Dead in the Water: Indo-Pak Conflict in the Indus River Valley

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Dead in the Water: Indo-Pak Conflict in the Indus River Valley

Kristy Throndson

GOVT 451

Professor Karber

Source: “Wular Lake,” Indian Tourist Guide <http://indiantouristguide.in/wp-‐content/uploads/2012/03/wular_lake2.jpg> (Accessed 5 December 2012)

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Introduction

The Indus River runs through the valley like blood through veins. For

thousands of years, its life-‐giving waters sustained and unified the people of the

Indian subcontinent. Even when the subcontinent was split in the partition of

British India, bitter rivals Pakistan and India were brought together in a treaty of

cooperation in order to share the waters of the Indus. Their agreement was based

not on mutual friendship and political agreement, but rather on the begrudging

understanding that the only way they could have access to the river was through

partnership. The peace created by the treaty has lasted an astounding fifty years.

However, the stability of this treaty will soon be put to the test. The combination of

population growth, industrialization, and climate change has depleted the flow of

the Indus River and will continue to do so until the river runs dry. When the waters

that were the foundation of Indo-‐Pak cooperation begin to dry up, the pillars of their

peace agreement will crumble. Diplomacy will fail and the two states will go to war

over the last of the remaining waters. Unless a dramatic change is made to increase

the efficiency of water use in the Indus River Valley, the water running through the

valley will be replaced by the blood of its people.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the source of conflict in the Indus

River Valley and present a military balance of the two potential combatants: India

and Pakistan. The paper will examine the past, present, and future of the Indus

River Valley beginning with its partition in 1947, continuing with an exploration of

the treaty that brokered the sharing of its water, and proceeding with an

investigation of how water scarcity in the valley could ignite future conflict. Finally,

the paper will assess the military forces of India and Pakistan in order to develop an

understanding of how operations could proceed in the event of the outbreak of

“water wars” in the Indus River Valley.

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Source: Naveed Tajammal,“The Indus Accord 1960,” <http://pakpotpourri.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/the-‐indus-‐accord-‐1960/> (Accessed 4 December 2012)

The Division of the Indus River Valley

The end of British colonial rule necessitated the partitioning of the Indian

subcontinent. Although Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the Boundary Commission,

drew the border in only seventy-‐two days, his partition sparked a conflict that

would last decades.1 The Indo-‐Pak border divided not only lands and peoples, but

also water resources. After the official

partition on August 15, 1947, the Indus River

Valley was split between the two countries,

dividing a major water source that had

historically been under the management of a

single government. As shown in Figure 1,

Pakistan gained control of the larger portion of

Indus River Valley and greater length of the

Indus and its tributaries. However, India

acquired upper riparian status.

In the eyes of the Pakistani government,

India’s command of the upper Indus River

system threatened the security of Pakistan’s

water supply. Pakistani leaders feared that India would cut off the flow of water -‐

particularly at essential irrigation headworks at Madhopur on the Ravi River and

Ferozpur on the Sutlej River -‐ and turn West Punjab into an unproductive desert.2

With no historical precedent or formal treaty to guide future water-‐sharing,

India and Pakistan came to a “standstill agreement” in which the new countries

pledged to maintain the status quo water flow until March 31, 1948 in order to

1 Dennis Kux, India-‐Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006) 2 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms (New York, NY; Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)

Figure 1: The Indo-Pak Partition

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allow enough time to develop a permanent solution.3 However, the deadline passed

without an accepted settlement, and on April 1st, India suspended the water flow to

Pakistan. In the minds of many Pakistani, this action confirmed their suspicion that

India was bent on sabotaging the success of the new nation. India returned the flow

to Pakistan eighteen days later, but not before a mutual distrust was created that

would hinder cooperation between the two states for years to come.

Despite their feelings of suspicion, India and Pakistan both understood that their

survival depended on their successful negotiation of the Indus River disagreement.

There was an unspoken understanding between the two states that although each

would have preferred to have the resource for itself, it would rather cooperate with

its rival than lose the water source outright.

