Dear Sir or Madam

Marta Kaczynska Zuzanna Kurtyka

;10110354.---

Smo1e6sk2010 Family Association, their friends from Poland and Polonia (represented by

http://freepl.info/.) present a translation of the official remarks made by Polish representatives on

the grounds of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention in response to the Interstate Aviation

Committee report on the crash that occurred on in Smolensk. The translation was carried out by

TransPerfect, a highly respected American company who provide language services globally.

'Remarks to the 'Interstate Aviation Report" were prepared by Polish prosecutors and

Members of a Polish Aviation Committee. These remarks fundamentally undermine the main

thesis of the IAC report. For this reason the document was intended to be translated and published

in English thus highlighting to the world the discrepancies and falsifications leading to a

hypothesis built on evidence tapered to support it. This we were promised by the Polish

government. Yet, in April 2011, the Chief of Polish Air Accidents Committee — Jerzy Miller,

informed us that there was very little reason to conduct such a translation. That is why we have

delivered, albeit late, a translation prepared on behalf of all non-governmental bodies and

institutions.

We would like to turn your attention to the most fundamental accusations: Firstly, 169 of a

total of 222 Polish motions and requests for legal assistance were refused or ignored. The IAC

presented false transcripts of communications records by the cabin crew. Sentences which were

never uttered by the crew were included in their report. In the first chapter, entitled 'Factual

Information', the IAC presented a psychological hypothesis not supported by any real evidence.

The summary delivered by our expert depicts the basic scrutiny of the report's failures.

With kind regards

Families and Friends letter

As members of families and friends of those who died on 10 April 2010 in the Smolensk

air crash we appeal for the acknowledgement of this letter and the attached documents. We appeal

for help in establishing an International Committee to investigate the Smolensk crash and in

retrieving the wreckage and black boxes of the aircraft.

Amongst the dead were the President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, and the

First Lady. All the people on board devoted their lives to making Europe and Poland strong and

independent and to having a positive influence on the world's politics. They supported the idea of

securing and protecting the supply of energy resources, so important in today's world. It is baffling

that those who are greatly interested in resolving the Smolensk crash case quickly will also be

those who will write to government representatives and intemational organisations. What is truly

baffling is that those who write are not actually members of the Polish government or any

connected bodies. We feel abandoned by the Polish government in our efforts, in the same way I

imagine the crew of the Tu-154M aircraft which crashed in Smolensk felt. The govemment of

Donald Tusk negligently sent crew and passengers to a Russian airport in Smolensk without

undertaking basic security checks. The Polish security services simply accepted Russia's refusal to

allow inspection of the airport and its infrastructure. On the day of the planned landing there were

no security officers (BOR) present on the runway apart from the drivers. No army surveillance

was in operation, despite the fact that the President, senior officials and representatives and the

highest Chiefs of Staff of all army forces were on board. No officer was supervising the work of

the Flight Control Centre. No important security information was delivered on board during the

flight. The reserve airfield was not properly prepared.

After the crash all important evidence was seized by the Russians and all attempts to

inspect the wreckage were barred despite a mutual agreement that both sides would investigate the

crash within the first three days. After three days and under mysterious circumstances, the Polish

govemment withdrew its participation in the investigation leaving the investigation entirely in

Russian hands. Up to now the govemment has refused to reveal details of the decision process

used to withdraw from the investigation. The bodies of the victims were delivered in soldered

coffins and the families were prohibited from opening the coffins under Russian jurisdiction

allegedly expanded to cover Polish territory in this case. After the funerals had taken place, it was

revealed they had been misled. Polish medical specialists were not present at the autopsies. They

were not performed in Poland. After 14 months not all of the autopsies documentation was

delivered and that which was, contained discrepancies showing evident falsifications; eye colours

not matching, height differences; there are medical documentations describing organs being

removed years before the crash date. Unfortunately, despite many motions, the first filed in July

2010, the public persecutors office has not considered exhumations.

There are no analytical reports on the wreckage. The wreckage itself has been deliberately

destroyed and a journalist who recorded acts of vandalism performed by Russian uniformed unit

members was subsequently dismissed from his position at a Polish national TV. Donald Tusk kept

silent when without any supportive evidence, the IAC accused renowned pro-Western general, The

Chief of Staff of Air Forces — General Blasik, of travelling under the influence of alcohol, with a

reading of 0.6 %opermille of alcohol in his blood. The Russians failed to disclose the fact that

General Blasik's body was actually found a day after the crash and according to medical experts,

had exactly the level of endogen alcohol expected in a naturally decomposing corpse. No further

examination was performed and documentation of the original examination has not been

delivered; there are no appendixes showing chromatographs or calibration charts.

