Peluso & Trannoy Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Lorenz Dominance Intra-Household

Inequality D10, D63, D31, D81

2004 Rapallini RPE Empirical Italy ICS/1999 Bargaining Power

Sharing Rule Consumption

D13, H31

2005 Aura JPubE Empirical US CPS1989 HRS

AHEAD

Nash-Bargaining Marriage Annuities

D1, J1

2005 Blundell et al. JPE Theoretical NA NA Public

Consumption Welfare

NA

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2005 Bourguignon & Chiuri Working

Paper Empirical France

FranceTUS/ 1998-199

Women Home Production

Time Use D13, J22

2005 Chiappori AERAE

2005 Hourriez Mimeo Empirical France ECHP/1994-2001 Labor Supply

Non-Participation Intra-Household

D13, J22

2005 Iyigun Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Marriage Matching

Labor Supply C78, D61, D70

2005 Jia REHO Empirical Norway Statistics Norway/

1994-96

Labor Supply Retirement Bargaining

D10, J26

2005 Lundberg Working

Paper Empirical US NLSY79

Child Gender Labor Supply

Time Allocation J22, J12, J13, J16

2005 Maitra & Ray AEP Empirical Australia AHES1998-99 Simultaneous Expenditure

Bargaining Power NA

2005 Maitra & Ray Working

Paper Empirical Pakistan PIHS/1991

Expenditures Resource Pooling Intra-Household

I32, I38, D12, D32

2005 Strand JRU Theoretical NA NA Bargaining

Intertemporal Optimal Life

I12, G22, J17

2005 Vermeulen EmpE Empirical Netherlands DNBHS/1995-2003 Intra-Household

Bargaining Labor Suppy

D12, J22

2006 Alessie et al. Working

Paper Empirical

Ten European Countries

ECHP/2001 Consumption

Financial Satisfaction

D12, D13,I31

2006 Bargain et al. REHO Survey NA NA Labor Supply

Intra-Household Tax Reform

D11, D12, J22

2006 Bargain & Moreau AERAE Empirical France NA Labor Supply Tax Reform Simulations

NA

2006 Basu EJ Theoretical NA NA

Gender Balance of Power

Household Equilibrium

NA

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2006 Bayudan AE Empirical Phillipines CLHNS/1984-1999 Wive’s Time Allocation

Intra-Household NA

2006 Beninger et al. REHO Empirical Germany GSOEP/1998 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Tax Reform

D11, D12, J22

2006 Beninger &Laisney CESR Empirical France NA Labor Supply

Policy Simulations

NA

2006 Browning et al. REHO Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Distribution Factors

D13

2006 Chiappori & Donni AERAE Survey NA NA Non-Unitary Cooperative

Non-Cooperative NA

2006 Chiappori & Ekeland JET Theoretical NA NA Demand Theory

Aggregation Group Behavior

D11, D13, C65

2006 Choo & Siow JPE Empirical US Census/

1971-72, 81-82

Marriage Market Non-Parametric

Matching NA

2006 Dauphin et al. AERAE Empirical UK FES/1982-93 Consumption

Testing Collective Model

NA

2006 Donni CJE Theoretical NA NA Demand Theory

Slutsky Symmetry Welfare

NA

2006 Donni AERAE Empirical US PSID/1990 Non-Cooperation

Labor Supply Nash

J22, D13, C79

2006 Fuwa et al. DE Empirical India NA

Child Labor Intra-Household

NGO Interventions

C81, D13, I21, I31, J16, J22, J24, O15

2006 Lancaster et al. Economica Empirical India NSS/1993-94 Endogeneity

Bargaining Power Expenditure

NA

2006 Mazzocco Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Public Consumption

Children D10, D91, H41

2006 McPeak & Doss AJAE Empirical Kenya Survey/1993-97 Household Production

Non-Cooperation NA

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2006 Myck et al. REHO Empirical UK FRS/1998-99 Fiscal Reforms Labor Supply