A Tenuous Peace: The Indus Waters Treaty

In 1951, India and Pakistan were embroiled in intractable conflict. The two

nations were on the brink of war over Kashmir, and the Indus River dispute

remained unsolved. David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Commission

and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission saw the conflict over the Indus as an

opportunity for cooperation rather than collision. After a visit to the Indus River

Valley he wrote the following in his journal:

One way to reduce hostility . . . would be to concentrate on other important

issues where cooperation was possible….Accordingly, I proposed that India and

Pakistan work out a program jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus

Basin river system.4

3 Daanish Mustafa “Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin,” United States Institute of Peace (November 2010), <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo19414/SR261-‐HydropoliticsinPakistansIndusBasin.pdf> (Accessed 1 December 2012) p. 4 4 Niranjan Gulhati, The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, (Allied Publishers: Bombay; Allied Publishers, 1973). p. 93

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Lilienthal suggested that the World Bank act as moderator, and it accepted the

position in order to support economic development in the region. The World Bank

instituted a new strategy for brokering the deal, insisting that India and Pakistan put

aside political prejudices and focus instead on the functional aspects of the dispute.5

Rather than allocate water based on historical rights and political claims, engineers

were tasked to find the most practical way to divide the waters so that the river

system would yield the water necessary to both countries to sustain their

agricultural production.

After eight years of proposals and negotiations, the conflict was ripe for

settlement. Neither party wanted to give up their claims on the waters, but they

feared that their use of the river would be suspended if they refused. The Indus

Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960 and ratified by Indian President

Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Pakistani Field Marshal Ayub Khan on December 27th and

28th of the same year.6 Shortly after, the United States, Australia, Germany, United

Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand pledged to contribute $900 to the Indus Basin

Development Fund to cover the expense of constructing new canals agreed upon in

the Indus Waters Treaty. 7

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) delineates Pakistan and India’s water-‐

sharing rights and privileges in the Indus River Valley and specifies mechanisms for

future conflict resolution. To Pakistan, it allocates control of the western rivers –

the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – and to India, the eastern rivers up to the Pakistani

border – the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi.8 The IWT limits India’s ability to store

substantial amounts of water from the three western rivers rewarded to Pakistan.

5 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms op. cit. p. 60

6 Ibid., 66 7 Ibid., 66 8 Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, (Majority Staff Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report 112-‐10; Washington, DC 112th Congress, 1st Session, February 2011) p. 10

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However, the treaty also acknowledges the legitimate limited use of water for

irrigation and electricity generation in the Indian territory of the rivers allocated to

Pakistan.9 Foreseeing that this ambiguity may cause disputes, the IWT set up a

commission to adjudicate arguments. The Permanent Indus Commission is

designed to increase transparency between the riparians and to manage differences

of opinion before they escalate into collision. Indian and Pakistani members sit on

the commission and meet regularly to discuss the development of the river system,

exchange data, and negotiate dispute settlements. This institution facilitates

cooperation by promoting interdependence, increasing accountability, and reducing

the incentive to cheat. However, Indo-‐Pakistani cooperation in the Indus River

Valley has not been without its challenges. The following section will examine three

cases in which the IWT conflict resolution mechanisms have been put to the test.

Testing the Waters: Challenges to the Indus Water Treaty

Although continual access to the water resources of the Indus motivated

India and Pakistan to cooperate in the Indus River Valley, the temptation to

monopolize the waters occasionally motivated India to pursue projects that pushed

the boundaries of the treaty. When technical disagreements occur, they are

classified into one of three groups and handled accordingly. Those categorized as

questions are brought before the Permanent Indus Commission and examined by

Indian and Pakistani commissioners. If a discord cannot be mediated by the

Permanent Indus Commission, it is labeled as a difference and sent to a neutral

expert who issues an independent decision. If the neutral expert determines that

the disagreement is especially severe, it is treated as a dispute and brought before a

Court of Arbitration. 10 The descriptions of the following challenges demonstrate

9 Daanish Mustafa “Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin,” op. cit 10 “Indus Waters Treaty,” World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-‐1105737253588/IWT_Article_IX.pdf> (Accessed 3 December 2012), article IX

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that cooperation based on a shared dependence on the Indus River can withstand

petty technical disagreements as long as the necessary water continues to flow.

Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage and Storage Project

The Indo-‐Pak conflict over the Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage and

Storage Project began in 1986 and remains unresolved to this day. India began

construction on a barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of Wullar Lake in 1985

to regulate the flow from the lake. The source of the difference of opinion is

apparent in its title. While India claimed that the barrage would be used solely for

the purpose of maintaining the necessary water flow for navigation between Sopore

and Baramula, Pakistan was concerned about its potential to be used for storage or

even as a geo-‐strategic weapon.11 The issue was brought before the Permanent

Indus Commission in 1986. Although an agreement was not reached, India pledged

to stop construction of the barrage until the two states could come to a bilateral

consensus.12 A series of talks have been held between representatives of each

country, but each has resulted in a failure to resolve the conflict. Today the Tubul

Navigation Project/Wullar Project has yet to be settled, and the dispute remains a

point of contention between Indians and Pakistanis.

Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project

The Baglihar Hydroelectric Power Project created a dispute that threatened

to break down the Indo-‐Pak cooperation established by the Indus Waters Treaty. In

1992, Indian engineers developed plans to build a dam on the Chenab River in the

Doda district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.13 Although the IWT awarded

rights of the Chenab River to Pakistan, the treaty allowed for India’s use of the river

for the generation of hydroelectric power. As is mandated by the IWT, India 11 Ashutosh Misra , India-‐Pakistan: Coming to Terms op. cit. p. 159 12 Ibid., p. 165 13 Rajesh Sinha, “Two Neighbors and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 41. No 7 (2006) p. 606-‐608

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presented its construction plans to Pakistan, and at first, Pakistan did not raise any

major objections.14 However, as technical changes were made to the design of the

dam increasing its hydroelectric capacity, disagreements arose. India and Pakistan

held a series of bilateral talks, but they could not come to a mutually acceptable

consensus. It seemed that without third party involvement, the conflict was likely to

become intractable.

Pakistani opposition to the Baglihar Dam project was founded in their belief

that it would compromise their share of the flow of the Indus River system and

create water shortages in Pakistan. Their main technical objections were the

designs of the dam’s storage, power intake tunnels, and spillways, which they

claimed violated the regulations laid out in Annexure D of the Indus Waters Treaty

of generation of hydroelectric power on the western rivers.15 The Pakistanis

believed that the 144.5 meter height of the dam allowed for an unnecessary amount

of storage and the gated spillways and low power intake tunnels gave India the

ability to manipulate the flow of the Chenab River. They argued that the combined

effect would allow India to either flood or starve Pakistan at its discretion.

Additionally, the Pakistanis were worried that if they compromised on the Baglihar

project, it would set a precedent of appeasement that the Indians would abuse in the

future, further siphoning off the precious waters of the Indus. Therefore, in 2005,

Pakistan invoked the arbitration clause of the IWT for the first time when leaders

petitioned the World Bank to assign an expert to issue an impartial decision.16 The

World Bank agreed, labeling the disagreement as a difference and selecting Swiss

engineer Raymond Lafitte to write a compromise. Lafitte’s final decision, released

14 Robert Wirsing and Christopher Jasparro, “Spotlight on Indus River Diplomacy: India Pakistan and the Baglihar Dam Dispute” Asia-‐Pacific Center for Security Studies (May 2006) < http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/IndusRiverDiplomacy.Wirsing.Jasparro.pdf> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 15 Rajesh Sinha, “Two Neighbors and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters,” op. cit. 16 Tapan R. Mohanty and Adil Hasan Khan, “Dam of Division: Understanding the Baglihar Dispute,” Economic and Political Weekly , Vol. 40, No. 29 (2005), p. 3155-‐3158

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Source: “Disputed dam sparks Indo-‐Pak race” The Telegraph., (16 April 2008) <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080416/jsp/nation/story_9144828.jsp> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 1 http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590 1http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C08%5C23%5Cstory_23-‐8-‐2012_pg5_13

on February 17, 2007, included only minor modifications to the design of the dam.

