D2.2 Design of UTM Scenarios and use cases reportprojectgauss.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GAUSS-D2_2.pdf · H2020-GALILEO-GSA-2017 Innovation Action Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for

H2020-GALILEO-GSA-2017

Innovation Action

Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for UTM Safety and Security

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 776293

D2.2 Design of UTM Scenarios and use cases report

Report Identifier: D2.2

Work-package, Task: WP2, T2.2 Status – Version: 4.00

Distribution Security: PU Deliverable Type: R

Editor: Enric Oliveres (EVADS), Adrian Jimenez (EVADS)

Contributors: Enrique Caballero (EVADS), Christian Verdonk (CU), Huamin Jia (CU), Antonis Kostaridis (STWS), Manolis Tsogas (STWS)

Reviewers: Adrian Jimenez (EVADS)

Quality Reviewer: Elisabeth Perez (EVADS)

Keywords: UTM Scenarios; use cases; Galileo; EGNOS; UAS; RPAS; UTM; U-Space; ATM; traffic management; safety; security;

Project website: https://projectgauss.eu/

Ref. Ares(2019)3821678 - 14/06/2019

https://projectgauss.eu/


© GAUSS Consortium 2019

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Galileo-EGNOS as an asset for UTM safety and security

TITLE


ABSTRACT

This document establishes the GAUSS UTM relevant operational scenarios (including UTM and RPAS operations) and Use Cases, including expected applications in order to serve as basis to establish the GAUSS solution requirements. These scenarios will serve as a reference for the experimentation plan in WP6.

CHANGE CONTROL

Version Description Created Revised

Author Date Responsible Date

1.0 First draft Enric

Oliveres 27/12/18

Adrian Jimenez

28/12/18

2.0

Consolidated draft after reviewers and

advisory board comments

Enric Oliveres

18/02/19 Adrian

Jimenez 22/02/19

3.0 Consolidated draft

after further internal reviews

Enric Oliveres

26/02/19 Adrian

Jimenez 28/02/19

4.0 Modifications according to

reviewers feedback

Enric Oliveres

04/04/19 Adrian

Jimenez 08/04/19

© 2019, GAUSS Consortium. All rights reserved.



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Content Content ........................................................................................................................................... 3

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................. 7

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ 10

1. Executive summary ................................................................................................................ 12

2. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 16

Glossary ......................................................................................................................... 16

Document structure ........................................................................................................ 17

3. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 19

4. Literature review .................................................................................................................... 22

SESAR Joint Undertaking ............................................................................................... 22

4.1.1 U-Space Blueprint .................................................................................................... 22

4.1.2 European Drones Outlook Study ............................................................................. 22

4.1.3 European ATM Master Plan ..................................................................................... 23

EASA .............................................................................................................................. 23

4.2.1 Regulatory framework .............................................................................................. 24

4.2.2 UAS Workshop on standard scenarios .................................................................... 24

UAS Integration Pilot Program ........................................................................................ 24

NASA-JAA’s Concept of Operations ............................................................................... 25

JARUS (SORA) .............................................................................................................. 26

R&D projects .................................................................................................................. 27

4.6.1 TERRA .................................................................................................................... 27

4.6.2 CORUS ................................................................................................................... 28

4.6.3 DREAMS ................................................................................................................. 29

4.6.4 PODIUM .................................................................................................................. 29

4.6.5 CLASS ..................................................................................................................... 30

4.6.6 DOMUS ................................................................................................................... 30

4.6.7 IMPETUS ................................................................................................................. 31

GSA ................................................................................................................................ 32

Previous GAUSS findings ............................................................................................... 32

4.8.1 GAUSS D1.1 ........................................................................................................... 32

4.8.2 GAUSS D2.1 ........................................................................................................... 33



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4.8.3 GAUSS D7.3 ........................................................................................................... 33

AESA .............................................................................................................................. 33

Advisory Board & Stakeholders ...................................................................................... 33

EUROCAE ...................................................................................................................... 33

Literature review summary .............................................................................................. 34

4.12.1 Market potential ....................................................................................................... 35

4.12.2 Regulatory initiatives ................................................................................................ 35

4.12.3 U-Space framework ................................................................................................. 36

4.12.4 GAUSS UTM operational framework ....................................................................... 36

4.12.5 Project objectives ..................................................................................................... 36

5. Operational description .......................................................................................................... 37

Alignment with field trials ................................................................................................ 37

Assumptions ................................................................................................................... 37

Main operational parameters .......................................................................................... 39

5.3.1 Type of vehicle ........................................................................................................ 39

5.3.2 Vehicle MTOM ......................................................................................................... 39

5.3.3 Vehicle flight altitude ................................................................................................ 39

5.3.4 Visual conditions ...................................................................................................... 39

5.3.5 Surroundings ........................................................................................................... 39

5.3.6 EASA operational category ...................................................................................... 40

5.3.7 Flight plan type ........................................................................................................ 40

Integrity concept ............................................................................................................. 41

6. Use Case 1: Coordinated UA operations in a land scenario ................................................... 43

6.1.1 Individual applications descriptions .......................................................................... 43

6.1.2 Scene ...................................................................................................................... 51

7. Use case 2: Coordinated UA operations in a maritime scenario ............................................. 61

7.1.1 Individual applications descriptions .......................................................................... 61

7.1.2 Scene ...................................................................................................................... 69

8. Coordination requirements ..................................................................................................... 80

Accuracy requirements ................................................................................................... 80

8.1.1 GAUSS examples .................................................................................................... 81

8.1.2 Figures proposal ...................................................................................................... 82

Integrity requirements ..................................................................................................... 82



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8.2.1 GAUSS examples .................................................................................................... 87

8.2.2 Figures proposal ...................................................................................................... 88

9. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 91

Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................... 93

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 96

10. Annex I: RPAS information ............................................................................................... 101

TUCAN ......................................................................................................................... 101

ATLANTIC .................................................................................................................... 102

10.2.1 Overall description ................................................................................................. 102

SCRAB II ...................................................................................................................... 103

10.3.1 Overall Description ................................................................................................ 103

X-Prop .......................................................................................................................... 104

10.4.1 Overall Description ................................................................................................ 104

11. Annex II: Applications details ............................................................................................ 106

Precision agriculture ..................................................................................................... 106

11.1.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 106

11.1.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 106

Long range forest surveillance ...................................................................................... 106

11.2.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 106

Wind turbine vertical inspection .................................................................................... 107

11.3.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 107

11.3.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 107

Power line transmission inspection ............................................................................... 107

11.4.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 107

11.4.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 108

Event surveillance ......................................................................................................... 109

11.5.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 109

11.5.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 109

Border surveillance ....................................................................................................... 110

11.6.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 110

11.6.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 110

Delivery......................................................................................................................... 110

11.7.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 110



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11.7.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 111

Fish farm monitoring ..................................................................................................... 111

11.8.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 111

11.8.2 Metrics ................................................................................................................... 111

Spill detection ............................................................................................................... 111

11.9.1 Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 111

Beach monitoring ...................................................................................................... 112

11.10.1 Assumptions ...................................................................................................... 112

11.10.2 Metrics ............................................................................................................... 112



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List of Figures Figure 1: Unmanned aircraft classification [2] ................................................................................ 17

Figure 2: Systematic analysis........................................................................................................ 19

Figure 3: Methodology scheme. .................................................................................................... 20

Figure 4: U-Space phases [3]........................................................................................................ 20

Figure 5: Demand outlook by industry domain [6]. ........................................................................ 23

Figure 6: Demand outlook by type of mission [6]. .......................................................................... 23

Figure 7: UTM Research Technical Capability Levels [14]. ........................................................... 25

Figure 8: UTM RTT Risk Adjusted Schedule [14] .......................................................................... 26

Figure 9: JARUS Global Community [16]. ..................................................................................... 27

Figure 10: Simplified categorization of operation types, IMPETUS; [26]. ....................................... 31

Figure 11: Overview use cases, IMPETUS; [26]............................................................................ 32

Figure 12: typical area sweep flight plan ....................................................................................... 40

Figure 13: typical localized flight plan [40]. .................................................................................... 41

Figure 14: typical lineal flight plan. ................................................................................................ 41

Figure 15: possible situations when navigating with EGNOS, [44]. ............................................... 42

Figure 16: Typical flight plan of a precision agriculture application. ............................................... 43

Figure 17: Summary of demand outlook in agriculture, [6]. ........................................................... 44

Figure 18: Typical flight plan of a forest monitoring. ...................................................................... 45

Figure 19: Typical flight plan of a wind turbine inspection. ............................................................. 46

Figure 20: Global wind power cumulative capacity [49]. ................................................................ 47

Figure 21: typical flight plan of a linear infrastructure inspection. ................................................... 48

Figure 22: Scheme of RPAS duties during crowded event ............................................................ 50

Figure 23: use case 1, scenario. ................................................................................................... 53

Figure 24: use case 1, phase 1. .................................................................................................... 54






Figure 30: Typical flight plat to look out for spills in the vicinity of a port. ....................................... 61

Figure 31: Significant spills by area [53]. ....................................................................................... 62



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Figure 32: Distribution of spills by source type [53]. ...................................................................... 62

Figure 33: Typical flight plan for monitoring several fish farms. ..................................................... 63

Figure 34: Global harvest of aquatic organism in million tonnes, 1950-2010, as reported by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). [54] ..................................................................................... 64

Figure 35: aquaculture areas in the south of Spain, [55]. .............................................................. 64

Figure 36: typical flight plan between a port and a nearby vessel. In green the direct drone flight and in blue the path of a conventional transport vessel. ....................................................................... 65

Figure 37: typical flight plan for patrolling some maritime area. ..................................................... 67

Figure 38: typical flight plan for beach monitoring. ........................................................................ 68

Figure 39: use case 2, scenario. ................................................................................................... 71








Figure 47: Different potential volumes around a UA [58]. .............................................................. 80

Figure 48: Avoidance of a tactical geo-fence while in flight. .......................................................... 81

Figure 49: Sample representation of RPA trajectory uncertainty, [26]. .......................................... 83

Figure 50: Flight trajectories through especial volumes; horizontal view. ...................................... 83

Figure 51: Close flight trajectories of two RPA; vertical view. ........................................................ 84

Figure 52: No interaction situation. ................................................................................................ 85

Figure 53: Interaction expected situation. ...................................................................................... 85

Figure 54: Conflict detected situation. ........................................................................................... 86

Figure 55: Reference System with CPA at origin [61]. ................................................................... 87

Figure 56: Proposed vertical separation. ....................................................................................... 89

Figure 57: TUCAN RPA. ............................................................................................................. 101

Figure 58: ATLANTIC RPA. ........................................................................................................ 102

Figure 59 SCRAB II .................................................................................................................... 103

Figure 60 X-PROP RPA .............................................................................................................. 104

Figure 61: most typical power transmission towers in Spain. The green box highlights the nominal tower that is taken as a reference in this case. ............................................................................ 108

Figure 62: Scheme of camera’s visibility range ........................................................................... 108



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Figure 63 schematic view of the beach with its main aspects. ..................................................... 112



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List of Tables Table 1: Summary of operations and individual requirements for land use case. .......................... 13

Table 2: Summary of operations and individual requirements for maritime use case. ................... 14

Table 3: Accuracy and integrity requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations. ....... 15

Table 4: methodology alignment with sources. .............................................................................. 34

Table 5: objectives and KPI [8]. ..................................................................................................... 36

Table 6: RPAS models to be used with their main characteristics. ................................................ 37

Table 7: summary of surroundings contemplated .......................................................................... 40

Table 8: Main characteristics of precision agriculture application. ................................................. 43

Table 9: Accuracy requirements for precision agriculture operation. ............................................. 45

Table 10: Integrity requirements for precision agriculture operation. ............................................. 45

Table 11: Main characteristics of long range forest surveillance application. ................................. 45

Table 12: Accuracy requirements for long range forest surveying. ................................................ 46

Table 13: Integrity requirements for long range forest surveying. .................................................. 46

Table 14: Main characteristics of wind turbine vertical inspection application ................................ 46

Table 15: Accuracy requirements for wind turbine vertical inspection. ........................................... 48

Table 16: Integrity requirements for wind turbine vertical inspection.............................................. 48

Table 17: main characteristics of transmission power line inspection application. ......................... 48

Table 18: Accuracy requirements for transmission power line inspection. ..................................... 49

Table 19: Integrity requirements for transmission power line inspection. ....................................... 49

Table 20: Main characteristics of event surveillance application. ................................................... 50

Table 21: Accuracy requirements for event surveillance ............................................................... 51

Table 22: Integrity requirements for event surveillance. ................................................................ 51

Table 23: Summary of operations for land..................................................................................... 52

Table 24: main characteristics of spill detection application .......................................................... 61

Table 25: accuracy requirements for spill detection. ...................................................................... 62

Table 26: Integrity requirements for spill detection ........................................................................ 63

Table 27: main characteristics of fish farm monitoring application. ................................................ 63

Table 28: Accuracy requirements for fish farm monitoring. ............................................................ 64

Table 29: Integrity requirements to fish farm monitoring. ............................................................... 64

Table 30: main characteristics of delivery application. ................................................................... 65

Table 31: Accuracy requirements for delivery ............................................................................... 66



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Table 32: Integrity requirements for delivery ................................................................................. 66

Table 33: main characteristics of border surveillance application. ................................................. 67

Table 34: accuracy requirements for border surveillance. ............................................................. 67

Table 35: Integrity requirements for border surveillance. ............................................................... 68

Table 36: main characteristics of beach monitoring application ..................................................... 68

Table 37: accuracy requirements for beach monitoring. ................................................................ 69

Table 38: integrity requirements for border surveillance. ............................................................... 69

Table 39: Summary of operations for maritime scenarios. ............................................................. 70

Table 40: Accuracy requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations........................... 82

Table 41: Well-clear violation distances [m] for an UA flying at 10 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61]. ........................................................................................................................ 88

Table 42: Well-clear violation distance [m] for an UA flying at 20 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61]. ........................................................................................................................ 88

Table 43: Well-clear violation distance [m] for an UA flying at 30 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61]. ........................................................................................................................ 88

Table 44: Integrity requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations. ........................... 90

Table 45: TUCAN's technical data. *Depending on configuration ................................................ 102

Table 46 ATLANTIC’s technical data. *Depending on configuration ............................................ 103

Table 47 SCRAB II technical data ............................................................................................... 104

Table 48 X-Prop's technical data. * Depending on system configuration ..................................... 105

Table 49: Typical sizes of a power transmission tower. ............................................................... 108

Table 50 Distance between wires depending on the Field Of View (FOV) of the camera. ........... 109

Table 51 minimum height (over the wire) to ensure proper camera frame visibility. ..................... 109



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1. Executive summary Drones have a very high market potential and although individual technologies are certainly advanced, their combination and use in a homogenized, regulated and safe way is still a work in progress; however, efforts are being made not only from the technological and regulatory side but also from an operational and procedural point of view.

GNSS plays a key role in UAS operations and more concretely multi-GNSS solutions including Galileo and the use of EGNOS in Europe are essential for UAS market development. Project GAUSS focuses on the use of EGNSS within UAS operations and U-Space. As it has been mentioned, there is a large number of possibilities and a lack of homogeneity when it comes to operating drones in a coordinated and common way so previous work needs to be done and this is the overarching goal of Work Package 2 “UTM operational framework”: set up the basis/framework and high level requirements for the following technical works of GAUSS.

D2.1 provided a big picture by defining a concept of operations but there is still the need to select the applications and scenarios which will be taken as references for the rest of the project and this is what is done in this document “D2.2 Design of UTM Scenarios and use cases report”.

Therefore, this document has two main goals:

Design the GAUSS UTM operational scenarios by selecting the most relevant drone applications and then proposing two use cases (land and maritime) where such applications are operated simultaneously;

Propose requirements for the navigation systems focusing on accuracy and integrity from two points of view: each application in an isolated manner and specific needs in order for a safe coordinated operation of several simultaneous UA operations.