Intra-Household D11, D12

2006 Rapoport et al. AERAE Empirical France EET-INSEE/

1998-99

Household Production

Sharing Rule NA

2006 Vermeulen JOPE Empirical Belgique SEP/1992-1997 Female

Labor Supply Tax Reform

D11, D12, J22

2006 Vermeulen et al. REHO Theoretical NA NA Labor Supply Tax Reform

Non-Participation D11, D12, J22

2006 Vermeulen et al. AERAE Empirical Belgium EB-INS/

1996-97, 1997-98, 2000

Public Consumption

Intra-Household NA

2007 Apps & Rees Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Cooperation Welfare Function

Bargaining D10

2007 Aura Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Dynamic

Commitment Consumption

D1, D91, J12

2007 Bargain & Moreau Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Taxation Intra-Household

Simulations NA

2007 Beninger et al. JOPE Empirical Germany GSOEP/1998 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Tax Reform

D11, D12, J22

2007 Blundell et al. RES Empirical UK FES/1978-2001 Labor Suppy

Heterogeneity Non-participation

NA

2007 Chau et al. ChER Empirical China USU-SSB/2002

Labor Supply Developing

country Patriarchalism

D13, J22, O12

2007 Cherchye et al. Econome-

trica Theoretical NA NA

Intra-Household Revealed

Preferences Nonparametric

NA

2007 Couprie EJ Empirical UK BHPS/1992-2000 Leisure Demand

Time Use Welfare

NA

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2007 Daunfeldt & Hellstrom Labor Empirical Sweden HUS/1984-93 Time Allocation

Household Production

C24, D13, J22

2007 Donni EJ Empirical France INSEE/1984-85 Female

Labor Supply Intra-Household

NA

2007 Donni & Moreau JHR Empirical France INSEE/1999-2000 Labor supply Conditional

demand NA

2007 Iyigun & Walsh JDE Theoretical NA NA Gender Power Labor Supply

Bargaining J13, O11, O33, O40

2007 Iyigun & Walsh RES Theoretical NA NA

Marriage Market Spousal Powers

Assortative Matching

NA

2007 Lee EDCC Empirical South Korea KHPS/1993-98 Consumption

Spouses Power Dynamic

NA

2007 Lundberg & Pollak JEP Survey NA NA Family Economics American Families

NA

2007 Mazzocco RESt Empirical US CEX/1984-1995 Commitment Intertemporal

Intra-Household NA

2007 Rainer EER Theoretical NA NA Asset Division

Divorce Marital Contract

J12, K11, D78

2007 Trannoy & Peluso JET Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Inequality Sharing Rule

D13, D63, D31

2007 Xu Mimeo Survey NA NA Intra-Household

Bargaining Dynamics

NA

2008 Cherchye et al. JEcon Empirical Russia RMLS/1994-2003 Revealed

Preferences Programming

D11, D12, D14

2008 Cherchye & Vermeulen RESt Empirical Netherlands DNBHS/1995-2005 Labor Supply

Revealed Preferences

C13, D12, J22

2008 Chiappori & Oreffice JPE Theoretical NA NA Birth Control

Intra-Household Female Power

NA

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2008 Dietrich AFE Empirical China CHNS/1991-93 Consumption

Demand System Bargaining

NA

2008 Donni JPubE Theoretical NA NA Labor supply Public goods

NA

2008 Donni Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Collective Models Household

NA

2008 Ermisch & Pronzato EJ Empirical UK BHPS/1991-2005 Intra-Household

Father’s Child Payments

NA

2008 Fafchamps Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Intra-Household Welfare

NA

2008 Kalugina et al. EP

2008 Lewbel & Penkakur JEcon Empirical Canada CFES/1990-92 Consumption

Demand System Bargaining

D12, D11, C30, C31, J12

2008 Mazzocco Mimeo Empirical US CEX/1982-95 Consumption Intertemporal Commitment

NA

2008 Mazzocco Mimeo Empirical US CEX/1982-98 Consumption Intertemporal Identification

NA

2008 Rasul JDE Empirical Malaysia MFLS/

1976-77, 1988-89

Fertility Bargaining

Commitment J12, J13, O12

2008 Silvennoinen Ph.D. Thesis

NA NA NA Intra-Household Time Allocation

NA

2008 Siow CJE Empirical China NA Marriage Matching

Labor Supply NA

2008 Van Klaveren et al REHO Empirical UK BHPS/2003 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Time Allocation

D12, D13, J22

2008 Ward-Batts JHR Empirical UK FES/1973-1983

(excluding 1977-79)

