Cruz vs. Tuazon

VOL.76,APRIL29,1977 543Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

No.L23749.April29,1977.*

FAUSTINOCRUZ,plaintiffappellant,vs.J.M.TUASON&COMPANY, INC., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,defendantsappellees.

Civil law; Statute of Frauds; The statute of frauds does notapply to an alleged contract whereby one party agreed to deliver aparcel of land to another in consideration of the latters acting asintermediary to effect a compromise in a civil action.Intheinstantcase, what appellant is trying to enforce is the delivery to him of3,000squaremetersoflandwhichheclaimsdefendantspromisedtodo in consideration of his services as mediator or intermediary ineffecting a compromise of the civil action, Civil Case No. 135,between the defendants and the Deudors. In no sense may suchallegedcontractbeconsideredasbeingasaleofrealpropertyorofany interesttherein.Indeed,notalldealings involving interest inreal property come under the Statute. Moreover, appellantscomplaintclearlyallegesthathe

_______________

*SECONDDIVISION

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544 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

hasalreadyfulfilledhispartofthebargaintoinducetheDeudorstoamicably settle their differences with defendants as, in fact, onMarch 16, 1963, through his efforts, a compromise agreementbetween these partieswas approved by the court. In otherwords,theagreementinquestionhasalreadybeenpartiallyconsummated,andisnolongermerelyexecutory.AnditislikewiseafundamentalprinciplegoverningtheapplicationoftheStatutethatthecontractin dispute should be purely executory on the part of both partiesthereto.

Same; Quasicontract; A presumed quasicontract cannotemerge as against one party when the subject matter thereof isalready covered by a contract with another party.From the verylanguage of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed quasicontract cannot emerge as against one party when the subjectmatter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with

another party. Predicated on the principle that no one should beallowedtounjustlyenrichhimselfattheexpenseofanother,Article2142createsthelegalfictionofaquasicontractpreciselybecauseoftheabsenceofanyactualagreementbetweenthepartiesconcerned.Corollarily, if the one who claims having enriched somebody hasdonesopursuanttoacontractwithathirdparty,hiscauseofactionshould be against the latter, who in turn may, if there is anyground therefor, seek relief against the party benefited. It isessential that the act by which the defendant is benefited musthave voluntary andunilateral on thepart of the plaintiff.As onedistinguished civilian puts it, The act is voluntary, because theactorinquasicontractsisnotboundbyanypreexistingobligationtoact.Itisunilateral,becauseitarisesfromthesolewilloftheactorwho is not previously bound by any reciprocal or bilateralagreement.Thereasonwhythelawcreatesajuridicalrelationandimposescertainobligationsistopreventasituationwhereapersonisable tobenefit or takeadvantageof such lawful,voluntaryandunilateralactsattheexpenseofsaidactor.(AmbrosioPadilla,CivilLaw,Vol.VI,p.748,1969ed.) In the caseatbar, sinceappellanthas a clearer and more direct recourse against the Deudors withwhom he had entered into an agreement regarding theimprovements and expenditures made by him on the land ofappellees, it cannot be said, in the sense contemplated in Article2142, that appellees have been enriched at the expense ofappellant.

Appeal; A pro forma motion for reconsideration does notsuspend running of the period for appeal.Wecannotseeanythingin said motion for reconsideration that is substantially differentfrom the above oppositions and rejoinder he had previouslysubmittedandwhichthetrialcourthadalreadyconsideredwhenitrendered its main order of dismissal. Consequently, appellantsmotionforreconsiderationdidnotsuspendhisperiodforappeal.

545


BARREDO,J.:

AppealfromtheorderdatedAugust13,1964oftheCourtofFirst Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q7751,Faustino Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and GregorioAraneta, Inc., dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruzfortherecoveryofimprovementshehasmadeonappelleeslandandtocompelappelleestoconveytohim3,000squaremetersoflandonthreegrounds:(1)failureofthecomplainttostateacauseofaction;(2)thecauseofactionofplaintiffisunenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; and (3) theactionoftheplaintiffhasalreadyprescribed.