The Donald Tusk government, in full possession of the IAC report discrepancies and

falsifications, have not been able to translate the Polish remarks in response to it. The document

itself reveals to a large extent Russian report failures. The Polish government has voted against the

resolutions aimed to allow Polish experts to access the wreckage and other vital material evidence.

A refusal to reveal to the public all relevant information about agreements being signed or adopted

with the Russian Federation during the period after the crash. Such international agreements have

not been registered by the United Nations. He called those who were appealing for support from

the allied countries and organisations as `traitors'. He has been trying to dismiss all the voices

appealing for EU and NATO engagement, using sympathising media.

Despite all of that, our devotion is to the memory of the loved ones who died on 10 April

2010 in Smolensk and in respect to law and order required to undertake an action. For this we

appeal for any possible help in resolving the Smolensk tragedy. We truly believe that solidarity

and basic human values make international public opinion engaged in supporting a nation which

has never refused to stand against common threats.

With kind regards

Families and Friends of the Stnolensk tragedy victims.

President and vice-president Katyn2010Families Association.

Marta Kaczyfiska Zuzanna Kurtyka

SUMMARY

Remarks Of the Republic of Poland as: the state of registration and operator on the draft Final

Report regarding the investigation into the accident of the Tu-154M tail number 101 aircrafi

which occurred on 10 April 2010drafted by the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC).

An unreliable analysis instead of facts supported by evidence.

After viewing a draft of the final Interstate Aviation Committee report, the Polish

authorities find that certain chapters of the report were prepared contrary to the guidelines

contained in the ICAO doc. 9756 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, part

IV, Reporting.

According to the guidelines for the investigation into aircraft incidents, the first chapter

of the report titled '1. Factual Information' should not contain evaluations and analysis but

factual information, whilst the analysis should be included in the second chapter. Thus, Polish

authorities refuse to acknowledge the so called `psychological analysis' contained incorrectly in

chapter one.

However the analysis alone is based on inaccurate transcripts from the cockpit voice

recorder containing commands and sentences by crew members during the last 30 minutes before

the crash. The transcripts, prepared by the IAC in May and June 2010, contain lines which do not

appear on the CVR recordings copy which remains in the possession of Poland. Amongst other

things, the Russians have included the sentence 'He will go crazy', what has been an attempt to

prove that there was pressure coming from a third party. In fact no such sentence was uttered.

The words and sentences of the crew were altered to imply such a situation. Based on the

delivered copy of the CVR recordings, both the Polish Investigation Committee and the Polish

Prosecutors office refuse any suggestions that the crew might have undergone any psychological

pressure from a third party to continue descent. The Russian committee have ignored Polish

remarks and used unreliable and unsupported analysis and psychological hypothesis.

In the chapter describing the history of the flight, the Russians have not included much

information which according to the template included in Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention

and guidelines from Doc. 9756 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, part IV

Reporting it should contain.

Contrary to what the Russian cornrnittee report states, at an altitude of 100 metres, the

Pilot-in-Command instructed a `Go-around'. This was confirmed by the Co-Pilot. The evidence

reveals the clear counting of the distance from the runaway centreline by the navigator (Russians

have falsely stated that the crew descended on the glide path late, contrary even to the flight

parameters diagram). Parts of the conversation which prove the crew knew the topography of the

terrain perfectly were not quoted (The IAC committee suggested in the final chapter that the

crash was caused by a lack of knowledge on the part of the pilots on the terrain topography).

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Unverified hypothesis in place of analysis

In the chapter II titled `analysis', the Russians provide analysis based on hypothesis

rather than any fact related evidence. The way the analysis was performed is so far from the

guidelines contained in the ICAO Doc. 6920 (Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation).

Hypothesis not supported by fact should have been abandoned. Unfortunately, the analysis

provided was not abandoned, but presented as a thesis, dropping the conditional clause.

