www.ebook3000.comDEBATING BRAIN DRAINwww.ebook3000.comDEBATING ETHICSGeneral EditorChristopher Heath WellmanWashington University of St. LouisDebating Ethics is a series of volumes in which leading scholars defend opposing views on timely ethical questions and core theoretical issues in contemporary moral, political, and legal philosophy.Debating the Ethics of ImmigrationIs Tere a Right to Exclude?Christopher Heath Wellman and Philip ColeDebating Brain DrainMay Governments Restrict Emigration?Gillian Brock and Michael Blake www.ebook3000.com1Debating BrainDrainMay Governments Restrict Emigration?GI LLI ANBROCK MI CHAELBLAKE www.ebook3000.com1Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.It furthers the Universitys objective of excellence in research,scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.OxfordNewYorkAucklandCape TownDar es SalaamHong KongKarachiKuala LumpurMadridMelbourneMexico CityNairobiNew DelhiShanghaiTaipeiTorontoWith ofces inArgentinaAustriaBrazilChileCzech RepublicFranceGreeceGuatemalaHungaryItalyJapanPolandPortugalSingaporeSouth KoreaSwitzerlandTailandTurkeyUkraineVietnamOxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Pressin the UK and certain other countries.Published in the United States of America byOxford University Press198 Madison Avenue, NewYork, NY 10016 Oxford University Press 2015All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the priorpermission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law,by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization.Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to theRights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.You must not circulate this work in any other formand you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataBrock, Gillian.Debating brain drain:may governments restrict emigration? / Gillian Brock and Michael Blake.pages cm.(Debating ethics)Includes index.ISBN 9780199315628 (pbk.:alk. paper)ISBN 9780199315611 (hardcover:alk. paper)1.Emigration and immigrationEconomic aspects.2.Emigration andimmigrationGovernment policy.3.Brain drainGovernment policyDeveloping countries.4.Manpower policyDeveloping countries.5.Skilled laborDeveloping countries.I.Title.JV6098.B76 2015331.12791dc232014014465135798642Printed in the United States of Americaon acid-free paper www.ebook3000.comCONTENTSIntroduction:Te Brain Drain and Global Justice by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake 1PART I BY GILLIAN BROCK1.Introduction to Part I 112.What Does Global Justice Require? 243.Prosperity in Developing Countries, the Efects Departing Individuals Have on Tose Left Behind, and Some Policy Options 364.Whose Responsibility Is It to Remedy Losses Caused by the Departure of Skilled Migrants? 605.Consideration of Central AnticipatedObjections 856.Summary of Conclusions from Part I 101 www.ebook3000.comv i | C ONT E NT SPART II BY MICHAEL BLAKE7.Te Right to Leave:Looking Back 1118.Te Right to Leave:Looking Forward 1559.Te Right to Leave and What Remains 190PART III RESPONSES 10.Brock Responds to Blake 237 11.Blake Responds to Brock 286Index297 www.ebook3000.comDEBATING BRAIN DRAINwww.ebook3000.comwww.ebook3000.comIntroductionThe Brain Drain and Global JusticeTHE WORLD AS WE KNOW it is a terribly unequal place. It is unequal in terms of simple dollars and cents:the aver-agecitizenofMalawihasanannualincomeofUS$320, whiletheaveragecitizenofJapanhasanannualincome ofalmostUS$48,000.1Tissortofinequalityhasbeen muchdiscussedinrecentpoliticalphilosophy;philoso-phers have spent a great deal of time trying to understand preciselywhatsortsofinequalitymightberegardedas unjust, and why.2Te world is terribly unequal in other ways as well, and philosophershavespentcomparativelylittletimedealing with some of these. Consider again Malawi and Japan:Japan has around twenty-one physicians per ten thousand people, while Malawi has only one physician for every ffty thousand people.3 Tis radical inequality in medical skills and talents has bad consequences for health; people born in Malawi will live, on average, thirty-two years fewer than their counter-partsborninJapan.4Tesefactsaretroublinginthem-selves.Teybecomeevenmoretroublingwhenwestart asking why nations like Malawi have so few physicians. Te answer, it seems, is not that the citizens of developing coun-trieshavenointerestinbecomingphysiciansoralackof opportunity for medical training. In fact, many developing 2 | I NT RODUC T I ONsocietiesspendagreatdealofmoneytrainingnewphysi-cians, and spots in medical school are avidly sought in these countries. Te reason for the low numbers of physicians has muchtodowithwhatmedicaltrainingprovides: namely, theopportunitytoleavethedevelopingsocietyandenter into a more developed one. Developed societies such as the UnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomhavemadeimmi-grationcomparativelyeasyforthosewithdesirablemedi-cal skills. Tose who are trained abroad will often choose to take their newly minted skills to the developed world, leav-ing their impoverished compatriots behind. Te result is a continuedshortageofmedicalpersonnelinsub-Saharan Africa. No matter how much a developing country invests inmedicaleducation,itisunlikelytoobtainanadequate stockofmedicalpersonnel.In2000,forexample,Ghana trained250newnursesandlost500nursestoemigra-tion.5 In 2001, Zimbabwe graduated 40 pharmacistsand lost 60.6 In 2002 alone, Malawi lost 75 nurses to the United Kingdomacohortthatrepresented12percentofallthe nurses resident in Malawi.7Tis phenomenon is often referred to as the brain drain. Tis term has a multiplicity of uses, but it is often usedas weuseitheretorefertothemovementoftalented(and oftenexpensivelytrained)peoplefromdevelopingnations to developed ones.8 Te phenomenon is found most acutely inthemedicalcontext,butitismoregeneralthanthat;it emergeswhereverthereisanetmovementoftalentedand educatedpersonsawayfromanimpoverishedsocietytoa wealthierone.Itisfound,inthewordsofTaboMbeki,in thestockofphysicists,engineers,doctors,businessman-agers and economists who grew up in a developing society but live and work in a developed one.9 Te brain drain is, or T HE B R A I NDR A I NA NDGL OB A L J US T I C E | 3should be, troubling to those of us who care about global jus-tice. Te brain drain seems to result from a shared history of colonialism and violence; the countries from which it occurs are,mostfrequently,thosethathavebeenmostbrutalized byWesternpowers.Tephenomenon,moreover,seems poised to perpetuate the inequality in life-chances between developing and developed societies. Te absent talent of the emigrantunderminesboththelife-chancesofpresentciti-zens of the developing societya society with fewer doctors, after all, is a society in which more people will die avoidable deathsand the chances for that society to develop fourish-ing institutions for future citizens. Te phenomenon, fnally, seems almost ludicrously unfair:the wealthy citizens of the UnitedStates,alreadywell-equippedwithmedicalservices, are increasing their stock of medical personnel by depriving the most needy global citizens of medical practitioners. It is temptingtoconclude,asarecentheadlineintheNew York Times had it, that America is stealing the worlds doctors.10Tisbookisaboutwhatiswrongwiththebrain drainand about how we might, consistent with our val-ues,respondtothesewrongs.Itisperhapsimportant, beforewegoanyfurther,tosayafewwordsaboutwhat the authors of this book cannot claim. We are not special-ists in development economics, but philosophers; as such, what we ofer is ethical reasoning about which pathways to development are legitimatenot which of those pathways are most likely to be efective. We emphasize this to note that,whilewediscusssomeempiricalresultsaboutwhat efects diferent interventions might have, we do this with aduesenseofmodestyaboutourempiricalskillsand with a hope that others, more skilled in empirical research thanourselves,willtakethisbookasanopportunityfor 4 | I NT RODUC T I ONfurthercross-disciplinaryconversation.Neitherarewe globalactivists;wearespecialists,again,inwhatmight bemorallyrightfulforustodoinresponsetothebrain drain but not in how we might begin to marshal the global forces necessary to make an efective response. True global change,weaccept,requiresnotjustgoodreasoningbut skilled agents, adept at the tasks of coalition-building and institutional design. While we hope that such agents con-tinuetheworkwediscusshere,wecannothopethatwe ourselves shall specify how that work should be completed.What,then,canweclaim?Wearebothpoliticalphi-losophers,whohavewrittenonhowjusticemightbe understoodwhenappliedtotheglobalcontext.11Weare both interested in applying the core liberal intuitionthat persons, all of them, are alike in moral dignity and must be treated as such by the institutions that shape their livesto the world as a whole. We are capable, then, of providing some argument about how justice as a concept might deal with the apparent problem of the brain drain.Ourresponses,however,willbemarkedlydifer-ent.Despiteoursimilarintuitionsatthelevelofpolitical morality, we ofer distinct takes on how developing societ-ies might legitimately respond to the emigration of skilled persons from within their borders. Te most important dis-agreementwehaveonethatshapestherangeofaccept-ablepolicyalternativeswedefendiswhetherornota statemay,consistentwiththeliberalmoralitywedefend, conditionorpreventexitfromitsborders.GillianBrock arguesthatitmay,andthattherangeofpolicyoptions availabletoworkagainstthebraindrainiscomparatively large. Michael Blake will argue that it may not, and that the range of acceptable policy options is therefore rather small.T HE B R A I NDR A I NA NDGL OB A L J US T I C E | 5In Part I, therefore, Brock describes several reasons to thinkthatthedevelopingstatemaylegitimatelyseekto make exit from that state more difcult. To begin with, she notes that there is a deep unfairness in allowing those who have been trained by an impoverished state to simply leave that state and sell their talents to the highest bidder; those who have sacrifced to train that individual deserve some reasonablereturnontheirinvestment.Morecentrally, however, those individuals who depart from the state are oftenthosewhoaremostlikelytobeenergeticandskill-ful builders of social and political institutions; when they leave,theydeprivetheircompatriotsnotonlyoftheir particular skills but of the institutions that might emerge from the use of those skills in the broader political context. Brockthereforeconcludesthatthedevelopingstatehasa wide array of potential tools with which to respond to the braindrain.Tesetoolsincludeprogramsofmandatory service prior to departure from that state and programs of taxation after departure.In Part II, Blake describes several reasons to think that thisvisionisilliberal.Byhisaccount,itisfundamentally unfairthattheburdenofbuildingdevelopingsocieties should be placed on those who happen to have been born withinthem;theworldasawholehasthedutytoassist with development, and it is unjust for a state to restrict the mobility of the talented simply because it might be useful todoso.Morecentrally,though,theliberalstatesimply shouldnottakeitselfashavingtherighttopreventexit fromwithinitsterritorialjurisdiction;bothhistorical andphilosophicalconsiderationstellusthatsuchpowers arenotrightlyheldbystates.Terangeofpolicyoptions