Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference

Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference

A study of concepts, ideas and thinking tools developed by Edward de Bono that have

potential for application within a design process and design thinking framework.

Craig Austin

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Swinburne University of Technology

April 2015

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Abstract

My research project focused on design as an agency for change. I began by acknowledging that

design is (amongst other things) a creative act, then investigated thinking behaviors associated

with the process of design referred to as design thinking. I sought to answer the question: can

design thinking be enriched with the ideas of de Bono, in order to make the thinking and the

process more effective and can some of these ideas be graphically visualised?

In this thesis I consider both the professional practice of design as social, cultural and

economic production and the view that all people, to varying degrees, possess an innate capacity

to be creative as an aspect of more general human behavior. I propose design as a creative act

that incorporates thinking, and therefore knowledge, and include important contemporary

distinctions about design (designing), design knowledge, design praxis and design thinking.

The thesis also includes contemporary perspectives on creativity, cognition and perception

relevant to these central design themes.

In studying design thinking, I examined ideas promoted by Edward de Bono and

considered their suitability for use within the context of design. I investigated his early writings on

thinking and creativity first described in The Mechanism of Mind in 1969 and much of his more

recent work. Of particular interest are the ways in which de Bono proposes shifting, deepening and

broadening perception, and directing thinking along with managing the process of thinking

(metacognition) at both an individual and group level.

In responding to the research question—Can design thinking be enriched with the ideas of

de Bono, in order to make the thinking and the process more effective and can some of these ideas

be graphically visualised?—I developed two sets of graphic visualisations. These were designed to

give concrete form to a design process and design thinking sequence, including representation of

how de Bono’s thinking tools can be deployed. It has been proposed as a model for a way of

proceeding that visually frames specific aspects of the process of design on the one hand and the

cognitive activity associated with design thinking on the other.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank each of my two supervisors, Denise Whitehouse and Deirdre Barron, for their

expertise and assistance in helping me research and prepare this thesis. The journey has been

long and their continued guidance and constructive discourse over time has been invaluable.

My gratitude also extends to many colleagues in the Faculty of Health, Arts and Design at

Swinburne for their generous dialogue, insightful observations and contributions to opening up

new lines of enquiry.

Susan Mackie, CEO of the de Bono Institute in Melbourne, was an early supporter of this

research project and contributed many unique and important perspectives including her own

experiences to a shared discourse about Edward de Bono’s work. Edward de Bono was very

generous in providing time for discussion and interview at key points in the project. To be a

recipient of his wise counsel, insight and formidable experience in the field that he knows so

expertly has been a very real privilege.

Dr Campbell Aitken of Express Editing Writing and Research provided professional editing

services in accordance with the Institute of professional Editors’ Guidelines for editing research

theses (approved by the Deans and Directors of Graduate Studies on 12 November 2010).

Many friends and associates often found themselves on the receiving end of

conversations about the content of the research project and may not fully appreciate just how

valuable many of those discussions were. Now, I can offer my thanks to you all for your committed

listening, reflections and encouragement.

Finally, to my family, Fiona, Timothy and Nicholas, your love and support of the person

who was often in his study when you may have wanted him to be elsewhere, is truly heartfelt.

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Declaration

I, Craig Austin, the author of this thesis, declare:

This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other

Degree or Diploma.

To the best of my knowledge the thesis contains no material previously published

or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the

text of the thesis.

None of the work is based on joint research or publications.

Signed

Craig Austin

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Contents

Abstract Acknowledgements Declaration Contents List of figures

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background to the research project 11

1.2 Aim of the study 13

1.3 Structure of the thesis 13

1.4 Research design and methods 14

1.5 Development of the diagrams 17

1.6 Main contribution of the thesis 18

Chapter 2 Conceptualising design and its precursory landscape 2.1 Introduction 19 2.2 Anthropological foundations of design 20 2.3 Design as social, cultural and economic production 22

2.4 Gutenberg: Invention, systematisation and transformation 24

2.5 The Bauhaus: a search for unity, process and educational innovation 25 2.6 Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm: A culture of scientific operationalism 32

2.7 Emergence of the design methods movement 35

2.8 Design methods: A Popperian view of designing 47

2.9 Summary 51

Chapter 3 Design practice and design process 3.1 Introduction 53 3.2 Professional practice and the process of design 56

3.3 Pedagogical ramifications 64

3.4 Summary 69

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Chapter 4 Drawing and diagrammatic representation in design 4.1 Introduction 72 4.2 Drawing as a language of thought 73 4.3 Similarity-based reasoning: Visual analogy and metaphor 80

4.4 Foreshadowing the development of research-based cognitive artifacts 83

4.5 Summary 83

Chapter 5 Creativity and cognition 5.1 Introduction 86

5.2 Historical and cultural perspectives 87

5.3 Cognitive science and computational science 92

5.4 Perception and insight: A viewpoint from theoretical physics 95

5.5 Intuition and unconscious thought 97

5.6 Analogical thinking and imagination 99

5.7 Artificial intelligence and connectionist systems 101

5.8 Behavioral science and psycho-logical theory 103

5.9 Scientific studies and pragmatic approaches 115

5.10 Summary 116

Chapter 6 Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference

6.1 Introduction 119

6.2 Design thinking: A biologically and culturally informed approach 119 6.3 Edward de Bono: Medicine, mathematics and The Mechanism of Mind 121

6.4 The brain as a self-organising pattern recognition system 124

6.5 Natural, logical, mathematical and lateral thinking 129

6.6 PO: a concept for a Provocative Operation 135 6.7 The artificial dichotomy between intellect and feeling 137

6.8 A clarion call for a new Renaissance: Rock Logic and Water Logic 138

6.9 Summary 145

Chapter 7 Thinking tools 7.1 Introduction 148

7.2 Compensating for the brain’s behavior: The concept of thinking tools 149

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7.3 Parallel Thinking as an alternative to adversarial thinking 155

7.4 The Six Thinking Hats® 157

7.5 Lateral Thinking® 164

7.6 DATT® (Direct Attention Thinking Tools) 170

7.7 Summary 173

Chapter 8 Graphic visualisation of a design process and design

thinking framework 8.1 Introduction 176

8.2 Explication and representation 177

8.3 Proposing a schema for a design process and design thinking sequence 181

8.4 Part 1: Graphic visualisation of de Bono’s biologically-based model for

The Mechanism of Mind 183

8.5 Part 2: Graphic visualisation of a proposed schema for a design process

and design think sequence 189

8.6 Summary 202

Chapter 9 Conclusion 204

References 216

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List of figures

2.1 The Bauhaus: Examples of diagrammatic representation: 1

Wassily Kandinsky – ideal correspondence between form and colour 28

The Bauhaus: Examples of diagrammatic representation: 2

Walter Gropius – structure of teaching at the Bauhaus

Paul Klee – idea and structure at the Bauhaus (written in German) 29


Wassily Kandinsky – diagrams of point and line in formal composition 29


Paul Klee – Pedagogical Sketchbook 30

2.2 Alain Findeli’s archetype (Urmodel) of a design curriculum 32

2.3 Alain Findeli’s three historical embodiments of a design curriculum archetype 34

2.4 J. J. Foreman’s representation of Edward Matchett’s design concept 39

2.5 Examples of early categorical models of the design process 41

2.6 A model for value analysis 42

2.7 A model for choosing design methods: 1

A word-based taxonomy 42

A model for choosing design methods: 2

Diagrammatic representation 44

2.8 Karl Popper’s model 47

2.9 Michael Brawne’s interpretation of Karl Popper’s model 49

4.1 Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 1

Glen Murcutt: site analysis and architectural concept sketches 75

Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 2

Communication design: iterative brand identity development sketches 76

Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 3

Product design: form development sketches 77

6.1 De Bono’s diagrammatic representation of Lateral Thinking 133 7.1 Parallel thinking as an alternative to adversarial thinking 157

8.1 Proposed four-stage design process and design thinking schema 182

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8.2 Edward de Bono’s biologically-based model for The Mechanism of Mind

Description of the brain’s ability to undertake two different types of thinking 184

8.3 Edward de Bono’s biologically-based model for The Mechanism of Mind

The possibility of shifting perception and thinking direction 185

8.4 Edward de Bono’s biologically-based Model for The Mechanism of Mind

The dominance of pre-existing patterns within the system 186


The potential value of alternatives within the system: 1 187


The potential value of alternatives within the system: 2 188

8.7 Schematic framework for a design process and design thinking sequence

Establishing a problem / solution space (sequence from A to B) 190


Identifying, locating and characterising stage 1 191








Superimposing Karl Popper’s four stage model on the framework 195


Superimposing Michael Brawne’s interpretation of Karl Popper’s Model 196


Establishing a contextual space 197


Identifying functionality of the thinking tools 198


Directing thinking, deploying the Six Thinking Hats® 199


Deepening and broadening perception, deploying the DATT® tools 200

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Shifting perception, deploying the Lateral Thinking® tools 201

9.1 Core topics in this thesis 209

9.2 Summary of models put forward in this thesis 212

9.3 Proposed schema for a design process and design thinking sequence 213

incorporating thinking tools developed by Edward de Bono

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Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Background to the research project In this thesis I focus on design as an agency for change through its motivation and role in bringing

imaginable worlds out of non-existence into existence. I propose that design (designing) is an act of

doing; that is, design as a verb, and that as an act of doing it involves thinking and therefore

knowledge. Acknowledging that, amongst other things, design is a creative act, my central focus for

the research was the investigation of thinking behaviors associated with a dimension of the design

process referred to as design thinking. The outcome of this research contributes to the field through

the development of a new understanding of design thinking. These understandings are then

presented in a graphic visualisation of a four-stage design process and design thinking schema

incorporating three sets of thinking tools developed by Edward de Bono.

In 2004, when being trained to become a lateral thinking instructor with the de Bono

Institute in Melbourne, I perceived there was a problem with some of the content and the methods

described in the training manual and the ways in which some of the material was being visually

represented. From my perspective as a communication designer and design educator, and more

recently as a design researcher, I believed there was a need for greater clarification and simplicity

(Mollerup, 2006, p. 8) in terms of communicating de Bono’s ideas to do with the behavior of the

brain, the concept of lateral thinking and the use of his thinking tools. Further investigation of his

work suggested that other concepts and ideas could be added to the lateral thinking construct

and could form the basis of a design process and design thinking sequence and this led to my

PhD proposal.

Research into the design process and design methods gained prominence in the early

1960s leading to the emergence of design research as field of study around twenty years later.

The work of Archer, Arnheim, Buchanan, Cross, Gordon, Jones, Lawson, Osborn, Rowe, Rittel and

Webber, Schön and Simon figured strongly during this period. However, it was not until 1991 that

the first academic research symposium specifically on design thinking took place. Herbert Simon in

his 1969 book The Sciences of the Artificial had explored the notion of design as a “way of thinking”

and explored further by Robert McKim in his 1973 book Experiences in Visual Thinking (Curedale,

2013, p.3). Rolf Faste subsequently developed McKim’s ideas in the 1980s and 1990s in his

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teaching work at Stanford around the idea of design thinking being a form of creative action

(Curedale, 2013, p.3). Curedale indicates the term design thinking emerged in the early 1980s and

coincided with increased interest in human-centred design; that it’s evolution spanned a period of

twenty to thirty years and that it “incorporates ideas from a number of design methodologies and

movements” (Curedale, 2013, p.3). Yet, design thinking and the design process remain intangible

for many professionals and observers of design.

Friedman points out that design is a process incorporating both theoretical disciplines and

fields of practice and, as in all fields of practice, involves both explicit and tacit knowledge

(Friedman, 2000, p.13). To this he adds that a challenge for design or any evolving field is “to

render tacit knowledge explicit” (Friedman, 2000, p.13). In respect of an important implication for

this challenge, Oxman asks who will reconcile theory and practice sufficient to shift design

education pedagogy toward a model that engages with existing meta-knowledge associated with

thinking behavior more akin to the needs of design? (Oxman, 2003, p. 3).

In this thesis, I propose that design thinking incorporates a sophisticated interplay

between creative or generative thinking and analytical- and judgment-oriented thinking and this is

explored in ideas put forward by Edward de Bono, particularly to do with brain function and our

thinking behavior. De Bono has a medical background and invented the term lateral thinking in the

late sixties during a period of medical research involving the extensive use of computers. At that

time, his research work led to an interest in “the sort of thinking that computers could not do’” which

he described as being “creative and perceptual thinking’” (de Bono, 1996, p. 52). My research

considered his views on creativity and thinking that arose from ideas and models de Bono first

described in The Mechanism of Mind (1969). Examination of his corpus, including his more recent

work, revealed that many of his ideas are predicated on a biological model for “the way the brain

becomes mind” (de Bono 1990c, p. 7) which contributes a valuable perspective to a broad

understanding of creativity as a human activity. Of particular interest in terms of design thinking are

the ways in which de Bono proposes shifting, deepening and broadening perception, and directing

thinking in conjunction with managing the process of thinking (metacognition). While

acknowledging the populist and some times controversial nature of de Bono’s ideas, my research

sought to establish whether, given their focus on creativity and thinking behavior, they have value if

engaged with during the design thinking process.

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1.2 Aim of the study

This thesis addresses the question: can design thinking be enriched with the ideas of de Bono,

in order to make the thinking and the process more effective and can some of these ideas be

graphically visualised? Effective, in this sense, means thinking and thinking behavior regarded as

being more capable of creating new perceptions and concepts, that is cooperative and non-

adversarial in nature, and that can be engaged with strategically.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

To achieve these aims, the thesis is organised in the following manner.

Chapter one frames the thesis, describes the research approach, establishes the aim of

the study, summarises the content relative to the research question and outlines the contribution

the thesis makes to existing knowledge. Having framed the questions to be addressed, chapter two

provides an overview of important historical antecedents to contemporary notions of design

(designing) and design knowledge and, in particular, those leading to the development of the

design methods movement and emerging interest in the notion of design thinking. Drawing on that

history it is possible to identify elements that constitute professional design practice. To understand

these elements, chapters three and four introduce those identified aspects of the professional

practice of design including the use of drawing and diagrammatic representation. In this thesis I

considered the professional practice of design as social, cultural and economic production, and on

the other hand the view that all people, to varying degrees, possess an innate capacity to be

creative as an aspect of more general human behavior. Consequently, the narrative in some

instances refers to the domain-specific nature of design as a professional discipline, as

professional practice, and sometimes adopts a broader perspective to encompass a more

generalised view of design. It also identifies areas of consistency where it exists between these

two perspectives to allow, where appropriate, for new ideas to form. Chapter five introduces a

range of material on creativity, cognition, perception and thinking behavior linked to key themes

established in chapter two, three and four and also to many of de Bono’s ideas put forward in

subsequent chapters.

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Drawing on the understandings generated from the previous chapters together, chapter

six proposes an expanded frame of reference for design thinking is proposed. This proposition

brings together ideas already articulated in the thesis about design thinking but adds to it a

perspective informed by brain function, thinking behavior and a number of other important ideas

described by de Bono and which constitute a biologically and culturally informed approach. This is

further expanded in chapter 7 which builds on many of these ideas by introducing his concept of

thinking tools and, specifically, three sets of thinking tools de Bono developed to compensate for

aspects of the way the brain functions, and for the ways in which our thinking behaviors

have developed.

Chapter 8 is devoted to presenting graphic visualisations of a four-stage design process

and design thinking schema which incorporates three sets of creativity tools developed by de Bono.

These diagrammatic representations build on framing design as a professional discipline that

encompasses the role of drawing and diagrammatic representation as a language of thought

intrinsic to design. In relation to further explication of the tacit nature of design knowledge, this

chapter brings forth my proposition that while some individuals benefit from verbalisation of the

design and design thinking process others may benefit from visualiation of aspects of these

processes through graphic representation. Chapter 9 draws together the multiple strands of ideas

developed in the thesis and encapsulates the rationale used in the process of developing them.

The thesis concludes with indicating further research being possible to do with evaluating the

effectiveness (as defined in the research question), or otherwise, of the schema.

1.4 Research design and methods

In a broad sense, engaging in systematic research may contribute to the knowledge base of a field

(pure research), enhance the practice within a particular discipline applied research), evaluate or

estimate the nature or quality of something (evaluation research), or address a given problem with

a particular context (action research) (Merriam, 2009, p. 4). All research is predicated on

“underlying philosophical assumptions about what constitutes ‘valid’ research’ and requires

research methods appropriate for the development of knowledge in a given study” (Thomas, 2010).

Merriam tell us that, “Engaging in systematic inquiry about your practice—doing research—involves

choosing a study design that corresponds with your question” and contends that seeking to

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improve one’s practice “leads to asking researchable questions, some of which are best

approached through qualitative research design” (Merriam, 2009, p. 1).

In response to the nature and intent of this research project, it adopts a qualitative theory

building approach to data collection and a holistic, interpretivist sense-making approach to its

analysis. Qualitative research is most often located within an interpretivist paradigm and

interpretive approaches rely heavily on naturalistic methods (interviewing, observation and analysis

of existing texts) and assume that reality and knowledge are socially constructed and are subject to

diverse interpretation. While some debate has existed to do with how qualitative research is best

defined, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) assert “qualitative researchers study things in their natural

settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people

bring to them” (cited in Merriam, 2009, p. 13). An older definition by Van Maanen (1979) states it is

“an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode,

translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning and not the frequency, of certain more or

less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (cited in Merriam, 2009, p. 13). Another

important characteristic of qualitative research is that it is an inductive process, in the sense that

data gathering leads to building concepts, hypotheses, or theories rather than using deduction to

test hypotheses as is the case in positivist research (Merriam, 2009, p. 15). According to Merriam,

“Bits and pieces of information from interviews, observations, or documents are combined and

ordered into larger themes as the researcher works from the particular to the general” and often

take the form of “themes categories, typologies, concepts, tentative hypotheses and even a theory

about a particular aspect of practice” (Merriam, 2009, p. 16). Outcomes of qualitative research are

often described as being richly descriptive where words and images rather than numbers

(quantitative methods) are used to communicate what has been learned and may include material

such as quotations from documents, field notes, interviews or combinations of these to support the

research findings (Merriam, 2009, p. 16). Each of these qualitative research attributes is well suited

to this study.

There are several types of interview that can be conducted within social research.

Structured interviews rely upon the use of a questionnaire for data collection and where the

neutrality of the interviewer is emphasised. However, this method is regarded as limiting an

interviewee’s ability to express their opinions in their own words as their responses must fit into

categories that have been predetermined by the interviewer (May, 2001, p. 132). In these ways the

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ability for the interviewer to probe is reduced because the format of the interview is structured. This

method was not considered suitable for this research study. In a semi-structured interview,

questions are normally predetermined but the interviewer has the opportunity to probe responses

to questions to seek clarification and elaboration (May, 2001, p. 134). The key difference with an

unstructured or focussed interview, as compared to the two previous types of interviews, is its

open-ended nature, its ability to challenge assumptions made by the interviewer and to enable the

interviewee to answer questions within their own frame of reference and to use language of their

choosing (May, 2011, p. 136). This was considered a more appropriate approach to the range of

interviews anticipated.

To support the development of the diagrams and their rationale, I scrutinised many of de

Bono’s texts and identified material that informed the conduct of several unstructured interviews

with de Bono and the CEO of the de Bono Institute in Melbourne. Analysis of field notes from

these encounters helped to underpin the initial and subsequent evolution of the graphic

visualisation of a four-stage design process and design thinking schema. The diagrams that

comprise this visualisation are an output method of this research project.

An extensive analysis of selected material from the literature review was also undertaken

in areas aligned with design and creativity but which exist outside of the domain-specific nature of

design (designing) as a discipline. This material was drawn from selected texts in the fields of

science, theoretical physics, behavioral psychology, cognitive science and artificial intelligence and

was undertaken with the following four key themes in mind: creativity; cognition; perception and

thinking behavior. Examining this material, which extended beyond de Bono’s corpus, assisted with

clarifying opinions that were also relevant to building a rationale for the iterative development of

the diagrams.

Critical reflection drawing on a career of over 35 years as a communication designer and

design educator, and more recently as a design researcher, also contributed to the development of

the diagrams and the process of developing the rationale upon which they are based. This required

key concepts being identified and challenged (assumption analysis), meaningfully situating the

development of the diagrams (context awareness), envisioning new possibilities for revealing tacit

design knowledge (imaginative speculation) and seeking to remain objective in the interrogation of

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ideas (reflective skepticism) that were forming as a consequence of the research study (Brookfield,

cited in Clark, 2015).

Dewey conceived of reflection as being concerned with and dwelling upon “things that

puzzle or disturb us, and saw reflection as a kind of precursor to action” hence Dewey’s distinction

of it being “future-facing” not being about “mulling over the past” (Farrow, R. 2011). Schön went on

to further distinguish “’reflection-on-action’ from ‘reflection-in-action’” where “The former refers to

the kinds of tacit knowledge we reveal in the way we carry out tasks and approach problems. The

latter occurs after the fact, and is often conscious and/or documented” (Farrow, R. 2011). Schön’s

work on reflective practice is referenced in chapter 2 in relation to the history of design methods.

Critical reflection also incorporated action research when tentative theorising about the content and

diagrammatic form of the design process and design thinking schema took place.

1.5 Development of the diagrams

Completed as an artifact of the research project, the process of developing the diagrams

commenced in 2006 and they have been iteratively developed over a period of approximately eight

years until the thesis was submitted in June 2014. During this time they were presented to

hundreds of design students within a university design education context to support lectures

presented by the author of this thesis on the design process and design thinking. Feedback from

both undergraduate and postgraduate design students in relation to the material presented

combined with field notes and diagrammatic notation from unstructured (but focussed) interviews

and group discussion became significant in shaping the diagrams. Typically, feedback over time

saw categories and boxes in the early versions of the diagrams give way to the design of simple

forms to express generalised concepts within the framework. Iterative development also included

gathering informal insights from professional designers and colleagues in design education again

through the use of unstructured interviews.

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1.6 Main contribution of the thesis This thesis focuses on four important concepts—creativity, cognition, perception and thinking

behavior—which are regarded as being central to both the design process and to the notion of

design thinking. Selected material considered relevant to building a broadly informed view of these

concepts has been brought together from the fields of science, theoretical physics, behavioral

psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and design research. The inclusion of this

material is regarded as important in the ways in which it underpins further explication of tacit design

knowledge through being inclusive of multiple perspectives external to design yet aligned to design.

The main contribution of the thesis is a visualisation of two types of thinking (based on

de Bono), a visualisation of the design process in four steps with the incorporation of three sets of

creativity tools developed by de Bono, and an extensive literature review on designing and

related concepts.

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Chapter 2 Conceptualising design and its precursory landscape

Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into

preferred ones (Simon, 1988, p. 67).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.1 Introduction

In recognising there is no single global view of design (Whitehouse, 2011, p. 8), this thesis

commences with my view that all people, to varying degrees, possess an innate capacity to be

creative, to design, as an aspect of general human behavior. I then move to frame design as social,

cultural and economic production. The narrative in this thesis sometimes intentionally refers to the

domain-specific nature of design as a discipline or as professional practice while on other

occasions it adopts a broader perspective to encompass a more generalised view of design.

Identifying points of consistency between these two viewpoints was an important theme in the

research and allows for ideas to coalesce into a shared viewpoint. This is referred to at several

points in the text as a shared platform. I used both viewpoints—the discipline-specific and a

broader and more generalised notion of design—to examine the interplay between generative

thinking and analytical- and judgment-oriented thinking within the design process and creative

process, in general.

In this thesis I propose design as an act of doing: design as a verb. The nexus between

generative action and reflection (Schön, 1983) is central to the narrative and enabled an approach

to design thinking to be proposed suitable for application in both the discipline-specific, professional

domain of design and also within the context of a more generalised and unifying concept of design

and the creative process. I argue that design thinking includes a dynamic interplay between

different types of thinking behaviors that are rational and intuitive.

This chapter introduces a range of key concepts and associated material to conceptualise

the term design relative to the research agenda. Sub-headings in this chapter are arranged

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chronologically to provide a framing of design history, the processes of design and design

knowledge based on historical antecedents and development.

Simon’s definition of design (at the beginning of the chapter) is put forward as a terminus

a quo for the research agenda and its central ideas led me to examination of the idea that design

(in both the broad sense and in its professionally focused form) seeks to generate value and thus is

also closely linked to the notion of value perception.

In this chapter, design can be seen over time to have shaped itself into a professional

discipline. While a degree of coherence exists in terms of many key aspects of design as a

profession, thorough explication in terms of its methods, processes, the nature of design

knowledge and design practice, is elusive and remains a challenge.

An important marker in the contemporary literature of design research is the term

designerly coined by Cross a number of years ago. Yet as Lawson suggests, while there is now

widespread agreement among design researchers of what Cross described as “designerly ways of

knowing” (Cross N., 2007), it is unclear how we find out what it is. So, where to begin?

2.2 Anthropological foundations of design

Although design is often associated with the spread of Modernism, it is actually a far more ancient

activity. Friedman (2000) writes “the practice of design—making things with a useful goal in mind—

actually predates the human race ... design began over two and a half million years ago when

homo habilis manufactured the first tools” (p. 5). Arguing that all people do something called

design, N. Cross (1991) views it as a distinctly human activity, one which sets us apart from other

members of the animal kingdom and one that is still un-matched by machines. He regards design

as an innate and natural ability, a part of human intelligence that is universal amongst human

populations. Like Friedman, N. Cross evidences the long history of this ability through the artifacts

belonging to previous civilisations and the ongoing traditions of ethnic crafts and vernacular design

(N. Cross, 1999, p. 1).

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Friedman (2000) establishes a timeline for design commencing with urban design and

architecture in Mesopotamia 10,000 years ago which, he suggests, which brought forth an interest

in interior design and furniture design around the same time (p. 5). He observes that another 5,000

years passed before the appearance of Sumerian cuneiform script, one of the first forms of graphic

design and typography. He proposes that taking a given situation, imagining a better one and

undertaking the necessary action to achieve it dates back to these human ancestors. In this way,

Friedman’s ideas clearly align with Simon’s definition of design, previously described at the

beginning of this chapter. Friedman also establishes time for the conception of design as both a

verb and as a noun. The first known written reference to design as a verb “to conceive and plan out

in the mind; to have as a specific purpose; to devise for a specific function or end” (Friedman 2000,

p. 5) dates to 1548, but it was until the early 1600s its use as a noun was detected.

Ancient antecedents are important reminders that design is rooted in our humanity and out

tool-making ancestors’ craft-based consciousness was central to the advancement of the species..

Nevertheless, in seeking to build a more coherent picture of contemporary views about the nexus

between design knowledge and design practice based on earlier antecedents, it is necessary to

move forward in time. But not entirely. Ancient antecedents are important reminders that design is

rooted in our anthropology and in the case of our tool-making ancestors, their craft-based

consciousness was central to the advancement of the species over eons and multiple millennia.

In leaving the prehistoric world behind and moving forward in time. It is useful to identify the

Ancient Greek concept of poiesis as another marker in the further conceptualization of design as

an act of doing.

Derived from an ancient Greek term, poiesis is the origin of the modern notion of poetry

and is etymologically derived from the notion of making. It was firstly a verb, and its meaning lies

somewhere between a mode of production or formation and an action that transforms and

continues the world. The philosopher Heidegger likened it to the idea of “occasioning” or “bringing

forth” (O’Brien, 2004, p. 12) rather than just the making of something. O’Brien (2004) also tells us

Heidegger associated poiesis with the idea of a threshold occasion, when something moves from

its current standing or form to become something extra-ordinary via a transformative process of

some kind. In these ideas there is a likeness with Simon’s notion of moving from current or existing

circumstances to preferred ones as a description of the transformative nature of design (designing).

In these ways poiesis can be regarded as an act of doing that encompasses perceptual subtlety

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and intrinsic knowledge and which makes its association with design more apparent. And the idea

of inventing something that is an improvement on what already exists remains embedded in the

more contemporary manifestations design.

2.3 Design as social, cultural and economic production Design has become a widely applied term prompting associations with modish products, alluring

forms and desired lifestyles. While often associated with luxury and wealth, the idea that something

is well designed has become a desirable notion of the mass markets. In this zeitgeist, design is

undeniably a mass-cultural phenomenon, significant and powerful in its transcultural relationship

with human perception and behavior. It gives form to communication and significantly contributes to

generating identity, and as a conscious act creates meaningful order in the contribution it makes to

culture and society. However, design now also crafts products, services and aspirations that extend

beyond pre-requisites for the living of a sustainable life. Yet it was not always thus.

In the early nineteenth century, design was engaged with contributing to the development

of intelligent problem-solving solutions as an expression of an ideological commitment to the

process of transforming the world to benefit its human inhabitants. In reflecting aspects of the

Enlightenment’s engagement with the democratisation and standardisation of knowledge, design

can in this way be regarded as an agency for potential positive and sustainable change. Referring

to design as a form of making rather than an act of problem solving, Schön held that design

knowledge and reasoning are manifest in the transactions designers have with materiality, with

artifacts produced and the context within which they were made (Schön, cited in Clark & Brody,

2009, p. 111). Once elementary requirements for social survival had been broadly fulfilled,

enhanced livability and ‘quality of life’ became objectives to be considered. Maldonado (1995)

asserts the diffusion of the idea of “comfort” as an aspect of modernisation was no accident,

arguing that since the industrial revolution it has had a significant role “in the task of controlling the

social fabric of the nascent capitalist society’” (p. 248).

The process of modernisation and industrialisation brought with it an increased output in the

manifestations of goods and services associated with better living, a more enjoyable life and a

future to look forward to. Against a background of what Pevsner (1977) referred to as “a stodgy and

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complacent optimism” (p. 40) in England around 1850, The Great Exhibition of 1851 brought

together an exhibition of raw materials and technical products from all over the world. Prince Albert,

who had personally devoted great energy to planning and preparation for the event, in one of the

preparatory addresses indicated “Nobody who has paid any attention to the particular features of

the present era will doubt for a moment that we are living in a period of most wonderful transition”

and extolled the virtues of “… the great principle of division of labour, which may be called the

moving power of civilisation” (Pevsner, 1977, p. 40). Yet a cost was perceived by many who

attended the exhibition in relation to many of the advancements on display, in that although new

machines could produce objects that were previously made so laboriously by craftsmen, it was now

produced by a machine and had lost a good deal of the craftsmen’s imagination and skill. Other

exhibitions of the same type followed in Europe, America and Australia and collectively they

revealed the profound and lasting impact of the industrial revolution.

Industrialisation and modernisation also brought forth new possibilities in gaining social

and economic wealth through the division of labour, increased trade outputs and the rise of

capitalism. Design was a driver in the quest for improvement and became synonymous with mass

production and the reduced costs associated with economies of scale (Whitehouse, 2011).

Refinement and differentiation in product development, in turn, required searches for new and

diverse markets.

Part of the role of these consumer goods was, and remains, to provide us with means to

make sense of our surroundings including our need to be able to communicate with one another.

Communication provides information relevant to understanding the changing nature of society and

can only take place where a system of structured meanings exists (Douglas & Isherwood 2009,

p. 301). Cultural identity is informed and shaped through our engagement with both these

meanings and their embodiment in physical forms. In these ways, design, as a means for having a

better life and being more comfortable, is inextricably linked to aspects of social control.

Before focusing upon the modern world to further conceptualise design as social, cultural

and economic production, it is worth noting an observation made by Kinross. Gutenberg’s invention

of movable type prior to The Enlightenment provided “a principal means of spreading knowledge,

enabling the shift from medieval attitudes to modern ones” (Kinross 1994, p. 8). Margolin (1989), in

a similar way to Kinross, pointed out that “Most scholars would agree that modernism as a

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paradigm began with the Enlightenment, if not before.” (p. 10). This is not to suggest, of course,

that Kinross is implying the modern period commenced at the time of Gutenberg; rather, his

invention symbolises much that was embedded within the paradigm of modernism in the late 19th

and early 20th centuries that became very much synonymous with the notion of design. It is in this

sense that Gutenberg’s invention provides a significant historical marker upon design’s

precursory landscape.

2.4 Gutenberg: Invention, systematisation and shared knowledge The invention of movable type marked an important turning-point in both Western and world

history. The revolution is generally attributed to Gutenburg because historians and others argue

that it was central to the development of typecasting and printing as we now know it and unlikely he

would have known about earlier methods of printing in both China and Korea employing wood

blocks and cast bronze type (Garfield, 2010, p. 4). Nevertheless, Gutenberg’s role in developing

the means by which “the dissemination of debate, science and dissent—printing as the dual

mouthpiece of human sense and human folly” is incalculable (Garfield, 2010, p. 37).

In terms of building a composite picture of the history of design, it was Gutenberg’s craft-

based knowledge of smithing, working with metals, which facilitated his invention. While a craft and

artisan-based tradition provided for the development of movable type, it was Gutenberg’s

engagement with the notions of innovation, systematisation, automation and mass production, 500

years before Modernism, that changed the world forever (Kinross, 1994, p. 8). Not until the

Industrial Revolution several hundred years later would there be a comprehensive shift from a

craft-based tradition to a technological one that would also re-shape the modern world in a new

and powerful way.

For Gutenberg’s invention to flourish, another equally important craft-based process

needed to be refined as a systematic, mechanical process and: the making of paper. Without it,

there could be no printing. While paper was being made in Europe prior to the 1450s the invention

of movable type hastened the need to refine its production as an industrial process. The design

and form of the early printing press was inventively derived from presses commonly used in

vineyards, paper-mills and binderies where vellum (fine parchment originally made from calf, lamb

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or goat skin) manuscripts were bound (Garfield, 2010). Upright, with a large wooden screw-type

device, the presses were capable of delivering a very strong downward pressure. The principle was

modified and refined such that a brief pressing down and subsequent release phase could be

achieved in a relatively simple manner. The process of making paper was resolved through the use

of a pounding technique applied to either wood or linen fibres that produced a thick liquid that was

poured into a mold, shaken, and then dried. With paper being able to be systematically produced,

attention turned to the lasting development and refinement of movable type. The creation of sets of

individual letterforms that could be used over and over again and from which words, sentences and

whole books could be produced changed the production of the written word forever. With the

invention of what came to be known as the printing press, craft-based knowledge had been

transformed through innovation, automation, systematization and mass production. It provides an

important example of a shift occurring from the existing to the preferred (Simon, 1988).

In 1548, about one hundred years after Gutenberg’s invention, design as a verb appeared

in print, and used to mean: “to conceive and plan out in the mind; to have as a specific purpose; to

devise for a specific function or end ...” (Friedman, 2000, p. 5). After The Enlightenment and by the

time of the Industrial Revolution, the craft-based model of design, in which various raw materials

were being converted into finished products through the utilisation of tried and true craft-based

knowledge, was under challenge. New processes, new materials and new possibilities sat

uncomfortably beside the way things had always been done. Machines were replacing manual

labour. Harnessing much of what seemed possible would involve design as being “inextricably

linked to the history of how the world was made modern” (Whitehouse, 2011, p. 1).

2.5 The Bauhaus: A search for unity, process and educational innovation

Modernism’s concern with rejecting tradition strengthened with the emerging realities of a fully

industrialised world. With traditional forms of religious faith, social organisation, literature, art and

architecture increasingly being seen as outdated there was fertile ground for the new. Included

within this emerging world was the capitalist notion of mass production and with it came the birth of

consumer society (Whitehouse, 2011, p. 5). Catalysed by nineteenth-century technological-

industrial development “a seemingly unbridgeable gap had opened between artistic conception and

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realisation, between the ‘spiritual’ on the one hand and the ‘materialistic’ on the other” (Wingler

1984, p. xviii). How was the nexus between ideation and realisation to be managed and by whom?

In response to these triggers and within the broader context of social, political, artistic,

literary and educational reform sweeping through Europe at the time, a manifesto appeared

emphasising two ideas. It sought “a unity of all the creative arts under the primacy of architecture

and for a reconsideration of the crafts by the artist” (Wingler, 1984, p. xviii). The author of that

manifesto was Walter Gropius and the community that he was instrumental in creating would strive

for expression of a common social responsibility in its programmatic goals. The community,

established in Germany in 1919, was the Bauhaus, which would become a profoundly influential

school famous for the approach to design.

As director of the Bauhaus, Gropius claimed it was founded upon the idea of “the

fundamental unity underlying all branches of design” explaining that it was neither experiment nor

the work of one single individual responsible for the original idea (Cross, A 1983, p. 43). Identifying

unifying principles underlying all branches of design was considered central to providing students

with requisite knowledge in the process of bringing things into existence (designing) in all forms of

artistic production. Gropius argued that the Bauhaus was not alone in pursuing this agenda

indicating many institutions across Europe were engaging with and synthesising an evolution of

ideas (Cross, A., 1983, p. 43).

The real achievement of the Bauhaus that largely accounts for its profound influence, was

the creation of an “intangible” and “fundamental human quality” which encompassed all members

of the campus in “shared ideals” and “common goals” allowing it to achieve “more than the sum

total of its masters” (Cross, A 1983, p. 43). Students at the Bauhaus were not encouraged to base

their views or their work on existing exemplars but to enquire into the nature of materials, the

means of production and the constraints of function. Innovation was fostered over continuity that

tended to be derided (Brawne 2003, p. 167). A student of the Bauhaus in the 1920s noted that with

the formation of the school, design education had taken its place alongside other general

developments occurring in the world and, in particular, the cultural and intellectual developments in

Germany at the time (Cross, A., 1983, p. 43).

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Dewey’s philosophical and educational influence in applying theory to the educational

practices of the Bauhaus was significant (Cross, A., 1983, p. 44). Dewey, according to Wingler

(1984), held the conviction “that creative forces can be awakened in every human being” (p. 192).

Wingler tells us that he drew on ideas from Hegel, Marx, Darwin and other educational

reformers such as Friedrich Froebel and Maria Montessori. Collectively, these ideas would help the

school to achieve its goals of contributing not only to the shaping of physical order but also social

and cultural order. Froebel had established the concept of kindergarten drawing on ideas of

Heinrich Pestalozzi and his interpretation of Rousseau’s Enlightenment-based ideals of education

being concerned with “the cultivation of inherent faculties rather than the imposition of knowledge”

(Abbott Miller & Lupton, 1993, p. 5). Pestalozzi and Buss had written about the centrality of drawing

to educational reform in the very early nineteenth century and regarded drawing as a form of

writing equivalent to the traditional word-based form. Significantly, Froebel propounded the

importance of drawing as a distinctive mode of cognition (Abbott Miller & Lupton, 1993, p. 5) and

his drawing philosophy and method engaged with the idea of reducing complexities of the visual

world into simple, structural and graphical representations. Included was the use of dots, lines and

grids. Diagrammatic representation was an expression of these ideas (see Figure 1.1) and in a

later chapter of this thesis, the idea of drawing as a language of thought will be introduced and

further explored.

In seeking to reveal “a fundamental grammar of the visual” (Abbott Miller & Lupton, 1993,

p. 4) re-claimed from the detritus of historicism and traditional forms, the Bauhaus legacy included

“an attempt to identify a language of vision, a code of abstract forms addressed to immediate,

biological perception rather than to the culturally conditioned intellect” (Abbott Miller & Lupton,

1993, p. 22). The emblematic use of the triangle (yellow), square (red) and circle (blue) (Figure 2.1)

is a prime example of its interest in abstract representations of what was regarded as “elementary,

irreducible, essential, foundational, and originary” (Abbott Miller & Lupton, p. 4). Bauhaus theorists

described this coded language as comparable to, yet distinct from, the written form of language.

The use of diagrammatic representation at the Bauhaus (Figure 2.1) was rich and diverse and

often manifested in theoretical work developed by the “masters” – there were no students or

professors at the Bauhaus Weimar; instead, the terms journeymen and masters were used.

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The search for theoretical underpinnings to the teaching program included the quest of

Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee to search for a universal visual script (Wingler, 1984) that saw a

number of their theories affirmed through the introduction of a series of lectures from 1928 onwards

to do with psychology (p. 159). Aligning with an interest at the Bauhaus to introduce systems and

engage with scientific methods, engagement with Gestalt psychology provided insight into

problems through the science of perception at the time (Wingler, p. 159), In seeking to better

understand how the mind is able to make sense out of visual data, Gestalt psychology asserted

that the brain spontaneously organizes sense data into simple patterns, and that this was a

process of ordering (Abbott Miller & Lupton, 1993, p. 30).

Kandinsky taught the basic design class for beginners and also the course on advanced

theory at the Bauhaus and also conducted painting classes and a workshop in which he

augmented his colour theory with new elements of from psychology. It was he who proposed a

universal correspondence between the three elementary shapes and the three primary colours.

Kandinsky described the dynamic triangle as being inherently yellow, the static square as being

intrinsically red, and the serene circle as being naturally blue. (Lupton & Abbot Miller, 1993, p. 2).

These he described as “colourful colours” that are distinguished from black and white (Kandinsky,

1979, p. 62).

Figure 2.1 The Bauhaus – Examples of Diagrammatic Representation: 1

Wassily Kandinsky – ideal correspondence between colours and shapes.

Kandinsky (1979) cited in Abbott Miller, J & Lupton, E 1993, p. 26.

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The Bauhaus – Examples of Diagrammatic Representation: 2

Walter Gropius – structure of teaching at the Bauhaus. Paul Klee – idea and structure at the

Bauhaus (written in German).

Wingler 1984, Figure 1; p. 52.


Wassily Kandinsky – diagrams of point and line in formal composition.

Kandinsky 1979, p. 62



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Paul Klee – Pedagogical Sketchbook.

Klee 1953 pp. 16–17.

_______________________________________________________________________________

An active line on a walk, moving freely, without goal. A walk for a walk’s sake. The mobility agent is a point, shifting its position forward.

The same line, accompanied by complementary forms.

The same line circumscribing itself.

Two secondary lines moving around an imaginary main line.


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Kandinsky (1979), like other masters at the Bauhaus, had found a place ideally suited to

his art and also his belief in the need for rigorous enquiry. His description of this rigor is evocatively

characterised in the quotation below in which he describes the organic continuation of his work

after completing his book On the Spiritual in Art (p. 21).

The investigation should proceed in a meticulously exact and pedantically precise manner.

Step by step, this “tedious” road must be traversed – not the smallest alteration in the nature, in

the characteristics, in the effects of the individual elements should escape the watchful eye. Only

by means of a microscopic analysis can the science of art lead to a comprehensive synthesis,

which will extend far beyond the confines of art into the realm of the “oneness” of the “human”

and the “divine” (Kandinsky 1979, p. 21).