Income Pooling Intra-Household

Expenditure shares

NA

2008 Yoshida & Kim AE Empirical Japan 1996-97-98 Consumption Health Risk Income Risk

NA

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2009 Allgood JPubET Theoretical NA NA Tax Policy Household Production

NA

2009 Ashraf AER Empirical Philippines Authors’data/

2004

Experiments Information

Communication D13, D14, J12, J16, O15

2009 Bobonis JPE Empirical Mexico PROGRESA Intra-Household

Female Consumption

NA

2009 Bonke &Browning FS Empirical Denmark DHES/1999-2005 Intra-Household

Expenditure D13, C81, C42

2009 Bonke & Browning REHO Empirical Denmark ECHP/1994 Relative Income

Well-being Intra-Household

D13, D60, D63, I31

2009 Bonke & Browing EJ Empirical Denmark DHES/1999-2005 Expenditure

Children NA

2009 Bourguignon et al. RES Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Efficiency Identification

NA

2009 Cherchye et al. Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Revealed Preference Demand

NA

2009 Cherchye et al. JPE Empirical Russia RMLS Revealed

Preference Intra-Household

2009 Chiappori & Ekeland Econome-

trica Theoretical NA NA

Non-parametric Identification Labor Supply

NA

2009 Crespo IE Empirical Spain ECHP/1994-1999 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Unitary/Collective

J22, D13

2009 Deb JET Theoretical NA NA

Externalities Revealed

Preference Consumption

C14, C72, D11, D59

2009 Donni RESt Empirical US CES/1980-2003 Public Goods Conditional

Demands NA

2009 Kalugina et al. RIW Empirical Russia RMLS/1994-1998 Inequality

Identification Sharing Rule

NA

2009 Kalugina et al. REHO Empirical Russia RMLS/1994-2003 Intra-Household

Inequality D13, I31, C3, P36

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2009 Kato & Matsumoto TRB Empirical Japan Time Surveys/2003 Intra-Household Children Gender

Spouses Job NA

2009 Lundberg et al. REHO Empirical US NLSY79 Children Parents

Investments NA

2009 Sahn & Younger HE Empirical Seven countries LSMS BMI

Intra-Household NA

2009 Seitz JLE Empirical US NLSY79/1979-1994 Racial Differences

Marriage Dynamic

NA

2009 Trannoy & Peluso JID Theoretical NA NA Poverty

Intra-Household D31, D63, I32

2009 Zhang et al. TRB Empirical Japan NA Intra-Household

Heterogeneity Bayesian

NA

2010 Amuedo-Dorantes et al. Working

Paper Empirical Denmark DHS/1999-2005

Income Pooling Household Production

D13, D14, J12

2010 Apps & Rees REHO Empirical Australia ATUS/2005-06 ABS/2003-04

Labor Supply Taxation

Time Allocation D13, D91, H31, J2

2010 Attanasio & Lechene Working

Paper Empirical Mexico Surveys/1998-99

Consumption Cash Transfers

QUAIDS NA

2010 Bargain et al. ESR Empirical Ireland IHBS/2005

Demand Sharing Rule

Costs of Children

D11, D12, C30, D36, I31, J12

2010 Bloemen EJ Empirical Netherlands SEP/1990-2001 Labor Supply

Non-participation Sharing Rule

NA

2010 Browning et al. EJ Theoretical NA NA Non-Cooperation

Public Good Game Separate Spheres

NA

2010 Cherchye et al. JET Theoretical NA NA Consumption

Revealed Preferences

D11, D12, D13, C14

2010 Chiappori JET Theoretical NA NA Demand

Transferable Utility

C78, D11, D12

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2010 Couprie et al. JPubE Empirical France FFES/2000 Expenditures

