Devitt Realism and the Renegade Putnam PDF

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Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meaning and the Moral SciencesAuthor(s): Michael DevittSource: Nos, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May, 1983), pp. 291-301Published by: WileyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215148.

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CRITICAL STUDIESRealism and theRenegadePutnam:A CriticalStudyofMeaning and the Moral Sciences

MICHAEL DEVITTUNIVERSITYOFSYDNEY

For many years Hilary Putnam has been an enthusiastic supporter of the causeof realism about the external world (e.g., in [14]). However, he has never beenafraid to change his mind. In the paper, "Realism and Reason," the last part(Part Four) of Meaning and the Moral Sciences [16], he abandons the cause.Indeed, he now finds his former position "incoherent" ([16]: 124). He attri-butes the change in his views partly to new influences from Michael Dummettand Nelson Goodman, and to an old influence from W. V. Quine (pp. viii-ix).Aside from these influences he is led to anti-realism by a model-theoreticargument he propounds in "Realism and Reason" (pp.125-127) and in muchgreater detail in a recent paper. "Models and Reality" [18]. One aim of thisstudy is to refute that argument. That is the concern of Part II.The issue of realism is not confined to Part Four of [16]: it recurs through-out, particularly in Part One. Until Part Four, Putnam's stance is pro-realist. Toassess the bearing of any of Putnam's discussion on realism we need a clear ideaof what realism is. Unfortunately, that is something that Putnam does notsupply. On the contrary, Putnam casts almost impenetrable darkness on thequestion. The other aim of this study is to show this. That is the concern of PartI.The chief difficulty in understanding Putnam's discussion of realism isthat it is thoroughly entangled with a discussion of truth. Truth is the othermajor concern of the book. Part One, the 1976John Locke lectures, comprisinghalf the book, is largely devoted to arguing against Hartry Field [7] that we donot need to supplement a Tarskian theory of truth with theories of reference;indeed, Field's view that such theories are possible is "a species of scientificutopianism" (p. 58). And in Part Three, the paper "Reference and Under-standing," Putnam argues for a verificationist theory of understanding but fora correspondence notion of truth. (I have discussed these arguments abouttruth in [4].)Part Two, the paper "Literature, Science, and Reflection," is the most

sketchy part of the book. Part One ends with the claim that the social sciencesare fundamentally different from physics and must find a place for Verstehen(empathetic understanding). In Part Two this "humanist" line is applied toliterature and morality.291

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292 NOOSPART I

1. Realism and TruthWhat does truth have to do with realism? I have complained that Putnamentangles the two issues. In this section I shall set out briefly my view of theconnection between them.' I shall then consider Putnam's discussion.I seek first a statement of the doctrine of realism that captures its tradi-tional opposition to idealism about common sense entities and its more recentopposition to instrumentalism bout scientific ones. There are two dimensions ofthis doctrine: first, a claim about what exists; second, a claim about the natureof that existence. To capture the first dimension we can say that it is commonsense, and scientific, physical entities that exist. Words that frequently occur inattempts to capture the second are 'independent,' 'external,' and 'objective.'The entities must be independent of the mental; they must be external to themind; they must exist objectively in that they exist whatever anyone's opinion.We can capture both these dimensions well enough in the following doctrine,"Physical Realism" ("PR"):

Common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist inde-pendently of the mental.A lot more than this could certainly be said to clarify realism. However, Itake it that PR fairly obviously, even if a little roughly, expresses the centralintuitions of realist doctrines about the external world (see e.g., 112]: 77). Weare not entitled to insist that the word 'realism' be used for PR, or somethinglike it, rather than say for some semantic doctrine, but we are entitled towonder whether in another use it has anything to do with the traditionalmetaphysical and epistemic disputes between realists and idealists/ instrumen-talists. It is clear that Putnam sees his discussion of realism as bearing on thosedisputes and that he has something like PR at the back of his mind, at leastpartly, when he talks of "realism"([16]: 9, 18-20, 102). So, I shall rest with PR asthe doctrine of realism.What has truth to do with this doctrine of realism? On the face of it, nothingat all. PR says nothing about truth nor even about the bearers of truth,sentences and beliefs (except perhaps, in its use of 'objective,' the negative pointthat beliefs do not determine existence). PR says nothing semanticat all.PR does not strictly entail any doctrine of truth at all nor, I would claim, isthere any obviously rue proposition which, together with PR, entails a (nontri-vial) doctrine of truth. There is no inconsistency in being a realist and yetaltogether skeptical of truth, as Stephen Leeds has pointed out [13] (drawingon Quine). The most we can expect is that a doctrine of truth is part of the bestexplanation of the world the realist believes in.So much for the inference from PR to truth. What about the reverseinference? This has even less to be said for it. Mere acceptance of truth entailsnothing ontological at all. For one thing there are various notions of truth:disquotational, epistemic, correspondence, etc.. We need to know, at least,