availabletous,inBlakesaccount,iscorrespondingly 6 | I NT RODUC T I ONshortandBlakeconcludesthatwemaynot,consistent withliberalmorality,beabletodealwiththebraindrain in any efective way at all.Tesearetwodistinctvisionsofhowjusticeshould respondtotheproblemofthebraindrain;weagreein thefoundationsofpoliticalmoralitybutdisagreequite strongly about what such morality might defend. We would conclude, though, with one point of agreement. We are both convinced that the phenomenon of brain drain is worthy of attention from those who are worried about international justice;weareheartenedtoseeincreasedconsideration giventothisissueinrecentpoliticalphilosophy.Itisour hope that this volume will spark further inquiry into this vitally important topic.NOTES1.Data from 2012 World Bank survey, available at http://data.worldbank.org/country.2.See, for a survey of some recent work on this, Michael Blake, GlobalDistributiveJustice: WhyPoliticalPhilosophy Needs Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012):121136.3.Te data are from studies between 2005 and 2012; they are available at http://kf.org/global-indicator/physicians/.4.Figuresarefrom2012lifeexpectancydata,availableat http://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.5.MagdaAwases,AkpaGbary,JenniferNyoni,andRufaro Chatora, Migration of Health Professionals in Africa:ASynthesis Report (Brazzaville:World Health Organization, 2004).6.DavidR. KatereandLloydMatowe,EfectofPharmacist Emigration on Pharmaceutical Services in Southern Africa, AmericanJournalofHealth-SystemPharmacy60(2003): 11691170. T HE B R A I NDR A I NA NDGL OB A L J US T I C E | 77.SueJ. Ross,DanielPolsky,andJulieSochalski,Nursing Shortages and International Nurse Migration, International Nursing Review 52 (2005):253262, at 260.8.Tetermmightalsobeusedtodescribeanysignifcant decreaseinskillswithinagiventerritoryresultingfrom migration;inthiswiderview,themovementofentrepre-neurialyoungpeoplefromruralAmericatothecitiesrep-resentsaformofbraindrain.Wedonotengagewiththis issue in the present work and will generally use the term in arestrictedsense.See,though,PatrickJ. CarrandMaria J. Kefalas,HollowingOuttheMiddle: TeRuralBrainDrain and What It Means for America (Boston:Beacon Press, 2010).9.TelistisfromMbekisAfricanRenaissancespeech, which urged such individuals to return to Africa. Te speech isavailableathttp://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0813.htm. 10.Matt McAllester, America Is Stealing the Worlds Doctors, NewYork Times, March 7, 2012. 11.SeeGillianBrock,GlobalJustice: A CosmopolitanAccount (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2009);MichaelBlake, JusticeandForeignPolicy(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 2013).PART IGI LLI ANBROCK 1Introduction to Part ITHEBASICNEEDSOFDESPERATELYpoorpeoplerightly commandournormativeattention.1Weareconcerned notonlyaboutthefactthatthereispovertyandunmet needintheworldtoday,butalsothescaleofthisneedi-nessso many in the world lack the basic necessities for a decent life. Some of these widespread, severe deprivations include lack of food, clean water, basic healthcare, primary education,basicsecurity,infrastructure,andanenviron-mentthatcansustainandensuresecureaccesstothese goodsandservices.Animportantpartofenjoyingthe basicgoodsandservicesnecessaryforadecentlifeisthe availability of skilled personnel able to provide these. Here therearesevereshortages,especiallyindevelopingcoun-tries where needs are gravest. For instance, about 2million moreteachersand4.25 millionmorehealthworkersare needed to supply basic health and education for all.2 Tese shortages are exacerbated by high numbers of skilled per-sonnel departing developing countries and seeking better prospects for themselves in developed ones. What, if any-thing, may developing countries defensibly do to stem the fow? Tis is the central question that orients my work in this book.BeforeI canexplainmyapproachtoansweringthis question, further background is necessary. As noted, fuel-ing the shortage of skilled personnel is the very high rate ofemigrationamongthosewiththenecessaryskills,a 1 2 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kproblemcommonlyreferredtoasbraindrain.Tough braindrainoccursinmostsectors,braindrainamong healthprofessionalsisparticularlywidespreadanddam-agingfordevelopingcountries.Tesecountriestypically havepoorheathcareresourcesanyhow,sothelossof trained healthcare workers is felt even more than it might beinplacesthatarebetterresourced.Insomecases,the departureofhealthcareworkersfromdevelopingcoun-triesthreatenstheviabilityofthehealthcaresystemsin those countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.3Skilledworkersoftenhavegoodreasonsforwanting toleavepoorcountriesoforigin.Inadequateremunera-tion, bad working conditions, lack of professional develop-mentopportunities,lackofsecurity,andlackoffunding are important factors in their decision to leave. Developed countriesfrequentlyappeartooferbetterpayandwork-ingconditions,orcareerandtrainingopportunitiesthat arenotavailableindevelopingones.Departureseemsto be an entirely rational decision under such circumstances. Skilledworkers,likeeveryoneelse,shouldhavetheright to exit countries in which they no longer wish to live. But there are normative questions about citizens responsibili-ties,fairtermsofexit,andwhethermigrationshouldbe managedtoensuretheburdenofmigrationdoesnotfall disproportionatelyontheworldsworstof,sothatthose whobeneftfrommovementacrossbordersdonotalso imposeimpermissibleseverelossesonthosewhosufer disadvantagebecauseofthatmovement.Aswediscuss, theselossessometimesincludesignifcantreductionin educationalandhealthservices,poorhealthandeduca-tionalattainment,publicfundswastedonexpensiveter-tiary training which does not beneft citizens, fscal losses, I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 1 3andmoregenerallylossofassetsrequiredforbenef-cial development. As I also discuss, there are various ways toensurethatmovementsworkwellforallsignifcant stakeholders,butonesuchway,forwhichI argue,isthat developingcountriesmaypermissiblytaxcitizenswho depart under certain conditions. Ialso argue that they may reasonably expect citizens with relevant skills to assist fel-low citizens for a short period of compulsory service under certain important conditions. Compulsory service and tax-ation are two kinds of measures that developing countries may take to help reduce poverty in their countries.4Whiletherehasbeenconsiderablenormativetheo-rizingonthetopicofimmigration,5mostanalyseshave focused on the relation between the migrant or prospective migrant and the society she will joinissues of admission, accommodation,integration,andsoforth.6Bycontrast, inthisworkI focusonthemoreneglectedrelationship between the migrant and the society she will leave, and the normative implications of her departure. Te central ques-tions for analysis arethese:(1)Aretheresetbackstosignifcantintereststhat result from the departure of migrants?(2)Even if there is such damage, is this compensated for by benefts that result from their exit?Iarguethat,overall,departurescanresultinimportant net losses, which raises the following further questions for analysis.(3)Whatkindsofpoliciesmightbestaddressthe identifed harms?1 4 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC K(4)When there are important losses, what may gov-ernments permissibly do to address those losses?(5)Howshouldburdensassociatedwithaddressing harms best be distributed?(6)Is it fair to impose costs on emigrants?(7)What kind of normative account can best support appropriate burden-sharing arrangements?Together,theanswerstothesesevenquestionsform thebasisofananswertothequestionofwhatjusticein emigrationconsistsinforthosewhowishtoexitpoor, developingcountries.I claimthattheissueofjusticein emigrationisarelativelyneglectedtopic.Indeed,the neglect in the philosophical literature seems quite marked, giventhesubstantialamountofwritingthatfocuseson therelationshipofthemigranttothehostsociety.7In tryingtoaccountfortheneglect,itmightseemobvious thatwehaverightstoexitcountriesfromwhichwehail. Indeed,ourcommitmentstofreedomofmovementand associationmightseemtoaccountfullyforwhythisisa non-issue. However, as we come to appreciate, both these freedoms have limits, and the limits correspond, in impor-tant ways, to where setbacks to others important interests would otherwise result. Asimple appeal to these freedoms cannot fully explain the neglect.Afewpreliminaryremarksareinordertoforestall possiblemisunderstandingsabouttheviewsI arguefor here.First,mygeneralpositionisthatpeopleshouldbe freetomoveacrossstateborderssolongasthatmove-ment satisfes a number of important conditions to be dis-cussed. Tese can be met if we actively manage migration better and take account of relevant negative externalities. I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 1 5Tobeclear,then,I amnotarguingthatpeopleshouldbe completelyprohibitedfrommigrating.Mybasicargu-mentisformoreactivelymanagedmigrationandmore attentiontoundesirableandsomewhathiddenefectsof thismovement.I amconcernedwithdevelopingreason-ableandrobustpolicythatcanmitigatethesenegative efectsandtakeseriouslytherightsandimportantinter-ests of migrants, along with the concerns of others who are importantly afected.Second,thefocusinthisworkwillbeonemigrants departingfromdevelopingcountries,becausethisiswhere vulnerabilitiesandlossesaremostpressing.Teanalysis doeshavesomebearingonmovementfromdeveloped countriesaswell,thoughI donotextendtheanalysisto developed world migration explicitly here.Tird,itisimportanttonotethatthoughtheyare important,migrationpoliciesareonlyonecomponent ofafullaccountofglobaljustice.Indeed,giventhatthe number of people who move is likely to remain a relatively small percentage of the worlds total population, it can be onlyarelativelysmallpartofseekingamorejustworld.8 However, there will always be people who want to move for avarietyofreasons,especiallywhentherearesignifcant wage diferentials between economies, so it is worthwhile considering what just emigration policy consists in in such cases.Butwecannotexpectallthewrongsofourcur-rentglobalsituationtobeaddressedsolelythroughpoli-cies concerning migration. When considering some policy remedies, Ido discuss some broader issues, though a fuller treatment of these issues can be found elsewhere.9Fourth, it is important to defne the core case of inter-est here so we have that frmly in view. As Idiscuss, there 1 6 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Karemanysalientpolicyoptionsthatcouldbeexploredas potentialsolutionstothebraindrainproblem.Butakey orientingquestioninthisworkiswhatdevelopingcoun-triesthemselvesmaypermissiblydotosolvetheirprob-lems. And we are concerned primarily with skilled citizens. What can reasonably be expected of this group of citizens and what permissible actions may governments take with respect to them? Tere are many ways in which people can acquire skills. And, over time, some will change their occu-pations as their plans alter in the course of living a life they consider valuable. But it will help to defne what Iconsider to be the standard highly prevalent case, and Itake that to be one in which skilled workers have acquired their current skillsetindevelopingcountriesandlivedinthosecoun-tries until the point of emigration to a