Quotation from the translation of Polish remarks made to the IACRemarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101

(...)2 Analysis

The method of the analysis does not comply with the guidelines contained in the ICAO Doc. 6920 (Manual of

Aircraft Accident Investigation, IV edition). The analysis should be based on an assessment of evidence and not

hypotheses. The analysis should examine the evidence already presented in Chapter 1. Factual Information, and

develop circumstances and situations that might occur. This should lead to the formulation of possible hypotheses

that should be discussed in the context of the evidence gathered. Hypotheses unsupported with evidence should be

rejected. Hypotheses mgy not be treated as certainties, and their proof may not rely on hypothetical evidence. The

listed items are presented as statements in the form of axioms; and conditional expressions, such as likely, possible,

etc., were not used even once.

The analysis contains many repetitions as well as references to many facts that were not included in the

Chapter I. Factual Information. It does not focus on the description ofpossible variants of the course of action and

the assessment of the course of individual ,flight sequences. The activities of the Flights Management Group were

not evaluated and the impact of decisions taken outside the Flights Management Group on these activities. It mainly

focused on proving that the activities of the controllers at the traffic control were correct. The influence of pressure

from other persons at the CATC-a, who as the only one suggested sending the Tu- I 54M aircraft to an alternate

aerodrome, was not assessed. Full analysis of the situation at the Smolensk "Severny" aerodrome should be carried

out after the additions in the recording of the fourth track from BSKP in respect of the accurate indication of the

interlocutor and the content of the information passed on(...)

Russians change and hide the information about the ground Smolensk airbase personnel.

In its final report the Interstate Aviation Committee states that the Chief Air Traffic

Controller and Landing Zone Controller underwent medical examinations and were authorised

for air traffic control by a doctor on duty at the medical point JW 06755. According to the

statement given to the Russian Federation public prosecutors on 10 April 2010 the medical point

was closed at that time. Both controllers decided themselves that `there were no obstacles to

fulfil their duties' judged on their wellbeing. The IAC report dismisses important and vital

information such as allowing the Chief Air Traffic Controller (CATC) to perform his duties at the

airport. There is no record of authorisation in existence which permits the Air Traffic Controller

to work in difficult meteorological conditions. During questioning by the IAC on 18 April 2010,

the Air Traffic Controller admitted it was only his second time in the role ever at the Smolensk

airport. His first ever shift took place on 7 April. Within the 12 months prior to that date he had

only undertaken the role nine times altogether. Again, there is no documentation proving that the

Landing Zone Controller had ever been trained or authorised to operate and supervise the

Precision Approach Radar RSP-6M2 system in Smolensk.

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The information about the role of FSB Colonel Krasnokutsky, as the final report

describes, is misleading and contradicts the evidence provided. Russian committee members are

assured that Colonel Krasokutsky did not take an active part in directing flights, although he was

the most active member of the ground crew. His solitary command: 'We lead him down to 100

metres'— ended all attempts by Chief Air Traffic Controller to direct the aircraft to the reserve

airfield, breaching regulations. At the same time Colonel Krasnokutsky was able to give

thorough reports about the aircraft position and the situation at the airport. The Russians refused

to give information about who Colonel Krasnokutsky had contacted and spoken with regarding

these reports.

According to the Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, this was adopted as a legal basis

three days after the crash. The Polish authorities had 60 days to prepare remarks for the final

Interstate Aviation Committee report. Members of the Polish Committee 'prepared a 148 page

document, which revealed precisely how flawed, and at some points contradictory the evidence

is in the report. The Poles acting through their representatives aimed to realise its defined powers

on the grounds of article 5.25 of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention and filed a dozen motions

enquiring about 222 specified problems from which only 34 had been answered in full. The

Russians ignored or refused to acknowledge 169 enquiries; in the rest of the cases the

information delivered was not satisfactory.

222 enquiries for legal help — 169 refused or ignored

Amongst the motions ignored or refused, was the refusal of the request for 'presentation

regarding assessing the minimum airdrome conditions' at the Smolensk airport and video

recordings of radar display readings by the Chief Air Traffic Controller (landing approach of 11-

76, Yak-40, Tu-154 M flights) on 10 April, photographic documentation from the crash scene,

authorisation for servicing on two positions simultaneously (Chief Air Traffic Controller and

Landing Zone Controller) data of fly-around subsequent to the crash and the inspection of

communication and navigation aids. The Polish authorities had not received technical expertise

of the wreckage debris and any data of two failed attempts of 11-76 landings, prior to the crash.

The motion to authorise Polish specialists and accredited representatives to take part in the fly-

around was refused. A protest after the refusal was ignored as well as the protest against the

refusal of the inspection of the RSP-6M2 radar system in Smolensk on 10 April.