whichnotion of truth is accepted before drawing any ontological conclusions. Foranother thing we need to know whichstatements he notion is applied to; truthmight be applied to some statements but not others. It is common to linkrealism to the correspondence otion of truth applied tophysicalstatements (onescontaining words like 'tree' and 'electron'). I capture the doctrine that it isappropriate. to apply that notion to those statments as follows:



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REALISM AND THE RENEGADE PUTNAM 293Physical statements are true or false in virtue of: (i) their structure; (ii) thereferential relations between their parts and reality; and (iii) the objectivenature of that reality.

Call this doctrine, "CNT." Now even CNT does not entail PR for it says nothingaboutthenatureof the reality hat makes physical statements true or false. So far asCNT is concerned that reality could be an idealist's realm of sense data.In sumno doctrineof truth s in any way constitutiveof a realistdoctrine ikePR.2Doubtless this brief account of realism and truth, and the relationshipbetween them, is open to objection. My criticism of Putnam is that he gives noclear account of the matter at all.2. TheBoydianHypothesisand RealismAn example of the difficulty occurs early in [16] when Putnam discusses anhypothesis he attributes to Richard Boyd. His stance at this point is pro-realist.Since his discussion first appeared in an article called "What is 'Realism'?" [15]we might hope for some clarity about the nature of realism. Yet the discussion isbaffling.

Boydtriestospell outrealismasan over-arching mpiricalhypothesisbymeansoftwo principles:(1) Terms in a maturesciencetypicallyrefer.(2)The lawsof a theorybelongingto a maturesciencearetypicallyapproximatelytrue.What he attempts o showin his essay s that scientistsact as they do becausetheybelieve1) and (2) and that their strategyworksbecause (1)and (2)are true. [16]:20-21)

What then, according to Putnam, constitutes ealism at this point? It looks asif (1) and (2) are thought to constitute it and that the part of the followingsentence beginning "scientists act as they do" is the empirical hypothesis. And itis because (1) and (2) are mentioned in that sentence that realism is an empiricalhypothesis.What is realist about (1) and (2)? Putnam does not say. Yet, as we have seen,the links between truth (and reference) and realism are not that close andrequire a lot of explanation. Putnam does not even make it explicitthat he has acorrespondence notion of the truth in mind in (1) and (2), though he knows aswell as anyone that other notions have been proposed (and has indicated asmuch, without explanation, on the previous page )Realism as an empirical hypothesis is alleged to explain two things, scien-tific behaviorand scientific success.Putnam also thinks that Boyd has shown howrealism explains the convergenceof scientific knowledge (pp. 20-22, 123). Itseems, in fact, that this explanation is the same as the one of scientific behavior.Let T' be the successor of T in any mature science. Then convergenceholds if and only iffrom theperspective f T', the terms of T typically refer and thelaws of T are typically approximately true. So if convergence holds it must bethe case the scientists typically choose a T' relative to which, as a matter of fact,reference and approximate truth for T are preserved. Putnam thinks thatrealism explains this scientific behavior and thus explains convergence (pp.20-21).Acceptance of convergence is not the same as acceptance of (1) and (2) (letalone realism). Convergence requires only truth and reference relative to theory



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294 NOOSwhereas (1) and (2) require "absolute" truth and reference. However accept-ance of convergence makes acceptance of (1) and (2) possible. On the otherhand, rejection of convergence threatens the collapse of truth and reference,hence (1) and (2), altogether, as Putnam brings out neatly:

the following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly compelling:just as no termsused nthe cience fmorehanfifty or whatever)years goreferred,o t willturnoutnotermusednow .. refers. p. 25)Putnam's actual explanation of scientist's choosing theories in the way thatthey do is that scientists believe(1) and (2). How could this possibly give groundsfor realism? It would do so straightforwardly if we identified realism withscientists'believing in (1) and (2). But such an identification is absurd. It seemsrather that we are supposed to identify realism with (1) and (2), as I conjectured,

