Devitt Dummett's Antirealism PDF

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Dummett's Anti-RealismAuthor(s): Michael DevittSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Feb., 1983), pp. 73-99Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026236.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYVOLUME LXXX, NO. 2, FEBRUARY 1983

DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM*M~ICHAEL DUMMETT is a prolific, ubtle,but complexli/I writern thephilosophyoflanguage and thephilosophyLViof mathematics. t is well known thathe argues againstrealism. In thephilosophical circlecentered n Oxfordtheinflu-ence of thisargument s alreadygreat.' Elsewhere ts influence s2growing. CrispinWright, n able and vigorousdefender f Dum-mett, laims that Dummetthas setup whatpromisesto be one ofthemostfruitful hilosophical researchprogrammes f thiscen-tury. 3Yet I suspect thatmanyphilosophersare skepticalaboutDummett'sargument: t smacks too muchof positivism nd Witt-gensteinianism.4 sympathizewiththeskeptics nd disagreewithWright.

* Earlier versionsof this paper weredelivered t La Trobe UniversityJuly 1980),the 1980 Annual Conference f the AustralasianAssociation of Philosophers inSydney, heUniversity f California, Los Angeles January1981),the University fMichigan (February1982), and the University f Wisconsin at Milwaukee (March1982). I am indebted to many for comments. Those by the following have led tochanges: RogersAlbritton, ohn Bigelow, TylerBurge,Joshua Cohen, Hartry ield,Philippa Foot, KenGemes, Karen Green,Timothy McCarthy, eterSnow, Kim Ste-relny, nd Nicholas White. am particularly ndebted o Gregory urrieforforcingme to see that a verificationistrgumentnot based on the propositional assump-tion could be abstracted romDummett'sdiscussion. In effect he point had beenmade tomebyHilary Putnam n correspondence bout myDesignation New York:Columbia, 1981),but I had failed to see its significance.'See, e.g., manyof the papers in Mark Platts,ed., Reference, ruth nd Reality:Essayson thePhilosophy of Language (London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1980).

2 See, e.g., Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason, in Meaning and the MoralSciences (London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1978): 123-138;parenthetical age ref-erencesto Putnamwill be to this book.CriticalStudy:Dummett nd Revisionism, Philosophical Quarterly,XXI, 122(January1981):47-67, p. 67.4Wright was recentlyprovoked to defend a Dummettian view partly by PeterStrawson'scriticisms f thatview, Scruton and Wright n Anti-Realism tc., Pro-ceedings of the Aristotelian ociety New Series), XXVII (1976/7): 15-22, nd partlyby the grateful eceptionof [Strawson's] remarks y an audience who seemed, byand large, to thinkthatanti-realism ould be nothing otherthan the Positivismofthe Thirties [ Strawson on Anti-Realism, Synthese,XL, 2 (February 1979):283-299, p. 283].0022-362X/83/8002/0073$02.70 ? 1983 The Journalof Philosophy, nc.

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74 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYDummett's rgumenthas a general form hat s claimed to covervarious realisms, e.g., about common-sense physical entities,

about scientific ntities, bout mathematical ntities, nd about thepast. I shall be concernedonly with the first f these. My aim is todefend realism about common-sensephysicalentitiesfrom Dum-mett's rgument. shall call the doctrine defend implyRealism.The twentieth enturyhas seen a linguistic turn in philo-sophy. Dummett's rgument gainst Realism exemplifies strongcommitment o this turn:The wholepoint f my pproach o thevarious isputes oncerningrealism] as beentoshowthat he heoryf meaning nderliesmeta-physics.f havemade nyworthwhileontributionophilosophy,think tmustie inhaving aised his ssue n these erms.5

For Dummett, the goal of philosophy s theanalysis of the struc-tureof thought. He justifiesthepre-eminencehe assigns to thephilosophy of anguage by ts bearingon that nalysis TOE 458).6Underlying mycriticismof Dummett s a verydifferent iew ofphilosophy,what s sometimes alled a scientific iew. This doesnot make mycriticism ut of place; forRealism is as appropriateplace as any for these rival views of philosophy to join battle.IthinkDummettwould agree see TOE 24).There are three remisesnDummett's rgument or nti-Realism:A. The Realism dispute s the disputeabout whether tatementshave realist evidence-transcendent)r onlyverificationistruthconditions.The statementsn questionhereare,of course, statementsontain-ing words ike 'stone', tree', nd 'cat': physical statements. all

' Truth and OtherEnigmas (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1978), p. xl; hereafter,TOE. Other worksof Dummettto be cited are as follows: Frege: Philosophy ofLanguage (London: Duckworth, 973);hereafter,PL; What Is a TheoryofMean-ing? in Samuel Guttenplan,ed., Mind and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975): 97-138; hereafter,WTM; What Is a Theory of Meaning?(II) in GarethEvans and JohnMcDowell, eds., Truth nd Meaning: Essays in Semantics Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1976): 67-137; hereafterWTM II: Elementsof ntuitionism NewYork:Oxford, 1977);hereafter, l; Comments, n Avishai Margalit, d.,Meaningand Use (Boston: Reidel, 1979): 218-225; hereafter, ; Common Sense and Phys-ics, in G. F. MacDonald, ed., Perception and Identity:Essays Presentedto A. J.Ayer,with His Replies (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1979): 1-40; hereafter, SP.I shall oftenmakemultiplereferenceso Dummett'swork to supportan attribu-tion. In so doing I do not mean to suggestthatthese re theonly places that wouldsupply the support. Indeed any attempt o be comprehensiven such referencessrapidlybecoming hopeless.Aside from he 1800odd pages in the works ited above,a follow-upvolume to FPL of 621 pages, The Interpretationf Frege'sPhilosophy(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1981), appeared while the presentpaper was in thehands of thisJOURNAL. AndDummett'sWilliam JamesLectures,The Logical Basisof Metaphysics, re imminent. s there ny chanceof a timeout?6Dummett attributes his view of philosophyto Frege and sees it as definitive fanalytical philosophy (TOE 442).



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 75the doctrine that these statementshave realist truthconditionsRealist Truth.For DummettRealism is Realist Truth.B. The dispute about truth conditions is the dispute aboutwhether hecompetent peaker'sunderstandings realist evi-dence-transcendent)r only verificationist.It followsfromB that f the understanding s only verificationistthen Realist Truth s false.WithA this eads to anti-Realism.C. The competent peaker'sunderstandings only verificationist.(A consequence of B and C is thatverifications a more basicsemanticnotion than truth.)There is general agreement n only one thingabout Dummett'sphilosophy: it is difficult. o it may seem mprobable that t couldbe made as simple as A-B-C (as John Bigelow nicelyremarked ome). In factB and C conceal complications:each has twodistinctversions.With those complicationstaken nto account I do indeedclaim thatthe above three remises, ogetherwith their upportingarguments, onstituteDummett's rgument gainstRealism.Dummettfocuses his discussion of Realism on verificationismand premiseC. The discussionof A and B is slight.Yet thesetwopremises re crucial to Dummett'scase against Realism. My focuswill be on them.The paper is in four parts.Part I is on premiseA and therela-tionship betweenRealismand Realist Truth.I arguefirst hatA isfalse I.1), next thatDummett ubscribes oit (I.2), and finally hathis argumentfor it is inadequate (I.3). Nothing simply followsabout Realism from ny view of Realist Truth. In Part I I distin-guish two versions f B,hence two of C, which Dummett onflates.Bi and Cl are based on the assumption that inguisticcompetenceinvolves propositional knowledgeof truth onditions. B2 and C2see competenceas merelya practical ability (2.1). I argue thatDummettgivesthe propositional assumption about competenceno adequate support 2.2) and that t is false 2.3). So Bi and Cl arefalse. Verificationistrguments o show that peakersdo not knowrealisttruth onditions re irrelevant o Realist Truth. Part II takescompetenceas a practical ability. Interest hen centers n C2, theview thatthesentencesunderstoodby thecompetent peaker haveonly verificationistruth onditions. setout Dummett's rgumentfor this 3.1) and reject t (3.2). In Part4 I argue that, n any case,verificationism as littlebearingon Realism. Theoriesof anguageand understanding houldnot determine heories f theworld 4.1).

