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8/10/2019 Cuba - United States Secret Diplomacy Documents (1961-1977)
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Cuba - United States Secret Diplomacy
(1961-1977)
Historical Documents
BACM Research
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The Califano Papers, 1,300 pages of Kennedy Administration papersdealing with Cuba policy
http://www.paperlessarchives.com/jfk_cuba.html
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Bay of Pigs: CIA - NSC - State Department Files2,200 pages of CIA, National Security Council, and Department of State
files covering the Bay of Pigs. In 1961 a covert operation codenamed
"Operation Zapata" called for 1,500 Cuban exiles to land on the
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Cochinos).
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Cuba - United States
Secret Diplomacy Documents
(1961-1977)
A selection of documents dating from 1961 to 1977 chronicling secretdiplomacy between the United States and Cuba. Includes documentsfrom the Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, and Carter Administrations,Department of State, CIA, Justice Department, and Kennedy secretWhite House audio recordings.
Highlights from the Material include:
Kennedy Approves Secret Meeting between Envoy and Castro
Seventeen days before his assassination a recording made in the WhiteHouses Oval Officecaptures a conversation between President Kennedyand his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussing the Castroregimesoverture to have a meeting in Havana with a KennedyAdministration envoy. Kennedy's conclusion was that he approved, if it
could be assured that it could be denied that that the meeting ever tookplace. Memorandums document the process in arranging for a meetingbetween William Attwood, a deputy to UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson.This initiative waned after Kennedy's assassination.
Kennedy Speech Writer and Advisor Meets with Ernesto "Che" Guevara
A memo dated August 22, 1961, written by JFK speech writer and advisor
Richard N. Goodwin conveys to the President details about his chancemeeting with Guevara in Uruguay.
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Castro Offers to Aid LBJ's Campaign
The notation of a verbal message from Castro to LBJ given through ABCnews reporter Lisa Howard. The document in part records Castro'smessage as, "Please tell President Johnson that I earnestly desire hiselection to the Presidency in November though that appears assured. Butif there is anything I can do to add to his majority (aside from retiringfrom politics), I shall be happy to cooperate." Further the messagecontains Castros assessment of the juncture of U.S. domestic politicsand U.S./Cuba relations.
Frank Mankiewicz Secret Intermediary to Cuba
Frank Mankiewiczscareer included serving as Robert F. Kennedy's presssecretary, George McGovern's presidential campaign strategist, and thepresident of National Public Radio (NPR).
In April of 1974 Mankiewicz called Secretary of State Henry Kissinger toinform him of an upcoming trip to Havana to interview Cuban leaderFidel Castro. Kissinger used this as an opportunity to have delivered toCastro a handwritten letter. On his return Mankiewicz delivered a
handwritten letter and a box of Cuban Cohiba cigars to Kissinger fromCastro. Mankiewicz's efforts lead to Kissinger's deputies and FidelCastro's representatives having a meeting at La Guardia Airport onJanuary 11, 1975.
Jimmy Carter Presidential Directive
A Presidential Directive signed by President Jimmy Carter dated March15, 1977, stating, "I have concluded that we should attempt to achieve
normalization of our relations with Cuba.
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Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11/06/1940
Castro first reached out to an American President when he was 14-years-old. In the letter Castro congratulates President Roosevelt on his recentre-election, and asks FDR to send him a $10 bill. Theres an interestingdiscrepancy in the letter: in 1940, Fidel was 14 years old, however hestates in the letter that he is 12-years-old.
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CONTENTS
1940-11-06 (White House - FDR) Letter from Fidel Castro to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, November 16, 1940
1961-08-22 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, Conversation
with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba, August 22, 1961
1963-03-04 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Mr.
Donovan's Trip to Cuba, March 4, 1963
1963-04-11 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba -
Policy, April 11, 1963.
1963-05-01 (CIA) Briefing paper, Secret, Interview of U.S. Newswoman with FidelCastro Indicating Possible Interest in Rapprochement with the United States, May
1,1963
1963-11-12 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Secret, November
12, 1963 Bundy reports to William Attwood on Kennedy's opinion of the viability of a
secret meeting with Havana
1963-11-19 (White House - Kennedy) White House memorandum, Top Secret,
Approach to Castro, November 19, 1963.
1963-11-22 (Department of State) U.S. UN Mission memorandum, Secret, Chronology
of events leading up Castro invitation to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba,
November 8, 22, 1963
1963-11-25 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Cuba -
Item of Presidential Interest, November 25, 1963.
1963-12-12 (Justice Department) Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney
General, RFK Memo -Travel to Cuba, December 12, 1963
1963-12-13 (Department of State) State Department, Travel Regulations, December13, 1963
1964-02-12 (White House - Johnson) Message from Fidel Castro to Lyndon Johnson,
Verbal Message given to Miss Lisa Howard of ABC News on February 12,1964, in
Havana, Cuba.
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1964-06-16 (Department of State) United Nations memo, Top Secret, from Adlai
Stevenson to President Johnson, June 16, 1964. Stevenson sends the verbal message
given to Lisa Howard from Castro to LBJ
1964-07-07 (White House - Johnson) White House memorandum, Top Secret, Adlai
Stevenson and Lisa Howard, July 7, 1964
1974-04-24 (Department of State) Department of State, Telcon, [Kissinger
conversation with Frank Mankiewicz about seeing Castro], April 24, 1974
1974-08-30 (White House - Ford) National Security Council, memorandum for
Secretary Kissinger, Confidential, Cuba Policy, August 30, 1974
1975-01-11 (White House - Ford) Kissinger Aide-Memoire to Cuba, January 11, 1975
1975-01-11 (Department of State) Department of State, Meeting Memorandum,
Meeting in New York with Cuban Representatives, Secret-Sensitive, January 11, 1975
1975-01-16 (Department of State) Department of State, Memorandum, Message to
Castro, January 16,1 975
1975-01-20 (Department of State) Department of State, Action Memorandum, The
Mankiewicz Trip, Secret-Nod is-Eyes Only, January 20,1975
1975-03-27 (Department of State) Department of State, Secret, Normalizing relations
with Cuba, March 27, 1975.
1975-07-09 (White House - Ford) Memorandum of Conversation, Pierre Hotel U.S.-Cuba Meeting, July 9, 1975
1977-03-15 (White House - Carter) Presidential Directive - NSC-6, Subject Cuba, March
15, 1977, Secret
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C O L E G I O D E
D O L O R E S
P R T D O 1
S N T I G O D E
C U B
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SECRET
THE
WHITE HOUSE
W S H I N G T O N
August 22, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
PRESIDENT
Subject: Conversation with Commandante
Ernesto
Guevara of Cuba
The conversation
took place the evening of
August 17 at 2
A. M.
Several
members
of the Brazil ian and Argentine
delegations
had
made efforts
-
throughout the Punta del Este C o n f e r e n c ~ ; t o ar range a meeting between
me and Che.
This was obviously done
with Che
s
approval, i
not his
urging, I had
avoided
such a meeting during the
Conference, On
Thurs-
day we
ar r ived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday par ty for
the. local Brazi l ian
delegate
to the Free Trade area, ;
After I
arrived,
and had been there for
about
an hour,
one
of the Argentines
present
(who
had
been on the Argentine delegation)
informed m e
they were in-
viting Che to the party, .