and despite the objections to such an identification. This yields an argumentfor realism that illustrates a highly novel form of inference to the best explana-tion.Another illustration of this novel form would be what we may call "ThePutnam-Boyd argument for the existence of God." Argument: the explanationof the behavior of religious people is that they believe that God exists; so(inference to the best explanation), probably God exists. The trouble with theinference is, of course, that beliefs can explain behavior and yet be alse.So even if Putnam's explanation of convergence in terms of scientists'beliefs is a good one, it could not show that realism explains anything. Asidefrom that, the explanation is not such a good one. First, at best, the scientists'beliefs could explain them tryingto choose theories which, as a matter of fact,converge. It would not explain how they manage to succeed. How does it comeabout that there is typically a theory of that sort available for choice? Second,the explanation is shallow. The beliefs of scientists are as much in need ofexplanation as their behavior and could not, in the final analysis, explainconvergence. At least that is what a materialist should think.I conclude that Putnam's explanation of scientific behavior is beside thepoint. If we want an argument for realism we must focus on the explanation ofscientific success.Even if (1) and (2) were the explanation of success they would not establishrealism because they are compatible with any ontology. Nevertheless there maybe a good argument for realism underlying Putnam's discussion. It is notprimarily an explanation of success and makes no mention of truth or refer-ence.The realism Putnam is seeking to justify in this discussion is scientificrealism (pp. 18-19). Take this doctrine to be that part of PR that concernsunobservables. Then the main argument for it is that only bysupposingthatthereare thoseunobservables anweexplainthebehaviorandcharacteristicsftheobservables.The test for this explanation, as for all others, is that it is successful in practice:the observable world must be as if there were these unobservables. We can say,if we like, that realism explains this success, but that explanation is trivial. Thesuccess does not need explanation. If the supposition that there were theseunobservables were not successful we would drop it. What scientific realismprimarily explainsis the observableworld not observational uccess.It might be claimed that we need PR and CNT to explain the success of aperson (which is very different): he is mostly successful because his beliefs aremostly in correspondence with the realist's world (cf. pp. 100-103). The need isnot compelling (cf. [4]: 403). What matters to a person's success is that his



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REALISM AND THE RENEGADE PUTNAM 295beliefs be accurate at the level of evidence whether they are true or not andwhatever entities there are. However if we can otherwise ustify realism (asabove), and otherwiseustify CNT in the face of Leeds-Quine skepticism (bestbet: to explain learning and teaching), then these doctrines are further con-firmed by their ability to explain personal success along the lines indicated.3What about convergence? What needs explanation here, primarily, is notthe behavior of scientists but that convergence accompanies increasing obser-vational success. PR and CNT4 certainly promise a good explanation of this. Tand T' refer to the unobservable entities, parts of the realist's world. T' gives amore truthful and complete account of those entities and so is more successful.On the other hand, we expect to increase our success by finding out more aboutthose entities. What is unclear is how necessaryrealism or CNT are to atnexplanation of convergence. Perhaps other doctrines could do as well.In this section I have demonstrated the confusions in Putnam's discussionof Boyd both about the nature of realism and about what can count as anargument for realism. I have tried briefly to reconstruct a plausible argumentfor realism from the wreckage.3. Putnam and the CorrespondenceNotion of TruthIn his discussion of Boyd, and elsewhere ([16]: 4-5,18-19,30,99-100), Putnamoften seems to identify realism with acceptance of a correspondence (or realist)notion of truth. I have pointed out (section 1) that this is a mistake even if thatnotion is the one described by CNT.5 What notion does Putnam have in mind?Not simply one defined d-la-Tarksi because, as Putnam points out (pp. 25-29),an anti-realist could accept that. For Putnam, what has to be added to such adefinition to make the notion realist is the requirement that the logical connec-tives be understood "classically" (and not, e.g., "intuitionistically"). What is it toso understand the connectives? Putnam's initial answer is that it is to acceptcertain model statements exemplifying the fact (from a realist perspective) that"a statement can be false even though it follows from our theory" (pp. 34-35).But then Putnam allows that phenomenalism, and a Peircean view (truth ="warranted assertability in the ideal limit of scientific investigation"), can alsoaccept these modal statements (p. 36). So far as I can see Putnam leaves us herewith no answer to our question about the connectives, hence no answer to thequestion what makes a notion of truth realist, hence no account of realism.Further it is simply not plausible that mere acceptance of Tarski-defined truthwith classical connectives will commit a person to the existence of anything inparticular. Accepting this places no constraint on whatmakesa statement true;even an idealist could accept it. There is nothing here that should shake ourfaith that the only way a doctrine of truth can be realist aboutx's is by explainingtruth in terms of reference to x's.4. "InternalRealism"The mystery deepens in Part Four. Putnam sees this part of the book asrepresenting a development in his views (pp. viii, 5, 129). The first difficulty isin understanding the nature of the change. The second is in seeing anythingrealist about his new view, "internal realism."Putnam's account of the change (pp. 5, 123-124, 129-130) is as follows. InPart Three he argued for a verificationist theory of understanding but realistnotions of truth and reference. He has now abandoned the latter notions,settling for a full-blown verificationist semantics taken from Dummett (pp.