I. REALISM AND REALIST TRUTHI.1 Realism and TruthI seekfirst statementfthedoctrine f Realism that aptures tstraditional opposition to idealism and phenomenalism about



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76 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYcommon-sense ntities.Thereare twodimensions to thisdoctrine:first, claim aboutwhat exists; econd,a claim about thenatureofthat existence.To capturethe first imension we can saythat t iscommon-sensephysical entities thatexist. Words thatfrequentlyoccur in attempts o capturethe second are 'independent', exter-nal', and 'objective'.The entitiesmust be independent f themen-tal; theymustbe external to themind; theymustexistobjectivelyin that they xist whatever nyone's opinions. We can captureboththesedimensionswell enough in the followingdoctrine:Common-sense physical entitiesobjectivelyexist independ-entlyof the mental.A lot more than this could certainly e said to clarifyRealism.7take t, however, hat this characterizationairly bviously, venifa littlevaguely, xpresses hecentral ntuitions f Realist doctrinesabout the external world, doctrinesthat have always seemed soplausible. I mean this statement f Realism to be a relatively n-controversial reliminarytatement uch as mightbe made by anyperson nformed y the history f philosophy prior to Dummett. tis, forexample, in accord with the entry Realism in The Ency-clopedia ofPhilosophy.8

We are not entitledto insist that realism'be used in thisway,rather han, say,for some semanticdoctrine as is now common),but we are entitledto wonder whether n another use it has any-thingto do with traditionalmetaphysical nd epistemicdisputesbetween realists nd idealists/phenomenalists.n the next sectionwe shall see thatDummett ertainly oes see Realism(characterizedin the above way)as threatened y his arguments.Whathas truth o do with this doctrine f Realism? On thefaceof it, nothingat all. Realism says nothingabout truthnor evenabout the bearers ftruth,entences nd beliefs except perhaps, nits use of 'objective', the negative point that beliefsdo not deter-mineexistence).Realism says nothing emantic t all.Realism does not strictly ntail any doctrine of truth nor, Iwould claim, is thereany obviously true proposition which, to-getherwith Realism, entails a (nontrivial)doctrine f truth.Thereis no inconsistencyn being a Realistand yet takinga thoroughlyskepticalviewofthe need for n explanatorynotion of truth. takeit that uch a viewis a centralpart of Quine's semantic kepticism.It is verydifficult or a physicalisticallyminded realist to under-mine thisskepticism,s StephenLeeds has pointedout in an excel-lentarticle.9

7 say a lotmore n Realism and Truth in preparation).8R. J. Hirst, Realism, in Paul Edwards,ed. Encyclopediaof Philosophy,vol.vii (New York: Macmillan, 1967): 77-83, p. 77.9 Theories of Reference nd Truth, Erkenntnis, iii, 1 (July 1978): 111-129.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 77So much for the entailment romRealism toa doctrine f truth.Whatabout the reverse ntailment?t is common to link a corre-spondence or realist notion of truthto Realism. Is a person

committedto Realism if he adopts such a notion for physicalstatements?We need to knowmore about this notion of truth hanthat t isevidence-transcendent. ome may think hat ny notion that anbe defineda la Tarski s realist.Such definitions, owever, rephil-osophicallyneutral, s HilaryPutnampoints out (2-4, 9/10): theymiss the ntuitive dea of correspondenceo a worldout there 1).The view thatthiscorrespondences a picturing or mirroringrelationship is nothing but a metaphor.What is needed, in myview, s to maketruth ependent n genuinereferenceelationsbe-tween words and objectivereality.We might capture thedoctrinethat uch a notion s appropriateforphysical tatementss follows:

Physical tatementsre true r false n virtue f: i) their bjectivestructure;ii) the bjectiveeferentialelationsetweenheir arts ndreality;nd iii) the bjective aturef that eality.This is mycharacterizationf thedoctrine,Realist Truth. t does

not make truthdependenton our having the evidence or on ourhaving the capacityto get theevidence.Truth is altogethernde-pendentof evidence; t is evidence-transcendent. his is not tosay that truth s unknowable, whateverthat mightmean, butsimplythat ruth s one thing, ur means ofdiscoveringt another.'0Does Realist Truth entail Realism? It does not. Realism (as Ihave defined t), requires the objective independentexistenceofcommon-sensephysical entities. Realist Truth concerns physicalstatementsnd has no suchrequirement:tsaysnothing bout thenatureof thereality hat makes those statements rueorfalse,ex-cept that t is objective.An idealistwho believed n theobjectiveexistenceof a purelymentalrealm of sense data could subscribe oRealist Truth.He could believe thatphysicalstatementsre true rfalse according as theydo or do not correspondto the realm ofsensedata, whatever nyone's opinion on the matter:we have noincorrigibleknowledge of sense data. (He mighteven believe ntheobjectiveexistenceof physical objectsbut thinkthemnothingbut sensedata.) Analogouslysome nominalists n the philosophyof mathematics ccepta doctrineof realisttruth ormathematicalstatements y takingthem orefer o linguistic tems.Andan oper-ationistcan accept realisttruth forstatements pparently boutunobservablesby takingthem to be really about observables. nsum,meretalk of truthwill notyieldany particular ntology.

10 ee my Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Studyof Meaning andthe Moral Sciences, forthcomingn Nous, May 1983; sec. 5.



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78 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYI conclude thatno doctrine f truth s in anyway constitutive fRealismand thatpremiseA is false.This conclusion does not mean, of course, that the issues ofRealismand truth ave no bearing on each other. ndeed I think tis impossible to find plausible epistemology orRealism that anbe combinedwith most, fnot all, epistemicdoctrines f truth. ngeneral,we can expect a positionon one of these ssues to lead byinference o the best explanation to a position on the other. willconsider such inferencesn IV.1. However, links of this sort areweak and should lead to greatcaution in runningthe two issuestogether.

I.2 Dummett'sCommitment o ADummett s notat all cautious. He often traightforwardlyden-tifies the two issues. Thus he says that the realism/anti-realismdisputeconcernshenotion ftruthppropriateor tatementsf the isputedclass; ndthismeans hat t sa dispute oncerninghekind fmean-ing which hese tatementsave TOE 146; ee also xxx,22/23, 55,314,358/359; SP 3).On thisview the doctrineof Realist Truth s constitutive fReal-ism: it is thedoctrine hatphysical statementspossess an objectivetruth-value,ndependentlyof our means of knowing it ; theirmeanings are not directly ied to thekind ofevidenceforthemwecan have (TOE 146; see also FPL 466). On theother hand, anti-Realism denies Realist Truth.This view is premiseA.SometimesDummetturgesan apparentlyweakerview: the the-oryof meaning underlies the realismdispute (TOE xxx, xl) orsupplies the premisses for various positions in thedispute (EI382/383;TOE xxviii,229). However,Dummett ttachesno signifi-cance to the difference etweenthesetwoviews:

Realism ests pon-or better,onsistsn-an adherenceoa truth-conditional emanticsor ur anguageC 218).Given thatwhatI havecharacterized nderthe termRealism' is,prima facie, quite differentromany semanticdoctrine, t is ap-propriateto wonderwhethermy disagreementwithDummettoverpremiseA is merelyverbal. Perhaps he is using the termdiffer-entlyand does not intend his discussion to have any bearing-atleastnotanydirect earing-on the raditionalmetaphysical ispute.This is certainlynot the case. He describestherealism thatheidentifieswith rests pon) a semanticdoctrinen a traditionalway:. . . on a realistic onceptionf thephysical niverse,hatuniverseconstitutesnobjectiveeality,ndependentfourknowledgef t El382; ee also TOE xxv, 28).