Kandinsky was not alone in pursuing lines of rigorous enquiry that would associate art with

the spiritual. Paul Klee, another master at the Bauhaus, also exemplified the ethos indicative of

searching for the fundamental unity underlying all branches of design and for a re-consideration of

the crafts by the artist. Klee believed that communication with nature was the most essential

condition “for the artist who is human, part of nature within natural space” (Klee, 1953, p. 7) and

this personal philosophy lead to his belief in seeking the meaning through experiencing “a

reverberation of the finite in the infinite of outer perception and inner vista” (p. 12). This, he

believed, would impel the student forward toward producing or participating “in the production of

works that are indications of the work on God” (p. 12). Klee, like other masters at the Bauhaus,

chose to articulate many of his ideas through diagrammatic representation and many exemplify the

notion of drawing as a language of thought that will be elaborated upon in chapter three.

World War I and the Great Depression challenged the high ideals and existence of the

Bauhaus and globally re-set the political, economic, social and cultural landscape. While the

Bauhaus in Germany was no more, its re-birth in America was underway with Moholy-Nagy

establishing the New Bauhaus in Chicago in 1937 (Findeli, 2001, p. 7). Although seeking to remain

faithful to the original philosophy, Moholy-Nagy also engaged with ideas of the philosopher Charles

Morris, one of the leading representatives of the Vienna Circle in the US and a proponent of logical

positivism (Findeli, 2001, p. 7). Working on his own general theory of signs or semiotics while

teaching at the New Bauhaus, Morris “attempted to articulate what he believed to be the three main

dimensions of design: art, science, and technology…For various reasons, this ambitious project

and highly original project never was satisfactorily achieved” (Findeli 2001, p. 7). Nevertheless, the

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search at the Bauhaus in its early years for unity in design and methods of facilitation through

educational inventiveness had transformed the teaching of art and design (particularly architectural

education) forever. Its legacy was built on the creation of a germinal curriculum as a purposeful

model for the new world embodying the triumvirate of art, technology and science (Findeli, 2001,

p. 7) – (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 Alain Findeli’s archetype (Urmodel) of a design curriculum

Findeli, 2001, p. 8.

_______________________________________________________________________________

That legacy became the platform for the establishment of a new and influential design

education entity in Germany nearly thirty years after the Bauhaus had been established in Weimar.

2.6 Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm: A culture of scientific operationalism

The Ulm School of Design was established by a private foundation in 1953 in West Germany and

while explicitly claiming the heritage of the Bauhaus initially, it would only take five years before

Tomás Maldonado proclaimed “that these ideas [had] now [to] be refuted with the greatest

vehemence, as well as the greatest objectivity” (Findeli 2001, p. 7). Believing the Bauhaus heritage

had become unmanageable he declared that “A new educational philosophy…is already in

preparation; …its foundation is scientific operationalism” (Findeli 2001, p. 7). Findeli describes the

artistic dimension of the original curriculum becoming diminished “whereas its scientific content

P U R P O S E / P R O J E C T

A R T

TECHNOL OGY

SCIENCE THIS IMAGE IS UNABLE TO BE REPRODUCED ONLINE.

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was increased and emphasised, especially with contributions from the human and social sciences”

(Findeli, 2001, p. 7). A goal was set of embedding scientific and totally objective approaches within

the educational reform agenda at Ulm with a strong sense of rational determinism prevailing. Also

prevailing was the view that the whole process of design could then be fully explicated leading to

ideal artifacts being produced (Rowe, 1987, p. 49).

Postmodernism reminds us of the extent to which the period of scientific rationality

following the Renaissance provided the Modernists with its visual nomenclature, belief in a kind of

golden age of peace, and a belief in justice, prosperity and considerable self-confidence (Betts,

1998, p. 67). Bett’s (1998) writing on The Ulm Hochschule für Gestaltung in retrospect reveals “the

denunciation of right-angle messianism and its accompanying celebration of ornament and historic

pastiche (be it the Baroque, art deco, or Las Vegas pop) has [had] itself become a vigorous

academic industry ever since the late 1960s” (Betts, 1998, p. 67). Yet the Ulm school had arrived

and its story was more than a revival of The Bauhaus. Its existence “effectively marked

modernism’s last real attempt to unite industrial design and genuine social reform, to preserve in

particular the redemptive pathos of the design object from the corrosive effects of Nazi irrationalism

and American commercialism” (Betts, 1998, p. 67). The Ulm approach replaced the Bauhaus

model with a new theoretical model where design was considered an applied human and social

science rather than applied aesthetics. Yet what was retained, significantly, was the same

“underlying dualistic epistemological structure” (Findeli 2001, p. 7) of science and technology

intersecting with art.

Aicher and Scholl, co-founders of the school and both with strong anti-Nazi backgrounds,

were motivated by a vision of creating an educational environment that could take its place at the

centre of “true democracy” (Betts 1998, p. 68). To achieve this they advocated a universal

education that encompassed both general media studies (politics, sociology, journalism, radio, and

film) and art instruction (photography, advertising, painting, and industrial design) as “a tonic

against the dangers of instrumental reason and cultural responsibility” (p. 68). In these ways, Scholl

and Aicher envisioned an institute for social and cultural reform. However, their pedagogic intent

and program content were challenged with the arrival of the Swiss sculptor, painter and designer

Max Bill, who perceived a greater need to engage with the more pragmatic teaching of architecture

and design over formal political education (p. 68). Bill articulated the raison d'être for the institution

in line with its original mission at the opening of Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm in 1955.

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Nowhere in the world is there an institution dedicated to the same tasks as the Institute of

Design. Above all, the school hopes to create simple useful everyday objects for a general

everyday culture, especially since most designers and manufacturers neglect the importance of

these commonplace things as cultural factors of great consequence… We are of the opinion that

culture is not the special domain of ‘high art’, but rather must be present in everyday living and in

all things of form; indeed, every form is an expression of function and purpose. Yet we are not

interested in producing cheap arts and crafts (Kunstgewerbe), but rather genuine objects that

people need… in short, practical things which should improve the beauty of life (Betts 1998,

pp. 68–69).

A greater unity between science and technology at Ulm had become the third iteration of

the model originally established at the Bauhaus with an embodied shift in its contextual perspective

from global, to personal, to cultural (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Alain Findeli’s three historical embodiments of a design curriculum archetype

Findeli 2001, p. 8.

_______________________________________________________________________________


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While none of the three models became fully actualised through problems associated with

“the relative weight of the three dimensions, and in their adequate articulation” (Findeli, 2001, p. 7),

the Ulm model became a substantial influence on design education around the world.

At Ulm, various staged-process models of design were developed and deployed as a

basis for both design education and undertaking client-based industrial projects alike. Contributing

to the design of audio equipment for the forward-looking German company Braun was among such

projects (Betts, 2010). Finally, it was internal conflict amongst staff in relation to the German

government’s reduction of funding for curriculum development that resulted in the school’s closure.

The Bauhaus had left its legacy: Ulm had also. Until the establishment of the Ulm School of Design

in 1953, no systems-based approach to design education had been adopted.

2.7 Emergence of the design methods movement

In examining Simon’s definition of design (Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed

at changing existing situations into preferred ones – Simon, 1988, p. 67) within the context of this

research project and taking the narrative to the first half of the twentieth century, it is useful to

identify several precursors to the emergence of interest in design methods, outside of design

education.

Rowe (1987) offers a clarifying summative chronology of early theoretical positions and

contributions to the formation of the Design Methods movement commencing with the influence of

The Würzburg School, which is provided in its entirety below (pp. 42–67).

The Würzburg School regarded creativity as ‘essentially purposeful’ and where a prototype of

directed-thinking evolved; the Gestalt Movement extended this idea with the concept of mindset

which then progressed to schemata but which rejected the notion of random mechanisms; …the

dominating influence for several decades of Behaviorism (particularly in the USA) until the end of

the 1950s – rejecting the use of ‘the Würzburg School’s use of introspection as unstable and thus

suspect’; Asimov’s model of feedback loops and their inclusion in a later operational model where

design as a sequence of activities defined by the general task involved was put forward by Bruce

Archer and others (Hochschule für Gestaltung at Ulm, Royal College); Information Processing

Theory (Newell, Shaw, Simon 1957, 1967) which became dominant in the 1980s put forward the

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idea of the ‘problem space’, …’generative processes or operations’, …the notion of ‘a decision

tree’, …random trial and error procedures, …‘generate and test procedures’; and, …‘top-down or

hierarchical decomposition and bottom-up or hierarchical re-composition (Rowe, 1987, p. 42–67).

In relation to their own work both Simon and Popper, whose four-stage iterative model of

scientific discovery is described and diagrammatically represented later in this chapter,

acknowledged the influence of the school.

Referring to early precursors of the design methods movement, Cross reflects that “It

would seem to be either a very brave or foolish thing to do, to assemble a book on design

methodology” (Cross, N 1984, p. vii), asserting an almost universal contempt for methodologies.

Declaring that “methodologists are reviled as impoverished creatures who merely study, rather than

practice, a particular art or science” (Cross, N 1984, p. vii) he suggests part of the distrust of

methodology comes from the etymology of the word, which can refer to a precise, prescribed and

rather rigid approach “of which practitioners are justifiably skeptical” (Cross, N 1984, p. vii). For

Cross, methodology refers to the general study of method.

Writing nearly twenty years later, Love (2003) asserts that “an early and pervasive dream

of the design research community was to automate design activity via systematic methods” which

assumed that such approaches “directly result in design solutions, especially in areas of

knowledge-based systems and intelligent systems” (p.1). Love challenged “the widespread myth

that systems design is sufficient to create a design or plan for intervention” arguing that “conflating

Systems and Design has caused many unnecessary difficulties in systems theory and

research” (p. 1).

Risky business or otherwise, literature devoted to design methods gained strength in the

early 1960s. Early writings engaged with the design process being a variant of systematic design

which drew on a new range of strategies and techniques developed in the post-war problem-

solving, management and operational spheres (Jones, 1981). Before long, however, design

problems revealed they were not so complaisant to systematisation as had been anticipated.

Design problems were seen as being characteristically complex problems and attempting to better

understand them. Cross (1984), identifying issues associated with this in his own work on design

methodology at the time, cites Simon’s view that “In general the problems presented to problem-

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solvers by the world are best regarded as ill-structured problems” (p. 103). Rittel and Webber

coined the term “wicked” in their description of the ill-structured nature of design problems

indicating “a meaning akin to that of ‘malignant’ (in contrast to ‘benign’) or ‘vicious’ (like a circle) or

‘tricky’ (like a leprechaun) or ‘aggressive’ (like a lion, in contrast to the docility of a lamb)” (Rittel &

Webber, 1973, cited in N. Cross, 1984, p. 136). Referring to the first published account of Rittel’s

idea, Buchanan (1992) pointed out that wicked problems were described as “a class of social

system problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are

many clients and decision makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications of the whole

system are thoroughly confusing” (p. 15). He also argues there was a fundamental reality lying

behind the practice of design to do with “the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy

in design thinking” (Buchanan 1992, p. 15). A linear model of design thinking he argued was based

on there being a determinate nature to design problems where they have exact and discernable

limits or forms (Buchanan 1992, p. 15). Conversely, “the wicked-problems approach suggests that

there is a fundamental indeterminacy within them” (Buchanan 1992, p. 15).

In the next chapter, many of these early ideas will combine with more contemporary ideas,

reflecting the advancement of knowledge of the professional practice and the process of design

over the intervening 50 years. In this chapter, I describe some of the early propositions, including

some that became problematic over time, which emerged as interest in the area of design

methods developed.

Returning to the chronology of principal events in the early development of the design

methods movement, in 1962 Jones and Slann organised The Conference on Systematic and

Intuitive Methods in Engineering, Industrial Design, Architecture and Communications in London in

1962 (Designing Design Research 4: Panel Biographies, viewed 28 May 2014). Jones and Slann,

along with others attending the conference, were interested in and increasingly concerned about

the various manifestations of the modern industrialised world. Such practices and outcomes

seriously challenged many extant conventions and methods they and others faced within the

evolving complexity of post-industrial societies. Jones (1981) in Design Methods: Seeds of Human

Futures indicates that “Literature on design methods began to appear in most industrialised

countries in the nineteen fifties and sixties” and citeses several attempts by various authors at that

time to “isolate the essence of designing and to write it down as a standard method” (p. 3).

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In considering the usefulness of Simon’s definition of design in this chapter, attempts to

define design in the early years (the early sixties) of the design methods movement are instructive

in revealing the significantly diverse viewpoints and perceptions about design at the time. Jones

(1981, p.3) suggests there appeared to be as many definitions about design as there were authors,

and his list of them is reproduced below.

• Finding the right physical components of a physical structure (Alexander, 1963).

• A goal-directed problem-solving activity (Archer, 1965).

• Decision-making, in the face of uncertainty, with high penalties for error (Asimov, 1962).

• Simulating what we want to make (or do) before we make (or do) it as many times as may be

necessary to feel confident in the final result (Booker, 1964).

• The conditioning factor for those parts of the product which come into contact with people

(Farr, 1966).

• Engineering design is the use of scientific principles, technical information and imagination in

the definition of a mechanical structure, machine or system to perform pre-specified functions

with maximum economy and efficiency (Fielden, 1963).

• Relating product with situation to give satisfaction (Gregory, 1966ba).

• The performing of a very complicated act of faith (Jones, 1966a).

• The optimum solution to the sum of the true needs of a particular set of circumstances

(Matchett, 1968).

• The imaginative jump from present facts to future possibilities (Page, 1966).

• A creative activity – it involves bringing into being something new and useful that has not

existed previously (Reswick, 1965).

(Jones 1981, p. 3).

An early concept of the design process was put forward in the sixties by the prominent

design and creativity theoriser Edward Matchett. Matchett proposed a Fundamental Design Method

(F.D.M.) which was conceived of as being a means “To enable a designer to perceive and to

control the patterns of his thoughts and to relate this pattern more closely to all aspects of the

design situation” (Jones 1981, p. 178). Drawn to the idea of improving design science and engaged

by locating the design process within the context of the universe, his ideas drew on the work of

Viktor Frankl (Austrian neurologist and psychiatrist) and Carl Jung (Swiss psychologist and

psychiatrist), and the metaphysical teacher George Gurdjieff amongst others. His somewhat

idiosyncratic view of the design process is revealed in a constellated diagrammatic representation

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drawn by J. J. Foreman in 1967 where “North Pole” and “South Pole” orientation, lines of longitude

dividing the “global surface” and the “potentially infinite space of knowledge” are evident (see

Figure 2.4). The challenge of interpreting the complex nature of the diagram is also apparent.

Figure 2.4 J. J. Foreman’s diagram of Edward Matchett’s design process concept

Jones 1981, p. 181. _______________________________________________________________________________


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What can be observed in the literature of the design methods movement during the first

and second decade of its existence is the prevalence of categorical models that were often

expressed diagrammatically and which became more complex over time. In Design Methods:

Seeds of Human Futures, Jones (1981), who became a key figure in the design methods

movement, included approximately 50 different diagrammatic representations (see Figure 2.5

and 2.6) of process models and specific project-based applications of some models showing how

they functioned.

Within these diagrams, categories and matrices contained within them have fixed

boundaries and relationships between elements are clearly delineated Boxes, circles and

interconnecting arrows were often employed to encapsulate specific aspects or parts of the

process of design and the general flow or direction the process was taking. Jones had studied

engineering and his interest lay in generating an original philosophy of design in response to what

he encountered as inadequacies of industrial design at the time. Several of the models

documented by Jones demonstrate the effort invested in undertaking identification and

classification processes necessary for the development of such models during this period of the

Design Methods movement. Indicative of this endeavour is a comprehensive strategy for Choosing

Design Methods which comprises a text-based taxonomy that is subsequently rendered in

diagrammatic form (see Figure 2.7).

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Figure 2.5 Examples of early categorical models of the design process

Diagrammatic representation of linear, cyclic, branching and adaptive strategies. Jones 1980, pp. 76,–77; p. 80, 109.

_______________________________________________________________________________


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Figure 2.6 A model for value analysis

Jones 1980, p. 109.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Figure 2.7 A model for choosing design methods: 1 – A word-based taxonomy

(original image too small to reproduce clearly).

1 Decide which of the inputs in the chart is already known to you.

2 Select, from the outputs, the category of information that you require next.

3 Methods appropriate to your problem appear in the cells where the selected input rows and output

columns cross, eg method in AIDA 5.3 is in input row 4 and in output column 6.



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1 Prefabricated strategies (Convergence)

1.1 Systematic Search (The Decision Theory Approach

1.2 Value Analysis

1.3 Systems Engineering

1.4 Man-Machine System Designing

1.5 Boundary Searching

1.6 Page’s Cumulative Strategy

1.7 CASA (Collaborative Strategy for Adaptable Architecture)

2 Strategy control methods 2.1 Strategy Switching 2.2 Matchett’s Fundamental Design Method (FDM)

3 Methods of exploring design situations (Divergence)

3.1 Stating Objectives

3.2 Literature Searching

3.3 Searching for Visual Inconsistencies

3.4 Interviewing Users

3.5 Questionnaires

3.6 Investigating User Behaviour

3.7 Systemic Testing

3.8 Selecting Scales of Measurement

3.9 Data Logging and Reduction

4 Methods of searching for ideas (Divergence and Transformation)

4.1 Brainstorming

4.2 Synectics

4.3 Removing Mental Blocks

4.4 Morphological Charts

5 Methods of exploring problem structure (Transformation)

5.1 Interaction Matrix

5.2 Interaction Net

5.3 AIDA (Analysis of Interconnected Decision Areas)

5.4 System Transformation

5.5 Innovation by Boundary Shifting

5.6 Functional Innovation 5.7 Alexander’s Method of Determining Components

5.8 Classification of Design Information


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6 Methods of evaluation (Convergence)

6.1 Checklist

6.2 Selecting Criteria

6.3 Ranking and Weighting

6.4 Specification Writing

6.5 Quirk’s Reliability Index

A model for choosing design methods: 2 – Diagrammatic representation

Jones, 1980, Endnotes.

_______________________________________________________________________________


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The underlying assumptions that the complex nature of design could be categorised in

these ways would eventually be challenged. Describing his own reaction against design methods in

the 1970s, Jones (1997 indicated his dislike for its “machine language, the behaviorism, the

continual attempt to fix the whole of life into a logical framework” (cited in N. Cross 2007, p. 120).

Eventually, focus upon categorical models gave way to the emergence of dimensional models that

had softer boundaries between categories and were less complex and less detailed in appearance

but more advanced in their summative conceptual framing. Categorical models that included

multiple boxes enclosing key concepts and categories; numeric and alphabetic codes; arrows,

dotted lines and other graphic devices linked to processes and procedures (see Figure 2.5, 2.6 and

2.7) began to move into the background as the Philosophy of Design method in the second decade

of design methodology (1972–82) emerged.

The concept of categories is further explored in chapter 5, where several ideas put

forward by de Bono in relation to how the brain gives rise to mind ill be introduced into the narrative

to support my proposition of an expanded frame of reference for design thinking. Among these will

be his views on the notion of categories, where a type of logic based on identity and non-identity,

inclusion and exclusion is employed (de Bono, 1990, p.57 ). Central to de Bono’s model of the way

the brain functions, is his description of the brain as self-organising pattern recognition system (de

Bono, 1990, pp. 266–267). In such a system, patterns are created through experience are

analysed, categorised and stored according to previous patterns. For this to take place, the brain

utilises what de Bono refers to as “knife-edge” discrimination (de Bono, 1996, p. 57). This is an

important property of the brain and is the way the mind moves from maybe to certainty and which is

very valuable in a survival sense. However, while this is a highly valuable property, it has limitations

to do with perception where clear and distinct boundaries do not always exist. In chapters six and

seven, I reveal are some of de Bono’s ideas for ways in which these deficiencies can be

compensated for in a self-organising pattern recognition system.

Returning to the early years of the development of the Design Methods movement,

engaging with systematic methods had focused on the area lying between traditional intuitive

methods and “rigorous mathematical or logical treatment, on the other” (Jones (1963) cited in N.

Cross, 1984, p. 9). The intention was to add traditional design methods to systematic methods and

not replace them. However, as Jones observed, the imagination “does not work well unless it is

free to alternate between all aspects of the problem, in any order, in any time, whereas logical

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analysis breaks down if there is the least departure from a systematic step-by-step sequence”

(Jones 1981, p. 10). Antagonists tended to assume that systematic methods must be the enemy of

intuitive methods. Systematic Design was an attempt to keep imagination and logic separate by

structural means rather than intellectual intent and Jones described these intentions in the

following way.

1 To leave the mind free to produce ideas, solutions, hunches, guesswork, at any time without

being inhibited by practical limitations and without confusing the process of analysis.

2 To provide a system of notation which records every item of design information outside the

memory, keeps design requirements and solutions completely separate from each other, and

provides a systematic means of relating solutions to requirements with the least possible

compromise. This means that while the mind moves from problem analysis to solution-seeking

whenever it feels the need, the recording develops in three distinct stages:

1 Analysis: listing of all design requirements and the reduction of these to a complete set of

logically related performance specifications.

2 Synthesis: Finding possible solutions for each individual performance specification and

building up complete designs from these with least possible compromise.

3 Evaluation: Evaluating the accuracy with which alternative designs fulfill performance

requirements for operation, manufacture and sales before the final design is selected

Jones in Cross 1984, p. 10.

N. Cross attributes to Jones the assertion that “any design method must permit both kinds

of thought [logical and intuitive] to proceed together if any progress is to be made” (Jones in N.

Cross, 1984, p. 10). This idea is a central them of this thesis. It is explored further in chapter five

and six as part of an examination of the role of and interplay between creative or generative

thinking and analytical- and judgment-oriented thinking. The connection between these two types

of thinking within the context of systematic methods are closely linked to aspects of action and

reflection described by Schön in 1983.

Schön (1983), whose seminal work on reflective practice was written several years after

this period of engagement with systematic methods, argues in relation to the development of new

concepts and new theories that pre-existing concepts needed to be able to be displaced (p. ix)

adding the “process is nothing less than our way of bringing the familiar to bear on the unfamiliar, in

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such a way as to yield new concepts while at the same time retaining as much as possible of the

past” (Schön 1967, p. ix). He conceived of concepts (especially abstract ones) as being a type of

gestalt (a perceptual pattern or structure possessing qualities as a whole that cannot be described

merely as a sum of its parts) that could be conceived of in an infinite number of ways. Schön

pointed out “this stares us in the face whenever we look at what happens in the formation of new

concepts, even though the inertia of our conceptual systems, once established, is so great as to

make us almost incredulous about it” (Schön, 1967, p. 7).

New territory had been explored during the emergence of the design methods movement

including the role of the systematic versus the intuitive. During the next period of the development

of the design methods engagement with a proposition that came from the logic of science

would unfold.

2.8 Design methods: A Popperian view of designing

By the end of the 1970s, “a new generation of design methods was emerging that embodied a

‘Popperian’ view of designing” (Bamford 2002, p. 5). Popper had argued in his book The Logic of

Scientific Discovery that “it is a principle of science that solutions to problems are only hypotheses

for a refutation” (cited in Rittel and Webber in N. Cross, 1984, p. 143). Within this context, Popper

proposed the advance of scientific knowledge is an evolutionary process characterised by a four-

stage schema (see Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8 Karl Popper’s model

PS1 TT1 EE1 PS2

Figure 2.8. Where: PS1 = Problem Situation, TT1 = Tentative Theory, EE1 = Error Elimination,

PS2 = toward more and more interesting problems.

Bamford, 2002 pp. 245–261.

_______________________________________________________________________________


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Central to the Popperian model is the reciprocal nature of the interaction between the

tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutations) that scientific knowledge utilises

to advance, as Popper describes, toward more and more interesting problems. With regard to the

dual notions of conjecture and refutation, it is important to understand that both are strongly linked

by Popper to the scientific concept of falsifiability. He asserts that all scientific theories are by

nature conjectures and inherently fallible, arguing that scientists generally base scientific

hypotheses on previous observations that cannot be satisfactorily explained with available theories.

To be put forward as a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it.

Falsifiability is where something can be shown to be false by an observation or experiment and

refutation is undertaken from the point-of-view of seeking to test the hypothesis, proposition or

theory on the basis of existing knowledge. Popper believed that “hypotheses should actually be

designed to attract attempts to falsify them. Genuine scientific theories are in search of a counter-

instance that will call the theory to fail (Popper, cited in Trombley, 2012, p. 258)

A significant element of the Popperian model is that while it is inclusive of creating a

conjecture (a hypothesis or “the new”), at certain points it references existing knowledge to validate

the proposition suggesting that most, if not all, so-called new ideas must contain something within

them that is recognisable or pre-existing. Interestingly, Popper also expresses the view that

unfalsifiable propositions were also important for science and stressed the value of a capacity to

learn from our so-called mistakes.

The sequence leading from PS1 to PS2 stems from Popper’s attempt to define the nature

of science and characteristics of significant research and in Popper’s model PS1 to PS2 is an

iterative process. His theoretical model became controversial as it challenged an apparent

boundary between science and non-science where science is always potentially falsifiable. This

was contrary to the accepted view “that scientific theories represented ultimate truths. In Popper’s

view they were only the best and most rigorously corroborated statements at a particular time”

(Brawne, 2003, p. 35).

Popper (2002) asserts that

Quantitatively and qualitatively by far the most important source of our knowledge – apart from

inborn knowledge – is tradition. Most things we know we have learnt by example, by being told, by

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reading books, by learning how to criticize, how to take and accept criticism, how to respect truth”

(p. 36).

Popper (2002) adds:

Looking at the matter from the psychological angle, I am inclined to think that scientific

discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and

sometimes even quite hazy; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view

of science, and which, to that extent is ‘metaphysical’” (p. 16).

In 2003, Brawne put forward an interpretation of Popper’s model (see figure 2.9) and

although it bears a considerable likeness to Popper’s four-stage schema, Brawne nevertheless

proposes three key changes.

Figure 2.9 Michael Brawne’s interpretation of Karl Popper’s model

Michael Brawne’s interpretation of Karl Popper’s model:

P1 TS EE P2

Figure 2.9. Where P1 = Problem Recognition, TS = Tentative Solution, EE = Error Elimination,

P2 = Problem for next sequence.

Brawne, 2003, pp. 32–35.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Firstly, he redefined the commencement of the sequence as: P1 Problem Recognition (rather than

PS1 Problem Situation). Secondly, he proposed: Tentative Solution (in place of Tentative Theory).

Thirdly, he proposed: P2 Problem for next sequence (rather than “PS2 toward more and more

interesting problems). Brawne’s model exchanges the idea that a problem is situated in a particular

place replacing it with the idea that it emerges at point in time termed problem recognition.


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Referring to his own interpretation of Popper’s model, Brawne indicated that

the P1 to P2 sequence is a description of a sequence, of a process, and in no way either the

prescription of a particular solution or the enforcement of a starting point. It simply states that

there is a necessary starting point and that a sequence develops from that recognition of a

problem (p. 35).

The sequence also incorporates the value of “allowing both verbal and non-verbal thinking

to play their part with different emphasis at different stages” (Brawne, 2003, p. 35). Here Brawne

emphasised that “since it is based on both earlier precedents, on an awareness of the past, and

equally on the severest possible criticism of those examples before any acceptance, there may be

a reasonable balance between continuity and innovation” (p. 35).

It is important to point out that while Popper proposed the idea that a new hypothesis

(conjecture) should be subjected to what he termed falsifiability (refutation) which constitutes the

second stage of his model, this is very different to the concept of creating new ideas as described

by de Bono, which is explored later in this thesis. Subjecting a hypothesis to everything that you

know, which Popper encouraged in his model, to assess its viability is very different to engaging in

thinking which has at its core, the generative energy which de Bono encourages in his writings.

Schön (1967) regards Popper as being “concerned with stating the conditions under which

a discovery can be validated after the fact” (pp. 92–93) and Bamford identifies Schön as having

located “Popper’s conjecture/test at the heart of problem-solving in the professions generally”

(Bamford, 2002, p. 5). Schön, he added, identified a prevailing strand of “technical rationality”

established widely in professional education that had “reduced the epistemology and methodology

of professions to that of an applied (positivist) science” (Bamford, 2002, p. 5). Schön (cited in

Bamford, 2002) wrote “there were several distinctive features of the problems professionals face or

construct which make them intractable to such technical rationality” and proposed the idea of

“reflection-in-action” to describe ways whereby these could be addressed (Bamford 2002, p. 5).

Archer (1999), one of the major figures in the design methods movement of the 1960s,

reflects upon and acknowledges the importance of Popper’s contribution:

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if operational research was the mother of Design Research, Karl Popper (spiritually, at least) was

its father...he argued...that most, if not all, scientific discovery is based on the positing of an

insightful tentative explanation about the meaning of the evidence...this had to take the form of

serious, comprehensive, systematic attempts to find any flaws in the theory posited. You can spring

from your bath shouting “Eureka”, or wake up in the morning with a conception of relativity, or

visualise the structure of the double helix. You do not, said Popper, have to prove whence these

conceptions came. What you do have to do is apply every test you can think of to discover any

flaws in, or limitations to, your proposition (p. 2).

Within the context of this research project, it is significant to note while the intuitive and

insightful were signaled by Popper as being valuable in developing conjectures further explication

of any cognitive process associated with their development were not revealed by him. This will be

explored in later chapters to do with the work of de Bono. Several cognitive mechanisms

associated with the idea of creating the new are explored later in this thesis, where I consider

cognition and perception and the brain’s function as a self-organising pattern recognition system

are considered. The themes of shifting, deepening, broadening perception and directing thinking as

aspects of cognitive behavior central to the creative process of design are central to this research

project and provide a focus for a later chapter on Edward de Bono’s ideas related to these themes.

2.9 Summary

This chapter’s starting point was the idea of conceptualising design from two particular viewpoints:

the view that all people, to varying degrees, possess an innate capacity to be creative as an aspect

of general human behavior; and as professional practice that engages with social, cultural and

economic production. Included in both distinctions, most importantly in the latter, is the idea that

design (designing), inter alia, is a creative act that engages with the delivery of Simon’s notion of

preferred outcomes.

To this was added the idea that in the early nineteenth century, design was associated

with contributing to the development of intelligent problem-solving solutions and an ideological

commitment to the process of transforming the world to benefit its human inhabitants. This was

counterpointed against a contemporary conception of design as having become a favoured term

of the mass markets through its crafting of products, services and aspirations that extend beyond

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pre-requisites for living. Yet within this contemporary setting, design can still be regarded as an

agency for potential positive and sustainable change. With the rise of industrialisation and

modernization, design became a driver in the quest for improvement and became synonymous with

mass production and the process of identifying economies of scale.

Gutenberg’s invention of movable type is an early yet strong example of invention, mass

production and standardisation, which shifted knowledge significantly forward from the craft-based

tradition. It is historically significant because of its unique precursory alignment with the Industrial

Revolution nearly 500 years later that provided impetus for a search for an underlying unity in

design, a design process and educational innovation. The Bauhaus, The New Bauhaus and

Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm became synonymous with ideas of an emerging understanding of

design being an amalgam of art, science and technology.

Popper’s philosophical ideas about the advancement of scientific knowledge were

introduced into the narrative in this chapter. These are represented in his four-stage schema

(formula) that contributes several propositions about situated problem-solving and the sense that

such problems are often wicked (ill-formed by nature). Popper’s ideas and schema had significant

impact of the development of the Design Methods movement in the 1970s. Brawne’s respectful

interpretation of Popper’s model provided an additional perspective on the process of invention.

Having established the precursory landscape for design (designing) and the history of

design methods it is now appropriate to move forward in time and begin framing the professional

practice of design in greater detail.

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Chapter 3 Design practice and design process

3.1 Introduction In this chapter I begin the process of building a contemporary profile of the professional practice of

design relevant to the narrative of this thesis. To do this, it is appropriate at this point in the

narrative to consider several ideas drawn from design research and design theory to assist with

framing design as a professional field of endeavour.

With the emergence of new theories of praxis in the early 1980s, the mechanistic,

“canonical, linear, causal, and instrumental model[s]” (Findeli, 2001, p. 16) were no longer

considered adequate to describe the complexities of the design process. Identifying the role of

perception in the doing of design had gained influence, as had interest in interpreting and

explicating the nature of design knowledge.

In the early eighties, N. Cross had reported on the emergence of design “as a coherent

discipline of study in its own right based on the view that design had its own things to know and its

own ways of knowing them” (Cross, N., 2007, p. 3). N. Cross also points out that Archer had

observed “Design Methodology is alive and well, living under the name of design research” (Archer,

cited in Cross, N.,1984, p. 347). Moreover, a new word had joined the lexicon of design –

designerly. N. Cross initiated the term designerly in the early eighties and in Design Issues

asserted the existence of “Design epistemology—[the] study of designerly ways of knowing; Design

praxeology—[the] study of the practices and processes of design” and “Design Phenomenology—

[the] study of the form and configuration of artifacts” (Cross, N., 1999, p. 6). N. Cross had identified

a convergence between knowledge, particularised action and artifact production. N. Cross (1999)

framed his perception of design knowledge at that time within the context of his own design

research agenda, utilising the following three distinctions:

1 Design knowledge resides firstly in people: in designers especially, but also in everyone to

some extent. Designing is a natural human ability. Other animals do not do it, and machines

(thus far) do not do it.

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2 Design knowledge resides secondly in its processes: in the tactics and strategies of designing.

A major area of design research is methodology. The study of the processes of design, and the

development and application of techniques which aid the designer.

3 Thirdly, we cannot forget that design knowledge resides in its products themselves: in the forms

and materials and finishes which embody design attributes. (p. 5–6)

Compared to art and architecture that date back thousands of years, design is by any

measure a very new field. Friedman contemporaneously described design as being a “conscious

profession” convergent upon the design process which had “been a long time in development”

(Friedman, 2000, p. 8). Asserting the existence of design as a discipline he tells us “We are still

debating whether the arena of design knowledge constitutes a discipline, a field, or a science” (p.

8). Design, design knowledge and the processes of design were only being framed in these ways

10 to 15 years ago, which adds to Friedman’s assertion of a lengthy gestation period for a

discipline, a field or a science. Adding to his assertions that design is both a profession and a

discipline, Friedman postulated a view about its processes and practices that move it closer to

becoming conceived of as a field.

Design is a process. The design process is rooted in and involves both theoretical disciplines and

fields of practice. As all fields of practice do, design knowledge involves explicit knowledge and

tacit knowledge. Disciplines also involve practices, and they, too, involve explicit knowledge and

tacit knowledge both. The challenge of any evolving field is to bring tacit knowledge into articulate

focus. Professional excellence requires articulation. This means rendering tacit knowledge explicit.

(Friedman, 2000, p.13)

Friedman (2000) in articulating a linkage between design epistemology and praxiology

suggests “A designer is a thinker whose job it is to move from thought to action” (p. 10). He regards

a designer as “the psychological centre of his own perceptual process” rather than there being a

centre to the design process itself, and proposed the process as being “a network of linked events”

(p. 10). Consequently, shifts in perception enable knowledge (design knowledge) to become

transformational through applied action. Similarly, perception becomes part of the constitution of

design. Knowledge may provide the basic elements, the building blocks out of which are

constructed new ideas, but in order for these building blocks to be available, the mortar holding old

concepts and ideas together must not be too strong. In contemporary professional practice, the

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business of design requires “not one way of thinking but two: it is a mix of creativity and analytical

reasoning” (Dorst 2006, p. 14).

Reference has already been made to Schön’s organising concept of reflective practice,

often referred to within the scholarly literature devoted to the investigation of design, the processes

and practices of design, and design thinking. Reflective practice entered the design lexicon after

Schön published The Reflective Practitioner in 1983. Influenced by the work of John Dewey, Schön

describes reflective practice as a continuous process involving the thoughtful consideration of one's

own experiences in the application of knowledge to practice inclusive of being informed by the

conduct of professionals within a discipline (Schön, 1983, pp. 128–140). He also views perception

as part of the process of reflection. Friedman (2000) extends Schön’s proposition by observing “In

reflective practice, reflection takes the form of bringing unconscious patterns and tacit

understandings to conscious understanding through articulation” (p. 13).

But are linguistic means the only means available for articulation and explication of the

process of design? Does the discipline of design incorporate other ways of revealing detail of

design knowledge and practice? As was revealed in the previous chapter, extensive accounts of

the discourse on design methods and the design process exist—particularly the rise of attempts to

re-structure the design process in the 1960s. Many of these models sought to explicate the process

of design through diagrams. In a later chapter it is proposed that in a similar way to some

individuals being able to, or needing to, verbalise (or articulate) their thinking, others benefit from

such things being visualised through graphic representation. In this way, visual analogy and

metaphor are affirmed as another possibility of means in explicating tacit aspects of design praxis,

inclusive of the notion design thinking.

The narrative now turns to articulating a contemporary view of design praxis in terms of

the professional practice of design.

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3.2 Professional practice and the process of design

In this thesis, framing the process of design is undertaken in the following way. It is primarily

informed by Simon’s (1998) definition that all people design “who move from current or existing

circumstances to preferred ones” (p. 67) and also from a range of ideas articulated by several other

authors cited in this thesis including Archer, Bamford, Brawne, Buchanan, Cross, Dorst, Findeli,

Friedman, Goldschmidt, Krippendorff, Lawson, Oxman, Popper and Schön. This amalgam of

viewpoints combined with my own professional background (as both a practising designer and

design educator) has been deconstructed into the following four phases which comprise a single

sequence in what is often, typically, an iterative process.

1 an initial phase where problem recognition occurs which is generally characterised as involving

convergent production;

2 a subsequent phase where tentative concept and idea generation in response to the outcomes

of the problem recognition phase is undertaken which is generally characterised as involving

divergent production;

3 a subsequent development, evaluation and refining phase;

4 a final phase which resolves a preferred outcome to the sequence and which is generally

characterised as involving divergent production.

Lawson offers many valuable observations about the nature of the process and the

phases in the sequence described above, particularly in relation to it not being a simple linear

undertaking (Lawson, 2006, pp. 123–25). For example, he identifies the process as being endless

in the sense that it is often difficult to initially define the exact nature and scope of the problem at

hand and, equally, to know where the process ends; that there is no correct or infallible process;

that evaluation of solutions are value-laded and often subjective (pp. 123–25).

In terms of my core argument, which is that a focus on design thinking exists within the

context of the process of design, it is useful here to note a generalised framing of design thinking

that is embedded within the description of the process of design above. It is also important to note

that this generalised framing of design thinking is elaborated upon in a later chapter when an

expansion of the frame of reference for design thinking (see chapter five) is proposed. This

expansion of the frame of reference specifically considers specific biological and cultural material in

relation to shifting, broadening, deepening perception and directing thinking within the process of

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design. Within the generalised framing of design thinking it is regarded as a particular type of

creative thinking-in-action that is solution-based or solution-focused type of creative thinking-in-

action that commences with a goal in mind rather than starting with a specific problem. This

approach enables a focusing on the present and the future concurrently as parameters of the

problem, and an exploration of possible resolutions. It is characterized, in a general sense, as

a style of thinking that combines empathy for the context of a problem, creativity in generating

insights and possible solutions, and rationality to analyse and fit solutions to the context

of a problem.

Design routinely engages with the idea of possibility in seeking to bring imaginable worlds

into existence. While this is true of a generalised view of design (something of which all human

beings are capable) it is amplified in the professional setting. And while some design problems may

be amenable to being solved through removing something that is problematic, this is not the same

as creating new theories or tentative solutions that enhance existing circumstances. Design

routinely requires more than just a reformulation or altering of the past.

The idea that the practice of design is about problem solving was introduced in the last

chapter, where it was linked historically to the view that a problem could be analysed and the

generation of solutions would simply follow. However, Dorst suggests “creative design is not a

matter of first fixing the problem and then performing a ‘creative leap’ to a solution” and proposes

that a “radically different view, which tries to arrive at a much closer description of design as it is

experienced by designers, concentrates on the learning that takes place during design projects”

(Dorst, 2006, pp.16–17). This approach recognises that knowledge about the problem evolves over

time, and in turn informs potential possibilities for a solution. He adds:

To begin with, there is no fixed playing surface in design: we design in the real world, so outside

influences can disturb our plans at any time. And considering a design problem from various angles

will give you different pictures of what can be done to solve it – there are many perspectives, each

having its own version of truth. To complicate things further, there are always aspects of the

problem that will only emerge during the solution process. So a design problem can’t even be

comprehensively stated before you set out to solve it (Dorst, 2006, p. 22).

Earlier in this thesis, I introduced Herbert Simon’s (1988) oft-cited definition of design:

“Everyone designs who devises course of action aimed at changing existing situations into

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preferred ones” (p. 67). Although described as a terminus a quo for this research project, this

definition is often cited on its own whereas it is, in fact, part of a larger statement about the practice

of design as Simon saw it, a view about it being a rational problem-solving paradigm, a view that

has become contentious over time. Krippendorff (2007), for example, challenges Simon’s

description of design being a rational paradigm. Simon’s statement has been included below in its

entirety to facilitate a point of reference for Krippendorff’s views.

Everyone designs who devises course of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred

ones. The intellectual activity that produces material artefacts is no different fundamentally from the

one that prescribes remedies for a sick patient or the one that devises a new sales plan for a

company or a social welfare policy for a state. Design, so construed, is the core of all professional

training; it is the principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the sciences. Schools of

engineering, as well as schools of architecture, business, education, law, medicine are all centrally

concerned with the process of design (Simon, 1988, cited in Krippendorff, 2007, p. 70).

Krippendorff’s (2007) concern is with Simon’s reduction of design into being about rational

problem solving where a problem is defined relative to how something ought to be, which evolves

into enumerating alternative solutions and ends with ways of selecting an optimal one (p. 70).

While conceding that this may be attributable to the period within which Simon wrote his

description, Krippendorff observes that designers (including himself) are influenced by and

stimulated through challenges, opportunities and possibilities asserting these are not ‘tame’

problems in the sense of how problems were described by Rittel (cited in Cross, N 1984, p. 136).

With a tame problem the precise nature of the problem is at hand or is assumed when the process

of designing a solution is commenced. This is in contradistinction to wicked problems, in which the

nature of the problem only becomes apparent in the process of design once sufficient investigation

into its nature has actually been completed.

It is possible that Simon may not have characterised or recognised (or chosen to

characterise or recognise) the extent of the tacit nature of design problems and the process of

design when writing his definition of design. Nevertheless, his view that design involves courses of

action that move from the current to the preferred fits within a broader and more contemporary

operational context for design inclusive of the one Krippendorff describes.