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296 NOOS127-129). Nevertheless he still sees his notion of truth as a "correspondence"one. In making this move he rejects "metaphysical realism," which he used tohold, as "incoherent." However, this does not amount to abandoning theempirical theory of the earlier part, which is now called "internal realism.""Metaphysical realism" is clear enough. It requires that

there bea determinaterelationbetweenterms n Land pieces (or sets of pieces)ofTHE WORLD... THE WORLDs ndependentf any particular epresentationwehave of it . .. truth s . . . radically on-epistemic.p. 125)"Metaphysical realism" also "transcends. . . any one theory." Set this allegedtranscendency aside until section 6. An example of the view that Putnam nowmocks would be a combination of PR with CNT.6We are told that "internal realism" is the empirical theory in Part Three. AsI understand it,7 Part Three argues that the combination of world view andnotion of truth that best explains the success of linguistic behavior, preservescertain deductive rules, and explains the reliability of our learning, is a realistone, a combination like PR and CNT. If this empirical theory were "internalrealism," all well and good. But then this theory is "metaphysical realism" whichhe now rejects. I am at a loss to know how we can subtract "metaphysicalrealism" from this and still be left with anything, let along anything that isappropriately called a "correspondence" notion of truth and "realism"(even ifonly 'of the "internal" variety).So the references to Part Three cast little light on the nature of "internalrealism." We must look to Part Four for this. "Internal realism" consists mainlyin the Peircean view that we mentioned in the last section. That view, whichPutnam earlier saw as anti-realist, equates truth with warranted assertability inthe ideal limit of scientific investigation. Suppose that T1 is a theory at that limit,an "ideal theory." Then T1 meets all "operational constraints," correctly pre-dicts "all observational sentences (as far as we can tell)," is "complete," "consist-ent," "beautiful," "simple," "plausible," etc. (p. 125). Truth is truth-relative-to-T1, and reference is reference-relative-to-T1.

It follows from this that no sense can be made of the idea that T1 might befalse. It is this aspect of "internal realism" that Putnam emphasises because hesees it as distinguishing "internal realism" from "metaphysical realism." Otheraspects are just as striking: it is not committed to correspondence truth; it is notcommitted to the objective existence of an external world, so far as one can tell."Internal realism" is not any sort of realism at all.In this part of the paper I have examined Putnam's view of what realism isand of its relation to doctrines of truth. I have found these views confused andmistaken, with the result that it is often hard to see the bearing of Putnam'sdiscussion on realism. I have made a few brief attempts to rectify this.

PartII5. The Intelligibilityof RealismI shall not attempt to argue for realism here. I think the epistemic argumentsPutnam has been urging for years, and the arguments in this book (mentionedabove, sections 2 and 4), are very much along the right lines. In any case, giventhe plausibility of realism, the onus lies on the anti-realist.Putnam accepts the onus, offering a model-theoretic argument for hismove away from realism. He claims to show that "the supposition that even an



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REALISM AND THE RENEGADE PUTNAM 297'ideal theory' . . . might really be false appears to collapse into unintelligibility"(p. 126). Before considering that argument it will help to see why the supposi-tion should be quite intelligible to a realist (of the PR sort).