For the first objective several relevant references are studied from different points of view: market potential, regulatory, U-Space framework, GAUSS UTM operational framework and project objectives; to ensure the selected applications are relevant both to GAUSS and to U-Space. This led to the selection of five applications for a land scenario (use case 1 in Section 6): Precision agriculture, long range forest surveillance, wind turbine vertical inspection, long range transmission power line inspection and event surveillance; and five applications for a maritime scenario (use case 2 in Section 7): Spill detection, fish farm monitoring, delivery, border surveillance and beach monitoring.

When studying the applications separately, each of them is treated in an isolated way as if the UA were flying alone in the airspace and from this situation accuracy and integrity requirements are proposed. The former requirements are based entirely in the application purposes and the reason for the latter ones is to ensure the application is performed safely.

For the land use case five RPAS (taken from Table 6) are combined each with a predefined task (described in Section 6.1.1) in a semi-rural environment where:

RPA1: fixed wing (MTOM 50kg) operated by local government to survey a forest for potential fires.

RPA2: rotary wing operated by local police monitoring an event.



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RPA3: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by a private company (Agrodro1) to monitor a crop field.

RPA4: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by a private company (Dronins2) to monitor a power transmission power line.

RPA5: rotary wing operated by Dronins to inspect a wind turbine.

Precision agriculture

Long range forest surveillance

Wind turbine vertical inspection

Long range transmission power line inspection

Event surveillance

Type of vehicle

Fixed wing Fixed wing Rotary wing Fixed wing Rotary wing

MTOM [kg] 5 50 6 5 6

h (AGL) [m] 70 120 90 80 100

Visual BVLOS BVLOS VLOS BVLOS VLOS

Surroundings -Unpopulated -Unpopulated -Unpopulated -Unpopulated

-Urban environment

-No buildings -No buildings -Few buildings -Few buildings -Moderately urbanised

EASA Category

Specific Specific Open (A3) Specific Specific

Flight plan type

Area sweep Area sweep Localized Linear Localized

Requirements

Horizontal Accuracy [m]

0.5 10 3 5 1

Vertical Accuracy [m]

2 NA 2 NA NA

HAL [m] NA 40 10 NA 50

VAL [m] 35 30 30 10 35

TTA [s] 20 109 10 7 2.5

IR 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 1E-7

Table 1: Summary of operations and individual requirements for land use case.

On the other hand, the maritime use case combines five RPAS (taken from Table 6) each with a predefined task (described in Section 7.1.1) in a coastal environment with both land and maritime interactions, being the latter more relevant than the former, where there is a port, a beach and a national maritime border (see Figure 39).

RPA1: rotary wing operated by life guards to monitor a beach for possible drowning.

RPA2: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by the port to monitor the port entrance looking for spills.

1 This is a purely fictions name and any resemblance to existing persons, companies, email addresses or URLs is purely coincidental. 2 This is a purely fictions name and any resemblance to existing persons, companies, email addresses or URLs is purely coincidental.



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RPA3: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by the port to monitor nearby fish farms

RPA4: fixed wing (MTOM 50kg) operated by local Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) to survey a border.

RPA5: rotary wing operated by the port to deliver an emergency medical good to a nearby vessel.

Spill detection

Fish farm monitoring

Delivery Border surveillance

Beach monitoring

Type of vehicle


MTOM [kg] 5 5 6 50 6

h (AGL) [m] 100 100 60 120 100

Visual BVLOS BVLOS BVLOS BVLOS VLOS

Surroundings Unpopulated Unpopulated Low density of People Unpopulated

Moderately populated

No buildings No buildings Few buildings No buildings No buildings

EASA Category

Specific Specific Specific Specific Open (A3)

Flight plan type

Area Sweep & Tracking

Area Sweep Linear Area sweep Linear

Requirements


10 2 6 10 25


NA NA 0.1 NA NA

HAL [m] NA NA 6 NA NA

VAL [m] 46 46 0.1 30 35

TTA [s] 42 42 14 109 4.5

IR 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 2E-6 1E-6

Table 2: Summary of operations and individual requirements for maritime use case.

Nevertheless, U-Space framework does not contemplate isolated UA operations but the coordination of several of them within near or even the same airspace; therefore, further requirements are deduced to ensure safe coordinated operations in Section 8. This time, figures are qualitatively assessed through GAUSS’ use cases, where several operations take place simultaneously, but quantitative figures are deduced by other means: figures on accuracy are deduced as a buffer percentage from Collision Avoidance (CA) separation minima and figures on integrity are deduced as an uncertainty around a nominal path of a RPA.

According to this approach on coordination requirements, accuracy becomes critical at tactical level, dynamic situations that take place during the flight, and integrity may define requirements at strategic level, situations that take place before the flight starts (for example assessing how close two UA are allowed to fly).

Due to the lack of specific and reliable figures regarding drone operations, most figures in this document are deduced (see Table 3) although an explanation is always provided.



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Property Value

Horizontal accuracy [m]

5

Vertical accuracy [m]

2.5

HAL [m] 50-70

VAL [m] 25-35

TTA [s] 1,2

IR 1E-07

Table 3: Accuracy and integrity requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations.



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2. Introduction This document establishes the GAUSS UTM relevant operational scenarios (including UTM and UAS operations) and Use Cases, including expected applications in order to serve as basis to establish the GAUSS solution requirements; it also proposes some performance requirements for the navigation system. These scenarios will serve as a reference for the experimentation plan in WP6.

Glossary

This section includes definition of some specific terms in order to clarify concepts and avoid misunderstandings; most definitions are taken from ICAO ( [1] and [2]) and SESAR [3] to ensure homogenization and consistency; nevertheless, GAUSS deliverable D2.1 of this project [4] includes a more comprehensive list of terms.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft: it is “an aircraft where the flying pilot is not on board the aircraft” and it is a type of unmanned aircraft [2] (explained below).

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS): “A set of configurable elements consisting of a remotely-piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and control links and any other system elements as may be required, at any point during flight operation.” [1]

Unmanned Aircraft: “An aircraft which is intended to operate with no pilot on board.” [1] However, it contemplates several options, as it is shown in Figure 1. This term may be alternated with “drone”, following EASA’s nomenclature [5].

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): “An aircraft and its associated elements which are operated with no pilot on board.” [1]. This is the term ICAO encourages to use [2]

U-space: it "is a set of new services and specific procedures designed to support safe, efficient and secure access to airspace for large numbers of drones." [3] and, according to the same source, its roll out is expected to be executed in 4 phases: U-Space foundation services (U1), U-space initial services (U2), U-space advanced services (U3) and U-space full services (U4); [6] offers a visual approach on such roadmap, [3] contains a clear summary of these services’ classification.

Detect & Avoid (D&A): “The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards and take the appropriate action” [2].

Operator: “a person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation”. In the context or RPA, it includes the RPAS. [2]

Remote pilot: “a person charged by the operator with duties essential to the operation of a RPA and who manipulates the flight controls, as appropriate, during flight time. [2]

Pilot (to): “To manipulate the flight controls of an aircraft during flight time”. [1]

Very Low Level (VLL): division of the airspace by altitude referring to the space roughly below 150m (500 ft.) [7].



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Figure 1: Unmanned aircraft classification [2]

Most current technology and regulation focus on RPA (a pilot should always be kept in the loop of decision making process, especially for safety reasons). This is the reason GAUSS solution focusses on RPAS although it is expected to be applicable to all UAS (current and future); moreover, this document (and all along the GAUSS project) uses the term UAS and alternately “drones” (including aircraft and its systems) as a generic term to cover all types of unmanned aircraft systems, be they remotely piloted (RPAS - remotely piloted aircraft system) or automated (in the future).

Document structure

This document is divided into several sections in order to guide the reader to the use cases, which are the final outcome of this deliverable.

Previous Section 1 provides an executive summary of the document highlighting the needs for it and the approach taken.

Section 2 provides introductory remarks.

Section 3 explains the methodology followed to gather the relevant information for this document.

Section 4 briefly describes such references and finishes with a review where the main information extracted from each reference is highlighted.

Section 5 describes the main operational parameters and assumptions common to all use cases and it also includes a summary of the integrity concept.

Section 6 details the first use case, focused on land operations. First, the different applications selected for the use case are explained and some requirements on accuracy and integrity are drawn. This same section also explains how the use case evolves and the main events that take place in it.

Section 7 follows the same principles than the previous section but for the use case focused on maritime operations.

Section 8 proposes an approach to derive accuracy and integrity requirements for safe coordination of several drone operations.

Section 9 summarises the main conclusions that may be extracted from this document.



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Finally, information annexed includes:

Annex I: briefly describes the main characteristics of the drones that are taken as a reference to build the applications and use cases; which are the same that are expected to be used for the field trials.

Annex II: includes details on the elaboration of some specific numbers of the operational requirements for the applications included in Sections 6 and 7.



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3. Methodology A vast amount of the work performed is related to gathering and analysing information from different and heterogeneous sources in order to provide a unified and easy to follow procedure to provide operational requirements. This specific section has been devoted to clarifying this process.

A systematic review methodology has been applied to identify, analyse and interpret all available evidence related to UAS potential uses as well as to determine the most relevant use cases in the civil domain (present and future). This evidence will be analysed in a manner that is thorough, unbiased, (to a degree) repeatable, and of high scientific value. Its main features include:

Reviews start by defining a review protocol that specifies the situation to analyse and the methods that will be used to perform the review.

They are based on a pre-defined search strategy to detect as much of the relevant literature as possible.

Their search strategy is documented so that readers can assess the process rigor, completeness and repeatability (bearing in mind that searches of digital libraries are almost impossible to replicate).

Systematic reviews require explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria to assess each potential primary study.

Systematic reviews specify the information to be obtained from each primary study including quality criteria to be followed in order to evaluate each primary study.

A systematic review is a prerequisite for quantitative meta-analysis.

Systematic analysis is divided in three stages which are performed iteratively: (1) Planning of the review; (2) Conducting the review; and (3) Dissemination, Figure 2 describes the methodology:

Figure 2: Systematic analysis.

This review has been performed focusing on several points of view ensuring a comprehensive visibility that will later allow to decide the most relevant and with more future applications that will be used to further build GAUSS solution.



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Figure 3: Methodology scheme.

This section explains the procedure schematized in Figure 3:

Market potential: Potential uses of UAS are very diverse, some of them present more solid possibilities and others are destined to a very narrow market. GAUSS project aims at having major impact, so that applications with more potential are the ones dealt with here.

Regulatory initiatives: In order to ensure more relevance the use cases shall be aligned with current and expected future regulation, especially at European level.

U-Space framework: GAUSS solution will serve as a technological and procedural basis to U-Space development, especially focusing on GNSS dependencies for U2 onward phases where positioning provides important and even crucial information.

Figure 4: U-Space phases [3]

GAUSS UTM operational framework: The use cases described in this document shall be aligned with works being developed within GAUSS project regarding the UTM operational framework in T2.1.



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Project objectives: The use cases described in this document shall offer the opportunity to prove GAUSS objectives [8]:

1. Accurate positioning for individual UAS

2. Safety for UAS and UTM operations

a. Required Navigation Performance

b. Operational safety

3. Security and cyber-resilience in UAS and UTM operations

4. Coordination among UAS within the same airspace in a safe, precise, efficient and timely manner.

5. Compatibility with all different type of UAS (fixed wing and rotary wing) and all EASA categories.



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4. Literature review This section briefly describes the main sources used.

SESAR Joint Undertaking

SESAR has released a series of relevant documents:

U-Space Blueprint [3]

European Drones Outlook Study [6]

European ATM Master Plan: roadmap for the safe integration of drones into all classes of airspace [9]

4.1.1 U-Space Blueprint

An easy-to-follow overview on drone use especially in low-level airspace, focusing on safety, security and environment.

It defines the U-Space concept as a “set of new services and specific procedures designed to support safe, efficient and secure access to airspace for large numbers of drones”.

The alignment of this Blueprint and GAUSS regarding the exclusivity of drones and focus on low-level, makes it very relevant for this project.

4.1.2 European Drones Outlook Study

It is divided into three main sections:

1. An overview of the UAS landscape

2. A forecast on UAS market

3. Steps taken and to be taken to ensure EU has a relevant position at global level

The second section together with its Annex is the most relevant for the current study since it shows current (civil) uses of UAS into today’s society and how these applications will evolve.

The current study has focused on the applications where more growth is estimated.



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Figure 5: Demand outlook by industry domain [6].

Figure 6: Demand outlook by type of mission [6].

4.1.3 European ATM Master Plan

It focuses on integration of drones into manned aircraft’s space which falls beyond GAUSS’ scope, but its annex on U-Space services is very informative.

EASA

This European Regulatory body published several relevant documents to legislate drones operations:

Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA 2017-05) [10]

Opinion 01/2018 [10]: based on the previous NPA

Furthermore, a UAS Workshop on standards scenarios took place in July 2018 (videos may be found in [11])



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4.2.1 Regulatory framework

The use cases exposed here have been designed according to the rules of such documents, focusing on Open and Specific categories.

4.2.2 UAS Workshop on standard scenarios

EASA is still in the process of developing these scenarios which shall go through a validation process where certain aspects will be taken into account in order for the scenario validation to move forward [12]:

The scenario shall be applicable and valid for as many MS as possible.

Ensure a high number of potentially interested operators in order to have a wider and better impact on MS and operators.

Offer a clear benefit for society: for example by positively impacting on safety/public health.

Ensure the scenario is as feasible as possible.

Although EASA’s future standard scenarios are expected to be based on ground & air risk operational aspects (e.g. VLOS/BLOS, overflown areas, UA characteristics) and not directly on use cases/applications (e.g. aerial inspections, agriculture, media production), the use cases explained in this document have been developed following the same principles to foster their use and maximise their impact.

Furthermore, the initial set of these scenarios may be classified into:

Generic: BVLOS operations over sparsely populated areas, below 150m in uncontrolled airspace using UA with KE<34kJ and the largest dimension smaller than 3m

Detailed: derived from the Generic and with stronger limitations and more detailed provisions.

GAUSS use case scenarios will agree with most “Generic” characteristics.

UAS Integration Pilot Program

This initiative [13] started at the end of 2017 and consists on testing several advanced operations for UAS in partnership with ten organizations (private and governmental) spread across the US.

The concepts proposed within this initiative are very heterogeneous including different operational conditions (day-night, VLOS-BLVLOS and dense-scarcely populated areas to name a few), some of them are:

Delivery of emergency medical goods


Livestream video support to emergency situations

Energy distribution line inspections

Transportation infrastructure inspections

Critical infrastructure inspections (security risks)

Long distance delivery (BVLOS)



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Detection of foreign object debris on airports’ runways/taxiways

NASA-JAA’s Concept of Operations

NASA and FAA joint forces in 2015 regarding UTM in the form of the UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Research Transition Team (RTT) in order to “jointly identify, quantify, conduct, and effectively transfer UTM capabilities and technologies to the FAA as the implementing agency and to provide guidance and information to UTM stakeholders to facilitate an efficient implementation of UTM operations” [14]

Figure 7: UTM Research Technical Capability Levels [14].

Since these activities imply diversity of operating environments and technological areas, UTM RTT was broken down into four subgroups (which are now operative):

Concepts and Use Cases

Data Exchange & Information Architecture

Sense and Avoid

Communications and Navigation



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Figure 8: UTM RTT Risk Adjusted Schedule [14]

Although all of them are relevant for UTM operations, the most important one for this deliverable is the first one. This Working Group released the “UTM Concept of Operations” [15], were several UTM use cases are exposed including a high variety of environments (VLOS-BVLOS, coordination with manned aviation, controlled-uncontrolled airspace); although most of them fall beyond the scope of GAUSS, others have been taken into account to build the scenarios exposed in this document, especially the introduction of Dynamic Restriction of airspace.