developed country, whereupon they continue to work in the same general line of occupation (in that country or another developed one), usually at much more attractive remuneration packages.Finally, there are a number of ways to view my projects motivatingquestionandmultipleentrypointsintothe debates central to this book. Imention the following three important ways to motivate my orienting question to show that the importance of the basic concerns can be arrived at from several starting places; even if one is not compelling to a reader, she may feel the force of another.First, if we are concerned about the unmet needs of the desperately poor, this concern should extend to the people who can provide for those needs. What can we reasonably askthosewhohavetheabilitiestomeetneedstodoto address others unmet needs?Second, the responsible state also has important obli-gationstoensurethatcitizensareequippedwithcore I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 17goodsandservices.Whatmayitpermissiblydotocoerce citizensintosupplyingthesegoodsandserviceswhen market incentives are insufcient to attract enough work-ers to do the necessary jobs?Tird,theconcernsalsofowfromamorecompre-hensivepictureofwhatglobaljusticerequiresandthe importance of strong institutions in promoting prosperity. Goodinstitutionsmattergreatlyforpovertyreduction, whateverotherfactorsarealsosignifcant.Forinstance, those institutions that promote respect for the rule of law and accountability make for an environment conducive to innovation and investment in education, health, and infra-structureallkeyingredientsforliftingpeopleoutof poverty.Creatingbetterinstitutionsisasignifcantcom-ponent in helping people out of poverty and a central fac-tor in promoting development. One of the most worrisome setbacks developing countries can sufer from emigration isdamagetoinstitutionsandinstitutionbuilding,and thereforethelossthatissustainedinopportunitiesfor development and escape from poverty. Helping developing countriesretaintheirmostskilledcitizensisoftenakey issue in building the better institutions crucial to prosper-ity.Tehighlyskilled,itseems,areimportantsourcesof demand and supply for better institutions. If that is right, what policy options to retain such citizens are permissible, given that on the face of it, we might be unduly restricting peoplesimportantfreedoms,suchasfreedomofmove-ment or association?Itisimportanttonotethateveniftheinstitutional viewisrejected,becauseitisfoundtobeempirically(or otherwise) defective, more simple versions of the core issue areavailable,ashighlightedinthefrsttwodescriptions 1 8 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kof questions motivating interest in this project. Given the extentofunmetneedintheworldtoday,itwouldseem thatwehaveseveralcompellingreasonstoattendtothe coreissueofwhetherrequiringskilledcitizenstoassist with deprivation can be justifed.An overview of Part Imight be helpful and is provided next. In this book Idevelop an account of the responsibili-tiesskilledcitizensofpoor,developingcountrieshaveto contributetodeprivationreduction,especiallywhenthey wishtoleavesuchcountries.Tisgroundsaviewabout fair terms of exit from such countries. Ibegin, in the next chapter, by briefy outlining what global justice minimally requires.I describethenatureofourobligationstoone anotherandhowstatesmatterinworkingtowardglobal justice.Aswecometoappreciate,stateshaveanintegral role to play in reducing global injustice, and we have obliga-tionstoassisttheminprovidingcertaincoreingredients necessary for a decent life. In addition to the general obli-gationsI identify,I alsoarguethatagentsfromafuent, developedcountrieshaveimportantremedialresponsi-bilities and can be expected to take up a large share of the work in the project of moving toward a less unjust world.Chapter3 covers some important empirical issues. In it Ialso outline some of the conditions necessary to promote prosperity in developing countries and the efects depart-ing individuals can have on those left behind. As signaled, goodinstitutionsareimmenselyimportantforsustained gainsineliminatingpoverty.Helpingdevelopingcoun-tries retain their most skilled citizens is often a key issue inbuildingthebetterinstitutionscrucialtoprosperity. Chapter 3discussessomeoftheempiricalevidencefor these claims, a catalog of some possible policy options that I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 1 9deserve further consideration, and a more detailed discus-sion of two policy options that will be the focus here:com-pulsory service and taxation programs.Chapter4 begins the main normative work. Iofer sev-eral arguments as to why the skilled citizen has important responsibilitieswithrespecttocompatriotdeprivation. My claim is that the cluster of arguments provided is suf-cient to make the case that carefully designed compulsory serviceandtaxationprogramscanbejustifedundercer-tainkindsofconditions,suchaswhenpoor,responsible, legitimate developing states are making good-faith eforts tosupplycoregoodsandservicesthatcitizensneedfora minimally decent life, under severe budgetary constraints, and where there is full information about those constraints and what is expected when students accept opportunities for tertiary-level training.Chapter 5continuesthedevelopmentoftheargu-mentbyconsideringkeyobjectionstotheviewalong withreplies.Whatcountsasalegitimatestate?Donot compulsoryserviceprogramsinappropriatelylimitthe freedomandopportunityofemigrants?Whythinkitis justifable to coerce some people to labor for the beneft ofothers?Whydistributesomuchoftheresponsibility forassistingtheneedyonrelativelypoorcompatriots ratherthanafuentdeveloped-worldcitizens?Andwhy think the emigrant can assist best by staying in the coun-try of origin rather than from outside of it? Tese are the sorts of reasonable questions that need further analysis, andthisisundertakenthroughoutPartI butespecially in Chapter5. Chapter6 ofers a concise summary of the central arguments marshaled for the positions defended in Part I.2 0 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KNOTES 1.Foroutstandingcommentsonpreviousdraftsofthiswork I thankHelenAdams-Blackburn,ChristianBarry,Timothy Berry,MichaelBlake,EamonnCallan,JoeCarens,Josh Cohen, Stephen Davies, Avigail Eisenberg, Nir Eyal, Andrew Harland-Smith,CindyHolder,DeveshKapur,SimonKeller, Eszter Kollar, Will Kymlicka, Patti Lenard, Alistair Macleod, ColinMacleod,JohnMcHale,MargaretMoore,Gerhard Overland,TomasPogge,GeorgeRainbolt,HamishRussell, HughSpringford,LucasStanczyk,AnnaStilz,Christine Straehle,ChristineSypnowich,ChristopherWellman,Jo Wolf, and Lea Ypi. For excellent research assistance with this project Ithank Hamish Russell. 2.OxfamInternational,PayingforPeople(2007),availableat www.oxfam.org.nz/imgs/about/070314PayingForPeople.pdf. 3.See,forinstance,JennyHuddartandOscarF. Picazo,Te HealthSectorHumanResourceCrisisinAfrica(Washington, DC: UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment, 2003);PeterE. BundredandCherylLevitt,Medical Migration:Who are the Real Losers?, Lancet 356 (2000):245246; and Edward Mills, William A.Schaba, Jimmy Volmink, et al.,ShouldActiveRecruitmentofHealthWorkersfrom sub-SaharanAfricaBeViewedasaCrime?,Lancet371 (2008):685688. 4.As we see, compulsory service programs come in a variety of favors,fromquitecoercivetonotobjectionablycoerciveat all. Program design is important both to the defensibility of the program and the level of coercion (or otherwise) that they involve. 5.Some notable recent publications include Joseph Carens, Te Ethics of Immigration (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2013); JosephCarens,Live-inDomestics,SeasonalWorkers,and Others Hard to Locate on the Map of Democracy, Journal of PoliticalPhilosophy16(2008): 419455;ChristopherHeath Wellman and Phillip Cole, Debating the Ethics of Immigration:Is Tere a Right to Exclude? (NewYork:Oxford University Press, 2011); David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 2 1TeJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy16(2008): 371390;Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, Immigration, Multiculturalism andtheWelfareState,EthicsandInternationalAfairs 20(2006): 281304;MathiasRisse,OntheMoralityof Immigration, Ethics and International Afairs 22 (2008):2533; Christopher Heath Wellman, Immigration and Freedom ofAssociation,Ethics119(2008): 109141;JosephCarens, TeRightsofIrregularMigrants,EthicsandInternational Afairs22(2008): 163186.Forsomeotherinfuentialcon-tributions to recent debates see Veit Bader, Citizenship and Exclusion: RadicalDemocracy,CommunityandJustice.Or, What Is Wrong with Communitarianism?, Political Teory 23 (1995): 211246;JosephCarens,AliensandCitizens: Te CaseforOpenBorders,ReviewofPolitics49(1987): 251273; Jonathan Seglow, Te Ethics of Immigration, Political StudiesReview3(2005): 317334;MichaelWalzer,Te DistributionofMembership,inPeterG. BrownandHenry Shue(eds.),Boundaries: NationalAutonomyandItsLimits (Totowa:Rowman and Littelefeld, 1981), 135; David Miller, Immigration:Te Case for Limits, in Andrew I.Cohen and ChristopherHeathWellman(eds.),ContemporaryDebatesin Applied Ethics (Oxford:Blackwell, 2005), 193206; Chandran Kukathas,TeCaseforOpenImmigration,inAndrew I.Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford:Blackwell, 2005), 207220; Chandran Kukathas, Are Tere Any Cultural Rights?, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), Te Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1995),228256;WillKymlicka,Politics intheVernacular: Nationalism,Multiculturalism,and Citizenship(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2001); Michael Blake, Immigration, in R. G.Frey and Christopher HeathWellman(eds.),ACompaniontoAppliedEthics (Malden,MA: Blackwell,2003),224237;WillKymlicka, MulticulturalCitizenship: A LiberalTeoryofMinorityRights (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1995); Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries:ALiberal Egalitarian Perspective, in David Miller andSohailHashmi(eds.),BoundariesandJustice(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2001), 249275, at 266267; 2 2 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KStephen Castles and Mark J.Miller, Te Age of Migration, 3rd edition(Basingstoke: Palgrave,2003);SusanMollerOkin, FeminismandMulticulturalism: SomeTensions,Ethics 108(1998): 661684;JoshuaCohen,MatthewHoward, andMarthaNussbaum(eds.),IsMulticulturalismBadfor Women?(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress,1999); JeremyWaldron,MinorityCulturesandtheCosmopolitan Alternative,inWillKymlicka(ed.),TeRightsofMinority Cultures(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1995),93119; TomasPogge,MigrationandPoverty,inVeitBader(ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (Houndsmills:Macmillan, 1997). 6.Typicalquestionsincludethese: Isitmorallydefensiblefor afuentcountriestorestricttheentryofwould-beimmi-grantsfrompoorercountries?Isitfairtoimposespecifc terms,suchasthetypeofworkthatcanbeperformed,as aconditionofentryinimmigrationpolicies?Whatentitle-mentsorrightsshouldnewimmigrantshave?Whatcanbe requiredorreasonablyexpectedofimmigrantsinintegrat-ingintotheirnewsocieties?Howshouldclashesbetween immigrant and host culture be resolved? For excellent recent coverageofalltheseissuesseeJosephCarens,TeEthicsof Immigration (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2013). For one oftheclassictreatmentsofalltheseissuesseeKymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. For excellent extended treatment of thefrstissueseeWellmanandCole,DebatingtheEthicsof Immigration. 