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Separate to the idea that designers work only on formally set problems are ideas put

forward by Krippendorff to do with his own personal experience (as a designer) about designers

being motivated by emergent factors that only become revealed once the process of engaging with

the problem is underway and continuing. These he describes as sometimes “troublesome

conditions, problems or conflicts that have escaped (re)-solution” arising “from the perception of

presently undesirable conditions … opportunities not seen by others” which don’t have to be a

problem, per se, at the time and the idea of “introducing variations into the world that others may

not realise” (Krippendorff, 2007, p. 70). Conceding that Simon recognised that “the disciplines of

the sciences are concerned with what exists whereas the disciplines of design are concerned with

what, in his words, ought to be”, Krippendorff points out that unlike the sciences, design involves

itself with the production of artifacts that are not yet in existence, which makes them unable to be

observed to collect any useful data (Krippendorf, 2007, p. 72).

Several recurring themes can be observed in the narrative about the professional practice

of design thus far in this thesis and these will become particularly apparent in later chapters that

deal with creativity, cognition and design thinking. At this point in the narrative, it is useful to draw

attention to several perspectives described thus far that align with the notion of there being two

different types of thinking that are concomitant in design yet are diverse in nature. In an important

way, they constitute part of the flux of the dynamic relationship between certainty and possibility in

the process of design. Analytical thinking provides for an embodiment of the known (the past and

the existing) in the sense that analysis and judgment can only be exercised on the basis of prior

knowledge. By comparison, generative thinking is more speculative and tentative in nature and

provides embodiment for creative insight and intuition; it often seeks to escape the known (the past

and the existing) to envision the new. The professional practice of design requires both—an

accomplished ability to generate degrees of clarity through sophisticated analysis combined with a

more soft edged, more flexible perceptual disposition suitable for the mutable process of

incubation. “Incubation” is used here to describe an unconscious process involving the recombining

of aspects of thought stimulated through conscious activity at one point in time which results in a

novel idea or ideas at a later point.

While the practice of design routinely engages with the idea of possibility (in seeking to

bring imaginable into existence) these newly imagined worlds must make some kind of sense to us.

The statement one can only see what one can recognise draws attention to the role of memory in

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respect of sense-making. Krippendorf (2007) claims design is a sense-making activity by pointing

out that the etymology of the word affirms its Latin origin of de+signare meaning “marking out,

setting apart, giving significance by assigning it to a use, user, maker or owner “ (p. 71). He

proposes a view of design as being a sense-making activity that claims “perception, experience,

and perhaps appearance as its fundamental concerns “(p. 71).

Benda (2001) affirms that “In spite of the profession’s best efforts, design often remains a

fugitive concept … [given] it is multiply defined and multiply employed” (pp. 4.21–4.22). Her

expansive proposition is that “design is engaged with nothing less than the total physical and

cultural landscape”, and she argues that design

makes it possible to fit our environment to our human needs and desires and provides a

way for people to construct and interpret their lives in a world that sometimes tilts toward

chaos. It is a force that can create new cultural directions” (p. 4.20).

Design has long been associated with attractiveness and the novel within a context of

constraints relevant to market forces and product and service development. Today, the agency of

design is engaged with a broad spectrum of challenges where the designer is often part of a multi-

disciplinary team in the value-creation and value-perception chain (Valade-Amland, 2011, p. 17).

In their recent manifesto, Danish Designers claim design to be for “people, profit and

planet” (cited in Valade-Amland, 2011, p. 17), and Valade-Amland points out it is a statement which

informs all their dispositions and communications platform. In drawing attention to this perspective,

he proposes:

Design is about attractiveness, sensuality, aesthetics, and functionality, about real people, and real

problems, about individuals and their encounters with systems, about encouraging responsible

behavior and choices, about challenging our prejudices, about fellowship, and about expressing

identities for individuals, groups of individuals, corporate entities, and societies at large. It’s true:

Design is all about people, profit, and planet (p.17).

Within the contemporary world design seeks to address future needs and experiences of

“people, communities, and cultures” in interconnected ways that ten years ago were non-existent,

and with these intentions has come “a shift from focusing on the know-how and the know-what

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toward focusing on the know-why” (Celaschi, Celi, & Garcia, 2012, pp. 6–7). Designer’s are

increasingly engaged in the anticipatory rather than the existing and are less likely to be involved in

only the appearance of things. The massive changes brought by globalisation, the transformative

effect of the internet on our communications and information systems combined with the

empowerment of like-minded individuals are all part of an increasing complex world and the

evolving creation of complex systems (Siegel, 2012, p. 6). Within this paradigm, design is also

being transformed.

Traditional areas of design practice such as graphic/communication design, interior design

and product design have had their boundaries blurred if not reconfigured as a shift from traditional

product typologies or fields of application has either given way or has needed to encompass new

areas of human and social need. Celaschi et al. (2012) list “design for experience, design for

interaction, design for sustainability, design for cultural heritage” as examples of these changes

(p. 8). They claim identification of three consecutive shifts that have lead to proactive change. The

first shift they note is from “function to purpose” (p. 8). Here customer needs move from an

“immediate result to a longer, nonmaterial outcome” where product functionality is a given and

moves to the background while the value-perception of the product lies in its interest to do with

“social usefulness (for example, ecological features, or social impact)” (p. 8). Their second

observation involves shifts occurring in “consumer’s purchase motivation” which serves to alter the

focus of design to cover

the entire lifespan of the product, making it necessary to design not only the product but also the

processes that generate the product. Now the designer must anticipate problems related to the

production process and, eventually, to the end of the product’s lifecycle” (Celaschi et al.,

2012, p. 8).

The final shift they identify is to do with design’s enhanced orbit and influence, from user-

centredness to co-design where the user is not regarded a passive consumer; rather, as actors in a

process. The result is a move from “designing for to designing with” customers (Celaschi et al.,

2012, p. 8).

Valade-Amland (2011) proposes that “No one seems to contest design’s ability to beautify,

simplify, add meaning to products, to add value throughout the entire value chain” or that “material

design helps define our lives and identities” (p. 18). Yet material design may be also be of

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significance outside of our personal sphere. He points out “just as design adds value to material

products … it also contributes to intangibles, such as private or public services, client relations, and

business transactions … the way we communicate with each other—individually or systematically”

(p. 18). In these ways it can contribute to and promote social inclusion and coherence. If design is

to play a role in these new scenarios it is useful to look at what design can do rather than what it is

or used to be. At this point in time, design remains part of material culture and while it has helped

shape the material world to an alarming and unsustainable extent, the conviction that it can

contribute to a better world continues. Although design involves risk-taking and risk management,

Valade-Amland (2011) concludes the following.

Design is one of the most effective risk management tools we have. Applying design strategically

and managing the design process professionally makes it possible for a product or a service, an

environment, or a communication to be thoroughly tried and tested by the time it reaches the

market place and the users (Valade-Amland, 2011, p. 18).

As triple bottom line (people, planet, profit) values and quadruple bottom line (economic,

environmental, social, cultural) business memes continue to shape our world, further explication of

design’s processes and methods within this flux are part of the process of articulating not only what

design is but, increasingly and importantly, what design can be.

Interest in design thinking from within the business and management sectors positions it

as an important if not critical factor in enterprise associated with innovation and value-creation.

Mayfield et al. (2012), claim that markets have developed to a point of complexity that becomes

more challenging for business and design. This complexity often presents in the form of “ambiguity,

data-overload, interdependencies, and masked consequences that are not resolved through

precision alone” (p. 19). Mayfield et al. argue these situations require insight ”deep understanding

that helps us get past the myriads of specifics to the essence of the situation” (p.19). Suggesting

that dealing with complexity becomes easier when the essence of what is important becomes

apparent, they maintain “Design (and some related fields) creates this type of deep insight all the

time. Through methods of abstraction, problem redefinition, reflection, and rapid exploration, design

is a constant examination and interpretation of what matters” (p. 19–20).

Almost ironically, what many still regard as ‘creative’ (that is, fuzzy and undisciplined) activity can

provide a better view into handling complexity than can many traditional analytic approaches

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(Mayfield et al, 2012, pp. 19–20).

Kim and Baek (2011) describe “design-centred thinking” and “creative innovation” as

having been central to the international success of LG Hausys, “one of Korea’s leading design-

driven companies” (pp. 80–81). They claim that design thinking has “matured into an integral tool

for business” (Kim & Baek, 2011, p. 82). They assert the following.

the role of corporate design has evolved toward research, with a focus on design thinking.

Corporate design is a discipline that uses the designer’s sensibility and method’s to match people’s

needs with what is technically feasible and with what a viable business strategy can convert into

customer value and market opportunity (Kim & Baek, 2011, p. 82).

Nonetheless, not everyone regards design thinking as being unique to design (designing).

Design thinking has been somewhat cynically described as being “trotted out as a salve for

businesses who need help with innovation” (Merholz, 2009, p. 1). Interestingly, given the role of the

social sciences in the evolution of design theory previously described in this thesis, Merholz (2009)

asserts design thinking’s DNA is derived from the social sciences observation that

a not-so-secret truth about “design thinking” is that a big chunk of it is actually ‘social science

thinking’. Design thinkers talk about being “human-centered” and “empathic” yet the tools they use

to achieve that are methods borrowed from anthropology and sociology (Merholz, 2009, p. 1).

From the point-of-view of contemporary design practice, what remains unclear is the

degree to which an individual designer or groups of individual designers can enhance their

cognitive skill sets to address the challenges and paradigmatic shifts described previously. While

evidence of teaching research methods in addition to business concepts, technology horizons and

concepts relating to media and the social sciences are now increasingly found in design education

curricula, to what degree will this fulfill all of the challenges that design faces now and in the future?

Are there limits to what we might reasonably expect a designer to be able to do as an individual

compared to adopting team-oriented, multi-disciplinary approaches? And, within a team-oriented

and multi-disciplinary approach would it not be best to equip all members with enhanced cognitive

skills that enable, and indeed enhance, group collective endeavour?

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3.3 Pedagogical ramifications With enquiry into the practices of the design professions continuing to be examined in the light of

new knowledge, pedagogical implications for the teaching of design have also emerged. Some

have argued for a re-thinking of design education for the twenty-first century in line with new

knowledge given the widespread adoption of largely studio-based teaching approaches that have

characterised the general education foundation of design education programs for a considerable

period of time (Findeli, 2001; Rivka, 1999). Rivka describes the studio being regarded as “a venue

for making designs under the sporadic guidance of the design tutor who intervenes in the student’s

designing, generally in reaction to the student’s explicit design” (Rivka, 1999, p. 2). She likens this

to the “craft education which is based on artistic presentation rather than in the articulation of

principles” (Rivka, 1999, p. 2). Rivka’s (1999) analysis concludes with highlighting the need for

further explication of design knowledge.

Despite the numerous changes in studio pedagogy which have been developed in the subsequent

revolutionary design educational institutions such as the Bauhaus, HFG Ulm, and the Design

Institute, the design studio is still characterised by the faults of product orientation, creative design

as a black-box, the pedagogical distance of the tutor, the lack of explicit definition of the requisite

knowledge foundations of design, and the neglect of design methodological process as legitimate

pedagogical content (p. 3).

At the time when university level design programs were able to articulate the importance

of the profession of design, Friedman (2000) argues it reveals “the gaps in our understanding of

design knowledge” (Friedman 2000, p. 8). In his view, while new forms of professional training

have emerged, they do not provide “deeper understandings of ontology and epistemology that

serve as the foundation of other fields” (Friedman, 2000, p. 8). many prominent design researchers

(Brawne, Buchanan, Cross, Dorst, Findeli, Friedman, Goldschmidt, Lawson, Oxman and Rivka)

have articulated perspectives on the challenges faced in seeking to introduce explicit teaching of

what may constitute design knowledge into design curricula. Many acknowledge and promote the

need for a shift to occur in curricula content derived from the long-standing craft-based tradition of

design and design education toward something more aligned with new knowledge in the field. But

aligned with what, exactly? And, how, exactly? A consensus viewpoint is yet to be achieved.

Contributing to the discourse on this theme, specifically to do with design thinking, Oxman draws

attention to the role of both cognitive and metacognitive activity in the processes of design

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highlighting, again, the challenges faced in terms of the traditional atelier or studio-based method.

Her comprehensive portrayal of the setting for this dilemma is included below in its entirety.

In design education the studio setting is the main pedagogical framework for teaching …The

deficiencies of the studio as a medium for conveying knowledge in a manner that addresses the

endemic unstructured quality of both domain problems and domain knowledge comes through

clearly in much research on the studio. According to Akin the design instruction paradigm suffers

from the following weaknesses: motivational difficulties, insufficient instructions of the design

process and inefficiencies in learning. Another intrinsic problem of the studio instruction paradigm is

that it is carried out individually and strongly dependent on the personality, experience and

cognitive style of both the teacher and the learner. In other words the method of teaching the

student how to acquire, organise and apply design knowledge depends very much on the tutor’s

cognitive content and teaching style. …The tutor’s understanding of what has to be learned and

what knowledge must be transferred is based on his personal experience and knowledge. The

knowledge to be transferred may be implicit, and consequently, unarticulated in an explicit form.

Each student acquires knowledge according to his own interpretation of the process through which

he or she has passed. In the face of the dominance of this paradigm, there is a lack of an

alternative, or a supplemental/alternative method for conveying knowledge in design education.

This condition, being traditionally embedded in the design studio orientation of design education,

is now being questioned with respect to its ability to prepare students cognitively to be able to do

design. The obvious question that comes to mind is can we develop pedagogical approaches that

directly address the teaching of design thinking. If so, what might be their objectives, pedagogical

form, and knowledge content? (Oxman, 2003, pp. 3–4)

Oxman (2003) observes that N. Cross (2007) pointed out “design has its own things to

know, ways of knowing them, and ways of finding out about them” (p. 3). But who knows enough

about such knowledge—and importantly, praxis—to shape the articulation of teaching approaches

agreeable to both the design professional and the design theoretician alike? In respect of design

thinking, who will reconcile theory and practice sufficient to shift design education pedagogy toward

a model that engages with existing meta-knowledge associated with thinking behavior more akin to

the needs of design? Oxman concludes the following.

The actual practice of design in the problem-related studio situation of most design schools rarely,

if ever, treats the cognitive processes of design thinking as a form of explicit teaching content. How

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then can we formulate the aims of design education relative to knowledge content, and how can we

then incorporate such explicit definitions within successful pedagogical approaches?

This suggests that there is more in knowing how to design than just knowing more about designs.

Meta-knowledge in this sense is the knowledge of how to organize what one knows. According to

this view learning that contributes meta-knowledge regarding the organization of knowledge may

be a significant class of knowledge that helps us to organize and exploit the quantity of factual

knowledge we absorb in education. (Oxman, 2003, p. 3)

Findeli (2001) asserts the need to adopt a new theoretical framework inspired by “systems

science, complexity theory, and practical philosophy” (p. 16). Referencing the Bauhaus and Ulm

models previously described, he suggests instead of “science and technology” he would prefer

“perception and action” (Findeli, 2001, p. 16). He regards the first term as a concept related to

“visual intelligence” and the second indicates “a technological act always is a moral act” (p. 16).

The reflective relationship between perception and action, he considers, is “governed not by

deductive logic, but by a logic based on aesthetics” (p. 16). In his view, this second aspect

highlights the “specific training necessary for perception, action and their relationship to be carried

out adequately” (p. 16).

Offering a personal view of the state-of-play in design theory at the beginning of the

twenty first century, Findeli (2001) observes a “shift towards a system approach and

complexification, that is, from a ‘problem and solution’ to a ‘state 1 and state 2 of the system’, that

pushes material artifacts to the background in favor of the actors within the system” (Findeli, 2001,

p. 14). Within this context, he argues the need for the designer to comprehend the “dynamic

morphology of the system” identified as its “intelligence” (Findeli, 2001, p. 10). Findelli

characterises the emergence of this dynamic morphology in the following manner.

One cannot act upon a system, only within a system: one cannot act against the ’intelligence’ of a

system, only encourage or discourage a system to keep going its own way; state B of the system

is, among various possibilities, the one favored by the designer and the client according to their

general set of values; state B is only a transitory, more or less stable, state within a dynamic

process, never a solution; the production of a material object is not the only way to transform state

A into state B and since the designer and the user are also involved in the process, they end up

being transformed, too, and this learning dimension should be considered as pertaining to the

project (Findeli 2001, p. 10).

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Pointing to a need for “re-thinking” the content of design education curricula, Findelli

contends that “future visual intelligence must be capable of penetrating into the invisible world of

human consciousness (thoughts, motivations, purpose, fear, needs, aspirations, etc. and into the

intricate ecologies of the outer world)” (Findeli, 2001, p. 11).

Part of the challenge in reforming design education is the continued existence of long-

standing traditions and practices in existing schools and the profession. Another part of this

challenge includes the elusive nature of design knowledge. Some have argued that observational

analysis of designers at work is one way of capturing these elusive forms of design knowledge,

given much of what needs to be known already exists in the minds of designers (Cross, N, 1994,

p. vii/viii; Dorst, 2006, p. 72;). Yet, as Dorst explains, the challenge remains “that they [designers]

are not usually able to explain to others what they do, why they do it, and how” (p. 72). Writing on

design methodologies within the context of proposing a systematic approach in graphic design,

Cooke cites Frascara’s comment that “To design the research method and to design the design

method are tasks of a higher order than to design the actual communications. Methods create

frames, paradigms within which design decisions take place” (Frascara, cited in Cooke,

2006, p. 131).

Friedman (2003), writing about the need to structure professional design education for the

designer’s of tomorrow, described three sets of challenges to this goal: performance, substantive

and contextual challenges. Firstly, arguing that although historically the various design professions

had more distinct boundaries, cultures and methods than are apparent today, three performance

challenges continue: the design professions address the physical world, human needs and

generate material artifacts (Friedman, 2003, p. 40). Secondly, in relation to objective changes in

the world over time, greater ambiguity now exists between previously more distinct boundaries

between artifacts, structure and process, and projects are increasingly framed within large-scale

social, economic and industrial environments where requirements and constraints are more

complex (Friedman, 2003). Thirdly, in terms of contextual challenges, projects and products must

navigate complex environments where multiple stakeholders exert influence with challenging

demands at “at every level of production, distribution, reception and control” (p. 40). Friedman adds

that “professional design practice today involves advanced knowledge … this knowledge is not a

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higher level of professional practice … it is a qualitatively different form of professional practice”

arising within the information society and knowledge culture we have become (Friedman,

2003, p. 40).

One example of a response to these challenges is described by Oxman (1999) in terms of

“Educating the designerly thinker” (p.105) where she proposes a conceptual model for design

education that draws on cognitive theories about learning and which emphasizes “the acquisition of

cognitive structures and strategies of design thinking” (p. 105). Responding to the question "how

can the uniqueness of design cognition provide a theoretical foundation for design educational

approaches”, she proposes identification of relevant cognitive approaches “which emphasise and

exploit the explication of knowledge processes and knowledge structure in learning” (p. 107) as the

first step. Identifying and engaging with the theory of creative cognition (Ward, Smith, & Finke,

2005, p. 189) which relates to knowledge structures in creative processes, her model proposes a

structure that simulates “the student’s exploration of the design problem’s conceptual space and

the formulation of knowledge structures which are related to potential solution spaces” (Oxman,

1999, p. 107).

Design thinking has evolved as a term to define the cognitive characteristics of design and

has become part of the favoured lexicon of contemporary design practice and, increasingly, part of

the idiom of business and management. More broadly, design thinking describes a style of creative

thinking-in-action, which can be seen as non-discipline-specific and is gaining influence in

education across the disciplines. Although the etymology of the term design thinking can be

legitimately traced to interest in design methods and design research (and design epistemology

and design praxiology), its meaning can be denotative (when referring to things associated with

design epistemology and design praxiology (designerly)), and connotative (when describing a more

generalised thinking approach incorporating both creative or generative thinking and analytical and

judgment-oriented thinking). In this thesis, both denotative and connotative meanings are

referenced at various points as I examine the professional practice of design and the view that all

people, to varying degrees, possess an innate capacity for creative thinking. In a later chapter of

this thesis, I undertake further explication of design thinking is undertaken in relation to one of the

central themes of this thesis: can design thinking be improved, made more tangible by the

development of more effective approaches?

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3.4 Summary Establishing a contemporary composite picture of the professional practice of design in this

chapter, I identified the emergence of the view that design (designing) incorporates a convergence

between knowledge, particularised action and artifact production and that N. Cross initiated the

term designerly in the early eighties to reflect these attributes. Although “designerly” is a widely

acknowledged and accepted term, explicating its nature remains one of the central themes for the

field of design research.

The concept that perception plays a significant role in the constitution of design in a

variety of ways also emerged in this chapter. Friedman, for example, regards the designer as being

the psychological centre of a perceptual process. Schön’s concept of reflective practice, a

continuous process involving the thoughtful consideration (perception) of one's own experiences in

the application of knowledge to practice, is another.

Also established in this chapter is the idea that design routinely engages with the idea of

possibility in seeking to bring imaginable worlds into existence as compared to just re-formulating

the past. While identifying and removing a problem from something that is considered problematic

might provide a so-called design solution, this is very different to the idea of creating a new

concept, something that is largely novel. I also introduced the idea that design problems are not

always readily analysable and definable. A tame problem is where the precise nature of the

problem is at hand or is assumed when the process of designing a solution is commenced.

Conversely, the nature of a wicked problem only becomes apparent in the process of design once

sufficient investigation into its nature has been completed.

I presented evidence that design does not qualify as a scientific discipline, notably via

Simon’s idea that science concerns itself with what is whereas design concerns itself with what

might be was also introduced. Krippendorff extended this argument by adding that unlike the

sciences, design involves itself with things that are not yet in existence, making them unable to be

observed for the purpose of data collection.

Several perspectives were brought together to highlight ideas associated with there being

two different types of thinking that are concomitant in design yet are diverse in nature, and that

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these constitute part of the flux of the dynamic relationship between certainty and possibility in the

processes of design. Analytical thinking provides for an embodiment of the known given it can only

be performed on the basis of prior knowledge. Generative thinking, by comparison, is more

speculative and tentative in nature and seeks to move beyond the known to envision the new.

Design thinking has evolved as a term to define the cognitive characteristics of design (designing)

and has been embraced by business and management with the latter sectors seeing it as being

key in the process of innovation and value creation.

In this chapter, I raised the idea that in an increasingly complex world within which

complex systems are being created, design is being transformed. Traditional areas of design

practice such as graphic/communication design, interior design and product design have had their

boundaries blurred if not reconfigured as traditional product typologies or fields have shifted to

encompass to encompass new areas of human and social need. Nevertheless, Valade-Amland

affirms the view that in these emerging scenarios, it is useful to look at what design can do rather

than what it is or used to be.

Pedagogical implications for the teaching of design have also emerged in light of new

knowledge. Many acknowledge and promote the need for a shift to occur in curricula content

derived from the long-standing craft-based tradition of design and design education toward

something more aligned with new knowledge in the field. Central to these are ideas is the

dominance of a studio-based model and where Oxman has observed that cognitive processes of

design thinking are rarely taught explicitly. Oxman has proposed a conceptual model for design

education that draws on cognitive theories about learning to correct this. Findeli also challenged

the prevailing pedagogic paradigm, calling for a re-thinking of design education inspired by systems

science, complexity theory, and practical philosophy.

In establishing a composite profile of the professional practice of design relevant to my

research agenda, I revealed some of the attributes of design and the processes embedded within

it. I also revealed the idea that visual language is inextricably linked to the practice of design and

this in turn raises the notion of drawing or diagrammatic representation comprising part of the

dynamic morphology of the design process. These are important considerations in relation to the

development of a graphic visualisation of a framework for a design process and design thinking

sequence proposed at a later point in this thesis.

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Citing Friedman’s assertion that a need exists for any evolving field to bring tacit

knowledge into articulate focus, I introduced the question of whether linguistic means are the only

means available and suitable for explicating tacit design knowledge was introduced (Friedman

2000, p. 13). The view that the discipline of design incorporates other ways of revealing the detail

of design knowledge was also offered. In the next chapter I respond to the idea that, in a similar

way to some individuals needing to verbalise (or articulate) their thinking, others may benefit from

things being visualised through graphic representation. I address this idea through an exploration

of the concept of drawing as a language of thought deeply embedded in the process of design. In

this way visual analogy and metaphor and the value of diagrammatic representation will be

presented as another possibility of means in explicating tacit design knowledge.

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Chapter 4 Drawing and diagrammatic representation in design

4.1 Introduction In this chapter I establish a relationship between design praxis and the notion of drawing as a

language of thought; this concept is central to his research project, particularly in the ways this

relationship is visually realised in the research-based cognitive artifacts introduced in chapter

seven. (In chapter seven, as an outcome of this research project, a set of diagrams is

introduced and described as a graphic visualization of a proposed framework for a design

process and design thinking sequence.)

Drawing has been synonymous with art for thousands of years but is there a

particular connection between drawing and design given, as N. Cross states, “design has its

own things to know” and “ways of knowing them” (N. Cross cited in Oxman, 2003, p. 3).

Generating, developing and communicating ideas (where an idea is regarded as a basic

element of thought) seems central to the whole notion of design but how are these thoughts

and ideas communicated given they may be visual, concrete or abstract (Jonson,

2005, p. 613).

Over forty years ago, Arnheim asserted his belief that “artistic activity is a form of

reasoning, in which perceiving and thinking are indivisibly inter-twined” and although “A person

who paints, writes, composes, dances … thinks with his senses” this relationship between

perception and thought is “not merely a specialty of the arts” (preface v). His adjuration was

“What we need to acknowledge is that perceptual and pictorial shapes are not only translations

of thought products but the very flesh and blood of thinking itself” (Arnheim, 1969, p. 134).

My contention is that the cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of mental

processes above and beyond perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself. I am

referring to such operations as active exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, simplification,

abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion, correction, comparison, problem solving, as well

as combining, separating, putting in context (Arnheim, 1969, p. 13).

By “cognitive”, Arnheim meant “all mental operations involved in the receiving,

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storing, and processing of information: sensory perception, memory, thinking, learning” and, in

summary, made the claim “Visual perception is visual thinking” (Arnheim, 1969, p. 13).

Interestingly, Lawson (2006) points out “The cognitive theorist’s approach to thinking is also

attractive to those who seek to understand the design process because it draws many parallels

between thought and perception” (p. 136). Lawson (2004) contends that seeking to describe

“what designers know is not an easy task … The more generic question about what designers

do is even more difficult to answer simply and successfully” (p. 1). He indicates theorists in

cognitive science have only recently recognised the special nature of design and they have a

particular interest in whether or not design has “‘a language of thought’ and if so what is its

nature?” (Lawson 2004, p. 18).

4.2 Drawing as a language of thought

Cautioning that we should be careful in making any assumptions about whether various design

fields share common processes, Lawson (2006) affirms design is a distinctive mental activity

(and proposes a significant part of a designer’s language of thought involves the outward

expression of much of their thinking through drawing. He observes, “Many forms of design …

deal with both precise and vague ideas, call for systematic and chaotic thinking, need both

imaginative thought and mechanical calculation” (p. 4). In the example of architecture, Piano

regards design as

not a linear experience, in which you have an idea, put it down on paper, then carry it out and

that’s that. Rather, it is a circular process: your idea is drawn up, tried out, reconsidered and

reworked, coming back again and again to the same point” (Piano cited in Brawne,

2003, p. 78).

How then is an idea to be drawn up? Or a plan to be represented? Is a process part

of plan? Is a diagram a form of drawing? How complex or simple might the creation of these

artifacts be?

A reductionist viewpoint would suggest the nature of complex things is always able be

reduced or explained in a more simple way. From work on complex systems (complexity

theory) there is the idea that “by reducing complexities to underlying simplicities, science has

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allowed our brains to grasp the hitherto ungraspable” (Cohen & Stuart, 1994, p. 10). Yet,

equally, the same authors observe:

Scientists have been asking the wrong question. They have focused upon complexity as the

thing that requires explanation, and they have taken simplicity for granted…The interesting

question is precisely the opposite. The question that most scientists never thought to ask

because they didn’t see that there was a question to ask. Where does the simplicity come

from? (Cohen & Stuart,1994, p. 222).

It is useful to note here that within the field of information design there exists the

notion of simplicity and complexity as binary opposites. A further important distinction also

exists in the field to do with the notions of complex and complicated. Within the context of

information design, axiomatically, a routine challenge is often faced in seeking to represent

complexity in a simple but not simplistic way, and for the complex not to be become

complicated. Lawson suggests it is the reductive or simplifying properties of a design sketch or

diagram that make them important and valuable and which underline their role as attempts to

remove unnecessary information and reduce complexity (Lawson 2004).

Many different types of drawings and different types of drawings exist in the various

design disciplines. Some are highly experimental in intent and provide a means of attempting

to give visual form to an abstract idea. The idea may not, in fact, have any kind of known form

and in this case the drawing or rendering process documents aspects of the “conversation” the

designer is having with the representation as it is being developed. In this case, the process is

likely to be iterative given the speculative nature of the activity and exist in the form of a design

sketch. Other drawings may be highly technical in nature providing comprehensive technical

information about how something is to be constructed or operated. In this case, much of what

needs to captured and documented is already known. Such drawings are more diagrammatic

in nature. In both cases, the drawing or diagram is a means of transferring and communicating

knowledge to the external world from the internal world of the designer. Collectively, all these

examples of drawings and diagrams comprise Lawson’s notion of drawing as a language of

thought (see Figure 4.1: 1, 2 and 3).

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Figure 4.1 Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 1 – Glen Murcutt:

site analysis and architectural concept sketches

Fromonot, 1995, p. 144–145.


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Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 2 – Communication design:

iterative brand identity development sketches

Kim K J, 2013.


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Examples of drawing as a language of thought: 3 – Product design: form

development sketches

IDSketching, 2013.

_______________________________________________________________________________


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In the 1960s, Jones described the advent of design by drawing as providing “a

greater perceptual span” (Jones, cited in Lawson, 2004, p. 32). This relationship allows the

designer to not have to work on any particular object itself but with a representation of it (p.

32). Oxman has proposed “The design sketch can be considered as the basis of a visual and

mental transaction between the designer and the representation, which evokes a discrete

graphical response” (Oxman, 1997, p. 329). “According to Schön, the designer is engaged in

‘graphical conversation with the design’, and according to Lawson ‘the designer has a

conversation with the drawing’ “(Schön, cited in Oxman, 1997, p. 329). Oxman suggests these

transactions between the designer and the representation serve to reveal the “visual-mental

processes of designers” (Oxman, 1997, p. 329).

Diagrams belong to a group of objects known as cognitive artifacts, physical objects

developed by humans for the purpose of aiding, enhancing, or improving cognition. Blackwell

(1998) indicates diagrams are now commonly associated with

instruction manuals (Gombrich, 1990), electronics (Newsham, 1995; Petre & Green 1990),

software design (Martin & McClure, 1985), architecture (Porter, 1979), geometry (Lindsay

1989); Netz in press), general mathematics education (Pimm, 1995\; Kaput,1995) and

symbolic logic (Shin, 1991; Sowa,1993), as well as informal problem-solving (Katona, 1940)

(cited in Blackwell, 1998, p. 1).

It is the removal of many concrete physical properties of real objects that contributes

to the making of a diagram and Lawson (2004) regards “their very reductive or simplifying

properties” as “deliberate attempts to remove information and to reduce complexity” (p. 40) as

that which distinguishes them.

Lawson (2004) points out “designer’s drawings present cognitive theorists with a very

considerable challenge in accounting for this connection between external representation and

internal mental structure” (p. 33). From a cognitive science standpoint, Goel regards design

“as a manipulation of representations” which he analyses as symbol systems and observes

that “designers progress from the first representation to the last through a series of other

representations largely transforming one set of knowledge into another” (Goel, cited in

Lawson, 2004, p. 58). Lawson contends that the rigorous and coherent analysis of cognitive

science cannot help us to understand this process of transformation. With or without

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compelling cognitive theory to explain what is happening, drawings provide a lens into the

mind of a designer revealing aspects of their own knowledge system and ways of creating

mental representations (Lawson, 2004, p. 32).

Insight is often associated with the concept of invention, and it is interesting to reflect

upon its Middle English origin in inner sight, mental vision and wisdom. Pacey cites Glegg’s

suggestion that a picture of an idea may be a defining occurence in a so-called eureka

moment, a moment of a sudden unexpected discovery (Glegg, cited in Pacey, 2001, p. 59).

… the secret of inventiveness is to fill the mind and the imagination with the context of the

problem and then relax and think of something else for a change … Relaxation … releases

mental energy which your subconscious can use to work on the problem. Sometimes, the

subconscious will hand up … a picture of what a solution might be (Pacey 2001, p. 59).

To broaden the scope of an underpinning validation for the role and value of drawing

as a language of thought, visual thinking has been linked to the idea that scientists have

developed visual languages as well. Pacey refers to thought processes associated with

“puzzle-solving or problem resolution” in the sciences being of a type that “depends on

recognising a structure or pattern in a quasi-visual way” (Pacey, 2001, p. 42). His example

involves chemists talking about chemistry where, although they may not acknowledge the role

of visual language in their work, their language is “full of visual imagery referring to loops, half

loops, and flow pathways” adding that an ability to visualise complex molecular configurations

in three dimensions is recognized as important aspect of envisioning “new reactions and

designing new drugs” (Pacey, 2001, p. 44). Being able to visualise their thinking is recognized

as a particularly important skill when seeking to create computer-generated representations of

what these new concepts look like and portraying visually how these new concepts might work.

Geology is another example of a science “that began to take shape only when its characteristic

visual language—its diagrammatic sections, depictions of rock strata, and mapping techniques

—began to develop” (Pacey, 2001, p. 44).

The ability to recognise form and patterns is important in a variety of disciplines and

Polyani describes the importance of developing an awareness of form and patterns for a

medical student learning about an x-ray diagnosis for a disease on the basis of accumulating

substantial “visual memories” (Polyani, cited in Pacey, 2001, p. 62). “At first the student is

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completely puzzled” but eventually is able to detect “a rich panorama of significant detail…of

physiological variations and pathological changes, of scars, of chronic infections and signs of

an acute disease” (cited in Pacey, 2001, p. 62). Polyani believes at this point the student “has

entered a new world” where the “accumulation of memories, hunches, and also unconscious

skills” constitutes implicit or “tacit” knowledge (Pacey, 2001, p. 62). In this example, which

comprises a large part of the practice of medicine (in this case radiology), it is achieved not

through being able to recall every individual x-ray ever experienced but through sophisticated

high-order observations of form and patterns.

As has been previously stated, there are many different types of drawings and

Lawson (2004), in describing his own taxonomy, places the proposition drawing at “the very

centre, the heart of the design process” (p. 45). More than any other type of drawing, he

describes them as being what Schön (cited in Lawson, 2004) must have been referring to

when he talked about a designer “having a conversation with the drawing” (p. 46) in which the

designer “externalises some features of the design situation in order to examine them in a

more focused way” (p. 46). As Lawson describes it, it appears as if the designer’s intention

was to put something down in order to be able “to stand back and look at it” hence Schön’s

idea of reflective practice. A proposition is created, reflected upon, and subsequently re-visited

with new thinking, insight and possible reform. Lawson (2004) describes this process as one

which designers refer to as “temporarily freezing something in order to explore the implications

of it” (p. 46). Knowledge is transformed from one state to another in an iterative process. While

most of us, he suggests, are used to manipulating our thoughts through the use of language,

designers seem to also manipulate their thoughts through engaging with the visual (Lawson

2004). In this way, drawings or diagrams give form to their ideas.

4.3 Similarity-based reasoning: Visual analogy and metaphor

Schön who drew attention to the value of successfully transferring of concepts from one situation to

another situation; similarly, Goldschmidt indicates Gentner and Medina “have presented rich

evidence to support the claim that similarity-based reasoning is a powerful engine in the solving of

many types of problems” (Gentner & Medina, cited in Goldschmidt, 2001, p. 201). Goldschmidt

notes they highlight analogy as a method and proposes the use of visual analogy as a strategy in

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problem solving. This, she asserts, is because visual analogy is an example of similarity-based

reasoning. Analogy incorporates references to similarities between things, which she regards in its

most complete form as a way of establishing “structural commonalities” (Goldschmidt, 2001, p.

201). Goldschmidt indicates “Gentner and Medina (1998) have also shown that the use of analogy,

especially by novices, contributes to the learning of new abstract concepts and the extension and

application of previously acquired knowledge” (Gentner & Medina, cited in Goldschmidt,

2001, p. 202).

Adding to these ideas and offering further insight from her research interests in

computer science, cognitive science and creativity, Boden (2004) regards an analogical

representation as being “one in which there is some structural similarity between the

representation and the thing being represented” (p. 113). Boden, although viewing the use of

analogy as being central to creative thinking in both science and the arts (Boden, 2004, p. 68),

offers a range of commonplace examples to support her view that the use of visual analogy

may be more widespread than we realise. “Some homely examples of analogical

representations are maps, diagrams, scale-models, and family-trees (wherein family

relationships of blood and marriage are represented by verticality, horizontality, juxtaposition,

and connectedness)” (Boden, 2004, p. 113).

Asserting the significance of the visual, Boden (2004) observes “it is no accident that

many analogical representations are spatial for vision is our most powerful sense” (Boden,

2004, p. 114). Boden contends that the development of our visual systems “has evolved to

notice spatial relations like connectedness, juxtaposition, and gaps and to see connectedness

as implying a possible pathway along which the eye and/or body might be able to move in

either direction” (p. 114). In advancing a view of the primacy of the sense of vision, she

contends that certain “conceptual spaces” (problem domains) that can be represented as a

“spatial model or diagram” provide an opportunity to visually process relationships, gaps and

potential pathways revealing what may have otherwise be overlooked (p. 113). This she

frames as often part of our normal daily activity:

Adults and children alike … spontaneously construct maps of the mental processes going on

in their minds. These maps are used in exploring the many-leveled conceptual spaces

concerned, which can even involve transformation of the territory itself (Boden, 2004, p. 86).

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Boden (2004) also points out that the process of developing visual representations as

outcomes of analysis come not without attendant challenges, and reminds us that it was Koestler

who wrote “the difficulty of analyzing the aesthetic experience is not due to its irreducible quality,

but to the wealth, the unconscious and non-verbal character of the matrices which interlace in it,

along ascending gradients in various dimensions” (p. 285). Here, Koestler’s idea of wealth (linked

to the idea of abundance and associated with need for value-based analysis to process the output),

identifies the role of perception in determining value. Boden’s idea that certain conceptual spaces

(problem domains) may be capable of being represented as a spatial model or diagram describes a

model that appears relevant, valuable and well-suited to articulating aspects of tacit design

knowledge. This same premise underlies my own development of a set of diagrams proposed in a

later chapter of this thesis.

Dorst (2003/2006) observes we use metaphors “to help us understand the world, because

they are convenient simplifications that capture complex situations by likening them to more

familiar ones” (p. 218). However, for Goldschmidt, there is a distinction between analogy and other

forms of similarity relationships. Her belief is that analogy is sometimes equated to metaphor yet

she argues they are “two very different types of similes” (Goldschmidt, 2001, p. 201). Believing that

the use of visual analogy is an act of problem-solving in itself, she observes that design problems,

well-structured and ill-structured, are themselves often “concerned with form giving” (p. 202). In

proposing an imagistic, similarity-based reasoning strategy for ill-structured problem solving, In

Goldschmidt’s view, “tasks that are aimed at creating novel objects and entities (two and three-

dimensional), such as various design assignments or scientific modeling that is expressed in

diagrams etc., naturally require visual or pictorial representations” (p. 201). She adds that as “Inner

representations through imagery are known to complement external representations” of various

types “It is therefore not surprising that individuals who solve problems of this type make use,

extensive use at times, of their imagistic powers” (p. 201).

Goldschmidt (2001) indicates that in some ways the use of visual analogy in creative processes

serves a purpose similar to that of sketching: a problem-solver faced with a complex ill-structured

problem, in a domain that requires visual representation, recruits available resources that can fortify

his or her strategies” (p. 210).

Given that the existing goal is “to generate visual representations”, she claims outcomes that include

valuable clues “may potentially lead to a solution by way of similarity” (Goldschmidt, 2001, p. 210)

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4.4 Foreshadowing the development of research-based cognitive artifacts

The purpose of this research project is to determine whether design thinking can be enhanced. I

argue that diagrammatic representation is a valuable means suitable for further explication of both

tacit and explicit design knowledge associated with the process of design and, specifically, to

design thinking. As already noted, in a later chapter, I propose a set of diagrams in response to the

research question: can design thinking can be improved, made more tangible by the development

of more effective strategies.

In chapter one of this thesis, I introduced Popper’s four-stage model and Brawne’s

interpretation of Popper’s model in both textual and diagrammatic form (see Figure 2.8 and 2.9).

The purpose of their inclusion in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, these two diagrammatic

representations offer much in terms of revealing both the authors’ ideas and their own ways of

articulating aspects of both tacit and explicit knowledge in representational diagrammatic form. As

previously indicated, Popper’s ideas were very influential in the early years of the Design Methods

movement. Secondly, I encountered both models subsequent to the initial development of the

framework for a design process and design thinking sequence proposed in this thesis, and realised

clear alignments already existed between them. Popper’s ideas and diagrammatic representation

of a formula representing how the advancement of scientific knowledge takes place, and Brawne’s

subsequent respectful interpretation from an architectural and academic perspective provided

valuable reinforcement of the content and form of the proposed framework and its final resolution in

chapter eight.

4.5 Summary

The notion of designerly, in the sense that design “has its own things to know” and “ways of

knowing them”, provided one of the starting points for the development of this chapter. Added

to this was the view that generating, developing and communicating ideas seems central to the

whole notion of the process of design (designing) and resulted in several related issues

requiring exploration. How might these thoughts and ideas be communicated, given they may

be visual, concrete or abstract? And, although drawing has been synonymous with art for

thousands of years, is there a particular connection between drawing and design?

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Arnheim (1969) saw a clear relationship between perception and thought in all forms of

artistic activity and believed perceptual and pictorial shapes are central to thinking itself. For him,

artistic activity was a form of reasoning asserting that cognitive operations (thinking) were not

separate from perception but the essential ingredients of perception itself. These ideas and others

coalesced into the notion of drawing as a language of thought. This premise was supported by

Lawson’s (2004) view that a significant part of a designer’s language of thought involves the

outward expression of much of their thinking through drawing. Further underpinning of the role and

value of drawing as a language of thought exist in examples of the role of visual thinking in

the sciences.