JARUS (SORA)

The Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems is a global group of experts from the National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) and regional aviation safety organizations which purpose is to recommend technical, safety and operational requirements for the certification and safe integration of UAS into airspace and at aerodromes.



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Figure 9: JARUS Global Community [16].

The most relevant guidance material provided by this group of experts has been SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment) which is a set of recommendations that a UAS operation should follow in order to establish a sufficient level of confidence that it can be conducted safely. Although these guidelines, covered in several documents (including a main document and several annexes) are focused on procedures rather than applications, they include a draft for a single standard scenario3 [17]: Aerial Work, which has been used to develop the operational explanations of this document.

On the other hand, annexes to SORA are also taken into account when defining technical requirements at the end of the document.

R&D projects

4.6.1 TERRA

This project [18] addresses the research topic H2020-SESAR-2016-1 RPAS04: Ground-based technology, focusing on the performance requirements associated with the UTM concept, and identifying the technologies that could meet these requirements.

Its main objectives are [19]:

Leverage existing state-of-the-art, and potential new technologies, to develop elements of a ground-based UTM architecture that will

accommodate a large base of UAS (autonomous and remotely piloted)

in a mixed mode (manned and unmanned) environment

focused on VLL operations, with potential extension to other flight domains

3 At the moment of writing this document (September 2018) only a standard scenario has been published within SORA, although it is expected that more scenarios are developed in the future.



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paving the way for autonomous operations

Demonstrate proof-of-concept of critical elements of this architecture:

Explore architecture’s resilience to off-nominal operations (e.g. ADS-B link loss, GPS outages, etc).

Machine learning: early detection and classification of flight path trajectories, including potential off-nominal deviationsc.

Ability to accommodate various hypothetical (drone and manned) traffic levels.

Explore a matrix of concept of operation for different scenarios, from modern day to fully autonomous.

Their requirements are built on three representative RPAS operational business cases (developed in WP3) that take potential impacts on stakeholders into consideration and that are taken into account for this D2.2. The project is still on going and information has been validated by SESAR; information regarding business case selection and requirements on accuracy and integrity was gathered by GAUSS through TERRA’s workshops and are referenced in this document.

The three business cases are:

Agriculture: BVLOS crop monitoring by means of multicopter in rural environment and Class G airspace.

Delivery: BVLOS delivery by means of multicopter in urban environment within Airport Environment.

Infrastructure inspection: BVLOS inspection of infrastructure by means of multicopter in rural or urban environment over gathering of people in airspaces Class A, B, C, D or E.

Business cases considered in TERRA use RTK as a means of positioning.

4.6.2 CORUS

This project [20] will propose key principles and concepts of operations for UTM/U-Space. Specifically CORUS will:

1. Establish and clearly describe a concept of operations. Develop clear use cases for nominal scenarios and describe how losses of safety in non-nominal situations (e.g. contingency, emergency …) can be minimized.

2. Address drones operations in uncontrolled airspace as well as in and around controlled or protected airspace (e.g. airfields).

3. Develop a concept enabling safe interaction with all different classes of airspace users taking into account contingencies and emergencies, and making clear any assumptions about the volumes of traffic.

4. Examine non-aviation aspects, identifying key issues for society (e.g. safety and privacy, noise …) and offering solutions to ease social acceptance

5. Identify necessary services and technical development, quantifying the level of safety and performance required and proposing an initial architecture description.

Some use cases are contemplated in this project, which will be taken into account when deciding GAUSS applications in this document:



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Aerial monitoring (punctual). VLOS, 1.4kg multirotor, h<15m, NO flight plan (green).

Delivery. BVLOS, 80kg multicopt., h=?, flight plan (amber)

Aerial surveying (long). BVLOS, 5,4kg FW, h=60m, close to residential buildings, contemplates emergency landing.

Furthermore, separation information provided in their first version of the Concept of Operations for U-Space [21] have also been taken into account when assessing accuracy and integrity figures for coordinated drone operations (Section 8).

4.6.3 DREAMS

This project will help defining the European UTM Aeronautical Information Management operational concept by exploring need for and feasibility of new processes, services and solutions for the drone aeronautical information management within the new UTM.

The objectives of this project are [22]:

Fill the gap between the existing information used by traditional manned aviation and the needs of the new unmanned aviation.

Analyse and simulate present and future real-world applications, to ensure that the system can be scaled as the market for drones grows and the number of applications increases.

Analyse and validate the technologies related to information exchange that will make possible the implementation of the future U-space concept for the management of drones in Europe

It will study mission needs and operational requirements of drones commercial operators focusing on BVLOS VLL operations and their scenarios are taken into consideration for GAUSS use cases.

4.6.4 PODIUM

PODIUM stands for Proving Operations of Drones with Initial UTM and it is a SESAR Horizon 2020 project supporting U-space. Its goals are to [23]:

Demonstrate U-space services, procedures and technologies at four operational sites at Odense in Denmark, Bretigny and Toulouse in France, and Groningen Airport Eelde in the Netherlands throughout 2018 and 2019

Provide agreed conclusions on the maturity of U-space services and technologies – backed up by evidence on flight efficiency, safety, security and human performance metrics etc. – when used in a defined set of operational scenarios and environments

Provide recommendations on future deployment and for regulations and standards

This project will integrate several UTM services from different partners in order to facilitate a large number of drone operations in controlled and non-controlled airspace. It will test the system through four large scale demonstrations (expecting more than 185 drone flights).

These demonstrations will include a large variety of applications including different type of operations (e.g. electricity line inspection, emergency services), various categories of users (e.g. authorities, drone operations, drone pilots), different conditions (VLOS and BVLOS), different VLL airspaces (controlled & uncontrolled), different environments (urban, rural and in the vicinity of airports) and including manned traffic interaction.



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4.6.5 CLASS

CLASS stands for CLear Air Situation for uaS and the project will merge existing technologies to build the core functions of an Unmanned Traffic Management System (UTMS) which will increase the maturity level of the main technologies required for surveillance of UAS traffic.

The main goal with this project [24] is to provide all stakeholders, from drone operators to Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP’s) and authorities, with services tailored for each end-user’s specific needs.

Functionalities will include real-time tracking of both cooperative and non-cooperative drones together with aggregated relevant aeronautical data from multiple trackers, both on the drones and on the ground-based systems (which will be merged through data fusion). This information will be centralised in real-time in a UTMS to create an overall solution with advanced functions.

Advanced functions include geo-fencing (where the drone pilot is warned automatically if he trespasses into an unauthorised zone), geo-caging (where the drone pilot is warned that he is leaving a pre-defined zone), conflict detection and resolution.

The performance of these cooperative and non-cooperative drone detection and tracking technologies will be assessed through live experimentations.

Several scenarios have been developed to cover different situations where cooperative, non-cooperative surveillance and identification which can provide useful input to GAUSS.

The first workshop provided a list of scenarios where five of them were selected as the main representatives of the CLASS aspects and U-Space matches:

Intrusion in no-fly zone

Runway inspection by a swarm of drones

Vehicle tracking, or event monitoring

Generating a conflicting situation and assess priority cases

Emergency situation

4.6.6 DOMUS

DOMUS [25] is a demonstration project that aims at preparing and de-risking a rapid deployment of U-space initial services (U2) as outlined in the U-space Blueprint, through the integration of developed technologies and concepts to enable initial BVLOS operations in rural, urban and sub-urban environments as well as facilitating the processes for authorisations for some drone operations towards their deployment in the European ATM system. In addition, the project also targets some of the specific applications of U3 services.

This demonstration will be performed through the execution of flying scenarios and use cases concerning how different drones’ applications can be performed within a U-Space ecosystem. The scenarios contemplated in this project are:

1. Inspection, mapping and surveillance. Terrain surveillance is seen as the most common use case for drones so it will be performed on two environments: inspection campaign and maritime surveillance.

2. Emergency management. This scenario will demonstrate the cohabitation of manned and unmanned aerial platforms in a firefighting mission.



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3. First aid and urgent delivery. This scenario demonstrates a number of drones performing delivery missions providing small packages like medicines, medical devices, critical components and electronics. This service will be provided both as a normal service and as an emergency operation.

4. Urban scenario. It will be considered the operation of several drones performing business activities in an urban environment, like for example: monitoring of construction works, 3D modelling of buildings, inspection of structures and buildings, create documentary evidence of traffic accidents, etc. One of the drones will be equipped with thermographic and image cameras to collect data about persons flows.

4.6.7 IMPETUS

This project will analyse the information management needs of drone operations in very low-level (VLL) airspace and propose technologically and commercially feasible solutions to address those needs.

One of its deliverables, D2.1 (Drone Information Users’ Requirements) [26], provides an idea on the current, and potential future, of UAS application market. The project performed an analysis of use cases and selected six that hold the most potential, see Figure 11.

Figure 10: Simplified categorization of operation types, IMPETUS; [26]4.

4 LVLOS: Localized visual line of sight



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Figure 11: Overview use cases, IMPETUS; [26].

GSA

The European Global Navigation Satellite System Agency has published several market reports and the one regarding GNSS ( [27]) contains a special section for drones, focusing on the added value of (E)GNSS.

Previous GAUSS findings

Operational scenarios, use cases and applications defined in this document will be used to develop GAUSS solution and validate the requisites.

4.8.1 GAUSS D1.1

Having the project management plan in mind ensures that the solution is always aligned with the scope initially set up. In this case, for example, operations exposed in Section 5 and the use cases defined in Sections 6 and 7 will ensure the validation of GAUSS objectives:

1. Accuracy: enhance individual UAS positioning, velocity and orientation estimation precision together with navigation performance and manoeuvrability.

2. Safety: provide compliance with RNP (Required Navigation Performance), ensuring accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability.

3. Safety: mitigate risks identified in current UAS and future UTM operations

4. Security: mitigate security risks identified in current UAS and future UTM operations through exploitation of Galileo multi-frequency, authentication and other anti-jamming and anti-spoofing.

5. Coordination: among UAS within the same airspace in a safe, precise, efficient and timely manner.

6. Compatibility with all UAS (fixed/rotary wing) and EASA operational to which GAUSS solutions can be applied.



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4.8.2 GAUSS D2.1

The use cases here defined are aligned with the concept of operations defined in D2.1. Furthermore, use cases in this document shall be able to validate requirements expressed in D2.1.

4.8.3 GAUSS D7.3

This deliverable (D7.3: Preliminary exploitation and business plan) offers a preliminary view on the expected commercial potential of the GAUSS system and describes how it will be achieved. Applications and use cases defined in this document (D2.2) shall be aligned with such plan.

AESA

The Spanish Aviation Safety and Security Agency published exhaustive information on safety operation with drones including practical guidelines on how to apply SORA; two standard scenarios for specialized RPAS operations were also included:

Night time, VLOS, far from people and buildings, uncontrolled airspace, RPA’s MTOM<25kg

Day time, VLOS, far from people and buildings, controlled airspace, RPA’s MTOM<25kg

Advisory Board & Stakeholders

Feedback from experts in several fields (regulatory, R&D, UTM, etc.) has been used to provide first-handed input to the use cases.

EUROCAE

This European organization for the development of worldwide recognised industry standards for aviation offers a very relevant source of information.

In this case its highest value comes from offering technical information (concepts, requirements, etc.) which are especially useful to help in the definition of technical requirements once the applications and use case scenarios have been decided. Nevertheless, its documentation (drafts, minutes of meetings, white papers, etc.) are also useful in helping shape both the applications and use cases.

Access to this information is granted thanks to EVADS being a full member of such organization.

The most important working group in this case is the WG-105 (Unmanned Aircraft Systems) due to the nature of the project. It is important to highlight that despite the fact that at the moment this document is being written all documents in WG-105 are at a draft stage, they have been still deemed relevant. Such group is also divided into subgroups, where the ones providing the most relevant documents are:

WG-105 SG-10: WG-105 Detect and Avoid Focus Team.

Operational Performance Assessment (OPA) for Detect and Avoid [Traffic] (DAA-Traf) applications for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) [28]: it offers a compilation of requirements for traffic coordination.

Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) for Detect and Avoid [Traffic] (DAA-Traf) for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Draft



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12-October-2018 [29]: it offers a compilation of safety consideration for traffic coordination including integrity issues

Operational Services and Environment Description for detect and avoid [traffic] in class D-G airspaces under VFR/IFR [30] and Operational services and environment definitions (OSED) for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) automation and emergency recovery (A&ER) functions [31] are taken into account for concept definitions, especially regarding DAA systems.

WG-105 SG-13: DAA for UAS operating in VLL. This is the most relevant group due to the nature of operations contemplated in GAUSS and some figures in the current document have been deduced or built upon their OSED for DA in VLL operations [32], the same document also offers some examples of drone applications with market potential.

WG-105 SG-33: UTM Geo-Fencing. Has worked on definitions regarding geoawareness, especially the White Paper on Geofencing and Definitions [33] has been used in this document.

Literature review summary

Source Market

potential Regulatory initiatives

U-Space framework

GAUSS UTM

operational framework

Project objectives

SJU: U-Space Blueprint

SJU: European Drones Outlook Study

SJU: European ATM Master Plan

EASA: Regulatory framework

EASA: UAS Workshop on Standard scenarios

NASA-JAA’s Concept of Operations

JARUS: SORA

GSA (GNSS Market Report, Issue 5)

R&D PROJECTS (TERRA, CORUS, DREAMS, etc.)

GAUSS: D1.1

GAUSS: D2.1

GAUSS: D7.2

Advisory Board & Stakeholders

AESA

Table 4: methodology alignment with sources.



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4.12.1 Market potential

This section focuses on analysing the literature from the business point of view. It analyses applications (both generic guidelines and specific operations) that hold the higher market potential.

There are two main guidelines common to most of the applications described:

BVLOS is more common than VLOS, since they yield greater potential [6]. And [15] focuses on BVLOS operations in uncontrolled airspace

Day time operations are most common, for example among the ten awardees of [13] only three contemplate some kind of night operation.

Drones are not expected to be operated near people or buildings in the short term. UTM RTT contemplates a progressive movement from unpopulated areas to urban environments in terms of successive UTM Technical Capabilities. A progressive approach is also contemplated in [6]; for example conferring more importance to delivery applications in semirural environments.

Agriculture is an expanding business for drones and with an expected high demand in the upcoming years [6]; furthermore, it is one the examples in [34] and [13]. UTM RTT also predicts agriculture as one of the first capabilities to be developed within UTM (see Section 4.4).

The UTM RTT also includes infrastructure monitoring within those first capabilities, which is in line with [6] where long range inspections are expected in the upcoming years whereas VLOS localized operations are already a reality.

Governmental bodies, are likely to use small, low altitude drones according to [6] (for example to monitor evens in semirural environments by police or monitor beaches by first aid helpers).

EASA’s standard scenarios are still quite recent and further work is still to be performed; however, the only generic scenario available (at the time this document was written) fulfils several criteria:

BVLOS

Over sparsely populated areas

Below 150m (VLL)

Uncontrolled airspace

Furthermore, EASA’s validation process guidelines (to accept a standard scenario) are relevant to maximise future use of GAUSS use cases (European application, elevated operators’ interest, societal benefits, feasibility).

From the marketing point of view GAUSS applications are selected so they offer a comprehensive approach to applications with great potential in the short term and including some applications that are expected to take off in the long term. This same approach has been followed from the U-space point of view.

4.12.2 Regulatory initiatives

EASA regulation is taken into account when defining the type of operations so they belong to one of the categories; nevertheless, GAUSS will focus on Open and Specific since they are expected to experience a more important growth both medium and long term (see Figure 5).

SORA has also been followed when performing the safety assessments of the operations and AESA documentation has provided relevant examples.



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4.12.3 U-Space framework

Use cases are designed having different U-Space levels in mind and considering inputs from other R&D European projects.

4.12.4 GAUSS UTM operational framework

Use cases are designed to be aligned with GAUSS concept of operations (D2.1) and ensuring that the system requirements can be validated through the applications and their combination.