7.NotableexceptionsincludeKierenOberman,CanBrain DrainJustifyImmigrationRestrictions?,Ethics123 (2013): 427455;AnnaStilz,IsTereanUnqualifed Right to Leave?, in Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (eds.), Migration andMorality: TeEthicsofMembershipandMovement (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming);LeaYpi, JusticeinMigration: A ClosedBordersUtopia?,Te JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy16(2008): 391418;Tomas Pogge,MigrationandPoverty,inVeitBader(ed.), CitizenshipandExclusion(Houndsmills: Macmillan,1997), 1227;Miller,Immigration: TeCaseforLimits;and EricCavallero,AnImmigration-PressureModelofGlobal I NT RODUC T I ONT OPA R TI | 2 3DistributiveJustice,Politics,Philosophy,andEconomics5 (2006):97127. 8.If climate change is very dramatic, resulting in environmen-tal refugees, the numbers of people moving might alter dra-matically. In considering what justice in emigration consists inforthatcase,wewouldneedtoaddressarangeofother issues not covered here, such as climate justice issues. For an interestingargumentonjustthisissueseeMathiasRisse, TeRighttoRelocation: DisappearingIslandNationsand CommonOwnershipoftheEarth,EthicsandInternational Afairs 23 (2009):281299. 9.GillianBrock,GlobalJustice: A CosmopolitanAccount (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2009).2What Does GlobalJustice Require?THE PROBLEMS OF BRAIN DRAIN arise largely because there are vast disparities in life prospects in diferent countries, and some are not able to provide core ingredients necessary for a decent life. If a states inability to ensure the essentials for a decent life is a fundamental factor driving migration, weshouldinvestigatewhatobligationstheremightbeto remedy that situation. So, what responsibilities do we have to one another to ensure essentials for a decent life? How, if at all, should membership in states matter to our obliga-tions? Ihave developed a comprehensive account of global justice elsewhere.1 Here, Isketch only some of the central features that bear on the core issues that are our focus, so we can extend the analysis and apply it to the debates con-cerning brain drain.Istartwiththeimportanceofinstitutionstojustice. Tere are many diferent ways to see that institutions are a focal point in matters of justice. Te fundamental institu-tions that we collectively uphold structure and importantly infuencehowourliveswillgo.Temostprominentcon-temporarypoliticalphilosopher,JohnRawls,makesthis a central feature of his theory. Te basic structure of soci-etywhich includes all the main political, economic, legal, andsocialinstitutionsisthecorefocusfortheorizing WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 2 5aboutjusticebecauseitsefectsarepervasive,profound, and present from birth. Whether or not we endorse Rawlss particular claim about the impact of institutions, we must atleastrecognizeaversionofit: theinstitutionsthat governourliveswhetheratstateorinternationallev-elshave an important role to play in structuring our life prospects and so it is important that we ensure these aim to approximate just ones.2Mynextpresumptivelyuncontroversialpointisto acknowledgetheimportanceofwhatonemightcallthe moralequalityimperativeweallmustacknowledge themoralequalityofallhumanbeings.Nomatterwhere people are located on the planet they deserve to be treated ashumanbeingsthathaveequalvaluetootherhuman beings, ceteris paribus. All human beings needs and inter-estsmatterand,insomeimportantsense,deserveequal consideration, ceteris paribus. Clearly, there is much more thatcanbesaidinelaboratingontheideasentailedby thesemoralideals.Forourpurposesweshouldfocuson the particular institutional implications.Whatshouldcommitmenttothemoralequality imperative mean for how we ought to structure the insti-tutionswecollectivelyuphold?Inmyview,thecommit-ment minimally entails that we should ensure everyone is well positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life, and Ielaborate on this via four central components.3 First, one should be enabled to meet ones basic needs. Second, one ought to have adequate protection for ones basic liberties. Tird,fairtermsofcooperationshouldgovernonescol-lective endeavors. And fourth, one must have background conditions(especiallysocialandpoliticalarrangements) that support these core ingredients for a decent life.2 6 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KTerearevariouswaystomakethepointthatthese fourcomponentsareimportantingredientsforadecent life.4Likehumanrightsapproaches,wemightstartwith the individual human person and consider what she needs to live a life of dignity, feshing out opportunities, protec-tions,resources,andthelikethatarecentralforsucha life, taking account of a wide sweep of variation in human livingarrangements.Tatwillgetussomedistance,but we quickly realize that how that person stands in relation to others is also a key part of enjoying a life of dignity. Is shesubjecttodomination,exploitation,oroppression? Mustsheendurehighlycoercivetermsofcooperation?If her relationships with others are characterized by certain kindsofradicalinequalities,thismayinterferewiththe idealofalifeworthyofhumandignity.Andsowearrive at the necessity of including relational components in our account of what global justice requires, such as fair terms of cooperation. All the details of my account of global jus-tice need not concern us for the purposes of this work.5 For ourpurposes,weneednoteonlyafewkeypoints.First, globaljusticerequiresthatwemustbeconcernedwith everyonesprospectsforadecentlifeindesigningand upholdingjustinstitutions.Second,weallhavedutiesto one another to ensure that we are well positioned to enjoy prospects for a decent life. Tird, governments frequently canactasefcientcoordinatorsanddischargersofthese responsibilities.Asthisviewsuggests,governmentsthen have an important role to play in discharging global justice duties. So, let us also consider next the relevance of states in my account of global justice.On my view, rather than having little importance (as somecosmopolitanglobaljusticetheoristsmaintain), WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 2 7statesarehighlyrelevantforseveralreasons.First, statesmattertopeople.Peopleare,forthemostpart, attached to many of their fellow citizens and care greatly abouttheirstatesstandingandachievementsinthe world.Tisidentifcationandattachmentcanalsohave animportantbearingonanindividualswell-being.Of course,thisattachmentissociallyconstructedandis subjecttomodifcation,thoughthemechanismsfor modifcationrequirecarefultreatment,includingman-agingratherthansuppressingidentities,atleastovera reasonably long time frame.6 At any rate, there are good reasons to make space in an account of global justice for defensibleformsofsuchattachments,citizenscommit-mentstostatesand,indeed,fourishingformsofcivic nationalismthatenhanceratherthanunderminesup-portforkeyelementsofglobaljustice.Statesarelikely to be a core feature of our world order for many years to come and so to ignore the role they can and should play intransitioningtoamorejustworldisamissedoppor-tunity to further key global justice goals. Even in an ideal world,however,therearereasonstothinkstatesmight bearobustpartoftheglobalinstitutionalarchitecture and that a world state would be less desirable. Te obvi-ousconcernssurroundtheconcentrationofpowerand itspossibleabuse.Multiplecentersofpowermightpro-videbetterprotectionfrompotentialabuseandglobal institutional derailment.Second,therearemanystate-levelinstitutions,poli-cies,andpracticesthatshouldbeofconcerninensuring the moral equality imperative is implemented satisfactorily in state-wide institutions. State-level institutions are still highly signifcant in promoting or retarding human beings 2 8 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kprospects for fourishing lives and constitute an important site of cooperation that ought to aspire to fairness.Tird, in the world we live in, much responsibility for ensuringcoreingredientsnecessaryforagoodlifeare devolved to states. States are therefore an important vehi-clethroughwhichmanykeyaspectsofglobaljusticeare secured and protected.Fourth, as an empirical matter, in our current world efectivestatesareundeniablyimportantforbenefcial development.Oneofthelargest-scaleglobalinjustices wecurrentlyfaceisthemassiveextentofpoverty.Two billionpeoplecurrentlylivebelowthe$2(USdollars) perdaypovertyline.7Manyofthesepoorpeoplelivein developingcountries(orcountriesthatareclassifedas low-income or middle-income ones), and those countries especially need efective states that can actively manage thedevelopmentprocessandpro-pooreconomicactivi-tiesthatreducepoverty.Terearemanyreasonswhy efectivestatesareindispensabletobenefcialdevel-opment.Statesensuretheavailabilityofkeygoods including healthcare, education, water, sanitation, infra-structure,security,theruleoflaw,andatleastamini-mumlevelofsocialandeconomicstability,allofwhich are necessary precursors in building a dynamic economy capableofpro-poorgrowth.Statesarealsoinaunique position to regulate and develop the economy in helpful ways.8 All in all, the body of evidence that confrms the positive role efective states can play in reducing poverty is huge; by some accounts, states are altogether essential to the process.9 In addition, actively engaged citizens can play a key role in helping to produce and maintain efec-tive and accountable states.10WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 2 9Drawing on some of the strands sketched so far in this chapter,wecanmarshalthefollowingargument.Weall have obligations to one another to ensure we have the nec-essary ingredients for a decent life (and we have especially strongobligationsnottogetinthewayofwhatpeople need for such a decent life through our harmful activities and practices). Efective states are an essential component ofenjoyingadecentlifeinourworld.Sowehaveobliga-tionstosupportstatesattemptstobeefective,andwe have a range of other obligations to help secure for others core elements of a decent life.SofarI havepresentedageneralaccountofourcore obligations to one another that derive from my account of globaljustice.Tiscanbesupplementedwithanaccount of remedial responsibilities that addresses the distribution ofresponsibilitiesinmovingtowardaworldthatbetter approximatesidealsofglobaljustice.Toseindeveloped countries have a signifcantly greater share of the remedial duties associated with reducing global injustice, and we can argue for this position on several grounds. While we might all acknowledge that poor citizens and their governments arekeyactorsinrelievingpovertyinpoor,developing countries, they can be considerably helped or hampered in theseefortsthroughactions,institutions,practices,and policiesthatareunderthecontrolofthoseindeveloped countries. Developed world actors currently are too much partoftheprobleminunderminingstatesabilitiestobe efective through their support for a variety of institutions thatgovernglobalpracticesespeciallythosefoundin theglobaleconomyincludingthosethatgoverntrade, investment, international fnancial