He
arr ived about 2 A,
M.
and
told
Edmundo
Barbosa DaSHva of Brazi l
and Horatio :Larre t ta
of
Argentine that
he
had
something to say to
me,
The four of us entered a room, and the follow-
ing is a
summary
of what
took place, (The
Argentine and Brazil ian
al-
ternated as interpreters)
Che was wearing green fatigues,
and
his
usual
overgrown and scraggly
beard, Behind the beard his features are quite
soft,
almost feminine,
and his
manner is
intense,
He has
a
good sense of humor, and
there
was considerable joking back and
for th
during the meeting. He seemed
very
i l l a t ease
~ e r i
we
began
to talk, but soon became re laxed
and
spoke
freely, Although he lef t no doubt
of his personal and
intense
de-
votion to
communism,
his
conversation
was f ree
of propaganda and
bombast, . He spoke calmly,
in
a
st raightforward manner ,
and with
the
appearance
of detachment
and
objectivity,
He le f t no doubt, a t
any
time,
that he felt completely free to speak for his
gover=ien t
and
ra re ly dis-
tinguishe.d
between his personal observations
and the official
posi t ion
of
the Cuban
government,, I
had the
definite
impress ion
that he
had
thought
out his r emarks very
carefully they
were extremely well organized.
DeCLASSIFIEO
E 0 1 :??ISt ~ e
3,4
l-h i.
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SECRET
2
I
told him
at
the
outset
that
I
had
no
authority
to
negotiate my
countryts
problems, but would repor t what he said
to
inter\)sted
offi.cials
of
our government, He
said good and
began,
Guevara
began by
saying that
I
must
unders tand
the
Cuban revolu
tion,,
They intend
to
build
a socia l is t s tate ,
and
the revolution
which
they
have
begun is i r revers ib le , They a re also now out of the
U.:S.
sphere
of infl.uence,
and
that too is i r revers ib le
They
w ll establish
a
s ingle-party
sys tem
with Fidel as Secretary-General of
the party,
Their t ies with
the
East stpm
f rom
natural sympathies , and
common
beliefs in
the proper s tructure of the social
orde r
They
feel that
they
have
the
support
of the
masses
for
their
revolution,
and
that that
suppor.t will grow as
t ime
passes
He
said that
the United States
must
not act on the false assumptions
that (a) we
can rescue Cuba f rom the
claws
of conununism
(he
meant
by
other
than
direct mili tary action}; b} that
Fidel
is
a
moderate
surrounded
by a bunch of fanatic and aggressive men, and might be
moved to
the
Western side; (c) that
the
Cuban
revolut ion
can be over
thrown f rom
within
- - there is he said, diminishing support
for
such
an effort and
i t
will never be s trong enough,
He spoke of
the
grea t
st rength
of
the
Cuban
revolution,
and
the impact
i t
has
had
on l ibera l
thought
throughout Latin Ainerica , For
example,
he
said,
all
the leftwing forces
in
Uruguay were joining
forces under
the banner of
Cuba,.
He said civil war would break
out
in
many coun
trie's. i Cuba
were
in
danger - -
and
such
war might break
out
in
any
event,,
He
spoke
with
great
intensi ty
of the
i lnpact
of
Cuba
on the
con
t inent
and
the
growing
s trength of i ts example,
e
said that in
building a
communis t s tate
they
had
not r e p e t e d ~
of the aggressive moves of the East,) They did not intend to construct
an i ron cur ta in
around Cuba
but
to
welcome technicians
and
visitors.
f rom
all
countries
to
come
and
work,j
He
touched
on the matter of the plane thefts He said
he
didntt know i
I knew
but they
had not been
responsible for
any hijackings, , The
f i rst
plane
was
taken
by a
young fellow
who was a
good
boy but a
l i t t le
wild
and
who is now
in
ja i l They
suspected
that
the l a s t
plane
was
taken
by
a provocateur (a CIA agent),J He is afraid that i
t hese
thefts keep up
i t
wi l l be very
dangerous,
SEGRET
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SECRET
- 3 -
He began
t discuss
the
difficulties of the Alliance for Progress . He
asked
me i f
I
had
heard his speech at the
closing
of
the conference.
I said I
had Hstened to i t closely.
He
said
that
t
explained
his view-
point on the Alliance for Progress . (In
this
speech he said the idea
of
the
Alianza
was fine, but i t would fail . He spoke
also
of the play
of historical
forces
working on behalf
of
comrrmnis:rn, etc. - - that
there
would
be either
left ists
revolutions
or r ight ist
coups leading to
le f t is t
takeovers, and there
was
also a s t rong chance that the corrunies
would get in through popular
election.
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SECRET
- 4 -
put forth such a formula because
we had public opinion to
worry
about
whereas
he
could accept anything without worrying about
public
opinion.
I said
nothing, and
he waited
and then said that, in
any event, there
were
Some things he
had
in mind.I
1. That
they could not give
back
the
expropriated
properties the
fac
to r ies
and banks but
they could
pay
for them
in trade.
z.
They could agree not to make any
polit ical all iance
with the East -
although this would
not affect
their natural sym pathies .
3. They would have free elections but only after a period of institu
t ionalizing the revolution had been completed. In
response
to
m y
question
he said
that this included the establishment of a one-party
system.:
4 .
f course, they would
not
attack Guantanamo., (At this point
he
laughed as i
a t
the absurdly self-evident nature of such a s tatement _
5.1 He indicated, very obliquely,
and with evident r ~ u c t n c e
because
of
the
company in which we were talking, that they could also discuss
the
activi
t ies of
the
Cuban revolution in
other
countries.:
He
then went
on
to
say
that he wanted to thank
us
very
much for the
in
vasion tha t
i t
had been a
great
political victory for them
enabled
them to consol.idate and transformed
them
f rom
an aggrieved
little
country to an equal.
Guevara
said he knew
i t
was difficult
to
air;i;:S these
things
but
we could
open
up some
of
these
i ssues by beginning
to discuss subordinate i ssues
He suggested discussion of the airplane
issue.
(presumably,
we would
use
the airplane
i ssue as
a
cover
for
more ser ious conversation}
He said they could discuss no
formula
th;: .t
would
mean giving up
the
type
of
society
to
which they
were
dedicated.
At close
he
said that
he
would tel l
no
one of the
substance
of this
conversa
tion except
Fidel .
I said I would not publicize i t either.1
SECRET
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SECRET
5
After the conversation was
terminated
I
left
to
record
notes
on
what
had been said. He stayed at the
party,
and talked with the Brazilian
and
Argentine.,
The Argentine fellow l larret ta called
m e
the
next morning
to say
that Guevara had thought
the
conversation
quite
profitable, and had told
im
that i t was much easier to
talk
to someone of the
newer
generation,1
The above is substantially a complete account of the entire c o n v ~ e r s a t i o n
( \ )1c)L-
Dick
Goodwin
SECRET
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l OF SECRET
EYES
ON:L Y
March 4,
1963
.ME1vi0RANDUM
FOR
THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Mr.
Donovan s Trip
to Cuba
At
Mr.
Bundy s
request
I
passed
to
Bob
Hurwitch the
following
Presidential
reactions to the
attached memorandum:
._.-
'- ._
t..- _.. - :.
1. The President does
not
agree that we
should
make the
breaking
of
Sino/Soviet t ies a non-negotiable
point.
We don t want
to present
Gasho
with a condition that he obviously cannot fuUUl.
We
should start thinking along more flexible
lines.
2.
Donovan
should reeiat
taking his
week-long walk along
the beach
with
Castro
until
we
have had a chance to give Donovan
a very good briefing. We may want to give Donovan
some flies
to
dangle
in
front of
Castro.
3. The above must
be
kept close to
the
vest. The
President ,
himself,
ia very
interested
n this one.
Gordon Chase
TOP S::GRE f ETES ONLY
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TOP SECRET - EYES QNLY
April
11, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr Bundy
SUBJECT:
Cuba
Policy
l We are all concerned about solving our
Cuba
problem, but so far,
we
have been looking
seriously
at only
one side
of the coin ways
to hurt Castro by varying
degrees
of overt and
covert
nastiness. We
have not yet
lo6ked seriously
at the
other side
of the coin quietly
enticing
Castro
over to US.
z
I f the
sweet
approach
turned out to
be feasible
and,
in
turn,
successful, the benefits
would
be substantial.
n
the short
run, we
would probably
be able to
neutralize
at lea.st 2 of
our
main worries
about
Castro
the reintroduction of offensive missiles and
Cuban
subversion.
n
the long
run, we
would
be
able
to
work on eliminating
Castro
at our
leisure
and from a
good
vantage
point.