Consider the ideal theory T1. Its key features are that it is a correctpredictor and that it meets all operational constraints: it fits all the possibleobservational evidence we could gather. From a realist perspective, to say T1 isideal is therefore to say something about the relationship between T1, us, andindependent reality: our sense organs and reality are such that we could neverobserve anything about that reality inconsistent with, TI. Being ideal is speciesrelative. To suppose that T1 might be false is simply to suppose that there mightbe features of reality which could not affect us at all or could not affect us insuch a way that we come to the right view about them. What we can observeabout the world depends not only on the world but also on us and ourrelationship to that world.Imagine an intelligent organism like a human but with very inferior senseorgans. We have no difficulty in understanding how a theory might be ideal forthat organism and yet from our superior perspective be clearly false. What therealist believes is that this might be so for any organism including a humanbeing; for the realist believes that reality is altogether ndependentof experience.Nothing I have said here commits me to the supposition that T1 might befalse, simply to the view that, so ar as a realism ikePR is concerned,T1 might befalse: there is no inconsistency between that supposition and PR. What view wetake of the supposition depends first on how it is interpreted; second, on ourepistemology. The problem of interpretation concerns T1. What is it to meet alloperational constraints? T1 fits all possible observational evidence in what senseof "possible"? The possible evidence might be what humans would havegathered if they were at every point of actual space-time (provided they wereawake, sober, good observers, etc.). Or it might be what they would havegathered if they had performed all possible experiments. Or it might be thecombination of these. And of course talk of "possible experiments" raisesfurther problems. Are the experimenters in a state of nature or are theyallowed to use instruments? If the latter are they allowed instruments actuallyinvented by humans to date, or ones actually invented by humans in the longrun, or ones possibly invented by anything? And so on. Suppose it is the casethat each aspect of reality is capable of playing some causal role. Then perhaps

that aspect would be detectable by humans using some possible instrument. Soaccording to my epistemology, on some very liberal interpretations of "possibleevidence," perhaps T1 could not be false. But that is no reflection on myrealism.6. The Model-TheoreticArgument

Putnam's model-theoretic argument is aimed at "metaphysical realism." As wehave seen (section 4) this doctrine differs from PR, which is what I have called"realism." Nevertheless the doctrines are related. And the part of "metaphysi-cal realism" that the argument rejects-that it is intelligible to suppose that theideal theory might be false-is what I havejust argued the realist should accept.So Putnam's argument must be refuted.The version of the argument in [16] is brief (pp. 125-127); a much longerversion appears in [18] (pp. 471-477; his opponent is there described as the"hard-core" metaphysical realist). I summarize. Pick a model for T1, M. Rela-tive to the interpretation of 'reference' for L that yields M, T1 must come out



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298 NOUStrue. How could it not then be true? This interpretation must meet all oper-ational (and theoretical) constraints on reference because T1 is ideal. Therecanbe nofurtherconstraints hatwouldrule out M as the"intended"model. So, T1is true inany "intended" model and so must be true. The idea that T1 might be false isunintelligible.Putnam anticipates a response: according to a "causal"theory of referencethe intended referent of a term is whatever stands in the appropriate causalrelation to the term; the model we want, the world, is the totality of suchreferents and T1 may not be true in that model. The problem with thisresponse, according to Putnam, is that at does is addanother heory o T1: "How'causes' can uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how 'cat' can on themetaphysical realist picture" ([ 16]: 126); it is not "glued to one definite relationwith metaphysical glue" ([18]: 477).There are some obvious truths which may partly underlie Putnam's posi-tion.8 We cannot say anything about the relationship between language and theworld without saying something, i.e., without using language. One is impris-oned in language in theorizing about anything. The denial of these truthswould indeed be unintelligible, but the realist is not committed to denyingthem.What the realist needs to say is thatat anypoint in our theorizing, even at thepoint of the ideal theory T1, we can stand back from our theory and raiseepistemic and semantic questions. The answer to these questions will be furthertheory from which we can also stand back. Putnam is not, of course, in anyposition to object to this procedure, because the above anti-realist argument isan example of it: it is a theory about T1. The realistanswer to these questions atany point will see belief in the object theory arising out of a causal interactionbetween the believers and a reality independent of those beliefs. Related to thisit will always seem intelligible to the realist to suppose that the theory might notbe true. The realist will also see the reference of the terms in that theory asbasically, and in general, determined by these causal interactions; at least hewill if he combines a causal theory of reference with his realism (and perhapsthis is necessary to resist Putnam's anti-realism; so much the better for causaltheories ). So his answer may include a sentence like "Termx is causally relatedin way A to object and to nothing else" as an explanation of another sentence"x refers to y and to nothing else." In such circumstances he will regard thereference of x as determinate. The realist thinks such circumstances are com-mon. Of course, a critic can then stand back and ask about that answer (asPutnam does). "What determines the reference of 'causally related'?" Therealist gives him the same sort of answer (setting aside any nominalist scruples):

'Causally related' is causally related in way B to causal relations and tonothing else.'Causally related' is "glued to one definite relation" by causal relations not"metaphysical glue." (The suggested form of answer here may well be toocrude but that does not affect the point.)