4.12.5 Project objectives

Finally, use cases will provide validation means to ensure project objectives are achieved.

Objective KPI Target

Accuracy Accuracy of individual UAS estimated positioning, velocity and orientation as well as navigation performance and manoeuvrability.

Sub-metric and sub-degree precision.

Safety Required navigation performance in terms of: Accuracy; Integrity; Continuity and Availability.

To be defined by ICAO for VLL UTM.

Safety

Operational risk level indicator (combining likelihood, impact and exposure) under relevant EASA/JARUS and SESAR methodologies: SORA [34].

Acceptable level of residual risk as assessed by SORA.

Security

Security risk level indicator (combining likelihood, impact and exposure) under relevant security standards: ISO 31000 [35] and ISO/IEC 27005 [36] standards.

Acceptable level of residual risk as assessed by ISO 31000 and ISO/IEC 27005

Coordination Number of UAS coordinated in the air and primary and alternate trajectories available with acceptable safety conditions.

4 UAS coordinated with 3 primary and 3 alternate trajectories per UAS.

Compatibility

Unmanned aircraft (fixed-rotary wing) and EASA UAS operational categories to which GAUSS solutions can be applied and thus, share the same UTM Airspace

All types (Fixed and rotary wing) and all relevant VLL EASA categories: Open and Specific.

Table 5: objectives and KPI [8].



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5. Operational description The following scenarios have focused on BVLOS and Specific operations since they offer the higher potential for future uses of drones.

Alignment with field trials

Besides the previously exposed reasons to decide the applications and define the use cases, the field trials are also taken into account to ensure they can actually be tested during the final stages of GAUSS (T6.4 and T6.5 [8]).

Several RPAS are already decided to be used for the field trials, so their characteristics are taken as a reference (see Table 6 summarises the main characteristics), Annex I: RPAS information provides further information on the vehicles.

RPAS model Type MTOM [kg] Vcruise [m/s]

Atlantic Fixed wing 50 30

Tucan Fixed wing 5 18

SCRAB-II Fixed wing 90 82

X-Prop Rotary wing 10 4

Table 6: RPAS models to be used with their main characteristics.

Assumptions

This section lists the assumptions that are taken into consideration when defining the operational scenario.

1. Operations shall be conducted in uncontrolled airspace. The safest way to validate some project results should be to validate interaction among drones first in uncontrolled airspace [37]. Furthermore, the roadmap to safe integration of drones is currently less addressed than in controlled airspace [6].

2. According to GAUSS scope, flights will take place at VLL, below 150m (AGL), which represents the majority of future drone operations [6]. Furthermore, most applications expected for drones (at least for the first stages) can be executed within this altitude and according to EUROCAE [32] “VLL operations will have a profound positive effect on society”.

a. Although the limit is indeed 150m, UA contemplated in this project will fly at lower altitudes to ensure a safety margin and avoid surpassing such vertical limit, which would be critical. More information on vertical separations is included in Section 8.

3. Interaction with manned aviation falls beyond the scope of the project since it is not expected to be relevant during the initial stages of U-Space (U1 to U3).

4. Operations shall be conducted during day time. As it has been summarised at the end of Section 4 most applications take place during day time.

5. GAUSS will focus on EASA’s Open and Specific category, since they are the most relevant ones, see Section 4.12.



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6. Strategic actuations will take place prior to the flight start and tactical actuations will take place during flight. It is important to note that a situation could be strategic for a drone and tactical for another one.

7. Cooperative detect and avoid. Information regarding drone positioning is (and will be) critical for safe drone operations; the more accurate and reliable positioning data is the better the services will be provided (especially Tracking and Monitoring) and the safer operations will be. Such information can obtained cooperatively (meaning the vehicle is aware of its own position, it transmits it and then external systems work with that information) and non-cooperatively (the drone does not transmit any positioning information and it shall be actively detected by external means) and GAUSS will focus on the former5. This information will later be used by U-Space Service Providers (USP) to effectively coordinate several flights (strategically and tactically) by means of detect and avoid technologies and algorithms. DAA at tactical level will be contemplated through:

Tactical Geofencing (U2): a USP will alert the RP of a new geofence and provide a proposal of a new flight plan.

Traffic information (U2) used for separation management: The remote pilot is responsible of separation management based on U-Space traffic information service

Tactical Deconfliction (U3): Initially GAUSS limits to U-Space Services up to level 2. However, given the importance of positioning and GNSS for future Tactical deconfliction service (U3), GAUSS will partially address a potential implementation of this service. In GAUSS implementation tactical conflicts are detected at USP and deconfliction manoeuvre are generated and proposed by USP to the respective remote pilots. It is the remote pilot who is responsible for the final decision of accepting and executing this deconfliction manoeuvre. This will be valid in a several minutes timeframe (RWC). Collision Avoidance is out of scope of GAUSS.

8. A person is always in the loop during an operation (Pilot in the loop) and he/she is the ultimate responsible for the operation.

9. Flight plan modification will not be contemplated at strategic level since it will be assumed that there are no a priori conflicts.

10. U-Space services contemplated: According to GAUSS scope, only U-Space services up to level 2 will be contemplated (with the exception of a partial implementation for U3 Tactical Deconfliction); which has two relevant implications regarding tactical actuations:

a. Geofencing: tactical geofencing is contemplated so when a special/segregated airspace is activated which conflicts with a RPA already flying the USP will advise a new flight plan and it will be up to the RP to accept it; therefore, there is no need for this update to reach the drone directly (Dynamic Geofencing, U3, is not contemplated).

b. Separation management: use cases contemplated in GAUSS assume that flight plans have previously been approved (in line with assumption 9).

5 The positioning system developed in this project (WP3) is not directly related to cooperative/non-cooperative since it may be taken on board of any drone and it is then up to the drone to transmit (or not) such information; nevertheless, the UTM technologies to be worked with and/or developed within GAUSS (WP5) will only contemplate cooperative detections and this is why the whole project will focus on such detections.



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11. BRLOS is not contemplated.

12. The RPS (Remote Pilot Station) is connected to the internet so it can interact with U-Space through USP

Main operational parameters

The main operational parameters to be taken into account are enumerated below and they have close relationship with the Air and Ground risks associated to the operation (see SORA methodology [34]).

5.3.1 Type of vehicle

The type of vehicle that will be used for each application, it could be fixed wing or rotary wing.

5.3.2 Vehicle MTOM

This refers to the Maximum Take Off Mass of the vehicle, regardless of the type of vehicle. One main distinctions has been drawn in this study so the type of vehicles used are aligned with EASA’s operational categories: 25kg; this mass is a limit for EASA’s open category (A3).

This concept is commonly also known as MTOW (Maximum Take Off Weight).

5.3.3 Vehicle flight altitude

The altitude Above Ground Level (AGL) at which the operation will be performed. Two distinctions have been drawn:

150m is the maximum altitude for VLL

120m is the maximum altitude for EASA’s Open category operations

5.3.4 Visual conditions

Two options are contemplated: VLOS and BVLOS

5.3.5 Surroundings

This refers to the close environment in which the RPAS will operate; two parameters will be contemplated: density of people and density of buildings, since they pose severe constraints to safe operations; however, no specific and international figures have been found in the literature to draw distinction lines for different levels of those parameters.

On the other hand, SORA [38] does contemplate two scenarios regarding population: Urban and Rural, but it leaves at the discretion of the Competent Authority their definition and two levels are not felt to provide enough level of distinction for this project. Another relevant source of information has been followed in this case [15], where four densities of people are contemplated6 (Figure 7): “unpopulated”; “low density”; “moderately populated”; and “urban environment, higher density”;

6 People involved in the operation are not taken into consideration in this case.



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although these concepts do not provide specific figures and such definition falls beyond the scope of this project.

Interactive population maps could be used to evaluate density of people near the operation, some public source provide this kind of information [39] although higher resolution will be required; in this line some authorities provide a map with populated and non-populated areas of their countries.

No specific information has been found regarding divisions for density of buildings either so a general division has been drawn in this document, following a similar idea to people: no buildings; few buildings; moderately urbanized; and high density of buildings.

Density of people [15] Density of buildings

Unpopulated No buildings

Low density of people Few buildings

Moderately populated Moderately urbanised

Urban environment High density of buildings

Table 7: summary of surroundings contemplated

5.3.6 EASA operational category

All operations will be classified according to EASA categories (and subcategories if applicable); according to Section 5.2, GAUSS will only deal with Open and Specific.

5.3.7 Flight plan type

The type of operation might require different kind of trajectories to be performed by the RPA; several types are contemplated:

Area sweep

In this case the objective is to monitor or survey a specific area. The aircraft will typically follow several straight lines linked with turns. Examples of this kind of flight plan include precision agriculture and border patrol to name a few.

Figure 12: typical area sweep flight plan



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Localized

They are characterised by the aircraft moving within a reduced volume where it usually stops periodically to take detailed measures. The aircraft speed in this case is low compared to other flight plans since the level of detail needed is higher. Examples of this kind of flight plan include wind turbine inspection and solar panels inspection to name a few.

Figure 13: typical localized flight plan [40].

Linear

In this case the aircraft’s mission is usually to go from one point to another following a rather lineal trajectory. The goal could be the journey itself (for example for delivery purposes) or to monitor overflown terrain (for example to survey a pipeline).

Figure 14: typical lineal flight plan.

Tracking

In this case the aircraft follows an objective so the flight plan is not known a priori and it is highly dependent on the objective speed and manoeuvrability; for example, to follow a high speed vehicle (land or maritime) a lineal trajectory (updated at high rate) might be enough; low speed bodies such as oil spills might require curved shaped flight plans to keep the spill within the camera range.

EUROCAE’s WG-105 SG-13 (DAA for UAS operating in VLL) highlights the importance for the RP (Remote Pilot) to be particularly aware since the target may be travelling in a non-linear manner [32].

Integrity concept

Unlike accuracy, integrity is a complex term that can sometimes mislead to ambiguity. The goal with this section is to provide a brief summary before making use of the term in the following sections.

ICAO provides a confidence-based definition of Integrity [41]:



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“Integrity is a measure of the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and valid warnings to users.”

An EGNOS receiver continuously estimates a predicted position error, known as protection level (PL) since the true position error (PE), i.e. the difference between the computed position and the true position, is not known. [42]

Furthermore, allowable errors are bounded and the Alert Limit (AL) is the error tolerance not to be exceeded without issuing an alert to the user; it represents the largest error that results in a safe operation.

Time To Alert (TTA) is the “maximum allowable time elapsed from the onset of the estimation system being out of tolerance until the equipment enunciates the alarm” [43]. So, if the error exceeds the limit (AL) the user must be warned within this TTA.

Finally, the Integrity Risk (IR) is the probability that an error exceeds the AL without the user being informed within the TTA.

For the system to behave correctly, the PL should be always larger than the PE and smaller than the AL, see Figure 15 where the parameters are referring to Horizontal dimension.

Figure 15: possible situations when navigating with EGNOS, [44].

Therefore, the study of integrity in this report will be performed through several parameters, explained above:

Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL)

Vertical Alert Limit (VAL)

Time To Alert (TTA)

Integrity Risk (IR)



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6. Use Case 1: Coordinated UA operations in a land scenario

This section describes the use case in a land scenario, it first describes each application individually and ends with the combined operation of all them in the same scenario.

Each application is briefly described and reasons are provided to justify its relevance; after that, requirements regarding positioning systems are also drawn for each application from two points of view:

Application: positioning requirements that should be fulfilled so the application meets its goals. They have been divided into horizontal and vertical accuracy

Safety: requirements that should be fulfilled so the application can be performed safely, they have been transferred to integrity requirements of the navigation system: Horizontal Alert Level (HAL), Vertical Alert Level (VAL), Time To Alert (TTA) and Integrity Risk (IR); see Section 5.4.

It is important to highlight that the requirements drawn in this section only consider each application from an isolated point of view, as if it were the only UA flying in the airspace. Later on, Section 8, deals with the requirements of several drones operating in the same and/or nearby airspace.

6.1.1 Individual applications descriptions

OP1.1 Precision agriculture

Type of vehicle Fixed wing

MTOM 5 kg

h (AGL) 70m

Visual BVLOS

Surroundings -Unpopulated

-No buildings

EASA Category Specific

Flight plan type Area sweep

Table 8: Main characteristics of precision agriculture application.

Figure 16: Typical flight plan of a precision agriculture application.



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Precision agriculture consists on using on-board sensors to monitor crop characteristics, with this information the farmer may asses their health or make more informed decisions (such as harvest, irrigation or fumigation measures).

Flying over crops offers a wider point of view compared to more local methods like installing the sensors on the roof of a tractor and more accessible than satellite images and less dependent on clouds.

This functionality may be easily transferred to other agricultural purposes, such as counting livestock, with some modifications on the sensors to be used.

Long range surveying for precision agriculture is one of the civil applications with more potential in the upcoming years, expecting around 40.000 operating drones by 2025 [6] and agriculture applications appear in several literature:

UAS Pilot Programme [13]

SORA's Standard Scenario [34]

European Drones Outlook study [45]

UTM RTT also predicts agriculture as one of the first capabilities to be developed within UTM (Figure 7).

One of the examples in [27].

[27] mentions Precision Agriculture is one of European GNSS focus.

Focus area for GSA, even financed projects (H2020): MISTRALE [46]

Agriculture is seen as one of the most influential mission for drones according to GSA [47]

A similar example is contemplated in [38].

TERRA contemplates this application as one of its three business cases.

Precision agriculture is one the representative use cases chosen by EUROCAE in [32].

Figure 17: Summary of demand outlook in agriculture, [6].

Requirements analysis

Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of two specific cases of precision agriculture (vineyards crops and corn crops), detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



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Horizontal Accuracy Vertical Accuracy

Value [m] Justification Value [m] Justification

Application 0.5 Half line

separation 2 Vineyard height

Table 9: Accuracy requirements for precision agriculture operation.

Value Justification

HAL [m] NA Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) is not critical

VAL [m] 35 Half the flying altitude. It still ensures flying

below VLL

TTA [s] 20 Around half the time it would take for RPA to

cross a nominal field (1km)

IR 1E-6

Table 10: Integrity requirements for precision agriculture operation.

OP1.2 Long range forest surveillance


MTOM 50 kg

h (AGL) 120 m

Visual BVLOS


-No buildings



Table 11: Main characteristics of long range forest surveillance application.

Figure 18: Typical flight plan of a forest monitoring.

In this case the RPAS is used to monitor forests and prevent and add disaster relief, such as forest fires, with aerial views, especially in difficult to access or remote areas.

A similar example is contemplated in [38] and [27] mentions drones are a key asset to cut costs and time for environmental monitoring and one of the applications of UAS Pilot Program is surveying in remote areas.



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Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed operation for firefighting in a forest, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



Application 10 Effective water bombing area

NA

Table 12: Accuracy requirements for long range forest surveying.

Value Justification

HAL [m] 40 Based on APV-I limits.

VAL [m] 30 To ensure flying below VLL7

TTA [s] 109 Time to hit the ground when loss of engine8

IR 1E-6

Table 13: Integrity requirements for long range forest surveying.

OP1.3 Wind turbine vertical inspection

Type of vehicle Rotary wing

MTOM 6 kg

h (AGL) 90 m

Visual VLOS


-Few buildings

EASA Category Open (A3)

Flight plan type Localized

Table 14: Main characteristics of wind turbine vertical inspection application

Figure 19: Typical flight plan of a wind turbine inspection.

This scenario is focused on wind turbine inspection although the applicability can be transferred to other inspection of localized elements just by adjusting the sensors; these applications include solar

7 The option of half the difference between flight level and average tree height (40m) would not ensure flying below VLL since the flight altitude is 120m 8 In this case there is no average size of the forest (like in agriculture precision)



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plants, cooling towers and other infrastructure where inspection personnel is put in a controlled risk environment.