Although both sides had to make compromises, India and Pakistan pledged to

uphold the decision. As long as both sides still received enough of the flow to

support their people, it was less costly to compromise than to risk extended conflict.

However, the Baglihar dam remains a point of contention in Pakistan, as many

believe that it deprives farmers of their rightful supply of water.

Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Project

One of the most recent challenges to the stability of the Indus Waters Treaty

is the construction of a dam on the Kishanganga River (known in Pakistan as the

Neelum River), the largest tributary of the Jhelum. Both countries have plans to

harness the power of the river’s waters to supply

electricity and irrigation.17 However, the river can

only feasibly support one major hydroelectric

project. The Pakistanis began construction on the

Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam in 2002, and in 2007 signed a

$1.5 billion contract with Chinese companies

China’s Gezhouba Water and Power Company and

China National Machinery and Equipment Import

and Export Corporation to construct the

project.18 The building race began in 2007 with

that start of construction on India’s Kishanganga

Hydroelectric Project. Although the Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam is the larger of the two

projects (generating three times the electricity of the Kishanganga Dam), the

Kishanganga upper riparian position (demonstrated in Figure 2) allowed it to

17 Sury Amurthy, “Disputed dam sparks Indo-‐Pak race” The Telegraph., (16 April 2008) <http://www.telegraphindia.com/1080416/jsp/nation/story_9144828.jsp> (Accessed 3 December 2012) 18 “Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam,” International Rivers, < http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590> (Accessed 3 December 2012)

Figure 2: Kishanganga and Neelum Projects

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reducte the flow of the river of up to 21 percent, significantly decreasing the

productivity of the Pakistani dam.19

Pakistan contends that India’s diversion of the Kishanganga River violates

the Indus Waters Treaty. In 2010, Pakistan brought its complaints to the Permanent

Court of Arbitration at The Hague.20 Members of the Court of Arbitration visited the

sites of the Kishanganga and Neelum-‐Jhelum dams in June of 2011 and finished their

deliberation in October 2012. The court is expected to release their decision within

the next four months.

Despite challenges from both sides, the Indus Waters Treaty has maintained

a tenuous peace in the Indus River Valley for over fifty years, withstanding multiple

disputes as well as the Indo-‐Pak wars of 1965, 1971, and 1991. Many contend that

the design of the treaty, especially the Permanent Indus Commission and the system

of dispute settlement, is responsible for the prevention of conflict in the river valley.

Although the Indus Waters Treaty has been instrumental in the mitigation of water

disputes over the last fifty years, it was not the cause of the lasting stability. Rather,

the key to the prevention of armed conflict in the Indus River Valley lies in simple

supply and demand economics. As long as both India and Pakistan have the supply

of water to meet the personal, agricultural, and industrial demands of its population,

there is no incentive to engage in a costly conflict to obtain control of additional

water sources. Because the Indus River System has provided India and Pakistan

with a sufficient amount of water to meet the needs of their populations up to this

point, the two states have been willing to cooperate and compromise. However,

future climate change and increasing development will reduce the supply of water

while inflating the demand. This will result in an environment of water scarcity that 19 Zeeshan Javaid, “Kishanganga Hydropower Project : Face-‐off between Pak, India to continue till 31st at PCA,” Daily Times. (23 August 2012) <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C08%5C23%5Cstory_23-‐8-‐2012_pg5_13> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 20 “Neelum-‐Jhelum Dam,” International Rivers, < http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/neelum-‐jhelum-‐dam-‐3590> (Accessed 3 December 2012) op cit.

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will threaten the vitality of the states and encourage competition rather than

cooperation. The following section examines the changing environmental and

developmental conditions that will create water scarcity in the Indus River Valley,

eroding the basis for interstate cooperation.

Changing Circumstances

As the global use of water grows at more than double the rate of the world

population, water scarcity is predicted to become a widespread problem by the year

2050. Nowhere will this be more apparent than in the Indus River Basin. The

combined effect of rapid population growth, industrialization, lifestyle adjustments,

and climate change are predicted to raise water scarcity to critical levels in the near

future.