Actually, a perusal of plaintiffappellants complaintbelowshowsthatheallegedtwoseparatecausesofaction,namely:(1)thatuponrequestoftheDeudors(thefamilyofTelesforoDeudorwholaidclaimonthelandinquestiononthe strength of an information posesoria) plaintiff madepermanentimprovementsvaluedatP30,400.00onsaidlandhavinganareaofmoreorless20quionesandforwhichhealso incurred expenses in the amount of P7,781.74, and

since defendantsappellees are being benefited by saidimprovements,heisentitledtoreimbursementfromthemofsaid amounts; and (2) that in 1952, defendants availed ofplaintiffs servicesasan intermediarywith theDeudors towork for theamicable settlement ofCivilCaseNo.Q135,thenpendingalsointheCourtofFirstInstanceofQuezonCity, and involving 50 quinones of land, of which the 20quinones aforementioned form part, and notwithstandinghishavingperformedhisservices,asinfact,acompromiseagreement entered into on March 16, 1963 between theDeudorsandthedefendantswasapprovedbythecourt,thelatter have refused to convey to him the 3,000 squaremetersoflandoccupiedbyhim,(apartofthe20quinonesabove) which said defendants had promised to do withintenyearsfromandafterdateofsigningofthecompromiseagreement,asconsiderationforhisservices.

Within the period allowed by the rules, the defendantsfiled separate motions to dismiss alleging three identicalgrounds:(1)Asregardstheimprovementsmadebyplaintiff,thatthecomplaintstatesnocauseofaction,theagreementregardingthesamehavingbeenmadebyplaintiffwiththeDeudorsandnotwith thedefendants,hence the theoryofplaintiffbasedonArticle2142oftheCivilCodeonunjustenrichmentis

546

546 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDCruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

untenable; and (2) anent the alleged agreement aboutplaintiffs services as intermediary in consideration ofwhich,defendantspromisedtoconveytohim3,000squaremeters of land, that the same is unenforceable under theStatuteofFrauds,therebeingnothinginwritingaboutit,and,inanyevent,(3)thattheactionofplaintifftocompelsuchconveyancehasalreadyprescribed.

Plaintiffopposedthemotion,insistingthatArticle2142oftheCivilCodeisapplicabletohiscase;thattheStatuteofFraudscannotbeinvokedbydefendants,notonlybecauseArticle 1403 of the Civil Code refers only to sale of realproperty or of an interest therein and not to promises toconvey real property like the one supposedly promised bydefendants to him, but also because, he, the plaintiff hasalready performed his part of the agreement, hence theagreementhasalreadybeenpartlyexecutedandnotmerelyexecutorywithinthecontemplationoftheStatute;andthathisactionhasnotprescribedforthereasonthatdefendantshadtenyearstocomplyandonlyafterthesaidtenyearsdidhiscauseofactionaccrue,thatis,tenyearsafterMarch16,1963,thedateoftheapprovalofthecompromiseagreement,andhiscomplaintwasfiledonJanuary24,1964.

Rulingonthemotiontodismiss,thetrialcourtissuedthehereinimpugnedorderofAugust13,1964:

In the motion, dated January 31, 1964, defendant GregorioAraneta, Inc.prayedthat thecomplaintagainst itbedismissedonthe ground that (1) the claim on which the action is founded is

unenforceableundertheprovisionoftheStatuteofFrauds;and(2)the plaintiffs action, if any has already prescribed. In the othermotion ofFebruary 11, 1964, defendant J.M.Tuason&Co., Inc.soughtthedismissaloftheplaintiffscomplaintonthegroundthatit statesno cause of action and on the identical grounds stated inthemotiontodismissofdefendantGregorioAraneta,Inc.Thesaidmotionsaredulyopposedbytheplaintiff.

Fromtheallegationsofthecomplaint,itappearsthat,byvirtueof an agreement arrived at in 1948 by the plaintiff and theDeudors, the former assisted the latter in clearing, improving,subdividing and selling the large tract of land consisting of 50quinonescoveredbythe information posesoria in the name of thelate Telesforo Deudor and incurred expenses, which are valuedapproximately atP38,400.00 andP7,781.74, respectively; and, forthereasonsthatsaidimprovementsarebeingusedandenjoyedbythe defendants, the plaintiff is seeking the reimbursement for theservicesandexpensesstatedabovefromthedefendants.