Wind turbine blades can be damaged, for example, by birds, lightning strike or erosion and this damage can reduce system efficiency, make the wind turbine unbalanced and at worst destroy the turbine [48]. This is why they need to be periodically inspected, currently these inspections are carried out by professionals hanging from ropes and visually checking the blades status.

RPAS can be used to collect detailed imagery to better assess and forecast the wind turbine’s maintenance needs.

Wind power production is increasing (Figure 20) and this tendency is expected to maintain, [6] forecasts a notable increase by 2035 in Europe.

Furthermore, wind turbines are getting larger which increases complexity, risks and cost of conventional inspection operations.

By using RPAS the risk is drastically reduced and the operation time is also reduced which minimizes production downtime, therefore improving the industry’s competitiveness.

Figure 20: Global wind power cumulative capacity [49].

Some specific examples that include this type of application are:

Outlook study [45] VLOS localized operations are already a reality.

The UTM RTT also includes infrastructure monitoring within those first capabilities.

[27] mentions drones are a key asset to cut costs and time for inspection of infrastructures.

Inspection of infrastructures (VLOS) of the energy sector is seen as one of the most influential mission for drones according to GSA [47]

TERRA contemplates an infrastructure inspection with multicopters as one of its three business cases.


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been based on EVADS’ experience with



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inspection of wind turbines, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



Application 3 Image frame 2 Image frame

Table 15: Accuracy requirements for wind turbine vertical inspection.

Value Justification

HAL [m] 10 Sensor range

VAL [m] 30 Lowest altitude of a wind turbine blade and

within the range shown in EUROCAE figures for VLL applications [32]

TTA [s] 10 Time to hit the blade9

IR 1E-6

Table 16: Integrity requirements for wind turbine vertical inspection.

OP1.4 Transmission power line inspection


MTOM 5 kg

h (AGL) 80 m

Visual BVLOS


-Few buildings


Flight plan type Linear

Table 17: main characteristics of transmission power line inspection

application.

Figure 21: typical flight plan of a linear infrastructure inspection.

This scenario is focused on power transmission lines inspection although the applicability can be transferred to other inspection of elongated elements such as roads, rail network, pipelines, etc. by just adjusting the sensors.

9 Less distance than to the ground, more critical.



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These transmission lines are inspected periodically checking both the towers and wires; furthermore, some of these lines run through vegetation bodies and the ground below them must be free of flammable material (such as small trees, fallen branches, etc.) to reduce the risk of fire.

These inspections are currently carried out by means of manned helicopters with an elevated cost and complexity of operations, visual ground inspection are also performed. RPAS offer a more cost-effective and accessible alternative.


UTM RTT also includes infrastructure monitoring within those first capabilities

Outlook study [45] forecasts an increase in long range inspections in the upcoming years

One of the applications of UAS Pilot Program does pipeline inspection.


[27] mentions drones are a key asset to cut costs and time for inspection of infrastructures.

Inspection of infrastructures of the energy sector is seen as one of the most influential mission for drones according to GSA [47]

BVLOS inspection of power lines is one the representative use cases chosen by EUROCAE in [32].


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed inspection of a transmission power line, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



Application 5 Distance between

cables NA

Table 18: Accuracy requirements for transmission power line inspection.

Value Justification

HAL [m] NA Horizontal Protection Level (PL) is not critical

VAL [m] 10 Assuming flying the closest possible

TTA [s] 7 Time to hit the wires in case of engine loss and

flying closest to the tower.

IR 1E-6

Table 19: Integrity requirements for transmission power line inspection.



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OP1.5 Event surveillance


MTOM 6 kg

h (AGL) 100m

Visual VLOS

Surroundings

-Urban environment

-Moderately urbanised


Flight plan type Localized

Table 20: Main characteristics of event surveillance application.

Figure 22: Scheme of RPAS duties during crowded event

This scenario is focused on monitoring gathering of people (outdoor events, demonstrations, etc.).

Current methods exhibit operational drawbacks: static cameras have range of vision constraints, pole cameras manned helicopters raise complexity and costs, on-site police have very limited visibility due height issues (even if using horses), etc.

RPAS offer an alternative which is quick and easy to deploy and a high degree of flexibility, especially for multicopters; tethered models even exhibit a virtually endless autonomy. Furthermore, on-board computer algorithms can also offer advanced functionalities in an automated way: anticipate potential hazards (such as excessive overcrowded areas or gas leaks); detect accidents (like a fire); detect violent people [50].


Governmental bodies, are likely to use small, low altitude drones according to [45].

This is one of the scenarios mentioned in CLASS Workshop [51]



Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from a proposed surveillance of an event in a semirural environment, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



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Application 1 Average distance between people

NA

Table 21: Accuracy requirements for event surveillance

Value Justification

HAL [m] 50 Buffer according to Spanish regulation [52] and within the range shown in EUROCAE figures for

VLL applications [32]

VAL [m] 35

Minimum flying altitude (for privacy issues). Similar to altitude near airports, according to

French ANSP10 and similar to EUROCAE figures for VLL applications [32]

TTA [s] 2.5 Time for the drone to hit the ground in case of

loss of engines (all of them).11

IR 1E-7

Table 22: Integrity requirements for event surveillance.

Final remarks

Some or all of the applications exposed in this section will be tested during the field trials of the GAUSS solution (T6.4: First trials campaign – field operation in WP6: Integration, Trials and Validation), the final decision will be made in future stages of the project.

Some of these applications fall within the Specific category of EASA regulation and therefore need a safety assessment; in order to fulfil with this requirement SORA will be followed. Applications categorised as Open (in this case the wind turbine inspection) will only need their operator to be registered, without the need of further studies.

6.1.2 Scene

The previous section selected the most relevant applications, especially from the market potential point of view; however, it is the simultaneous operation of different applications that holds the most potential.

This section proposes an example of such interaction between the previously explained applications, within neighbouring (and even coincident) airspaces.

Summary

This use case combines five RPAS (taken from Table 6) each with a predefined task (described in Section 6.1.1) in a semirural environment where:

RPA1: fixed wing (MTOM 50kg) operated by local government to survey a forest for potential fires.

10 See Annex for more information 11 In this case the time to cover the HAL is much higher than to cover the VAL



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RPA2: rotary wing operated by local police monitoring an event.

RPA3: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by a private company (Agrodro12) to monitor a crop field.

RPA4: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by a private company (Dronins13) to monitor a power transmission power line.

RPA5: rotary wing operated by Dronins to inspect a wind turbine.




Long range transmission power line inspection

Event surveillance

Type of vehicle


MTOM [kg] 5 50 6 5 6

h (AGL) [m] 70 120 90 80 100

Visual BVLOS BVLOS VLOS BVLOS VLOS

Surroundings -Unpopulated -Unpopulated -Unpopulated -Unpopulated

-Urban environment

-No buildings -No buildings -Few buildings -Few buildings -Moderately urbanised

EASA Category

Specific Specific Open (A3) Specific Specific

Flight plan type

Area sweep Area sweep Localized Linear Localized

Requirements


0.5 10 3 5 1


2 NA 2 NA NA

HAL [m] NA 40 10 NA 50

VAL [m] 35 30 30 10 35

TTA [s] 20 109 10 7 2.5

IR 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 1E-7

Table 23: Summary of operations for land

12 This is a purely fictions name and any resemblance to existing persons, companies, email addresses or URLs is purely coincidental. 13 This is a purely fictions name and any resemblance to existing persons, companies, email addresses or URLs is purely coincidental.



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Figure 23: use case 1, scenario.

Execution

Phase 0

Prior to the operations execution it is assumed that all strategic actions have taken place such as the approval of flight plans. Furthermore, all changes contemplated in this use case during the operations will be made at tactical level since the corresponding flight are already taking place.



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Phase 1

Figure 24: use case 1, phase 1.

Preconditions

NA

Actions

1. Company Agrodro launches RPA3 to monitor crop field

2. City council launches RPA1 to survey the forest

3. Police launches RPA2 to monitor event

Safety specific requirements

NA

Security specific requirements

NA

UTM interaction

When requesting flight plans for RPA1 and RPA3 their 4D trajectories are checked and although they fly over the same airspace they do so a different times; therefore, no tactical interaction is expected.

GAUSS U-Space related services

NA



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Phase 2


Preconditions

RPA1 is surveying the forest

RPA2 monitoring event

RPA3 monitoring crop field

Actions

1. Company DronInsp launches RPA4 to inspect transmission power line

2. Company DronInsp launches RPA5 to inspect wind turbine


Accuracy & Integrity in positioning increases performance of conflict resolution systems (RPA1-RPA4).


NA

UTM interaction

Interaction between RPA1 and RPA4 that would ideally be solved at strategic level (by a USP) since both flight plans are known a priori. However, due to proximity it is advised to the pilots to monitor traffic information and, since RPA4 is delayed in its D4 trajectory due to weather conditions there is the need to apply tactical deconfliction to avoid potential separation conflicts. The conflict is detected by the USP and a deconfliction manoeuvre is generated for both aircrafts and proposed to their remote pilots by USP. The remote pilots, who are responsible for the final decision, accept and execute both deconfliction manoeuvres.



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Traffic Information (U2)

Tactical deconfliction (U3)

Phase 3


Preconditions

RPA1 is surveying the forest



RPA4 monitoring transmission power line

RPA5 inspecting wind turbine

Actions

1. Alert received of potential fire

2. City council requests a geo-fence14 (for exclusive use of RPA1) around that potential fire and sends RPA1

3. USP provides RPA4’s PIC with an alternative flight plan to avoid the geo-fence.

14 According to EUROCAE [75] “A geo-fence is defined by geographical coordinates and a time slot (4D definition)”



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Accuracy & integrity in location allows more demanding geo-fence limits and ensures better geoawareness.


NA

UTM interaction

Specific airspace segregation and flight plans modification (RPA1 and RPA4)15

RPA1 keep inside this airspace (geo-caging16)

RPA4 keep outside this airspace (geo-exclusion17)


Tactical geofencing (U2)

Flight Planning management (U2)

Phase 4


15 The USP provides an alternative flight plan and it is up to the Remote Pilot (RP) to accept it or to activate some emergency procedure (such as flight termination). 16 Geo-caging: “aims to prevent a UA from flying outside of a predetermined volume” [51] 17 Geo-exclusion: “aims to prevent a particular UA or a set of UAs from flying into a predetermined volume” [51]



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Preconditions

RPA1 loitering around the potential fire


RPA3 monitoring crop fields

RPA4 loitering outside geo-fence


Actions

1. RPA1 confirms the fire

2. No drone zone (NDZ)18 is requested over the forest to send in aerial manned firefighters

3. RPA4 leaves NDZ before an established time19 and flies back to base

4. RPA1 tries to leave NDZ but a malfunction raises and the aircraft cannot properly leave the NDZ (for example, the RPA’s velocity is compromised and it cannot leave the NDZ before an established time). This emergency situation leads to the flight termination, in this case by deploying a parachute, so the NDZ is effective as soon as possible.


Accuracy & integrity in location are import so authorities know when the NDZ is effective (all drones have evacuated the volume).


Security allows more reliability when urgently leaving the NDZ

UTM interaction

RPA1 manages an emergency flight termination

RPA4 keeps outside NDZ

Interaction RPA4 and RPA5 near wind turbine



Emergency management (U2)

Flight planning Management (U2)

18 According to EUROCAE [74], UAS are totally prohibited in this volume (NDZ) unless granted special authorization. 19 It is assumed that when a NDZ is activated, drones flying inside of it must leave the volume before a certain time interval.



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Phase 5


Preconditions




Actions

1. RPA3 finishes monitoring the crop field and goes back to base following a different flight path to avoid NDZ


Accuracy & Integrity in location allows flying through more stringent corridors (RPA3)


Security allows more reliability when flying close to critical areas (event and NDZ)

UTM interaction

Geofencing interaction since RPA3 must keep outside NDZ and the event area



Flight planning Management (U2)



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Phase 6


Preconditions



Actions

1. RPA2 finishes operation

2. RPA5 finishes operation


NA


NA

UTM interaction

NA


NA



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7. Use case 2: Coordinated UA operations in a maritime scenario

This section describes the use case in a land scenario, it first describes each application individually and ends with the combined operation of all them in the same scenario.

Each application is briefly described and reasons are provided to justify its relevance; after that, requirements regarding positioning systems are also drawn for each application from two points of view:

Application: positioning requirements that should be fulfilled so the application meets its goals. They have been divided into horizontal and vertical accuracy

Safety: requirements that should be fulfilled so the application can be performed safely, they have been transferred to integrity requirements of the navigation system: Horizontal Alert Level (HAL), Vertical Alert Level (VAL), Time To Alert (TTA) and Integrity Risk (IR); see Section 5.4.

It is important to highlight that the requirements drawn in this section only consider each application from an isolated point of view, as if it were the only UA flying in the airspace. Later on, Section 8, deals with the requirements of several drones operating in the same and/or nearby airspace.

7.1.1 Individual applications descriptions

OP2.1 Spill detection


MTOM 5 kg

h (AGL) 100m

Visual BVLOS


-No buildings


Flight plan type Area Sweep & tracking

Table 24: main characteristics of spill detection application

Figure 30: Typical flight plat to look out for spills in the vicinity of a port.



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Currently, RPAS offer the possibility to monitor sea surfaces in search of spills from vessels, they can involve involuntary actions such as accidents or voluntary actions such as disposal of waste water.

These spills might include metals, toxics and other elements hazardous to the environment.

On board sensors (usually cameras of different wavelengths) can automatically detect strange substances on the sea surface by identifying their properties such as light reflection, colour, temperature, etc.

Once a spill is detected the RPAS can loiter over it and follow it to provide real time information to the appropriate organization.

The period of time right after a spill is critical to ensure the best possible assessment and reduce its impact and drones provide a virtually permanent and fast response tool.

Furthermore, according to [53], most spills come from maritime sources and a lot of spilled areas are closed to shore (Figure 31 and Figure 32).

Figure 31: Significant spills by area [53].

Figure 32: Distribution of spills by source type [53].

Finally, [27] mentions drones are a key asset to cut costs and time for inspection of infrastructures.


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed operation to monitor waters nearby a port for possible spills, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



Application 10 Horizon for vessel NA

Table 25: accuracy requirements for spill detection.



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Value Justification

HAL [m] NA

VAL [m] 46 Approximately half the difference between the

flying altitude and the average boat height. This still ensures the aircraft stays below VLL

TTA [s] 42 Time to glide VAL

IR 1E-6

Table 26: Integrity requirements for spill detection

OP2.2 Fish farm monitoring


MTOM 5 kg

h (AGL) 100m

Visual BVLOS


-No buildings

EASA Category Specified


Table 27: main characteristics of fish farm monitoring application.

Figure 33: Typical flight plan for monitoring several fish farms.

This case is similar to Precision agriculture but fishing areas are monitored instead of vegetation.

This functionality can be done together with looking out for non-authorised fishing activities in those areas.

Aquaculture production has been increasing in the past years (Figure 34) and this tendency is expected to maintain; furthermore, some aquaculture areas are close to the coastline (Figure 35) and RPAS offer a cost-effective option which is also easy and quick to deploy.



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Figure 34: Global harvest of aquatic organism in million tonnes, 1950-2010, as reported by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). [54]

Figure 35: aquaculture areas in the south of Spain, [55].


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed operation to monitor fish farms nearby a port for possible damage in the structures, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details:



Application 2 Cage sections NA

Table 28: Accuracy requirements for fish farm monitoring.

Value Justification

HAL [m] NA

VAL [m] 46 Approximately half the difference between the

flying altitude and the average boat height. This still ensures the aircraft stays below VLL

TTA [s] 42 Time to glide VAL

IR 1E-6

Table 29: Integrity requirements to fish farm monitoring.



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OP2.3 Delivery


MTOM 10 kg

h (AGL) 60 m

Visual BVLOS

Surroundings -Low density of people

-Few buildings



Table 30: main characteristics of delivery application.