Population Growth

By 2050, the Indian population is expected to expand from 1,224,614 to

1,692,008 and the Pakistani population from 173,593 to 274,875.21 Such a dramatic

increase will put a strain on the existing supply of water, increasing the demand for

water-‐intensive foods. The water needed for irrigation will increase by 68.5 trillion

liters, and farmers will be forced to deplete groundwater resources in order to

produce enough food to meet demand. This will result in the depletion of

groundwater resources by 50-‐75% by 2050.22 India and Pakistan will therefore be

forced to rely more heavily on surface waters such as the Indus River and its

tributaries.

21 “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision,” United Nations <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2008/wpp2008_text_tables.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 22 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. (2009). <http://www.grailresearch.com/pdf/ContenPodsPdf/Water-‐The_India_Story.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012)

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Industrialization

Although Pakistan and India are still largely agricultural societies, the recent

trend has been towards industrialization. The manufacturing sector has been

growing steadily (about 8-‐9%) in both countries and is projected to continue to

expand.23 The success of India and Pakistan’s factories is dependent upon electricity

provided by hydroelectric power. In India, industrial water consumption is

expected to quadruple its 2000 levels by 2050.24 However, because Indian and

Pakistani companies often do little to prevent pollution, billions of liters of

wastewater are produced every day, depleting the supply of available freshwater.

Lifestyle Changes

Increased industrialization and development are predicted to have positive

effects on the salaries of the average Indian and Pakistani citizen. By 2050, per

capita GDP is projected to rise from its current $1,489 to $41,700 in India and from

$1,194 to $7,900 in Pakistan.25 Assumedly, this will alter citizens’ preferences and

allow them to demand more water-‐intensive products such as chicken, milk, and

cotton. Overall, per capita domestic water consumption is projected to double from

89 liters per day to 167.26

As has been demonstrated above, the forces of population growth,

industrialization, and changes in domestic consumption will all increase the demand

for fresh water. The following subsection will explore the trend in future freshwater

supply.

23 “Pakistan Growth and Export Competitiveness” World Bank. (25 April 2006) < http://www-‐wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2006/05/23/000012009_20060523095241/Rendered/PDF/354991PK0rev0pdf.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 24 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. op cit. 25 “GDP per capita,” The World Bank. < http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 26 “Water – The India Story,” Grail Research. op cit.

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Climate Change

The Indus River and its tributaries are fed by some of nature’s largest “water

towers”: the Himalayan mountains. Water melts off of the snow and glaciers in the

Himalayas and runs into Pakistan and India where it supplies water to the Indus

River Valley irrigation system. The rising temperature caused by global warming

have caused the Tibetan glaciers to melt quickly. While this will increase the flow of

the rivers in the short run, by 2065 the flow of the river will be consistently and

considerably reduced.27 Some have predicted that by the end of the century, the

Indus River could be running at only half of its current levels.28 This reduction will

have serious consequences for agriculture in the region. It is estimated that the

number of people that can be fed by the agricultural output of the Indus River will

decrease by around 26 million.29 David Grey, World Bank senior water advisor,

commented on effects of climate change on the Indus River saying,

“…we all have very nasty fears that the flows of the Indus could be severely,

severely affected by glacier melt as a consequence of climate change…Now

what does that mean to a population that lives in a desert [where], without the

river, there would be no life? I don’t know the answer to that question, but we

need to be concerned about that. Deeply, deeply concerned.”

Ticking Time Bomb: The Grounds for Conflict

The waters of the Indus River are essential for the survival of India and

Pakistan. The Indus River and its tributaries support the economic vitality and

strategic defense of the nations and therefore must be protected at all costs. In the

27 Walter W. Immerzeel, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers,” Science Vol. 328 No. 1382 (2010) <http://1004378.liweb1.pinshosting.net/wp-‐content/uploads/2011/05/Immerzeel_Science_11June2010.pdf> (Accessed 4 December 2012) 28 Fred Pearce, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water – the Defining Crisis of the Twenty-‐First Century (Boston, MA; Beacon Press, 2006)

29 Walter W. Immerzeel, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian Water Towers” op cit

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absence of water scarcity, the lease costly way for Pakistan and India to ensure that

they received their fair share of the flow was to cooperate and join in the Indus

Waters Treaty. However, in a situation of scarcity, the best way to protect national

interests may be to enter into conflict. The following sections examine how the

Indus River represents a national security concern.