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 79He sees therealism that s threatened yhis discussion as a doc-trine bout what therereally s, an ontological/metaphysicaloc-trine EI 386; TOE 146/147,230) opposed to idealism (FPL 671,681; TOE 145) and phenomenalism (TOE 147). His problem isold, but the semanticapproach is new (TOE xxxi). Indeed,as thepassage quoted at the beginning of this paper shows, Dummettthinksthatany worth-while ontributionhe has made to philo-sophy lies in this approach to such metaphysicalproblems.Fi-nally, Dummettsometimes xpressestheanti-realism hathis ar-gument inclines him toward in ontological terms,though theexpression s brief nd obscure. His anti-realism appears a moreradicalrepudiationofobjectivereality han dealism (C 223); real-itycomes intoexistence s we probe, thoughwe do not create t; itis notfullydeterminateTOE xxviii/xxix, 8/19, 29/30;C 221/2).So thedifferencefopinion overpremiseA is notmerely erbal.Dummettsees his discussion as bearingdirectly n Realism. Hedoes thinkthat theparticularformof his semanticversionof real-ism maydepart somewhatfromtraditionalusage. He thinksthatusage has confused two issues: (a) the ssue of whether tatementsofone kind (e.g., physical)can be reduced to thoseof another e.g.,sense-datum); b) the issue of whether tatements f the one kindare determinatelyrueor false TOE xxxii, 157-159; CSP 1-5). Hisdeparturefromtradition,he thinks, omes in his setting a) asideand taking b) as the basic issue.Traditionally, s I havepointed out, therehave been two dimen-sions to Realism: thedimensionofexistence nd thedimension ofindependencefromthe mental. Now the second of thesehas usu-ally been an issue ofreduction:Can physicalobjectsbe reduced toideas or sensedata? This issue of ontological reduction s not thesame as Dummett's a), an issue of linguisticreduction.Overlookthat,forDummett ets a) aside. My centraldisagreementoncerns(b). What has the ontological issue of what existsto do with (b),the linguistic ssue ofdeterminate ruth alues? On theface of it,nothingat all.1'III.3 Dummett'sArgument or ADummett ompletelymisconceives heRealismissue. Why?Thecrux of the explanation is that, forDummett, ny metaphysical

Dummett uggests hatthe mportance freduction o the Realismdisputehasbeen its role as a step toward b) (CSP 5). I suggest that tsimportance omesfromthefact thatanti-Realistshave typicallybeen conservative. hus Berkeley id notdeny the very xistenceof the common-sensephysicalworld, but claimed that tcould be reduced osomethingmental.This conservatism as good tactics: bandonit and anti-Realismwould deserverefutation y thekicked stoneand theincredu-lous stare.



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80 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYview is

a picture hich as n tself o substancetherwisehan s a represen-tationof the givenconception fmeaning El 383; see also TOExxviii/xxix).The metaphysicalview adds only a metaphor (TOE xxv/xxvi,229).12 uch a pictureor metaphor s nonetheless natural (TOExxviii); it will force tself on us (TOE 229/30); t is irresistible(TOE xxviii, 230). So although Dummettwill fromtimeto timeuse the anguage of thetraditionalmetaphysical ispute,when thechips are down he talksonly ofmeaning.Dummett'sbelief n this metaphor thesis-metaphysicsbeyondmeaning is mere metaphor-is central to theexplanation of var-ious puzzling aspectsof his discussionwhich we have noted:first,of his holding premiseA; second,of his attachingno significanceto the difference etweenA and the apparentlyweakerview thatthe dispute over truth underlies the Realism dispute; third, fthe brevitynd obscurity f his account of theontological conse-quences ofhis anti-Realist rgument.

Whydoes Dummett believe the metaphor thesis?Whydoes hethink the metaphysicaldisputeabout Realism cannot standon itsown feet? he cause is clear, but it supplies no good reason.Dummett's view of metaphysics omes fromhis philosophyofmathematics TOE xxiv). He thinks i) thatthe critical disagree-ment between platonistsand intuitionists s over the appropriateforms f reasoning n mathematics nd thatthis s a disagreementover the meaning of mathematicalstatements, ver the typeoftruth onditionsthosestatements ave (El 380; TOE xxvii/xxviii).Now this alone does notshow,of course, thatthere s not another,evenif esscritical,disagreementver themetaphysicalssueof thenatureof mathematicalobjects; t does not show thatthere s notalso a substantive isagreement verwhether heseobjectsare in-dependently xisting bstract bjectsor arecreations fthe humanmind. Nevertheless,ii) Dummettdoes want to claim that there sno such further ubstantivedisagreement.He is impressed byGeorgKreisel'sremark, theproblem s not theexistence fmathe-matical objects, but the objectivity f mathematicalstatements(quoted, e.g., at TOE xxviii). He thinks hatthedisagreement ver

12Simon Blackburn, Truth, Realism,and the RegulationofTheory, n PeterA.French,Theodore E. UehlingJr., nd Howard K. Wettstein,ds. MidwestStudies nPhilosophy, VolumeV: Studies in Epistemology Minneapolis: Univ. of MinnesotaPress, 1980): 353-371, rguesfor metaphoricalview of the Realismdispute; cf. myRealism and Semantics:Part II of a Critical Study of Midwest Studies in Philo-sophy V, forthcomingn Nou4s,November1983; sec. 1.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 81objects adds only metaphorsto the discussion,one metaphorsee-ing the mathematician s an astronomer, he other seeing him asan artist EI 382/3;TOE xxv/xxvi, 29). Suppose this s so. It doesnot show, of course,that ll metaphysical isagreements bout theontological statusof objects have no substancebeyonda disagree-ment over meaning. Perhaps the disagreementbetween Realistsand idealists overphysical objects is substantive ven thoughthatbetween platonistsand intuitionists vermathematicalobjects ismetaphorical. Yet, (iii) Dummett does want to extend his claimabout mathematics o all fields EI 381-383;TOE xxix). He arrivesat the metaphor hesis.Consider ii). Whydoes thedisagreementver mathematical b-jects add only metaphors o the disagreementver meaning?So faras I can see Dummettdoes littlemore than claim that t adds onlythis. For Dummett, t seems, the metaphysical isagreementmakesno literal sense on theface of it, and theonly way to interprett isto relate t to the ssue of meaning.A certain rgumentdoes feature rominentlyn Dummett'sdis-cussion of mathematical bjects. Take the disagreement ver theseobjects literally.Dummett rgues that t does not bearon thedis-agreement ver meaning.Assuming a platonistontologydoes notlead to a platonistview of meaning and logic; assumingan intui-tionistontologydoes not lead to an intuitionist iew ofmeaningand logic (FPL 507/8; EI 382-389; TOE 230-247).Suppose Dummettwere rightabout this lack of bearingof theontological dispute on the semantic one. (I don't thinkhe is, forreasons indicated n I.1 and considered n IV.1. Dummett'sargu-ment depends on his views about meaning,to be discussed n thenext two parts of this paper.) The mere fact that a disagreementdoes not have anyconsequence for emanticsdoes not show that tis not a realdisagreement, oes not show that t is only metaphori-cal. Most real disagreements re irrelevanto semantics.Despite the ack of argumentfor t, Dummett'sclaim about themetaphoricalnatureof thedisagreementver mathematical bjectsseems tome to have some plausibility. Consider, however,how itwould strike hard-core latonist. For him the disagreement oesnot seemmetaphorical;he thinkshe has a clear conception ofin-dependently xisting mathematical objects,a conception thathefinds vividlydifferentrom conception of mental constructs.Hewill thinkDummett'sview mistaken.Furthermore,ummett's r-gumentthat theplatonist's ontologydoes not settlehis semanticsgives the platonistno reason to thinkotherwise.We see the importanceof this when we examine move (iii) in



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82 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYDummett's rgumentfor themetaphorthesis:the extensionof hisview about mathematics o otherfields.Whatreason s there or x-tending such sympathy s we may have for Dummett's positionagainst thehard-core latonist to his positionagainst thehard-coreRealist about the physical world? So far as I can see Dummettoffers o argument or this extensionbeyondclaiming thatthe ar-gument about the ack ofbearingofontologyon semantics arriesover frommathematics o otherfields EI 381; TOE xxix). Even ifthiswereso, and the argumentwere good, it would no moreshowthat the metaphysical isputeabout physicalobjects s metaphori-cal than t earlier howed that hemetaphysical ispute boutmath-ematical objects was metaphorical.Not only is the extension from mathematics unargued; it ishighly mplausible. The difference etweenthe mathematical ndphysical worlds is striking.'3The platonist'sconception of inde-pendently xistingmathematical bjects strikesmanypeople as far-fetched.Whatare they ike? Where do they xist?How could wecome to know about them?The intuitionist'sconception is nomore transparent. ow could numbersbe mental constructions rfree reations f the humanmind? These conceptions reso odd, sohard to grasp, thata metaphorical nterpretationf thedispute istempting though I don't say right). n contrast he Realist's con-ception of independently xistingphysical objects s the very oreof common sense. Thereis certainly omevagueness bout it,someroom forfurtherxplanation, but it is not in the least bit meta-phorical. Indeed if this talk cannot be taken literally,what talkcan? It mustbe close to a bench markof the iteral. Even the deal-ist's conception, the traditionalrival of Realism, has a certaintransparency,or we are all familiar withminds and experiences.Only a philosophercould suppose that our talk about language,one of thenewest nd least developedareas of knowledge, s cleareron the face of it than our talkabout ordinary hysical things, neof theoldest and mostdeveloped areas of knowledge.In thispartof the paper I have argued that Dummett ubscribesto premiseA and that t is false. His reason foradoptingA is the