3.
While
the practical obstacles
to
this sort of approach
may
be
immense,
they
may not be
insuperable. Two
such obstacles
are
the domestic
p8Utical
situation and Castro s reluctance to be entieed.
(a)
Domestic Problem
I f the American people
can
be shown
that
the
offensive missi le threat and the subversive threat
are
under
control, that the Russian presence in
Cuba
i s
reduced and
that Castro
is much more a nationalist than
a
Communist, the selling
Vc>b
necessary
for
a
careful,
quiet policy
turn-around
may not be impossible.
b) Castro s
Reluctance to be Enticed This may beuan
easier
nut to crack now than
lt once
would have been,
Castio
may
have received, from our
point
of
view,
some very
valuable
education
over the past couple
years.
Hopefully,
he
has
learned that
the
Russians
are not
as
tough and
reliable as
he
thought they
were and that
we
are a
lot tougher
and nastier
than he thought we were; also
hopefully,
he
is
scared.
DECLASSiFl ::D
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. .. .g:E-C-R-E-T' _ I
NO
FO .REIGN
DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM/NO
DISSEM A B ~ D B A C K G R O U N D USE ONLY
CENTR L INTELLIGENCE GENCY
WASHINGTON 2S
D C.
1 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intel l igence
SUBJECT Interview of U.S. Newswoman with
Fidel
Castro Indicating Possible Interes t in
Rapprochement
with the United
Sta tes
1. On 30 April 1963
Liza
Howard U.S. newswoman
associated with
the American
Broadcasting.
Company
returned to
Miami
from
Cuba
where
she
.had
interviewed
a
number
of high-ranking Cuban
of f ic ia l s including
Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto Che Guevara,
Vilma
Espin
de
Castro,
Raul Roa, and Rene Vallejo. Her
conversat ions with
Fidel
Castro tota led
about
ten hours
and included one session
on 22
April which las ted from
12:45 a.m. to 5:30 a.m.
Following
is an account of
those conversations and Liza Howard's observations
concerning the present Cuban
s i tua t ion .
2. I t appears that
Fidel
Castro
i s
looking for
a
way to reach a rapprochement with the United Sta tes
Government,
probably because
he
is aware
tha t
Cuba
is
in
a s t a t e of economic chaos.
The October
blockade
hurt the
Cuban economy. Liza Howard believes
tha t
Castro
ta lked
about
th is
matter
with her
because
she
is known as a
progressive
and she
ta lked
with
him
in frank, blunt ,
honest terms; Castro has l i t t l e opportunity to hear
th is type of conversat ion. Castro indicated tha t
i f
a
rapprochement
was
wanted President John F.
Kennedy
would
have
to
make the f i r s t move. In response to
the
s t a t e -
ment tha t Castro would probably have to make the f i r s t
move,
Castro asked what
the U.S. wanted
from
him.
When
a
re turn to
the original aims of the revolut ion was
suggested, Fidel
said
that perhaps
he,
President
Kennedy,
S-::.E-C-R.;.E-T
NO
FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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, . - i E C-R-E-'J . -- .
O
FOREIGN
DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE
ONLY
discuss rapprochement and
she
herself is
ready
to discuss
i t
with
him
i
asked
to
do
so
by
the
U.S.
Government.
- ? z - h : : d ~
Deputy Director Plans)
CSDB-3/654,439
Orig: The
Director
of Central
Intel l igence
cc:
Special
Assistant
to the President
for National Security
Affairs
The Director of Intell igence
and Research
Department of
State
The Director,
Defense
Intelligenci;;, gency
The Attorney General
The
Department
of Just ice
The
Deputy Director
of
Central
Intel l igence
Deputy Director for Intel l igence
Assistant
Director
for
National Estimates
Assistant Director for u r ~ e n t Inte l l igence
- 4 -
lil
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O FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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- Sli:C:>l ET
SEMB1TI V
Novcnilicr lZ, 1903
I
talkod
l:hi.s :;lftornoon with William .Attwood a:c.d "tllll&
him
that
at
th-a P raGident s instruction. I was conveying thi.G
mes.sage
o::: .lly
and
nc:
by
C i : . ~ l c .
I
told him
that
the
Presldant
hop ?d
110 would
go1 n touch with
Vallejo
to
i:eport that
i t
did net
aacm
p;;acticr.blo
to us at
this
:;it.'.lge to
sand
an Amcdcan ofii.cicl. to Caba
=d
1/bs.t
we
;-;o"ld
pl"o er
to be:;:in with a vi.cit
by
V'clfojo
to tho
O
.S. where.
..'1.tt\yood would
be
glad
to lleo him
and to liatan
to
any me&SatJS
he miaht bring ::om CV .&. , . ; ; : r ~ - l IC'> l :t
i:...o;::;. :::.:::
C - : . i ? ; ~ n : : : r . . 1 \ t i ~ o o ~ :ln:::=.catcd
W
me. thot. Jv;
-ex-pectecl
U ~ c . .
- I r . : . i : ;
r ; . : . ~ d .
to
t : ; : l ~ ~ - i c : i a
..
a l l c j t ~
and
h ~ a
probably
to
get
Ol'l-tlte
l i ~ ~
l ~ ~
?Jc1 to Uo.ndl:a t ;.o c c t 1 \ ~ o r 3 c . t c n alons i lle lines staied ~ a t t e .
P tt ..
~ o o d
t'":ill
l"c-po:rt
t . 1 . - ~ :-cct"lt.::J
o:
tbio
c o m m t t n L e ~ ' l i o n .
and n - t 1 J ~
event i: 'lr:t
an ~ r Z ~ : l e c m o n t mado fc:r Vallejo "to came
to
Mew
Yark
Att-;;-ccd will como to Wachlnzton to concert a rnsliibl l-k.r bls iise
k i this cc11.11er.saoon.
~ c G .
B,
SEGRE'X' - SENSl'fIZE
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SF
:3ECR
. :I -
SENSI:PIVE -
EYE
Q N I y
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
WASH INGTON
November 19, 1963
MR. BUNDY
SUBJECT: Approach to Castro
Bill
Attwood called to report the
following:
. . . .
.
1.
Lisa
Howard
called
Vallejo and
then
put
Bil l
Attwood on
the
line. Vallejo repeated his
invitation
for Bil l to come
to
Cuba,
adding that the vis i t would be very
secure. Bill replied
that
this
was impossible for the present , that
preliminary
talks were es-
sential ,
and
that Vallejo
might
consider
coming
to New
York.
2. Vallejo said he
could not
make
it
to
New
York
at
this
t ime.
However,
a message would be sent to
Lechuga instructing
him to
discuss
an
agenda with
Bill. Bill
agreed
that this
might be a
good
way
for
the
Cubans to
convey what was on their
mind.
He added that
we are
prepared to
listen.
.
3.
The
ball
is
now in
astro
1
s
court . As
ljlOOn
as
Lechuga
calls
Bill
to
set up
an
appointment for the
discuss ion
of
an
agenda,
Bill
will get
in touch
with us.
Gordon Chase
fOP
SECRET
-
SENOil l PTE
EYES
ONLY
( - ~ ,
.
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... . . ........ . . - - - : '
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No
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4
oopies,
Series- B
UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE
UNITED
NATIONS
MEMORANDUM
SBSFH3 3.
TO:
Gordon Chase
FROM:
William Attwood
November 8, 1963
DEC .ASSmED
E.O. 12356,
Sec.
3.
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t ' i r" - enr L
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Thia article
stressed
Castro s expressed desire for
reaching an accommodation
with
the united States and
his
willingness
to make substantial concessions
to
this
end. On September 12 I talked with Miss Howard whom
I have known for some
years,
and .she echoed Ambassador
Diallo
1
s
opinion that
there was a
r i t
between Castro
and the Guevara-Hart-Aliieida groupon the question of
Cuba s
future
course,
On
September 12 I
discussed
this
with
Under
Secretary
Harriman in Washington.