Economic Dependence

India and Pakistan are dependent on the Indus River as a source of both

electricity and food. In India, 11.9% of power is generated by water and in Pakistan,

this number is 29.4%.30 Any abatement of this power supply would exacerbate

existing power shortages and slow economic production. In a situation of scarcity,

each nation will be concerned primarily with meeting its own energy needs

regardless of the effect on its neighbor.

Despite the recent move towards industrialization, India and Pakistan remain

primarily agricultural societies. Of the total amount of renewable water resources

withdrawn in India and Pakistan each year, 92-‐97% is used for agriculture.31 In

Pakistan, the Indus River system irrigation network covers 83% of cultivated land,

irrigates up to 90% of the country’s crops, and contributes nearly one-‐fourth of its

GDP.32 While a disruption in the flow of the Indus River would be detrimental to

either country, Pakistan is in a uniquely vulnerable position because the Indus River

is its single main source of freshwater. Whereas India could fall back on its

groundwater supplies or its access to the Ganges River system, Pakistan must rely

on the uninterrupted flow of the Indus for its economic survival.

30 “Electricity production from hydroelectric sources,” The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.HYRO.ZS/countries?display=default> (Accessed 5 December 2012) 31 “Annual freshwater withdrawals,” The World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.FWTL.K3> (Accessed 5 December 2012) 32 Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, op sit. 6

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Strategic Value

Not only is the Indus River system valuable for its contribution to the

economy, but it could also be converted into a powerful defensive or offensive

weapon of war. Whoever gains control of the river can choose to either flood their

enemy’s territory or cut off their water supply completely. Additionally, the dams

could be used as defensive trenches in the event of a conventional attack. Either

way, it is clear that the maintenance of control of at least part of the Indus River is

essential for national security.

India and Pakistan are on the brink of crisis. The Indus Waters Treaty was

written under the assumption that when judiciously allocated, there would always

be enough water to fulfill both countries’ needs. The stability of the treaty depends

on that unwritten clause. However, with the increasing demand and decreasing

supply of water in the Indus River Valley, it is only a matter of time before there is a

shortage. When this occurs, the incentive to protect the economic vitality and

essential security of one’s nation will overcome the desire to cooperate. The

Permanent Indus Commission will become irrelevant as the countries compete

openly to capture any remaining water resources. As the upper riparian, India will

have the strategic advantage, presenting an inherent threat to Pakistan’s water

security. This threat alone may be enough for Pakistan to launch a preventative

offensive against India before it uses its hydroelectric dams to strangulate Pakistan

into submission. A Pakistani offensive would trigger an Indian retaliation, and

armed conflict would begin.

Military Balance

This section of the paper will analyze the military capabilities of India and

Pakistan in order to predict operations and outcome in the event of an Indo-‐Pak

conflict.

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Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 -‐ 248, 272-‐275

Defense Budget

Table 1: Indian and Pakistani Finances 2010-11

India Pakistan

2010 2011 2010 2011

GDP ($US) 1,640,000,000,000 1,890,000,000,000 173,000,000,000 202,000,000,000

GDP per capita 1,394 1,591 936 1,079

Growth 10.09% 7.84% 3.76% 2.56%

Inflation 12.00% 10.60% 11.70% 13.90%

Defense Budget ($US) 29,700,000,000 31,900,000,000 4,470,000,000 5,160,000,000

India’s impressive GDP growth rate of 10.09% in 2010 and 7.84% in 2011

insulated the country from the global financial crisis and provided it with additional

tax revenues to spend on defense.33 In its quest to achieve great-‐power status, India

has recently focused on the modernization of its military, resulting in an increase in

its capital expenditures.34 Although the Pakistani defense budget is about a sixth of

that of India (as can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1), Pakistan too is working

towards the modernization of its military, particularly its air force. Although they

have less to spend on defense, it would be unwise to discount the Pakistani military.