The idea that a designer engages in a dialogue with a drawing or diagram was established

by Schön with Lawson adding that such a process allows for a designer to pause and reflect upon

the idea being worked upon. Drawings such as these are referred to as propositional drawings and

for Lawson they lie at the very centre of the design process. Consideration of there being different

types of drawings in design each with differing attributes is also very relevant to the research

question: can design thinking can be improved, made more tangible by the development of more

effective strategies. Some drawings are notional, highly speculative and experimental in nature,

such as so-called design-sketch. Others are highly technical and precise, providing important data

about how something is to be assembled or used. The latter fall into the category of diagrams and

belong to a group of objects known as cognitive artifacts: physical objects developed by humans

for the purpose of aiding, enhancing, or improving cognition. Reference to the discipline of

information design allowed for the notions of simplicity and simplistic, complex and complicated to

be introduced enabling further analysis of some of the reductive properties of diagrams.

Similarity-based reasoning incorporating the use of visual analogy and metaphor adds

another dimension to understanding some of the attributes of diagrams. As Dorst describes, they

provide a means of simplifying complex situations by likening them to something more familiar

which is of particular relevance to the research question: can design thinking can be improved,

made more tangible by the development of more effective strategies?

Although Lawson (2004) affirms an inextricable association between designers and

drawings, this chapter has revealed that diagrammatic representation is not exclusive to design as

a language of thought. Diagrams, as cognitive artifacts, within a broader context provide a valuable

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generalised means of revealing and communicating explicit and tacit knowledge, often inclusive of

concrete and abstract forms.

The idea that design routinely engages with the idea of possibility in seeking to bring

imaginable worlds into existence has already been introduced in this thesis. Although true of a

generalised view of design (something of which all human beings are capable) it is certainly

amplified in the professional setting, and this became the focus of the previous chapter on the

professional practice of design. In this chapter I reiterated these ideas in asserting that generating,

developing and communicating ideas, where an idea is regarded as a basic element of thought, is

central to the whole notion of design.

In order to inform the context from which ideas in this thesis can be developed in response

to the question of whether creativity can be enhanced, in the next chapter I introduce a range of

additional material that focuses on the implicit nexus between creativity and cognition. This

provides important material that is drawn upon in chapter six and chapter seven, chapters that

focus on expanding the frame of reference for design thinking and design thinking and exploring

the theme of shifting, broadening, deepening perception and directing thinking.

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Chapter 5 Creativity and cognition

5.1 Introduction

From a Western perspective creativity “can be defined as the ability to produce work that is novel

and appropriate” (Barron, 1988; Jackson & Messick, 1967; Lubart, 1994; MacKinnon, 1962; Ochse,

1990; Stein, 1953) (Lubart, 2005, p. 339. Lubart describes novel work as being “original, not

predicted, and distinct from previous work” and appropriate work as what “satisfies problem

constraints, is useful, or fulfills a need” (Lubart, p. 339). In noting this definition of creativity, in this

chapter I consider the value of incorporating ideas from the literature of relevant domains of enquiry

that add either explicit knowledge about creativity or suggest ways-of-proceeding valuable to

enhancing creative activity and the production of creative outputs, including those where complete

explication of what take place cognitively is unable to be fully achieved.

Literature on the practice of design over the last 20 years reveals increasing interest in the

role of perception in design knowledge and design praxis. This chapter introduces material from

several important biological, psychological and cultural perspectives associated with creativity,

cognition and perception. It includes information drawn from recent developments in several areas

of cognitive science including those connected with the management of thinking (metacognition)

and developments in computer science within the area of artificial intelligence. Within the context of

the implicit nexus between creativity and cognition, the role of and interplay between creative or

generative thinking and analytical and judgment-oriented thinking in the creative process, as a

correlate to action and reflection (Schön, 1983), is also examined.

To establish a contemporary narrative on creativity, cognition and perception relevant to

the central themes of this thesis, an initial overview has been drawn from literature of history,

philosophy, art, behavioral psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and design

research. This overview was developed as a broad chronology and includes transcultural

perspectives to support the ethnographic and anthropological dimensions of the narrative. In these

ways, this chapter elaborates on ideas introduced in previous chapters that made a direct or

indirect reference to creativity and invention as constituent parts of the process of design. It is

important to note that a number of lengthy direct quotations are dispersed throughout this chapter.

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These have been included in their entirety because such quotes reflect the author’s domain-

specific expertise and their particular use of language, as an expert in their field. The sophisticated

nuances in vocabulary and phrasing in some of these quotations is considered critical in the

process of building a highly developed and suitably advanced understanding of the more subtle

dimensions of creativity, particularly in regard to the role of unconscious thought.

An extensive range of material on creativity and cognitive processes associated with the

creative process has been researched for the material included in this chapter. My literature review

revealed a significant and extensive body of writing exists around and the notions of reason and

logic being conscious dimensions of thought embedded within the creative process with knowledge

of and articulation about these dimensions of creativity advancing over time. However, another

theme also emerges. Well-founded understanding and agreement about the nature of the many

unconscious dimensions of the creative process such as intuition and insight remain elusive to full

explication. Although resolution of this intellectual impasse appears vexed, there is agreement,

from a variety of quarters, to do with accepting the crucial role of the unconscious in creativity even

though it continues to challenge logical analysis.

5.2 Historical and cultural perspectives

Several thematic perspectives and definitions of creativity have evolved over time in different

societies and different cultures. An early Pre-Christian perspective that had continuing influence

over several centuries was that creativity was powerfully related to the concept of genius, and that

a strong mystical association between the two prevailing (Albert & Runco, 2005). By the time of

Aristotle creativity had assumed a social value and “an association with madness and frenzied

inspiration, a view that reappeared during most of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth

centuries” (Albert & Runco, 2005, p. 18).

Following the Pre-Christian perspective, the early western conception of creativity,

scholars agree, was “the biblical story of the creation given in Genesis from which came the

idea of the artisan doing God’s work on Earth” (Boorstin & Nahn, 1956, cited in Albert & Runco,

2005, p. 18).

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For the Hindus (1500–900 BC), Confucius (c. 551–479 BC) and the Taoists and Buddhists,

creation was at most a kind of discovery or mimicry. The early Taoists and Buddhists emphasized

natural cycles, harmony, regularity and balance, therefore ‘the idea of the creation of something

ex nihilo (from nothing) had no place in the universe of yin and yang’ “ (Boorstin, cited in Albert &

Runco, 2005, p. 18).

Within the classical Greek context, Plato felt that nothing new was possible and that art in

his time was an effort to match or mimic ideal forms. Many of these ideas, from the Pre-Christian to

the Aristotelian, remained for around 1200 years.

The idea of “human talent or unusual ability” being special (most often linked to a male)

did not emerge until The Middle Ages, when its manifestation was regarded as a conduit of an

external spirit (Albert & Runco, 2005, p. 18). In the early Renaissance “the apparent divine attribute

of great artists and artisans became understood (and often emphasized) as manifestly their own

talent or skill and not of divine origin” (Albert & Runco, p. 18). This idea, part of several social

transformations that took place saw “the decline of serfdom, the triumph of the English language,

the rise of the judicial and medical professions, and the growth of religious non-conformity” (Wilson-

Given, cited in Albert & Runco, 2005, p. 18).

The foundations of twentieth century research into creativity were laid during the

nineteenth century (Becker, cited in Albert & Runco, 2005), Becker completed concluded that as

early as 1837, Bethune was exploring ideas to do with and ability to originate “new combinations of

thought” and the idea that a highly creative individual might be able to “store away ideas for future

combinations” (p. 25). Becker added that Bethune was one of several writers who foresaw some of

Freud’s thinking about the role of the conscious and the subconscious in the sense of future

combinations being conscious only when the chain of unconscious association was regained

(Albert & Runco, 2005).

Similar themes were articulated by James, the pioneering American psychologist and

philosopher who trained as a medical doctor and who produced a number of very influential books

on the young science of psychology, on educational psychology, psychology of religious

experience and mysticism, and the philosophy of pragmatism. In 1880, he sought to explicate the

dynamics of creative thinking in the following way.

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Instead of thoughts of concrete things patiently following one another in a beaten track of habitual

suggestion, we have the most rarefied abstractions and discriminations, the most un-heard of

combinations of elements, the subtlest association of analogy; in a word, we seem suddenly

introduced into a seething cauldron of ideas, where everything is fizzling and bobbling about in a

state of bewildering activity, where partnerships can be joined or loosened in an instant, treadmill

routine is unknown, and the unexpected seems only law (James, cited by Weisberg, 2005, p. 227).

Nearly thirty years later, in 1908, James emphasised the negative influence of convention,

tradition and habit in thinking on creativity in the following manner.

The force of habit, the grip of convention, hold us down on the Trivial Plane; we are unaware of

our bondage because the bonds are invisible, their restraints acting below the level of awareness.

They are the collective standards of value, codes of behavior, matrices with built in axioms which

determine the rules of the game, and make most of us run, most of the time, in the grooves of

habit – reducing us to the status of skilled automata which Behaviorism proclaims to be the only

condition of man (James, cited by Weisberg, 2005, p. 227).

Similar themes and ideas were being considered in other fields around the same time. In

1913, the French mathematician Poincaré proposed the idea that creativity involves making “new

combinations of associative elements which are useful” which “reveal to us unsuspected kinships

between other facts well known but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another“ (cited in

Martindale, 2005, p.137).

Koestler (cited in Weisberg, 2005), writing around fifty years later, pursues several similar

themes to do with the interplay between conscious and unconscious thinking behavior including

suggesting that conscious thought, particularly in the form of language, could actually inhibit the

intuitive (unconscious) forming of connections that underlie insightful leaps. Koestler describes

normal thought proceeding within a frame of reference, associative context, or type of logic

suggesting that in normal personal dealings we operate within many such frames of reference, but

only one at a time. In his view, by comparison, creativity involves not just an association but a

bisociation between two normally independent frames of reference which he termed a bisociation

of matrices. Koestler, emphasising the negative influence of habit as James had done, described

the necessity for creative thinking to break out of the boundaries set by knowledge in the form of

habit in the following way.

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Habit is thus second nature...at any rate as regards its importance in adult life; for the acquired

habits of our training have by that time inhibited or strangled most of the impulsive tendencies

which were originally there. Ninety-nine hundredths or, possibly, nine hundred and ninety-nine

thousandths of our activity is purely automatic and habitual’ (Koestler cited in Weisberg,

2005, p. 228).

Similar themes were pursued by Campbell, an American social scientist who proposed a Darwinian

perspective on creative thinking in 1960 which asserted that creative ideas “like the mutations that

provide the raw material on which natural selection operates, are the results of a ‘blind’ process”

(Weisberg, 2005, p. 228). In Campbell’s introduction, he suggests that true advances or

‘breakouts’, in knowledge are identified as having been brought about by a process or processes

that are random (blind) and inexplicable.

Between a modern experimental physicist and some virus-type ancestor there has been a

tremendous gain in knowledge about the environment... It has represented repeated ‘breakouts’

from the limits of available wisdom, for if such expansions had represented only wise anticipations,

they would have been exploiting full or partial knowledge already achieved. Instead, real gains

must have been the products of explorations going beyond the limits of foresight and prescience,

and in this sense, blind. In the instances of such real gains, the successful explorations were in

origin as blind as those that failed. (Campbell, cited in Weisberg, 2005, p. 229).

Weisberg (2005), a cognitive scientist, points out that it was Simonton who took

“Campbell’s basic view and elaborated it into being a wide-ranging theory of creative development

and creative process” (p. 229). Simonton proposed that problem solving comes close to being a

random process in the sense that the less disciplined resource of free-associative procedures are

necessary to allow for the insight process (Weisberg, 2005, p. 228).

Mayer (2005) offers an interesting perspective on the relationship between knowledge and

creativity in suggesting that although

the various theoretical views proposed by psychologists appear on the surface to be very different,

there is among many of them ... one critical assumption concerning the relationship between

knowledge and creativity. Since creative thinking by definition goes beyond knowledge, there is

implicitly or explicitly assumed to be a tension between knowledge and creativity” (Mayer, 2005, in

Sternberg, 2005 p. 456)

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In his view, although knowledge “may provide the basic elements, the building blocks out

of which are constructed new ideas, but in order for these building blocks to be available, the

mortar holding the old ideas together must not be too strong” (Mayer, 2005, p. 456).

In terms of a Western conception of creativity, Mayer summarises that the majority of

definitions “endorse the idea … [that] creativity involves the creation of an original and useful

product … the creative product must be new and must be given value according to some external

criteria” where its value is derived from being “appropriate for the situation in which it occurs”

(Mayer, 2005, p. 449). Within this broad view of creativity, not one necessarily specific to design,

the notion of culture, context and domain relevance is revealed.

While Mayer’s themes are identifiable within a Western conception of creativity, Eastern

perspectives on creativity diversify an understanding of cultural context. Within an Eastern

conception of creativity, creativity

appears to be less focused on the creation of the novel from the point-of-view of producing any kind

of artifact and more to do with an inner world that seeks to reconcile a connection to a primordial

realm, an inner essence of ultimate reality. (Chu, Kuo & Mathur, cited in Lubart, 2005, p. 340).

Here, creativity is linked to self-reflection and meditation in its role of assisting an

individual to see “the true nature of the self, an object or an event” (Chu & Onda, cited in Lubart,

2005, p. 340). This corresponds very much with “humanistic psychology’s conception of creativity

as part of self-actualisation” (Lubart, 2005, p. 340). Seeking enlightenment, in the Eastern

conception of it, is the goal of advanced spiritual practice and is very different to the ethos of the

eighteenth century Western historical period of The Enlightenment. By contrast to the Eastern

metaphysical conception of enlightenment, The Enlightenment or Age of Reason promulgated

reason as the principal source of legitimacy for authority. This was achieved through the conscious

process of making sense of things using logic. Lubart (2005) affirms that creativity is context

dependent when examining the notion of creativity in diverse cultures and that culture in this

context serves to define the nature of creativity and the creative process (p. 347). “Culture

promotes creativity in certain forms and domains and in certain segments of the

population” (p. 347).

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Lubart conceives of the Western definition of creativity as being “product-oriented, originality-based

phenomenon” compared with an Eastern view of creativity as a phenomenon of expressing an

inner truth in a new way or of self-growth (p. 347).

The purpose of this section in chapter five, is to not only historicise creativity but to reveal

relevant cultural, ethnographic and anthropological perspectives. While not seeking to disregard

Eastern perspectives on creativity, in this thesis I focus on a Western conception of creativity.

Within a Western conception of creativity, several examples already described in this thesis align

with the idea that an ability to re-organise or “re-cognise” linkages between previously

unassociated material is a valuable type of thinking behavior. This provides a useful entry point

from which to introduce several themes from the inter-disciplinary field of cognitive science.

5.3 Cognitive science and computational science

Defined broadly, cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of how information is represented

and transformed in the brain as it gives rise to mind. It encompasses multiple research disciplines

including philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology,

sociology and education. Its emergence as a discipline coincides with work undertaken by the early

cyberneticists who concerned themselves with the science of communications and automatic

control systems in both machines and living things. Undertaken in the 1930s and 1940s, their work

sought to understand the organising principles of the mind. Some of this work led to the

development of the first versions of what are now known as artificial neural networks—

mathematical or computational models designed to simulate the structure and/or function of

biological neural networks.

Development of the digital computer and associated theories of computation in the 1940s

and 1950s played a central role in the development of cognitive science both as a metaphor for the

mind, and as a tool for investigation. Although Chomsky challenged the prevailing influence of

Skinner’s Behaviorist paradigm in psychology in the 1960s (MacCorquodale, 1970), the focus of a

considerable amount of cognitive science research at that time was the possibility of the concept of

creating artificial intelligence. In time, limitations in terms of what hoped to be achieved within the

scope of artificial intelligence research became apparent from which had arisen an interest in

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neural networks, both artificial and biological. Several themes from within these areas of enquiry

are relevant to the discussion on creativity in this chapter and subsequent chapters that focus more

directly on understanding aspects of how the brain gives rise to mind.

Boden (2004), a researcher in the fields of artificial intelligence, psychology, philosophy,

cognitive and computer science, has argued that the romantic view of creativity had long held the

belief that this intuitive talent was innate “a gift that can be squandered but cannot be acquired—or

taught” (p. 15). In her view, for a considerable period of time the idea of fostering creativity was

unimaginable which is significant point in relation to my research question— can design thinking be

enriched with the ideas of de Bono, in order to make the thinking and the process more effective

and can some of these ideas be graphically visualised? Boden describes the long-held romantic

view of creativity as being “defeatist” arguing “it implies that the most we can do to encourage

creativity is to identify the people with this special talent, and give them room to work. Any more

active fostering of creativity is inconceivable” (p. 15).

Boden (2004) defines creativity as the ability “to come up with ideas that are new,

surprising and valuable” and that it is not a special “faculty” but an aspect of human intelligence in

general: in other words, it is “… grounded in everyday abilities such as conceptual thinking,

perception, memory, and reflective self-criticism” (p. 1). Boden contends that the sudden

emergence of a new insight necessitates the conversion of what she describes as something that

otherwise could be “merely intriguingly crazy” into something of value. This she argues requires

“the skilled, and typically unconscious deployment of a large number of everyday psychological

abilities, such as noticing, remembering, and recognizing” (p. 22). Perkins, an educational

psychologist, similarly regards creativity as being “grounded in universally-shared psychological

capacities such as perception, memory, and the ability to notice interesting things and to recognize

analogies” (cited in Boden, 2004, p. 35) and agrees with Boden that these skills can be learned.

Boden’s (2004) description of the origins of creativity is of it being in the unconscious

mind, “not the Freudian unconscious of repressed instinct, but what Coleridge himself called ‘that

state of nascent existence in the twilight of imagination and just on the vestibule of consciousness”

(p. 130). Adding to the early characterisation of the creative process previously offered by James ,

she characterises a personal perspective on these ideas in the following contemporaneous way.

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The “subliminal self is in no way inferior to the conscious self; it is not purely automatic; it is capable

of discernment; it has tact, delicacy; it knows how to choose, to divine. What do I say? It knows

better how to divine than the conscious self, since it succeeds where there has failed. In a word, is

not the subliminal self superior to the conscious self?...I confess that, for my part, I should hate to

accept it” (Boden, 2004, p. 30).

Boden (2004) observes that creativity may involve generating “unfamiliar combinations of

familiar ideas” (p. 3) where the new association or idea may have resulted from either deliberate

conscious thought, or unconsciously, or through a process of exploration and transformation of

conceptual spaces in people’s minds. However, when these new ideas are generated, the new

idea must be valued by us; it has to have some point (p. 3). “It may or (more usually) may not have

been caused by some random process … but the ideas … have to have some intelligible

conceptual pathway between them for the combination to make sense” (p. 3). Consequently,

Boden (2004) asserts that “the concept of creativity is value-laden” (p. 41) and is elaborating here

on the notions of value creation and value perception, ideas that were introduced earlier in the

thesis narrative.

In describing some of the limitations associated with current work in computational

science and the development of artificial intelligence, Boden (2004) points out that in relation to

creativity “two major bottlenecks remain … the need for domain expertise in defining conceptual

spaces, and the difficulty in identifying aesthetic values clearly enough for them to be expressed in

computational terms” (p. 305). She adds that “computational psychology is helping us to

understand such things in scientific terms and achieves this “without lessening our wonder, or our

self-respect, in any way. On the contrary, it increases them, by showing how extraordinary is the

ordinary person’s mind” (p. 304). Summarising her own overview of current perspectives about

computational science and cognitive science, she indicates that current “computational models of

creativity are crude at best and mistaken at worst, if compared with human thinking” (Boden, 2004,

p. 321). Although advising there are distinct limits to the scope of achievement in this area,

she reveals

they do offer us some promising, and precise, ideas about how to come up with creative

combinations, and how to identify, map explore and transform conceptual spaces. And that, in my

view, is a large part of what the psychology of creativity is about” (p. 321).

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Boden adds that her own interest is not in awarding accolades to computer programs but through

understanding their development, in shedding light on the ways human beings manage

their creativity.

5.4 Perception and insight: A viewpoint from theoretical physics

Although believing that creativity is impossible to describe in words, the theoretical physicist David

Bohm, writing in his own book on the topic of creativity asks: “Is creativity, then, appropriate only to

a few people of special talents, who rise to a level that is commonly called ‘genius’?” (Bohm 2004,

p. 4). Proffering the view that it is not all a matter of talent, he asserts “there must have been a

considerable body of scientists who were better at mathematics and knew more about physics than

Einstein did. The difference was that Einstein had a certain quality of originality” (p. 4). In this

context, Bohm suggests that originality requires a willingness to see things as they are, or as they

might be, not only how they ought to be based on previous experience or experiments (p. 4). This

is highlighted in his view that “the order, pattern, and structure of what is perceived come from the

record of past experiences and thinking … this record is varied, adapted, and adjusted so as to

accommodate the presently perceived fact. But basically it is not new” (p. 18).

The benefit of not having a strong attachment to past experience (or knowledge) is also

highlighted in Bohm’s (2004) description of the early years of childhood development as being

spent “in a wonderfully creative way, discovering all sorts of things that are new to him” (p. 4). In his

example of the development of a child, Bohm describes the child learning their way around “just by

trying something out and seeing what happens” (p. 4). In turn, this subsequently modifies behavior

such that a change in what is done (or thought) occurs in accordance with what actually

happened—what was directly experienced. He adds that as we grow older we are inhibited in

“giving primary emphasis to the perception of what is new and different” because of a cultural

inclination to not want “to make mistakes” (p. 5).

Amplifying the impact of pre-existing knowledge and cultural context on our thinking

behavior, and more specifically on creativity, Bohm (2004) asserts that “creative work requires,

above all, a creative state of mind” (p. 20), which may be in contradistinction to our normal patterns

of thinking and learning disposition. His belief is that “what we learn as children, from parents,

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teachers, friends, and society in general, is to have a conformist, imitative, mechanical state of

mind” that does not seek to involve itself with “‘upsetting the apple cart’” (p. 20). Having indicated

that creative work requires “a creative state of mind”, Bohm (2004) asks: “What, then, is the

creative state of mind?” (p. 21). Again he responds with likening it to the behavior of a young child

in the sense of there needing to be a wholehearted interest in what is being done and “remaining

open to learning what is new, to perceiving new differences and new similarities, leading to new

orders and structures, rather than always tending to impose familiar orders and structures in the

field of what is seen” (p. 21).

Bohm (2004) sees that escaping from the dominance of pre-existing patterns in the brain

derived from past experiences in order to embrace corresponding shifts in perception required for

originality to occur, needs a quality of insight that goes “beyond any particular fixed form of reaction

and associated reflective thought” (p. 74). He cautions that this type of insight must be “free of

conditioning to previously existing patterns, otherwise it will, of course, ultimately be just an

extension of mechanical reaction” (p. 74). For Bohm (2004), this kind of insight

is a form of perception through the mind, which is the essence of what is most deeply meant by the

word ‘intelligence’. When such intelligence operates, then in each case there is a perception of

where the ever-changing dividing line between a given pair of opposing categories properly falls,

and of whether a given pair of such categories is relevant. (p. 74)

In this setting, thinking behavior is “no longer dominated by its mechanical tendency to

hold unalterably to such fixed and limited sets of categories” (Bohm, 2004, p. 74). Holding a

somewhat similar view to Boden on the role of the unconscious in terms of the source of the

intelligence that is manifest in creativity, Bohm provides a deeply personal view about his concept

of intelligence where he emphasizes that “what is being suggested here is that intelligence does

not thus arise primarily out of thought. Rather, as pointed out earlier, the deep source of

intelligence is the unknown and indefinable totality from which all perception originates” (p. 75).

Interestingly, Bohm also suggests that “perhaps there is some kind of perception or intelligence

which is deeper, which is able to see this incoherence” (p. 23). In terms of the thinking system of

the brain, he indicates he is not saying

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the system is everything there is, I’m saying that the system pervades our whole activity…but that

doesn’t mean that it’s all there is…The system has become so pervasive, however, that it may be

almost all that we are able to see much of the time” (Bohm, 2005, p. 23).

While regarding the system as being necessary to a certain extent, Bohm describes his

belief that an intelligence or a perception exists which goes beyond memory and which has “a

capacity to see the incoherence. There’s a lot beyond this system. The system is only a very tiny

part of reality; but it looms large” (Bohm, 2005, p. 23). In this sense, Bohm, does not regard

intelligence as a result of accumulated knowledge, rather it might best be described “as an art” —

the art of perception that manifests through mind (Bohm, 2004). In this sense, thought provides a

basis from which this form of intelligence arises and upon which it operates (Bohm, 2004).

Many of Bohm’s views, particularly in relation to the impact of the dominant and

mechanical nature of perception and the role of shifting perception (intelligence) to enable creativity

(originality) are congruent with many of de Bono’s ideas considered later in this thesis. Although

believing that creativity is impossible to describe in words, his ideas, alongside Boden’s, reveal

further intricacies of knowledge about what constitutes human creativity and originality. Their views

also acknowledge that complete explication of a totally defining model of creativity remains elusive.

5.5 Intuition and unconscious thought

Part of Boden’s professional background is in computational science yet at the core of her thinking

and writing is her interest in the human mind. Boden (2004) has a particular interest in how intuition

works, asking “How is it possible for people to think new thoughts?” (p. 15). She expresses a view

that “despite the elitist claims of inspirationalists and romantics alike —we all share some degree of

creative power, which is grounded in our ordinary abilities” and that “it is potentially misleading to

refer … to creativity as a ‘capacity’ ” (p. 22). She affirms “creativity is not a single ability, or talent,

any more than intelligence is … Nor is it confined to a chosen few” (p. 22). Boden describes her

own taxonomy of creativity as one comprising three forms. “The first involves making unfamiliar

combinations of familiar ideas” and that the “other two types of creativity are interestingly different

from the first. They involve the exploration, and in the most surprising cases the transformation, of

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conceptual spaces in people’s minds” (pp. 3–4). Inherent in her articulation of these forms is the

notion that “These new ideas can be generated either deliberately or, often, unconsciously” (p. 3)

Adding to the discourse on intuition she suggests that such matters can be better

understood by considering ideas from artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence is the study of how to build and/or program computers to do the sort of things

which human minds can do … It provides many ideas about possible psychological processes, and

so has given rise to a new approach in studying the mind, ‘computational’ psychology” (Boden,

2004, p. 15).

An interesting connection exists here in relation to Simon’s (1988) previously mentioned definition

of design: Everyone designs who devise courses of action aimed at changing existing situations

into preferred ones (p.67). Simon also originated some of the core concepts of artificial intelligence

—such as search, search-space, heuristic, planning, means-end analysis, and production system

(p. 209). But, it is his idea that everyone is capable of design (designing) and his notion of the

preferred implying the need for critical evaluation in determining one thing having greater perceived

value over another that aligns with many of Boden’s views and which is also one of the central

themes of this thesis.

In referring to different thinking styles, Boden (2004) proposes “A given style of thinking …

can render certain thoughts impossible—which is to say, unthinkable” (p.6) and offers, however,

that “thinking styles can be changed – sometimes in the twinkling of an eye” (p. 6). Her views on

intuition include the idea of thinking styles being decidedly human attributes, and she asserts that

“Insights do not come from gods—and they do not come from nowhere, either … Flashes of insight

need prior thought processes to explain them” (p. 28). Thus Poincaré’s quandary in seeking to

discern and evaluate the differing roles of the subliminal and the conscious mind is “no romantic

hymn to the supreme majesty of the unconscious. Rather the reverse” (p. 30). In having made a

previous reference to her interest in Koestler’s ideas on creativity, she argues that one of the

strengths of Koestler’s approach is that “he appealed to no special creative faculty, granted only to

an elite” (p. 35)—ideas which are thematically linked to views expressed by both Bohm and Boden

cited in this thesis. Revealing her personal view of the significance of unconscious thought in the

creative process, and from her stock of other writers’ nuanced and thematic reflections offered by

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other writers on the dynamic interplay between conscious and unconscious thought and the role of

intuition, she cites the molecular biologist François Jacob’s evocative words.

Day science employs reasoning that meshes like gears … One admires its majestic arrangement

as that of a Da Vinci painting or a Bach fugue. One walks about it as in a French formal garden …

Night science, on the other hand, wanders blindly. It hesitates, stumbles, falls back, sweats, wakes

with a start. Doubting everything … It is a workshop of the possible … where thought proceeds

along sensuous paths, torturous streets, most often blind alleys (Jacob in Boden, 2004, p. 126).

At this point in the narrative, it is useful to distinguish the subtlety in meaning between intuition and

insight. Intuition is defined as “a natural ability or power that makes it possible to know something

without any proof or evidence : a feeling that guides a person to act a certain way without fully

understanding why: something that is known or understood without proof or evidence” (In Merriam-

Webster.com. Retrieved May 15, 2014 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary). Intuition is

thus associated more with unconscious thought. Insight is defined as being “the ability to

understand people and situations in a very clear way: an understanding of the true nature of

something” (In Merriam-Webster.com. Retrieved May 15, 2014 http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary). De Bono asserts a further particular distinction between the two in stating

Intuition and insight are not the same thing. Insight is a sudden realization like a mathematician or

computer programmer suddenly realizing that something can be done much more simply. Intuition

is a gradual building-up of background patterns which often cannot be verbalized or even made

conscious. (de Bono, 1991, pp. 93–94)

5.6 Analogical thinking and imagination

Boden (2004) describes the origin of creativity as being the unconscious mind swiftly pointing out

that she is not referring to the Freudian unconscious of repressed instinct (p. 130). Imagination has

also been described as a form of analogical thinking; Policastro and Gardner (2005) asserted that

while it draws on previous experiences it seeks to bring things together in unusual ways. Indicating

that considerable evidence exists to suggest that adopting a playful disposition in a problem solving

approach is likely to enhance the creative output, they point out that it is the demanding rules of

logical thinking that do not encourage or provide for playful associations to be made within relevant

contextual constraints (Policastro & Gardner, 2005).

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Boden (2004) is also among those who note a valuable connection between analogical

thinking and analogical representation, a notion introduced in the last chapter and one that will be

considered further in relation to the development of a design process and design thinking

framework. She points out “Analogical thinking is common in science as well as in art” (p. 147) and,

again, offers Koestler’s words to do with how in many scientific discoveries there was an act of

“‘seeing an analogy where no one saw one before’ ” (Koestler in Boden, 2004, p. 197). Boden also

points out that analogical thinking is to be found in both the arts and sciences.

Boden (2004) poses a question: what is the role of chance, randomness, unpredictability

in creativity?. She argues that creative thinking is made possible by constraints which are the

opposite of randomness and that many people see unpredictability as the essence of creativity.

She subsequently then asks, “how can these views be reconciled?” (p. 233). Her reconciliation

asserts that “scientific understanding of creativity is widely regarded as impossible: creative

surprise, it is often said, can never be anticipated by determinist science” [yet] “modern science is

not wholly deterministic” (p. 234). Thus, in terms of the value of randomness and chance, Boden

maintains that in a non-determinist sense, serendipity is “the finding of something valuable without

it being specifically sought’” (p. 234). Boden, in historicising and exemplifying the role and value of

imagination, argues that since the Renaissance our tendency toward self-glorification has been

challenged numerous times. “Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud successively challenged comfortable

beliefs: that the earth is the centre of the universe, that homo sapiens was created in the image of

God, and that people are fundamentally rational creatures” rounding this view by commenting that

“the three intellectual revolutions cited above each showed some cherished belief to be false”

(p. 277). Thus “Geocentrism, special creation, rational self-control: one by one, these bit the dust”

(p. 277). Her argument extends to the idea that

Many people fear that explanation in and of itself must devalue creativity. Forget computers, for the

moment: the conviction is that any scientific account of creativity would lessen it irredeemably.

Even an explanation in terms of brain-processes (never mind silicon chips) would undermine our

respect for creative thought. (Boden, 2004, p. 277)

Bohm (2005), aligning with Boden’s view on analogical thinking and analogical

representation, argues that the way perception works is highly affected by representation and

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imagination and describes imagination as meaning “making an image” or “seeing the image of

something that is not there” (p. 151). He asserts that in reality there is “no fundamental difference

between the processes of imagination and perception” (p. 151). Pürto (2004) distinguishes

imagination that involves memory is referred to as “reproductive imagination”, and “imagination that

involves the formation of concepts beyond those derived from external objects is called productive

imagination” (pp. 60–61). Although a central theme of his thesis is to do with diagrammatic

representation and drawing as a language of thought, Pürto also points out that “composers

imagine works in their ‘mind’s ear’, and that mechanics imagine problems in their physical and

spatial array” (p. 61). For Pürto, imaginative thought also constitutes both daydreaming and what

might also be called night dreaming, and includes the notion of fantasy.

At this point in the narrative, although Boden has previously acknowledged that tensions

exist around the idea of fully explaining creativity in scientific ways, she nevertheless suggests

some of these matters can be better understood by considering several ideas from the domain of

artificial intelligence.

5.7 Artificial intelligence and connectionist systems

As a computational scientist, Boden (2004) makes it clear that her “aim is not to hand out

accolades to computer programs, but to illuminate the ways in which human beings manage their

own originality” (p.148). Her interest in the human mind and how intuition works extends to the

development of neural networks within artificial intelligence systems. It is useful to indicate here

that traditionally the term neural network referred to a network or circuit of biological neurons (an

electrically excitable cell within which information is transmitted through electrical and chemical

signaling). However, modern use of the term often refers to artificial neural networks where the

“neuron” is a programming construct designed to mimic behaviors or properties of biological

neurons. Sometimes referred to as connectionist systems, neural networks in this sense refer to

models developed and adopted within the domain of cognitive science known as connectionism

defined in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) as being “a movement in cognitive

science which hopes to explain human intellectual abilities using artificial neural networks”. An

intriguing feature of neural networks is that they function around the notion of analogical pattern

matching, a concept that will be explored more fully in the next chapter in relation to the ideas of

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de Bono. Neural network systems contain both a range of stored patterns that can be matched

according to their similarity and what is referred to as a “contextual memory” (Boden, 2004, p. 132).

Interestingly, they do not require “perfect” information; they can compute using probabilities that are

referred to as weak constraints with their functionality also grounded in both meaning and context

(Boden, 2004).

Boden (2004) points out that in computer science, “‘Computation’ means ‘following a

program’”, adding that “whatever the brain is doing it is surely not that.“ (p. 126). Boden’s interest in

and willingness to contribute to a balanced discourse on the notion of creativity from a

computational science perspective includes pointing out that although connectionist research

remains in its infancy. Her equitable and elegant description of the nature of neural networks as

compared to what might be taking place in human brain cells follows.

Current neural-network models, for all their likeness to the brain, are significantly unlike brains too.

For instance, nearly all involve two-way connections, whereas brain-cells send messages in one

direction only. Any one unit is directly connected to only a few others, whereas the lacy branches of

a given neurone usually abut on many hundreds of cells. Computer models normally contain no

analogue of the neuro-chemicals that diffuse widely through the brain. Further, neuroscientists still

know very little in detail about what computations are carried out by brain-cells, and how. It follows

that suggestive explanations, indicating how creative associations ‘might’ be scientifically

understood, are—as yet—all that can be offered (Boden, 2004, p. 144).

In drawing several significant strands of her ideas about conscious and unconscious

thought, intuition and imagination, and the analogical value and limitations of neural networks

compared to human neuronal behavior together, Boden contends that while many people claim

“‘Creativity requires consciousness’“ (Boden, 2004, p. 294), she points out “We have seen, time

and time again, that much—even most —of the mental processing going on when people generate

novel ideas is not conscious, but unconscious” and refers to “reports given by artists, scientists and

mathematicians show this clearly enough” (p. 294).

With several references having already been made in this chapter and elsewhere to the

field of psychology and behavioral science, it is now appropriate to navigate the thesis narrative

toward recent relevant developments within these fields.

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5.8 Behavioral science and psycho-logical theory

My literature review concentrated on scholarly work on creativity from various psychological

perspectives including several important chapters of Sternberg’s (2005) Handbook of Creativity.

Sternberg, indicates that the goal of this collection of essays “is to provide the most

comprehensive, definitive, and authoritative single-volume review available in the field of creativity.

To this end, the book contains 22 chapters covering a wide range of issues and topics in this

field” (p. ix).

My review of an extensive range of behavioral research covers some of the scientific and

other perspectives on creativity already described in this thesis and provide a background for

others yet to be discussed. As my research agenda includes examination of selected conceptual

models and thinking tools developed by de Bono, including whether these are of value within the

context of design thinking and the process of design, consideration of critical perspectives on his

work are also important. One need not look any further than the introduction to the collection of

essays contained within Handbook of Creativity to discover Sternberg and Lubarts’ view

of de Bono.

Equally damaging, to the scientific study of creativity, in our view, has been the takeover of the

field, in the popular mind, by those who follow what might be referred to as a pragmatic approach.

Those taking this approach have been concerned primarily with developing creativity, secondarily

with understanding it, but almost not at all with testing the validity of their ideas about it. Perhaps

the foremost proponent of this approach is Edward de Bono, whose work on lateral thinking and

other aspects of creativity has had what appears to be considerable commercial success. De

Bono’s concern is not with theory, but with practice.

De Bono is not alone in this enterprise, Osborn (1953), based on his experiences in advertising

agencies, developed the technique of brainstorming to encourage people to solve problems

creatively by seeking many possible solutions in an atmosphere that is constructive rather than

critical and inhibitory. Gordon (1961) also attempted to stimulate creative thinking by a method

called synectics, which primarily involves analogies... (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 5).

Sternberg and Lubart (2005) then declare that from “our point of view as psychologists,

however, these approaches lack any basis in serious psycho-logical [sic] theory, as well as any

serious empirical attempts to validate them (p. 5). Interestingly, in due course, views of from other

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authors in Sternberg’s Handbook of Creativity offer quite different perspectives to that of Sternberg

and Lubarts’ (2005) above and which indirectly support many of the ideas and approaches

of de Bono’s.

So, where to begin in order to establish a relevant psychological perspective on creativity?

Mayer (2005) indicates “Creativity was at the heart of the cognitive psychology proposed by the

Gestalt psychologists in the 1930s and 1940s” which was motivated by interest in the nature of

insight (p. 459). Gruber and Wallace (2005) identify the increasing attention to problem-solving in

the post-World War II period (p. 108) (this was mentioned in chapter 2 in relation to the early

development of the Design Methods movement). In identifying historically significant distinctions

within the landscape of “psycho-logical” theory, Sternberg and Lubart (2005) indicate that “The

psycho-dynamic approach can be considered the first major twentieth-century theoretical approach

to the study of creativity” (pp. 5–6). This approach holds the idea “that creativity arises from the

tension between conscious reality and unconscious drives’ (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 6).

Sternberg and Lubart (2005) indicate that numerous researchers on creativity agree that

multiple factors must converge for creativity to occur and cites: Amabile (1983, 1996);

Csikszentmihalyi (1988); Gardner (1993); Gruber (1989); Lubart (1994); Mumford & Gustafson

(1988); Perkins (1981); Simonton (1988); Sternberg (1985a, 1985b, 1996); Sternberg & Lubart

(1991, 1995); Weisberg (1993); Woodman & Schoenfeldt (1989), (p. 10). In the following

paragraphs I review the most significant work in this field.

Amabile describes creativity as requiring a confluence of “intrinsic motivation, domain-

relevant knowledge and abilities, and creativity-relevant skills” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 10).

Amabile’s taxonomy of creativity-relevant skills consists of

a) a cognitive style that involves coping with complexities and breaking one’s mental set during

problem solving, b) knowledge of heuristics for generating novel ideas, such as trying a counter-

intuitive approach, c) a work style characterized by concentrated effort, an ability to set aside

problems, and high energy” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 10).

Gruber et al. (2005) proposed a “developmental evolving-systems model for

understanding creativity” where they theorise that “a person’s purpose, knowledge and affect” over

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time serve to “amplify deviations that an individual encounters” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 10).

that result in the generation of creative products.

Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1996) takes a different “‘systems approach’“, highlighting the

interaction of the “individual, domain, and the field” where “the individual draws upon information in

a domain and transforms or extends it via cognitive processes, personality traits, and motivation”

(Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 10).

Sternberg and Lubart (2005) developed a confluence model which they describe as an

investment theory; they assert that creativity requires a merging of six distinct but interrelated

human resources. These are: “intellectual abilities, knowledge, styles of thinking, personality,

motivation and environment” (p. 11). Within their construct of this theory, the two authors list three

important intellectual abilities:

a) the synthetic ability to see problems in new ways and to escape the bounds of conventional

thinking, (b) the analytic ability to recognize which one of one’s ideas are worth pursuing and which

are not, and (c) the practical-contextual ability to know how to persuade others of – to sell other

people on – the value of one’s idea” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 11).

In this model, the confluence of these three attributes is also important. Here Sternberg

and Lubart distinguish that the analytic ability used without the other two abilities results in powerful

critical thinking but not creative thinking. Whereas the synthetic ability without the use of the other

two results (b + c) in new ideas “that are not subjected to the scrutiny required, first, to evaluate

their promised and, second, to make them work” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 11). They add that

the practical-contextual ability without the use of the other two may result in “the transmittal of ideas

not because the ideas are good, but rather because they have been well and powerfully presented”

(p. 11). Sternberg and Lubart also assert that with regard to thinking styles, that ”a legislative style

is particularly important for creativity, that is, a preference for thinking in novel ways of one’s own

choosing” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, p. 11). Importantly, this is described as being different from

the ability to think creatively given an individual “may like to think along new lines, but not think

well, or vice versa” (p. 11). Finally, they proffer a view that being a major creative thinker is assisted

by whether an individual is able to “think globally as well as locally, distinguishing the forest from

the trees and thereby recognising which questions are important and which are not” (p. 11).

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Of particular interest to my research agenda are comments made by Sternberg and Lubart

(2005) above in relation to describing the importance of three intellectual abilities: “a synthetic

ability, an analytic ability, and a practical-contextual ability” (p. 11). This view reveals an interesting

conjunction with many of de Bono’s ideas that are to be comprehensively introduced in the next

chapter. Sternberg and Lubarts’ previous reference to de Bono (and others) having “concern not

with theory, but with practice”, seems to contradict their assertion of the need for a “practical-

contextual ability” (p.11). Sternberg and Lubart, although critical of pragmatic approaches to

enhancing creativity, concede that “techniques can work in the absence of psychological theory or

validation” and that “they may well be useful” (Sternberg & Lubart, 2005, pp. 5–6).