Small children soon learn to their delight that there is no end to questions:whatever answer is given to a question can be the subject of another question. Aspecies of this fact, usually discovered later, is that whatever answer is given to aquestion, another question can be asked about the meaning of that answer.Unfortunately there is no general rule to tell us how long we should tolerateeither line of questioning (explanation must stop somewhere). However, one



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ANALYTICITY AND TRUTH 299thing we should insist on: that an answercan bequestioned n thisdoesnot aloneshowit was not a good answer to its question.Putnam asks about the reference of'cat,' 'cow,' etc.. We answer in terms ofcausal relations. Putnam then asks about the reference of 'causally related.'That such a question can be asked does not show that our answer to the firstquestion was not a perfectly good one; it does not show that we have failed toexplain how one model among many is the "intended" one. To show this itwould be necessary to show that there is something about our first answer thatboth needs explanation and that we cannot explain. Putnam has not shown this.In particular he has not shown that our second answer, the explanation ofreference for 'causally related,' does not explain, sofar as explanation s necessary,how 'causally related' uniquely refers. He would want to claim that it does nQt,of course, because the words 'causally related' that areusedin the second answerdo not uniquely refer. But that is what he is supposed to be showing us. He issimply begging the question against the realist. However long he continues hisquestioning the realist has an answer along the above lines to pick out thedesired unique referent.This account does not make realism "transcendent" in any interestingsense (cf. the remark from p. 125 about "metaphysical realism," quoted insection 4 above and so far ignored). The semantic theory applies to all theories,even itself. Such self-reference need not be problematic (e.g., a constitutionallaw can specify the way in which all constitutional laws can be changed). Indeed,should we reach T1 self-reference is inevitable. The laws of an ideal theory mustbe both the best available and complete. So of coursewe would apply those lawsin theorizing about T1 as in theorizing about anything else. There is no prob-lem, despite the semantic paradoxes, in epistemic and semantic theories beingpart of the object theory so that when we ask our questions about that theory wehave to apply them to themselves. For example, if our semantic theory says thatany term of a certain type refers to whatever is causally related in way B to it,and if that semantic theory itself contains such a term (e.g., 'causally related'),then the theory will apply to that term.Putnam, in effect, accuses the realist of begging the question in appealingto a theory to determine reference for a theory. I have accused him of beggingthe question in claiming that the reference of 'causally related' is not determi-nate. These mutual accusations may be confusing and so I shall repeat the basisfor mine.Putnam claims to be offering an argument against "metaphysical realism."At no point is he entitled to assumethis doctrine false. If the doctrine is true thenthere will be determinate referential relations between the words of any theoryand pieces of the world. This will be true also of the words of any theory ofreference used to explain these relations. If such a theory is comprehensive itwill of course apply to its own words. Putnam's anti-realist argument dependson there being no answer to the question about what determines reference forT1. Using a theory of reference there is an answer: reference is determined bycausal relations of a certain sort. That answer works for 'causally related'just asit does for 'cat.' Putnam begs the question by simply assuming 'causally related'

lacks determinate reference. Doubtless he is encouraged in this by the apparenttriviality of the answer given for 'causally related.' But the triviality of theanswer as an explanation does not show that it is not correct nor does it showthat what it is explaining is not real. If you push explanation of any realm farenough you inevitably reach triviality, for explanation must stop somewhere.