markets, and taxation, allofwhichcanunderminerevenue-raisingcapacityand 3 0 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kjob opportunities in those countries. Developed countries also undermine the empowerment of citizens by failing to supportaninternationalanddomesticenvironmentcon-ducivetoaccountability,self-organization,andfreedom ofexpression,tonamebutafewcentralwaysinwhich they are currently contributing greatly to global injustices. Ihave ofered various arguments for these views in several otherplaces.11Weneednotrehearsethesehere,though Igive some examples of the problematic mechanisms that need reform below. It may be worth noting before Ido so that,inthecontextofthisdebate,thatdevelopedworld agentshavemanyglobaljusticeresponsibilitiesisnota contentiousissueMichaelBlake(andotherswhoare key opponents to the position Itake here) agrees with this importantpoint.Teissueoverwhichwedisagreeisnot thatdevelopedcountrieshavelargeglobalresponsibili-tiesbutratherwhetherskilledcitizensfromdeveloping countries should also be expected to play a special part in dischargingtheseresponsibilitiesandmitigatinglosses. I arguethattheycanreasonablybecalledontoplaya specialrole.MichaelBlakebelievesthatthisviewisnot justifed.Atanyrate,alongwiththeargumentsI advocateelse-where,I havealsooferedvariousmechanismsformaking progressondischargingourobligationsofglobaljustice. Imention one such area that has excellent potential here as it will be relevant to some of the policy options we explore below.I haveaguedformanytaxationinnovationsand reforms that, if implemented, could make signifcant inroads in reducing global injustice.12 Tese include the permissibil-ity of levying global taxes as a way of discharging our global obligationstoensureeveryonesbasicneedsaremet,their WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 3 1libertiesaresecured,fairtermsofcooperationaremain-tained in collective endeavors, and that social and political arrangements are in place to ensure all of this (for instance, sustaining the global public goods on which our prosperity relies). Ihave also argued that reforms to our global taxation andaccountingarrangementsarelongoverdue,especially thosethatfacilitatevasttaxescapethusenablingtheille-gitimatediversionofenormoussumsawayfromdevelop-ingcountries.13Moregenerally,whenweexaminesomeof the mechanisms that would help reduce global injustice, we notice that there is much that those in developed countries can do to help fortify strong local institutions for develop-ingones.14ExamplesincludesupportingtheInternational CriminalCourtortheExtractiveIndustriesTransparency Initiative,15 both of which promote an environment condu-cive to holding the powerful to account for their actions in waysthatcanmakeatremendousdiferencetoprotection of basic liberties and the meeting of basic needs. Tere are plentyofgoodinitiativesalreadydevelopedbutwhich couldbeneftfrommoresupporttofortifytheirefectsthataregoodexamplesofstrengtheningefectivegovern-ment and empowering citizens, and do well in meeting other desiderata for good assistance.InthischapterI havehighlightedtheimportanceof efectivestatesinsecuringglobaljustice.Skilledwork-ers have an important role to play in helping states to be efective. What may states permissibly do to retain skilled workersorbeneftfromtheirskills?Itistothoseissues that we turn shortly. Before we are in a position to discuss these normative issues, we must frst survey some relevant empirical evidence that suggests skilled worker migration can cause important losses. We turn to that next.3 2 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KNOTES1.GillianBrock,GlobalJustice: A CosmopolitanAccount (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2009).2.Anotherwaytoarguefortheimportanceofinstitutionsis throughrecognizingtheimportantempiricalconnections between institutions and promoting prosperity or benefcial development (a way we discuss in Chapter3).AsAllenBuchanandefnestheterm,aninstitutionis akindoforganization,usuallypersistingoversomecon-siderableperiodoftime,thatcontainsroles,functions, procedures,andprocesses,aswellasstructuresofauthor-ity(Justice,Legitimacy,andSelf-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law [Oxford:Oxford University Press,2004],2).I usetheterminstitutionslightlymore broadlytoincludealsosignifcantpracticeswhichsetup authoritativenormsforinteractionbetweenindividuals and groups, even if no one formal organization oversees the practicesoperations,includingenforcementoftherules (which might take difuse forms).3.Brock, Global Justice.4.Wecanarguethatthesedefnetheminimumthatwecan reasonably expect of one another, and we can go on to elabo-rate these ideas of reasonable expectation by harnessing the power of normative thought experiments, as Ido in Brock, Global Justice, Chapter3, for instance.5.Tough the interested reader might see Brock, Global Justice, especially Chapter12.6.Gillian Brock and Quentin Atkinson, What Can Examining the Psychology of Nationalism Tell Us About Our Prospects for Aiming at the Cosmopolitan Vision?, Ethical Teory and Moral Practice 11(2008):165179.7.AndySumner,WhereWilltheWorldsPoorLive?Global PovertyProjectionsfor2020and2030,Instituteof DevelopmentStudiesInFocusPolicyBriefng26(2012),avail-able at:http://www.ids.ac.uk/fles/dmfle/InFocus26-Final2.pdf. WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 3 38.I cannotelaborateonallthesevastthemeshere,butthe interestedreadermightconsultDuncanGreen,From PovertytoPower: HowActiveCitizensandEfectiveStates CanChangetheWorld(Oxford: OxfamInternational, 2008);DuncanGreen,FromPovertytoPower: HowActive CitizensandEfectiveStatesCanChangetheWorld,2ndedi-tion(Rugby,UK: PracticalActionPublishing,2012);and Gillian Brock, Global Poverty, Decent Work, and Remedial Responsibilities: WhattheDevelopedWorldOwestothe Developing World and Why in Diana Meyers (ed.), Poverty Coercion,andHumanRights(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2014).9.For a comprehensive summary of literature see Green, From Poverty to Power, 2nd edition. 10.Green, From Poverty to Power, 2nd edition. 11.ForasampleofargumentsseeGillianBrock,Health InequalitiesandGlobalJustice,inPattiLenardand ChristineStreahle(eds.),GlobalHealthInequality (Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversityPress,2012),102118; Gillian Brock, Global Poverty, Decent Work, and Remedial Responsibilities; Gillian Brock, Global Justice. 12.See,forinstance,GillianBrock,TaxationandGlobal Justice: ClosingtheGapbetweenTeoryandPractice, JournalofSocialPhilosophy39(2008): 161184;Gillian Brock, Reforming our Taxation Arrangements to Promote GlobalGenderJustice, PhilosophicalTopics37(2010): 141160;GillianBrockandRachelMcMaster,GlobalTaxation and Accounting Arrangements:Some Normatively Desirable andFeasiblePolicyRecommendations,inMartinONeill andShepleyOrr(eds.),PoliticalPhilosophyandTaxation (Oxford:Oxford University Press, forthcoming); and Global Justice, Chapter5. 13.Some of the egregious culprits are that we permit a variety ofaccountingmeasurestocountasperfectlylegitimate, including tax havens and so-called transfer pricing schemes. See Brock, Taxation and Global Justice; and Global Justice, Chapter5.3 4 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC K 14.For a summary of these see Brock, Global Poverty, Decent Work,andRemedialResponsibilities;andBrock,Global Justice. 15.TeExtractiveIndustriesTransparencyInitiative(EITI) is an excellent example of the kind of initiative worthy of support.EITIaimstoaddresstheenormousproblemof lostrevenuethatarisesfromnaturalresourcesalesthat arenotadequatelytransparentoraccountable.Inmany cases,therevenuethatpoor,developingcountriescould obtain from resource sales would be more than enough to fnancereformsnecessarytoaddresspoverty,thatisto say, if the revenue were actually received and appropriately disbursed.Approximately3.5billionpeopleliveincoun-tries rich in resources, yetall too often many poor citizens seelittlebeneftfromtheextractionoftheirresources. Onthecontrary,theseresourcesoftenundermineefec-tivestatesandtheempowermentofcitizens.Citizens, governments,andmultinationals(bothfromwithinand outsidethecountry)couldplayaveryimportantrolein assistingcountriestoreceivesuchrevenue.Currently, manyresourcesalesoccurthroughnon-transparentpro-cesseswherepricesandamountssoldarenotdisclosed, thusprovidingampleopportunitiesforprivategainand corruption,nottomentionextensivedamage.Onthe EITIscheme,companiesdisclosetheirtaxandroyalty paymentsforresourcestogovernments.Governments disclosewhattheyreceiveinpayments.Tetaxandroy-altypaymentsarethenindependentlyverifedandmade publicinaprocessoverseenbyseveralkeystakeholders, includingrepresentativesfromgovernments,companies, and civil society. Tis initiative provides mechanisms for relevantinformationgathering,suchthatcitizensand theprivatesectorinthosecountriescanhelpimprove governanceconducivetopromotingefectiveandlegiti-mate states. Citizens of countries in the developed world can assist poor citizens in resource-rich developing coun-tries by mobilizing to make participation in the EITI man-datorywhenoperatinginkeyorganizationsundertheir WH ATDOE S GL OB A L J US T I C E R E QU I R E ? | 3 5jurisdiction. For instance, they could require that all mul-tinationalsthatlistondevelopedworldstockexchanges complywithtransparencypracticessuchasthoseout-linedbytheEITI.TeycouldmakemembershipofEITI mandatoryforparticipationindesirableopportunities suchasbeinginvolvedincontractingagreementswith government.(SeetheEITIwebsiteathttp://eiti.orgfor more details.)3Prosperity in Developing Countries, the Effects Departing Individuals Have on Those Left Behind, and Some Policy OptionsACCORDINGTOTHEWORLDBANK,ifrichcountries allowed their workforce to swell by a mere 3 per cent by let-ting in an extra 14million workers from developing coun-triesbetween2001and2025,theworldwouldbe$356 billion a year better of, with the new migrants themselves gaining$162billionayear,peoplewhoremaininpoor countries$143billion,andnativesinrichcountries$139 billion.1Ifthistrulyisawin-winsituationforeveryone involved, surely one ought not to obstruct the movement of migrants who want to leave their poor countries of origin?WhileI donotdenythatthereisevidencetosuggest that considerable benefts may accompany migrants mov-ingacrossborders,weshouldalsoexaminesomeofthe waysinwhichtheirdeparturecanresultinimportant lossesaswell.Tereismuchevidencetoreviewhere.In this chapter we examine relevant empirical issues showing whytherecanbeimportantlosseswhenskilledworkers P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 3 7exit poor, developing countries. Once we understand what theselossesare,I outlineimportantpolicyoptionsthat could address them. Armed with relevant empirical knowl-edge, the following chapter, Chapter4, focuses on the nor-mativeanalysisnecessarytodecidingwhetherparticular measures are defensible.3.1PROSPERI TYI NDEVELOPI NG COUNTRI ESANDHOWDEPARTI NG I NDI VI DUALSCANUNDERMI NEI TOne of the big push factors in migration is the vastly dif-ferentlifeprospectspeopleenjoyindiferentcountries. Prominentamongthemanydiferencesarevastincome disparitiesamongcountries,especiallybetweendevel-opinganddevelopedones.Furthermore,atleast1.5bil-lion of the worlds population lives in poverty. If poverty andpoorlifechancesarekeydriversofmovementaway from developing countries, tackling these problems seems important.Whatarethecausesofpovertyandpoor lifechancesandhowcantheybeadequatelyaddressed? A livelydebatefourishesonthistopic.2Tereiscompel-lingevidencetosuggestthatinstitutionsmattergreatly inthisprocess,whateverotherfactorsarealsosignifcant.3 Creating better institutions is a signifcant component in helping people out of poverty and a key factor in promot-ingdevelopment.AsI goontodiscuss,oneofthemost worrisome setbacks developing countries sufer from emi-gration is damage to institutions and institution building, and therefore a loss in opportunities for development and escape from poverty. 