13See the passage from Strawson's Scruton and Wright n Anti-Realism tc.quoted by Dummett TOE xxiv), which makes a similar point.In a paperfromTOE not so far ited, Platonism (pp. 202-214),Dummetthim-self mphasizes thedifferencesetween he mathematical nd physicalworlds,draw-ing attentionparticularly o the power of the physical worldto affect s throughobservation.This seems to me verymuch along theright ines. It counts against theextension frommathematics o physics which I have attributed o Dummett, ndhence against that attribution.However, without the extension and the metaphorthesis that s supported by it, therewould be no argument t all in DummettforpremiseA.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 83metaphor thesis. This rests on an unsupportedthough possiblyplausible claim about the metaphorical natureof the ontologicaldispute n the philosophyof mathematics, nd on an unsupportedand highly implausible extension of that claim to the disputeabout physical reality.Experience suggeststhat ome people will not accept that Dum-mettdoes subscribe oA, despite theevidencethathe does. Supposehe does not. What then remains from this part? The claim thatnothing simply follows about Realism from ny thesis about thetruthconditions of statements. o even if an argument s madeagainst Realist Truth, furtherrgument s neededto establish nti-Realism. And this would still leave a possibility pen to the Real-ist: he might reverse he orderof argument.He might give a non-semanticargumentfor Realism and then use Realism to establishRealist Truth. These moves will be considered n IV.1.14

II. THE PROPOSITIONAL ASSIJMPTION ABOUT COMPETENCEII.1. Versions f B and CDummett's econd premise s:B. The dispute about truth conditions is the dispute aboutwhether hecompetent peaker's understandings realist evi-dence-transcendent)r only verificationist.This is a corollaryof Dummett's thesis that a theory f meaningis a theory f understanding FPL 92; WTM 99). With A it yieldsthe view thatif understanding s only verificationist, ealism isfalse.On thefaceofit,B is odd. How could a semanticdispute aboutthe truth onditions of sentencesbe a psychologicaldispute aboutthecompetent peaker'sunderstanding? ow could disputesaboutsuch differentortsof property e the same?15Yet Dummettdoesequate thetwodisputes WTM II 68/69;TOE 153-155, 58/9).Why?Wemust distinguish learly, houghDummettdoesnot,twover-sions ofB, reflecting uite differentssumptionsabout the natureof speaker competence.The first nd most prominentversion sbased on the assumption thatcompetence onsists at leastpartly)in knowledgeof truthfalsity) onditions:16

14 I have not consideredthe detailsofDummett's emanticversion fRealism:hemakes the principle ofbivalencethe touchstone TOE xxx-xxxii, 149/50,155; CSP4). The details are not centraltomyargument.15I don't mean to suggestthatpsychological properties ould not enter nto anexplanation of semantic properties; am too much of a Gricean for that; see myDesignation op. cit., pp. 80-86. My point is only the trivialone that thesemanticand psychologicalproperties n question here are very ifferentibid., pp. 92/3).16Parenthetical dditions such as those n this entence hould be taken s read nfuture.



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84 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYBi. The dispute about truth conditions is the dispute aboutwhether the competent speaker knows realist (evidence-

transcendent)r only verificationistruth onditions.The knowledge n questionhere s propositional: it is knowledge-that and not, for example, mere knowledge-how. So on this as-sumption an L-speaker'sunderstanding f a sentence f L consistsin his knowing that the sentence s true-in-L n such and suchcir-cumstances. Now if he knows this, t must be so. Therefore dis-pute over whether he truth onditions that speakerknows are, asa matter f fact, ealistor only verificationist ould settlewhetherthe truth onditions are realist or only verificationist. t least itwould settle this if we assume that whatevertruth onditionsasentencehas, the speakerwill know it to have. This assumption sprobably mplicit n the propositionalassumption about compe-tence. So we have establishedBi.With thepropositionalassumption goes a versionofC also:Cl. The competent peakerknows only verificationistruth on-ditions.The rival to this,which thebeliever n Realist Truth s thoughttobe committed o, s the viewthat speakerknows realist evidence-transcendent) ruth onditions.The propositional assumption about competence s a receivedwisdom of contemporaryemantics.As HerbertHeidelbergerhasrecentlypointed out, it seems to be regarded s uncontroversial,perhaps unworthy fserious discussion. Yet t is not obviouslytrue. 17 In myview it is false. Hence Bi and Cl are false. I thinkcompetence s simply a setof grounded skills or abilities. I shallindicate why n II.3.The attribution f thepropositional assumption, and hence ofBi, to Dummett s well based but not certain. Philosopherswhomake the assumption usually hedge theirbets. Dummett s no ex-ception. It is clearthathe thinks fcompetence s a practical bil-ity, but this alone does notcount against the attribution ecausehe mostlywrites s ifthe abilityconsisted n propositional knowl-edge of truth onditions.However, ratherthan straightforwardlyidentifying he ability with the knowledge, he seems to prefer osay that it can be represented s thatknowledge (FLP 461/2;WTM 105-109, 121-125; WTM II 69-71; EI 373; TOE 128/9).Further, e thinks hatpart ofthisknowledge s only implicit or

17 Understanding and TruthConditions (MidwestStudies V: 401-410), p. 402.Heidelberger oes on to argue thatthoughknowledgeof truth onditions does notimplycompetence, ompetence nearly nough implies the knowledge. reject helatter rgument, Realism and Semantics, ec. 2.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 85tacit (WTM II 70/1,80; EI 373/4; TOE 129).18This use ofweaselwords in stating the propositional assumption casts doubt on

Dummett's commitment o it. So I shall not restmy case againstDummetton attributing his assumption to him.'9Abandoning the propositional assumption, and taking compe-tence s simplya practicalability,we get anotherversionboth ofBand ofC:B2. The dispute about truth conditions is the dispute aboutwhether he sentencesunderstoodby the competent peakerhave realist (evidence-transcendent) r only verificationisttruth onditions.C2. The sentences nderstood y the ompetent peakerhave onlyverificationistruth onditions.These differ romBi and Cl in making no mentionof knowledge.B2 must be true, iven the tautological ssumptionthatthecompe-tent peakerunderstands he entences f the anguage. Interest henfocuseson C2. I shall argue in 111.2 hat t is false.11.2 An Argument or the Propositional Assumption?

Meanwhilewe must consider Bi and thepropositional assump-tion on which it depends. That dependence requiresthat we taketheassumption strictlynd literally: t is no meremannerofspeak-ing; thespeakerreallydoes know thatthe truth onditions re suchand such.At first ight t may seem that Dummett's engthy rguments ora verificationistnd against a realist theory funderstandinge.g.,in WTM and WTM II) constitute n argument forthe proposi-tional assumption.For the conclusion is always presented s: thespeaker knows only verificationist ruth conditions; i.e., as Cl.However thiswayofputting the conclusion simplyreflects um-mett's onflationof the propositional and nonpropositionalviewsofcompetence.There is nothing n Dummett's rgument orverifi-1 Dummett lso makes themysterious emark hat theory f meaning, which sforhima theory f understanding,s not a psychologicalhypothesis artly n theground, t seems, that somethingwith internalmechanisms unlike ours, e.g., aMartianor a robot,mighthave the required mplicit knowledge WTM II 70). Thisoverlooks the distinctionbetweenpsychologicaland physical mechanisms.A Mar-

tian or a robot that s physicallydifferent romus might be psychologicallythesame. The remark s mysterious ecause ifunderstanding s anything t is (at least,partly)psychological.19 know ofonly one place in which Dummettdoes not conflate he view thatun-derstanding s propositional withthe view that t is a practical bility.This is in hisrecent Comments (C) on Putnam's Reference nd Understanding in Meaningand theMoral Sciences and in Margalit, d., Meaning and Use). He there ontem-plates dropping the view that a theory f truth s a theory f understanding, ndthusdroppingthepropositional ssumption. n effect e restshiscase on B2 and C2.