He suggested
I prepare a
memo
and
we arranged to meet in New York
the
following week.
On September 18 I wrote a
memorandum
based on
these
talks and on
corroborating information
I had heard in
Conakry.
In i t
I
suggested
that discreet contact might
be
established with
the
Cubans at the
n i t e ~
Nations to find
out whether
Castro
in fact wanted
to talk,
and on our terms.
I showed this
memo
to Ambassador
Stevenson, who
felt
the
matter
was worth exploring quietly and
who
indicated he
might discuss i t with the
President.
On September 19 I met Harriman in New York. After
reading my memo he suggested I also discuss i t
with
the
Attorney-General
because
of the poli t ical
implications
of the Cuban issue.
-:; .. - l
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. H
t BRARY
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On September
20,
I made an appointment with the
Attorney-General in
Washington. Meanwhile, Stevenson
obtained the President s approval for me to make
discreet
contact
with
Dr. Lechuga, cubas
chief
delegate at the
United Nations.
On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard s
apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since
her
vis i t with
Castro
and
invited
him
for
a
drink to
meet
some
friends who
had
also
been
to
Cuba, I was
Just
one
of
those friends, In
the
course of our conversation,
which
started
with recollections of my own talks
with
Castro in
1959, I mentioned
having read
Miss Howard s
ar t icle .
Lechuga
hinted that Castro
was
indeed
in
a
mood to
talk,
especially
with someone he had met before.
He thought
there was a good
chance that I might be
invited
to Cuba
i
l9-Wished to resume
our 1959
talk.
I
told
him that in
ciy
present
position,
I
would need
off icial authorization to make
such a t r ip , and
did not know i i t would be forthcoming. However, I
said
an
exchange
of
views
might
well be
useful
and that I would
find
out
and
le t
him know.
On September
24,
I
saw
the
Attorney-General
in Washington,
gave
him
my
September 18
memo
and
reported my
meeting
with
Lechuga. He said he would
pass
the memo on to Mr. McGeorge
Bundy; meanwhile, he
thought that
i t would be
diff icult
for me to
visit Cuba
without
i t
being known
and
risking
SESRE Jl
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- --.
the accusation
that
we were trying to make a deal with Castro,
e wondered
i f
i t might be possible to meet Castro
i f
that 's
what he wanted in another
country,
such as Mexico,
or
at
the United Nations, Meanwhile, he agreed
i t
would be
useful
to
maintain contact
with Lechuga. I
said
I would so
inform
Lechuga and
wait
to
hear
from him or Bundy.
Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with
Lechuga and the Attorney-General.
On
Seppember 27, I
ran
into
Lechuga
at
the
United
Nations,
where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with
Miss Howard, I told him
that
I had discussed our talk in
Washington, and that
i t
was felt that my
accepting an
inv.ita
t ion
to
go
to
Cuba would be ciifficult'under present circum
stances, especially in view of my official
status,
I added,
however, that i f
Castro
or a personal emis-i.ary had something
to
t e l l
us,
we
were
prepared to
meet him and
l isten
wherever
else
would be convenient. Lechuga said he would so inform
Havana. Meanwhile,
he forewarned
me that
he
would be making
a hard anti-U.S. speech in the
United
Nations on.October 7,
I remarked that i t wouldn't help reduce tensions; he replied
he couldn't help making i t because of
the
blockade.
On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga
1
s
tough
speech,
Stevenson
suggested that i f Castro wanted peace with his
neighbors, he need
only
do
three
things
,--
stop
being
a Soviet
stooge, stop
trying
to subvert other
nations,
and star t
carrying out
the
promises
of his revolution regarding consti-
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.
.
.
. . .
.:\
. I
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1
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SF R l
On October
18,
at dinner
at the
home of Mrs. Eugene
Meyer, I talked with Mr. c. A. Doxiades, a noted Greek
architect
and
town-planner,
who
had
Just
returned
from an
architects congress
in
Havana, where he had talked
alone
to both Castro and Guevara, among others. He
sought me
out, as
a government
official ,
to say he was
convinced
Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the
United States i he
could do
so without
losing too
much
face. He also said that
Guevara and the
other
communists
were oppos.ed
to
any
deal,
and
regarded Castro as dangerously
unreliable; and
that
they would get r id of Castro
i
they
thought
they could
carry
on
without
him and retain his
popular support.
On October 20, Miss Howard asked
me
i
she
might cal l
Major Rene ValleJo, a Cuban
surgeon
who
is
also Castro s
current right-hand man
and
confidant.
She?said
Vallejo
helped her see
Castro
and made,it plain to
her
he opposed
the Guevara group. They became friends and have talked on
the
phone several times since
the
interview, Miss Howard s
purpose
in
calling him now was that she
thought
any message
from Lechuga would
not get past the foreign office,
and
she
wanted to make
certain,
through ValleJo, that Castro knew
there
was a U.S.
official
available i
he
wanted
to
talk.
I told
her
to go ahead, so long as she referred to my
SECFffi'f
--
. , .
r
~ . .
UBRARY
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'.,DJ
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-6-
talk with
Lechuga and made
i t quite
plain we were
not
soliciting
a meeting but only expressing our
willingness
to l isten
to
anything
they
had to say, She then
'called
Vallejo at his home He was
out
and she lef t word for
him
to
call her back.
On October
21, Gordon Chase
called me
from the White
House
in connection with my
September 18
memo
I
brought
him up
to
date and said the ball
was
in their court.
On
October
23,
Vallejo
called
Miss Howard
at
her
New
York apartment. She was out of town; he lef t word with
the
maid
that
he would call
again.
On
October
28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates
Lounge. He
told me
that Havana did
not
think
sending
someone
to
the United Nations for
talks would be
useful
at
this
time .
But he hoped he and I might have
s ~ informal
chats from time
to
time, I said i t was up
to
him and he
could
call
me
i f
he fel t
like
i t , He wrote
down
my
extension.
On October 29, Vallejo a g ~ i n
called
Miss Howard
at
home,
He assured
her,
in response
to her
question, that Castro s t i l l
fel t as he
did
in April about improving relations
with
us,
As to his going to
the
United Nations or elsewhere for such a
talk,
Vallejo said
i t
was impossible
for Castro
to leave the
country at the present time. But he said he would relay h.er
.
t ~
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.:
.
.
-'1
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l
:
l
.1
I
. I
d
.
< f ~ S llSREW
do
not
remember
him).
Miss Howard
got
the
impression
that Lechugas previous
message
to
Havana had
not
reached
Vallejo
or
Castro.
On
November 1, Miss Howard
reported the Vallejo call
to me
and I
repeated i t
to Chase
on
November
4.
On November 5, I met
with
Bundy and Chase
at
the
h i ~ e
House and informed them
of the foregoing, The
next day, Chase
called
and asked me
to
put
i t in
writing,
'
WAttwood:nmg
.,
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~ a
.
.
.. .
:i:
.
'
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.
UNITED
STATES MISSION
TO
THE
UNITED NATIONS
November 22, 1963
MEMORANDUM
TO: Gordon Chase
FROM:
William Attwood
Following
is
an
addition
to my memorandum to you dated
November 8, 1963;
On November 11,
Vallejo
called
Miss
Howard again to
1
-
reiterate their appreciation
of the need
for security
and to
say that Castro would
go along with any
arrangements
we might
want to make. He
specif ical ly
suggested that a Cuban
plane
could
come
to Key West and
pick
up
the
emissary;
alternatively
they would agree to have him come in a u.s1'plane which could
land at one
of
several secret airf ie lds .near Havana.
He
emphasized that only
Castro and himself would be
present
at
the talks and that no one else
he
specif ical ly mentioned
Guevara
would be
involved. Vallejo also rei tereated
Castro
desire for th is ta lk and hoped to hear
our answer
soon.