547


Defendant J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. claimed that, insofar as theplaintiffsclaimforthereimbursementoftheamountsofP38,400.00and P7,781.74 is concerned, it is not a privy to the plaintiffsagreementtoassisttheDeudorsinimprovingthe50quinones.Onthe other hand, the plaintiff countered that, by holding andutilizing the improvements introduced by him, the defendants areunjustly enriching and benefiting at the expense of the plaintiff;and that said improvements constitute a lien or charge on thepropertyitself

On the issue that the complaint insofar as it claims thereimbursementfortheservicesrenderedandexpenses incurredbythe plaintiff, states no cause of action, theCourt is of the opinionthat the same iswellfounded. It is found that thedefendantsarenot parties to the supposed express contract entered into by andbetween the plaintiff and the Deudors for the clearing andimprovement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore in order that thealleged improvement may be considered a lien or charge on theproperty,thesameshouldhavebeenmadeingoodfaithandunderthemistakeastothetitle.TheCourtcantakejudicialnoticeofthefactthatthetractoflandsupposedlyimprovedbytheplaintiffhadbeenregisteredwaybackin1914inthenameofthepredecessorsininterest of defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact isconfirmed in thedecision renderedby theSupremeCourt onJuly31,1956inCaseG.R.No.L5079entitledJ.M.Tuason&Co.Inc.vs. Geronimo Santiago, et al. Such being the case, the plaintiffcannotclaimgoodfaithandmistakeastothetitleoftheland.

Ontheissueofstatuteoffraud,theCourtbelievesthatsameisapplicable to the instant case. The allegation in par. 12 of thecomplaint states that thedefendantspromisedandagreed to cede,transfer and convey unto the plaintiff the 3,000 squaremeters ofland in consideration of certain services to be rendered then. It isclear that the alleged agreement involves an interest in realproperty. Under the provisions of Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of theCivilCode,suchagreementisnotenforceableasitisnotinwritingandsubscribedbythepartycharged.

I.

II.

1.

On the issue of statute of limitations, theCourtholds that theplaintiffs action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. 11 of thecomplaint that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached theplaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromiseagreement inCivilCaseNo.Q135 and allied cases. Furthermore,pars.13and14ofthecomplaintallegedthattheplaintiffactedasemissaryofbothpartiesinconveyingtheirrespectiveproposalsandcounterproposalsuntil the final settlementwaseffectedonMarch16, 1953 and approved by the Court on April 11, 1953. In thepresent action, which was instituted on January 24, 1964, theplaintiff isseekingtoenforcethesupposedagreemententered intobetween him and the defendants in 1952, which has alreadyprescribed.

548


WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs complaint is hereby orderedDISMISSEDwithoutpronouncementastocosts.

SOORDERED.(Pp.6569,Rec.onAppeal.)

On August 22, 1964, plaintiffs counsel filed a motion forreconsiderationdatedAugust20,1964asfollows:

PlaintiffthroughundersignedcounselandtothisHonorableCourt,respectfullymovestoreconsideritsOrderbearingdateof13August1964,onthefollowinggrounds:

THATTHECOMPLAINTSTATESASUFFICIENTCAUSEOF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR ASPLAINTIFFS CLAIM PAYMENT OF SERVICES ANDREIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, ISCONCERNED;THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM OVER THE3,000SQ.MS.,THESAMEHASNOTPRESCRIBEDANDTHE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLETHERETO;

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffscomplaintcontainstwo (2)causesofactionthe firstbeing an action for sum of money in the amount of P7,781.74representing actual expenses and P38,400.00 as reasonablecompensationforservicesinimprovingthe50quinonesnowinthepossessionofdefendants.Thesecondcauseofactiondealswiththe3,000 sq. ms. which defendants have agreed to transfer untoplaintiff for services rendered ineffecting thecompromisebetweentheDeudorsanddefendants;

Under its order of August 3, 1964, this Honorable Courtdismissed the claim for sum of money on the ground that thecomplaint doesnot state a cause of action against defendants.Werespectfullysubmit:

THATTHECOMPLAINTSTATESASUFFICIENTCAUSEOF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO FAR ASPLAINTIFFSCLAIMFORPAYMENTOFSERVICESANDREIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, IS

CONCERNED.

SaidthisHonorableCourt(atp.2,Order):

ORDER

xxxxxx

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VOL.76,APRIL29,1977 549Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

On the issue that the complaint, in so far as it claims thereimbursementfortheservicesrenderedandexpenses incurredbythe plaintiff, states no cause of action, theCourt is of the opinionthat the same iswellfounded. It is found that thedefendantsarenot parties to the supposed express contract entered into by andbetween the plaintiff and the Deudors for the clearing andimprovement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore, in order that thealleged improvement may be considered a lien or charge on theproperty,thesameshouldhavebeenmadeingoodfaithandunderthemistakeastotitle.TheCourtcantakejudicialnoticeofthefactthatthetractoflandsupposedlyimprovedbytheplaintiffhadbeenregistered way back in 1914 in the name of the predecessorsininterestofdefendantJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.ThisfactisconfirmedinthedecisionrenderedbytheSupremeCourtonJuly31,1956incase G. R. No. L5079 entitled J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.GeronimoSantiago,etal.Suchbeingthecase,theplaintiffcannotclaimgoodfaithandmistakeastothetitleoftheland.