3 8 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KWhat do we know about absent human capital? Some sectors are especially hard hit; for instance, there is much awarenessconcerningtheoutfowsofhealthcarework-ers. Indeed, brain drain in the health sector is particularly widespread and damaging for citizens of developing coun-tries,sometimesofsuchascalethatitunderminesthe efectiveness of whole healthcare systems.4 Some countries lose a staggering percentage of the healthcare profession-alstheytrain.Forexample,in2001Ghanalostfvehun-dred nurses, which is more than double the number of new nursesgraduatedinthatyear.5Aboutathirdtoahalfof SouthAfricanmedicalschoolgraduatesemigratetothe developedworld,andabouthalfthephysicianstrained inGhanabetween1985and1994haveleftthecountry.6 Tese kinds of substantial losses, born by developing coun-tries already struggling with inadequate human resources, resultinmajorlossofhealthcaredeliverycapacity,with important consequences for the health of those in develop-ing countries.7Whilenegativeefectsinthehealthsectorareworry-ing, other damage is pervasive. Here Iidentify four types. First,thereareimportantfscalconsequences.8Skilled workerstypicallycontributemoretoacountrystax receiptsthantheygetingovernmentexpenditures.9Te lossofsuchworkerscanmeansignifcantlossofrevenue andopportunitiesformoreprogressivetaxationregimes. Desai, Kapur, McHale, and Rogers estimate the fscal cost of the brain drain for India as roughly 2.5percent of Indian fscal revenues, or 0.5percent of the Indian GDP.10 Gibson and McKenzie calculate that for those in the United States, thisisabout$4,120permigrantagedtwenty-fveand older, per annum.11 Te exact fscal loss a particular country P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 3 9experiencesdependsonthetaxsysteminthecountryof origin and how progressive it is. So Micronesia and Tonga, which have low and fat income tax rates, experience losses ofapproximately$500$1,000permigrant.Bycontrast, Ghana has higher and more progressive income tax rates, and so sufers losses of approximately $5,500$6,300 per migrant per annum.12Second, there are knowledge spillover efects.13 Skilled workers knowledge spreads to others in the economy and inacontextwhereknowledgeaboutbesttechnicalprac-tices,organizationmethods,andsoforthisscarce,the lossofworkerswithhighlyspecializedskillscanbequite devastating.14Tird,onatleastonemodelofgrowth, highskilledworkermigrationreducesincomelevelsand long-term economic growth.15 But, fourth, the most wor-risomeefectsareinstitutional.Highlyskilledpeople areclosetoindispensableinbuildingdomesticinstitu-tions.16Asinstitutionsarecrucialinpromotingdevelop-ment,whenthosemostlikelytocontributetoinstitution building are absent, development sufers.Peoplebuildinstitutions,andtheskilledpeoplewho leavearepotentiallyimportantinstitutionbuilders. Skilledandtalentedcitizensarebothimportantsources of demand and supply for institutional reform. Generally, for institution building to occur, you need a critical mass of people with high levels of human capital.17 For instance, in theUnitedStatesithasbeenarguedthatanintellectual vanguard of university-trained professionals, economists, andotherprogressivethinkerswasamongitsmostvalu-ablestate-buildingresourcesduringtheearlytwentieth century.Teseindividualsplayedkeyrolesindeveloping amoreprofessionalandbureaucraticstatebyproviding 4 0 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Knewideasaboutbetterorganizationandtheexerciseof power.18 Te loss of those with high skill levels often pro-motesmoreemigration,thusfurtherunderminingthat criticalmassnecessaryforinstitutionbuilding.Inaddi-tion, the World Values Survey Data suggests a strong con-nectionbetweenapro-democracystanceandclassand education, so when the more educated leave, there may be lesslocalsupportfordemocracy.19Developingcountries tend to have a limited middle class. If members of this seg-ment leave in high numbers, maintaining robust democra-cies may be challenging.Itisimportanttopointoutthatthereareatleast three distinct types of harms that have been identifed in this brief survey of detrimental efects from compatriots departures on those left behind:(1)Purely fnancial loss (such as costs of training or loss of tax revenue);(2)Loss of skills and services; and(3)Loss of institution-building assets.In many ways, the third set of harms is the most dif-fcult to address, but all of these losses are not insignifcant and can anyhow afect this third set. Some losses of types (2) and(3) haveanimportantindirectefectonthequal-ityandcapacityforbetterinstitutions.Forinstance,loss of tax revenue can play a vital role in states abilities to be efective, and having sufcient funds to build and sustain institutionsisalsoobviouslyimportant.Also,providing somekindsofgoods(suchasbasiceducationandhealth-care) might be necessary precursors for the right kinds of P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 41institutionstotakerootandsomaybenecessarycondi-tions for institution building.3. 2PROSPERI TYI NDEVELOPI NG COUNTRI ESANDHOWDEPARTI NG I NDI VI DUALSCANPROMOTEI TDothepositiveefectsthatresultfromemigrationout-weighorcompensateforthelossesidentifed?Itisoften suggestedthatthereareanumberofwaysinwhich high-skillmigrationcanhavegoodpoverty-reducingor institution-enhancing efects, and can beneft countries of origin. Tese include:(1)Increased human capital formation:the prospect of leaving to seek a better life elsewhere incentivizes many to acquire skills they would not otherwise.(2)Networkordiasporaefects: emigrantsresiding abroadcanbecomeassetstocountriesoforigin, forinstance,enhancingtradelinksorfacilitat-ingadditionalmutuallybenefcialopportunities which would not arise in the absence of migrants living abroad.(3)Temporarymigrationandreturn: migrantsoften bringmanybeneftsbacktocountriesofori-ginwhentheyreturn,suchasenhancedhuman andotherformsofcapital,orprogressiveideas, includingtheimportanceofpromotingfreedom, equality, or democracy.(4)Remittances: Migrantsoftensendsizeablefunds back to friends and family in countries of origin. 4 2 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KTe volume of such cross-border transfers is huge and standardly is much greater than ofcial devel-opment assistance.20In Part III we explore these considerations further and examine the state of the empirical literature on these top-ics, especially in response to Michael Blakes claims, which relyinpartonthisevidence.Atthismoreintroductory stage,I believeanextendedanalysisoftheempiricallit-erature is not needed for several reasons, but importantly, both Michael Blake and Iagree that despite a huge range of benefts that accrue to countries of origin, there are some cases in which net losses may be occurring, so the key nor-mative question is worthy of consideration. Tus it is perti-nent to consider the key normative question, namely: when thereareimportantnetlossesforpoordevelopingcoun-tries, what may they do to remedy these? And we share the view that there are enough real-world cases of tragic losses that this core normative issue has some important bearing for the world we live in and so deserves analysis.Asweseefromsurveyingsomeoftheempiricalevi-denceinPartIII,theefectsforcountriesoforiginare complex and multifaceted. Tere are many ways in which high-skillmigrationcanhaveimportantconsequences forcountriesoforigin.Temainchannelsofinfuence thatI discussinthisbookincludefscallosses,human capitalformation,temporarymigrationandreturn, networkordiasporaefects(especiallyontrade,foreign direct investment, technology adoption, and home coun-tryinstitutions),remittances,impactsonservicesor outcomesinvolvingcoregoods(notablyhealthandedu-cation),knowledgespilloverefects,efectsonincome P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 4 3andgrowth,andofcourse,efectsoninstitutionsand institution-buildingpossibilities.Giventhisrangeof considerations,itisnotsurprisingthatresearchcon-frms that the efects of brain drain vary considerably for diferent countries of origin, especially given population size,skilllevelswithinthosepopulations,andsoforth. WhiletheargumentI makeinthisbookaimstobewell informed by current evidence, it is not, strictly speaking, dependent on it, in the sense that Iam not relying on there always being important losses, as a key assumption in my argument. Obviously, if there are no relevant losses, there is nothing to ofset. So it is relevant to my project that at least in some cases we can identify relevant losses. And it isalsopertinentthatwecanidentifymanyofthetypes oflossesthataccompanyhigh-skillmigrationsowecan identify appropriate policy that could mitigate these cate-gories of losses. But we need not be committed to the view (that is surely false) that the losses identifed must always accompanyhigh-skillmigration.Again,andforempha-sis, my central question is a conditional one:when there arerelevantlossesthataccompanyhigh-skillmigration, whatmaygovernmentsfrompoor,developingcountries do about such losses?Two key points are worth highlighting at this stage of our inquiry (with further analysis to come in Part III). First, accordingtomanystudies,braindrain(orthemigration of high-skill workers) is becoming a dominant pattern of internationalmigrationandamajoraspectofglobaliza-tion.21Second,becausethereisadominantassumption in some literature that remittances are a widely neglected mechanism of positive change for developing countries, it may be testing readers patience to ask them to wait until 4 4 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KPart III before Iaddress this issue. Terefore, Imake some brief comments about that next.Itiswidelyassumedthatfnancialremittancescan compensate for the departure of citizens, substituting one scarce factor (fnancial resources) for another (human cap-ital)thatiscriticalfordevelopment.22Butthesefactors are not substitutable. Tough there are some notable suc-cesses from remittance programs, these are not necessarily of the right type or scale to provide the needed economic changes.23 Tere is a vast literature on this topic and more empirical work is underway which is relevant to an assess-mentofthepowerofremittances.24However,asDevesh Kapur and John McHale argue, there is as yet no evidence thatremittancescancatalyzebroadeconomictransfor-mations,thekindthatisessentialtoalleviatestructural povertyinthelongterm.25Andunlessremittanceshave good institution-building efects, Ithink we should be cau-tiousabouttheirpowertobethemainvehiclefortrans-forming poor, developing countries into the kinds of places thatcanprovidereasonablydecentlifeprospectsforall citizens, even though they can have good poverty-reducing efects for select individuals lucky enough to feel the direct orindirectefectsofremittances.Weshouldbecautious aboutthepowerofremittancesbecausethereareanum-ber of worrisome negative efects that can accompany sig-nifcant remittance fows, such as the following:the infow of funds can create dependence for recipients encouraging further migration especially among the working-age, pro-ductive adults; both home and host countries can become dependent on continuing migration arrangements and may failtoinvestinlocaleconomicarrangementsthatwould eliminatethedependence;economicactivitycanbecome P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 4 5depressedincountriesoforiginthusencouragingmore emigration; needed economic reforms can be neglected, as can be the creation of rewarding opportunities in the home country;remittancesmayhaveapositiveefectontran-sientpoverty,butdonotbythemselvesreducestructural poverty; and remittances tend to decline over time.26InthissectionI havenotedthathowtheefectsof high-skillmigrationplayoutvariesenormouslyamong countries. Tough Ido not deny that there can be consider-able benefts, Ialso want to emphasize that, when we do the aggregation,weneedtoconsiderbothbeneftsandcosts, andweneedtoevaluatewhethernetresultingbenefts are sufciently large as to outweigh some of the pervasive harms that also fow from migration. In trying to arrive at anoverallassessment,weshouldbeespeciallycarefulin taking into account factors that might undermine the fun-damental features necessary to sustain the right kinds of prosperity-promotingconditions.Prominentamongsuch conditionsarethosethatsustainrobustinstitutionsand efective states.3. 