On
November
12,
Bundy
called
me
and
I
reported Vallejo
1
s
message. He said this
did
not affect
the
White House decision
that a preliminary
ta lk
with
Vallejo
at
the United Nations
should be held
in order
to
find
out
what Castro
wanted to
SECRE f
CCFf
BJ
U 3RARY
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2-
SE8RE'f
ta lk
about
-- part icularly i f he was seriously interested
in
discussing
the
points cited
in
Stevenson s
October 7
speech.
Bundy
suggested
I
transmit
our
decision to
Vallejo,
stressing
the
fact that , since we are
responding
to their invi ta t ion
and are not sol ic i t ing a
meeting,
we
would
l ike to know more
about
what
i s on Castro s mind before
commiting
ourselves
to further
talks
in Cuba
n November 13, I went to Miss
Howard s
apartment
and
called
Vallejo
at
home
There
was no
answer.
She
then sent
a telegram asking that he cal l her at his convenience.
n November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him
my
message --
that we
would want
to
ta lk
to
him
here a t the
United Nations
before
accepting an
invi ta t ion
to go to Cuba
She
said
that , i f he wished to
confirm
or
~ i s u s s
th i s
further
with
the U.S.
off ic ia l
he
could
cal l him (Vallejo)
at
home
on
the evening of November
18.
Vallejo said he
would
be there to receive the
call .
Meanwhile, he did not exclude
the
possibi l i ty
of his coming to the
United
Nations
and
said
he
would
discuss i t
with
Castro.
n November 18,
Miss
Howard reached Vallejo
at home
and
passed
the
phone
to me I told him Miss Howard had kept
me
informed of her ta lks with him
and that
I assumed
he
knew of
~ F f
i 0J
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-3-
our
in terest in
hearing
what Castro had in mind.
Vallejo
said
he
did,
and
rei terated
the invi ta t ion to
Cuba,
stressing
the
fact
that security could
be guaranteed.
I
replied
that
we fel t a
preliminary meeting
was
essential to
make
sure
there
was something
useful to
talk
about, and
asked
i f
he was
able
to come to New York. Vallejo
said
he
could
not come at this
time . However,
i f that s
how we fe l t , he said that we
would send
instructions to
Lechuga
to
propose
and
discuss
with
me
an
agenda
for
a
la ter
meeting
with
Castro.
I
said
I would
await
Lechugas cal l . Vallejo
1
s manner was extremely cordial
and he called me Sir
throughout
the conversation.
On
November
19,
I called Chase, and reported the
conversa-
tion.
WAttwood:nmg
-SECRE P
o ~ v
.IJJ
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THE WHITE
H O U S E
\VA ;
--l
IN TON
TO P i>ECPl:T - EYES ONLY
November 25, l963
MEMOR/1.NDUM
FOR MR. DUNDY
SUBJECT: Cubil - -
I tem
of
Prcsidcnti i l l
l n t e r c s t _
1. I
assume
you will want to br ief the Pres iden t on Bill Attwood's
Cuban
ex
erc i se which
is
presumJ.b]y st i l l in t ra in {sc:c
attached).
2. My own thinking on this one, vis a
vis
the
events of November 22,
is st i l l
very
fluid; but here
i t is . Dasic;illy, the, events
of
November 22 would appear
to
make
accomodation with Cast ro an even more doubtful issue than i t was.
while
I think that Pres iden t
Kennedy
could have accornodated
with
Cast ro and
gotten away
with it with
a minimum
of
domest ic
heat ,
I m
not
sure
about
Pres i -
. dent
Johnson. For
one
thing,
a new
Pres iden t who
has no
background
of being
successful ly nasty to
Cas t ro and
the Communis t s
(e,
g.
Pres ident Kennedy
in
October ,
1962 ,
would probably run
a
grea ter
r i sk of being
accused, by
the
Amer ican
people,
of going
sof t , In
addit ion,
the
fact that Lee Oswald has
been heralded as
a
pro-Cas t ro
type
may
make
rapproachment
with Cuba
more
difficult - - although
it is
ha r d to
say
how much more difficult .
3.
I f
one concludes thCJ t
the prospects for accornodation
with Cas t ro
a re
much
d immer than they
were
before
November 22, then Bil l
Attwood
1
s
present
effor t loses much of i ts meaning. We
would
appear to
have three a l ternat ive
courses
of
action
in
handling the presen t status
of
the Attwood-1;
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.
O ) f f i c ~ nf
t ~ e
i\ttnrn.ey 0 D r u 1 ~ r u l
llanl1ingtntt ii
Qt
December
12,
1
~ 6 3
HLllOP.ANDUM FOR HONO
RAB
LE DEAN H.USl:
0ECHTAIts to p roh ib i t
f u t u r e
t r ave l to Cuba
woulc
t ake the f ollowing
form:
{1)
Publ ic i ty
t ha t
t r a v ~ l
to
Cuba
i s
p.rohibi
ecl
l;,y t he
goverrtril
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(2)
No
't i f i c a t i o n o f all c a r r i er s
and
c u ~ : : t o m
s
o f f i c i a1 s t h a t t r a v e l to Cuba i s proh ib i t ed
and th:1 :t they . should ta l ;::e
measures
to br ing
to t h e
P
OV
ernment
s
a t t e n t i o n any
a
t teni
ot s
to
v i o l ~ t e
t he
law.
.
------
. : - ----
(3 )
l n
efi,:.ort
to
remove
pas
f :;p
o r t s
of
p er
.sons
wherever we
have r easonab le ground
t
ha
t
they
may be headed for
Cuba
. This pres e
n t s
some
. l e g
a l and
p r a c t i c a l
d i f f i c u l t i e s .
The
r
ig h t
t o phys ica l ly
s e i z e
p s ~ p o r t s h ~ s never
been
t e s ted
; it
would be d i f f i c u l t in
many i n s t ances
to
g o to Cuba ; and p a s s p o ~ t
0 o u l d
n o ~ b ~ needed
fo r t r ave l to Cuba from Ca .nacla o r Mexico , and
pe
rhaps
some
other .c:::oul:rtries
L})
Prosecu t ion
Of
all
peri:>onS .
t r a v e l i n
g
to
.
Cuba
. in v i o l a t i o n of l ~ w ~ This i s c o n t ~ ~ r y
to t he s t eos we took in the first
in s tan6
c
t6
p r o s e ~ u t e l eader s
or1ly;
would r equ i r e us to
i n d i c t
a l l 'o r
most
o f '. :tJ1e
s tudents
.
who
made
t he p:rior t r i p ; ahd c: ould"
r e s u l t
,n l i t e r 1 l l y .
hundreds
of
.
ind ic tmen ts
if
p:resent plans f e r
t r a v e l to Cuba a r e c a r r i e d th rough.
. ( 5)
Seek
an i n j u n c t i o n
with
r e s pec t
to
any
group
Hhere
we
have
rea son
to
be l i eve th e
y
.
a r e
headed fo r C ~ b a .
There
a re
l ega l d i f f i
c u l t i e s
in secur ing s0ch an in j t inc t ion in view
o f th e f a c t th .a t c r imina l
refl\ed i e
s
e x i s
t t ie
could
improve
our> chances fo r i n junc t ive r e l i e f
on l y
by
p
r>omptly
br ing ing more
in
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i n c c ma j o r appea l to
s tuc lents
o f
s u
ch t r a v l . l i e :3
i n t h e
f a c t
. t h a t
the government
p r o h i b i t s
it
.