Figure 36: typical flight plan between a port and a nearby vessel. In green the direct drone flight and in

blue the path of a conventional transport vessel.

This scenario does not contemplate the commercial potential since this capability has more future in land areas (especially semirural, [6]) where storage facilities and customers are located. Nevertheless, the approach is the same and the outcomes are expected to be very similar.

This scenario focuses on delivery necessities between two points where the flight plan crosses water areas. Some situations might require fast delivery of material and current methods imply expensive manned aerial methods, RPAS can cut these costs and even fly in weather conditions where manned operations are dangerous; some examples include:

Delivery of emergency components, such as medical supplies, to offshore platforms or vessels.

Delivery of original documentation. Currently vessels are required to hand in original documentation to ports and since they are light and urgent, drones are a logical alternative to current short range maritime transport.

Delivery of important material between two points within a port, for example for rush order official documents.

Delivery of material between two vessels.

Even for not so critical deliveries RPAS offer a fast and cost-effective alternative to traditional land or water transports.

Some specific sources include:

One of the scenarios of REAL [56] contemplates a rapid transportation of urgent medicines from a central healthcare facility to a given inaccessible area, ensuring h<150m [57].


TERRA contemplates this application as one of its three business cases.



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IMPETUS considers a delivery application [26], although in that case is a commercial premium package delivery service.

Delivery of goods above water bodies is also contemplated in EUROCAE [32].


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed delivery operation between the port and a near vessel, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details

This application has the peculiarity that the transport of the drone is the goal in itself since it carries some goods that have to be delivered, therefore the requirements for the application and safety are the same (see the beginning of this section for further information on this classification)



Application 6 Half heliport

diameter 0.1

Waves height in landing and

requirements for approximation

Table 31: Accuracy requirements for delivery

Value Justification

HAL [m] 6 Half heliport diameter

VAL [m] 0.1 Waves height in landing and requirements for

approximation

TTA [s] 14 Time to fly between the heliport and the sea

surface20

IR 1E-6

Table 32: Integrity requirements for delivery

20 Check Section of Metrics of this application to see another option (too restrictive).



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OP2.4 Border surveillance


MTOM 50 kg

h (AGL) 120m

Visual BVLOS


-No buildings



Table 33: main characteristics of border surveillance application.

Figure 37: typical flight plan for patrolling some maritime area.

Some European countries have maritime borders that have to be monitored both for humanitarian and security purposes: sea migration and drug smuggling through fast vessels.

Current methods involve manned aircraft and vessels that have limited operational range (the number of vehicles is limited and usually low) and relatively complex operation; RPAS offer a complementary option to reduce deployment time and increase the area being monitored by operating several vehicles simultaneously.

Some specific sources include:

IMPETUS contemplates this specific application, [26].


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed patrolling operation of a maritime border near a port, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details.



Application 10 Horizon for

rescue/interception vessel

NA Sea surface

Table 34: accuracy requirements for border surveillance.



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Value Justification

HAL [m] NA

VAL [m] 30 Difference between flying altitude and VLL limit

to ensure flying below the heigh limit (150m)

TTA [s] 109 Time to hit the ground when loss of engine21

IR 2E-6

Table 35: Integrity requirements for border surveillance.

OP2.5 Beach monitoring


MTOM 6kg

h (AGL) 100m

Visual VLOS

Surroundings -Moderately populated

-No buildings

EASA Category Open (A3)


Table 36: main characteristics of beach monitoring application

Figure 38: typical flight plan for beach monitoring.

RPAS offer the opportunity to have an eye in the sky around beaches and quickly detect any emergency such as drowning.

Current range of view of lifeguards on beaches is limited to visual sight from their posts, RPAS would extend this range easing their tasks and enhancing their capabilities.


Specific figures for application accuracy and integrity requirements have not been found in the literature. Therefore, requirements have been obtained from the analysis of a proposed operation to monitor a beach for safety reasons, detailed information may be found in the corresponding Section of Annex II: Applications details.

21 See Application of forest surveillance for calculations, same aircraft and same flight altitude.



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Application 25 Half the distance between buoys

NA

Table 37: accuracy requirements for beach monitoring.

Value Justification

HAL [m] NA

VAL [m] 35 Minimum flying altitude (for privacy issues). Similar to altitude

near airports, according to French ANSP22 and similar to EUROCAE figures for VLL applications [32]

TTA [s] 4.5 Time to free fall from nominal flight altitude

IR 1E-6

Table 38: integrity requirements for border surveillance.

Final remarks

Some or all of the applications exposed in this section will be tested during the field trials of the GAUSS solution T6.5: Second trials campaign – sea operation in WP6: Integration, Trials and Validation), the final decision will be made in future stages of the project.

Some of these applications fall within the Specific category of EASA regulation and therefore need a safety assessment; in order to fulfil with this requirement SORA will be followed. Applications categorised as Open (in this case A3) will only need their operator to be registered, without the need of further studies.

7.1.2 Scene

Summary

This use case combines five RPAS (taken from Table 6) each with a predefined task (described in Section 7.1.1) in a coast environment with both land and maritime interactions, being the latter more relevant than the former, where there is a port, a beach and a national maritime border (see Figure 39).

RPA1: rotary wing operated by life guards to monitor a beach for possible drowning.

RPA2: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by the port to monitor the port entrance looking for spills.

RPA3: fixed wing (MTOM 5kg) operated by the port to monitor nearby fish farms

RPA4: fixed wing (MTOM 50kg) operated by local Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) to survey a border.

RPA5: rotary wing operated by the port to deliver an emergency medical good to a nearby vessel.

22 See Annex for more information



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Spill detection


Delivery Border surveillance

Beach monitoring

Type of vehicle


MTOM [kg] 5 5 6 50 6

h (AGL) [m] 100 100 60 120 100

Visual BVLOS BVLOS BVLOS BVLOS VLOS

Surroundings Unpopulated Unpopulated Low density of People Unpopulated

Moderately populated

No buildings No buildings Few buildings No buildings No buildings

EASA Category

Specific Specific Specific Specific Open (A3)

Flight plan type

Area Sweep & Tracking

Area Sweep Linear Area sweep Linear

Requirements


10 2 6 10 25


NA NA 0.1 NA NA

HAL [m] NA NA 6 NA NA

VAL [m] 46 46 0.1 30 35

TTA [s] 42 42 14 109 4.5

IR 1E-6 1E-6 1E-6 2E-6 1E-6

Table 39: Summary of operations for maritime scenarios.



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Figure 39: use case 2, scenario.

Execution

Phase 0

Prior to the operations execution it is assumed that all strategic actions have taken place such as approval of flight plans. Furthermore, all changes contemplated in this use case during the operations will be made at tactical level since the corresponding flight are already taking place.



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Phase 1


Preconditions

NA

Actions

1. Life guard team launches RPA1 to monitor the beach

2. Port launches RPA2 to monitor the port entrance looking for spills

3. Port launches RPA3 to monitor nearby fish farms


NA


NA

UTM interaction

NA


NA



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Phase 2


Preconditions

RPA1 monitoring the beach

RPA2 monitoring port entrance

RPA3 monitoring fisheries

Actions

NA


More accuracy and integrity in location increases performance of flight plans and coordinated trajectories.


Security allows more reliability when flying close to critical areas

UTM interaction

Interaction between RPA2 and RPA3 that would ideally be solved at strategic level (by a USP) since both flight plans are known a priori. However, due to proximity it is advised to the pilots to monitor traffic information and, since RPA3 is delayed in its D4 trajectory due to performance degradation (without compromising safety, e.g. battery saving mode, motor degradation, etc.) and there is the need to apply tactical deconfliction to avoid potential separation conflicts. The conflict is detected by the USP and a deconfliction manoeuvre is generated for both aircrafts and proposed to their remote pilots by USP. The remote pilots, who are responsible for the final decision, accept and execute both deconfliction manoeuvres.





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Phase 3


Preconditions




Actions

1. Authorities launch RPA4 to monitor a maritime border

2. RPA1 hovers outside RPA4’s ascending flight plan


Increases performance of conflict resolution systems

Avoid need to interact with other flight plans


Security allows more reliability in sensible surveying activities (border patrol)

UTM interaction

Interaction between RPA2 and RPA3 that would ideally be solved at strategic level (by a USP) since both flight plans are known a priori.



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Interaction between RPA4 and RPA1 and between RPA4 and RPA2 that would ideally be solved at strategic level (by a USP) since both flight plans are known a priori. The vehicles are flying at different altitudes but the safety buffers associated to their trajectories might partially coincide initially.




Phase 4


Preconditions




RPA4 surveying border

Actions

1. A nearby boat has a medical emergency and asks for help

2. Due to the emergency the port requests a geo-fence and sends a drone (RPA5) with medical supplies

3. USP provides RPA2’s PIC with an alternative flight plan to avoid the geo-fence

4. RPA5 flies back after delivering the package through the same geo-fence



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Better accuracy allows more stringent geo-fence limits


Security allows more reliability in critical activities (medical delivery)

UTM interaction

Geo-fence creation and flight plan modifications23

RPA2 keeps outside geo-fence. According to EUROCAE [33], this function is called Geo-exclusion24.

RPA5 keeps inside geo-fence. According to EUROCAE [33], this function is called Geo-caging25.



Flight planning management (U2)

Phase 5


Preconditions


23 The USP will provide an alternative flight plan and it is up to the Remote Pilot (RP) to accept it or to activate some emergency procedure (such as flight termination). 24 Geo-exclusion: “aims to prevent a particular UA or a set of UAs from flying into a predetermined volume” [47] 25 Geo-caging: “aims to prevent a UA from flying outside of a predetermined volume” [47]



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Actions

1. RPA3 finishes monitoring fisheries and goes back to base

2. RPA2 detects a spill and starts tracking it. Live images together with tracking algorithms suggest short term flight plan updates.


More accurate and reliable navigation systems allow better awareness of RPA2’s location; such information is highly valuable since it is very dynamic (depends on spill movement).


NA

UTM interaction

Continuous update of RPA2’s flight plan since it depends on the spill movement.



Phase 6




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Preconditions


RPA2 tracking spill


Actions

1. RPA1 finishes monitoring the beach and lands

2. RPA4 finishes monitoring the border and goes back to base following a different flight path due to changing RPA2 flight plan (depending on the spill)


NA


NA

UTM interaction

NA



Phase 7


Preconditions

RPA2 tracking spill



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Actions

1. The spill is under control and RPA2 flies back to base


NA


NA

UTM interaction

NA


NA



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8. Coordination requirements In order to safely execute several operations simultaneously in the same airspace, as expected within U-Space framework, further requirements for the positioning system should be contemplated to ensure safety. Those requirements have been summarised into:

Accuracy: Horizontal and vertical accuracy.

Integrity (see Section 5.4): HAL, VAL, IR and TTA.

Assumptions from Section 5.2 are still applicable for this section; furthermore, requirements in this section are focused on the in-route operation of all flights and other flight phases are omitted for interaction purposes (taxi, take-off, landing, etc.).

The approach taken in GAUSS is to define Accuracy requirements based on tactical requirements and Integrity requirements based on strategic requirements.

Accuracy requirements

As it has been explained at the beginning of this section, in order to define accuracy, last safety net of DAA is analysed, i.e. Collision Avoidance (CA).

In order to do this, the RPA could be associated to a volume (which centre is the RPA itself) and the calculations will be done so nothing comes inside this volume. To the best of the author’s knowledge there is no reliable reference that defines what volume around the RPA should be contemplated for this purpose and the CA volume has been assumed a priori. Other volumes could be contemplated: smaller volumes would allow higher traffic density but at higher risks; on the other hand, larger volumes would ensure more safety but hinder the market development by restricting the number of operations; see Figure 47 for an idea on potential volumes.

Figure 47: Different potential volumes around a UA [58].

GAUSS approach is to define the accuracy of the positioning system as a percentage of this volume which should be added as a safety margin to perform calculations. Therefore, these figures will highly depend on the RPA, not only because of the flying attitudes that it could endure (climb rate, turn rate, minimum speed, etc.) but also because of the accuracy of the positioning system. The higher the accuracy the smaller margin that would be added to the CA volume.

Another tactical aspect that could be contemplated is the appearance of a geo-fence (or NDZ) nearby an operating RPA. In such case, the aircraft shall be able to properly avoid it without declaring an



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emergency situation; in order to do this, the associated volume must not invade the geo-fence (or NDZ) and the manoeuvre shall be performed by the aircraft without compromising its control.

Figure 48: Avoidance of a tactical geo-fence while in flight.

Figure 48 shows how an increase of the associated volume, due to a lower accuracy poses an operational problem for RPA2 that will not be able to perform the manoeuvre so an emergency actuation should be activated.

8.1.1 GAUSS examples

There are several situations during the interaction between operations contemplated in Use Case 1 and Use Case 2 where accuracy is important, even critical; however, specific numbers for these cases are not relevant since they would highly depend on the operation size. The idea with this section is to emphasise the actions contemplated in this use case where accuracy is important for safe operation of combined flights:

In the land scenario:

When RPA1 (forest) and RPA4 (inspection line) operate within the same airspace.

When geo-fence is requested around the fire (Phase 3), in case RPA4 is not in it yet, it shall be able to avoid it safely within the operational specifications of the aircraft.

In the maritime scenario

When RPA2 (spill) and RPA3 (fish farm) partially operate within the same airspace.

When RPA4 (border) flies close to RPA1 (beach) and RPA3 (fish farm), Phase 3.

When RPA2 is following the spill, its trajectory is highly dynamic.



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8.1.2 Figures proposal

EUROCAE WG-105 SG-13 [32] proposes a Collision Avoidance Minima Horizontal Separation of 35m for UA not carrying passengers (the case for GAUSS).

From that number it is thought that a buffer of a 15% to account for accuracy of the positioning system is an appropriate number, leading to a figure of approximately 5 m for the horizontal accuracy.

On the other hand, comparing the separation minima for conventional aviation, based on ATS surveillance systems, of 5 NM [59] to the required horizontal accuracy for Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II)26, which is 16m, [60] it is obtained that the potential buffer is of 17%, very close to the 15% proposed here.

Among all the typical operations established by ICAO in [60] the “Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II)” is chosen because in GAUSS operations the vertical accuracy is more critical than the horizontal one since the vertical dimension is highly limited (VLL) and flights close to the ground are common.

Looking at the vertical dimension now, the same proportion than for ICAO’s “Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II)” is used: half the horizontal accuracy. Therefore, the vertical accuracy proposed is 2.5 m.

This means that, using EUROCAE WG-105 SG-13 [32] proposal for Collision Avoidance Minima Vertical Separation for UA not carrying passengers (25m), the buffer this time is 10%.

Previous values are summarized in Table 40.

Value Justification

Horizontal accuracy [m]

5 Safety buffer from CA volume

Vertical accuracy [m]

2.5 Relation to horizontal accuracy

Table 40: Accuracy requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations.

Integrity requirements

The goal with this section is to propose a methodology to obtain the integrity requirements for coordinated operation of several drones, for the sake of simplicity only a combination of two drone is contemplated here, although the principles could be transferred to more interactions.

Integrity parameters could be used to build requirements for designing and approving flight plans, at strategic level. For example HAL and VAL could account for the uncertainty around the nominal path of the RPA and set up a separation between operations, similarly to what is defined in IMPETUS, see Figure 49.

26 Among all the typical operations established by ICAO in [43] the “Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II)” is chosen because GAUSS contemplates VLL flights very close to the ground and because these type of operations is the first to require a specific vertical accuracy, which is also needed in GAUSS.



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Figure 49: Sample representation of RPA trajectory uncertainty, [26].