Figure 3

33 The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Solutions) p. 243 34 Ibid., p. 217

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Army

Table 2

The Indian army is significantly larger and better equipped than the

Pakistani army. India boasts the third-‐largest army in the world and, as shown in

Table 2, more than doubles the manpower of the Pakistani army. However, the size

of the Indian army can make it unwieldy. The sluggish response to the December

13, 2001 terrorist attack displayed the army’s incapability to perform an efficient

mobilization.35 Conversely, the Pakistani army can mobilize faster due to its smaller

35 Ibid., 243

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

2010

2011

2010

2011

India

Pakistan

2010-11 Defense Budgets (in US$ billions)

India Pakistan Active Manpower 1,129,900 550,000 Reserve Manpower 960,000

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Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics


size and closer proximity to the border. Therefore, Pakistan may have the

advantage in a limited ground attack. However, once successfully deployed and

engaged in conventional warfare, the Indian superiority in artillery and armored

fighting vehicles (as can be seen in Figures 4 and 5) will give its army the advantage.

Despite their lack of medium artillery and modern tanks, the Indian troops would

easily overwhelm the Pakistani army.

Navy

Table 3

The naval balance is tipped decisively in

favor of India. Indian naval forces

outnumber the Pakistani in surface

combatants and submarines. As shown

in Table 3, the Pakistan Navy has neither

an aircraft carrier nor any destroyers.

The India Navy does not typically view the Pakistan Navy as a threat and spends

most of the time maintaining a presence in the South China Sea to balance Chinese

Naval Force Type India Pakistan Air Craft Carrier 1 0 Destroyers 10 0 Frigates 10 10 Corvettes 6 0 SSN 1 0 SSK 14 5 SSI 0 3

Figure 4 Figure 5

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influence. However, in the event of warfare, the India Navy would likely focus on

blockading the Sea Lines of Communications to Pakistan. In return, Pakistan’s

submarines would target India’s carrier battle group, necessitating a precautionary

combat vessel escort at all times. Despite the minor setbacks of submarine attacks,

India decisively dominates the naval balance.

Air Force

Table 4

India Pakistan Fighter Aircraft 762 393 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Aircraft 3 10 Electronic Intelligence Aircraft 0 2 Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft 2 3 Aerial Refueling Tanker 6 3 Transport Aircraft 217 34 Training Aircraft 212 139

Both the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces are in the process of modernization.

After the effectiveness of its air defense were called into question after the US attack

on Osama Bin Laden’s compound, Pakistan made an effort to update its air force by

improving its precision strike and ISTAR capabilities.36 The India Air Force is in

desperate need of maintenance as nearly 500 of its planes are out of commission.

However, its modernization plans have been postponed by the delay in its

procurement program.

If the two forces were to come into contact, the India Air Force would have

the advantage. Although the Pakistan Air Force is well-‐trained and organized, the

numbers are stacked against it. The PAF could provide sufficient cover for ground

units, but would not be able to defend its airspace against Indian forces when their 36 : The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics p. 272

20

fixed-‐wing aircraft are outnumbered two to one and rotary-‐wing aircraft

outmatched thirty to one. Again, the military balance is in favor of India.

Nuclear Weapons – The Great Equalizer

If India and Pakistan were to engage in strictly conventional warfare, it is

clear that India would prevail. Having quantitative (if not always qualitative)

advantages on land, in the air, and at sea, Indian forces would easily overwhelm

Pakistan. However, both states’ possession of nuclear weapons changes the rules of

the game. India is estimated to have stockpiled up to one hundred nuclear

warheads and ten nuclear capable missiles with ranges from 700 to 3,000 km. India

currently has the capability to deliver the warheads to Pakistan via warship and

nuclear-‐capable aircraft and is planning to complete its nuclear triad with nuclear

ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant by the end of this year.37 India has declared

a nuclear doctrine of “no first use” and pledges only to use its nuclear capacity in

retaliation.