Th e ma j o r
arguments
a g a i n s t p e r ~ i t t i n g t rav e l to
Cuba are :
(1)
I t
0oul d
be
i n t e rp re fe d
by som
e g rou ps
as
a
sof t e n i ng
of our
pol i cy to
w
ard
Cu ba ;
(
2 )
e cannot provic1e pi.. o
- tect ion
fo r p
e r
son s
t rav e l l i n ~ t h e r e th rough
normal
d i p
lom
a
ti
c
c hu n n
e l s ;
ancl
O ) I t makes more d i f f i c u l t
our
po s
iti
o n \vi t h
r e
s p ec t t o
t he Cen t ra l
American
c o u n t r i es
,
ha
v i
ng a gr eed wi th them to t ake e f f o r t s to
c urt il t r a v e l to Cu ba .
The pr i n c i p a l
aP
guments
fo r
remov
in
g the pr e s e n t
r es t r i c t i o n s
a re
:
1 )
I t
i s g oing to be ex t remely d i f f i c u l,t
under
t h e
be s t of cond i t ions to .pr e v
en t
t r a v eJ
to
Cu ba ancl
t h i s pro b lem i s li ke ly
to
be i n c r ea s
in
g l y e:nbar r a s s
in
g
to us t h i s summer ;
( 2 ) I t i s
more
cons
i s t e n t
with our
v ie
ws
o f
a
f r
ee
s o c i e ty and wou l d c o n t r a s t with such t h in g s
as
t h e Be r l i n Wall and Communist c o n t ro l s on such t r a v e l .
h e
n
th e se
two
a r e put t o g e th e r , they
form a
power f u l
a r g umen t
in t e rms
o f
both domest ic
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l
p o l i t i c s (excep t f
o r
Cen t r a l America ) f or
t ak ing such
a s t e o. And I
be l i eve it l i k e l y
t h a t
th
e r e muld b e
l ess t r a v e l
to
Cuba i f r e s t r i c t l . ons wer e
removed
than
th ere wi l l be
if t h ~ y
a r e mainta ined . Fur the r ,
tho
s e
who t r ave l would
be
l e s s l i k e l y to
be organ iz
ed b } ,
i
nf luence
d
by
rn
d ,
to
a
degree
,
co n t r o l l ed
by
t he
l e
ft
-
wing rn
ovements which
have
p r e s en t l y taken ov er
much o f
t h i s
a g i t a t i o n . The chances . f6 r Cas t ro to
g e t a
cl
v a nta g e from ou r permi t t i ng
t r a v e l
a:r' e faP l e s s
t h
an from
our p
r o h i b i t i o n
coupled
with t he
i rrun
en
s e
an
d d i s t a s t e f u l p r o s ecu t i
on
s
which
it
i;
1i11 p
roba
b
ly
r e o u
i r e .
I-t J O u l c l
b e
much
e a s i e r
to
remove r e s tri c t ion$ on
t r av
e l
to Cuba now than it woulcl be a f t
e r
t h e com
D
l e t
i
on
o f sev e ra l of t h e contem p
l a t ed
t r i p s and
wh
en t he . m
a t t e r
i s
i.
n t h e D
Ubl ic
e y
e . Hhi le th
e r e
woul
cl
be
.c r i t i ci.s
rn
,
J 1; di e v c tiL:1t it wou1 cl
be
l es s c P i t i c i ;
:c
d
a
nd mor e
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~ ~ . w .
J f ' i ' ; ' 4
l ~ ~ ' t J ,
t h ~ i l : t t ~ m t . ~ ~ J .
~ ~ ~ .;
1.. ~
~ ~ ~ n ~
~ v ~ l
~ t : . r l : ~ t 1 ~ $ ;
t s : U \ ~ ~ s t t - .:litla
' t ; ~ i , ; l ~ , 1
, ~ ~ ~
~ ~ y t ; } ~ $
...
.'.'} ti..
" - * ' ~
~ " " ....,..,.'4', t .;t;f.. i'..6\t-,..,
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t ,J,. , .
~ e f l , , l . f t i L ~ . . . 4'
"'"" ,.,._; ~ , , . ; . . , ; ~ ~ ~ ~ - # , ~ ~ - , ; . . ~ ~ W ; : f ~ ~ ~ i : i : ~ ~ U ' . t >
" ~ { d l t l W , ' ' i > ~
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llit 't
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rrW;j J W ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - \ < l
Put t:fmt
tti
, t'ta'IPU ~ ~ t ~ t l ~ ~ ~ ~ lt( ) lr:l.dvJ;$ ,, ~ ~ i i i \ ~ '
u .
d . t ~
u , ~ - ~ n ' t l ; y , ~ ' W l ' n t . - ~ t '
~ b ~ d h f , ' U $ . ~ t ~ a
~ l i j ~ ~ t
with
t l ~
A ~ ~ . -
~ ~ r a l ~ i . . . t ~ ~ t t
...
n. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e witb
t b ~
& : ~ J ' ~ 1 ~ ; t - ~ a t ,
att.ai
l, .,
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t 'O'W" ~ f
a
~ ~ ~ l " . a m \ t ~
flf 'm
~ t ~
A t t ~ m t ~ J
& ~ ~ 1 i ' l l l t:o t. le
s ~ ~ ~ t ~ : ;
2. A r af t f l f ~ h $
l ' t ~ V
: r e ~ l a . U ~
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?
}f.'. a;ii ~ l o ~ J J
~ n . ~ t t ~ i ~
t h ~ r ~ v i a ~
~ ~ t .
n ~ .
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\ _c
4.
Tell
the
President and I cannot
stress
this too
strongly) that I seriously hope that Cuba and
the
United States can eventually
s i t down
in an atmosphere
of good will and of mutual respect and
negotiate our
d i f f e r e ~ c e s
I believe that there are Q. areas of
contention
between us that
cannot
be
discussed
and
sett led within a climate of mutual understanding.
But
f i rs t
of
course,
t
i s
necessary
to discuss
our
dif-
ferences. I now
believe that
this host i l i ty between
Cuba and
the United
States 1s both unnatural and
unnecessary - and
i t
can be e l i m i n a t e d ~
5. Tell
the
President he should not interpret my conciliator
att i tude, my desire for
discussions
as
a
sign
of weakness
Such an interpretation would be a
serious
miscalculation.
We are not weak the
Revolution
1s strong
very
strong.
Nothing, absolutely
nothing that the United
States can do will destroy the
Revolution.
Yes, we are
strong.
nd
i t
is
from
this
position
of
strength
that
we wish to resolve
our
differences
with
the United States
and
to
l ive in
peace
with
l l
the nations of the
world.
6.
Tell
the President
I
realize fully the
need for absolute
secrecy,
1f
he should decide to continue the Kennedy
approach.
I revealed
nothing
at that
time
I have
revealed
nothing since
I would reveal
nothing
now.
COPY L J
LIBRA
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99
UNITED
NATIONS PLAZA
NE\V YORK 17 N
Y
YUkon 6 4 4
To:
From:
FOP SECRE F
The President
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO
THE UNITED NATIONS
June 16, 1964
Adlai E,
S t e v e n so n Q 2 f -
Last fa l l ,
with
the knowledge of
JFK, I
brought
Lisa Howard
and
Ambassador Bil l
Attwood
now
in
Nairobi)
together to
consider
Castro s statement to her
in
Havana
that he
wanted
to
open
discussions with
the United
States .
Under my
supervision,
the project had
reached
the
point
of preparat ion of
an agenda by
the
Cubans,
when
President
Kennedy was assassinated. Lisa Howard now
informs
me
that following
fur ther ta lks and
correspondence
with
Castro she
was asked to
give
you the attached message.
Attwood s
communication
was through Dr. Rene Vallejo,
said to be Castro s close friend and companion. e speaks
perfect
French
and
English.
While I
am
not sanguine that anything wil l come
of th is , she is
convinced
that he sincerely
wants
some
channel of communication. I f
t
could be resumed on a
low enough level
to
avoid any
possible embarrassment, t
might be worth
considering.
I am.sure i t cannot be done
through the
usual
channels,
I f
you
wish to
discuss th is fur ther ,
l e t
me
know.
COPY LBu LIBR
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MEMORANDUM
THE
WHITE HOUSE
.-'f'OP SECRE'I
.,,..