Acknowledging “that creative work takes place within a complex social manifold“, Gruber

and Wallace reference Csikszentmihalyi (1994) and his view that “creativity is not something that

takes place inside the head of a person but is the product of a far larger and more mysterious

process” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1994, cited in Gruber & Wallace, 2005, p. 110). Runco and Sakamoto

(2005) contend that given the complex nature of creativity, meaningful research must take into

account “multiple influences and diverse forms of expression” (p. 62) pointing out that this is

precisely what makes experimental research on creativity useful. They also put forward the

view that

Experimental methods utilise various controls to reduce complexity to a manageable level. They

deal with complexity by manipulating one or a set of independent variables, controlling (and thereby

minimising the effects of) confounding or nuisance variables and measuring changes in dependent

variables” (Runco & Sakamoto, 2005, p. 62).

Acknowledging that creativity and creative acts in themselves are difficult to analyse,

Runco and Sakamoto (2005) offer the view that “creative insights and ideas, like problems, may

themselves be ill-defined … In a word, they may begin as some sort of intuition” (p. 68). Similarly,

they refer to a study by Bowers et al. (1990, cited in Runco & Sakamoto, 2005) in which intuition

was defined as “‘a preliminary perception of coherence (pattern, meaning, structure) that is at first

not consciously represented, but which nevertheless guides thought and inquiry toward a hunch or

hypothesis about the nature of the coherence in question’ ” (p. 68).

Nickerson (2005) offers a generalised and broadly accepted view of creativity views

already expressed by other authors cited in this thesis same (pp. 417–418).

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Some investigators have noted that insights or ‘breakthroughs’—major advances toward an

objective—have often been reported to occur unexpectedly after a period of intense effort that

seems to lead nowhere, followed by a period of rest or engagement in unrelated activities.

There are many accounts in the literature of unusually creative people being inspired with

novel and productive ideas at unpredictable times, when not actively thinking about the

subject of the inspiration, but after having labored on it without much success for lengthy

periods (Ghiselin 1952). This phenomenon led to the idea, first put forward by Wallas

(1926/1945), that creative work typically involves a period of ‘incubation’, during which one

does not consciously think about the task but the mind continues to work on it below the level

of consciousness (Nickerson, 2005, p. 418).

Martindale (2005) confirmed Nickerson’s view, writing that “The formal similarity

between scientific and artistic inspiration is mirrored in the similarity in self-reports concerning

creative inspiration. For neither scientists nor artists do novel ideas arise from intellectual

deduction” (p. 137).

Martindale (2005) indicates that Kris (1952, cited in Martindale, 2005) has proposed that

creative individuals are better able to switch between primary process and secondary process

modes of thought. He describes primary process thought as being found “in normal states such as

dreaming and reverie, as well as in abnormal states such as psychosis and hypnosis” (p. 138).

Primary process thought in this context is “autistic [sic], free-associative, analogical, and

characterized by concrete images as opposed to abstract concepts. Secondary process cognition

is the abstract, logical, reality-oriented thought of waking consciousness” (Martindale, 2005, p.

138). According to Kris (cited in Martindale, 2005) “creative inspiration involves ‘regression’ to a

primary process state of consciousness. Because primary process cognition is associative, it

facilitates the discovery of new combinations of mental elements. On the other hand, creative

elaboration involves a return to a secondary process state” (p. 138).

Adding further description to the dichotomy between primary process and secondary

process thinking, Martindale (2005) cites Ghiselin (1952, cited in Martindale, 2005) who concluded

from a study of reports concerned with creative inspiration in both artistic and scientific endeavor

that “production by a process of purely conscious calculation seems to never occur” (p. 137).

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In focusing on the challenges involved in investigating insight, Ward et al. reference the

belief of Schooler and Melcher (1995, cited in Ward et al., 2005) that mainstream cognitive

psychology may have disregarded it because “anecdotal accounts of dramatic insights and non-

experimental observations of such phenomena tend to highlight the unconscious aspects of

insightful solutions” (p. 194). Their portrayal of the important and interrelated nature of conscious

and unconscious thought in human creativity also acknowledges the challenge faced in the

scientific study of creativity from a psychological and behavioral science perspective. They draw on

Koestler’s (1964) suggestion that

conscious thought, especially in the form of language, might actually inhibit the unconscious

forming of connections that underlie insightful leaps. If creative insights occur in sudden,

unpredictable ways and if conscious thought might inhibit insights, how could they ever be studied

under controlled laboratory conditions?” (Koestler, 1964, cited in Ward et al., p. 194).

Although in their view it is understandable “that experimental cognitive psychologists might

shy away from such notions, because on the surface they seem to imply a type of process that may

not yield to experimental observation”, they describe how Schooler and Melcher “went on to

describe an ingenious set of studies that shed light on the phenomenon” (Schooler & Melcher,

1995, cited in Ward et al., 2005, p. 194).

Another dimension of scientific study into creativity includes research into brain function

associated with the physiology and topology of the brain that may be associated directly with

creativity including the location of specific types of thinking within the brain. This research is not

central to my research agenda, but it is worth mentioning because continuing research in this area

may provide important insights into how the brain does what it does. However,

Some neuroscientists have held the view that creativity can be ascribed to differential

activity between the right and left hemispheres of the brain. Although Martindale cites several

examples of studies in this area, it is important to note several of those research studies are now

over thirty years old. Whether appropriate scientific measurement of hemispheric activity in the

brain confirms, or otherwise, these theories, this material is not considered central to the research

agenda. Nevertheless, this strand of information is referred to here as an example of areas of

research into brain function that has taken place and that research continuing in this area may

provide further new and important insights into how the brain does what it does. However, the

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barriers to serious scientific investigation of creativity are substantial, and include the interlacing of

the known and the unknown, the conscious and the unconscious, the explicit and the tacit. In

contrast, my central concern is investigating a contemporary view of what may enhance creativity

within the context of praxis, that is, from the point-of-view of doing rather than necessarily needing

to thoroughly understand how this occurs. In this way, the research study focuses on the notion of

what can be done whether the notion of how it is done can be fully explicated.

Nickerson (2005) offers a range of personal views about creativity extending from the

challenges to the scientific study of creativity on the one hand, and evidence that suggests that it

might be capable of being enhanced on the other (p. 392). Although Sternberg and Lubart are

critical of pragmatic approaches, Nickerson frames a positive view of exploring such approaches in

terms of actualising human potential (Nickerson, 2005, p. 392). In Nickerson’s view, the following

assumptions to do with creativity are plausible.

1) Both nature and nurture are important determinants of creative expression; 2) debate over which

has the greater effect is generally not very useful; 3) essentially all people of normal intelligence

have the potential to be creative to some degree; 4) few people realise their full potential in this

regard; 5) creative expression is generally desirable, because it usually contributes positively to the

quality of life on the individual who engages in it and often enriches the lives of others as well; 6)

the search for ways to enhance creativity – to help people develop more of their potential - is a

reasonable quest in the absence of compelling evidence that creativity can be enhanced; and 7)

the evidence, although somewhat tenuous, suggests that creativity can be enhanced; and 8) how

to enhance creativity is not well understood, but there are possibilities that merit exploration

(Nickerson, 2005, p. 392).

Csikszentmihalyi (1997) makes an associated yet differing point-of-view view in his belief

that “It is easier to enhance creativity by changing conditions in the environment than by trying to

make people think more creatively (p.1). In terms of biological and cultural evolution,

Csikszentmihalyi (1997) proffers a view that “Creativity is the cultural equivalent of the process of

genetic changes that result in biological evolution, where random variations take place in the

chemistry of our chromosomes, below the threshold of consciousness” (p. 7). He asserts “creativity

results from the interaction of a system composed of three elements: a culture that contains

symbolic rules, a person who brings novelty into the symbolic domain, and a field of experts who

recognise and validate the innovation” (p. 6). In this way, he argues that creativity is a process

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whereby a particular symbolic domain within the cultural context is changed. Csikszentmihalyi

(1997) claims “what holds true for the sciences, the arts, and for the economy also applies to

education” (p. 12). Csikszentmihalyi (1997) argues that school curricula for varying reasons, but

often to do with economic rationalism, choose to focus on the so-called “three Rs” (p. 12). He

suggests this would not be such a problem if the “three Rs” were taught in ways that encourage

originality and creative thinking, but adds “if the next generation is to face the future with zest and

self-confidence, we must educate them to be original as well as competent” (p. 12).

With regard to the proposition put forward in this thesis that the concept of creativity (and

therefore, design) is value laden, Csikszentmihalyi (1997) provides a useful elaboration of the

triumvirate nature of the Systems Model by identifying the importance and role of a pre-existing set

of relevant contextual factors and values (domain relevance) to assist with evaluating the

usefulness, or otherwise, of a new idea. He argues that for a novel proposition “To have any effect,

the idea must be couched in terms that are understandable to others, it must pass muster with

experts in the field, and finally it must be included in the cultural domain to which it belongs” (p. 27).

The question he asks about creativity is “not what it is but where is it” (p. 27). The response that

makes most sense to him is that creativity can be observed and located only in the interrelations of

a Systems Model comprising three main parts:

The first of these is the domain, which consists of symbolic rules and procedures. Mathematics is a

domain, or at a finer resolution algebra and number theory can be seen as domains. Domains are in

turn nested in what we usually call culture, or the symbolic knowledge shared by a particular society,

or by humanity as a whole.

The second component of creativity is the field, which includes all the individuals who act as

gatekeepers to the domain. It is their job to decide whether a new idea or product should be included

in the domain. It is this field that selects…what…deserve[s] to be recognized, preserved, and

remembered.

Finally, the third component of the creative system is the individual person. Creativity occurs when a

person, using the symbols of a given domain such as music, engineering, business, or mathematics

has a new idea or sees a new pattern, and when this novelty is selected by the appropriate field for

inclusion into the relevant domain (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, pp. 27–28).

Boden (2004) expresses a corresponding view related to the challenge associated with

seeking to create the novel by stating

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If, by some miracle, a composer had written atonal music in the sixteenth century, it would not have

been recognized as creative …To be appreciated as creative, a work of art or a scientific theory

has to be understood in a specific relation to what proceeded it (p. 74).

A capacity to analyse and exercise judgment based on knowledge that is domain relevant,

is endorsed by Boden (2004), who considers “Creativity, whether in children or adults, involves

evaluation. The new idea must be compared to some pre-existing mental structure, and judged to

be ‘interesting’ by the relevant criteria” (p. 76). Nickerson aligns with a view about usefulness and

states that while “Serendipity is widely acknowledged to have played a significant role in many

scientific discoveries; … it is also widely acknowledged that good fortune will be useful only to one

who knows enough to recognize it for what it is” (p. 409).

A part of my argument asserts that acquisition and application of domain-specific

knowledge in design (designing) is important in terms of evaluating contextually relevant production

and Nickerson offers support of this view in asserting that “the importance of domain-specific

knowledge as a determinant of creativity is generally underestimated, even though investigators

have given it considerable emphasis” (p. 409). Yet a question arises out of this: does design

thinking only concern itself with domain-specific knowledge? From a domain-general point-of-view,

creativity may be regarded as a general skill, trait or characteristic that can be applied to a wide

variety of situations including the idea that “creative capacity is an essential property of normative

human cognition” (Ward et al., 2005, p. 190). A domain-specific view of creativity affirms “different

kinds of creative ability are required in different domains, for example, the creativity required in

artistic production is different from that involved in scientific discovery” (Gruber & Wallace, Chapter

5; Policastro & Gardner, Chapter 11 cited in Mayer, 2005, p. 451).

An important theme pursued in many areas of the literature review and which was

introduced earlier in this thesis concerns different types of thinking. It is valuable here to

characterise the two particular thinking types that are central to this research project: generative

thinking and critical thinking.

Generative thinking may be characterised as being expansive, divergent or unconstrained

thinking and is often associated with exploration, idea generation, invention and innovation. It is

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daring, uninhibited, imaginative, fanciful, free-spirited, unpredictable, revolutionary, and often

regarded as lying at the heart of creativity itself.

Critical thinking is the antithesis of creative thinking and may be characterized as being

focused, disciplined, logical, linear and constrained thinking often associated with analysis and

judgment. It is down-to-earth, realistic, practical, dependable, conservative and staid.

These two types of thinking are contrasting yet complementary in nature. In due course

the thesis narrative draws these together and identifies them as being concomitant thinking

behaviors constituent in design thinking. Their co-existence within design thinking is central to the

design process and design thinking sequence proposed in chapter eight. In this thesis, I argue that

both are thinking behaviors that have biological, anthropological, ethnographic and cultural origin.

I contend that design thinking, as it may be defined and described at this point-in-time, brings

together both a generative type of thinking and an analytical type of thinking. In so doing,

I acknowledge that design thinking may be regarded as both a thinking ability innate to all human

beings to varying degrees while also being embedded in general and particular ways within the

professional practice of design.

With regard to generative and critical thinking, Nickerson (2005) writes that his preference

is for creativity and criticalness to be regarded as independent dimensions and “to believe that it is

reasonable to assume that the thinking of a given individual could be characterised by both

properties to a high degree” (p. 397). He adds there is an argument “that the ability to think well

requires both creative and critical capabilities, that neither type of thinking can be effective without

the other” (p. 398). Offering what appears to initially be a divergent perspective, Zhong, Dijksterhuis

and Galinsky (2008) assert that “Research has yielded weak empirical support for the idea that

creative solutions may be discovered through unconscious thought, despite anecdotes to this

effect” yet subsequently confirm that “The ability to associate remotely connected elements

underlies many discoveries and creations in fields such as physics, mathematics, and art” (p. 912).

From their latter view, they conceptualise a two-step process to support incubation in the context of

creativity and problem solving, in which the first stage provides for the associative activities of the

unconscious that creates the novel idea that is then transferred to consciousness (Zhong et al.,

2008, p. 913). Although claiming there is insufficient empirical evidence to support the hypothesis

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that creative solutions may be discovered through unconscious thought, their proposal is

(paradoxically) derived from the following assumptions.

One remarkable aspect of associative processes is that they do not seem to excel under conscious

guidance. In fact, conscious thought can subvert the search for creative solutions, and novel

connections or ideas often insinuate themselves into the conscious mind when conscious attention

is directed elsewhere (Ghiseliin, 1952; Mednick, 1962; Olton, 1979, cited in Zhong et al.,

2008, p. 912).

Indeed, creativity is often hampered by existing knowledge structures, salient exemplars, and

recently activated constructs. (Kray, Galinsky & Wong 2006; cited in Zhong et al., p. 912).

Recently, however, Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) found that unconscious thought (ie being

distracted while still holding a task-relevant goal) increased the generation of novel ideas more

than an equal duration of conscious attention to the task (Zhong et al., 2008, pp. 912–913).

The proposition Zhong, Dijksterhuis and Galinsky put forward about creativity—that

research has yielded week empirical support that creative solutions are a product of unconscious

thought—appears to controvert their starting premise to do with there being inadequate empirical

evidence to support their subsequent claim. How are we to determine whether empirical research

offers the only pathway to constructing theory? This territory seems problematic given the

paradoxes expressed by Sternberg and Lubart, and Zhong, Dijksterhuis and Galinsky. Whether

individual creativity is quantitative or qualitative, Mayer asserts that

The quantitative view is that creativity consists of one or more factors of which people may have

varying amounts … the qualitative view is that creativity always manifests itself in a unique way in

each creative person or each creative episode” (Mayer, 2005, p. 451).

Before finishing this section of chapter four, it is useful to present three key concepts from

Handbook of Creativity that contain important theoretical “psycho-logical’” perspectives on cognitive

function relevant to de Bono’s work reviewed in a later chapter. Thematic links to previously cited

material are apparent.

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Generative Cognitive Style

Policastro and Gardner (2005) outline a Generative Cognitive Style entailing three components:

“(a) imagination, (b) sense of domain relevance, and (c) intrapersonal intelligence” (p. 217). This

allows for “imagination to lead to originality”, domain relevance to lead to high-quality; and

intrapersonal intelligence to check on “illusory and/or emotional interferences in the process of

constructing a novel but appropriate representation” (p. 217). In this Generative Cognitive Style,

they regard imagination as “a form of playful analogical thinking that draws on previous

experiences, but combines them in unusual ways, generating new patterns of meaning” and adding

that substantial evidence “demonstrates that a playful approach to the task at hand increases the

likelihood of producing creative results” (p. 217).

Guilford’s Structure-of-Intellect Model

Sternberg and O’Hara (2005) describe Guilford’s Model’s notion of Divergent Production, as

involving “a broad search for information and the generation of numerous novel answers to

problems, as opposed to one single correct answer, which represents convergent production”

(p. 340). They point out that Guilford (1975, cited in Sternberg & O’Hara, 2005) “identified a number

of factors in creative problem solving … including (a) Sensitivity to Problems— the ability to

recognize problems, (b) Fluency—number of ideas, (c) Flexibility—shifts in approaches, and (d)

Originality— unusualness” (p. 340).

The Geneplore Model

Ward et al’s (2005) geneplore model is

a broadly descriptive, heuristic model rather than an explanatory theory of creativity. The central

proposal was that many creative activities can be described in terms of an initial generation of

candidate ideas or solutions followed by extensive exploration of those ideas (Ward et al.,

2005, p. 191).

This model includes the notion of initial ideas sometimes being described as pre-inventive

referring to the sense that

they are not complete plans for some new product, tested solutions to vexing problems, or accurate

answers to difficult puzzles. Rather they may be an untested proposal or even a mere germ of an

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idea, but they hold some promise of yielding outcomes bearing the crucial birthmarks of creativity:

originality and appropriateness. (Ward et al., 2005, p. 191)

This model assumes that, in most cases “one would alternate between generative and explorative

processes, refining the structures according to the demands or constraints of the particular task”

(Ward et al., 2005, p. 191).

5.9 Scientific studies and pragmatic approaches

Sternberg and Lubart (2005) have submitted a scornful view of “damage done to the scientific

study of creativity … by those who follow what might be referred to as a pragmatic approach”

pointing out “those taking this approach have been concerned primarily with developing creativity,

secondarily with understanding it, but almost not at all with testing the validity of their ideas about it”

(p. 5). Yet Nickerson indicates that within behavioral science “the belief that creativity can be

enhanced through training has many adherents” citing: Amabile (1983), Amabile &Tighe (1993);

Cropley (1992); Dominowski (1995); Finke, Ward & Smith (1992); Guildford & Tenopyr (1968);

Hennessy, Amabile & Martinage (1989); Stein (1974); Sternberg & Lupart (1996) (cited in

Nickerson, 2005, p. 400). However, Nickerson (2005) does acknowledge “a clear, unequivocal, and

incontestable answer to the question of how creativity can be enhanced is not to be found in the

psychological literature” (p. 407). Importantly, he also makes the claim “that what is known about

creativity suffices to make the approaches worth trying. The likelihood that they will work, if used

with good judgment, is high, in my view, and the chance they will do harm, is small (p. 420).

What can be extracted from these two differing perspectives? Perkins argues that

independent of any empirical evidence, the idea that creative thinking can be taught is supported

by numerous theoretical views (Perkins, 1990, cited in Nickerson, 2005, p. 401). Nickerson, writing

on whether creativity can be enhanced, appraises a range of processes and programs designed

with this intent in mind, citing: Brainstorming and Creative Problem Solving (Osborn 1953, 1963);

The Productive Thinking Program (Covington, Crutchfield, Davies and Olton 1974); The CoRT

Program (de Bono, 1973); Project Intelligence; and Synectics (Gordon, 1961; 1966; 1981), (cited in

Nickerson, 2005, p. 401). Nickerson (2005) indicates that evaluations of each indicate ranges of

improvement were achieved in each and of particular interest to the research agenda is The CoRT

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Program that was developed by Edward de Bono. A review of several evaluation studies of de

Bono’s CoRT Program is presented in the next chapter; however, as I have already already

introduced the idea of pragmatic approaches and outlined differing views held about them, some

extracts of Nickerson’s appraisal of this program follow.

The CoRT program … is composed of six units each of which contains several lessons ... One of

the six units (CoRT 4) is focused explicitly on creativity and offers suggestions of strategies that

may be used to help one generate ideas that might not normally be brought to mind.

An adaptation of the CoRT program was tested in Venezuela in the early 1980s as one of several

experimental educational innovations undertaken under the auspices of the Venezuelan

government …Evaluation data showed that students who received CoRT training for a year did

better than controls, who did not receive the training, in generating pertinent ideas during problem

solving; those who received the training for three years also showed gains as judged by the

abstractness and elaborateness of the ideas they generated (de Sanchez & Astorga, 1983),

(cited in Nickerson, 2005, p. 403).

These evaluations serve to support the validity of de Bono’s pragmatic approaches that

are embedded within the CoRT program. In the next chapter, which deals with the work of Edward

de Bono, the results of 6 of 27 evaluations of educational and other programs incorporating de

Bono’s conceptual models and thinking tools are described. It will be apparent from the content of

these studies that valuable data has been collected by Dingli (2001) to assess the value of many of

de Bono’s ideas.

5.10 Summary In this chapter I focused on biological, psychological and cultural dimensions of creativity, cognition

and perception. It combines a diverse range of material from a variety of sources. The scope of this

material is considered critical to establishing a significant frame of reference from which to explore

my research question. This included drawing on recent developments in psychology and cognitive

science, including those connected with the management of thinking (metacognition), and

developments in computer science within the area of artificial intelligence and the creation of

expert systems.

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The notion of creativity was framed through a range of historical, transcultural and

contemporary perspectives selected from literature of history, philosophy, science, art, behavioral

psychology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and design research. Included were pre-

Christian perspectives involving creativity and the concept of genius; an association with madness

and frenzy and the early western conception of creativity based on the biblical story of creation in

Genesis. To this were added several Eastern perspectives on creativity, while also firming on a

Western conception of creativity in which multiple definitions endorsed the idea that it involves the

creation of an original and useful product. This was done to not only historicise creativity but to

reveal some relevant cultural, ethnographic and anthropological perspectives.

By way on contrast, several important strands of thinking were introduced into the

narrative from the worlds of science, cognitive science, computational science and artificial

intelligence. I outlined Boden’s argument against the long held romantic view that creativity was an

intuitive talent that cannot be acquired or taught, and Bohm’s assertion of the impossibility of

defining creativity in words, despite writing extensively on the subject. In terms of the insight

process, Bohm indicated a belief in the possibility of there being a deeper perception or intelligence

which can see into what initially appears as incoherence. Poincaré contributed to the idea of the

need to generate new combinations of associative elements previously and erroneously held to be

un-related. I noted that Koestler observed that conscious thought may actually inhibit the creative

process, and that he emphasised the necessity for creative thinking to break out of the boundaries

set by knowledge. Boden’s work confirms the role of different thinking styles and contrasts thinking

styles that engage with chance, randomness and unpredictability with those that are conscious,

rational and analytical and suggested the origin of creativity is the unconscious mind. In defining

creativity as an ability to come up with ideas or artifacts that are new, surprising and valuable,

Boden also confirmed a view central to this thesis, that the concept of creativity is value-laden.

Although not attempting a dedicated analysis of psychological research into creativity, I

discussed a range of views that were introduced from several behavioral scientists and

psychologists. What this revealed was the difficulties facing serious scientific investigation of the

various correlation matrices relevant to studies on creativity. Nickerson submitted that while

agreement about whether creativity can be enhanced cannot to be found in the psychological

literature, he affirmed many behavioral scientists nonetheless believe it can be enhanced through

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training. Sternberg and Lubart, however, submitted a scornful view of those who follow a pragmatic

approach as compared to a scientific one.

The range of perspectives on creativity, cognition and perception in this chapter provides

useful background to my examination of how the brain functions, as it gives rise to mind. The next

chapter proposes a way of expanding the frame of reference for design thinking by incorporating

several biological and cultural perspectives that underpin much of the work of Edward de Bono.

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Chapter 6 Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference 6.1 Introduction I constructed this chapter to support the proposing of an expanded way of conceiving of design

thinking—one that identifies two particular types of thinking (generative thinking and analytical- and

judgment-oriented thinking) embedded with the process of design, and one which strategically

engages with specific biological and cultural perspectives of these types of thinking behaviors. In

this chapter I propose that a biologically-based model for the way the brain functions combined with

cultural perspectives related to our thinking inheritance, provides for valuable information to enter

the discourse on design thinking and expand its frame of reference.

I also propose that many of de Bono’s key concepts and ideas have distinct relevance,

value and potential application within a broad definition of design, and more specifically, within the

context of design thinking in the professional practice of design. In this chapter I introduce several

of de Bono’s most significant ideas related to creativity, including his model for the way in which the

brain and its associated thinking behaviors operate. I also explore the mathematical, biological and

cultural factors that enabled de Bono’s development of specific thinking tools.

6.2 Design thinking: A biologically and culturally informed approach The origins of a contemporary framing of what is now understood to be design thinking were

introduced into the thesis narrative in Chapter 2 – Conceptualising design and its precursory

landscape. The work of Archer, Arnheim (1969), Bamford (2002), Buchanan (1992), Cross (1984,

1991,1999, 2007), de Bono (1990, 1996), Findeli (2001), Friedman (2000), Gordon (1992), Jones

(1981), Lawson (1992), Rowe (1987), Rittel and Webber (1973), Schön (1983), and Simon (1988),

was cited in this regard. Though many of these contributions to the discourse on design thinking

were made in the 1970s and 1980s, it was not until 1991 that the first academic research

symposium took place in The Netherlands. Today, over 20 years further on, considerable

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interest in understanding design thinking and design cognition exists within both academic and

business circles.

Design thinking is often referred to as a particular type of creative thinking-in-action that is

solution-based or solution-focused; it commences with a goal in mind or what is meant to be

achieved rather than starting with a specific problem. This approach enables a focus on the present

and the future concurrently as parameters of the problem and possible resolutions are explored. It

is characterised, in a general sense, as a style of thinking that combines empathy for the context of

a problem, creativity in generating insights and possible solutions, and rationality to analyse and fit

solutions to the context of a problem.

An early example of a design thinking process was proposed by Simon (1969) and

involved seven stages: define, research, ideate, prototype, choose, implement, and learn. It is a

model that still has currency and involves engagement with both divergent thinking and convergent

thinking. Divergent thinking typically occurs in a spontaneous and free-flowing manner, producing

unexpected connections and generating a range of ideas. Conversely, convergent thinking

engages with a rationalizing approach where logic, accuracy and the need to come up with a single

answer to a problem are the focus. These two types of thinking are analogous to generative

thinking and analytical and judgment-oriented thinking, terms introduced to the thesis narrative

in chapter 5.

Simon’s model incorporates a staged process, and in this research I enquired into the

thinking behavior undertaken in those stages. My thesis is concerned with the nature of design

thinking from a cognitive standpoint informed by biological and cultural perspectives. It proposes

that a biologically-based model for the way the brain functions provides for important and valuable

information to enter the discourse. Knowledge of how the brain functions and its consequential

behavior have lead to specific approaches being undertaken to enhance creativity. These include

the development of thinking tools designed to enhance thinking behavior, especially creative

thinking behavior, and which also compensate for some of the brain’s deficiencies. Edward de

Bono is one of the most significant thinkers in this field, and in this chapter I introduce many of his

ideas into the narrative.

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Two particular types of thinking have already been introduced. Briefly, generative thinking

is expansive, divergent or unconstrained thinking often associated with exploration, idea

generation, invention and innovation. Critical thinking is described as being focused, disciplined,

logical, linear and constrained thinking often associated with analysis and judgment. Characterised

as contrasting yet complementary in nature, I propose that these two types of thinking are

constituent in design thinking. This proposition is also central to the design process and design

thinking sequence visualised in chapter seven, and which in many ways has its biological and

cultural origins in this and previous chapters.

Several themes introduced in the previous chapter of this thesis will be drawn together

during the process of presenting a biologically-based model for the way the brain functions,

augmented by several cultural dimensions to do with our thinking inheritance (acculturation), also

proposed by de Bono. While acknowledging the populist and sometimes controversial nature of

some of de Bono’s ideas, an aim of this research project is to ask: do they, given their focus on

enhancing creativity specifically and thinking behavior in general, have value in the process

of design?

This chapter includes description of de Bono’s academic and professional background,

which contributed significantly to the formation of many of his ideas and upon which the

development of his thinking tools is predicated. It also includes description of his key concepts,

ideas and thinking tools that I selected for incorporation into the design process and design thinking

sequence proposed in a later chapter.

6.3 Edward de Bono: Medicine, mathematics and The Mechanism of Mind

De Bono, born in Malta in 1933, was an intellectual prodigy. Commencing university in 1948 at the

age of 15, he qualified in medicine at the University of Malta. Although awarded a Rhodes

scholarship in 1953, it was not until 1955 that he took up the scholarship and enrolled at Oxford,

gaining an honours degree in psychology and physiology (Dudgeon, 2001, p. 8). He holds five

(non-honorary) degrees including his degree in medicine from the University of Malta, a DPhil

(Oxford) and a PhD (Cambridge) in medicine, and has held university appointments at Oxford,

Cambridge, Harvard and London University.

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His DPhil thesis, The Control of Blood Pressure in Hypertension, involved discovering the

dynamics of the circulatory system in chronic experimental hypertension (Dudgeon, 2001). Some of

his research at Cambridge laid the foundation for his interest in self-organising systems, which

became central to developing his model for the mechanism of mind (Dudgeon, 2001, p. 57). Other

medical research on the circulatory system challenged the conventional approaches and logic he

had been using. A growing awareness that conventional approaches and logic could and should be

challenged led to his longstanding search for “an underlying construct consistent with his ideas

about creative thinking that would explain the character and rules that governed the neural network

system” (Dudgeon, 2001, p. 57).

It is appropriate to indicate here that the term mind used in this thesis, denotes the sense

of it being an aspect of intellect and consciousness experienced as combinations of thought,

perception, memory, reason, emotion, will and imagination, including all unconscious

cognitive processes.

De Bono (1996), when outlining his view of the way the brain becomes mind in his book

The Mechanism of Mind, noted that the ideas he first put forward in 1969 were eventually accepted

and elaborated upon by others. Murray Gell-Mann, a nobel laureate in theoretical physics,

confirmed that de Bono’s proposal of certain ideas (chaos theory, non-linear and self-organising

systems) in 1969 occurred “eight years before mathematicians got around to dealing with them”

(de Bono 1996, p. 10). In The Mechanism of Mind, de Bono showed that creativity was a necessary

behavior in a self-organising system and that asymmetric patterns formed by the nerve networks in

the brain were the basis of perception. In an interview between de Bono and the author of this

thesis during 2009, he explained that Murray Gell-Mann, one of the founders of the Santa Fe

Institute for research into complex adaptive systems (complexity theory), set up two teams of

computer scientists at the Santa Fe Institute to test his model of how the brain functions and each

team, independently, concluded that the model worked.

In a later book of de Bono’s, I am Right – You Are Wrong, he writes about the confluence of

his medical background and his interest in thinking, and states

I am often asked to explain the connection between my background in medicine and my work in the

field of thinking. At first these seem to be two very different fields. Yet the connection is very direct,

and I probably would not have been able to develop my ideas without this background in medicine.

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As a biological system the human brain handles information in a way that is quite different from

traditional information systems. In traditional information systems we store information symbolically

and then operate on these symbols according to certain rules (logic, mathematics, grammar etc).

Traditional computers store information in memory then act upon it with the processor. In biological

systems the information and the receiving surface act together as a self-organizing system – which

means they produce patterns and arrangements on their own. In biology information triggers the

next stable state of the system.

When I wrote the book The Mechanism of the Mind [1969] about twenty years ago, many of the

ideas seemed crazy to many people. Today these ideas are mainstream for all those working on

self-organising systems. Even mathematics has begun to enter in consideration of non-linear

systems. There is a field of mathematics dealing with self-organising systems.

So the connection between medicine and thinking is quite direct. Indeed it is difficult to see how

anyone working in the field of thinking in the future can do so without an understanding of the

underlying biological processes (de Bono, 1991, p. xx).

As a Rhodes scholar I had studied psychology at Oxford and this gave me an interest in thinking.

In the course of medical research I was using computers extensively to carry out Fourier analysis*

of blood pressure waves in order to estimate the impedance in the pulmonary artery. I became

interested in the sort of thinking that computers could not do. This was creative and perceptual

thinking. Continuing my medical research at Harvard, I was working on the complicated way in

which the body regulated blood pressure and the general integration of systems in the human

body. This led to an interest in self-organising systems. The three strands (thinking, perceptual

thinking, self-organising systems) came together and I wrote a manuscript in which I referred to

‘the other sort of thinking’ meaning the thinking that was not linear, sequential, and logical.

That was in 1967. ‘Lateral Thinking’ now has an official entry in the Oxford English Dictionary which

is the arbiter of the English language. The entry in the Concise Oxford Dictionary reads: ‘seeking to

solve problems by unorthodox or apparently illogical methods’. The key word is ‘apparently’. The

methods may seem ‘illogical’ in terms of normal logic but are derived from the logic of patterning

systems where, for example, provocation is necessary (de Bono, 1996, p. 52).

______________________________

*Explanatory note: In mathematics, Fourier analysis (named after the French mathematician and physicist

Jean Fourier) is a subject area that involves attempting to understand functions (or other objects) by breaking

them into basic pieces that are easier to understand.

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6.4 The brain as a self-organising pattern recognition system Systems, de Bono maintains, “do not have to be complicated or unintelligible. A system is just an

arrangement of circumstances that makes things happen in a certain way” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 10)

and asserts “Of its own accord the brain does not seek to understand and explain, but to create

explanations—and that is a very different thing” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 7). In The Mechanism of Mind,

he begins by describing the brain in terms of the mechanical behavior of mechanical units. He

describes the organisation of the brain starting with “simple units until the mechanism of mind is

assembled” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 9) indicating the steps are small and that no special knowledge or

mathematical understanding is assumed. This provides the basis for his subsequent explanation of

the behavior of the system, including why it can only work in particular ways. His use of analogy

(described by Boden and others previously as an important creative thinking behavior) in the

following quotation to describe such a system is significant in that it characterises an approach he

often employs in seeking to deconstruct seemingly complex conceptual systems into more

accessible concepts. He describes the nature of a model as “a method of transferring some

relationship or process from its actual setting to a setting where it is more conveniently studied”

(de Bono, 1990c, p. 33).

At the end of this first half [of the book] the mechanism may be compared to a large sheet of paper

with writing on it. The paper is in the dark and across its surface moves a small pool of light as from

a flashlight. The words illuminated by the light are read out. The words represent information stored

in the brain. The first half of the book deals with how the writing comes to write itself on the page;

how it is not put there by some outside intelligence but how it comes to arrange itself to give sense

and significance. How the pool of light comes to move across the paper of its own accord without

there being any outside source of light or any hand to guide it. Why the light moves in one direction

and not in another. How the words are not read but read themselves. Such things are the basic

mechanics of consciousness, of free will, of memory and of thinking. In this first half is shown how

the brain is a good computer because it has a bad memory. It is this bad memory that provides the

computing function.

The second half of the book shoes how the mechanism in the first half actually works in practice.

The second half is concerned with why the mechanism can only work in certain ways, with the

advantages and disadvantages of these ways. The inescapable limitations of thinking are

examined. The four basic types of thinking are described: natural, logical, mathematical and lateral.

In part these are natural and in part they are the result of artificial devices that have been

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developed to improve the natural behavior of the mind. The necessity for a new artificial device and

the function of this new device are outlined (de Bono, 1990c, p. 10).

De Bono’s biologically-based model of the brain and the way in which this gives rise to particular

thinking behaviors leads him to assert the need for new artificial devices to compensate for some of

the brain’s limitations.

The whole of our thinking, the whole of our language, the whole of our education, perhaps the

whole of our Western culture, is concerned with the formation and communication of ideas. This is

the way the brain works. This is the way the brain needs to work to make life possible. This is the

way we encourage the brain to work. But what about the process of changing concepts as opposed

to establishing them? This is an unnatural process for which we have no tools and no training. Until

today ideas have always lived longer than people, but now people live longer than ideas. As a

result there is a great need for mental tools that make possible the re-forming of ideas (de Bono

1990c, p. 8).

The role of memory and recognition are important concepts to grasp in relation to many of

his ideas, particularly when he describes limitations or deficiencies in the natural behavior of the

brain. In a novel yet informative way, de Bono (1990c) describes memory as being “what is left

behind when something happens and doesn’t completely unhappen” (p. 41) pointing out that

“Memories constitute their own consciousness and their own perception” (p. 47). Interestingly, he

adds “if an event causes a particular pattern to form on a memory-surface then reactivation of the

same pattern will re-create the event as far as the memory-surface is concerned” (de Bono, 1990c,

p. 47). De Bono often uses the term ‘memory-surface’ in relation to describing the way in which the

brain gives rise to mind. The nature of memories as patterns and the brain’s ability to store and

recognise them are central to many of the ideas he has written about, particularly to do with his

views on creativity and the importance of lateral thinking.

Writing in accord with some of de Bono’s views nearly 30 years after de Bono’s The Mechanism of

Mind (1969), the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins describes “how the brain constructs our

perceptions of the external world according to what it is prepared to see” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 22). In

earlier writings, Dawkins expressed the view that our senses ‘”provide us with an incomplete view

of external reality” and that the brain constructs “a kind of virtual reality” (p. 22) that is constantly

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being updated. Whenever we see something, the brain is making use of an existing model already

present in the brain, a model “constrained by information fed in by the outside world” (p. 22).

De Bono (in his foreword to McAlhone & Stuart, 1998) claims that creativity arises as a

‘defect’ of the way the brain functions as a self-organising pattern recognition system (Foreword).

This he describes in the following manner:

Thank goodness the brain is designed to be uncreative. With eleven items of clothing to put on

there would be 39,916,800 different ways of getting dressed. The brain is designed to make

patterns, to use them and to stick to them. That is why we can get dressed, eat breakfast, cross the

road and do more or less useful work when we get to the office. Creativity, concept formation and

all the wonderful aspects of the brain are nothing to do with these established patterns: they arise

from the brain’s defect as an information system. (De Bon, McAlhone & Stuart, 1998)

Continuing with his views on the defects inherent in the self-organising pattern recognition

system operating within the brain and returning to his concept of the memory-surface,

de Bono states:

The two ways in which a bad memory-surface can be bad are distortion and incompleteness.

Distortion means that things are shoved around, emphasis is changed, relationships may be

altered. Incompleteness means that some things are just left out. Paradoxically, this is a

tremendously important deficiency, for when some things are left out there must be some things

which are left in. This implies a selecting process. And a selecting process is the most powerful of

all information-handling tools. It is quite likely that the great efficiency of the brain is not due to its

being a brilliant computer. The efficiency of the brain is probably due to its being a bad memory-

surface. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 56)

Although de Bono often refers to limitations associated with the nature of the brain’s pattern-

recognition capability, it is important to appreciate that in articulating the view that the brain is not

designed to be creative he also argues that this is actually one of its very important attributes.

The excellence of the human brain is that it is designed to form patterns from the world around

us and then to stick to those patterns. That is how perception works and life would be totally

impossible if the brain were to work differently. The purpose of the brain is to enable us to survive

and to cope. (de Bono, 1996, p. 36)

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In one of his summaries of the behavior of the system, he indicates “thinking cannot of

itself establish new pathways” and that “with time the units tend to get larger and less flexible”

(de Bono, 1990c, p. 159). In terms of inputs “the entry point into a pathway may make a great

difference to the direction of the flow” and “the slightest difference is sufficient for selection of a new

pathway” (p. 159). He describes the existence of this dividing and polarising effect as being where

“words are drains which channel away in fixed patterns the meaning of any new situation to which

they are applied” (p. 195). He points out “the new situation dissolves into ready-made units or

words where … Nothing is left of it except flow through the well-worn word channels” (p. 194).

The way the information is built up on the memory-surface into established patterns is very much

affected by the sequence in which the pieces of information arrive (de Bono 1990c, p. 208).

Breaking things down into units, establishing these units and then putting them together again in

different combinations is what the special memory-surface does. The ability to do these things

makes the memory-surface a powerful computing system. The combining property is common to

most computing systems, but the unusual feature is the extracting and selecting property which

allows the memory-surface to organize its own input. The separating behavior of the memory-

surface leads to discrimination and selection. The combining behavior of the memory-surface

leads to association, learning and creation. All this behavior is really due to the self-organisation

of information in the ideal surroundings offered by the special memory-surface (de Bono,

1990c, p. 120).

His description of the conjunction between the special memory-surface operating in the

brain and the role of language includes the following portrayal.

Words are mini-myths. They are for the convenience of the memory-surface in organising the

outside world in a more sensible manner than is apparent.

Words are not only useful for making attention-fragments into things on their own, but also for

creating things out of vague assemblies of patterns (de Bono, 1990c, pp. 194–195).

Words, he also argues, serve another twofold purpose in being “not only useful for making

attention-fragments into things on their own, but also for creating things out of vague assemblies of

other patterns” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 195). Importantly, the neural strength of labels as they arise as

a consequence of the creation of patterns in the brain can “give rise to sharp categories. Anything

that can sit under a label sits right under the centre of it. Anything else is shut out. Labels do not

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have to be words; signs or signals will do as well” (p. 199). The notion of categories, or labels, is

considered in greater detail later in this chapter when de Bono’s views regarding the influence of

classical Greek thinking, in particular the influence of Aristotelian logic, are described. Interestingly,

in proposing the concept of lateral thinking he states it as being “a deliberate implied division to

show up the deficiencies of vertical thinking. The idea is to rescue thinking from the strict

polarisation of sequential logic that has dominated it” (p. 201).

Significant in his writings is a recurring reference to humour as a demonstration of the

brain’s remarkable ability to shift perception very quickly. The idea that adopting a playful

disposition can enhance the process of generating creative outputs was already put forward in the

last chapter. In proclaiming that “Humour is by far the most significant behavior of the human mind

in I am Right—You are Wrong (1991a), de Bono asks:

If humour is so significant, why has it been neglected by traditional philosophers, psychologists and

information scientists? Humour tells us more about how the brain works as mind, than does any

other behavior of the mind – including reason. (de Bono, 1991a, p. 1)

Pointing out that with humour “there is a sudden switch from one way of looking at things to

another … which is exactly similar to the insight process” he maintains “Neither humour nor insight

could occur in a system that proceeded in a linear fashion as does a computer” (de Bono, 1990c,

p. 177). He adds that within a linear system “the best possible state would always be the current

one, and there would be no question of suddenly snapping over to an insight solution” (p. 177).

This he describes below in terms of the special memory-surface of the brain.