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86 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYcationism,however ound, thatmakes tan argument orCl ratherthanC2.

Despite the popularity of the propositional assumption, I canfind nothing n theliterature hat could seriouslybe called an ar-gument for t. Apparently t is thoughtto follow in some obviousway from heclaim that peakers know themeaning of sentencesin their anguage and from heslogan that themeaning of a sen-tence s its truth onditions. Some passages in Dummetthint atthis (e.g., WTM 105-109; WTM II 68/9; TOE 153-155). Consideralso thefollowing ummary f Dummett'sviews byColin McGinn:If a Tarskian heoryftruth]s to serve s a theoryfmeaning or ,andifspeakersreacknowledgedo knowwhat entencesf L mean,then heremust ea sensenwhich he heorytates,rserves ostate,what peakers f L know nknowingwhat entencesfL mean.20

Remarks ike thisare commonin the iterature, nd yetthey epre-sent not so much an argument s a play on words.Every ttempthave made to construct n argumentaround such remarks urnsinto a travesty. he followingattempt, uggestedby Dummett'sdiscussion ofFrege'sdistinctionbetween ense and referenceTOE117-126; particularly 124-126),21 s typical (X is a competentspeaker):(1) X understands ;(2) X knows themeaningofS;(3) The meaning ofS = thetruth onditionsofS;(4) X knowsthetruth onditionsofS;(5) X knows whatthe truth onditionsofS are.Let TC be the truth onditionsofS.

.,. 6) X knowsthat the truth onditionsofS are TC.No objection can be taken to (1). And themove to (2) is accepta-ble enough if 2) is takenas a mereeverydaymannerof speaking.However, f 2) is tobe construed s requiring thatthere xist someentity-the meaning of S-which X knows in the sense thathe isacquainted with it, then we should resist the move. We need astrongargument,not just ordinary alk, beforewe accept such a20 Truthand Use, in Platts,ed., op. cit.: 19-40, p. 20; see also CrispinWright,

Truth-Conditions nd Criteria, ProceedingsoftheAristotelian ociety, upp. vol.L (1976): 217-245, p. 221. McGinn is mostly riticalofDummett.However,he seemsto agree withtheview I have quoted. In general,he concedes a greatdeal to Dum-mettwithoutquestion.21 In thisdiscussionDummett onsidersthe viewthat ense s no more than refer-ence. He takes this to be the view thatcompetence s no more thanknowledgeofreference. e goes on to argue thatthis knowledge onsists n propositional knowl-edge of a certain ort.Roughly, haveconstructed he rgument claim is suggestedby this passage byreplacing reference' y truth onditions'.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 87requirement on linguistic competence. (2) does have to beconstrued n this wayif (4) is to followfrom t and (3). Therehasto exist some entitywhichis both the meaning of S and thetruthconditionsof S, so that f X is acquainted with the one he is ac-quainted with theother.Thus the nferencewill not go through fwe construe 2) as just anotherway of saying thatX knowswhatthe meaning of S is and construe 4) similarly i.e., construe t as(5)]: knowing-what ontexts re opaque. [And is (2) any moreac-ceptable construed his way than theotherway?]Nextconsider 3), the other premise n the nference o (4). It isbased on the slogan thatthemeaning of a sentence s its truth on-ditions. As slogansgo, this s a good one in my view. Neverthelessit is only a slogan. One way of nterpretingt would be as follows:it is because a sentence s true n such and suchcircumstancesndonly in thosecircumstances hat t plays the special semanticrolein our lives that t does play. There is no reason to suppose thattheory uided by thisslogan will posit anyentity, he meaningofS, or anyentity, hetruth onditionsof S, as (3) requires.Further-more, ven f thetheorywere to positsuchan entitynd even f 2),construed s positingan entity,were cceptable,therewould be noreasonto suppose thattheformertheoretical ntitywould be thesame as the latter ordinary entity.Certainly hemerefact thattheywerebothcalled themeaning of S would not showthattheywere thesame.These areperhapstheworst spectsof theargument, ut therestof t is also bad. First, 5) does notfollowfrom4): a personcan beacquainted withan entitywithoutknowingwhattheentitys. [Ofcourse,as I have noted,we could construe 4) as (5), but then itwould not follow from 2) and (3).] Second,the nference rom 5)to (6) is dubious, to saythe east. The main problemwith t is thatknowing-what eemstobe context-dependentas Dummetthimselfnotes but sets aside: TOE 126).22 inally, 6) cannotbe inferred i-rectlyfrom 4), ignoring (5): X can be acquainted withan entitywithoutknowingthat t is anything n particular.The argumentseems like a travesty ecause it involvesa naiveview first f an ordinaryuse of the word 'meaning', second of atheoretical logan, and thirdof theconnectionbetweentheordi-nary use and the slogan. So I don't attributethe argumenttoDummett.HoweverI do claim that fthis,or something ike it,isnot his implicitargumentfortheassumptionthatcompetencere-quires knowledgeof truth onditions,thenhe has offered oteven

22See also StevenE. Boerand WilliamG. Lycan, Knowing Who, PhilosophicalStudies,xxviii, (November1975):299-344; and my Designation,pp. 222-224.



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88 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYthe glimmer fan argument ortheassumption. f theassumptionis false, o also are Bi and Cl.11.3 Arguments gainst the Propositional AssumptionIn my view competence n a language does not consistin anysemantic propositional knowledge at all. It is a set of groundedskillsor abilities. It consists n beingable to do thingswitha lan-guage, notin having thoughts bout it. Understanding languageno more involveshaving propositional knowledge of a semanticsortabout thelanguage than being able to ride a bicycle nvolveshaving propositional knowledge bout mechanics, r beingable todigest food involves having propositional knowledge aboutdigestion.23Gilbert Harman has raised a very ood objection to the proposi-tional assumption.24 he knowledge t attributeso the speakerre-quires thathe have some way of representingo himself he condi-tions thatwould make sentences rue.But whatdoes competencentherepresentinganguage consist n? Eitherthe sameproblemhasreappearedor we are faced with an equal one.25I have raised a related objection.26Briefly, person could nothave semanticpropositionalknowledgewithouthaving theseman-tic vocabulary of some language. That vocabulary s an isolablepart of a language, just as is the biological or economic vocabu-lary. A person could be competent n the nonsemanticpart of alanguage without being competent n its semantic partor in thesemanticpartof any other anguage. So competence n thenonse-mantic part does not consist n semanticpropositional knowledge.So competence n the anguage as a whole does noteither.This is not theplace to attempt he arge task of giving a theoryofcompetence nd its relationtosemanticproperties. n thecourse

23 Perhaps this overstates he case a little see also Designation,p. 107). It is plau-sible to thinkthatthe explanationofreference or term ike bachelor' is in termsof the referencef 'adult', unmarried', human', and 'male' (ibid., pp. 202/3). f soit maybe the case that understanding his term onsists n knowing that t meansadult unmarriedhuman male. This could be the sort of term f which Dummettthinks he competent peakerhas explicitpropositionalknowledge EI 373). Whatam most intenton denying s thatcompetencerequires primarily, nd in general,semanticpropositionalknowledge,whether mplicitor explicit.24 Language, Thought, and Communication, in Keith Gunderson, ed., Lan-