W SHINGTON
EYES ONLY
-
-2-
at the same
time
we could
indicate to
Castro
that
we
prefer
to communicate on
the
Lechuga channel
and
that
we
would
apprecia te
his
cooperat ion in keeping
f rom Lisa
news of
this switch in channels.
Another possibility is to level with Lisa
and
tell
her
1)
that we are very
chary of the secur i ty aspects of her p:fy;one
conversat ions between the U.S. and
Havana,
2)
that
we have
decided to use
the Lechuga channel
for
any fur ther m e s -
sages (which Lisa effectively set up), and 3) Lisa should relax, s tay quiet,
and
stand at
the
ready we may want to use her influence with Castro in the future .
r c
Gordon
Chase
COPY LB J
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Mankiewiecz - page 3
K: And the
NY
Times
with i t s great
acumen
has
missed
the whole point of
what we did with Cuba at the
OAS.
M:
Really?
I
haven t seen
the
Times.
K: Well,
they
have
an
editorial compru_ning.
M: Complaining that you
didn t
do k anything.
K:
That
the Latin s know what we re doing.
M: Of course they do. I got that from the AP.
f
you know how to read and
if
you know how Latin s
talk,
it
was
quite obvious. I wasn
t surprised when
this other thing came along. I
think
we can make
l l
kinds of ground.
K: Exactly.
What you re doing
may fit really
very
nicely
into
it.
M: I hope
that
you will
not
mention
it
to anybody.
K: Look,
i t s against
my interest.
M: Where
it
could get back to
them.
Above
all,
we certainly
don t
want them
to
think
K:
No, no. What you can do
is
to give
your
impressions. I don t want you to
be a
messenger.
M:
But in any event, you
don t
know that I m going or at least you re not
trea
i t very
seriously
because
otherwise
they get the impression that I seerm to be
but
that I m indeed some kind of
K: No, I
m not going to
talk
to anybody about it.
M:
Good.
K: There s no NE
need
for me to talk to anybody.
M: But file the information away that
that
happened a day or two ago, i t shou
effect your
thinking about other things, perhaps.
K: Exactly. No, I don t consider it an
~ a c c i d e n t
M:
I don t either Just put
it
into your file and I
think
it s significant,
if
you
want to know, that this was the only one
accepted.
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Manki.ewiecz - page 4
K: What
channels
did
they use? I mean, they didn t use
the Soviets
that s
all
M: No
they
used their own UN mission.
K: OK well that s
fine.
M: And
simultaneously
did not
accept
major
networks, all
of which had
been
asking
for
the same thing.
K That s intelligence.
M
In
other
words,
they want
exposure, but
a
K But
from
somebody
with
political
sophistitcation.
M: Exactly.
K Very intelligent.
M: And whom
they
have
reason to
believe,
you know if
not
friendly,
at least
open.
K Exactly.
M: So
it
all
sort
of
fits together
and
r
K
Look
as
soon
as
you
hear
that
r back, will
you call
me.
M:
Yes
I
will.
K Good Franko
M: I will
and
if
you could give them a
date, we d
set
something
up
for late
M
on
the other thing.
K
Right.
M:
Alright, Thank
you
Henry
and
congratulations.
K
Thank
you Frank.
K
END
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MEMORANDUM
CONFIB-ENTL \-J,, (GDS)
NATIONAL
SECURITY
COUNCIL
ACTION
August
30,
1974
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
SECRETARY
KISSINGER
STEPHEN
Lovf >C
FROM:
SUBJECT: Cuba Policy
Events
are
now forcing
us
to make piecemeal
decisions
relating
to
our sanc
tions policy. Decisions already taken on l icenses for Argentine
subsidiar ies
and
agreement for an OAS Committee of Inquiry have moved
us beyond
the
policy framework within which we had
previously been
operating. We are
called
on to make
recommendations and decisions
on
such
matte rs
as Cuban
~
0
0
g
1
their
own decisions,
We should examine
the implications
of these two
out
comes
while there is s t i l l t ime to influence the process , The
terms
of
reference under which the Committee operates will
have
a significant effect
and these will
be
decided within the next two
to
three weeks.
l
In addressing
these
tactical decisions,
we have to think
ahead
to
a restatemen1
of U.S. -Cuba
policy after
the sanctions
have
been lifted o r
modified.
That \
policy will have
to
deal with
maintenance of aabilateral
position as well as
current legislative ,and executive
sanctions
against
thi rd
country trading with
Cuba.
As
more
countries normalize
their
t rade
and
diplomatic relations
with Cuba, pressures
on us
to modify these laws and regulations will increase 1::1
That policy must also
deal with
our bargaining
position vis-a-vis
the Soviet [
Union and Cuba
and pressures from the Congress
to
move quickly toward g
normalization
of bi lateral
relations.
If
you agree, I would propose
to
draw up an options
paper
dealing with the
various alternatives
involved.
The
project should
be
held very closely. I
would plan to
work with
only one person
each
f rom
CIA, State and
Defense.
We would hope to
submit
the paper
for your
and the Pres ident s
consideration
within the next few days,
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve drawing up an options paper
as
outlined above by NSC,
CIA, State
and Defense and on
an extremely res t r i ted
basis
for sub-
mission
to
the President .
Approve
Dis approve
CO:t-lFIDENTJ,;',L (GDS)
a
? I
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We are meeting
here
to explore the
possibilities for
a
rnore no l n1al
relati
> n s ~ 1 i w .:;etv.;eer:
~ u :v,o cOuntries. We do
this a g a L ~ t a b;:.c .
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- 2 -
The United St 'te_s, considers
it
appropriate
t:iat
~ u b a r s
begin
t 9ar>i< ipare 'more
actively
h ~ in:e lectual l:fc of tt.e U n ~ t e d States.
No
purpose
is served in attempting
to embargo
ideas.
Therefore,
it
is reasonable to
expect
that
the
Government of
the United States
may
begin
to grant
additional
visas
f rom time
to
t ime
to Cubans to
visit
this
country
for
cultural,
scientific
and educational meetings and
for other
similar purposes,
in
order
that
such
scholars
and experts may
begin
to communicate more
effectively with
their
colleagues in this country.
We recognize
that there re a number
of
issues
on
both sides.
We anticipate that
many
of these issues
must be
resolved over time
between
us for
itnportant substantive
reasons,
while a number of
them
re essential
for
Cuba or
for the
United States to settle
for
symbolic
reasons.
It would,
ther
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....
- "
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATZ
i
..
OFi'ICE ? 'l"'EE
~ T A R Y
S E C R E ~ T I V E
:;:::::>
.
January
11, 1975
M E J ~ O R A N D U M FOR
THE SECRETARY
. . .
:
. ..
' . .
Subject:
Meeting
"i.n
New York with Cuban
R e p r e s c n t ~ t h e s
Frank
Mankiewicz and I
met
today
at LaGuardia ai rpor t
with
Mr. Nestor Garcia , Fi rs t Secre ta ry of the Cuban Mission to
the
United Nations and Mankiewicz'
basic
contact , and Mr.
Ramon
Sanchez Parodi ,
who
had been
sent
f rom
Havana
to New
York
for
this
meeting.
After M a n ~ i e w i c z
made
the necessary introductions, the fo1.1r
of Ul3
had
cof cc
together
in a La.Guardia res taurant .
Our
conversa
t ion lanted for approximately one
hour.
I
began by saying that" you
a.nd l
had
met scvc ral
t imes on thi.o
iGsua, mo:Jt
r e c e n t ~ for about r.n
hour
lc:i.st night, anci
that
th3
docunlcnt
I
w ~ I J about to
h
i \.nd
o\cr to
them
{
nttachcd)
v.'ils
r o ~ 1 r s
in
both t 1 . o u ~ h t ~ n c l 1Ui1f.U;,:\f. C
that it had be
en
t;pcd
b; my accretaq ' ,
e.nd
t h ~ t
no one
olso
hacl s een
i t . l invited the tv."O
Curons
t:o rca.d
tha
c ocumemt
r.nd
make
any
commentg they m i ~ h t wioh.