Thinking is the flow of activity from area to area on the special memory-surface. The flow is entirely

passive and follows the contours of the surface. There is no question of an outside agency directing

where it should go. The sequence of activated areas constitutes the flow of thought… Although the

flow is entirely passive, certain artificial organising patterns which affect the direction of the flow can

become established on the surface … Four different types of thinking can be recognised. The basic

nature of all of these is still the passive flow of activity over the memory-surface, but in each case

the artificial organising patterns are different. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 220)

Broadly, de Bono describes his model (specifically, a system) of the way the brain

functions as having the following characteristics:

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1 A memory system which records things.

2 An iterative memory system which means that changes are cumulative.

3 A self-organising system which enables it to produce its own patterns.

4 A self-maximising system which gives it selection.

5 A two-stage memory system which gives it a combining function.

6 An internal bias which gives it individuality and adaptive behavior (p. 271).

Additionally, identifying the key points about the thinking behavior of the system, as the

brain gives rise to mind, he asserts that:

1 Thinking cannot of itself establish new pathways.

2 With time the units tend to get larger and less flexible.

3 The entry point into a pathway may make a great difference to the direction of the flow.

4 The slightest difference is sufficient for selection of a pathway (de Bono, 1990c, p. 159).

While acknowledging his model is analogical, at the time of writing The Mechanism of

Mind in 1969, knowledge about the brain broadly supported his hypothesis.

Throughout [The Mechanism of the Mind] there has been an obvious assumption that this type of

system may be similar to the one operating in the human brain. At times this assumption may have

progressed too far from possibility towards certainty for the comfort of many readers. This was a

matter of convenience, since it is extremely awkward to write continuously in tentative terms. At this

point it may be repeated that what has been described is a type of system. Whether in broad terms

this is the one operating in the brain remains to be proved. What is known about the brain does

support in broad terms a system of this sort. The details may be very different (deBono

1990c, p. 266).

6.5 Natural, logical, mathematical and lateral thinking De Bono (1996) distinguishes four different thinking types: natural thinking, logical thinking,

mathematical thinking and lateral thinking, and describes them below relative to his proposed self-

organising pattern recognition system within the brain.

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Natural thinking he describes as being a “raw, simple or even primitive thinking … where

the basic contours of the surface determine which way the flow goes, and there are no added

artificial patterns to interfere with this flow”, in this way “Flow is determined by the natural behavior

of the surface and as a result it has certain definite characteristics” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 220). Given

no hesitation arises, alternatives are not considered. As a rule, natural thinking proceeds from

“image to image as directed by emphasis or bias” where “Classifications, names and labels mean

more than actual statistical probabilities” (p. 222) and so natural thinking tends to move from one

well-used pattern (or cliché) to another as these have become established as units. “Once the flow

of thought has reached such a unit then it will follow the cliché pattern, completely ignoring

variations, modifying factors or side-turnings” (p. 222).

Natural thinking makes use of absolutes and extremes, since these patterns become more easily

established than intermediate ones. Abstraction is rare in natural thinking because the momentum

of established cliché patterns makes unlikely the use of only part of them. Natural thinking tends to

use concrete imagery and personal experience rather than patterns that are second-hand and

remote. With natural thinking the established cliché patterns are the important thing and the

connecting links trivial. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 222)

While this is described as natural behavior for the memory-surface where flow is

immediate, direct and basically adequate, de Bono contends it is also liable to very considerable

error. While natural thinking is very fluent, it is this fluency that is the source of errors, “for fluency

means following emphasis of patterns however that emphasis might have come about” (de Bono,

1990c, p. 224).

Logical thinking is a deliberate attempt to control the excesses of natural thinking through

selectively blocking the flow of natural pathways and de Bono, offering one of his own very distinct

perspectives, asserts that “logic is the management of NO” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 224).

Characterising the mechanism by which this takes place he explains natural thinking “tends to

follow emphasised pathways, but when these pathways are blocked with a NO then the flow has to

pursue other paths.” (p. 224). His view is that most logical processes can be reduced to identity

and non-identity, if there is

a sensitive mechanism for recognising non-identity then nothing needs to be done about

discovering identity, as it will sort itself out. Logical thinking uses the flow of natural thinking but

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controls it by means of a sensitive mechanism for recognising and labeling identity. (de Bono,

1990c, p. 224)

Logical thinking can be described as a trimming and refining activity related to the flow of

natural thinking which “allows seldom-used patterns to be used … But the actual patterns used are

used in their established way” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 228). Importantly, although de Bono (1990c)

makes it clear that logical thinking is not able to lead “to that alteration of a sequence that leads to

insight rearrangement of information” (p. 228), he contends “In spite of these limitations, logical

thinking is obviously a tremendous improvement on natural thinking and is immensely effective” (de

Bono 1990c, p. 229). Indicating that the units used by logical thinking and natural thinking are the

same, he adds the difference between the two types is contrasted in the way that “Logical thinking

may find out the best way of putting A, B and C together but it will not discover that A, B and C are

inappropriate units anyway” (p. 229).

Mathematical thinking embodies the notion that

Mathematics is a game played with symbols and rules … a special universe in which things happen

according to these rules…anything enters this universe by being translated into a symbol. The

symbol is processed according to the rules of the universe and then translated back at the end.

(de Bono, 1990c, p. 230)

De Bono (1990c) explains that in mathematics “the rules and techniques” are worked out in

advance so unlike what happens on the special memory-surface “the processing is not carried out

by information itself but arranged before the information ever arrives” (p. 230–231). This has the

effect of not letting the information cut its own channels as these are created beforehand and the

information follows them.

The pre-set channels are sometimes called algorithms. An algorithm is any fixed pattern which is

not derived from presented information but serves to control and sort out that information.

Algorithms may be mathematical techniques, but they may also be word patterns or any other type

of pre-set pattern. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 231).

The preliminary stage prior to mathematical thinking taking place is where the information has to be

sorted out and then translated into symbols. This preliminary stage “which depends on the ordinary

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information-processing of the special memory-surface, involves the choice of units and the choice

of a particular way of looking at things” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 233).

In the universe of mathematics, information behaves according to the rules of the special memory-

surface. In this way most of the faults and limitations of the information-processing on the special

memory-surface can be avoided. The result of this is an immensely effective method of information-

processing that is responsible for technological progress Even so, there are still limitations. (de

Bono 1990c, p. 233)

Interestingly, de Bono (1990c) observes “The above limitations of mathematical thinking,

and in particular the difficulty of defining the initial units, may explain why it has not proved so

useful in its application to people as it has to things” (p. 235).

Lateral Thinking, de Bono explains, counteracts “both the errors and the limitations of the

special memory-surface. The errors may lead to incorrect use of information. The limitations may

prevent the best use of information that is already available” (de Bono 1990c, p. 235). While natural

thinking possesses all the errors of the special memory-surface, logical thinking deals with avoiding

the errors of natural thinking but its limitation is that it is unable to generate new ideas which would

maximise the use of existing information (de Bono 1990c). The limitation of mathematical

thinking is that

it is only a second-stage system which is used to make the most of what has been chosen by the

memory-surface in the first stage. None of these types of thinking can get completely beyond the

limitations of the memory surface, though two of them can reduce the errors by a considerable

extent (de Bono, 1990c, p. 236).

De Bono’s (1990c) conception of lateral thinking is it being “more concerned with making

the best possible use of the information that is already available on the surface than with new

information” and in so doing is able to “compensate for the deficiencies of the special memory-

surface as an information processing device” (p. 237). Lateral thinking has to do with rearranging

available information so that it is snapped out of the established pattern and forms a new and

better pattern (see figure 6.1).

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Figure 6.1 De Bono’s diagrammatic representation of Lateral Thinking

de Bono, 1993, p. 195.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Within this context the pathway between A and B is dominated by the strength of the pre-

existing patterns on the memory-surface. These tend to overshadow the amplitude of alternatives

and inhibit shifts in perception and thinking direction. Lateral thinking counteracts this effect (de

Bono, 1993). This rearrangement has the same effect as insight. The established patterns that

determine the flow of thought can be changed by lateral thinking, as can the established patterns

that control how things are perceived.

Having argued the existence of four thinking types, de Bono categorises only one as being

generative—lateral thinking. With other types of thinking “you know what you are looking for, with

lateral thinking you may not know what you are looking for until after you have found it” (de Bono,,

1990c, p. 238). He provides a further distinction describing that with “vertical thinking [building

one’s thinking from where one is already located] … one moves only if there is a direction in which

to move. With lateral thinking one moves in order to generate a direction” (p. 238). The generative

effect of lateral thinking is exerted twofold: in counteracting, restraining or delaying the neural

strength of the selective processes of the memory-surface itself, and also counteracting the

selective processes that have been artificially developed; and through “bringing about deliberate

arrangements and juxtapositions of information that might otherwise have never occurred. The aim

of both these processes is to allow information to arrange itself in new and better patterns, as

A B


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happens in insight” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 238). Lateral thinking and the use of PO (Provocative

Orientation) counteract this effect (see, PO – A concept for a provocative operation, in the next

section of this chapter).

The nature of the self-maximising system of the special memory-surface is to create

“a coherent pattern out of separate points” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 240). With lateral thinking, as many

alternatives as possible are generated; ”One disregards the NO reaction since so often it is applied

prematurely” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 240).

Lateral thinking serves to avoid the selecting processes of natural thinking and logical thinking in

order to find out whether a useful arrangement has been excluded by such selection processes.

Thus no attention is paid to either the negative blocking of logical thinking or the dominant thinking

of natural thinking selection. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 241)

Embodied in de Bono’s view of logical thinking is the idea that each step must be justified.

This is enacted by any step being blocked with a negative if it is not justifiable. In lateral thinking

“the steps do not have to be justified” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 241). “Although lateral thinking can often

be recognised only after it has bought something about, this does not mean that it is impossible to

use it deliberately” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 243). An example is his notion of random input, which is

one of the strategies developed by de Bono for lateral thinking. In a self-maximising system such

as the brain, “the patterns that evolve cannot be easily changed from within the system. A random

input from outside can serve to disrupt the old pattern and allow it to reform in a new way”

(de Bono, 1990c, p. 243).

A frame of reference is a context provided by the current arrangement of information. It is the

direction of development implied by this arrangement. One cannot break out of this frame of

reference by working from within it. It may be necessary to jump out, and if the jump is successful

than the frame of reference itself is altered. (de Bono, 1990c, p. 240)

De Bono (1990c) indicates that sometimes “lateral thinking can provide an insight

arrangement of information that by itself solves the problem. At other times lateral thinking provides

an approach for vertical thinking to develop” (p. 245).

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6.6 PO: A concept for a Provocative Operation

Provocative Operation (PO) is another significant and powerful concept developed by de

Bono. He views the underlying concept of logical thinking as selection brought about by the

processes of acceptance and rejection. “The rejection process is incorporated into the concept of

the negative” and in this way he regards logic as being “the management of NO” (de Bono, 1990a,

p. 196). This can be contrasted to the concept of lateral thinking that de Bono (1990c) regards as

being about “insight restructuring … brought about through the rearrangement of information”

(p. 196). In this way, “PO is to lateral thinking what NO is to logical thinking. NO is a rejection tool.

PO is an insight restructuring tool” (de Bono, 1990a, p. 197).

Since the sequel of arrival plays so important a part in the arrangement of information, this must

always be less than the best possible arrangement, which should depend on the information alone.

Because they cannot control attention these imperfect patterns are not easily changed.

Occasionally, however, a chance combination of circumstances in the environment will trigger off a

complete re-structuring of the arrangement of information so that this gets closer to the best

possible arrangement. This is the insight phenomenon (de Bono, 1990c, pp. 246–247).

Past information controls what happens to new information. Patterns are created, become

stabilised and grow ever more rigid. In its pattern-making, the memory-surface has a divisive

tendency which makes divisions where none exist, and which separates things into fixed

categories; and from this follows the polarizing tendency which looks only at extremes.

(de Bono 1990c, p. 247)

A PO seeks to see existing things in a new way by establishing itself outside the pre-

existing system. One of the basic principles of lateral thinking is that a random stimulus from

outside can be effective in re-structuring a pattern or changing a point-of-view. “The function of PO

is to formalise the procedure, to indicate that the stimulus is being deliberately used as a random

stimulus” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 256). A PO can diminish the rigidity of the patterns. De Bono

contends that “while rigidity may not be an advantage” (p. 256), paradoxically it allows for what

initially can be regarded by the system as erroneous This, in terms of the evolution of new ideas,

allows for the necessity to go through a so-called wrong stage in order to arrive at a new and

useful idea.

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That error may be valuable in the process of generating new and useful ideas will be

explored in a later chapter within the context of design praxis and the development of a design

process and design thinking sequence. In terms of my argument and within the context of the

process of design (designing), I also proposed that so-called errors benefit from not being

categorised too quickly or too heavily, and as being regarded as negative (as if a set of pre-existing

correct solutions already existed for the problem). Rather, they can be conceived of as being an

outcome from an approach that simply reveals that re-thinking that approach may be required

within the (often iterative) process of reflective practice. In this way, knife-edge cognitive

discrimination (category allocation) of what the self-organising system regards as right or wrong

is offset.

The most fundamental difference between lateral thinking and vertical thinking is that in vertical

thinking one is not allowed to be wrong at any stage, whereas in lateral thinking one is allowed to

be wrong on the way to the solution. Being wrong may be necessary in order to get information

together in a certain way which can then develop into a useful solution. (de Bono 1990c,

p. 252–253).

PO encourages being mindful of errors in the information-processing system of the special

memory-surface and in this sense it can be seen that “PO is a tool for de-patterning” (de Bono,

1990c, p. 261). De Bono expounds that

the emotional content of PO would be derived from the anticipation of the pleasure of an insight

solution or a Eureka moment when everything suddenly snaps into place. This pleasure is related

to that of humour, and possibly even that of aesthetic appreciation’” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 262).

PO also fulfills the role of providing “a temporary escape from the discrete and ordered

ability of language which reflects the fixed patterns of a self-organising memory-system” (de Bono,

1990c, p. 265). Thus, while NO implies categorical (and logical) disagreement, “PO implies

disagreement not with the contents of the statement but with the dogma [implied truth] of it”

(de Bono, 1990c, p. 268).

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6.7 The artificial dichotomy between intellect and feeling

De Bono (1990c) acknowledges that it may be felt that far too much attention has been paid to

mechanical information processes in his analogical model, and too little attention has been paid to

the feeling processes that can easily override information processes. However, his commentary on

the role of emotion in such a system begins to humanise the analogical model he proposes

It is the information processes that provide the aim for the gun that is fired by a powerful emotional

charge. It is the information processes that give rise to the divisive tendencies, to the creating of

differences where none exist, to the creating of myths and bogeys. It is the information system that

creates the patterns and recognizes them.

Far from reducing the importance of emotions, the nature of the special memory-surface elevates

them into an essential position. The special memory-surface is a passive system, and on it

information organizes itself into patterns. The emotions … are the only contribution which the

memory-surface makes to these information patterns. Thus emotion in its broadest sense provides

the sole method of adaptation whereby more useful patterns achieve dominance over neutral ones.

Emotions also provide the substance of self and individuality. Without the emotional aspect, exactly

identical information patterns would be formed on memory-surfaces which had a similar exposure

to information. On account of emotional variability these patterns may be very different (de Bono,

1990c, p. 278).

He also contends “The artificial dichotomy between intellect and feeling creates a matched

arrogance on either side … emotion is essential to information processing”, adding “The feelers

distrust the word-games of the intellectuals and the intellectuals distrust the aesthetic sighs of the

feelers” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 279).

The essential feature of the special memory-surface is that it is a passive system which provides

an opportunity for the information to organize itself. Much of the information comes from the

environment, but a good deal is supplied by internal patterns which represent the needs and

emotions of the body that is using the memory-surface. The memory-surface comes to represent a

biased record of cumulative experience of the environment. It is biased because it represents the

interaction of the body and the environment (de Bono, 1990c, p. 280).

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6.8 A clarion call for a new Renaissance—Rock Logic and Water Logic

Three Nobel Laureates in physics—Ivar Giaver, Brian Josephson and Sheldon Lee Glashow—

each write a foreword in de Bono’s seminal text, I am Right—You are Wrong (1991a), in which

de Bono puts forward a direct challenge to what he refers to as the rock logic of Western thinking.

To answer the question of why he asked physicists to write the forewords, de Bono explained

“Because physicists spend their whole lives looking at fundamental processes and their

implications” (de Bono, 1993, p. vii). In this treatise, inter alia, a powerful picture of the nexus

between the biological and the cultural is expounded.

Giaver (in de Bono, 1991a) draws attention to de Bono’s view that humour is not studied

in philosophy yet de Bono emphasises that he considers it “central in importance to understanding

aspects of the way the brain functions” (Foreword x). Offering a rather spirited view, Giaver

suggests that this point may be best encompassed through paraphrasing Descartes “I laugh,

therefore I am” pointing out that “humour … is not missing from this book” (Foreword x).

Giaver affirms

at first glance the writing may appear somewhat simplistic because of this style, but upon reflection

it is very deep and perceptive. Complex matters can indeed be explained in simple terms if the

expositor has a thorough understanding of the subject (Giaver, in de Bono, 1991a, p. x).

He acknowledges the impact of de Bono’s statement “… if the brain were understood, it

would have enormous consequences for human affairs’” (Giaver, in de Bono, 1991a, Foreword x).

Giaver offers a personal perspective to do with the literature of his field stating “Scientific papers

are … written in a wonderfully logical way, but the progress of real science that precedes the

papers depends on hunches, accidents imagination and luck” (p. x). Giaver adds the following

Many discussions have taken place recently in artificial intelligence circles over whether or not

computers can ever learn to think like humans. Computers are, of course, experts in algorithms

(ie logical manipulations). But algorithms cannot be equated to creative thinking, as Roger Penrose

emphatically points out in a book called The Emperor’s Mind. There are, however, new approaches

to computers – the so-called neural networks – that in a very rudimentary way try to emulate the

nerve cells in the brain. A superb and amusing description of this can be found in de Bono’s book in

which the brain is described by analogy as a beach full of octopuses. Although computer neural

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networks are at an elementary stage at present, the fact that they are self-organising systems

makes them reminiscent of the brain (Giaver, in de Bono, 1991a, p. xi).

Giaver (in de Bono 1991a) notes de Bono’s view of the role that language plays in human

communication writing “In a sense language is a museum of ignorance” … “An example of this is

that words tend to polarise and categorise situations: you are either guilty or innocent, right or

wrong, happy or sad” (Foreword xi). De Bono has labeled this as “knife-edge discrimination” and

Giaver confirms a similar view in that “our traditional system of logic both relishes and depends on

this dichotomy” (in de Bono, 1991, p. xi). This is in contrast to water logic which is not absolute but

changes with circumstances and contexts. De Bono refers to our traditional system as “rock logic”,

in contrast to water logic, which is not absolute but changes with circumstances and contexts.

Josephson (in de Bono, 1991a) reiterates de Bono’s assertion that “we give too much

weight to conclusions that are based on logic” (p. xiii) and claims that “logical thinking is thinking

based on propositions and on consideration of the truth or falsity of propositions. Its primary

usefulness is where facts remain facts ie in circumstances where nothing new is likely to happen”

whereas “The other side of things, according to Dr de Bono’s scheme, is perception’ ”(p. xiv).

Josephson while seeing antecedents to de Bono’s model offers “but until recently conventional

scientists did not, as Edward de Bono has done, apply such models to understand processes of

thinking other than the logical ones’”(Josephson, in de Bono, 1991a, Foreword xiv). While not

believing that “there was no such thing as ‘lateral thinking’ before Edward de Bono invented the

term” ”(Josephson, in de Bono, 1991a, Foreword xiv), Josephson offers the following observations:

Our culture (or perhaps one should say instead, that part of our culture associated, according to

some, with the masculine aspect of our being) is suspicious of any kind of thinking that works in

ways other than through logic; and to a very large extent, logical thinking is the only kind of thinking

that is encouraged in our educational system. De Bono does well to expose so clearly the faults in

a system that places exclusive reliance on one aspect of the mind alone (Josephson, in

de Bono, 1991, p. xiv).

Glashow (in de Bono, 1991a), the third of the Nobel Laureates, comments on one of the

central tenets of de Bono’s argument in, I am Right—You are Wrong, that our thinking inheritance

and thinking disposition is informed from a cultural perspective (Foreword xvi), which is also one of

my central themes in this thesis. Glashow writes “The last Renaissance was clearly based on the

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re-discovery of ancient Greece [sic] (about 400 BC) thinking habits of logic, reason, argument,

truth, and the importance of man, says Dr de Bono” and then asks “Are these patterns still

applicable to today’s changing world?”(Glashow, in de Bono, 1991a, Foreword xvi). Glashow

identifies the significance of de Bono’s request for transformational change in the following way.

The old habits seem confining, inadequate and perhaps even dangerous, since our social conflicts

are as primitive as ever while our technical ability to pursue them is unconstrained.

I am Right—You are Wrong (whose title signifies the gist of old thinking patterns) issues a clarion

call for a New Renaissance. Today’s thinking habits cannot be based on word-play or belief

systems but must be attuned to the latest developments in neuroscience and matched to “the way

the human brain creates perception (Glashow in de Bono, 1991a, Foreword).

Glashow (cited in de Bono, 1991a), confirming the view Josephson expressed in his

Foreword, writes “Dr de Bono is not alone in attacking the language-based-logical strategies that

we have inherited. Feminist sociologists … despair of the aggressive and repressive tendencies

inherent in conventional thought” (Foreword, p. xvi). Although Glashow suggests there are feminist

advocates for the revolutionary reconstruction of our social economic and educational institutions,

he indicates de Bono is not so radical in asserting that his analyses are not explicitly gender-

specific. “He [de Bono] suggests the term ‘provolution’ to describe a gradual but cumulative

introduction of values and perceptions into a society where rock logic and water logic may work

hand in hand” (Foreword, p. xvi). Glashow observes that de Bono “would like to design better

software for the brain’” (Glashow, in de Bono, 1991a, p. xvi).

In, I am Right—You are Wrong, de Bono introduces his view of the need for a New Renaissance

by way of a provocation incorporating, again, his view of the significance of humour.

You may find this surprising, if humour is so very significant, why has it been so neglected by

traditional philosophers, psychologists and information scientists? Why humour is so significant

and why it has been so neglected by traditional thinkers together form the key to this book. Humour

tells us more about how the brain works, than does any other behavior in the mind—including

reason. It indicates that our traditional thinking methods, and our thinking about these methods,

have been based on the wrong model of information system. It tells us directly about the possibility

of changes in perception. It shows us that these changes can be followed by instant changes in

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emotion—something that can never be achieved by logic (de Bono, 1991a, Introduction:

The New Renaissance, p. 1).

De Bono (1991a) contends that before the last Renaissance the thinking habits of the

Western world were derived largely from dogma and theology. This laying down of a principle by an

authority as being incontrovertibly true is a significant issue for de Bono, writing “The search for

truth—as distinct from dogma—was to be made through the exposure of falsity by means of

argument, reason and logic. This reason, not dogma, was to decide what was right and what was

wrong” (Introduction 3: The New Renaissance). Not that this is wrong, de Bono adds, pointing out

that many of these thinking habits have served us well exemplifying the “legalistic application of

principles through the use of argument and reason can be said to be the basis of the civilisation we

know” (Introduction 3: The New Renaissance). Nevertheless, de Bono (1991a) indicates that

argument has been, and is, the basis of our search for truth and

the basis for our adversarial system in science, law and politics. Here we have absolutes and

finality and judgment—and the confidence (sometimes arrogance) which comes from these. Here

we have the mutually exclusive compatibility which is the very essence of our logic. Each party

cannot be both right and wrong at the same time. The essence of logic is identity and contradiction”

(de Bono 1991a, Introduction 5: The New Renaissance).

That cultural perspectives are embedded in the special memory-surface of the brain and

contribute to certain types of thinking behavior comprises another important dimension of de

Bono’s work and has served to inform many of his ideas. De Bono characterises a bi-cultural view

of Eastern and Western philosophical perspectives in the following ways. He suggests

The major theme of Eastern philosophy is the arbitrariness and artificiality of the separate units that

have been carved out of the environment” where “The ultimate aim is to dissolve these separate

units – and the self as one of them – back into the continuum of nature”. ”Western philosophy, on

the other hand, emphasizes the usefulness and sometimes the permanence of certain patterns”

where “The ultimate aim is not to get rid of patterns, as in the East, but to achieve the right

patterns. (de Bono, 1991a, p. 280)

One of de Bono’s principle observations is the influence of Classical Greek thinking upon

our thinking inheritance, in particular, the influence of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. De Bono

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summarises their individual and collective contribution to our thinking inheritance in the

following way.

Socrates (469 – 339 BC) was interested in challenging people’s thinking and, indeed, getting them

to think at all instead of just taking thoughts for granted. He wanted people to examine what they

meant when they said something. He was not concerned with being creative or making things

happen. From Socrates we get the emphasis on argument and critical thinking. Socrates chose to

make argument the main thinking tool. Within argument, there was to be critical thinking: why do

you say that? What do you mean by that?

Plato (c.427 – 348 BC) is generally held to be the Father of Western philosophy. From Plato we get

the notion that there is the ‘truth’ somewhere but that we have to search for it to find it. The way to

search for truth is to use critical thinking to attack what is untrue.

Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) was the pupil of Plato and the tutor of Alexander the Great. Aristotle was a

very practical person. He developed the notion of ‘categories’, which are really definitions. Aristotle

developed the sort of logic we still use today (based largely on ‘is’ and ‘is not’). From Aristotle we

get a type of logic based on identity and non-identity, on inclusion and exclusion.

The outcome was a thinking system based on the search for ‘truth’. The search carried out by the

method of argument. Within argument there was critical thinking that sought to attack ‘untruth’.

This attack used the methodology of Aristotle’s logic (de Bono Institute, 2004).

In terms of the inadequacy of argument, de Bono maintains while there is a place for it, it

is inadequate as the main tool of thinking because it lacks “creative, design and constructive

energies that we so badly need” (de Bono 1993, p. vi). He observes “pointing out faults may lead to

some improvement” but it does not of itself create something new (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Nor does

synthesising both points of view … produce a stream of new alternatives. Today … there is a huge

need to be constructive and creative. There is a need to solve problems and to open up

opportunities. There is a need to design new possibilities, not just argue between two existing

possibilities. (de Bono Institute, 2004)

Arguing that during the last Renaissance a revival of interest in argument from Classical Greek and

Roman thinking occurred, de Bono (1991a) observes a remarkable paradox existed.

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On the one hand, humanistic thinkers used the system of logic and reason to attack the dogma that

suffocated society. On the other hand, Church thinkers lead by the genius of Thomas Aquinas of

Naples developed the same argument logic into a powerful way of defeating the numerous

heresies that were forever surfacing (de Bono 1991a, Introduction: The New Renaissance p. 5).

Thus arose the pre-eminence of critical thinking as the highest form of civilized thinking – and the

defense of civilization itself. Any intrusion was to be subjected to an intense scrutiny and fierce

criticism within existing frameworks, since these were assumed to be eternal (de Bono,

1991a, p. 6).

His [Thomas Aquinas] evaluation of the usefulness of thinking behavior based on principle, logic

and argument, breaks down around “the assumption that perceptions and values are common,

universal, permanent or even agreed” (de Bono, 1991a, p. 5).

The very excellence of language for description has made language crude and inefficient

for perception, de Bono (1990c) asserts, and in his model of the way the brain functions as a self-

organising pattern-recognition system he highlights that a significant amount of the brain’s

functionality is fundamentally and inextricably linked with past-based phenomena (experience).

This means that something can only be recognised if a past-based pattern exists within the system

and for which a match can be determined. While this is an important pro-survival mechanism and,

therefore, an understandably dominant behavior of the brain, it nevertheless implicates language

itself as being inherently past-based. The strength of existing neural patterns here is significant in

that alternative perceptions tend to be weaker in amplitude. Although highly esteemed in our

civilisation, this supports de Bono belief that critical thinking has some unfortunate consequences

given, as already stated, it lacks “the productive, generative, creative and design elements that are

so needed to tackle problems and find our way forward” (de Bono, 1991a, p. 6).

The reason behind de Bono’s choice for the title of his book, I am Right—You are Wrong

(1991a), becomes clearer when considering his description of the biological mechanisms operating

within the brain that constitute a self-organising pattern recognition system and his view that our

thinking behaviors have been significantly influenced by Socratic, Platonian and Aristotelian notions

of principle, logic, identity and argument. He contends the following.

In our tradition of thinking we have sought to get away from the vagueness and instability of

perception in order to deal with such concrete matters as mathematics and logic. We have done

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reasonably well at this and can now get back to dealing with perception as such. Indeed we have

no choice because if our perceptions are faulty then our perfect processing of those faulty

perceptions can only be given an answer that is wrong, and sometimes dangerous. We know from

experience that both sides in any war, conflict or disagreement always have ‘logic’ on their side.

This is true: a logic that serves their particular perceptions (de Bono, 1993b, Introduction vii/viii).

In I am Right— You Are Wrong (1991a), de Bono articulates a need for an entirely different form of

logic to that of traditional logic and commences a metaphorically rich argument in favor of

developing two distinctively different forms of logic. He proposes water logic as the logic of

perception in contrast to rock logic as the logic of traditional thinking. De Bono describes traditional

(Aristotelian) logic as comprising of categories that precise and permanent and that so often our

judgment seeks to locate something into a category. Whereas, if we look at humour, it depends

directly upon patterns, flow, expectations and context (de Bono 1991a, p. 8).

In our traditional thinking we have what I call ‘rock logic’. In humour we have what I call ‘water

logic’. A rock has a shape of its own. It is hard, hard-edged, permanent and unchanging. We can

see and feel its shape. We can say that a rock ‘is’. It is not going to let us down and change into

something else. There is the sense of an independent absolute. Water is very different from rock,

but just as real. It flows. The emphasis is on ‘to’ rather than ‘is’. Water flows according to the

gradient (context). It takes the form of the vessel in which it is placed (circumstance). Rock logic is

the basis of our traditional processing logic, with its permanent categories, identities and

contradictions. Water logic is the basis of the logic of perception (de Bono, 1991a, pp. 8–9).

A rock is solid, permanent and hard. This suggests the absolutes of traditional thinking (solid as a

rock). Water is just as real as rock but it is not solid or hard. The permanence of water is not

defined by its shape (p. 290).

A rock has hard edges and a definite shape. This suggests the defined categories of traditional

thinking. We judge whether something fits that category shape or not. Water has a boundary or

an edge which is just as definite as the edge of a rock, but this boundary will vary according to

the terrain (p. 290).

Water will fill a bowl or a lake. It adapts to the terrain or landscape. Water logic is determined by the

conditions and circumstances. The shape of a rock remains the same no matter what the terrain

might be. If you place a small rock in a bowl, it will retain its shape and make no concession at all

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towards filling the bowl. The absolutes of traditional thinking deliberately set out to be

circumstance-independent (p. 290).

If you add more water to water, the new water becomes part of the whole. If you add a rock to a

rock, you simply have two rocks. This addition and absorption of water logic corresponds to the

process of poetry, in which new images become absorbed in the whole (p. 290).

In traditional (rock) logic we have judgments based upon right/wrong. In perception, (water) logic

we have the concepts of ‘fit’ and ‘flow’. The concept of ‘fit’ means: ‘Does this fit the circumstances

and conditions?’. The concept of ‘flow’ means: ‘Is the terrain suitable for flow to take place in this

direction?’ Fit and flow both mean the same thing. Fit covers the static situation, flow covers the

dynamic situation (p. 291).

In a conflict situation both side are arguing that they are right. This they can show logically.

Traditional thinking would seek to discover which party was really ‘right’. Water logic would

acknowledge that both parties were right but that each conclusion was based on a particular aspect

of the situation, particular circumstances, and a particular point of view (p. 291).

De Bono’s articulation of the need for an entirely different form of logic to that of traditional

logic includes challenging the notion of the supposed universality of categories. His preference is

for a thinking approach which incorporates flow, expectations and context. Here change can occur

on the memory-surface allowing for categories to be softened, re-shaped, informed by context, new

information, new experience and, importantly, shifts in perception. Additionally, de Bono puts

forward a view that water logic, with its embedded notion of flow and being the logic of perception,

can co-exist with rock logic of traditional thinking.

6.9 Summary In the previous chapter, I presented Sternberg and Lubarts’ rather scornful view of those (such as

de Bono) adopting pragmatic approaches to creativity enhancement, including suggesting that

such approaches have been damaging to the scientific study of creativity. Nickerson, on the other

hand, writes that within behavioral science a belief that creativity can be enhanced has many

adherents. Adding that although a clear, unequivocal, and incontestable answer to the question of

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how creativity can be enhanced is not to be found in the psychological literature, Nickerson

suggests that what is known about creativity suffices to make the approaches worth trying.

In this chapter I identified the intrinsically pragmatic nature of design thinking,

characterising it as a particular type of creative thinking-in-action that is solution-based or solution-

focused. In seeking to expand the frame of reference for design thinking, I then presented the idea

that examining cognitive function via a biologically-based model for the way the brain functions

(combined with cultural perspectives to do with our thinking inheritance) provides a new

perspective to enter the discourse on design thinking.

Knowledge of how the brain functions have lead to specific approaches being developed

to enhance thinking behavior, including the development of thinking tools, particularly for creative

thinking. Edward de Bono’s work in these areas is significant, and this chapter introduced many

ideas from his corpus.

De Bono proposes the brain as a self-organising pattern recognition system; in his

seminal work The Mechanism of Mind, he showed that creativity was a necessary behavior in a

self-organising system and that asymmetric patterns were formed by the nerve networks in the

brain as the basis of perception. Yet, paradoxically, the excellence and efficiency of the brain

carries with it certain limitations; de Bono articulates the view that although the brain is not

designed to be creative, this is actually one of its very important attributes. The brain is designed to

form patterns from the world around us and to adhere to those patterns. This is how perception

works and life would be totally impossible if the brain were to work differently. The purpose of the

brain is to enable us to survive and to cope. Yet de Bono asks: but what about the process of

changing concepts as opposed to establishing them? He argues this is an unnatural process for

which we have no tools and no training. As a result there is a great need for mental tools that make

possible the reforming of ideas.

De Bono’s extensive writings on the way the brain operates as a self-organising pattern

recognition system, as it gives rise to mind, are paralleled by his views about our thinking

behaviors, inheritance and acculturation. De Bono asserts significant historical and cultural factors

have confirmed a preference for argument as the means by which to establish truth, and that it has

become the basis for our adversarial system in science, law and politics. De Bono maintains while

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there is a place for it, it is inadequate as the main tool of thinking because it lacks creative, design

and constructive energies.

De Bono calls for a new Renaissance and articulates a need for an entirely different form

of logic to that of traditional logic. He proposes water logic as the logic of perception in contrast to

rock logic as the logic of traditional thinking. He argues traditional logic as comprising categories

that are clear, hard-edged and permanent and that we make judgment decisions as to whether

something fits into a category, does not fit into a category or cannot fit into a category. By contrast,

water logic depends directly upon patterns but also encompasses flow, expectations and context.

Here change can occur on the memory-surface allowing for categories to be softened, re-shaped,

informed by context, new information, new experience and, importantly, shifts in perception.

Additionally, he puts forward a view that water logic, with its embedded notion of flow and being the

logic of perception, can co-exist with rock logic of traditional thinking.

The next chapter focuses on design thinking and the value of an ability to be able to shift,

broaden and deepen perception, and direct thinking. This will provide a setting to introduce a

number of de Bono’s other ideas that, importantly, include the concept of thinking tools.

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Chapter 7 Thinking tools 7.1 Introduction

De Bono’s theoretical model for the way the brain functions provides a biological basis for many of

his ideas about thinking behavior. In describing the brain’s remarkable ability as a self-organising

pattern recognition system, he also highlights its inherent deficiencies relative to the notion of

creativity. As brilliant as the brain is at managing our survival through its ability to recognise

patterns, to use them and to adhere to them, de Bono argues it is not “designed” to be creative.

Creativity and concept formation requires something else apart from using these established

patterns that (in theory) arise from the brain’s defect as an information system.

De Bono overlays his brain model with insights about our thinking inheritance and thinking

behavior being culturally induced; much of this he predicates on the influence of classical Greek

thinking profoundly shaping Western ways of thinking. The dominance of critical thinking, argument

and logic features strongly in his work, and he frequently draws attention to how these thinking

approaches lack creative, design and constructive energies.

The last chapter brought many of these ideas together, including his comprehensive

argument for a new Renaissance in our thinking behavior within which he proposes water logic as

the logic of perception in contrast to rock logic as the logic of traditional thinking. Having articulated

numerous reasons why we might want to consider changing and improving our thinking behaviors,

I now focus upon de Bono’s ideas as to how we might go about achieving this. These include the

use of thinking tools deliberately designed to compensate for and transcend the self-organising

nature of the brain.

De Bono (1991a) argues “For twenty-four centuries we have put all of our intellectual effort

into the logic of reason rather than the logic of perception. Yet in the conduct of human affairs

perception is far more important. Why have we made this mistake?” (p. 42). He presumes this may

have occurred as a consequence of us believing that trying to manage the vagueness, subjectivity,

and variability of perceptions was not that important and instead perceptions could be controlled

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with the solid attributes of truth and logic (p. 42). He infers that at least in part it was “the Greeks

who created logic to make sense of perception” (p. 42).

The senses are the physiological methods of perception. The senses and their

classification, operation and theory are overlapping topics studied by a variety of fields, most

notably within neuroscience, cognitive psychology (cognitive science) and the philosophy of

perception. While disagreement exists among some neurologists as to the number of senses due

to differing definitions of what constitutes a sense, a traditional categorisation attributed to Aristotle

comprises five senses; sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste.

There are four main modalities: the light senses (photoreception; i.e., vision), the mechanical

senses (mechanoreception; i.e., touch, balance, and hearing), the chemical senses

(chemoreception; i.e., taste and smell), and the electric sense (electroreception) of certain fish. In

addition to these external senses there are also internal senses that use the same modalities. For

example, there are proprioceptors, which are mechanical sensors that measure the lengths of

muscles and positions of joints, and there are interoceptors that monitor blood pressure

(Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, viewed 21 May 2014).

In, I am Right –You are Wrong (1991a), de Bono claims it is only at this point in human

history that we are able to understand the neurological basis of perception and the logic of it as a

system, and this is why we previously had no choice but to disregard it (de Bono, 1991a, p. 42).

De Bono (1991a) insists that perception has its own logic which “is based directly on the behavior

of self-organising patterning systems” and is completely different from “the logic of traditional

reason and language” adding that constructed truth is different from perceptual truth (de Bono,

1991a, p. 42).

In this chapter I also consider de Bono being referred to as popularist (as he doesn’t

publish academically) and also to the sometimes controversial nature of his ideas.

7.2 Compensating for the brain’s behavior: The concept of thinking tools In relation to the explicit teaching of thinking as a skill and writing about various thinking

approaches, de Bono indicates there are two different ways of attaining general operations (de

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Bono, 1991a, p. 130). Traditionally, immersion is used where participants, with guidance, are

immersed in thinking situations and are asked to extract particular principles. These principles,

which are extracted under guidance, are then refined into a form that can be employed in other

situations. In his view, while this system appears to work well in theory it has significant

shortcomings in reality (de Bono, 1991a, p. 130). While principles are being extracted, he argues

the momentum of the content and levels of interest in it often dominate or preclude attention being

paid to the thinking process itself. As a consequence, the extraction of abstractions does not easily

or naturally happen given the strength of the rules of logic that tends to dominate the procedure (de

Bono, 1991a, p. 130). De Bono makes the point that: when we deal with thinking, we are actually

managing perceptions; that when we are managing perception, we are actually managing patterns;

that when managing patterns we are dealing with attention, and that when seeking to direct

attention we need to use “attention-directors” (de Bono 1991a, p. 138).

The second approach to deriving thinking operations he argues is quite different and

introduces his notion of thinking tools. In this approach “the operations are created deliberately and

independently as tools. There is no question of waiting for them to be abstracted. They are created

artificially and offered in advance” (de Bono 1991a, p. 130). With this approach, as an alternative

the technique of immersion, a user can become familiar with the use of attention directors through

being provided with thinking situations where their use can be practiced to acquire a skill in using

them (de Bono 1991a, p. 130). In this setting, a range of thinking situations can be provided where

the intent is for focus to remain on using the tool rather than moving to the content of the thinking

situation. Practice with the thinking tool builds familiarity, enhances capacity in using the tool and

allows for the tool to be applied in real life. The skill attained is embedded into a transferable tool

(de Bono 1991a, p. 131).

De Bono (1991a) concedes, however, that within the field of thinking “there is an

instinctive dislike of structure and jargon” where some hold the view “that any structure confines or

restricts thinking to tramlines” which inhibits “a free-flowing exploring mind with its untrammeled

curiosity” (p. 135). In his view, such a fear of structure arises from a failure of being able to see the

distinction between “restricting structures and liberating structures” (p. 135). To distinguish the

difference between the two, he points out “Tracks, tramlines, rooms, cages can all be restricting

structures. But a ladder, a hammer, and a concept can all be liberating structures” (pp. 135–136).

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He argues that these latter structures are actually enabling and not restricting and that while their

use is not mandatory, they do make it easier for you to achieve certain things (pp. 135–136).

De Bono’s development of thinking tools commenced in the early seventies after he

developed the concept of lateral thinking described in The Mechanism of Mind. This was followed

by the development of an innovative thinking program for schools referred to as the CoRT program

(Dudgeon, 2002, p.128). CoRT stands for the Cognitive Research Trust, an entity established by

de Bono at Cambridge University to administer the project. Ivor Mills, who was Chair of Medicine at

Cambridge University and de Bono’s boss at Addenbrookes Hospital, recalls “Once I was

appointed to the Department of Medicine … I saw more and more of Edward … He stood out, from

my point-of-view, in one respect. He had novel ideas” (cited in Dudgeon 2002, p. 58). Although

Mills was very supportive of his ideas he indicated at the time of setting up CoRT “There were

plenty at Cambridge antagonistic to him. The concepts were too new” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 128).

Dudgeon (2002) in his biography of de Bono includes the topic of criticism of de Bono’s

work and, in particular, comments on some of his methods. He writes that de Bono was

deliberatively and provocatively superficial in his scholarship, in a positive sense (p. 122). This was

done not because he believed people may think he was cheating, rather he was “pitting his

educational programme [CoRT ] against the establishment version by highlighting usability,

transferability, and its success in action” and in this way was also “flouting what he saw as the

irrelevant elements in the establishment version” (p. 122). De Bono, according to Dudgeon, was

interested in skills that actually make a difference for people in their lives and was not seeking to

attract approval “from the rarefied environs of academia”, adding that integrity and honesty are two

of de Bono’s virtues acknowledged by both friends, and enemies, who know him (p. 122). In his

view, de Bono was contending with the “’mind set’” of an old idiom when he was actually proposing

an idiomatic change (p. 122). “Edward’s style is to put the old idiom down as part of his strategy to

depict contrast. It was bound to make him enemies. But he and his work have survived” (p. 122).