guage, Mind, and Knowledge:Minnesota Studies n thePhilosophy of Science,Vol.7 (Minneapolis: Univ. ofMinnesotaPress, 1975):270-298,p. 286.25This objection ndicates an important act bout competence n L: this compe-tencemightcovermany competences ncluding,e.g., competence n understandingspokenL, competence n writingL and, most mportantly,ompetence n thinkingin L. In this paper I mostly ollow theusual, rathermisleading,practiceof conflat-ing competence n speaking L with competence n understandingspoken?)L, andof writing s ifthese ompetenceswerethe onlyones that oncernedus.26Designation,pp. 97-100.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 89ofoffering semantictheory have elsewheremade someprelimi-naryremarks owardthattask.27 hese indicatehow wemightviewcompetence s a set of grounded skills or abilities. I summarize.I take the usual line of explaining meaning largely n terms ftruth onditions. Truth conditionsare to be explained ultimatelyin terms f reference nder the guidance of Tarski, as interpretedand developed by HartryField.28 look to causal theoriesfortheultimate xplanation of reference. causal theory xplains the na-tureof referencen terms f a certainsort of causal chain, a chainwith threekinds of link: groundings of word in object; referenceborrowingswhen a word is passed on or reinforcedn a person;and abilities with a word gained and sustainedbygroundings ndreference orrowings.Implicit n this semantics s a view of competence.Thus, tohavetheability we all have with cat', to understand he English word'cat', is to be appropriately inked to the network fcausal chainsfor cat', a network nvolving other people's abilities as well asgroundings nd reference orrowings. o have this bility personmust be able to combine 'cat' appropriatelywith otherwordstoform entences.He must be able to have thoughtswhichthose sen-tencesexpress. Furthermore, hese thoughtsmust be groundedincats. A Twin-Earthian,who in other respectshas thesame abilitywith 'cat' that we have, does not have our understanding f thetermbecause his ability s grounded not in cats but in apparentlysimilar but really quite differentnimals, Twin-Earth-cats.How-ever,having our abilitydoes not require knowing that cat' has anyparticular emanticor syntactic roperty, or does itrequire beingable to recognize ats.The theory as little to say about the property f understandinga sentence, or xample, the sentence The cat is on the mat'. Thatunderstanding nvolves,of course, having abilities with containedwords ike cat'. Beyondthat t involveshaving the syntactic killofcombining words of those types nto sentences f thatstructure.tdoes not involve knowing that the truth onditions ofthe sentenceare such and such; it does not involve knowing that thesentencehas any particular emanticproperties.

On thisview of inguisticcompetence, ny propositional knowl-27Ibid.,pp. 101-110, 129-133,196-199.28 Tarski's Theory of Truth, n Platts,op. cit.: 83-110. Field's views have beencriticizedby Donald Davidson, Reality without Reference, bid.: 131-140 cf. myDesignation 118-124); by John McDowell, Physicalism nd PrimitiveDenotation:Field on Tarski, ibid.: 111-130 cf. my Realism and Truth); nd by Hilary Putnam,Meaning and the Moral Sciences [cf. my Critical Notice of that book, Australa-sian Journal of Philosophy,LVIII, 4 (December 1980): 395-404].



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90 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYedge of a language that personhas is something ver nd abovehiscompetence, omething ained from heorizingbout the anguage.

In the previoussection arguedthatDummettgives theproposi-tional assumption no adequate support. In this section I haveargued that the assumption s false and have suggested n alterna-tiveviewof competence. f I am rightthenBi and Cl are false.It is worthhighlighting heconsequence of this for Dummett'sverificationistrgument gainst Realism. If the propositionalas-sumption is false then a person committedto Realistic Truthshouldhold only to the view thatthe speakerunderstands entencesthathave realist truth onditions. So it is quite beside the point toargue against him that speakersdo not know realist truth ondi-tions. Yet that s the centralthrust f Dummett'sverificationistr-gument against Davidson (WTM, WTM jl.29 Davidson is open totheargument, f course,because he accepts the propositional as-sumption). Establishingmerely hat speakersdo not know realisttruth onditionscasts no doubt on RealistTruth.Even less does itcast doubt on Realism.

III. COMPETENCE AS A PRACTICAL ABILITY111. . Dummett'sArgument or VerificationismConsidernow the alternative ersionsof B and C. B2 is trivial.Interest ettles n C2:C2. The sentences nderstood ythe ompetent peakerhaveonlyverificationistruth onditions.To establishthis Dummettneeds to argue that speakercould notunderstand sentence hat s a matter f facthad realist evidence-transcendent)ruth onditions.In theiroriginal formDummett'sverificationistrguments repermeatedby talk of the speaker'sknowledge.30 he present ask sto ignore all such talk and abstract n argument hattreats ompe-tence s simply practical bility.The task s hard,forthepreciseargument s elusive. What follows s my best ttempt t abstraction(fromFPL 467/8,WTM 115-123; WTM II 70-111; El 4-6, 373-380;TOE xxxii-xl, 16-18, 23/4,132/3,153-155).329 See also Wright, Truth-Conditions nd Criteria, and Strawson on Anti-Realism.30The Comments (C) mentioned n fn 19, are an exception. However, the ar-gument there s (i) very rief, ii) unclear to me, at least), nd (iii) aimed specificallyat Putnam's theory f truth,which does not make use of an explanatorynotion ofreferencend hence s not what I have herecalled Realist Truth (see my CriticalNotice, op. cit., fn 28).31See also Dag Prawitz, Meaning and Proofs: On the ConflictbetweenClassicaland IntuitionisticLogic, Theoria, XLIII, 1 (1977): 2-40, pp. 4-7; Wright, Truth-Conditions nd Criteria, p. 224-228, nd Strawson'sAnti-Realism, p. 284-286.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 91(1) The competent peaker's understanding fa sentenceSis a practicalability;(2) This practical bility s an ability o manifest particularsortofbehavior;(3) The only sortof behavior thatcould manifest he speak-er's understandingf S is thatbehaviorwhich bringshiminto the position in which, f the conditionobtains thatconclusively ustifiesthe assertionof S, he recognizes tas so doing;32(4) The speaker'sunderstanding f S is his abilityto mani-fest ehavior thatbringshiminto the position n which,if the condition obtains whichconclusivelyustifiestheassertion fS, he recognizes t as so doing;(5) The recognizable onditionsof S's conclusivelyustifiedassertion re itsverificationistruth onditions.Let us put (4) and (5) togethernd abbreviateby using the phrase'associatesrecognitionally'.(6) The speaker's understandingof S associates S recog-nitionallywithverificationistruth onditions.

This conclusionestablishes hat ll understandings verificationistbut not thatall truth s. The 'only' in C2 requiresthat S not haveany truthconditions other than verificationistnes: that it nothave truth onditions transcending herecognizable onditionsofconclusively ustified ssertion;that t not have realist ruth ondi-tions. Dummett has to rule out the possibility thatS has realisttruth onditionsas well as the verificationist ruth onditionsre-quired forunderstanding.(7) S has no truthonditionsother han those ssociatedwithit recognitionally y the speaker'sunderstanding;(8) S has only verificationistruth onditions.S stands in here for any sentenceunderstood by the competentspeaker, nd so C2 follows mmediately.33The threekey premises re (2), (3), and (7). The first wo tie un-derstanding o verificationistruth onditions.The third reventsfromhaving any truth onditions that re not so tied.32 Dummettmakesthis laim onlyof sentences orwhichhe thinks ur knowledgeof truth onditions s implicit.Wheretheknowledge s explicitthemanifesting e-havior s the statement f thoseconditions.He thinks hatthe basicmanifesting e-havior mustbefor entenceswherewe could not state ruthonditions.See also fn23.33 Dummett ometimes eans towardpreferring semanticsbased on falsificationto one based on verificationWTM II 127-137).This preference ould requireob-vious adjustmentsto myversionof Dummett'sargument.The differenceetweenfalsificationismnd verificationisman be overlookedforour purposes.



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92 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY111.2 The Rejection of Dummett'sVerificationism34Dummett'sverificationistrgumentraises too many ssues to bediscussed in detail here. My strategys first o make objections tothe argumentfromtheperspective f several contemporary heor-ies; second, to rejecttheconsiderationsDummettoffersn supportof some of his premises. A thorough rebuttal of the argumentwould includea worked-outheory upportingRealist Truth. Sucha theory s alluded to in IV. 1.Step 4 stands opposed to holism in psychology nd epistemol-ogy.The stand on psychology omes mainly frompremise2. Thisrequires,forunderstanding t least, a kind of behaviorism: o havean ability s to manifest particular ortof behavior n the appro-priate circumstances. n my view,recentwork n the philosophyofminddecisively avors unctionalism ver thiskindof behaviorism.The difference an be put like this. Behaviorism ees each mentalstateas a simple input-outputfunction:to be in a mental state ssimplyto be apt to yield certainbehavior as output given certainstimuli s input. According ofunctionalism mentalstate s not asimple input-output unction: t is related to input and output bycausal relations to other mental states,usually complicated rela-tions.Competencewith wordorsentence an no morebe tied toaparticularmanifestation han can pain, love, belief, r bravery.Dummett does argue against a holistic view of understanding,particularly n discussing Davidson and Quine (FPL 592-601;WTM 115-138;TOE 134-140,301-309). However,so far as I cansee, the argumentdepends on accepting the propositional assump-tion about competence. Furthermore, unctionalismdiffers romthe holism ofDavidson or Quine.Dummett'scommitment o anti-holist pistemology omes withpremise3. It requires that therebe a particularrecognizable ondi-tion in which the belief xpressedbyS is conclusively ustified. nmyview the best recentwork n epistemology nd the philosophyof scienceshows this tobe an impossiblerequirement. he relationbetweenworldly conditions and a justifiedbelief is much morecomplicated thanis presupposed by the requirement.Manydiffer-

34For some objections to Dummett related to some of mine see Alan Millar,Truth and Understanding, Mind, LXXXVI, 343 (July1977): 405-416; Gregory ur-rie and PeterEggenberger, Knowledge of Meaning, Nouts forthcoming).3'Dummett concludes a discussion of the realist view that a person who diedwithout verbeing put in danger eitherwas braveorwas not with the following s-tounding statement: it is evident that only a philosophicallyquite naive personwould adopt [the] realistview (TOE 150). In my view, he was brave f he realizedthe appropriate functional tate nd not brave f he did not. His quiet life s besidethe point.