3POLI CYOPTI ONSTHATMI GHT ADDRES SSOMEOFTHELOS SES I DENTI FI EDAvarietyofpolicyoptionstoaddressimportantlosses deserveconsideration.I identifythreemain(sometimes interrelated)strategiesthatcouldbedeployed,andthese haveimplicationsforanumberofdevelopedanddevel-opingworldagents.I thenidentifythecoreonesthatare myfocushere,namelythosethatconcentrateonwhat 4 6 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kdevelopingcountriesthemselvesmaypermissiblydoto solve their own problems.(i)Controloutfowbytryingtochangebehaviorof thoseindevelopedcountries: Developedcountriescould mandate that codes of practice be followed in recruitment, andprohibitcertainpracticessuchashighlyaggressive targeting of scarce talent (in which, for instance, recruiters aim to lure the entire graduating class of a university or the entirestafofahospitalawayfromcommunitiesalready experiencing critical shortages). Developed country agents could consider employing migrants for short-term assign-ments,suchasclearingthebacklog,ratherthanperma-nent positions.(ii)Requirecompensation: Formandatorycompensa-tionprogramstobeefective,mostrequirecooperation betweendevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Wecould linkdevelopmentaidwithhumancapitalrecruitment. We could work on arrangements to share streams of taxa-tion revenues. We could establish programs requiring emi-grants to pay exit taxes in which revenue accrues to source countries(suchastheBhagwatitax27).Wecouldprovide conditionaleducationgrantsrepayableonemigration.28 We could require compulsory service from citizens.(iii) Create opportunities and incentives:Both developed and developing countries could explore various strategies to create more human capital. Developed countries could focus ontheirownpoliciessurroundinghumancapitalcreation, suchasafuentcountriessystematicallyunderinvesting in sectors such as healthcare and education, which leads to permanent skill shortages, and they could consider a more appropriatelevelofinvestmentinthesehigh-needareas.29 Developedcountriescouldreducebarrierstotemporary P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 47migration.Bothcouldcreatemoreincentivesformigrants to want to return to countries of origin, such as depositing fundsinspecialaccountsthatcanonlybeaccessedwhen emigrants return.30 Developing countries could try to lever-age connections in the diaspora to promote mutually benef-cial opportunities (such as in trade or investment).Allitemslistedinthefrstsetofpolicyoptionsthat primarily target the actions of those from developed coun-triesseemworthyoffurtherconsideration.Controlling the targeting of scarce talent seems important. Tere are a number of ways of doing this that have yielded some suc-cesses, though there is much scope for further gains in this area.Reachingmoreagreementoncodesofbestpractice for international recruitment of workers from developing countries would be a signifcant advance. Ensuring recruit-ment transactions are more benefcial for source countries seems key. Tis often entails compensation in one form or another (so this shades into the second set of policy consid-erations).31Compensatorymeasurescouldtakeanumber offorms,includingtechnological,technical,orfnancial assistance;settinguptrainingprograms;orhelpingwith institutionbuilding.Sincegovernmentsissueworkvisas, theyhaveanaturalinterventionpointforcheckingthat recruitmentsdoconformtoagreements.Toensuregov-ernmentscontinuetoplaytheirpartsinrecruitment agreements, it would be best for an international agency to overseeactivities,brokercompensation,punishviolators (perhaps by levying meaningful fnes), and so forth.Someonemightobjectthatwhiletheseideasarenoble theoretical aspirations, none of these policies will be able to gaintractioninourcurrentworld.Evenifwereachagree-mentsonrecruitmentorcompensation,whowillenforce 4 8 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kthem?Currentlywehaveseveralwillingandablesuch bodies.A numberofagenciesdealwithmigrationissues, including the United Nations (UN), the International Labor Organization,theWorldHealthOrganization,andthe InternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM).Temain one is the IOM, which was set up in 1951 and has 105 mem-bers. Tere are also calls for a World Migration Organization, which would function like the World Trade Organization and couldgatherdata,provideinformation,facilitatetheforg-ing of agreements, monitor and help enforce any agreements thataremade,andsoforth.Whetherornotthatcomesto pass, it is worth pointing out that there are already organiza-tions in existence, such as the IOM or the UN, that are well positioned to assist with policy implementation.As we have seen in this section, there are a variety of policy options that deserve our consideration in attempt-ing to reduce damage to those left behind. Te ones Iam particularly interested in discussing here are the permis-sibilityofcompulsoryserviceprogramsandtaxation arrangementsthattargetcitizenswhohavedepartedor those who wish to do so. Is it permissible to coerce (whether directlyorindirectly)highlyskilledcitizenstoprovide service for payment in their skill areas for a short period? Are programs that tax non-resident citizens justifed?3. 4COMPULSORYSERVI CE PROGRAMSFirst of all, what do Imean by a compulsory service pro-gram? Te basic idea is that on completion of a course of study,aperiodofserviceisrequiredandthestatemay P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 4 9bequitespecifcaboutwherethatserviceshouldtake place.Typically,thestatedirectsservicetowardunder-servedareas thoseareasforwhichitishardtoattract stafcapableofdeliveringthenecessaryservices,given normalmarketincentives.A commonreasonforanarea being underserved is that it is geographically remote or far fromtypicalattractionsthaturbanizedareasofer,such as many schooling or lifestyle opportunities often desired bypotentialprovidersespeciallythosewithfamilies. For this reason, compulsory service is frequently directed toward rural areas.Programsofcompulsoryservicemayincludealarge varietyofschemes.Inacomprehensivestudy,Frehywot, Mullan,Payne,andRosssurveyseventycompulsoryser-viceprogramscurrentlyinusethatattempttodeploy andretainaprofessionalhealthworkforcewithinpar-ticularcountries.32Teyidentifyanumberofprograms asinstancesofcompulsoryservice,someofwhichare more accurately characterized as incentive schemes, in my view.33 While Ireject the authors particular typology, the studyisusefulinbringingtoourattentiontherangeof programs classifed as compulsory service. Surveying and refecting on these programs, we might distinguish seven commontypesofprograms.34I listthemnext,ordered looselyfromonesthatmaybeconsideredmorecoercive, tothosethatcouldreasonablybeseenaslesscoercive andperhapsaremoreaccuratelydescribedasincentive schemes:(1)Somerequiredservicemustbeperformedasa conditionofcompletingtheeducationneededto be awarded a degree. For instance, a requirement 50 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kto complete a module of underserved community service(typicallyinruralareas,butothercom-munitiesaresometimesincluded)ispartofthe degree requirements to become a medical doctor.(2)Serviceinunderservedcommunitiesisrequired oncompletionofthedegree.(Testatemaybe quite directive about exactly where service will be performed.)(3)Tereisadelay(suchasoneyear)betweencom-pleting the education necessary to be awarded the degree and the awarding of the degree.(4)Tereisarequirementtocompleteamoduleof service in an underserved community in order to gain a license to practice in that state.(5)Tere is a requirement to complete a term of ser-vice in an underserved community in order to be considered for postgraduate training.(6)Completingatermofserviceinanunderserved community is considered an advantage in applica-tions for postgraduate training.(7)Incentivesareoferedtoserveinvariousunder-served areas. Tese incentives could take various forms, including ofering employees subsidized or free housing, education for their children, higher salaries, or low-rate loan opportunities.Inmyview,(6) and(7) arenotatallcoerciveandare moreaccuratelydescribedasincentiveschemes.A domi-nantassumptionisthatcompulsoryserviceinvolves programs such as (2), but in the literature we fnd quite a range of possibilities. Compulsory service programs could taketheformof(3) or(4),whichinvolvefairlylowlevels P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 51ofcoercion.Inpractice,(3) mayhavealmostthesame desired result as (2)because newly trained but not yet of-ciallygraduatedhealthcareworkersmayleanheavilyon government-providedopportunitiesduringthatperiod, whichmightinvolveperforminglessdesiredworkin underserved communities. At any rate, many of the newly trained (but not yet graduated) are likely to remain in the country for at least the length of time required to get the paperworkneededtoreceivethequalifcations,andso inefectwillserveincountriesoforiginforthatperiod. Under(4),ifonewantsalicensetopracticeinthestate, onemustperformaperiodofcompulsoryservice.Ifone does not wish to practice in the state, (4)would hardly be coercive.Another interesting fact we learn from examining the literature on compulsory service is that the most common way to enforce service requirements is through withhold-ing certifcation necessary to practice legally within a par-ticularcountry,inotherwords,programssuchas(3) and (4). Freywot etal. report that 64percent of the compulsory service programs they surveyed do this.353. 