Pakistan is estimated to have between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads with

ranges of up to 3,000 km.38 The Pakistanis have developed two nuclear delivery

systems: warheads aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-‐to-‐

surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Although Pakistan does not have

an official nuclear doctrine, high-‐level officials have disclosed that Pakistan’s nuclear

arsenal is meant to deter aggression, prevent escalation, and achieve strategic

deterrence in South Asia.39 The development of nuclear capability has been

Pakistan’s way of countering India’s conventional superiority. Therefore, when

37 The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defense Economics p. 243 38 “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance” Arms Control Association < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> (Accessed 6 December 2012) 39 Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (13 January 2011), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155624.pdf> (Accessed 6 December 2012)

21

considering potential conflict in the Indus River Basin, Pakistan’s use of nuclear

weapons to deter Indian conventional territorial advances cannot be ruled out.

Operations

Although operations following the spark of conflict in the Indus River Valley

could develop any number of ways, this paper will base its predictions on the

preceding military assessment and historical precedents set by past Indo-‐Pak

military encounters.

It is the year 2065, and water scarcity has hit the Indus River Valley. Two

years earlier, when the region had been experiencing water stress, India withdrew

from the Indus Waters Treaty, stating that it was no longer in its national interest to

share the Indus River and its tributaries. Soon afterwards, India began construction

on large storage dams on the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers to trap the already

thin flow of water coming into Pakistan. Pakistan appealed to the World Bank, but

there was nothing that they could do. Pakistan knew that if India finished the dams,

it would completely cut off one of Pakistan’s last sources of freshwater. Therefore,

Pakistan plans a surprise offensive in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The terrain

there makes it hard to seal the borders, and Pakistan’s small, highly mobile forces

will easily penetrate Indian territory. The Pakistan army deploys two units of

ground forces covered by fighter aircraft. The units succeed in bombing two of the

three dams and return to Pakistan to regroup.

After learning of the attack, India has a decision to make. While it must

retaliate against the invasion of its territory, it does not want to cause so much

destruction as to trigger Pakistani use of nuclear weapons. India decides to send

destroyers to blockade the Pakistani coast and launches air raids against military

camps in Kashmir while it deploys its army to the border. This has little effect as

Pakistan as its military bases are armored to resist air attack and Pakistanis utilize

overland routes to China to resist the effects of the blockade. Meanwhile, Pakistan

22

continues to send ground forces into Jammu and Kashmir to wreck havock on Indian

irrigation systems, and the Indus River runs red with blood. Indian leaders become

frustrated and plan a full scale conventional attack on Lahore. India launches a

combined ground and air assault on the Pakistani border, and the Pakistani army

and air force are quickly overwhelmed. The Indian Army gains ground. The

Pakistan army retreats, but superior Indian artillery and armored vehicles have

caused heavily casualties. Pakistani leadership feels trapped knowing their

conventional forces cannot keep the Indian military from taking Lahore. The only

way they can balance the playing field and protect their national security is through

the use of nuclear weapons. However, strategists are not willing to commit to the

destruction of a full nuclear attack and opt instead for a nuclear airburst over Sirsa

air force base in Haryana. India heeds the demonstration and retreats, but the

conflict incites a cold war and nuclear arms race between the two nations.

Conclusion

The Indus River has held together Indo-‐Pak relations since the partition in

1947. Without the incentive to cooperate on the sharing of the waters, relations will

break down, and they will view each other not as partners, but as rivals. The lands

once used for agriculture will become fertile pastures for extremism and hardening

hatreds. The asymmetric military balance makes the situation especially precarious

as any perceived threat to Pakistan’s security could trigger a nuclear response. In

order to avoid escalating tensions, it is essential that India and Pakistan take

measures to conserve the resource that links them. The future of Indo-‐Pak

cooperation in the Indus River Valley depends on it.

23

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Documents

Dead in the Water: Indo-Pak Conflict in the Indus River Valley