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DUMMETr'S ANTI-REALISM 93ent worldly onditions can produce thesame sensory timulation.Givendifferentast experiences nd present eliefs, hesame stim-ulation can produce differentxperiences.Given differenttherbe-liefs,the same experience an lead to differentobservational be-liefs. Given differenttherbeliefs, hesame observational beliefcan lead to differenttheoretical beliefs.No belief s conclusivelyjustified.Each belief is tied loosely to a range of conditions inwhich, relativeto otherbeliefs, t is justified n varyingdegrees,Premise 3 requires n unreconstructedositivist pistemology.There are two signs of Dummett'sretreating rom he epistemicextremism f (3). First,though Dummettusually talksof conclu-sive justification n presentinghis verificationisme.g., FPL 148,467, 514, 586; WTM 123;WTM II 111,132;EI 375), he now seemsto thinkthis s a mistake TOE xxxviii). Second, he is sympatheticto the epistemic holism of Quine's Two Dogmas (FPL 591;WTM 11 1; TOE 297/8).Despite thishe does still wantto hold, itseems, thatsome beliefs-the peripheralbeliefs have called ob-servational are conclusivelyustifiedn certain pecifiable ondi-tions. This is at odds with the theory-ladennessf observationhavedescribed: he retreat as not gone far nough.However,themostimportantpoint about this retreats that tthreatens hecollapse ofDummett'sposition.How can (3), (4), and(5) be revised?The problem s that there re indefinitelymanyrec-ognizable conditions thatcould give a belief some degreeof sup-port.And the one conditioncould give some degreeof supporttoindefinitelymany beliefs.Are we to modify3) so thatthe speakeris to be able to recognizeone of theseconditions? Or a few? Ormany? Or all? Whatever heanswer,there eems to be no way tomodify 5). Wecan pick out no condition fromS's set ofpossibleconfirming onditionsand make it theverificationistruth ondi-tions of S in particular.The retreat eads straight o a holisticverificationism,articu-larly whenit is accompanied, as it should be, by a moveto a func-tionalist theoryof the mind. Holistic verificationisms not, ofcourse, any comfortto the believer in Realist Truth (see IV.1below). However, it is certainlynot what Dummettwants. Hismolecular verificationism equires behaviorist sychology nda positivist pistemology.The objections so far are freeof any semanticpresuppositions.Not so theone that follows.The theory f understanding rieflydescribed n 11.3 s in direct onflictwiththe verificationismf (3)and (4). The basic disagreements thatbetween ausal and descrip-tion theories of reference.According to a descriptiontheory,



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94 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYcompetent speaker of a propername or natural-kind ermasso-ciates with the term description ufficient o identify hereferent.By allowing the descriptionto include demonstrativelements,description heory an cover straightforwardecognitional apac-ity. By allowing thedescription o refer o otherpeople's referencesthe theory an covera much more attenuated dentificational a-pacity. All of this fitsnicelywith (3). Causal theories f referencewere born out of the rejectionof descriptiontheories.A speakercan use a termto refer hough almost entirely gnorantabout itsreferent. e may not be able to describe t, recognize t, or knowhow to track t down. Causal theorieshave a differentiew accord-ing to which references fixedby an appropriate causal link toreality.Judging which partof reality s so linked is a job for theexperts, ot theessenceof what every peaker an do. The opinionsofexperts ependon their heories,nd so opinions maydifferndchange over timeeven thoughreference emainsconstant.This is not the place to air this disagreement n detail. In myopinion-some might saya biased one-the causal theorys lead-ing heavilyon points. Descriptiontheorists ave not producedanyeffective esponse to the detailedcriticisms save to theredherring,rigid designation ).36Criticisms f causal theoriesby Dummett(FPL 135-151;TOE 140-144, 20-430)and othersmay appear moreeffectivehan they eally rebecause of the undeveloped tate fthetheories t which they re aimed. I have attempted development(in Designation).It is worth mphasizing thatthis disagreement ver understand-ing is not settledby whether r not we would ordinarily ay thata personhad fully grasped the meaning of a term n thisandthatcircumstance. ven ifDummettwereright n his claims aboutsuch matters which I thinkhe mostly sn't) thatwould onlyshowsomething bout our folktheory.Whatthecausal theorists claim-ing is that his more austereconcept of understanding s all that sneeded to explain the behaviorof speakers. ffolktheory iffers,omuch the worse forfolk theory ibid., 8, 87-90, 99/100,198).If thecausal theory f understanding s right then the verifica-tionisttheorys wrong.How is understandingmanifestedccord-ing to the causal theory? n a multitudeof ways, many of themhaving nothing to do with verification.My objectionsso far have been to (2) and (3). The causal theory

36 Rigid designation s a redherring ecause the best Kripkean rguments gainstdescription heoriesmake no appeal to the modal intuitionson which thatnotiondepends Designation, pp. 13-23).



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 95is also opposed to (7). It is a consequence of thattheory hatwordshave referents,nd hence sentenceshave truth onditions, whichare not associated with them recognitionally by the speaker'sunderstanding.I have not yetconsideredDummett's rgumentsfor 3) and (7).The slogan for thesearguments s an appealing one which Dum-mett akes fromWittgenstein:meaning is use. It is important osee that good deal ofthis slogan's appeal comes from ts suggest-ing an indubitablefact: t is whatpeople do withwords thatmakesthem mean what theydo; in particular,taking a centralaspect ofmeaning, t is whatpeople do thatmakes t the case that certainobject is thereferent f a word.Similarly, t is whata person doesthat makes it thecase thata certainobjectis his child. It no morefollows fromthe first actthat a personmustbe able to recognizetheobject in question as the referentletalone know that t is thereferent) han t follows from he secondfact hat person mustbeable torecognize he object in questionas his child (know that tishis child). Our actions can relate us to objects and conditionswithoutourhaving thecapacity torecognize heobjectsand condi-tions as so relatedto us (know thatthey re so related).The causal theorist an embrace the indubitablefact suggestedby the slogan with as much enthusiasm as the verificationist.talone givesno support to (3) or (7).Wittgenstein'slogan has to be construed n a Wittgensteinianwaytogive therequired upport: use' must be takentomean rec-ognizable conditions of conclusively ustifieduse. That is howDummett does construe t. The step fromthe indubitablefact tothis construal s a giantstep.What ustifies t?It is clear thatDummett thinks that the slogan, and hence (3)and (7), are justified by thenature of communication and by theway language is learnedand taught.A view of communication and a view of understanding re socloselyrelated s to standorfall together. orcommunicating uc-cessfullywithS normallyrequires speakerand audience to under-standS in the ameway.Dummett'sview, nmyterminology,s thatthey ssociate S recognitionallywiththe same verificationistruthconditions.All theobjections to his view of understanding pplyequally to this view. Ifcommunication s to be possible it must re-quire speaker nd audiencetoassociateS with omething ther hanitsrecognizable onditionsofconclusively ustified ssertion.Dummett's briefremarkson language learningdo not yield aview that s bothplausible and supportive f 3) and (7). Oftenthe