5TAXATI ONPROGRAMSTebasicideawiththetaxationprogramsthatareour focushereisthatdepartingcitizenswouldbeeligiblefor taxation,andthetaxescouldbeleviedinvariousways. Tese include departure taxes, ongoing taxation on income (at least for a certain period such as ten years after exit), or taxsharingarrangementsbetweenhomeandhostcoun-tries. Ahigh-profle proposal concerning ongoing taxation 52 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC Kis the Bhagwati tax proposal, which has undergone several revisionssinceitsinitialformulationin1972.36Asorigi-nally conceived, the Bhagwati tax would enable developing countriestoreceiverevenuestreamsfromemigrantsliv-ing in developed countries to ofset some of the efects of brain drain.37 Another reason ofered for such taxes is that if those who leave countries of origin still retain the right tovote(asmanydo),theyhaverepresentationwithout taxation. Tose who have a say in determining the life of a community should also be prepared to help support that community fnancially.38InBhagwatispreferredform,thetaxwouldbecol-lectedandadministeredviatheinstitutionsoftheUN. Te tax would be levied for a certain period, such as the frst ten years after an emigrant departs from a develop-ingcountry.TeUNwouldhavetheauthorityandthe meanstodirecttherevenuetocountriesoforigin,and coulddealwiththeissueofanycorruptordictatorial countriesbydisbursingfundstodevelopedcountries to spend as part of their normal development spending. Earlyreactionstotheproposalfocusedonanticipated legal,administrative,andpracticalproblems.Butafur-therwaveofattentionchallengedtheideathatthese issueswereinsurmountable.Morethanthreedecades on,thereisconsiderablecooperationamongjurisdic-tions(especiallyabouttaxationmatters)insuchaway thatmanyobstaclestoitsimplementationhavebeen cleared.39Inpractice,weseethatseveralcountriesdo taxtheircitizenswholiveabroad.Countriessuchas theUnitedStates(currently)andthePhilippines(prior to1998) usecitizenshipasthebasisforongoingtaxa-tion, taxing their citizens on worldwide income received, P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 5 3regardless of where they reside. Te US experience shows thatitisnotonlypossibletotaxcitizenslivingoutside oftheircountriesofcitizenship,butthatitmaybeless complicatedthanpreviouslyarguedandcanbringin considerablesumsfromsomeofthemosthigh-income citizens who are globally mobile.40Why would it be fair to expect citizens who wish to exit a country to pay taxes to the country they leave? Are com-pulsory service programs a defensible instrument of social or global justice? We need to turn to the important norma-tive issues next and explore the responsibilities emigrants anddestinationcountrieshavetothoseleftbehind.We discusssomeofthesepolicyoptionsinmoredetailafter exploringthenormativecasefortherebeingimportant responsibilitiesthatneedtobedischarged,especiallyon the part of the emigrant.NOTES1.PhilippeLegrain,Immigrants: YourCountryNeedsTem (London:Little, Brown, 2006), 19.2.Foranaccessibleintroductiontothedebate,seeGillian Brock Global Justice:ACosmopolitan Account (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter5.3.Seeforinstance,DouglasNorth,Institutions,Institutional Change,andEconomicPerformance(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1990);DaronAcemoglu,SimonJohnson, and James Robinson, Te Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: AnEmpiricalInvestigation,American EconomicReview91(2001): 13691401;DaniRodrik, ArvindSubramanian,andFrancescoTrebbi,Institutions Rule: TePrimacyofInstitutionsoverGeographyand 5 4 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KIntegration in Economic Development, Journal of Economic Growth9(2004): 131165;DaniRodrik,WhatDoWe LearnFromCountryNarratives?,inDaniRodrik(ed.),In SearchofProsperity: AnalyticNarrativesonEconomicGrowth (Princeton, NJ:Princeton Univserity Press, 2003), 119, at 1011.4.For a synthesis of just some of this vast literature, see Peter E. BundredandCherylLevitt,MedicalMigration: Who aretheRealLosers?,Lancet356(2000): 245246.See alsoEdwardMills,WilliamA Schaba,JimmyVolmink, et al.,ShouldActiveRecruitmentofHealthWorkers fromsub-SaharanAfricaBeViewedasaCrime?,Lancet 371(2008): 685688;WorldHealthOrganization,World HealthReport: WorkingTogetherforHealth(2006),avail-ableathttp://www.who.int/whr/2006/whr06_en.pdf.For anexcellentrecentsurveryofrecentliteratureseeEszter Kollar and Alena Buyx, Ethics and Policy of Medical Brain Drain:AReview, Swiss Medical Weekly 143 (2013), available at http://www.smw.ch/content/smw-2013-13845/.5.MagdaAwases,AkpaGbary,JenniferNyoni,andRufaro Chatora, Migration of Health Professionals in Africa:ASynthesis Report (Brazzaville:World Health Organization, 2004).6.TikkiPang,MaryAnnLansang,andAndyHaines,Brain DrainandHealthProfessionals: A GlobalProblemNeeds GlobalSolutions,BritishMedicalJournal324(2002): 499500.Nearly25 percentofAmericasphysiciansaretrained outside America, and almost two-thirds of them come from low-andlower-middle-incomecountries.Fourteenper-cent of recently licensed nurses are trained abroad. See, for instance,AmyHagopian,MatthewJ. Tompson,Meredith Fordyce, Karin E.Johnson, and L. Gary Hart, Te Migration of Physicians from Sub-Saharan Africa to the United States ofAmerica: MeasuresoftheAfricanBrainDrain,Human ResourcesforHealth2(2004);alsoLindaAiken,James Buchan, Julie Sochaliski, Barbara Nichols, and Mary Powell, Trends in International Nurse Migration, Health Afairs 23 (2004):6977.P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 557.See,forinstance,HuddartandPicazo,TeHealthSector HumanResourceCrisisinAfrica;BundredandLevitt, MedicalMigration: WhoaretheRealLosers?;andMills, Schaba, Volmink, etal., Should Active Recruitment of Health Workers from Sub-Saharan Africa be Viewed as a Crime?8.Forsomeexcellentsurveysbyeconomistsofthesetypes ofefects,seeDeveshKapurandJohnMcHale,GiveUs YourBestandBrightest: TeGlobalHuntforTalentandits ImpactontheDevelopingWorld(Washington,DC: Center forGlobalDevelopment,2005);DeveshKapurandJohn McHale,ShouldaCosmopolitanWorryabouttheBrain Drain?,EthicsandInternationalAfairs20(2006): 305320;DeveshKapurandJohnMcHale,WhatisWrong withPlanB?InternationalMigrationasanAlternative toDevelopmentAssistance?,inSusanCollinsandCarol Graham(eds.),BrookingsTradeForum2006: GlobalLabor markets?(Washington,DC: BrookingsInstitutionPress, 2006), 137186.9.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, Chapter6. 10.Mihir Desai, Devesh Kapur, John McHale, and Keith Rogers, TeFiscalImpactofHigh-SkilledEmigration: Flowsof IndianstotheU.S.,JournalofDevelopmentEconomics88 (2009):3244. 11.JohnGibsonandDavidMcKenzie,EightQuestionsabout Brain Drain, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (2011):107128, at 123124. 12.GibsonandMcKenzie,EightQuestionsaboutBrain Drain, 124. 13.FrancisFukuyama,StateBuilding,GovernanceandWorld Orderinthe21stCentury(Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity Press,2004);AlbertHirschman,Exit,Voice,and Loyalty:Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress,1970);Dani Rodrik,InstitutionsforHigh-qualityGrowth: WhatTey AreandHowtoAcquireTem,NBERWorkingPaper7540 (Cambridge,MA: NationalBureauofEconomicResearch, 2000);LantPritchettandMichaelWoolcock,Solutions 5 6 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KWhen Te Solution is the Problem:Arraying the Disarray in Development, World Development 32 (2004):191212. 14.KapurandMcHale,GiveUsYourBestandBrightest,95.See also Chapter6, for more detailed treatment. 15.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 97. 16.KapurandMcHale,GiveUsYourBestandBrightest,96.See also Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins ofDictatorshipandDemocracy(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,2006);EdwardGlaeseret al.,Do InstitutionsCauseGrowth?JournalofEconomicGrowth9 (2004): 271303;EdwardGlaeser,GiacomoPonzetto,and AndreiShleifer,WhyDoesDemocracyNeedEducation?, NBER Working Paper 1218 (Cambridge, MA:National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006); Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice andLoyalty: ResponsestoDeclineinFirms,Organizations, andStates(Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1970);Rodrik,InstitutionsforHighQualityGrowth, 2000;Fukuyama,StateBuilding;PritchettandWoolcock, Solutions When Te Solution is the Problem. 17.KapurandMcHale,GiveUsYourBestandBrightest,97; Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty; Fukuyama, State Building. 18.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 97. 19.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 108109. 20.Formoreonthesetopics,seeGillianBrock,GlobalJustice:ACosmopolitan Account (NewYork:Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter8. 21.Frederic Docquier and Hillel Rapoport Globalization, Brain Drain, and Development,Journal of Economic Literature 50 (2012):681730, at 681. In this excellent article the authors comprehensively document four decades of research, focus-ing especially on more recent contributions. 22.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 145. 23.Included in the success stories would be the Mexican three foroneprograminwhichremittancesfromHometown Associationsarematchedwithfederal,state,andlocal authorities contributing equal amounts. Overall, though, it isnotclearthattheprogramshavegeneratedmuchinthe wayofincome-producingjobs.Alsonotcleariswhether P ROS P E R I T Y I NDE V E L OP I NGC OU NT R I E S | 57they are simply funding future migration through enhanced training.ForagoodexplanationoftheconcernseeKapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 152. 24.Forexcellent,detailed,verycurrentdataonremittances, seethededicatedWorldBankwebsiteonmigrationand remittanceefects athttp://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21121930~menuPK:3145470~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.Forolderdata,see Brock, Global Justice, Chapter8. 25.Kapur and McHale, Give Us Your Best and Brightest, 162. 26.Fernando Lozano-Ascencio, Bringing It Back Home:Remittances to Mexico from Migrant Workers in the United States (San Diego: Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, 1993); also Deborah Waller Meyers,MigrantRemittancestoLatinAmerica:Reviewing the Literature, in Rodolfo O.de la Garza and Briant Lindsay Lowell(eds.),SendingMoneyHome:HispanicRemittances andCommunityDevelopment(Lanham,MD: Rowmanand Littlefeld, 2002), 5381; Richard Black, Soaring Remittances RaiseNewIssues,availableathttp://www.migrationinfor-mation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=127. 27.FormoreontheBhagwatitax,seeJagdishBhagwatiand Gordon Hansen, Skilled Migration Today:Prospects, Problems, andPolicies(Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2009).See especiallyJohnMcHalescontribution,Taxationand Skilled Indian Migration to the United States:Revisiting the BhagwatiTax,availableathttp://web.business.queensu.ca/faculty/jmchale/research3/Taxation%20and%20Ski l l ed%20Mi gration%20to%20the%20Uni ited%20States%20%20Revisiting%20the%20Bhagwati%20Tax.pdf. AlsoJagdishBhagwatiandMartinPartington,Taxingthe BrainDrain(Amsterdam: NorthHollandPublishingCo., 1976). 28.ToughJohnGibsonandDavidMcKenziecautionthat manydevelopingcountrieslackthecapacitytorecover loans,sometimesrecoupinglessthan10 percentofloans issued.Tesameproblemplaguesevendevelopedcoun-tries; for instance, New Zealand has a high rate of default. 5 8 | PA R TI , GI L L I A NB ROC KSeeGibsonandMcKenzie,EightQuestionsaboutBrain Drain, 123. 29.Also,developedcountriesshouldnotwastethetalentthat does arrive by not recognizing skills that often function as a screen for protecti