De Bono does not publish academically, but as Dudgeon explains he is clearly capable of

scholarship and notes this is what some of his critics would prefer to see in his writings (p. 122).

His DPhil thesis, The Control of Blood Pressure in Hypertension, is exemplary, showing that in

1961 Edward was still working within the traditions. The style is understated, sober. He looks at

what scholarly work has gone before, produces his experiments, makes his findings, gives his

interpretations, not even gently speculative, and at the end of each section there is an endless

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bibliography. Nothing could be further from the style he adopted when he went public with lateral

thinking six years later (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 122).

A significant moment in the history and success of the CoRT program came after all of the

testing was done, the program’s design was completed and the associated publications were

produced with its appeal now extending across all age groups (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 130). The

program had been used by four and a half year olds and also by “senior executives in such major

corporations as IBM and ITT” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 130). “As a matter of interest the chief executive

of the Ford Motor Company in the UK makes use of the CoRT skills in solving his own industrial

problems in running a large and very successful company” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 130). In schools,

the program had an ability spread that ranged from “the gifted and schools that only admit pupils

with IQs of over 140, to ESN (educationally sub-normal) schools in the UK where the IQ range is

75 to 80” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 130). At the time, “the program was used across cultures including

“rural areas of Venezuela, metropolitan areas such as London, Sydney, Toronto, and also other

countries like Nigeria” (Dudgeon, 2002, p. 130). In schools, the CoRT program aims to develop skill

in broad practical thinking and does not seek to enhance intellectual virtuosity. It is designed to

acknowledge thinking as a skill, develop the skill of practical thinking and to encourage personal

objectivity in thinking as well as in the thinking of others. It provides a framework to teach thinking

explicitly. Over time, use of the CoRT program spread further and seven of the thinking tools from

“Book 1: Breadth and Perception would form the basis of a ten-lesson programme for sharpening

perception and focusing thinking, leveled at business executives, and re-labeled DATT (Direct

Attention Thinking Tools)” (Dudgeon 2002, p. 130).

The CoRT program for the teaching of thinking in schools is now widely used in Canada (including

French-speaking areas). In the USA there is increasing use of the program. Minnesota, which is

regarded as the lead state in education, has allocated special funds for training in this program and

to set up demonstration schools.

Dr de Bono was invited to Moscow by the Soviet Academy of Sciences to train teachers in the

special School Project One, which includes the leading laboratory schools in which new methods

are tried out. In China the CoRT program has been in use for some years with selected

senior schools.

In Singapore the government did their own testing and then tried out the CoRT program in 45

schools. They are now planning to extend the program to all schools. In Malaysia the program has

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been in use for some years with senior schools In Bulgaria after preliminary satisfactory tests the

government is introducing the method into all schools.

In Venezuela a professor of philosophy at the university of Caracas … became a politician and set

up a special Ministry for the Development of Intelligence. Dr de Bono was invited to Venezuela to

train a core of teachers. Eventually 105,000 teachers were trained and, by law, the teaching of

thinking is compulsory in all schools. Of the fourteen projects of the Ministry for the Development of

Intelligence, eight were based directly on Dr de Bono’s methods.

The CoRT program is also in use in various ways in many other countries: UK, Australia, New

Zealand, Israel, Sweden, Kuwait, Pakistan, etc. (de Bono, 1993a, p. 24).

As de Bono does not publish in academic journals, case studies about the use of his work

are hard to obtain. A review of studies on the use of the CoRT program compiled by Sandra Dingli

from the University of Malta in 2001 acknowledges that the use of the program in educational

settings has attracted some criticism on the basis that inadequate research has been conducted to

assess its effectiveness (Dingli, 2001, p. 1). As an example, she cites one particular criticism which

states “the lack of adequate evaluation studies on the CoRT program” to be “both surprising and

disturbing” given “The program has been in existence for over 10 years and is claimed to be in

wide use both in the British Isles and in Venezuela” (Dingli, 2001, p. 1). This example continues

with “de Bono makes strong claims concerning the effectiveness of the CoRT program. Yet after 10

years of wide spread use, we have no adequate evidence concerning those claims and thus no

support for the effectiveness of the program or the theoretical assumptions from which it was

derived” (Dingli, 2001, p. 1). Dingli points out that although this particular criticism was first

published in 1985 it reflects other statements that have continued after more than 25 years, adding

that “Whether the statement was correct or not when it was published in 1985 is disputable (p. 1).

In her view, in relation to the particular criticism above, it can, today, be considered as a mistaken

assumption as a great deal of serious academic research, some of which has been published, has

been carried out in recent years (Dingli, 2001, p. 1).

Dingli’s (2001) review of studies on the use of the CoRT program contains her summaries

of a total of 27 evaluation studies of de Bono’s CoRT program undertaken either in educational

contexts or from others conducted in organisational settings. Five examples of her summaries of

findings follow and are reproduced in their entirety.

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J Edwards and R B Baldauf Jr, 1983, ‘Teaching Thinking in Secondary Science’, in W Maxwell,

(Ed), Thinking: The Expanding Frontier, Philadelphia, PA: Franklin Institute Press, pp 129–138.

Using pre- and post-essays on familiar and unfamiliar topics, they report educationally

significant improvements on both essays. They further report significant correlations between

achievement on CoRT and the end of year science exam…The study is, however, of limited

value as it had no control group.

M A de Sanchez and M Astorga, 1983, ‘Projecto Aprender a Pensar: Estudio de sus Efectos Sobre

UNa Muestra de Estudiantes Venzolanos’, Caracas, Venezuela: Minsterio de Educacion

This study is cited in Nickerson et al (1985). It reports on the impact of the Venezuelan

implementation of an adaptation of CoRT. The researchers report increasing gains over

three years for treatment students compared with control students on open-ended problems

similar to those used in the treatment.

R S Nickerson, D N Perkins and E E Smith, 1985, The Teaching of Thinking, Hillsdale, NJ:

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

They review the limited available research on the effectiveness of CoRT including the

studies reported by de Bono in Teaching Thinking and in the CoRT Teachers Notes.

Although Nickerson et al suggest that the findings of their research are favourable for the

CoRT programme, they do not go as far as asserting the general effectiveness of CoRT.

They state:

In general, the CoRT operations seem to be more suitable for everyday contexts of

decision making and informal reasoning in humanistic, social, and design contexts.

They have a straightforward and immediate application to the sorts of problems that

arise in everyday life. The CoRT operations can be seen as simple practical tactics

that may help individuals to think sensibly about non-technical things, and, also, help

them to come to perceive themselves as thinkers. Within its scope, it seems to us that

CoRT is likely to have beneficial effects.

J Edwards, 1988, ‘The Direct Teaching of Thinking Skills’, CoRT 1, An Evaluative Case Study’,

unpublished PhD Thesis, James Cook University of North Queensland, Australia

This study includes the investigation of seven claims which Edwards identified in the

literature which de Bono has made concerning the CoRT programme. The study involves

a delayed post-test (fifteen weeks after the pre-test and eleven weeks post-treatment) in

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order to assess the long-term (non-immediate) effects of the CoRT programme. … the

positive results which emerged indicate great potential in the use of domain-independent

heuristics-based programmes such as CoRT 1 for the direct teaching of thinking in

education. Moreover, Edwards sets de Bono’s ideas in historical and contemporary

contexts and provides an extensive literature review on the subject of the direct teaching

of thinking.

J Edwards and J Clayton, 1989, ‘Observing a Thinking Skills Classroom’, unpublished paper

presented to the ‘Fourth International Conference on Thinking, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1989

The students achieved outstanding and unexpected results on a set of standardised national

tests and contributed many more ideas of a far higher quality than they had done before

CoRT instruction (Dingli 2001, pp. 2–5).

The creation of the CoRT program lead to the development of three separate sets of

thinking tools: The Six Thinking Hats®, DATT® and Lateral Thinking®. The Six Thinking Hats® are

designed to direct thinking, the DATT® tools are designed to deepen and broaden perception, and

the Lateral Thinking® tools are designed to shift perception. The three sets of thinking tools have

been located in the design process and design thinking sequence proposed in the next chapter. De

Bono describes these tools as contributing to operacy—a term he created and one he would like to

see added to numeracy and literacy. He describes operacy as hinging on a concept of usefulness.

A description of each set of tools outlining their suitability for inclusion in the sequence occurs later

in this chapter but before describing each of the sets of thinking tools in greater detail, and

identifying their relevance to design thinking, it is important to introduce another of de Bono’s

significant and influential ideas, the concept of parallel thinking. Parallel thinking is an alternative to

adversarial thinking and is implicit in the use of de Bono’s thinking tools. It is particularly evident in

the use of The Six Thinking Hats®.

7.3 Parallel Thinking® as an alternative to adversarial thinking

De Bono would like to see Parallel Thinking® contribute to transforming thinking behaviors via a

“provolution”, his word for describing “a gradual but cumulative introduction of values and

perceptions into a society where rock logic and water logic can work hand in hand” (Glashow,

1991, cited in de Bono, 1991, p. xvi). With Parallel Thinking® both analysis- and judgment-oriented

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thinking, and generative thinking are supported through the metacognitive selection and

management of a non-adversarial thinking approach. Parallel Thinking® encourages cooperative

and coordinated thinking within a group as all parties are thinking in parallel and in the same

direction (de Bono, 2015). Such collaboration enhances the breadth and depth of thinking and

reduces the need for debate and disagreement. The direction of thinking can be changed at any

time to enable a full scan of a situation but from moment to moment “each thinker is thinking in

parallel with all other thinkers” (de Bono, 2015). This does not mean there always has to be

agreement, but rather than arguing on any point, contradictory views can be laid down (in parallel)

and a way forward “designed” in the final stage (de Bono, 2015).

A good portrayal of Parallel Thinking® and an example of what it accomplishes is

illustrated in the following scenario created by Mindwerx (2015). Imagine you are with a group of

people in a square room that has windows in each of the four walls. If each group member looks

out of a different window they would experience a different view of the external world. In reporting

on what they observe of the outside world, as individuals, there is likely to be considerable

variation, if not disagreement. Alternatively, if all of the group were to look out of the first window

together although each may see different, as a group, they would see much more. If, as a group,

they then looked out of the next window, then the next window and so on, as a group they are likely

to get a far greater appreciation of what the outside world is like, and would have done all of this

more efficiently (Mindwerx, 2015). De Bono regards adversarial thinking as lacking a constructive,

creative or design element and describes it as being intended only to discover the 'truth' not to

build anything.

In proposing Parallel Thinking® as an alternative to adversarial thinking, de Bono argues

that in traditional adversarial thinking, A and B are in conflict and each side seeks to criticise the

other point-of-view, whereas in The Six Thinking Hats®, both A and B wear each hat together as

they explore all sides of an issue (see Figure 7.1).

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Figure 7.1 Parallel Thinking® as an alternative to adversarial thinking

Adversarial thinking A B

Parallel thinking A

B

A

B

© de Bono Institute 2004.

_______________________________________________________________________________

7.4 The Six Thinking Hats® De Bono (1990b) describes thinking as the ultimate human resource, and maintains the principal

difficulty with it is confusion. “We try to do too much at once. Emotions, information, logic, hope,

creativity all crowd in on us” (p. 2). The Six Thinking Hats® are designed to unscramble thinking so

that one thinking mode is undertaken at any one time—instead of attempting to undertake

This proposal won’t work Yes, it will

The development costs are high

Some components are hard to find

We could produce this with existing equipment

It’s lightweight and would ship easily


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everything at once (p. 199). Their purpose is to enable a switch in thinking away from the normal

argument style to a mapmaking style. “This makes thinking a two-stage process. The first stage is

to make the map. The second stage is to choose a route on the map” (p. 199). And de Bono

“considers the very artificiality of the hats as being their greatest value” (p. 199). In this way they

provide both a protocol and an expedience for a certain type of thinking to be requested of an

individual or members of a group (p. 199). The Six Thinking Hats® bring together the non-

adversarial and collaborative nature of Parallel Thinking® combined with the value of Lateral

thinking®. De Bono emphasises “the method is extremely simple but it is powerful simplicity” (de

Bono, 1996, p.77). De Bono identifies five value attributes of The Six Thinking Hats®.

Firstly, they provide a defined form of role-playing. He argues that one of the main

restrictions on good thinking is what he terms ego defence which causes many faults to occur in

our thinking. The hats allow users of the method a way to think and articulate things that we might

otherwise be reluctant to state because of the risk to our ego. De Bono offers an analogy: “Wearing

the clown costume gives you full permission to play the clown” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 29).

Secondly, the hats provide a means of directing attention. If we want to overcome our

reactivity, it is important to have a way of directing our attention to six different perspectives of the

matter (de Bono, 1990b, p. 29).

Thirdly, the hats provide convenience. The symbolism embedded in the notion of wearing

six different thinking hats provides a very opportune way of asking oneself, or others, to switch

gears, as it were. As de Bono explains, with The Six Thinking Hats® someone can be asked to be

negative or not to be negative, to be creative, or to offer a response that is purely emotional without

the need for any justification at all (de Bono, 1990b, p. 29).

The fourth value the hats provide is the possible link to brain chemistry. De Bono

proposes the idea of the thresholds and sensitivities of the nerve units in the brain being affected

by the chemicals that surround them and that changes in these chemicals results in the stabilising

of a different pattern (de Bono, 1990b, p. 26). He suggests that in a sense this means we actually

have a different brain for each different chemical setting (de Bono, 1990b, p. 26).

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The fifth value of the hats is what de Bono refers to as providing the rules of the game.

Learning the way any game is played allows for participation and the rules of The Six Thinking

Hats® are very easily learned (de Bono, 1990b, p. 30).

De Bono (1990b) explains he wants thinkers “to visualise and to imagine the hats as

actual hats” and for this to happen using colour is very important (p. 31). He explains that “clever

Greek names” could have been chosen to “indicate the type of thinking required by each hat” but

the names would be difficult to remember. Using colour for the names of each hat is an example of

de Bono’s commitment to the notion powerful simplicity. De Bono asserts that in practice the hats

should always be referred to by their colour and never by their function and points out there is a

very good reason for this (p. 32). He explains: “if you ask someone to give their emotional reaction

to something, your are unlikely to get an honest answer because people think it is wrong to be

emotional” (p. 33). By comparison the term red hat is neutral (p. 33). Equally, you can more easily

ask someone to “take off the black hat for a moment” rather than asking them to stop being so

negative (p. 33). In this way, the neutrality of the colours allows people to not feel awkward or

embarrassed about using the hats (p. 33). The colour of each of the hats is related to its function.

A summary of The Six Thinking Hats® follows.

The Blue Hat

“Blue is the colour of the sky, which exists above everything else” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 32).

The blue hat is for process control. The blue hat thinks about the thinking being conducted

(metacognition). The blue hat sets and manages the agenda for thinking. It suggests the next step

in thinking. The blue hat can ask for a switch to be made to another hat. The blue hat asks for

summaries, conclusions and decisions. The blue hat can comment on the thinking being used. In

practice, every thinking sequence begins and ends with the blue hat (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Some examples of blue hat thinking:

We have spent far too much time looking for someone to blame.

Could we have a summary of your views?

I think we should take a look at the priorities.

I suggest we try some green hat thinking to get some new ideas (de Bono Institute, 2004).

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Although the blue hat is often used by the organiser or chairperson of a meeting other

participants can also put forward blue hat suggestions. Blue hat thinking organises and controls the

thinking process which results in meetings being more productive and often requiring less time

(de Bono Institute, 2004).

Formally structured thinking is very different from the notion of thinking as a free flowing

discussion. Focus is one of the key roles for blue hat thinking. De Bono offers an analogy: “The

blue hat thinker is not driving the car along the road, but he is watching the driver. He is also noting

the route to be taken” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 187). Blue hat thinking is also required to make the final

summary and prepare a report but this does not mean it becomes the role of one person only.

Each thinker can switch into blue hat thinking and offer accurate and objective about the thinking

that has taken place (de Bono, 1990b, p. 189). Importantly, blue hat thinking stops argument, it is

the means by which Parallel Thinking® rather than adversarial thinking takes place.

The White Hat

“White is neutral and objective” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 31). The white hat has to do with data

and information. White hat thinking is a convenient way of asking for facts and figures to be put

forward in a neutral and objective manner. Some examples of blue hat thinking:

What information do we have here?

What information is missing?

What information would we like to have?

How are we going to get the information? (de Bono Institute, 2004).

De Bono (1990b) contends that “too often facts and figures are embedded in an

argument”, that is, facts are used for some kind of purpose rather than being presented as facts”

(p. 34). In his view, the habit of argument in Western thinking seeks to provide “a conclusion first

and then bring in the facts to support that conclusion” and this is different to the map-making style

of thinking that he is proposing with The Six Thinking Hats® (p. 35). With a mapmaking approach,

the map is made first, and then a route is chosen and this means we need to have the facts and

figures first (p. 35). The white hat becomes a discipline that encourages separating fact from

interpretation or extrapolation, in time white hat thinking becomes second nature (p. 35–43). The

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central role of white hat thinking is to exclude “such valuable things as hunch, intuition, judgment

based on experience, feeling or impression and opinion (p.53)

The Green Hat

“Green is grass, vegetation and abundant fertile growth. The green hat indicates creativity

and new ideas” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 32). The green hat is for putting forward possibilities and

hypotheses. The green hat is for generating additional alternatives. The green hat encompasses

both provocation and movement which are two of the Lateral Thinking® tools (these are described

in the next section of this chapter). Some examples of green hat thinking:

We need some new ideas here.

Are there any additional alternatives?

Could we do this in a different way?

Could there be another explanation? (de Bono Institute, 2004).

The green hat makes it possible to ask directly for a creative effort. The green hat makes

time and space available for creative thinking. Even if no creative ideas are forthcoming, the green

hat asks for the creative effort (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Green hat thinking is concerned with escaping from old or existing ideas in order to

generate new ones (de Bono, 1990b, p. 135). De Bono believes that “the urge to do things in a

better way should be the background to all of our thinking” and there may be more of a need for

green hat thinking than for any other of the thinking (p.136). With regard to his idea of the brain as

a self-organising pattern recognition system, he infers that for a majority of people creative thinking

is difficult because “it is contrary to the natural habits of recognition, judgment and criticism” which

all draw on the brain’s design as “a recognition machine” (p.136). Given his model of the way the

brain is designed to set up patterns, to use them and prioritise placing new inputs into existing

categories (patterns), creative thought requires a different type of thinking. He asserts most

thinkers like to feel secure with their thinking and they like to be right whereas creativity involves

provocation, exploration and risk-taking (p. 137). De Bono is keen to point out that the green hat

does not by itself make people more creative but that it can provide time and a focus to support

creativity (p. 137). In a sense, the green hat provides artificial motivation to engage with thinking

experiments that might otherwise be refrained from. Green hat thinking is also about lateral thinking

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(refer to chapter 6 and the next section of this chapter devoted to the Lateral Thinking® tools).

Lateral Thinking®, which is based on the nature of an active self-organising information system, is

about switching patterns.

The Yellow Hat

“Yellow is sunny and positive. The yellow hat is optimistic and covers hope and possibility”

(de Bono, 1990b, p. 32). The yellow hat is for the logical positive view of things. The yellow hat

looks for feasibility. And how something can be done. The yellow hat looks for benefits—but they

must be logically based. Some examples of yellow hat thinking:

This might work if we moved the production plant nearer to the customers.

The benefit would come from repeat purchases.

The high cost of energy would make everyone more energy efficient (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Yellow hat thinking often requires a deliberate effort. Often benefits may not be

immediately obvious and may have to be searched for. Every creative idea deserves some yellow

hat attention. The black hat is much more natural than the yellow hat because we need to avoid

mistakes and danger for survival (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Being positive is a choice, de Bono argues, and we can choose to look at things in a

positive way and discover benefits. Yellow hat thinking ”probes and explores for value and benefit”

and then seeks to find logical ways to support a value proposition (de Bono, 1990b, p. 110). In

attitude and practice yellow hat thinking is the exact opposite of black hat thinking. Unfortunately

there are more natural reasons to be negative than to be positive as being negative protects us

from mistakes, risk taking, danger and so on (de Bono, 1990b, p. 110). De Bono refers to the

yellow hat as being “speculative positive” in the sense that we set out to do something because we

perceive it to be worth doing but can’t know exactly how things will turn out (p. 111). Perceiving

value is central to the notion of yellow hat thinking.

The Black Hat

“Black is gloomy and negative” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 32). The black hat is the caution hat.

The black hat prevents us from making mistakes or doing silly things. The black hat is for critical

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judgment. The black hat points out why something cannot be done. The black hat is for the logical

negative view of things. Some examples of black hat thinking:

The regulations do not permit us to do that.

We do not have the production capacity to meet that order.

When we tried a higher price the sales fell off.

He has no experience in export management (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Mistakes can be disastrous. No one wants to make mistakes or do silly things. So the

black hat is very valuable. It is the most used hat and possibly the most useful hat. At the same

time it is very easy for it to be over used (de Bono Institute, 2004).

For de Bono, the emphasis in Western thinking on argument and criticism is why most

people will feel most comfortable wearing the black hat (de Bono, 1990b, p. 80). Sadly, he points

out, this completely overshadows “the generative, creative and constructive aspects of thinking”

(p. 80). Nevertheless, black hat thinking is a very important part of thinking; it is always logical but

is never emotional (p. 80). De Bono is very keen to point out that although the black hat is the hat

of criticism it is not a matter of taking sides as this would sway thinking towards an argument

(p. 82). He regards a person who is negative by nature as one who will want to often introduce

negativity into their thinking and negativity will be there to strike unless it is controlled. One of the

benefits of the black hat is that it can restrict the scope of negativity by limiting the time or amount

of negative bias that is being brought to bear on thinking.

The Red Hat

“Red suggests anger (seeing red), rage or emotions. The red hat gives the emotional

view” (de Bono, 1990b, p. 32). The red hat has to do with feelings and intuition. In a serious

meeting you are not supposed to put forward your emotions, but people do this by disguising their

emotions as logic. The red hat gives people permission to put forward their feelings and intuitions

without apology, without explanation, and without any need to justify them. Some examples of red

hat thinking:

Putting on my red hat, this is what I feel about the project.

My gut feeling is it won’t work.

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I don’t like the way this is being done.

My intuition tells me that prices will soon fall (de Bono Institute, 2004).

Red hat thinking is the language of emotions and can be undertaken at any point in a

meeting, a discussion or a conversation (de Bono, 1990b, p. 67). Red hat feelings can be directed

at the way in which the meeting is being conducted and not be about only the subject matter that is

being considered (p. 67). It may seem quite arbitrary to have a red hat as emotions tend to

naturally arise in the course of any discussion or meeting but de Bono makes the point that

because the red hat provides a definite channel for emotion they do not need to intrude upon

thinking at every point (p. 68). “Anyone who feels the need to be emotional has a defined way to

go” which means there is “no longer the need to try and guess I the feelings of others” (p. 68).

Thinking may change emotions, not the logical part but the perceptual part and if we see something

differently our emotions may alter with a different perception (p. 70). Importantly, the red hat allows

for feelings to be made visible and this allows for them to become part of the thinking map that

de Bono describes.

6.5 Lateral Thinking®

In the previous chapter, lateral thinking was characterised by way of comparing it to natural, logical

and mathematical thinking and also in terms of the behavior of the brain as a self-organising

pattern recognition system. What becomes evident in de Bono’s (1990a) conceptualisation of

lateral thinking is that it is essentially concerned with changing patterns and is, therefore,

fundamentally linked to the way the mind handles information (p. 51). The system’s function is to

establish patterns and then perpetuate them, and this inherent limitation gives rise to the need for

lateral thinking (p. 51). With no adequate mechanism being present in the system to change

patterns, lateral thinking seeks to bring about a restructuring of information (p. 51). It liberates

information that is held within existing patterns and it does this in a provocative way that stimulates

the formation of new patterns. New juxtapositions of information lead to the formation of different

perceptions and the creation of new ideas. Without such shifts in perception, which arise through

the re-arranging of information, patterns are established and become more and more firmly

established over time.

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Central to lateral thinking is the role of perception and although de Bono contends “most

ordinary thinking takes place in the perceptual phase” and that “most of the mistakes in thinking are

inadequacies of perception rather than mistakes in logic” (de Bono, 1996, p. 58). In his view, we

have traditionally placed emphasis on logic rather than perception and taken refuge in the “truth” of

logic rather than choosing to engage with the “fluidities” and “possibilities” of perception (p. 58). Yet

we conceive of perception as being reality. With perception, as de Bono puts it, “we do not see the

world as it is but as we perceive it” (p. 58) Patterns of perception are built up over time and in

particular sequences and we perceive and make sense of the world “in terms of these established

patterns that are triggered by what is in front of us” (p. 58). While lateral thinking can be described

as being closely related to creativity, de Bono maintains that creativity can too frequently be the

description of a result whereas lateral thinking is the description of the process (p. 11).

De Bono offers a novel way of looking at lateral thinking by suggesting “You cannot dig a

hole in a different place by digging the same hole deeper” adding this emphasises “searching for

different approaches and different ways of looking at things” (de Bono, 1996, p. 52–53). He

compares this to what he refers to as normal thinking or “vertical thinking” (de Bono, 1990a,

preface) where each step taken is firmly based on the preceding step (de Bono, 1996, p. 147). In

vertical thinking, the next step in thinking is derived logically from wherever you are at any point in

time and this suggests digging the same hole deeper (de Bono, p. 52–53).

In terms of the behavior of the memory surface in the brain “natural thinking, logical

thinking and mathematical thinking are all selective processes. The memory surface selects what it

will pay attention to” (de Bono, 1990c, p. 237). “Natural thinking selects a pathway according to

emphasis. Logical thinking blocks pathways according to the mis-match reaction. Mathematical

thinking uses the rules of the game to select possible changes. The only generative process

involved is the chance arrangement of information in the environment“ and this is where lateral

thinking becomes so effective (de Bono, 1990c, p. 237). He describes lateral thinking as being an

insight tool (de Bono 1996, p.10).

The generative effect of lateral thinking is exerted in two ways. The first is to counteract, restrain or

delay the fierce selective processes of the memory-surface itself. It is also necessary to counteract

the selective processes that have been artificially developed, such as logical thinking with its

heightened sensitivity to a miss-match. The second is to bring about deliberate arrangements and

juxtapositions that night never otherwise have occurred. The aim of both these processes is to

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allow information to arrange itself in new and better patterns, as happens in insight (de Bono,

1990c, p. 238).

De Bono (1990c) points out “Lateral thinking in no way detracts from the efficiency of

vertical thinking. On the contrary, as a generative process it can only add to the over-all

effectiveness of any selective process” but adds that the process of lateral thinking can never

justify the outcome, or this would be vertical thinking (p. 245). It is also important to grasp that

lateral thinking is not at all about “chaos for the sake of chaos” (p. 277). Disruption of a pattern in

lateral thinking is only undertaken in order for a better pattern to form (p. 277). The value of lateral

thinking is in its ability to bring about disruption while retaining its ability to generate coherent new

ideas (de Bono, 1990c, p. 277). He considers normal logic to be very much concerned with “truth”

and “what is” whereas lateral thinking, like perception, concerns itself with “possibilities” and “what

might be” (de Bono, 1996, p. 54). Interestingly, he indicates that this type of “information

processing” is now referred to as fuzzy logic “because there are no sharp right/wrong boundaries”

(de Bono, 1996, p. 54).

For de Bono, lateral thinking may be regarded in one of the two following ways, “one of

which is specific and the other more general. Specific: A set of systematic techniques used for

changing concepts and perceptions and generating new ones. General: Exploring multiple

possibilities and approaches instead of pursuing a single approach” (de Bono, 1996, p. 54).

Lateral Thinking® is conducted within a framework and in a sequence and utilises a set of

thinking tools and techniques that are structured around the following concepts: Focus, Challenge,

Alternatives and Concepts, Provocation and Movement, Random Entry, Harvesting, Treatment,

and Assessment.

Whereas The Six Thinking Hats® direct thinking, the Lateral Thinking® shift perception.

A summary of the Lateral Thinking® tools follows.

Focus The initial phase of Lateral Thinking® is devoted to developing a very clear idea as to

where the process of lateral thinking will commence and also what is being sought as final output.

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To do this it is important to view the topic from multiple perspectives before deciding on focus

statement. Two types of focus are required: the first is Area Focus, which identifies the area or

location where attention and thinking will take place. The second is Purpose Focus, which identifies

the purpose of undertaking thinking in that area or location.

In Area Focus, we define where we want new ideas but not why we want them. Area Focus allows

us to think about anything at all, not just the solutions to problems. This can be very powerful as it

often leads to thinking about areas that no-one else has given any attention. The topic can be

narrow or broad. With Purpose Focus, we spell out the purpose of our thinking. There is a problem

to solve, an improvement to make, or a task to accomplish. Purpose focus statements include a

verb that tells specifically what we want to do about the subject (The McQuaig Group Inc., 2006).

Challenge

The idea of examining the starting assumptions about what you know or what you take for

granted about something is a fundamental part of creative thinking. The notion of this kind of

Challenge works on the assumption that there may be another and more valuable way of doing

something, even if the current way is adequate.

Challenge is a part of any change process. The Challenge process is never an attack or criticism.

If you treat Challenge as a criticism, you will only look for faults, deficiencies and problems. You

may also provoke defensiveness in others, which wastes energy. Start with the assumption that

there is nothing wrong, but we will challenge things anyway to see if we can get new ideas (The

McQuaig Group Inc., 2006).

Alternatives and Concepts

Generating Alternatives is one of the most basic operations of Lateral Thinking®. This is

predicated on the belief that there are multiple ways of looking at things and that it is important to

consider many different alternatives before deciding on one.

Alternatives give us options for achieving the same purpose. Alternatives are not random.

Alternatives must have a connecting point. We can find the connection between alternatives by

asking: ‘Both of these ways are ways of doing what?’’. The connections that link alternatives are

called ‘fixed points’. A concept is a general approach to doing something. Concepts are vague

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and non-specific. An idea is a way to carry out a concept. It is more specific (The McQuaig Group

Inc., 2006).

Provocation and Movement

Provocation, as the word implies, is one of the more radical thinking tools developed by de

Bono and is used in Lateral Thinking®. This tool can be used to break away from our established

patterns of thinking. Provocation includes use of a mental process previously described in this

thesis (refer to chapter 6) called a Provocative Operation (also know as a ‘PO’).

PO is derived from words such as hypothesis, possible, and suppose, each of which invites us to

think of what will happen next. Because Provocations are uncomfortable and unworkable, we view

them as a starting point and move forward from them until we’ve thought of new, workable ideas.

Recall how the brain forms patterns and then defaults to those patterns. The result is that we often

get stuck in a thinking pattern (The McQuaig Group Inc., 2006).

Random Entry

The Random Entry technique is very effective at breaking our thinking out of pre-existing

patterns through introducing a random stimulus to shift perception. It is an easy technique to use

and can produce ideas which are exciting, unusual and provocative.

The brain is so good at making connections that it can take two seemingly disconnected thoughts

and find ways to relate them to each other. In a self-organising, pattern-making system, once a

pattern is established, you can go easily along that track; but it is difficult to get out of that track to

access new ideas. Using Random Entry helps open pathways to new ideas for the Focus (The

McQuaig Group Inc., 2006).

Harvesting

At the conclusion of a creative thinking session, and particularly in the case of using

Lateral Thinking® tools, there is often a broad range of new ideas and concepts that have

emerged. At this stage in the process of using Lateral Thinking® tools it is very important to not

prematurely rush into action by selecting only a few ideas while ignoring the rest of the creative

output and use of the Harvesting tool is a reminder to slowly look at all of the outcomes.

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The Harvesting phase includes extracting new and interesting concepts and looking for the

relationships between ideas. The breakthrough ‘aha’s’ are often discovered at this critical stage.

While it is often helpful to generate ideas in a group setting, Harvesting is most efficient and

effective when handled by one or two persons. Usually these people would include the facilitator

and the client, team leader or someone else who is familiar with the situation and with the

Harvesting process (The McQuaig Group Inc., 2006).

Treatment

It is likely that Harvesting will produce an array of ideas that require additional work that

maintains their originality but where their practicality is resolved. Some ideas generated in a

creative thinking session may be complete whereas others may be initial ideas only. “The first thing

to avoid is the quick rejection of ideas. This is usually the result of real-world constraints. If the idea

cannot meet these constraints it tends to be rejected” (de Bono, 1996, p. 216). This can be viewed

as premature use of Black Hat thinking and should be countered by the use of Yellow Hat thinking

and possibly some more Green Hat thinking (p. 216)

Treatment tools [Shaping and Strengthening] help us in this vital process. With the Treatment tools,

we consider real life constraints and modify our idea to fit them. A deliberate effort can be made to

strengthen an idea by building on its power and benefits (The McQuaig Group Inc., 2006)

Assessment

When a new idea has passed through the Treatment phase, the idea can then move

forward into the evaluation stage (de Bono, 1996, p. 217). “At the end of Treatment stage, positive

and constructive thinking have done their best for the idea. The idea must now compete with other

claims, on attention, time, and resources. The key elements of evaluation will be feasibility,

benefits, resources and fit” (de Bono, 1996, p. 223).

The purpose of a Preliminary Assessment is to quickly determine the feasibility of ideas. This

process is applied after ideas have been developed further using Treatment. If an idea fares well

through the assessment, it can be investigated and pursued in more detail (The McQuaig Group

Inc., 2006).

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7.6 DATT® (Direct Attention Thinking Tools)

DATT® is a set of thinking tools designed to deepen and broaden perception. They can be used in

conjunction with The Six Thinking Hats®. When using the tools with other people, the conversation

or meeting should be conducted under the rules of Parallel Thinking®. The DATT® were derived

from the Cognitive Research Trust (CoRT) thinking program (refer to chapter 6) developed by

Edward de Bono. The CoRT thinking program, which was designed for teaching thinking explicitly,

has been adopted widely, particularly in schools. The CoRT program’s development flowed from

the conceptual construct for lateral thinking articulated in The Mechanism of Mind which was first

published in 1969.

The tools hinge on a “concept of usefulness” that de Bono refers to as operacy, a concept

that extends beyond the notion of knowledge being enough. De Bono observes “most languages

lack operating concepts, which tell us what to do at any moment. As with his other thinking tools,

the design of the DATT® is based on a fundamental understanding of how the brain handles

information. DATT® provides ten operating concepts—instructions for actions—to help us manage

our thinking processes” (DATT® Training Manual, p. 4). DATT® provide shorthand commands for

complex operations. The CoRT Thinking Program deals mainly with perception and de Bono

explains “This is because most ordinary thinking takes place at the stage of perception rather than

at the point of processing” (de Bono, 1991b, p. 138). The DATT® were developed from CoRT,

Book 1: Breadth of Perception which consisted of a ten-lesson program for sharpening perception

and focusing thinking that were designed to be used by business executives (Dudgeon, 2002,

pp. 147–148).

In describing the purpose of the DATT® construct, de Bono notes “We can passively allow

attention to wander through experience as in the daydream type of thinking, or we can try to do

something deliberate about attention” (de Bono, 1991b, p. 138. This, he states, can be achieved by

firstly providing direction and secondly by providing destinations so in this way the DATT® are

“10 simple tools for sharpening and focusing thinking in a more comprehensive, effective, and

efficient way. They create a framework for defining a situation, making a decision and taking action.

They make thinking more deliberate, more structured, more organised” (de Bono Institute, 2004).

De Bono describes them as being “evaluation tools, exploration tools, value tools, and action tools”,

tools which direct attention (de Bono Institute, 2004).

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The 10 tools carry the following acronyms: C&S (Consequence and Sequel), PMI (Plus,

Minus, Interesting), RAD (Recognise, Analyse, Divide), CAF (Consider All Factors), AGO (Aims,

Goals, Objectives), FIP (First Important Priorities), APC (Alternatives, Possibilities, Choices), OPV

(Other People’s View), KVI (Key Values Involved), DOCA (Decision/Design, Outcome, Channels,

Action). A summary of the DATT® follows.

C&S Consequence and Sequel C&S, as a tool, looks for the consequences of where an idea is leading. The idea could be

in the form of an action, a plan, a decision, a rule, an invention and so forth. It is an excellent

evaluation tool. Its use is predicated on the notion that: everything we do has consequences in the

future, even if we do nothing and that consequences are not always apparent in the present unless

an effort is made to forecast them. As out living takes place in the future, being forward-looking is

an important part of our thinking. The C&S tool creates a map of where an idea is leading in the

current, short-term, medium-term and long-term.

PMI Plus, Minus, Interesting The PMI tool helps us consider all sides of a matter before a decision or commitment is

made. It is another important evaluation tool. There is an intended overlap for C&S outcomes to be

considered in a PMI evaluation. PMI can also be used to review a current situation or consider a

future one. One of the challenges with the use of this tool is that people often believe they do this

kind of scan when looking for pros and cons of something. While it appears to be a simple and

quite obvious tool when used deliberately the results from a PMI scan can be quite dramatic.

RAD Recognise, Analyse, Divide RAD breaks larger concepts down into smaller, more manageable parts and helps us to

identify the familiar in the unfamiliar. The method of looking for things that are recognisable within

something that might initially be perceived as daunting, complex or initially unrecognisable is very

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powerful and is very much related to systems thinking (a holistic approach to analysis that focuses

on the way the constituent parts of a system interrelate and work within larger systems).

CAF Consider All Factors

CAF collects information upon which the other tools go to work. It explores all the factors

of a given situation. While it encourages the generation of new ideas, its real value lies in seeking

to generate factors that are not obviously apparent. Factors are similar to headings for which

information is needed hence CAF is a prime information input tool. Other tools such as C&S or

OPV may be brought in under the CAF tool. Factors need to be comprehensively listed first then

evaluated for their importance.

AGO Aims, Goals and Objectives AGO explores purpose. AGO is concerned with purposeful action, real world thinking. It

focuses deliberately and directly on the intention that lies behind taking action. In this way, it

explores what the overall vision is in the long term and how that connects to the medium and

shorter term. It is not simply an evaluation tool. It can be an important creative tool in its own right.

Its function is to spell out what is being attempted.

FIP First Important Priorities FIP narrows down long lists to those things that need to be done first and those things that

are the most important. Priorities guide us in what we undertake, hence the importance of

establishing priorities. Priorities should be listed in a sequence. FIP is ideally used immediately

after AGO, that is, at the beginning of the thinking. The more strict the priorities, the easier the

decision making becomes. FIP, unlike the other tools, is for narrowing down and needs to be used

carefully in order to not run counter to the breadth of purpose of the DATT® tools. Priorities can

have positive and negative values—things you need to achieve and things to be avoided.

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APC Alternatives, Possibilities, Choices The concept of APC is fundamental to many of de Bono’s ideas on thinking. It is the

process of deliberately trying to find alternatives through broadening perception rather than quickly

deciding on an initial or obvious answer. It is an antidote to possible emotional reaction. It is an

action tool, an idea generation tool: one designed for creativity. OPV can be used in conjunction

with APC to shift the focus of thinking to explore other peoples point-of-view.

KVI Key Values Involved KVI acknowledges that values are central to everything yet they can be vague and

intangible. KVI allows for our own values to be examined along with the values of others. KVI is not

for changing values, it is for identifying them and taking them into account. KVI has many uses,

including exploration, assessment, design, problem solving and decision-making.

DOCA Design/Decision, Outcome, Channels, Action DOCA directs attention to the outcome of the thinking that has taken place and the action

steps that follow. It helps in creating confidence about the decisions that that have been made and

the plan of action put in place. It primarily addresses the questions of: what are we going to do;

and, how are we going to do it?

(abridged from Dudgeon, 2002, pp. 131–135; de Bono Institute 2005).

7.7 Summary Without his background in medicine, de Bono believes he would not have been able to develop his

ideas and regards it as difficult to work in the field of thinking without understanding how the brain

functions. The development of de Bono’s thinking tools primarily arose out of two of his key

propositions: a model for the way the brain functions as a self-organising pattern recognition

system; and as a response to the ways in which our Western thinking inheritance has culturally

informed our thinking behavior. They have been derived from a highly reasoned biological premise

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and also draw on several of his views to do with enculturated thinking. They are designed to

compensate for aspects of the brain’s behavior and to offset our thinking traditions.

Embedded within them are two other key features (concepts) linked to his ideas on

developing new approaches to thinking — the notion of parallel thinking, as compared to

adversarial thinking; and combining the use of water logic as the logic of perception along with the

use of rock logic as the logic of traditional thinking. The thinking tools are designed to enhance

thinking in terms of both analytical and judgment-oriented thinking and generative thinking, support

collaborative engagement with thinking, and enrich the quality of thinking outputs. Hence they offer

a positive response to the aim of this research project that asks: can design thinking be enriched

with the ideas of de Bono, in order to make the thinking and the process more effective? Effective,

in this sense, means thinking and thinking behavior regarded as being more capable of creating

new perceptions and concepts, that is cooperative and non-adversarial in nature, and that can be

engaged with strategically. Although Sternberg and Lubart (2005) write that pragmatic approaches

(and refer to de Bono as an exemplar of such approaches) have damaged the scientific study of

creativity, they concede that such approaches might have value in terms of enhancing creativity.

Many of de Bono’s concepts, ideas and methods have now been in active use for over

forty years. De Bono has written more than 80 books on the subject of thinking and creativity with

translations into 41 languages. His tools for perceptual thinking are widely used in both schools and

business. He has developed the most widely used program for the direct teaching of thinking as a

subject in schools (the CoRT Program). His methods are simple but powerful. The use of just one

method produced 21,000 ideas for a steel company in one afternoon. He works not only in the field

of education but also with business, government and foreign affairs. He has taught thinking to

Nobel prize winners and children with Down syndrome.

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce de Bono’s concept of thinking tools and their

ability to compensate for the brain’s behavior into the thesis narrative following the previous

chapter’s description of de Bono’s background and corpus. Collectively, these two chapters contain

a large amount of material that is considered highly relevant to the research agenda in relation to

design thinking. De Bono’s ideas and methods deal directly with thinking and creativity and many of

his ideas align with those of other eminent authors cited in this thesis.