Inequality Sharing Functions

D63, D13, C14

2010 Hendy & Sofer Working

Paper Empirical Egypt ELMPS/2006

Labor Supply Females

Distribution Factors D11, D12, J22

2010 Linciano & Simmons Working

Paper Empirical UK BHPS/1992

Labor Supply Work Travel

NA

2010 Prabhu WD Empirical India Survey/2005-06 Intra-Household

Willingness To Pay

NA

2010 Yoon & Goulias TL Empirical US CSTS/2000-01 Time Allocation Intra-Household

Life Cycle NA

2011 Apps & Rees Chapter

Book Theoretical NA NA

Time Use Inequality Taxation

NA

2011 Basu & Ray Chapter

Book Empirical Nepal NLSS/1995

Woman’s Power Child Labor

NA

2011 Cherchye et al. RES Empirical Russia RLMS/1994-95-96-

98-00-01-02-03

Revealed Preferences

Consumption Sharing Rule

D11, D12, D13, C14

2011 Cherchye et al. Chapter

Book Empirical Russia RMLS

Consumption Revealed

Preferences D11, D12, D13, C14

2011 Cherchye et al. Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Revealed Preference

Tests NA

2011 Cherchye et al. EJ Empirical Russia RLMS/1994-95-96-

98-00-01-02-03

Revealed Preference

Consumption NA

2011 Chiappori REHO Theoretical NA NA

Labor Supply Consumption

Goods Identification

NA

2011 Chiappori & Ekeland ARE Theoretical NA NA Aggregation

Demand Pareto-Efficient

NA

2011 Dauphin et al. EJ Empirical UK FES/1982-93 Children under 16

QUAIDS Intra-Household

NA

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2011 Donni & Chiappori Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Non-Unitary Models

NA

2011 Donni & Ponthieux TGS Survey NA NA Unitary/Collective

Models NA

2011 Gersbach & Haller JET Theoretical NA NA

General Equilibrium Household Formation

NA

2011 Lacroix & Radtchenko JOPE Empirical Russia RLMS/1994-2004 Sharing Rule

Intra-Household Economic Crisis

D1, J22, C5

2011 Lechene & Preston JET Theoretical NA NA Nash Equilibrium Intra-Household

Slutsky Symmetry D11, C72

2011 Lise & Seitz RES Empirical UK FES/1968-2001 Consumption

Marital Sorting Equivalence Scales

D12, D13, D31, J22

2011 de Palma et al. TD Empirical Germany Sessions/2005 Balance of Power

Experiments Intra-Household

NA

2011 Rapoport et al. JOPE Empirical France FrenchTUS/1998 Intra-Household

Home Production Labor Supply

D13, J22

2011 Talla Nobibon et al. CE Theoretical NA NA Revealed

Preference Graphs Colors

NA

2011 Zamora JOPE Empirical Spain EPF/1990-91 Intra-Household

Sharing Rule Engel Curve

D11, J22

2012 Bargain & Donni EER Empirical France INSEE/2000 Demand systems Cost of children

Indifference scales D11, D12, D36, I31, J12

2012 Browning & Gortz SJE Empirical Denmark DanishTUS/2001 Home Production Intra-Household

Time Use Money C3, D1, J1, J2

2012 Bruyneel et al. REHO Empirical NA 102 Undergr.

Students

Revealed Preferences

Experimental Data C14, C92, D11, D12, D13

2012 Cherchye et al. AER Empirical Netherlands LISS Panel Labor Supply

Household Production

D12, J12, J22

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2012 Cherchye et al. EER Empirical Netherlands DCES/1978-2004 Well-being