A tor
,
rc:oding
the
doc1.uncnt, S:inchoz
P ~ r o d i
sc:.id
that
nr.ithei
hc
nor No i; to
1G l?"ciC& hn.d. l ny ;:iat.l:arHy
to
nc-s otiflto: their
task
w:io
to l b e l \ ~ n t l 1cport
back
to
tbcir
~ u t horiticP. in
H ~ v a n n . . Howc1.or, he
did ..-J:i.r.t t.o rr:a.ke a nu..rnbcr of person.:V. coa1rncnt&:
0
11
..
C u b z ~
cor.:dtlcrcd
th;-.t ' 'US c:n.': in.r. of the b l o d ~ d o of Cub:l
~ . - ; . o
th-:
n ~ c .. e s n r ~
c c ~ d . i t . o n
for
b
i n ~ i . n g th
procoe;' i of
n o n n : : . U : ~ t i l l n . "
It
IH:
?n i
d.
" the d r . ~
q u ~
non. t
would be im?{)f'ir.ibo
for-
Cub.:i
to
b r ~ i n c.lincusdon:i '.'r'ith
tho L ? n ~ t ~ c l S t ; , . ~ : : : a
011
o ~ h ~ r
fo
;) :-t
e ~ u t l t ~ m i ~ .
: : i . ~ d th
i s
r c q ~ i :-r.:d
t h ~ t
tho b . r ; . c : ~ ~ . ; c P . bi?
b r o l ; : : : ~ t to
:ln cm. He ~ ~ i d
t h ~ t
wh
U
o
t
h t: b-2oc
~ c i c w
: ,
r.ol
::
:::
cct:.
e
ro. l'il
y h:\
rrr.
fol.
it
clid
p ~ 0 \ c n t C1:c.:; tr(" m ; l c C c ~ to
t h
e.: .r'\1"' 'lcric
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SECRET ' - :S ITIVE
7
- 3 -
an
act { Cong
res 9 . I
aisked
whether in his
personal
opinion Cuba would
requi re that we change our
laws
before
t he process
o r:orma.lh:ation
could bcsin. Sanchez Parodi
replied,
"I co n ~ t
think
eo.
Sanchez
Parodi then s i id t h ~ t we had probably seen report
o
.
Cnstro
1
a i s t : l t c : m ~ n t s agninet the l :i.ited Stoi.te:s during the
.. b i t
o Sena tor a
J2.vit:i
ilnd Pell . Ha i1aid thnt ~ ' i c ' e s ta tements were ' ' un;:noidablc " at
the times
but
th.it
~ . - e we:-e rit:1t to t.:i..kc
them
~ ~
v i: n ~ t h e : I'
t
1\
'1:1
: - r . r :
\ ' t c r ~
t t
l ~ i c r ) . , ~ . \ r ; ' ? v i . m cur- t . 1rn.
. . l . . ., i . r .
f1
; .
:-. "l l ~ ; . : tJ t::: < . t
'm:
t 1:; f
~
u t y
n
..i natl y ln '-
,
'11
r;oon r
. ;
[ ,_
n
t;'
h
'-1:l
' " n ~ : i
'}:.zn r r;tl
i t
-:-
.
:.
:
C < '
:l
o
d .11
to
t 1c
quo:.tiOl\
of
thr;
h l ~ ~ " " I b s::.: , _ ~ t " t w : n ~
1 f ' " J . ~ h e d ) :tc
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- 4 -
bnpor tan t ,
he
said, "to es tablish
a
w a ~ {
o r
get an
agreement whe "c-by
the
blockade
i no longer
an
i ssue . Perhaps a change in the
way
in
,..,hieh
the United
States reacts on
t rade
and economic
relations would
be suff ic ient; perhaps mo\.es ::o ch;lnge
our
legislation would be
necessary .
1 do not
know precise ly , but
I do know that the
situa.tioo
has to
be chanzed in
some
way. l unde s ta
.nd
t h ~ t the
is
sue is
complicated.
but
the
US mu ' l t take
.cti
v e
steps
in that sense. As
long as there is no ar ran si; t?1T1ent with respect to
the blockade
and i ts
removal, there
can
be no ad vance in our relat ionship. ' '
Sanchez
Parodi went on
to
sar that in Cuba's
view
t ime is ruo:Ung
aga
inst the
United Stat ' s, which is
running the u
r isk
oi
isolat ing i tse lf f rom
the
rent
o
the
Hemisphere .
11
Sanchez Parodi
in1ic:?.led that this \l.''1- >
the
e:\."tcnt of
h h personnl
rc m n.
rk J.
1 facn aaid t lu t I h::id some a d d
t i o n ~
orcl poi
nts
to
ma1:
The U n i t ~ c l
Statee ic prcpa t'cd to impro
ve
relations
with
Cub3.,
We
~ ~ c nt aGld ng
that C
b ~ g ive up
i ts
domestic
fltr.u.ct-..:re o r m ~ L h o d
oi
go \'
errunent.
We do believe,
bowevcl",
that
Cub..i
;h
o
dcl
pursu e
an
indcpcnriant
ot'ilign P I
e : o r n t ~ n
els n
a t
b t
c r
ti:
n c
c o:.
t. cl
c
?
t
:t
h1g
ue
and
dlscur.s
in w h ~ t c v : : i r orcler was mutunlly a greed.
Cub::.
mu :t u n d ~ r s t ~ n < l t h ~ :
v
hilc we
nre ,
of cour :
e ,
intcrestc
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-
countr ies , thi S
was not
a part icularly
"big
cleal' '
for
the
United
States.
It
was
not
. for example. so
significant
for
i lS
the process of normal.bing
relations with
the PRC ~ . . - h i . c h w ~
are
now
engaged in.
Cuba
must al.so understand that any normal ization
of
rclation5hips b z t ~ c e n our h\--o
countries must
involve
a. quid
pro
quo. Uncle.- no circumstances would the
United States be prepared to
view
the normalization
of relations
as
a one
way
street in
which
we gilvo
and
Cuba took.
After going
t h r o u ~ h
" instructed" comment J. I said that I
had flovoru t)c r .
.
on:. .l c o . n m c : n t ~ m ~ k a I c mph.:i.siz.ed that thcso
wero t o t ~ y rn;- u:m ro : action to the discus aion so
a r
nnd t h ~ t thoy
. in no wuy r eprcnr.:ntcd tho views
o nnyo
no o thi:?r than
myacH.
I s:i.id
t h ~ t in my cplnion i u b ~ .
rorr.tircd
d complete clL"nin:lt ion
of
the
b l o c J , ~ d c boforo L'..ny efforto toward n o r m , l b ~ ~ t i o n
of
rabtion& c:oulcl
k ~ pfat:c, the U : ~ i c d States v:ould be unprcparod to pl'"ocoed i 1 , , ~ r t h o r .
T h i ~ would h ~ r c l l y be a
11
b;J..anccd
11
way or
p r . o c c e d L ~ g . 1 on th3 oti1or
hllncl, wh
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S E CRE ; /S;z
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8
I will ~ < i l < e steps
on
Monday to ilce th;lt
we
c h l n ~ e
the
~ r . a " l l
res tr ic t ions on Cuban t::-\ diplomats . permit t ing them to t r:wel to
and from
W a s h i n ~ t o n
As
to
Manzdev:icz'
Ut)corr..in:
tr-i O to
H.3 3na.
' '
.
.
you
~ i l l want
to
consider v.-ith Bill o ~ v.hat u d d i t ~ o r . . a l mc::::iiat;c
Fri.i.nk
misht
l " . a r r ~ with him.
.
::
-
.... ,
.. _; ~
.
. ..
- ' -
' -0:
- ~ ' : .....
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