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300 NOUS7. Realism and EpistemologyIn a sympathetic review of Nelson Goodman's [ 10], Putnam mentions the idea,allegedly held by some realist friends "in places like Princeton and Australia,"that we can compare theories with "unconceptualized reality" ([17]: 61 1).9Theidea is that realism requires us to step outside all theories to see how the worldmatches up to them; it requires "direct access" to reality, an "eyeball to eyeball"confrontation.It is surprisingly common for people to suppose that realism (when com-bined with realist truth) has this absurd requirement.10 The supposition arisesout of the long tradition of putting the epistemological cart before themetaphysical horse. To put the cart back where it belongs the realist needs anaturalized, non-foundationalist, epistemology of a Quinean sort. He standsback from theories and theorists and considers, in the usual scientific way, therelations between them and reality. The resulting epistemological theory hasno special authority: it isjust one theory among many of the world we live in. Itdoes not change our view of what exists. Indeed that view, gained from othersciences, is taken for granted. Further, the theory does not make us questionthe independence of what exists from theories and theorists, which is theobvious starting point for an epistemology. Rather it confirms that startingpoint. Finally, epistemic relations are no more inaccessible than other relations.Theorizing about the relation between a theorist and an object no morerequires "direct access" to reality than does theorizing about the relationbetween, say, David Frost and Richard Nixon."1

REFERENCES[1] Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster(London: NLB, 1970).[2] Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theoryof Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975).[3] A. F. Chalmers, What s this ThingCalled Science?(St. Lucia, Queensland: Universityof Queensland Press, 1976).[4] Michael Devitt, "CriticalNotice" of [16],AustralasianJournal of Philosophy,58(1980:395-404.[5] , "Dummett's Anti-Realism,"Journal of Philosophy,80(1983): 73-99.[6] , Realism and Truth, in preparation.[7] Hartry H. Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy, 69(1972):

347-375.[8] , "Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference,"Journal of Philoso-phy 70(1973): 462-481.[9] , "Quine and the Correspondence Theory," PhilosophicalReview, 83(1974):200-228.[10] Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,1978).[11] Bruce W. Hauptli, "Inscrutability and Correspondence," Southern ournal of Philos-ophy, 17(1979): 199-212.[12] R. J. Hirst, "Realism," in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopediaof Philosophy(London:Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1967), vol. 7: 77-83.[13] Stephen Leeds, "Theories of Reference and Truth," Erkenntnis, 13(1978): 1 11-129.[14] Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: PhilosophicalPapers, Volume2 (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).[15] "What is 'Realism'?," Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety (1975-1976):174-194.[16] , Meaningand theMoral Sciences(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).



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ANALYTICITY AND TRUTH 301[17] Hilary Putnam, "Reflections on Goodman's Waysof Worldmaking,"JournalofPhilos-ophy 76(1979): 603-618.[18] "Models and Reality,"Journal of SymbolicLogic, 45(1980): 464-482.

NOTES14set out my view in more detail in [5] and in much more detail in [6].2Those who have been influenced by the current Oxford fashion may be a littleoutraged by this conclusion. For, "has not Dummett shown how intimately the issue ofrealism is linked to the view that truth transcends evidence?" I don't think that Dummetthas shown any such thing but that argument must be left to another place [5].3For more on this see [16] Part Three and [4] sections 2 and 7.4We will need more than CNT for this explanation: we will need a doctrine ofapproximateruth and perhaps also of verisimilitude. And the talk of reference may haveto be replaced with talk of partial reference (see [8]).51t seems that Putnam could not accept CNT because it requires that reference be agenuine explanatory notion which is what he denies in his argument against Field in PartOne of [16].6Putnam seems to suggest that "metaphysical realism" is to be found earlier in thebook but, given his early opposition to Field, it is hard to see how it could be. For thatopposition seems to undermine the realism about reference that "metaphysical realism,"like CNT, requires.7Once again there is a problem because of the Part One opposition to Field. I do notknow how to reconcile the apparent realism about reference of Part Three with thatopposition.81n a passage reflecting the influence of Goodman, Putnam says:If one cannot sayhow THE WORLD is theory-independently, then talk of all these

theories as descriptions of "the world" is empty. ([16]: 133)9My failure to meet any of these benighted Australians makes me doubt thisallegation."'Some other examples: Althusser and Balibar ([1 ]: 51-69): Bhaskar ([2]: 248-250),;Chalmers ([3]: chs. 10 and 11); Hauptil, in a response to [9], ([11]: 208)."Earlier drafts of this paper were delivered at La Trobe University (July, 1980),University of California at Riverside (November, 1980), and San Francisco State Univer-sity (December, 1980). I am grateful for the comments received on those occasions; alsofor the members of an informal seminar in Sydney in 1979 and to David Armstrong,Hartry Field, Bill Lycan, J. J. C. Smart, Kim Sterelny, and Wal Suchting.

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