Poverty Elderly Consumption

D11, D12, D13, D63, I31

2012 Chiappori et al. RES Theoretical NA NA

Theoretical restrictions Game

Theory Nash solution

NA

2012 Del Boca & Flinn JEcon Empirical US PSID/2005

Time Allocation Trigger Strategy

Household Proudction

C79, D19, J22

2012 Donni & Matteazzi AES Empirical US ATUS/2003-2006 Labor Supply

Home Production Identification

D13, J21, J22

2012 Haan & Myck AE Empirical Poland PHBS/2005 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Work Incentives

J22, I38, D13

2012 Lundberg Working

Paper Empirical Germany GSOEP

Personality Marriage Divorce

J22

2012 Mazzocco & Saini AER Empirical India ICRISAT/1975-85 Efficient

Risk Sharing J12, D86, G22, O12, O18,

R23 Z13

2012 Menon et al. EL Empirical Italy CISF/2009 Expenditure

Children Sharing Rule

C2,D1, D6, D7

2012 Sinha AsER Empirical India HDP/1994 Labor Supply

Bargaining Health

J22, C31, I15, D13

2012 Van Klaveren & Ghysels JLR Empirical Belgium FFCS/2004-05 Labor Supply

Child Care D12, D13, J22

2013 Bargain & Moreau JFEI Empirical France FHBS/2001

Labor Supply Bargaining Tax-benefit

Reform

NA

2013 Browning et al. RES Empirical Canada FAMEX/1974-1992 Consumption

Economies of Scale Bargaining Power

D11, D12, C30, I31, D63, J12

2013 Cherchye et al. ET Empirical NA 102 Underg.

Students

Consumption Revealed

Preferences Public/Private

D11, D12, D13, C14

2013 Cherchye et al. EJ Empirical Belguim 116 Economic

Students Nash Bargaining

Consumption NA

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2013 Chiappori et al. Mimeo Empirical France Census/1999

Location Bargaining

Transportation Costs

NA

2013 Choo & Seitz Chapter

Book Empirical US Census/2000

Labor Supply Intra-Household

Transfers NA

2013 Doss WBRO Survey NA NA Intra-Household

Bargaining Development

O12, O20, R2

2013 Dunbar et al. AER Empirical Malawi HIS/2005-2011

Children Resources

Consumption Child Poverty

I31, I32, J12, J13, O12, O15

2013 Fujii & Ishikawa REHO Theoretical NA NA Intra-Household

Bargaining Separability

C78, D01, D11

2013 Fujii & Ishikawa OBES Empirical Japan JPSC/1994-2002 Childbirth

Expenditure Intra-Household

NA

2013 Himmelweit et al. JMF Survey NA NA Sharing Resources

Gender Inequality

NA

2013 Loken et al. Dem Empirical Norway Administrative

Data/2006

Marriage Gender Residential

Location NA

2013 Martinez EDCC Empirical Chile CASEN/1990-92-

94-96-2000 Intra-Household

Bargaining Power NA

2013 Mazzocco et al. Mimeo Empirical US PSID/1968-96 Labor Supply

Wealth Dynamics Marriage

NA

2013 Ortigueira & Siassi JMonE Empirical US NA Labor Supply Risk Sharing

Unemployment NA

2013 Picard et al. IJTE Survey NA NA Transportation

Urban Economics Pareto Efficiency

NA

2014 Adams et al. AER Empirical Spain ECPF/1985-1997

Intertemporal Decisions, Revealed

Preferences

E24, F13, F16

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2014 D’Aspremont & Dos Santos

ET Theoretical NA NA Cooperative and Noncooperative Nash Solution

C11, C72, H41

2014 Attanasio & Lechene JPE Empirical Mexico PROGRESA/

1998-1999

Consumption Cash Transfer Distribution

Factors

NA

2014 Bargain & Donni Economica Theoretical NA NA Consumption

Optimal Taxation Intra-Household

NA

2014 Bargain et al. JDE Empirical Côte d’Ivoire CILSS/2002 Intra-Household

Expenditures Child Poverty

D11, D12, D36, I31, J12

2014 Bertochhi et al. JEBO Empirical Italy SHIW/1989-2010 Intra-Household

Gender Financial Choices

J12, D13, E21, G11

2014 Boone et al. IZAJOLE Empirical US CEX/1998-2007 Consumption Labor Supply

Non-Cooperation D11, D12, D13

2014 Browning et al. Book NA NA NA Family Economics NA

2014 Del Boca & Flinn JET Empirical US PSID/2007 Marriage Market

Matching Time Allocation

D13, J12, J22

2014 Donni MSS Theoretical NA NA Bargaining

Risk Durable Goods

NA

2014 Inoa et al. Working

Paper Empirical France Paris

Location Commuting

Intra-Household R21, R31,C35

2014 Kebede et al. JAE Empirical Ethiopia 1,200 Couples Efficiency

Experiment Spouses’ Power

D13, C93, D03

2014 Lise & Yamada Working

Paper Empirical Japan JPSC/1993-2007

Consumption Leisure

Dynamic Commitment

D12, D13, J22

2014 Mangiavacchi & Rapallini

BER Empirical Italy ITUS/2002

Household Production Inequality Time Use

D13, J16, J22, 052

2014 Mazzocco et al. AERP&P Empirical US PSID/1968-96 Labor Supply

Dynamics Gender

NA

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2014 Menon et al. AJAE Empirical Italy Survey/1997 Travel-Cost Model Non-Market Good Demand System