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96 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYfollowing argument seems to be suggested FPL 467/8; EI 4-6,375-380; TOE 16-18, 188-190).37 A person learns to understandby being taughtto associate t with the recognizable ondition thatin factconclusively ustifies ts assertion.He can learn to associateno other semantic propertywith S. This supports (3). So S canhave no other emanticproperty. his supports 7).This argument s too crude to be Dummett's actual argument,but it is quite unclear how Dummettwould want it modified ndhow such modifications ould remedy ts failings.First, heviewof anguage learning s obviously t odds with thefollowing relativelyuncontroversial acts. i) Most sentencesweunderstandwe neverhearuttered. ii) Wemostly earn a languagenot frombeing taught t but fromobserving ts use. (iii) Hardlyany of theseobservations re of sentencesn thepresence fcondi-tions thatare close to being candidates forconclusivelyustifyingthesentences. iv) Manyof the observations re of false or unjusti-fied ssertionswhich,nevertheless, anifestinguistic ompetence.38Next,all our earlierobjections count against Dummett'sviewoflanguage learning. ndeed theperspective f thoseobjectionsseemsmuch more ikely to provide n explanation of the uncontroversialfactsof language learning than Dummett'sverificationism.o re-flectionon language learning seems likely to provide a good ar-gument against verificationism.n particular, t suggests hatveri-ficationism is too passive. If we are to learn anythingin thelinguistic situations that we actually experience we must go waybeyondthe evidence. I suggestwe learna language in thecourseofvery ctivetheorizing bout theworld n generaland about peo-ple in particular.And thatwhat we primarily earn with sounds istoassociate themwith thethoughts hat re conventionally elatedto them.But that's nother tory see Designation 75-86).Finally,thesupportthecrude argument s alleged to give to (7)is spurious. Even if it were the case that speakersrecognitionallyassociate with S only the condition of its conclusively ustified s-sertion, t would not follow thatS had no semanticproperty therthan association with that condition: the act of association canconfer n S propertieswe don'trecognize. ee aboveon parenthood.

In thissection have attempted o expose the elements f Dum-mett'sverificationismnd indicate their opposition to well-sup-See also Prawitz, p. cit., pp. 3-6, 10.38Talk of correctuse encourages a confusion here. An assertion an be correctin the sense of manifesting ompetence,but incorrect n the ense that t expressesmistakenview of the world. Mistakenviews are one thing, inguistic ncompetenceanother.



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 97ported ontemporary heoriesn psychology, pistemology,nd se-mantics. fanyof thosetheoriess right,Dummett's iew s in severedifficulty. thinkthey re all right.Further, here s little n Dum-mett ocast doubton them.C2 is false.RealistTruth s unscathed.

IV. VERIFICATIONISM AND REALISMIV.1 Verificationismnd RealismDummett's rgument gainst Realism restson threepremises.havearguedthat ach ofthese exceptB whenconstrued s the triv-ial B2) is false. f I am right,Dummett's rgument s bad frombe-ginningto end.In this section I shall consider thegeneralquestion of the rela-tion betweenRealism and verificationism. his is important norderto guard againstother verificationistttempts o undermineRealism (and against the nevitablechargethatDummett'srealar-gument s otherthanthe argument have attributed ohim).What sortof connectionmight therebe betweenRealism andverificationism?My argumentshows that the issues of Realism,truth, nd understanding re distinct.So therewill be no entail-mentrelationsbetween position n one area and a position n the

other.Whatwe can expectare inferences o thebestexplanationholding betweenpositions.With uch inferenceshecase for Real-ism looks good.I think thatthemostpromisingof such inferences tartsfromRealism, togetherwithsomeobservations bout thepropertiesndrelationsoftheobjectsthe Realistbelieves n, and arguesforReal-ist Truth and a nonverificationistoctrine f understanding. hetheory ketchedn II.3 is, in effect,art of such an argument.Themajor problem for this inferenceto the best explanation is inshowing thatthe Realist needs an explanatorynotion of truth tall.39 However I thinkwe can hope to show this need in ordertoexplain learningand teaching.40howingthiswould completethecase againstverificationism.Now the striking hingabout this inference, upposing that tcan be made good, is that t starts romRealism. Those impressedwithDummettwill object,claiming thatwe should start rom hetheory funderstandingnd see whatwe can infer rom hat boutRealism. For example, suppose we can establisha verificationist

39See 1.1 above and Leeds,op. cit.40 For some brief uggestions long these ines see HartryField, Mental Repre-sentation, Erkenntnis, III, 1 (July1978):9-61, pp. 47/8, nd myDesignation,pp.68/9. n my CriticalNotice of Putnam'sMeaning and the Moral Sciences,p. 403,I agreedwithPutnam thatwe needed truth o explain thesuccessofbeliefs. nowthinkthisa mistake: ee Realism and Truth.



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98 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHYtheory f understanding,hen t maybe claimed that we can inferfrom this an epistemicdoctrineof truth.Then, given the earlier-mentioned mpossibility f finding plausible Realist epistemol-ogy to combine with thatdoctrine f truthI.1), we can infer nti-Realism. I have three omments n this.(a) The theory f understanding s the wrongplace to start.Thetask s to put together he most plausible comprehensive heory fthephenomena thatconfront s. Theories of language and under-standingare only two among many scientific heories hatmustbefitted nto the comprehensivepicture.Realism is an overarchingempirical scientific) heory r principle. t is initiallyplausible. Itcan be supportedby arguments hat make no appeal to theories flanguage or understanding: .g., it is the only plausible explana-tionof the way things eem; it accordswith our best science;criti-cisms of it fail; it is supported by naturalizedepistemology; ivaloverarching principles such as those of idealism all fail. Whatfirmer lace could there e to stand thanRealism, as we theorizensuch undevelopedareas as those of language and understanding?In contrast, hepoor stateof theories n thoseareas,whether erifi-cationistor not,makes them bad place fromwhich to start heo-rizing, particularly n determining verarchingprinciplesaboutthenatureof reality.To thinkotherwise s to put thecartbeforethe horse.(b) Suppose, however, hata good argument ould be producedfora verificationist heory,making us feel inclined to waive ourobjection in principleto using understanding s a starting lace.Suppose furtherhatfrom hattheorywe could infer nti-Realismin the way suggested.What should not be overlooked s that,how-ever good that inferencewas, it alone would not undermine theearlier promising inference romRealism to Realist Truth. Ourchoice betweenthese two inferences hould be guided byour viewof whichstarting ssumption had thegreater lausibility. suggestthattheargumentsfor Realism are very trong nd that t wouldtake an argumentfar stronger han any yetoffered ora verifica-tionist heory funderstanding o make it the more plausible start-ing assumption.

(c) Finally, doubt that nference o the bestexplanationfromverificationistheory funderstandingwould yield nti-Realism. fnot,then t does not matter o theRealist how strong case couldbe made forverificationism.Consider the austere physicalismdescribed by Leeds (op. cit.),drawingon Quine. This position is unequivocally committed oRealism, butskeptical bout semanticnotions ike truth. o far s I



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DUMMETT'S ANTI-REALISM 99can see it could accommodate a verificationist heory f under-standing of a Quinean sort,forexample). Given the ndependentplausibility ofRealism, it seems ikely that thebestexplanation oftheworld for a verificationisthould be not that of anti-Realismbut thatofLeeds-Quine.In thesecomments have takentheories f language and under-standingto be ordinary cientific heories. give them no specialrole in settling ur comprehensiveworld view. I thinkwe shouldresist Dummettianattempts o use them as the basis fora born-again first hilosophy.IV.2 ConclusionIn its more prominent version,Dummett's argumentagainstRealism restson thetheory hat inguisticcompetence onsists nknowledge of truth onditions. In general it restson a linguistictheory f metaphysics, behaviorist heory f the mind, positivistepistemology, nd a description heory freference.n my view allthesetheories re false. In part I have argued this here; in part Ihave relied on whathas been done elsewhere.Moving away fromDummett's ctual argumentto consider thegeneralbearing of verificationismn Realism, I have foundlittlefor theRealist toworry bout. Realism is too strong doctrinetobe overthrown ycurrentpeculations bout understanding.What-everone makes of those peculations, hebesttheory ftheworld sRealist. I thinkthe besttheoryhould include RealistTruthand atheory funderstanding f thesort ketchedhere.However, ven fI am wrong about this,the Realist should not despair: there s stilltheLeeds-Quine position. Better o throw ll the semanticplanksoverboard hanabandon theRealist boat.

MICHAEL DEVITTUniversity f Sydney

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