Two interactions are contemplated in GAUSS:

Semi-static interactions between a moving vehicle (the UA) and a static volume (geo-fence)

Dynamic interactions between two moving vehicles (two UA)

For the former case, Figure 50 shows an example of two trajectories flying through geo-fence. Positioning system of RPA1 exhibits smaller HAL so it can fly through two geo-fence; on the other hand, positioning system of RPA2 has larger HAL and cannot fly through the same geo-fence and another trajectory should be submitted. In the latter case, RPA2 will need to find another route, which could be critical for endurance reasons.

Figure 50: Flight trajectories through especial volumes; horizontal view.

In the case of dynamic interactions, Figure 51 shows one RPA flying above another at two specified altitudes (AGL). The left hand side shows how both RPA have a VAL small enough so both



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trajectories can coexist; on the other hand, the right hand side shows how VAL for RPA2 is larger and then both trajectories intersect, therefore, flight altitude should be modified.

Figure 51: Close flight trajectories of two RPA; vertical view.

Then, especially for the dynamic interactions, time could also be contemplated since two (or more) UA could fly through the same point but at different times.

After taking the previous concepts under consideration several situations are envisioned (in the case of dynamic interactions):

1. Type 1: No interaction, the 3D trajectory of the flight plans do not intersect. Figure 52.

2. Type 2: Interaction expected, the 3D trajectory of the flight plans intersect but not in 4D, i.e. the aircraft will fly through the intersection area at different time; in this case constant monitoring of real-time position information will allow assessing if the UA is following the expected 4D flight plan, otherwise future conflicts can be anticipated and tactical deconfliction measures should be taken. Figure 53.

3. Type 3: Conflict detected, the volumes associated to the UA have some common volume. When this situation is detected at strategic level, a modification of one, or several, flight plans should be required. On the other hand, if this is a consequence of a Type 2 situation deconfliction measures at tactical level will be required. Figure 54.

A flight plan with interaction but no problem a priori (Type 2) could turn into conflict if one aircraft is expected to fly to the conflicting volume later than expected (for example due to a slower flying speed) which then coincides with another RPA expected to fly through that volume; this case should be managed tactically, although not necessarily as an emergency a priori.

For the sake of simplicity, in this explanation the volumes are assumed as spheres and only two vehicles will be considered although the concepts can be extrapolated to other volumes and more interactions.



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Figure 52: No interaction situation.

Figure 53: Interaction expected situation.



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Figure 54: Conflict detected situation.

It is worth mentioning that, although the horizontal dimension is important, as Figure 50 exemplifies, in the case of GAUSS, the vertical dimension is more critical since all flights are performed below a specified limit (VLL: 150m). For example, the solution to right hand side of Figure 51, could be to reduce hRPA2 which could be problematic, even unfeasible, if the ground is too close.

Once the previous concepts have been explained, the approach proposed in GAUSS is to extract the integrity requirements from an analysis of the separations performed in another GAUSS deliverable, D2.3 [61], where two factors are contemplated:

Relative velocity of the encounter, taking into account the velocity of the studied aircraft and the velocity of the intruder.

Relative position of the encounter, taking into account the angle in which the encounter potentially takes place.

The main idea behind D2.3 is to start from a temporal separation which depending on the velocities and bearings (the two factors mentioned above, see ) is translated into a distance separation; the temporal separation (TAUMOD) chosen is 10 seconds ( [61], [62]). Detailed information may be found in D2.3, in the current deliverable only the final figures are displayed, and from that separation figures the integrity requirements are drawn see Section 8.2.2.



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Figure 55: Reference System with CPA at origin [61].

This approach requires highly reliable positioning systems and constant update of current and forecasted RPA position. The former would be achieved by the integrity mentioned in this section and the latter would require constant monitoring of RPA position and evaluating where it is likely to be in the upcoming instants (especially by means of Tracking and Monitoring services of U-Space phase 2).

8.2.1 GAUSS examples

There are several situations during the interaction between operations contemplated in Use Case 1 and Use Case 2 where integrity is important (especially HAL and VAL), even critical; however, specific numbers for these cases are not relevant since they would highly depend on the specific operation associated risk. The idea with this section is to emphasise the actions contemplated in this use case where integrity is important for safe operation of combined flights:

In the land scenario:

Flight plan submission of RPA1 (forest) and RPA4 (inspection line) operating over the forest.

When the geo-fence is requested around the fire (Phase 3) its size is to be determined by the horizontal buffer (HAL) needed for RPA1 to loiter. This geo-fence will also, tactically, modify the flight plan of RPA4, which will need to maintain a certain separation. The second case is not critical in this specific case since RPA4 can loiter as far as needed; nevertheless, should another critical volume be nearby RPA4 options would be more limited.

When RPA1 and RPA4 must exit the NDZ it is important to be able to know when both aircraft do not pose a threat for incoming manned aviation, either because they are outside the volume or because they are on the ground.

When the geo-fence is requested around the fire (Phase 3), RPA3 (agriculture) must modify its return to base flight plan and if its HAL is small enough it could fly between the NDZ and the volume where RPA2 (event) is flying, otherwise it will have to find another route, both situations are also exemplified in Figure 50.



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In the maritime scenario:

Flight plan submission of RPA2 (spill) and RPA3 (fish farm) partially operating within the same airspace.

The flight plan that RPA4 (border) submits to access the border area (Phase 3), its associated volumes partially coincides with the volumes of RPA1 (beach) and RPA3 (fish farm).

The size of the emergency corridor requested for RPA5 (delivery) will be determined by the HAL and VAL, which will affect the RPA2 (spill)

8.2.2 Figures proposal

As it has been stated previously, figures are based on temporal separation and studies of [61] lead to the following tables, Table 41, Table 42 and Table 43 refer to horizontal distances.

Bearing intruder [º]

Vintruder [m/s] 0 90 180

10 m/s 228 178 NA

20 m/s 320 250 144

30 m/s 415 335 228

Table 41: Well-clear violation distances [m] for an UA flying at 10 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61].



10 m/s 320 250 144

20 m/s 415 300 NA

30 m/s 512 380 144

Table 42: Well-clear violation distance [m] for an UA flying at 20 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61].



10 m/s 415 335 228

20 m/s 512 380 144

30 m/s 610 440 NA

Table 43: Well-clear violation distance [m] for an UA flying at 30 m/s for different intruder velocities and bearings, [61].

According to previous tables, the most restrictive value is 144 m which is chosen as the HAL.

For the vertical dimension a simplified version of the previous approach is taken; in this case the temporal separation is maintained (10 seconds) and only the relation between ascent and descent velocity between two UA flying one above the other is contemplated.



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Typical actuations of the UA used in GAUSS contemplate a typical vertical speed of 2m/s and a maximum of 5m/s; this case contemplates the typical speed for the UA flying higher (UAh) and the maximum vertical speed for the UA flying lower (UAl).

In this case, some interactions may take place (taking into account the 10 seconds separation):

The UA flying higher (UAh) must not overcome the VLL limit. Which means it needs to fly at least 20m below it.

The UA flying lower (UAl) must not hit the ground. Which means it needs to fly at least 50 m above it.

Enough separation must be left between both UA (UAh-UAl). In this case, the relative speed is 7m/s (5+2) so the distance between both has to be at least 70m

The overall distance is 140m which is still lower than the VLL limit (150m) meaning that two UA can fly one above the other, which

Figure 56: Proposed vertical separation.

According to the previous discussion, the VAL proposed is 20m.

The next proposed integrity value is TTA, which chosen as the TAUMOD used for the separation studies (10 seconds), further reasoning may be found in [61].

Finally, the IR proposed is 2E-7 in line with the signal-in-space performance requirements established by ICAO [60].



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Previous values are summarized in Table 44.

Value Justification

HAL [m] 144 Horizontal separation analysis, most restrictive

case

VAL [m] 20 Vertical separation analysis and usability of VLL

space

TTA [s] 10 Separation analysis

IR 2E-07 Signal-in-space performance requirements

established by ICAO [60]

Table 44: Integrity requirements proposal for coordinated U-Space operations.

Note that GAUSS requirements are established as a reference for the previously defined use cases and operations, being positioning requirements typically dependant on the operations associated risk (as determined by application of SORA and the need of different tactical mitigations and operational safety objectives assurance).

In case GNSS conditions change during flight or integrity alert is triggered, the most probable mitigation action would be safe termination of flight.



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9. Conclusions Several conclusions may be extracted from the current study:

Drones have the potential to perform tasks that are currently being performed by other means and to open new services; within this drone market framework there are some specific applications that hold the most potential: they are highlighted in several references, including government organizations (FAA), international research organizations (SJU), other R&D projects (CORUS, IMPETUS, etc.), regulatory bodies (EASA) and standardization bodies (EUROCAE). Some examples include agriculture precision and infrastructure inspection (localized/vertical and linear) among others.

These multiple operations need and will need a framework to ensure homogenization and safe and secure operations. The definition of this concept, also known in Europe as U-Space, is still ongoing and some of their ideas are a matter of debate at international level. Nevertheless, a notable work is being done at European level both from the regulatory side and from the technological/R&D side.

This framework will generate market opportunities for drone operator and also for companies providing the services required to ensure a safe operation (U-Space Service Providers).

Despite manned aviation being a very regulated sector, the drone sector tends to be more flexible, without compromising safety or efficiency

Several sources identify the positioning systems as one of the most relevant ones regarding safety of operations (e.g. SORA, IMPETUS, CORUS and EUROCAE)

Performance requirements, regarding positioning systems, for UA operations are not commonly defined at a numerical level and GAUSS has proposed some figures regarding accuracy and integrity.

Regarding the accuracy and integrity of the positioning system, in the case of GAUSS, the vertical dimension is more critical than the horizontal since the vertical space is highly limited and flights take place close to the ground and therefore obstacles (VLL).

Following GAUSS approach, some requirements of the positioning system depend on the dynamical performance of the RPA (minimum speed, maximum bank angle, minimum turn rate, etc.)

According to the applications and use cases proposed in GAUSS, when assessing the application purposes alone, horizontal accuracy is more important than vertical (showing several “NA” for requirements of the latter); since the raison d'être of the application is usually on the ground or right on the water surface.

According to the applications and use cases proposed in GAUSS, if the drone operation is assumed in isolation, as if the UA were the only vehicle in the airspace, the vertical dimension is the most critical one leading to VAL values more stringent than the values obtained from analysis the requirements for coordination purposes (Section 8).

According to the applications and use cases proposed in GAUSS, accuracy and integrity requirements are highly dependent on the risk associated to operations although they have similar order of magnitudes most of the time.



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According to the applications and use cases proposed in GAUSS, most VAL requirements should be defined as a margin to ensure aircraft fly below VLL. Therefore, the closer the aircraft flies to 150m the lower the VAL should be. This also applies if more than 1 UA is expected to share the same VLL airspace vertically.

Integrity requirements may be used at strategic level for assessing 4D flight plan interactions whereas accuracy requirements may become a critical requirement for tactical deconfliction systems, both on-board and through a U-Space System Provider.



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Acronyms A&ER Automation and Emergency Recovery

ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast

AGL Above Ground Level

AL Alert Limit

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider

APV Approach with Vertical guidance

ATM Air Traffic Management

BRLOS Beyond Radio Line Of Sight

BVLOS Beyond Visual Line Of Sight

CA Collision Avoidance

CAT Commercial Air Transport

ConOps Concept of Operations

CPA Closest Point of Approach

D&A Detect & Avoid

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

EC European Commission

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service

ESA European Space Agency

EU European Union

EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment

EVADS Everis Aerospace and Defense

FAA Federal Aviation Authority

GAUSS Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for UTM Safety and Security

GCS Ground Control Station

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System



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GPS Global Positioning System

GSA European GNSS Agency

HAL Horizontal Alert Limit

HPL Horizontal Protection Level

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IFR Instrumental Flight Rules

IR Integrity Risk

JARUS Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems

KE Kinetic Energy

KPI Key Performance Indicator

LEA Law Enforcement Agency

LPV Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance

MS Member State

MTOM Maximum Take Off Mass

NAA National Aviation Authority

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NDZ No Drone Zone

NM Nautical Mile

NPA Notice or Proposed Amendment or Non-Precision Approach

OPA Operational Performance Assessment

OS Open Service

OSA Operational Safety Assessment

OSED Operational Services and Environment Definitions

PBN Performance-Based Navigation

PE Position Error

PIC Pilot In Command

PL Protection Level



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R&D Research & Development

RNP Required Navigation Performance

RP Remote Pilot

RPAS Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

RTK Real Time Kinematic

RTT Research Transition Team

RWC Remain-Well-Clear

SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research

SJU SESAR Joint Undertaking

SORA Specific Operations Risk Assessment

SW Software

TAUMOD Time threshold to CPA

TTA Time To Alert

UA Unmanned Aircraft

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

US United States

USP U-Space Service Provider

UTM UAS Traffic Management

VAL Vertical Alert Limit

VFR Visual Flight Rules

VLL Very Low Level

VLOS Visual Line Of Sight

VPL Vertical Protection Level



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[29] EUROCAE, “Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) for Detect and Avoid [Traffic] (DAA-Traf) for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Draft 12-October-2018,” 2018.

[30] EUROCAE, “Operational Services and Environment Description for detect and avoid [traffic] in class D-G airspaces under VFR/IFR,” 2018.

[31] EUROCAE, “Operational services and environment definitions (OSED) for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) automation and emergency recovery (A&ER) functions,” 2018.



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[32] EUROCAE. WG-105 SG-13, “Operational Services and Environment Description for Detect & Avoid in Very Low Level Operations,” 2018.

[33] EUROCAE WG-105 SG-33, “White Paper on Geofencing and Definitions (V0)”.

[34] JARUS, “Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA) in Publications,” [Online]. Available: http://jarus-rpas.org/publications. [Accessed October 2016].

[35] International Organizarion for Standarization (ISO), “ISO 31000:2009, Risk management - Principles and guidelines,” 2009.

[36] International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), “ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Information technology - Security techniques - Information security risk management,” 2011.

[37] P. Kopardekar and e. al, “Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of operations,” AIAA Aviation, Washington, D.C..

[38] SJU, “SORA. Annex C V1.3: Strategic Mitigation Collision Risk Assessment,” 2018.

[39] CASA UCL, “LuminoCity3D.org,” [Online]. Available: http://luminocity3d.org/. [Accessed January 2019].

[40] DJI, “Grid and Wind Turbine Inspections Made Easy by Drone Solutions,” [Online]. Available: https://enterprise.dji.com/news/detail/grid-and-wind-turbine-inspections-made-easy-by-drone-solutions. [Accessed December 2018].

[41] ICAO, “Standards and Recomended Practices (SARPS) Annex 10 Volume I: Radio Navigation Aids,” 2016.

[42] ESA, “EGNOS Fact Sheet”.

[43] GSA, “Report on the performance and level of integrity for safety and liability critical multi-applications,” 2015.

[44] N. Blanco and J.-M. Lorenzo, “Summary of EGNOS Performance Characteristics,” 2018.

[45] SESAR Joint Undertaking, “European Drones Outlook Study,” https://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/European_Drones_Outlook_Study_2016.pdf, 2016.

[46] GSA, “MISTRALE,” [Online]. Available: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/monitoring-soil-moisture-and-water-flooded-areas-agriculture-and-environment.

[47] GSA, “European GNSS (EGNSS) brings important benefits for RPAS operations,” 2018.



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[48] S. Høglund, “Autonomous Inspection of Wind Turbines and Buildings using an UAV,” 2014.

[49] Wikipedia, [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power. [Accessed December 2018].

[50] G. Gottsegen, “Drones are now being trained to spot violent people in crowds,” 6 June 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnet.com/news/ai-drones-are-being-trained-to-spot-violence-from-the-sky/. [Accessed August 2018].

[51] European Commission, “CLear Air Situation for uaS,” [Online]. Available: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/210633_en.html.

[52] M. d. l. P. -. B. O. d. Estado, “Boletín Oficial del Estado 316 - Viernes 29 Diciembre 2017,” 2017.

[53] Cedre, “Spill data and chemical risks,” https://wwz.cedre.fr/en/content/download/1634/16274/file/1-cedre-spill-data-ENG.pdf, 2014.