D13, H41,Q26, Q51

2014 de Palma et al. Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Transportation Negotiation Efficiency

NA

2014 Zhang JOPE Empirical US SIPP/2004-08 Labor Supply

Shocks Income Instability

D12, D13, D81, J22

2015 Beblo et al. AES Empirical France Germany 156 Couples/2010 Experiment Inequality

Social Norms C71,C91, C92, D13

2015 Bonke REHO Empirical Denmark DHES/1994-2004 Income Pooling Consumption

Marriage D13, D31, C82

2015 Caiumi EmpE Empirical Italy SHIW/1995 Cost of Children Demand System

Sharing Rule D12, D13, J22

2015 Cherchye et al Econome-

trica Empirical US PSID/1999-2009

Demand Sharing Rule

Revealed Preference

NA

2015 Chiappori & Meghir Chapter

Book Survey NA NA

Inequality Sharing Rule

NA

2015 Chaippori & Naidoo Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Engel Curves

Non-Cooperation Working-Leser

NA

2015 Chiappori et al. JDE Theoretical NA NA Becker-Coase Consumption Marital Status

NA

2015 Couprie & Ferrant AES Empirical UK UKTUS/2000 Welfare

Time Use Bargaining Power

D10, D13, D63, J12, J22

2015 Eckstein & Lifshitz IER Empirical US PSID/1983-93 Labor Supply

Married Women Household Games

NA

2015 Galichon & Salanié Working

Paper Theoretical NA NA

Matching Marriage

Hedonic Prices C78, D61, C13

2015 Haddad EmpE Empirical Iran HES&ASY/2008 Intra-Household

Gender Ratio Divorce Rate

D13, J22

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2015 Mizushima & Futagami JE Theoretical NA NA Public Goods

Household Games Time Allocation

D13, J24

2015 Naidoo Mimeo Theoretical NA NA Testing Pareto Public Goods

Non-Parametric D13, D7

2015 de Palma et al. ETrans Empirical France Paris Time Decision

Congestion Delay Costs

D11, D70, R41

2015 Smeulders et al. JME Theoretical NA NA

Weak Axiom Revealed

Preference Consumption

NA

2015 Smeulders et al. ETB Theoretical NA NA

Transitivity Weak Axiom

Revealed Preference

D11, D12, D13, C14

2015 Sofer & Thibout ES Empirical France FTUS/

1998-99 2010-11

Domestic Production Time Use Gender

D13, J16, J22

2015 Voena AER Empirical US PSID&NLSYM/196

8-93 & 1967-99

Divorce Laws Intertemporal

Well-being D13, D14, D91, J12, J16, K36

2015 Yilmazer & Lich REHO Empirical US HRS/1992-2006 Portfolio Choice

Risky Assets Bargaining Power

NA

2016 Blau & Goodstein LE Empirical US HRS/1992-1998-

2004

Commitment Inheritance

Labor Supply NA

2016 Browning et al. Mimeo

2016 Cherchye et al. Working

Paper Empirical US PSID/2013

Marriage Economies Scale

Revealed Preference

D11, D12, D13, J12

2016 Chiappori EJ Theoretical NA NA Indifference

Scales NA

2016 Cochard et al. REHO Empirical France 100 Couples/2008 Experiment Cooperation

Efficiency Equal C72, C91, D13

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2016 Gutierrez Mimeo Empirical Mexico MxFLS/2002, 2005-