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I consider de Bono’s ideas, methods and thinking tools allow me to produce a positive response to

an additional dimension of the research question: can some de Bono’s ideas be graphically

visualised? In the next chapter of this thesis, three sets of de Bono’s thinking tools are incorporated

within a design process and design thinking framework. These tools provide a means for shifting,

deepening, broadening perception and directing thinking.

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Chapter 8 Proposing a graphic visualisation of a design process and design thinking framework

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this research project is to determine whether design thinking can be improved,

made more tangible by the development of more effective strategies. To investigate this, it has

focussed on the relevance and value of ideas put forward by Edward de Bono and has presented

an evaluation of a significant part of his corpus including his development of thinking tools. An

additional aim of this study asks whether some of these ideas can be graphically visualised.

In this chapter I affirm the role and value of visual analogy and diagrammatic

representation in supporting the articulation and explication of aspects of tacit design knowledge.

This provides a background for graphically visualising several of de Bono’s concepts including the

deployment of his thinking tools within a design thinking and design process sequence. The

development of the sequence by the author of this thesis is an outcome of this research project.

In this chapter I also introduce two schemas, developed by the author of this thesis, each of which

comprise a set of graphic visualisations (diagrams). The second schema incorporates the design

thinking and design process sequence. The development of the two schemas (cognitive artifacts)

as an outcome of this research project was foreshadowed in chapter four.

The first schema comprises a set of diagrams that visualise de Bono’s model for the way

the brain functions as a self-organising pattern recognition system, highlighting the biological

dominance of analysis and judgment-oriented thinking over generative thinking. Within this set of

diagrams is his framing of a biologically based model for the mechanism of mind that is aligned

with his ideas about creativity and the need for compensating for the brain’s deficiencies with

regard to creativity. Importantly, they incorporate de Bono’s original diagrammatic representations

of these concepts. The development of the second set of diagrams is predicated on this model.

The second schema comprises a set of diagrams that frames the design thinking and

design process sequence and locates within it the deployment of de Bono’s thinking tools.

Embedded within this schema is his model for the way in which the brain functions as a self-

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organising pattern recognition system and the need to offset this behavior to maximise the

generative thinking capability of the brain. The incorporation of his thinking tools have embedded

within them his concepts of lateral thinking, parallel thinking, water logic and rock logic.

Each schema is diagrammatically depicted in stages to reveal the development of the

whole construct. The individual diagrams have been constructed on a grid-based, digital template.

The majority of the slides have been designed to give concrete (visual) form to otherwise abstract

aspects of the process of design and design thinking. Although the development of the diagrams

was informed by many aspects of this research project and drew extensively on the work of

Edward de Bono, they were also informed by the author’s professional practice as a designer and

design educator for over 35 years. I developed the two sets of diagrams for digital presentation

using software applications such as Powerpoint or Keynote.

8.2 Explication and representation

Earlier in this thesis, I noted that Friedman proposed the idea that design knowledge involves

explicit and tacit knowledge; he added that the challenge of any evolving field is to bring “tacit

knowledge into articulate focus” (Friedman 2000, p.13). Similarly, from a practice-based

perspective, it is becoming increasingly important for designers to be able to describe their

processes and methods to support their claim to be part of a professional discipline. Over time,

many professional practitioners have acknowledged the importance of designers being

engaged earlier in the overall process of design and innovation. But if design warrants a place

at the round-table of innovation, how do designers, as change agents, explain to business

clients and users of design that the design professions are worthy of the status accorded

them? Are their methods actually known to them and, if so, are they able to adequately

articulate them?

In this thesis I argue that further articulation of the nature of design thinking through

expanding the frame of reference is a valuable contribution to the process of explicating the

otherwise tacit nature of design knowledge. Additionally, in this chapter I assert that in a similar

way to individuals being able to, or needing to, verbalise aspects of the process of design and

design thinking, there is value in being able to visualise these processes through the use of

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graphic representation.

Lawson (2004) contends “Describing what designers know is not an easy task … .

The more generic question about what designers do is even more difficult to answer simply

and successfully” (p. 1). As noted in chapter four of this thesis, Lawson indicates that theorists

in cognitive science have only recently recognised the special nature of design and that they

have a particular interest in whether or not design has “‘a language of thought’ and if so what is

its nature?” (Lawson, 2004, p. 18). He also proposes that a significant part of a designer’s

language of thought involves the outward expression of much of their thinking through drawing.

From the point-of-view of design praxis, these ideas are important. For example, if, as

Brawne (2003) suggests, “Architectural thought primarily involves non-verbal thought” (p. 7),

we might reasonably assert that in a broader sense design (designing) does similarly. And, as

Brawne points out, this engagement with non-verbal thought is of considerable significance

given we so often engage on a routine basis with much that lies with the domain of the verbal

(Brawne, 2003). To this we could add the architect Renzo Piano’s idea that design

is not a linear experience, in which you have an idea, put it down on paper, then carry it out

and that’s that. Rather, it is a circular process: your idea is drawn up, tried out, reconsidered

and reworked, coming back again and again to the same point” (Piano, cited in Brawne,

2003, p. 78).

We might also reasonably add a perspective from Eames, the acclaimed twentieth-

century architect and designer, about design being a process of creating a plan for arranging

elements in such a way as to best accomplish a particular purpose.

How, then, is “an idea be drawn up”? How is a plan to be represented? And what kind

of processes will be required to execute the plan? A reductionist viewpoint would suggest that

the nature of complex things can always be reduced to, or explained by, simpler or more

fundamental things. As noted in chapter four, from work on complex systems (complexity

theory) comes the idea that “by reducing complexities to underlying simplicities, science has

allowed our brains to grasp the hitherto ungraspable” (Cohen & Stuart, 1994, p. 10). Equally,

the same authors have observed that “Scientists have been asking the wrong question” in

that they have

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focused upon complexity as the thing that requires explanation, and they have taken simplicity

for granted…The interesting question is precisely the opposite. The question that most

scientists never thought to ask because they didn’t see that there was a question to ask.

Where does the simplicity come from?” (Cohen & Stuart, 1994, p. 222).

To propose and graphically visualise a schema for design thinking (within the context of

the process of design) involves consideration of a constellation of thought about a particular type

of thinking. To render the outcome of this analysis and interpretation visually is a significant

challenge. While some diagrams represent concepts that are quite simple to explain, others have

to adequately represent a myriad of subtle, complex, tangible and intangible, and often

independent or interdependent characteristics into a coherent whole.

Within the discipline of information design there exists the notion of the binary opposites of

“simplicity” and “complexity”. Equally, an important distinction exists between “complex” and

“complicated”. Within the praxis of information design, the challenge is to represent complexity in a

simple way, not in a simplistic way, and for the complex not to be become complicated. The idea

that a diagram’s reducibility or simplifying properties (without losing the key concepts it seeks to

explain) makes it valuable underlines the significance of its ability to remove unnecessary

information and reduce complexity (Lawson, 2004, p. 40). De Bono argues that a highly valuable

aspect of out thinking is the notion of concept extraction and he proposes the following useful

distinction. An idea is a practical way of doing something whereas a concept is the general method

involved (de Bono, 1996, p. 131). The extraction of concepts enables a grasp of key aspects of a

situation sufficient to allow for movement forward (possibly toward a subsequent stage). In this way

concept extraction becomes a kind of tool. In successful information design it is an imperative.

In chapter four, I noted that Goldschmidt (2001) points out that; Schön identified the value

of transferring of concepts from one situation to another and that Gentner and Medina (1998)

support the value of similarity-based reasoning, and proposes the usefulness of visual analogy as a

strategy in problem solving. She asserts they are an example of similarity-based reasoning. For

Goldschmidt analogy incorporates references to the similarities between things that she regards in

its most complete form as a way of establishing “structural commonalities” (Goldschmidt 2001, p.

201). In chapter four, I also noted Dorst (2003/2006) believes metaphors assist our understanding

of the world through the way they translate complex situations into more simple and familiar ones.

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In chapter five, I noted that Boden (2004) regards analogy as being central to creative

thinking, that the use of visual analogy is common, and that the development of our visual

systems “has evolved to notice spatial relations like connectedness, juxtaposition, and gaps

and to see connectedness as implying a possible pathway along which the eye and/or body

might be able to move in either direction” (p. 114). In advancing a view of the primacy of the

sense of vision, she contends that certain conceptual spaces (problem domains) that can be

represented as a “spatial model or diagram” provide an opportunity to visually process

relationships, gaps and potential pathways revealing what may have otherwise be overlooked

(Boden 2004).

Blackwell (1998) asks: “Is there any good reason why we should describe diagrams as

metaphors rather than as structural analogies or pictorial allegories?” (p. 4) and in believing that it

is convenient to do so provides three reasons. Firstly, in the field of Human Computer Interface

(HCI), metaphor has been adopted without reference to particular theories in cognitive science.

Secondly, existing literature in other fields, including education (Goldsmith 1984) and in graphic

design (Richards, 1997) describes the “interpretation of diagrams as a process of metaphor”

(Blackwell, 1998, p. 4). Thirdly, theories about the use of linguistic metaphors have been extended

from language to diagrams (Blackwell 1998).

Analogy and metaphor involve extraction of key concepts and transfer to another setting

or problem space. Diagrams belong to a group known as cognitive artifacts and as was noted in

chapter four, Blackwell (1998) points out that diagrams are now commonly associated with

instruction manuals, electronics, software design, architecture, geometry, general mathematics,

education, symbolic logic and informal problem-solving.

De Bono, who has used diagrammatic representation in many of his books over many

years, offers another perspective on the way they can be regarded. Within a public speaking or

lecture context he has often used an overhead projector that allows him to draw diagrams

continuously. This, he explains, “is in order to garner and focus the listener’s attention on the

development of an image (for example, developing a concept or idea) that is very different to

presenting a completed, fixed slide. Within the context described, importantly, the listener’s

attention is being controlled instead of choosing its own path” (de Bono, 2005, p. 17). This is a

good example of how de Bono directs the thinking of an audience.

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8.3 Proposing a schema for a design process and design thinking sequence

In chapter one of this thesis, I presented Popper’s four-stage schema and Michael Brawne’s

interpretation of Popper’s schema in diagrammatic form (see Figures 2.8 and 2.9). As I indicated in

chapter one, Popper’s theory became a significant model for those working in the early years of

design methods. I also indicated that within the context of the timeline for this research project,

both of the schemas were encountered by the author of this thesis after the early development of

the design process and design thinking sequence that is proposed in this chapter. This, as I’ve

already noted, revealed serendipitously that there were clear alignments between all three the

models and that encountering Popper’s theory and diagrammatic representation and Brawne’s

subsequent interpretation provided valuable reinforcement of the direction, content and form of the

proposed schema. Also of importance in terms of validating the content of the proposed schema

has been Lubart’s view that “The most widely cited Western description of the creative process

involves four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification” (Lubart, in Sternberg,

2005, p. 341).

Nevertheless, as has been previously stated, it is very important to understand that while

Popper proposed the idea that a new hypothesis (conjecture) should be subjected to what he

termed falsifiability (refutation) which constitutes the second stage of his model, this is very

different to the concept of creating new ideas as described by de Bono. Subjecting a hypothesis to

everything that you know, which Popper encouraged in his model (see 2.8 Design methods: A

Popperian view of designing), to assess its viability is very different to engaging in thinking which

has at its core, a generative energy which de Bono encourages in his writings. The proposed four-

stage design process and design thinking sequence, was overlaid with several key of de Bono’s

key concepts and three sets of his thinking tools. It is through incorporating de Bono’s thinking tools

into the proposed schema in this chapter that creative thinking and, therefore, design thinking

is made more effective.

The proposed schema identifies four key stages in a typical design process and design

thinking sequence (see Figure 8.1). The schema establishes a model for a sequence that can vary

in duration and one that commences at a given point and concludes at another. The sequence may

stand-alone and, therefore, have a beginning and an end or final outcome; or, the sequence may

be one of several where the end point of any one sequence results in a proposition that becomes

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the starting point or focus for the next sequence. In this way, multiple sequences may be

undertaken until a final proposition (final outcome) is achieved.

The first stage establishes focus for the sequence; the second stage provides for concept

and idea generation (typically the stage where creative responses to a focused task are

generated); the third stage involves iterative design development and evaluation (including

modification and refinement of concepts and ideas generated in the previous stage); the fourth

stage identifies the final proposition generated by the sequence.

Figure 8.1 Proposed four-stage design process and design thinking sequence

_______________________________________________________________________________

Embedded within the schema are several of de Bono’s key concepts and ideas about how

the brain functions (including his concept of lateral thinking). As previously indicated, the use of his

thinking tools within the schema provide for shifting, deepening, broadening perception and

directing thinking.

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8.4 Part 1: Graphic visualisation of de Bono’s biologically-based model for The Mechanism of Mind and the concept of Lateral Thinking

The first set of seven diagrams (see Figures 8.1 to 8.5) represent a staged visualisation of de

Bono’s model for the way the brain functions as a self-organising pattern recognition system

highlighting the biological dominance of analysis and judgment-oriented thinking over generative

thinking. Importantly, these diagrams also include de Bono’s own graphic representation of his

concept of lateral thinking.

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Figure 8.2 Edward de Bono’s biologically-based model for The Mechanism of Mind

_______________________________________________________________________________

Central to de Bono’s ideas about the behavior of the brain (introduced in chapter five) is his

description of the two different types of thinking the brain is capable of undertaking. Analysis- and

judgment-oriented thinking is the dominant thinking behavior that operates at a pre-linguistic level

and is very much connected to our survival. As a thinking behavior it relies heavily on pre-existing

information (patterns). In this way it is fundamentally derived from the past. Generative thinking, on

the other hand, is less dominant and incorporates the ability to create alternative possibilities other

than those that may already exist within the self-organising pattern recognition system of the brain.

Edward de Bono: A Biologically-Based Model for The Mechanism of Mind and the Thinking Behavior of the Brain as a Self-Organising Pattern Recognition System

1 Description of the Brain’s Ability to Undertake Two Different Types of Thinking

GenerativeThinking Analysis- and

Judgment-Oriented Thinking


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_______________________________________________________________________________

Drawing on de Bono’s own diagrammatic representation of the pattern-forming and pattern-using

behavior of the neural networks of the brain, I introduce his representation of a thinking sequence

(A to B), the direction of thinking and the potential for alternative patterns to exist within the

sequence is introduced. De Bono argues that the dominant pathway suppresses the other pathway

resulting in alternatives, in that moment, ceasing to exist (de Bono 1996, p. 12).


2 Representation of the Possibility of Shifting Perception and Thinking Direction

A B


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_______________________________________________________________________________

The inherent challenge in shifting perception and thinking direction is graphically highlighted

through representation of the differing amplitudes of the two pathways at the point of a potential

shift in perception and thinking direction.


3 Representation of the Dominance of Pre-Existing Patterns Within the System

A B


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_______________________________________________________________________________

Drawing on his initial diagrammatic representation of the of the pattern-forming and pattern-using

behavior of the brain, de Bono’s alternative and significant re-framing of the model and his

diagrammatic representation of it is introduced. In this version, the lines representing an alternative

pathway are now splayed to reveal the potential significant value of this alternative. De Bono

contends that sometimes these kinds of alternative pathways may have the potential to generate

better ideas than those being pursued in the initial (and dominant) pathway.


4 Representation of the Potential Value of Alternatives Within the System: 1

A B


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_______________________________________________________________________________

The potential value of alternative pathways to those being pursued in the initial (and dominant)

pathway is graphically highlighted. This diagram also depicts de Bono’s own visual representation

of his concept of lateral thinking.


5 Representation of the Potential Value of Alternatives Within the System: 2

A B


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8.5 Part 2: Graphic visualisation of a schema for a design process and design thinking sequence

The second set of diagrams (see Figures 8.7 to 8.18) comprises a model for a design process

and design thinking schema. The schema has several important dimensions to it. It establishes

a problem/solution space; it establishes the four key stages of the sequence; it compares and

contrasts itself to Popper’s model and Brawne’s interpretation of Popper’s model; it establishes

a contextual space; and identifies the deployment and role of each set of de Bono’s think tools.

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Figure 8.7 Schematic framework for a design process and design thinking sequence

_______________________________________________________________________________ The initial framing of the schema involves representation of a problem/solution space that

commences at A and concludes at B.

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Figure 8.8 Schematic framework for a design process and design thinking sequence.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Within the context of a problem/solution space (that commences at A and concludes at B), the

notion of a first stage comprising Focus is introduced. Drawing on the work of Edward de Bono,

stage 1 incorporates the initial determination of a broad area focus followed by a more specific

purpose focus. The two diagonal lines characterise this stage as being convergent in nature.

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______________________________________________________________________________

Within the context of a problem/solution space, and drawing on the work of Edward de Bono, the

notion of a second stage comprising Concept/Idea Generation is introduced. The two diagonal lines

characterise this stage as being divergent and generative (creative) in nature. Typically, it is the

stage in the sequence that maximises the use of de Bono’s creativity tools available in the Six

Thinking Hats®, DATT® and the Lateral Thinking® tools. In this stage, intention and time are

devoted to searching for new concepts and ideas. Analysis and judgment-oriented thinking is

temporarily suspended on the basis that this will be undertaken in the next stages of the sequence.

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______________________________________________________________________________

Within the context of a problem/solution space, the notion of a third stage comprising Design

Development/Evaluation is introduced. Importantly, this stage is key to allowing analysis-and

judgment-oriented thinking (the dominant thinking behavior of the brain) to combine with generative

thinking to determine the value of new concepts and ideas (that were created in the previous

stage). These are iteratively developed and refined over time until a final outcome from the

sequence is achieved.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

Within the context of a problem/solution space, the notion of a fourth and final stage comprising

identification of a proposition is introduced. Importantly, and reinforced by the models of Popper

and Brawne, a proposition represents an end-point to the sequence. The two diagonal lines

characterise this stage as incorporating forms of convergence and synthesis. The result of this

stage may be a stand-alone final outcome or it may become the beginning of a subsequent

sequence or set of sequences.

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_______________________________________________________________________________ Superimposing the Popperian stages introduced in chapter one of this thesis upon the framework

reveals broad alignment with the proposed four-stage schema.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

Superimposing Brawne’s interpretation of Popper’s model introduced in chapter one of this thesis

upon the framework reveals broad alignment with the proposed schema.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

Framing the design process and design thinking sequence within a contextual space acknowledges

that context informs the sequence.

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______________________________________________________________________________

In Figure 8.15, the three sets of thinking tools developed by de Bono are introduced into the

schema. During the sequence the use of the Six Thinking Hats® directs thinking, the use of DATT®

deepen and broaden perception, and the Lateral Thinking® tools shift perception.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

The Six Thinking Hats® direct thinking and provide for thinking to be “unbundled” (a simple concept

which allows each thinker to do one thing at a time and separate emotion from logic, creativity from

information, and so on). Significantly, the system also encourages cooperative exploration of ideas

and topics through the concept of Parallel Thinking® which reduces adversarial thinking and

encourages thinking collaboratively. In this way the system provides an alternative to that most

basic of thinking procedures: the argument. The Six Thinking Hats® can be used on their own or

can be combined with the other two sets of thinking tools.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

The DATT® deepen and broaden perception and hinge on a concept of usefulness that de Bono

refers to as operacy (introduced in chapter 6). The ten operating concepts (which are instructions

for action) embedded in the tools are based on a fundamental understanding of how the brain

handles information. They assist with managing thinking processes through deepening and

broadening perception and create a framework to assist with defining a situation, decision-making

and taking action. Consequently, thinking becomes more deliberate, more structured, more

organised. The DATT® are often combined with the use of the other thinking tools, particularly the

Six Thinking Hats®.

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_______________________________________________________________________________

The Lateral Thinking® tools are designed to shift perception and are a set of systematic techniques

that provide for the exploration of multiple possibilities and approaches instead of pursuing a single

approach. These tools allow for the possibility of re-framing any assumptions and any sharp-edged

(e.g., right/wrong) boundaries being considered. This allows for perceptions set up in one way to be

reconfigured quite differently. The Lateral Thinking® tools can be combined with the use of the

other thinking tools.

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8.6 Summary

In chapter 2, Cross’s (2007) idea that design “has its own things to know” and “ways of knowing

them” was introduced. Added to this was the issue of how might these things be communicated

given they may be visual, concrete or abstract. In this chapter, I built on content introduced in

chapter four concerned with drawing and diagrammatic representation in design to affirm the value

of visual analogy and diagrammatic representation in articulating and explicating aspects of tacit

design knowledge.

Diagrams belong to a group of objects known as cognitive artifacts—physical objects

developed by humans for the purpose of aiding, enhancing, or improving cognition. The diagrams

introduced in this chapter were designed with these objectives in mind which aligns with a view I

have already expressed: that in a similar way to individuals being able to, or needing to, verbalise

aspects of the process of design and design thinking that there is also value in being able to

visualise aspects of these same processes through the use of graphic representation.

Yet, Lawson (2004) contends that trying to describe what designers know and what they

difficult to answer simply and successfully. Moreover, as was stated earlier in this chapter, to

propose and graphically visualise a framework for design thinking (within the context of the process

of design) involves consideration of a constellation of thought about a particular type of thinking. To

render the outcome of this analysis and interpretation visually is challenging.

Development of the diagrams in this chapter drew on my professional background in

information design. They are predicated on information design’s axiomatic challenge of seeking to

represent complexity in a simple way, not in a simplistic way, and for the complex not to be become

complicated. While created in keeping with these ideas, the design of the diagrams, particularly

those in Figures 8.6 to 8.17, is also predicated on what de Bono describes as the notion of concept

extraction which, broadly speaking, is about identifying key aspects of a situation that enable a

transfer of knowledge.

Development of the second set of diagrams (see Figures 8.6 to 8.17) took place over a

period of approximately eight years, coinciding with an evaluation of the usefulness of incorporating

selected concepts, ideas and thinking tools developed by Edward de Bono within a design process

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and design thinking framework. As previously described, the schema proposed in this thesis is not

offered as a scientifically validated model nor can it exist without an accompanying narrative. It is

proposed as a model that frames specific aspects of the process of design and cognition

associated with design thinking concurrently. It was designed as a direct response to the thesis

question: can design thinking be enriched with the ideas of de Bono, in order to make the thinking

and the process more effective and can some of these ideas be graphically visualised? My answer

to this question, based on the work presented in this and the preceding seven chapters, is given in

chapter 9.

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Chapter 9 Conclusion

In chapter one I indicated that the central theme of this thesis is the idea of design being an agency

of change, combined with the view that design routinely engages with the notion of possibility in

seeking to bring imaginable worlds into existence. Additionally, I proposed that design (designing)

is an act of doing that involves thinking, and therefore, knowledge. In acknowledging that, amongst

other things, design is a creative act, my central focus was the thinking behaviors associated with

the process of design that have been referred to as design thinking. This lead to the framing of the

research question: can design thinking be improved, made more tangible by the development of

more effective approaches? My thesis presents a staged response to this question. The main

contribution of this thesis is the visualisation of two types of thinking (based on de Bono), a

visualisation of the design process in four stages with the incorporation of three sets of creativity

tools of de Bono, and an extensive literature review on designing and related concepts.

To establish a context for creativity within the process of design and within the context of design

thinking, I began by conceptualising the notion of design via its precursory

landscape. Important historical antecedents linked to contemporary notions of design (designing),

design knowledge, design process and design thinking, and in particular, those leading to the

development of the design methods movement were introduced to achieve this.

My conceptualisation of design in chapter one led to consideration of both the professional

practice of design as social, cultural and economic production and the view that all people, to

varying degrees, possess an innate capacity to be creative. These two perspectives allowed for a

coalescing of my ideas about the notion of creativity, building on a range of anthropological,

ethnographic and relevant cognitive science perspectives. These perspectives also contributed to a

more informed view about design thinking within the context of the professional practice of design.

To these perspectives I grafted the development of a contemporary profile of the professional

practice of design within which the dynamic nature of the process of design became apparent.

Two particular types of thinking behavior were subsequently explored. Analytical thinking was

introduced as an embodiment of the known in the sense that analysis and judgment, as a thinking

behavior, can only be exercised on the basis of prior knowledge. Generative thinking, on the other

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hand, is more speculative in nature and provides embodiment for creative insight and intuition and

thus seeks to escape the known in order to envision the new (possibility).

A key element of the thesis response to the research question is my conception of

drawing and diagrammatic representation as a language of thought. This includes the idea that

while some individuals benefit from verbalisation (on aspects of design and design thinking) there

is also value in visualisation. With Cross’s (2007) assertion that design has its own particular ways

of doing things, I also considered it important to indicate that visual language is inextricably linked

to the practice of design and that drawing and diagrammatic representation comprise parts of the

dynamic morphology of the professional practice of design.

In this thesis I framed the notion of creativity through a range of historical, transcultural

and contemporary perspectives selected from literature of history, philosophy, science, art and

design research. In the process, several contrasting and sometimes conflicting views were

revealed. For example, Bohm, arguing from the viewpoint of theoretical physics, stated it was

impossible to define creativity in words yet wrote extensively on the subject. Boden, arguing from a

computational science perspective, contrasted thinking styles that engage with chance,

randomness and unpredictability with those that are conscious, rational and analytical. Boden

expressed the view that the origin of creativity is the unconscious mind. What my examination of

many authors’ work revealed was the existence of barriers to serious scientific investigation of

creativity. Many authors attributed this barrier to the complex interlacing of the conscious and the

un-conscious, the known and the unknown, the explicit and the tacit, and so forth.

Having established a context for the broad notion of creativity, chapter five became the

locus for several strands of data to converge in relation to important biological, psychological and

cultural dimensions of creativity, cognition and perception. Assembling this range of material

allowed me to establish a frame of reference from which to explore the research question

effectively. I incorporated recent perspectives on creativity and perception drawn from psychology

and cognitive science including those connected with the management of thinking (metacognition)

and developments in computer science (including the area of artificial intelligence).

That perception plays a significant role in the process of design and, therefore, in design

thinking also emerged as my research progressed. Friedman, for example, locates the designer as

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being at the psychological centre of a perceptual process. Schön’s concept of reflective practice

incorporating a continuous process involving thoughtful consideration (perception) of one's own

experiences in the application of knowledge to practice, is another.

Several of these themes outlined above re-emerged in chapter six, which is devoted to an

examination of ideas promoted by de Bono. I selected several of de Bono’s most important

concepts, ideas and methods and evaluated them for their suitability for use within the context of

design thinking. Examination of de Bono’s corpus revealed that many of his ideas are predicated

on a biological model for the way the brain functions. He also has extensive views about our

thinking behaviors, thinking inheritance and acculturation. Knowledge of how the brain functions

combined with understanding thinking behavior led to de Bono’s development of a range of specific

approaches to promoting creative thinking, including thinking tools designed to enhance thinking

behavior. In chapter six I also considered the work of de Bono in relation to design thinking

specifically from the point of view of shifting, broadening, deepening perception and

directing thinking.

Of interest to the research agenda was the view that his work is not universally admired.

In terms of the science of creativity compared to pragmatic approaches (including those adopted by

de Bono), Sternberg and Lubart submitted a rather scornful view of those adopting pragmatic

approaches to creativity, even suggesting such approaches have been damaging to the scientific

study of creativity. Nickerson, on the other hand, submitted that within behavioral science a belief

that creativity can be enhanced has many adherents adding that although a unequivocal and

incontestable answer to the question of how creativity can be enhanced is not to be found in the

psychological literature, what is known about creativity suffices to make the approaches worth

trying. Although the thesis narrative initially indicated some cognitive scientists and psychologists

hold conflicting views, Sternberg and Lubart later conceded that pragmatic approaches may,

in fact, hold value.

Pedagogical implications for the teaching of design have also emerged in light of new

knowledge particularly in the area of design research. A need for a shift to occur in curriculum

content largely derived from the long-standing craft-based tradition in design education toward

something more aligned with new knowledge in the field was introduced by several authors.

Exemplifying the need for a shift to occur is Oxman’s (2003) view that in the studio–based teaching

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environment of most design schools, the cognitive processes of design thinking are rarely, if ever,

taught. Oxman (1999) proposed a conceptual model for design education that draws on cognitive

theories about learning and which emphasises the importance of acquiring the cognitive structures

and strategies of design thinking. My own research reveals that many of de Bono’s key concepts,

ideas and strategies are well suited for inclusion in this endeavour.

Having conceptualised a contemporary view of design (designing) and the types of

thinking embedded within it, I was able to turn to material to support the notion of expanding the

frame of reference for design thinking. This took the form of a biologically and culturally informed

approach. In chapter six, I raised ideas associated with the intrinsically pragmatic nature of design

thinking, characterising it as a particular type of creative thinking-in-action that is solution-based or

solution-focused. In seeking to expand the frame of reference for design thinking, I presented the

idea that examining cognitive function via a biologically-based model for the way the brain functions

was important to consider. To this I added the importance of understanding the influence of cultural

perspectives on our thinking inheritance (acculturation). These two strands of ideas allow valuable

information to enter the discourse on design thinking. Knowledge of how the brain functions and its

consequential thinking behavior have led to the development of specific approaches to the

promotion of creativity. These include the development of thinking tools designed to enhance

thinking behavior, particularly creative thinking. De Bono’s work in these areas is substantial, and

in chapter six, I introduced many of his ideas drawn from his extensive corpus.

De Bono proposes the brain as a self-organising pattern recognition system. In his

seminal work The Mechanism of Mind, he showed that creativity was a necessary behavior in a

self-organising system and that patterns formed by the nerve networks in the brain act as the basis

of perception. According to de Bono, while the brain is quite a remarkable self-organising pattern

recognition system it is not designed to be creative. The purpose of the brain is to enable us to

survive and he points out that the brain is designed to form patterns and adhere to those patterns

and life would be totally impossible if the brain were to work differently. De Bono asks: what about

the process of changing concepts as opposed to establishing them? He argues this is an unnatural

process for which we have no tools and no training, and as a result there is a great need for mental

tools that make possible the re-forming of ideas. De Bono’s extensive writings on the biology of the

brain in terms of its operation as a self-organising pattern recognition system are paralleled by his

equally extensive views about our thinking behaviors, thinking inheritance and enculturation.

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De Bono asserts that several historical and cultural factors have confirmed a preference for

argument as the means by which to establish truth, and preference has become the basis for our

adversarial thinking system in science, law and politics. De Bono maintains while there is a place

for it, it is inadequate as the main tool of thinking because it lacks creative, design and

constructive energies.

De Bono has passionately articulated the need for a new Renaissance related to our

thinking behavior, wherein he expresses a need for an entirely different form of logic to that of

traditional logic. He proposes water logic as the logic of perception in contrast to rock logic as the

logic of traditional thinking. He regards traditional (Aristotelian) logic as comprising categories that

are clear, hard-edged and permanent; it leads us to make decisions as to whether something fits

into a category, does not fit into a category or cannot fit into a category. By contrast, water logic

depends directly upon patterns but also encompasses flow, expectations and context. Here change

can occur on the memory-surface in the brain allowing for categories to be softened, re-shaped,

informed by context, new information, new experience and, importantly, shifts in perception.

Importantly, he also puts forward the view that water logic, with its embedded notion of flow and

being the logic of perception, can co-exist with the rock logic of traditional thinking.

De Bono’s array of ideas about how the brain works as it gives rise to mind, about

creativity and creative thinking, led him to development three sets of thinking tools specifically

designed to compensate for what he refers to as deficiencies in the way the brain operates.

De Bono claims he would not have been able to develop his ideas without his background in

medicine, and regards it as difficult for anyone to work in the field of thinking to do so without an

understanding how the brain functions. Although de Bono’s thinking tools are predicated on the

way the brain functions, they have also been developed in response to our Western thinking

inheritance and the ways in which it has culturally informed our thinking behavior. I examined de

Bono’s ideas and thinking tools because they respond directly and positively to my research

question: can design thinking be enriched with the ideas of de Bono, in order to make the thinking

and the process more effective and can some of these ideas be graphically visualised? Clearly

much of his work deals directly with thinking, and creative thinking in particular, and many of his

ideas align with those put forward by other eminent authors cited in this thesis. The core topics I

have covered in this thesis are described in the following table (see Figure 9.1).

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Figure 9.1 Core topics in thesis

Core topics Author Key points Chapter 2: Conceptualising design and its precursory landscape Human ability to be creative. Simon, H

Friedman, K Cross, N

· Definition of design. · Confirms Simon’s view all people do something called design. · Long history of human artifact production that was designed.

Design as social, cultural and economic production.

Schön, D

· Design as reflective practice. · Narrative on industrialisation, modernisation and design process.

Important historical antecedents linked to design (designing), design education and design methods.

Garfield, S Wingler, H Abbott Miller, J & Lupton, E Kandinsky, W Klee,P Findeli, A Rowe, P Cross, N Jones, C Buchanan, R Schön, D Popper, K Brawne, M

· Gutenberg: transformative invention, systematisation and shared knowledge (nearly 500 years before Modernism).

· The Bauhaus: search for unity, process, educational innovation. · Bauhaus philosophy, culture, teaching approaches. · Personal pedagogical approaches at The Bauhaus. · Personal pedagogical approaches at The Bauhaus. · Diagrammatic representation of Bauhaus and Ulm models. · Emergence of design methods movement and design thinking. · Initiates the term “designerly” (particular ways of design). · Early protagonist of design methods, later a detractor. · Description of design problems being wicked problems. · A Popperian view of designing and its influence. · Defines his model and concept of conjecture and refutation. · Broadly affirms Popper’s model.

Chapter 3: Design practice and design process Design knowledge. Design practice/process. Implications for design education.

Cross, N Friedman, K Lawson, B Dorst, K Krippendorff, K Oxman, R Friedman, K Findeli, A Thesis author

· Commentary on design epistemology and design praxis. · Commentary on design epistemology and design praxis. · Describes the distinguishing/unique features of the design

including it’s non-linear nature. · Describes mutable nature of the design process. · Affirms the mutable nature of design problems and challenges

some of Simon’s propositions; design is a sense-making activity. · Describes challenges facing traditional studio (craft-based)

instruction given evolution of design. · Affirms need for shift from craft-based instruction to that which

engages with new design knowledge. · Asserts need to adopt new theoretical model inspired by system

science, complexity theory and practical philosophy. · Drawing on the literature review, 4 generalised stages of the

design process are identified/proposed: 1 – Problem recognition; 2 – Tentative concept/idea generation; 3 – Development and refinement (synthesis); 4 – Identification of a preferred outcome.

Chapter 4: Drawing and diagrammatic representation in design Drawing as a language of thought.

Arnheim, R Lawson, B Oxman, R Pacey, A Goldschmidt, G Boden, M Dorst, K Thesis author

· “artistic activity is a form of reasoning …” · Affirms much of a designer’s thinking is expressed in drawing.

Design sketches contain reductive and simplifying properties. · Affirms sketches reveal “visual-mental” processes designers

undertake. · Affirms the value of visualising thinking and knowledge. · Affirms the value of similarity-based reasoning (the visual use of

analogy and metaphor). · Affirms value of the use of metaphor. · Foreshadows development of a set of diagrams.

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Chapter 5: Creativity and cognition Historical and cultural perspectives.

Albert, R & Runco, M

· Emergence of belief that creativity is a human talent or ability rather than being of divine origin.

Creativity, conscious and unconscious thinking, intuition, imagination, computational science, cognitive science, physics. Behavioral science, psycho-logical theory, pragmatic approaches.

James, W Koestler, A Boden, M Bohm, D Sternberg, T & Lubart, T Csikszentmihalyi, M Nickerson, R Martindale, C Perkins, D

· Emerging perspectives about design and creative thought; the role of conscious and unconscious thinking; the negative influence of tradition, convention and habit.

· Affirms similar views to James. Importance of breaking out of boundaries set by knowledge.

· Defines creativity as an ability to come up with new ideas that are surprising and valuable; and an ability to make unfamiliar combinations of familiar ideas. Affirms role of both conscious and unconscious thought. Identifies continuing challenges facing development of artificial intelligence. Value of analogy

· Seeking to describe creativity in words is impossible. Affirms creativity requires escape from existing patterns (similar to de Bono). Value of analogy (similar to Boden).

· Assert damage done to scientific study of creativity by pragmatic approaches (and implicate de Bono). Describe psycho-dynamic approach of creativity arising from tensions between conscious reality and unconscious drives. Affirm it requires a synthetic ability, analytic ability and a practical-contextual ability. Concede that pragmatic approaches (eg de Bono) may actually be worthwhile.

· Affirms a systems approach to creativity. Critical of education that does not encourage originality and creative thinking.

· Affirms role of conscious and unconscious thought, intuition and incubation; positive view of pragmatic approaches (de Bono) in contrast to view of Sternberg & Lubart.

· Asserts within behavioral science many believe creativity can be enhanced through training. Affirms role free-associative, concrete, analogical thinking and abstract, logical, reality-oriented) thinking.

· Affirms evidence that many theoretical views support idea that creative thinking can be taught.

Chapter 6: Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference Adopting a biological and culturally informed approach.

de Bono, E · Proposes model of the way the brain functions (The Mechanism of Mind) and asserts the brain is capable of 2 different types of thinking (analytical/judgmental and generative). Describes 4 different ways of thinking: natural, logical, mathematical and lateral). Argues the value of lateral thinking. Asserts the role of perception in thinking and the need for both Rock logic and Water logic. Describes influence of classical Greek thinking on thinking.

Chapter 7: Thinking tools Compensating for the brain’s behavior. The CoRT program. De Bono’s thinking tools.

de Bono, E Dingli, S de Bono, E

· Asserts need to compensate for how the brain functions to enhance creativity ie escape pre-existing patterns (similar to views of James, Bohm, Boden, Nickerson, et al). Argues significance of perception in thinking and possibility of shifting, broadening, deepening perception and directing thinking with thinking tools. Describes the value of parallel thinking (non-adversarial thinking)

· Studies of effectiveness of de Bono’s thinking course. · Descriptions of each set of thinking tools.

Chapter 8: Graphic visualisation of a design process and design thinking framework Explication and visual representation.

Lawson, B Boden, M de Bono, E

· Asserts value of removing unnecessary information and reducing complexity, and diagrammatic representation).

· Asserts the value of spatial models or diagrams. · The value of directing attention through staged progressive

development of a diagram.

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My exploration of these core topics culminated in the development of two sets of diagrammatic

representations—of:

• de Bono’s key concept of how the brain functions (incorporating his own

diagrammatic representation); and

• a design process and design thinking sequence (developed as an original artifact

from this research project).

To underpin one of the main contributions this thesis makes in terms of developing a

graphic visualisation of a design process and design thinking sequence, the following table

summarises key elements of each of the three models put forward in this thesis. An important

feature of each model is that they contain four stages. The third model (schema), while aligning

significantly with the Popper and Brawne models has, importantly, embedded within it the

deployment of three sets of thinking tools developed by de Bono to enhance thinking (see Figure

9.2 and 9.3). This is a significant feature of the third model (schema) as both Popper’s and

Brawne’s models do not describe how new concepts and ideas might be generated.

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Figure 9.2 Summary of models put forward in this thesis

Karl Popper: Model for the advance of scientific knowledge

Stage 1: PS1 = Problem Situation; Stage 2: TT1 = Tentative Theory; Stage 3: EE1 = Error Elimination; Stage 4: PS2 = Toward more and more interesting problems.

Key points: Popper’s model embodies the notion of conjecture (a hypothesis or “the new”) and refutation (error elimination through utilising existing knowledge). Schön regards Popper as being “concerned with stating the conditions under which a discovery can be validated after the fact”. Popper regarded by Lawson as “the father” of design research. Bamford identifies Schön as having located “Popper’s conjecture/test at the heart of problem-solving in the professions generally”. Michael Brawne: Interpretation of Karl Popper’s model

Stage 1: P1 = Problem Recognition; Stage 2: TS = Tentative Solution; Stage 3: EE = Error Elimination; Stage 4: P2 = Problem for next sequence.

Key points: Brawne regards P1 to P2 as a description of a sequence, of a process, and in no way either the prescription of a particular solution or the enforcement of a starting point, and that it simply states there is a necessary starting point and that a sequence develops from that recognition of a problem. Brawne regards the sequence as incorporating the value of “allowing both verbal and non-verbal thinking to play their part with different emphasis at different stages”. Craig Austin: Schematic framework for a design process and design thinking sequence

Stage 1: Focus (cf. PS1 = Problem Situation, TT1 = Problem Recognition); Stage 2: Concept/Idea Generation (cf. TT1 = Tentative Theory, TS = Tentative Solution); Stage 3: Design Development/Evaluation (cf. EE1 = Error Elimination, EE = Error Elimination); Stage 4: Proposition (cf. PS2 = Toward more and more interesting problems, P2 = Problem for next sequence).

Key points: The four stages share broad alignment with both Popper’s model and Brawne’s interpretation of Popper’s model. Both Popper’s and Brawne’s models do not describe how new concepts and ideas might be generated. The 4 stages draw on de Bono’s work to do with shifting, deepening, broadening perception and directing thinking (see Figure 8.17).



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Figure 9.3 Proposed schema for a design process and design thinking

sequence incorporating thinking tools developed by Edward de Bono

_______________________________________________________________________________

In the previous chapter I affirmed the value of visual analogy and diagrammatic

representation as legitimate forms of expression within the context of explicating particular aspects

of tacit design knowledge (specifically, aspects of design thinking). The two sets of diagrams I

presented in chapter 8 were designed for the purpose of aiding, enhancing, or improving cognition.

In particular, I developed the second set has been developed in direct response to my research

questions. The diagrams embody a design thinking sequence that deploys three sets of de Bono’s

thinking tools within the context of the process of design.

As has been previously stated, critical reflection drawing on a career of over 35 years as a

communication designer and design educator, and more recently as a design researcher, also

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contributed to the development of the diagrams and the process of developing the rationale upon

which they are based. The research and development of the second set of diagrams occurred over

approximately eight years coinciding with my evaluation of the usefulness of incorporating selected

concepts, ideas and thinking tools developed by de Bono within a design process and design

thinking framework. During this time they were presented to hundreds of design students within a

university design education context to support lectures presented by the author of this thesis on the

design process and design thinking. Feedback from both undergraduate and postgraduate design

students in relation to the material presented combined with field notes and diagrammatic notation

from unstructured (but focused) interviews and group discussion became significant in shaping

the diagrams. Iterative development of the diagrams also included gathering informal insights

from professional designers and colleagues in design education again through the use of

unstructured interviews.

Further evaluation of the effectiveness of the model in terms of whether it responds

effectively to the research question could open up further lines of enquiry and constitute a

subsequent research project that might incorporate both qualitative or quantitative analysis.

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Documents

Design thinking: Expanding the frame of reference