[54] Wikipedia, “Aquaculture,” [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aquaculture. [Accessed December 2018].

[55] Ministerio de agricultura y pesca, alimentación y medio ambiente, [Online]. Available: https://servicio.pesca.mapama.es/acuivisor/. [Accessed June 2018].

[56] REAL, “REAL-RPAS EGNOS Assisted Landings,” [Online]. Available: https://sites.google.com/pildo.com/real.

[57] GSA, “14 projects selected for funding and aimed at developing EGNOS at regional airports,” [Online]. Available: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/newsroom/news/14-projects-selected-funding-and-aimed-developing-egnos-regional-airports.

[58] ICAO, “Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Symposium,” Montréal (Canada), 2015.

[59] Skybrary, “Separation Standards,” [Online]. Available: https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Separation_Standards. [Accessed January 2019].

[60] ICAO, “Annex 10. Vol I,” 2006.

[61] GAUSS, “D2.3 Compilation of UTM performance requirements,” 2019.

[62] N. Peinecke, L. Limmer and A. Volkert, “Application of "Well Clear" to Small Drones,” 2018.

[63] SCR, “Descripción técnica del sistema Tucan”.



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[64] SKYbrary, “Rules of Thumb,” [Online]. Available: https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Rules_of_Thumb. [Accessed November 2018].

[65] R. Jannoura and e. al, “Monitoring of crop biomass using true colour aerial photographs taken from a remote controlled hexacopter,” 2015.

[66] M. e. al, “Development of an Adaptive Approach for Precision Agriculture Monitoring with Drone and Satellite Data,” 2017.

[67] A. Bell, “Water bombing of fires: no magic solution,” 1987.

[68] NASA Earth Observatory, “Forest Canopy Heights Across the United States,” [Online]. Available: https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/44717/forest-canopy-heights-across-the-united-states.

[69] M. e. al, “Remote sensing methods for power line corridor surveys,” 2016.

[70] Z. e. al, “Automatic power line inspection using UAV images,” 2017.

[71] El País, “Lanchas de hachís a 120 por hora,” [Online]. Available: https://elpais.com/diario/2007/08/18/espana/1187388001_850215.html. [Accessed November 2018].

[72] A. T. Young, “Distance to the Horizon,” [Online]. Available: https://aty.sdsu.edu/explain/atmos_refr/horizon.html. [Accessed November 2018].

[73] “Cramex Helipuertos,” [Online]. Available: http://cramexhelipuertos.com/clasificacion.html . [Accessed November 2018].

[74] Euro Weather, “Douglas Scale,” [Online]. Available: http://www.eurometeo.com/english/read/doc_douglas. [Accessed November 2018].

[75] Grupo culmarex, “Grupo culmarex,” [Online]. Available: http://www.culmarex.com/granjas/culm%C3%A1rex. [Accessed November 2018].

[76] J.Simpson LTD, “Boats,” [Online]. Available: http://simpsonmarinedesign.com/boats/42ft-fishing-vessel-combination/. [Accessed November 2018].



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10. Annex I: RPAS information

TUCAN

TUCAN is a mini RPAS that resulted from the innovation carried out by SCR27. Its robust and modular frame is manufactured in composite materials (fiberglass, carbon and Kevlar) following strict design and quality requirements. TUCAN stands out for its versatility and can be launched by hand or by means of a little elastomers ramp.

The system is managed by rugged portable GCS. Landing is performed over skid integrated into its cargo hold. System allows to install different gyro stabilized payloads according to each mission’s needs. TUCAN includes a parachute for emergency landing.

Figure 57: TUCAN RPA.

Technical data TUCAN

MTOW 5 kg

Wingspan 2740 mm

Length 1440 mm

Engine Enclosed three-phase electric motor

Payload 0.75 kg

Cruise Speed 65 km/h

Maximum Speed 100 km/h

27 Sistemas de Control Remoto. It is a company in the group of everis aerospace and defense.



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Range 25 km

Endurance 90 min

Altitude 1500 m

Table 45: TUCAN's technical data. *Depending on configuration

ATLANTIC

10.2.1 Overall description

ATLANTIC is an UA manufactured in composite material and designed for a rapid response operation. Due to its simplicity and reliability, it is operated only by two people.

Unit can take-off on airfield or by launcher. Flight plan (mission) is carried out automatically and autonomously. Atlantic assemblies parachute for emergency landing.

The full system includes platform, ground station and ruggedized laptop with command and control software. The system can integrate a wide range of payloads (EO & IR sensors, radio electric, radar, etc.) making Atlantic a very versatile UA.

Figure 58: ATLANTIC RPA.

Technical data ATLANTIC

MTOW 50 kg

Wingspan 3800 mm

Length 2800 mm

Engine 2 stroke, 2 cylinder petrol engine with electronic management system: 12 l fuel tank with 9 HP

Payload 5 kg


Maximum Speed 170 km/h



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Range 100 km

Endurance 5 h

Altitude 3500 m

Table 46 ATLANTIC’s technical data. *Depending on configuration

SCRAB II

10.3.1 Overall Description

SCR designed and built this turbojet target drone-II, with the hallmark of top performance, competitive price and simple operation and maintenance. It features a double twin turbojet propulsion operated autonomously by on-board electronics.

The SCRAB-II is so easy to operate that it is ideal for using in all types of locations, including on board ships for open sea exercises, thanks to the IP-67 protection of its internal components. Its communications are reliable, with over 100 km data-link coverage.

The powerful twin turbojet propulsion system gives the platform great high speed flight capacity. Since it uses standard aviation fuel (Jet A-1, JP5, JP8) end customers will find it easy to maintain.

SCRAB-II is used for missions that require different types of missiles, including STANDARD missiles, HAWK missiles, ROLAND missiles and IRIS-T missiles.

Figure 59 SCRAB II

Technical data SCRAB II

MTOW 90 kg

Wingspan 2520 mm



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Length 2940 mm

Speed 50-115 m/s

Engine Twin Engine

Range 100 km

Endurance 60 min

Altitude 6000 m

Table 47 SCRAB II technical data

X-Prop

10.4.1 Overall Description

X-PROP is a multi-rotor UAV designed and manufactured with high spec material and following strict quality control requirements. The result is a reliable, robust and high performance UAV. It can be operated in adverse environmental conditions. Its electronic management system increases endurance and easy maintenance. Flight operation is carried out by Tablet PC either in manual or automatic mode. The system can integrate a wide range of payloads becoming a very versatile UAV for professional purposes.

Figure 60 X-PROP RPA

Technical data X-PROP

Diameter 1500 mm

Height 500 mm

MTOW 10 kg



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Engine Four three-phase electric motors

Payload 2 kg


Maximum Speed

20 km/h

Range 10 km

Endurance 40 min

Altitude 900 m

Options Parachute for emergency landing

Table 48 X-Prop's technical data. * Depending on system configuration



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11. Annex II: Applications details


11.1.1 Assumptions

Focused on two particular agriculture applications:

Accuracy vineyard crops

Vineyard are usually separated 1-1,5m and they are treated with special tractor running in between, so it is important to ensure there is no confusion between “lines”.

The vineyards are typically 2m high.

Accuracy corn crops

Similar to vineyards but the “lines” are separated 0.8 m approximately.

Assuming a characteristic length of the fields to monitor of 1km and a cruising speed of 65km/h [63], meaning that it takes around 55 seconds for the RPAS to fly it.

Descent speed in case of engine loss:

Assume rule of thumb that “For a 3 degree glideslope, required rate of descent in feet per minute is approximately equal to ground speed in knots multiplied by 5.” [64]

Take as reference the stall speed of 27 knots [63]

So the descent speed is approx.: 0,7 m/s.

So it would take 42 seconds to go from 30m (the minimum typical flying altitude, see Section 11.1.2) to the ground.

11.1.2 Metrics

Typical flight altitude: 30-100m [65] [66]

Typical image overlap: 50-70 %. For the sake of simplicity, image overlap has been omitted from the studies of this document.

Typically 50 photos are made to cover 0.1 Ha


11.2.1 Assumptions

An effective area footprint of water bombing is an oval of longest side 50 m [67].

Flight altitude of 120 m to maximize area.

Rule of thumb to calculate Vstall of this kind of RPA (Atlantic), taking into account cruising speed and Vstall of agriculture case: Vstall = 85 km/h approx.

Descent speed in case of engine loss:



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Assume rule of thumb that “For a 3 degree glideslope, required rate of descent in feet per minute is approximately equal to ground speed in knots multiplied by 5.” [64]

Take as reference the stall speed of 45 knots

So the descent speed is approx.: 1,1 m/s.

So it would take 109 seconds to go from 120m (the assumed flight altitude) to the ground.

Average height of forest trees: 40 m [68]

Height of potential buildings within the forest is well beyond the flying altitude.


11.3.1 Assumptions

EVADS’ experience with wind turbine vertical inspection is taken as reference to build metrics.

Buffer around the wind turbine is neglected since the mission is to fly very close to it.

Operating speed of 1m/s (even slower than the cruise speed to ensure good quality pictures and higher control over the operation).

11.3.2 Metrics

From internal experience drone should fly at maximum 10m from the blade.

Lowest tip of the blade is typically 30m from the ground.

Using the configuration used in previous internal experience, each picture will include 3m horizontally and 2m vertically of blade surface.

Displacement time: Taking into account the operating speed and the distance from the blade (minor than the distance to the ground) it would 10 seconds for a RPA flying at the maximum distance from the blade to hit it.

Power line transmission inspection

11.4.1 Assumptions

Distance between towers: 300-500m [69]

Height of each power line is 25m [70]

Distance between cables: 5-9 m

Descent velocity (glide) of 0,7 m/s 28.

Nominal tower:

28 Same as in case of precision agriculture



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Figure 61: most typical power transmission towers in Spain. The green box highlights the nominal tower that is taken as a reference in this case.

Figure 62: Scheme of camera’s visibility range

11.4.2 Metrics

Characteristic Value

Height [m] 25

Width [m] 18

Distance between cables [m] 9

Altitude of the ground cables [m] 20

Distance between ground cable and power cables [m]

5

Distance between two ground cables [m] 9

Table 49: Typical sizes of a power transmission tower.



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FOV [º] 90 69 45 32

Distance [m] 9 13 22 32

Table 50 Distance between wires depending on the Field Of View (FOV) of the camera.

The higher the AGL of the UA the higher efficiency (for example [70] flies at 400m).

Threshold for distance between ground objects and power line was set to 6.5m [70].

Assuming v descent of 0,7 m 29 and flying at 10 m from the tallest part of the tower, it would take 7 seconds to hit it.

Taking into account schematic geometry of Figure 62 the drone should fly at least 10m above the tower in order to fit all five cables into the picture and not overlap the two ground cables with the two external power cables.

Characteristic Minimum height over the cable

[m] Minimum HFOV [º]

Value 10 84

Table 51 minimum height (over the wire) to ensure proper camera frame visibility.

Event surveillance

11.5.1 Assumptions

The position of nearby buildings in global coordinates is known so the flight plan can be designed accordingly.

No temporary obstacles such as cranes exist within the area of operation.

The interest of this application relies on overall crowd behaviour without requiring individual information, so faces and other private characteristics should not be recorded.

Drone to be flown in semirural areas, so low density of buildings is expected.

11.5.2 Metrics

Calculations

Taking into consideration that a minimum of 262 pixels is needed to recognize a person’s face and that a face is assumed to have a rather square shape, it can be said that it is enough to have around 16 pixels on a side of a 20cm (simplification of a human face).

Using information form EVADS’ internal project it is obtained that an approximate distance to be able to identify a person’s face is 35m. This distance would be the minimum (vertical in this case) since people will be on the ground.

This number will determine the minimum altitude the drone can fly and therefore the minimum vertical precision is needed for navigation purposes.

29 Same as in case of precision agriculture



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A drone flying at 35m would take around 2.5 seconds to hit the ground in free fall (assuming gravity as the only acting force)

A drone flying at 1m/s would take 2500 seconds to run 2500m.

Typical values

It has been taken into account the typical distance that separates two people during an event can vary from less than half a meter in crowded events to several meters.

Vertical precision is not relevant in this case for application purposes since everything is related to the ground and there are no specific requirements on image field of view.

It is important to highlight values for navigation purposes are highly dependent on specific scenario which are typically very dynamic due to temporal infrastructure in events (cameras, cranes, etc.)

Border surveillance

11.6.1 Assumptions

Two specific use cases are contemplated:

Detection of illegal immigration boats. Speed of 60 knots [71]

Detection of smuggling vessels. Speed of 4 knots30

The common response is to send a manned vessel (LEA or medical assistance) to intercept.

11.6.2 Metrics

The horizon line of a typical ship of 7m height is approximately 10 km (𝑑ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡 = 3.57 √ℎ) [72]

For the operator at the GCS to properly detect an incidence the image should provide geoposition with a precision so that the accuracy for the Latitude Longitude given to the rescue team would be within a radius of 10 km, to ensure the target is within the visual range of the manned vessel that is sent.

Delivery

11.7.1 Assumptions

Vessel to deliver has a heliport or a similar area where a UA can land safely.

Since there is no specific requirements for remotely piloted helicopters, requirements for conventional requirements has been taken: according to ICAO heliports in vessels (for H1 helicopters, the smallest ones) shall have between 12 and 16 m diameter [73].

30 8-12 km/h. A 15 cv semi-rigid zodiac with 2 people on-board can reach relatively easy 15 kts (30 km/h) Immigration vessels are not semi-rigid (more weight) and carry out up to 40 people therefore motor is only going to drag water, so values are overestimated (could be even less)



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Since the goal of the application is to move the entire RPA from one place to another, requirements for application and integrity are assumed equivalent.

The delivery service will only take place in good weather conditions.

The delivery contemplates de drone landing to release the package, so no dropping is contemplated.

Vessel vertical oscillation of 0,1m; wave average height for calm sea [74].

Vertical descent speed for the RPA (helicopter) of 0,5m/s

Typical height of the heliport above the sea level of 7 m.

11.7.2 Metrics

In order to be able to trigger an alarm in time when descending in case the vessel oscillates upwards (0,1m) the response time should be less than 0,2 seconds, but this figure might be too low.

Another metric could be the height of the heliport above the sea level; in this case the response time needs to be 14 seconds.


11.8.1 Assumptions

Fish farms characteristics of facilities are based on a manufacturer example: CULMAREX [75]:

Cylindrical cages of a circumference within a radius from 32 to 160 m. Number of circular sector depending on this radius, varying from 2 to 3.5 m between brackets

Typical mast height of a medium fishing vessel: 6 m [76]

11.8.2 Metrics

Accuracy that the operator must provide in order to localize which cage has an incidence is half the radius of the cage.

Accuracy in a sector level (pipe or net damage) will be from 1 to 1.75 m since sectors will vary from 2 to 3.5 m.

If bracket precision is required, width will be the restrictive parameter, varying from 0.25 m to 0.4, depending on the model.

Spill detection

11.9.1 Assumptions

Spill detection is only contemplated on the sea surface.

Accuracy needed is assumed to be the same than for border surveillance since it is also required to detect something on the sea surface



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Beach monitoring

11.10.1 Assumptions

Target Area: beach of about 8 km of longitude, with buoys equispaced 50 m each other and 200 m away from the beach. That lateral distance is taken as needed accuracy to correctly position a person drowning.

Figure 63 schematic view of the beach with its main aspects.

11.10.2 Metrics

In order to calculate the TTA it is assumed that a critical time would be the time it would take the RPA to free fall from the flight altitude, so the operator is aware of the abrupt change in altitude. In this case the altitude is 100m so it takes approximately 4,5 seconds for the aircraft to hit the water.

Documents

D2.2 Design of UTM Scenarios and use cases reportprojectgauss.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/GAUSS-D2_2.pdf · H2020-GALILEO-GSA-2017 Innovation Action Galileo-EGNOS as an Asset for