06, 2009-10

Sharing Model Deaton-Paxson Consumption

D13, J12, O15

2016 Lundberg et al. JEP Survey NA NA Inequality Marriage

Childbearing NA

2016 Radtchenko JFEI Empirical Russia RLMS/1995-1998 Inequality

Labor Supply Sharing Rule

NA

2016 Rodriguez WD Empirical NA UNICEF/

2000, 2010-11

Inequality Children

Well-being NA

2016 Talla Nobibon et al. OP Theoretical NA NA

Revealed Preference

Consumption Programming

NA

2016 Tommasi & Wolf Working

Paper Empirical Mexico PROGRESA

Demand System Sharing Rule

Cash Transfers D13, D11,D12,C31, I32

2017 Beblo & Beninger REHO Empirical Germany 95 couples Intra-Household

Consumption Experiment

C71, C91, C92, D12, D13, J16

2017 Bruyneel et al. QE Empirical NA 100 Children

Children’s Consumption

Revealed Preferences

D11, D12, C14

2017 Cherchye et al. AER Empirical Denmark LISS/2012

Marriage Consumption

Revealed Preference

D60, D63, H21, H23, I38

2017 Chiappori & Mazzocco JEL Survey NA NA Static

Intertemporal Intra-Household

D11, D13, D15, I38

2017 Chiappori et al. AER Empirical US Census/2008-14 Consumption

Children’s Welfare Matching

D12, J12, J13, J15, J24

2017 Chiappori et al. EJ Empirical Canada GSS/2001 Alimony Rights

Cohabiting Matching

NA

2017 Bütikofer & Gerfin REHO Empirical Switzerland LWS/2000-2008 Sharing Rule

Equivalence Scale Subjective Data

D12, C21, D19

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2017 Couprie et al. Working

Paper Empirical France

81 Couples/ 2012-13

Experiment Stereotypes

Gender Roles D13, J16, J22, C91,C92

2017 Dunbar et al. Mimeo Empirical Malawi HIS/2005-2011 Costs of Children

Sharing Rule Demand Systems

D13, D11, D12, C31, I32

2017 Goussé et al. Econome-

trica Empirical UK BHPS/1991-2008

Assortative Matching Gender

Social Norms

NA

2017 Goussé et al. LE Empirical UK BHPS/1991-2008 Labor Supply Assortative Matching

C78, D83, J12, J22

2017 Lyssiotou EmpE Empirical UK FES/1991-93 Child Benefits Labor Supply Public Goods

D12, I38, J16, J18, J22, H31

2017 Matteazzi et al. AEPP Empirical Italy ISMEA/1995 Farm-Household

Household Production

D11, D12, D13

2017 Porter JDE Empirical China CLHLS/1998-2009 Caring

Elderly Parents Sex Ratios

NA

2017 Stieglitz et al. EvHD Empirical Bolivia 53 Couples Experiment

Sexual Division Labor

NA

2018 Armand et al. Working

Paper Empirical Macedonia MLSP/2010-11

Gender Expenditure

D12, D13, E21, O12

2018 Bargain et al. Mimeo Empirical UK FES/1978 Costs of Children

QUAIDS Sharing Resources

NA

2018 Campaña et al. Working

Paper Empirical Mexico Colombia TUS/2009 2012

Labor Supply Intra-Household

Bargaining Power D10 J22

2018 Chavas et al. TE Empirical Italy HBS/2007 Consumption

Welfare Inequality

D11, D12, D13

2018 Chiappori REHO Theoretical NA NA Labor Supply

Samuelson Randomized

D11, D12, D13

2018 Chiappori et al. REHO Empirical Russia RLMS/1995-2013 Divorce

Marriage Matching

J12, D1

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2018 Cochard et al. EE Empirical France 238 Individuals/