All filed motions for enabling the Polish accredited representative (and his advisers) to

fulfil his rights and duties on the grounds of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention. Polish

authorities were refused all information requested on what might have been the source of fires

which surrounded the airport and made the atmospheric conditions worse. Regular citations

made by the meteorologist from 4.00 a.m. UTC indicated the presence of smoke. No information

about the rescue and extinguishing of fires has been provided. No evidence regarding the

presence or any traces of explosive materials has been provided. No full post-mortem reports or

other examinations have been provided. Those which have been delivered are grossly inaccurate

as they contain the description of organs which the victim had removed years before the crash

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Ignoring documents and information delivered by the Polish party.

The information contained in the final report states that Poland had not delivered

information about the accident on 8 April 2010 when in truth, all required documents had been

delivered. The Russians refused access to allow an airport inspection before 10 April. There were

no Polish inspections held at the airport before 10 April

Contradictions in the IAC report

Attached to the IAC report, the approach chart for the runway is not identical to the one

delivered to the Tu-154 prior to the crash. The statement that the lighting system was working

properly was untrue, when in the same report the IAC admits four out of eight rows of lights

were turned off. This information was revealed after a Belarus journalist's photos showed

Russian soldiers replacing bulbs ana fixing power supply cables only a few hours after the crash.

Polish investigators despite repeated requests and motions were not allowed to fly-around the

scene or inspect the navigation system in Smolensk. The radar approach readings should be in

accordance with the approach chart.

As mentioned earlier, Polish authorities were not given authorisation to take part in a fly-

around check. According to landing charts, the ICAO performed a fly-around check on 25 March

2001 on the basis of maintaining the glide path angle of 2°40'. A second approach was selected

for further calculations. But if that was so, the aircraft could not have been positioned on the

glide path at any moment in time. The Russians while inspecting the last phase of the flight

decided to change the glide path angle to 3° 12'. If this was the case, the aircraft would have

remained off the path angle for 75% of the time while making the approach to land... The table

included on pages 66 and 67 shows clearly that even at a glide path angle of 3° 12' and taking

into account allowable deviations from the beam runway centre, the aircraft would still have

remained under the glide path, dangerously close to the ground, even if starting from a distance

of 3000 metres from the runway beam. The Chief Air Traffic Controller did not respond for at

least 30 seconds, reassuring the crew they were on course and on the correct path, misleading the

crew about the actual distance from the runway beam. Interestingly in the report, the IAC adopts

the 3° 12' slope glide angle as a basic value; although it also contains analysis, changed when

required, of both glide slope angles.

Impermissible rescue operation.

The plane crash landed at 6:41:05 UTC, 400 hundred metres from the runway beam. As

detailed in the final report, the PCz-3 rescue services unit was on duty all day on 10 April at the

aerodrome. The unit was not summoned until 6.50 UTC. The information eventually reached the

unit, but according to witnesses' testimonies, headed in the opposite direction and had to do a U-

turn. Finally it reached the scene 14 minutes after the accident took place. The Chief Air Traffic

Controller informed units stationed further away from the town location and they were at the

scene 44 minutes later. The Russians have not supplied any details of the rescue or actions taken

to extinguish fires at the scene.

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There is no information about the Medical Rescue Team present on the runway. It appears

there was no such team at all. Polish authorities point out that the first medical rescue unit

arrived at the scene at 6.58 UTC, 17 minutes after the crash. A further seven medical crew units

appeared 29 minutes after, despite the fact that the airport is situated within the city boundaries

borders.

Violations of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.

An accredited representative of the Republic of Poland was not sanctioned to inspect the

expert's analysis of the activities of the group directing flights on 10 April 2010. This was a

violation of paragraph 2.25(h) of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention. They were not authorised

to participate in any proceedings or scrutinise any observations or evidence found or provided by

the IAC. The Russians have ignored in the most part any Polish motions relating to the final

report draft. Parts of the wreckage as well as the original black boxes remain in the hands of the

Russians even though this is evidence which needs to be examined by investigators in Poland.

This is in violation of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.

Transcripts were published on the IAC website in Polish, in their original format. No

attempts by the Polish governrnent have been made to translate the transcripts into English. It is

entirely due to non-governmental organisations and private persons that the Western reader can

read these official remarks and confront the IAC report with facts.

We believe that with international support behind us, Russia will have no choice but to

return the black boxes and the wreckage back to its rightful owners - Poland. We hope that

setting in motion a credible international committee, we can get justice for the crew, passengers

and restore Polish public opinions.

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