2010-16

Experiment Time Allocation Work Division

D13, C99, J16

2018 Cosaert & Demuynck RESt Empirical US CEX/1994-2007 Non-Parametric Welfare Demand

Heterogeneity NA

2018 Dauphin et al. REHO Empirical Burkina Faso Survey CECI/1999 Consumption

QUAIDS Polygamy

D1, D7, J12

2018 Flinn et al. EER Empirical Australia HILDA/2001-16 Gender Wage Differentials

Time Allocations D1, J12, J16, J22, J31, J71

2018 Manzini & Mariotti JET Theoretical NA NA Stochastic Choice Attraction Effect Similarity Effect

D03, D01

2018 Menon et al. REHO Empirical Italy HES/2002-03-04 Demand System

Sharing Rule Alcohol

C31, C34, C51, D12, D13

2018 Molina et al. Working

Paper Empirical US PSID/1997-15

Intertemporal Labor Supply

D15, J22

2018 Molina et al. Working

Paper Empirical US ATUS/2003-15

Welfare Inequality

Labor Supply D15, J22

2018 Tommasi & Wolf EL Theoretical NA NA Demand System

Sharing Rule Shrinkage

D13, D11, D12, C31, I32

Forthcoming d’Aspremont et al. ET Theoretical NA NA Semi-Cooperation

Revealed Preference

D11, C72, H41

Forthcoming Bargain & Martinoty JOPE Empirical Spain EPF/2006-11 Mancession

Intra-Household Unemployment

NA

Forthcoming Bloemen JBES Empirical Netherlands SEP/1990-2002 Labor Supply

Intra-Household Taxation

NA

Forthcoming Donni & Matteazzi JAEcon Empirical US PSID/2009 Labor Supply

Non-Participation NA

Forthcoming Galichon et al. JPE Theoretical NA NA Matching

Transferable Utility Heterogeneity

NA

Forthcoming Molina et al. REHO Empirical Spain 55 three-generation families, 165 indiv./

2017

Intra-Household Intergenerational

Experiment D03, D64, D70

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31

Short-terms of Journals: AERAE= Actualité Économique: Revue d’Analyse Économique AER = American Economic Review AERP&P = American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings AJAE = American Journal of Agricultural Economics AES = Annals of Economics and Statistics ARE = Annual Review of Economics AEPP = Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy AE = Applied Economics AEL = Applied Economics Letters AEQ = Applied Economics Quarterly AFE = Applied Financial Economics AsER = Asian Economic Review AEP = Australian Economic Papers BER = Bulletin of Economic Research CESR = Cahiers d’Économie et Sociologie Rurales CJE = Canadian Journal of Economics CPP = Canadian Public Policy CESifo = CESifo Economic Studies ChER = China Economics Review CE = Computational Economics Dem = Demography DE = Developing Economies EJ = Economic Journal ER = Economic Record ET = Economic Theory ETB = Economic Theory Bulletin EDCC = Economic Development and Cultural Change ESR = Economic and Social Review EHB = Economics and Human Behaviors EL = Economics Letters ETrans= Economics of Transportation EP = Economie & Prévision EmpE = Empirical Economics EER = European Economic Review EvHB = Evolution and Human Behavior ExE = Experimental Economics FE = Feminist Economics FS = Fiscal Studies HE = Health Economics IER = International Economic Review IJTE = International Journal of Transport Economics IZADP = Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Papers IZAJLE = Institute of Labor Economics Journal of Labor Economics IE = Investigaciones Económicas JAE = Journal of African Economies JAEcon = Journal of Applied Econometrics JBES = Journal of Business and Economic Statistics JDE = Journal of Demographic Economics JDevE = Journal of Development Economics

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JDevS = Journal of Development Studies JEBO = Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization JEH = Journal of Economic History JEL = Journal of Economic Literature JEP = Journal of Economic Perspectives JES = Journal of Economic Surveys JET = Journal of Economic Theory JE = Journal of Economics JEcon = Journal of Econometrics JFEI = Journal of Family and Economic Issues JHR = Journal of Human Resources JMF = Journal of Marriage and Family JME = Journal of Mathematical Economics JMonE= Journal of Monetary Economics JOLE = Journal of Labor Economics JLR= Journal of Labor Research JPE = Journal of Political Economy JOPE = Journal of Population Economics JPubE = Journal of Public Economics JPubET = Journal of Public Economy Theory JRU = Journal of Risk and Uncertainty JSED = Journal of Social and Economic Development LE = Labour Economics OR = Operations Research OBES = Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics OEP = Oxford Economic Papers QE = Quantitative Economics QJE = Quarterly Journal of Economics REI = Research on Economic Inequality RE = Research in Economics RED = Review of Economic Dynamics RES = Review of Economic Studies REHO = Review of Economics of the Household RESt = Review of Economics and Statistics RIW = Review of Income and Wealth RevE = Revue Économique RiE = Ricerche Economiche RPE = Rivista di Politica Economica SJE = Scandinavian Journal of Economics SEJ = Southern Economic Journal SFP = Studies in Family Planning TD = Theory and Decision TE = Theoretical Economics TL = Transportation Letters TGS = Travail, Genre et Sociétés TRB = Transportation Research Part B: Methodological WB = The World Bank WBER = World Bank Economic Review WBRO = World Bank Research Observer WD = World Development

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