The position of this Honorable Court (supra) is that thecomplaintdoesnotstateacauseofactioninsofarastheclaimforservices and expenses is concerned because the contract for theimprovementofthepropertieswassolelybetweentheDeudorsandplaintiff,anddefendantsarenotpriviestoit.Now,plaintiffstheoryisthatdefendantsarenonethelessliablesincetheyareutilizingandenjoyingthebenefitsofsaidimprovements.Thus,underparagraph16ofthecomplaint,itisalleged:

(16)That the services andpersonal expenses of plaintiffmentioned inparagraph7hereofwere renderedand in factpaidbyhim to improve,astheyinfactresultedinconsiderableimprovementofthe50quinones,and defendants being now in possession of and utilizing saidimprovements shouldreimburseandpayplaintiff for suchservicesandexpenses.

Plaintiffscauseofactionispremisedinter alia,onthetheoryofunjustenrichmentunderArticle2142ofthecivilCode:

ART.2142.Certainlawfulvoluntaryandunilateralactsgiverisetothejuridical relation of quasicontract to the end that no one shall beunjustlyenrichedorbenefitedattheexpenseofanother.

Inlikevein,Article19ofthesameCodeenjoinsthat:

ART. 19. Every personmust, in the exercise of his rights and in theperformance of his duties, actwith justice, give everyone his due andobservehonestyandgoodfaith.

550

II.

12).


WerespectfullydrawtheattentionofthisHonorableCourttothefact that ARTICLE 2142 (SUPRA) DEALS WITH QUASICONTRACTS or situations WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACTBETWEENTHEPARTIESTOTHEACTION.Further, aswe canreadily see from the title thereof (TitleXVII), that the samebearsthe designation EXTRA CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS orobligationswhichdonotarise fromcontracts.While it is true thatthere was no agreement between plaintiff and defendants hereinfor the improvement of the 50 quinones, since the latter arepresentlyenjoyingandutilizingthebenefitsbroughtaboutthroughplaintiffslaborandexpenses,defendantsshouldpayandreimbursehimthereforundertheprinciplethatnoonemayenrichhimselfatthe expense of another. In this posture, the complaint states acauseofactionagainstthedefendants.

THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM OVER THE3,000SQ.MS.THESAMEHASNOTPRESCRIBEDANDTHE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLETHERETO.

TheStatuteofFraudsisCLEARLYinapplicabletothiscase:

Atpage2ofthisHonorableCourtsorderdated13August1964,theCourtruledasfollows:

ORDER

xxxxxx

On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same isapplicabletotheinstantcase.Theallegationinpar.12ofthecomplaintstates that the defendants promised and agree to cede, transfer andconveyunto theplaintiff, 3,000 squaremeters of land in considerationof certain services to be rendered then. It is clear that the allegedagreement involves an interest in real property.Under the provisionsof Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code, such agreement is notenforceableasitisnotinwritingandsubscribedbythepartycharged.

Tobringthisissueinsharperfocus,weshallreproducenotonlyparagraph 12 of the complaint but also the other pertinentparagraphsthereincontained.Paragraph12statesthus:

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COMPLAINT

xxxxxx

That plaintiff conferred with the aforesaid representativesof defendants several times and on these occasions, thelatter promised and agreed to cede, transfer and conveyuntoplaintiffthe3,000sq.ms.(nowknownasLots16B,17

(a)

(b)

(c)

13).

14).

and18)whichplaintiffwas then occupyingand continuestooccupyasofthiswriting, forandinconsiderationofthefollowingconditions:

ThatplaintiffsucceedinconvincingtheDEUDORStoenterinto a compromise agreement and that such agreement beactually entered into by and between the DEUDORS anddefendantcompanies;That as of date of signing the compromise agreement,plaintiff shall be the owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but thedocuments evidencing his title over this property shall beexecutedanddeliveredbydefendantstoplaintiffwithinten(10)yearsfromandafterdateofsigningofthecompromiseagreement;That plaintiff shall, without any monetary expense of hispart,assistinclearingthe20quinonesofitsoccupants;

That in order to effect a compromise between the parties,plaintiffnotonlyaswellactedasemissaryofbothpartiesinconveying their respective proposals and counterproposalsuntil plaintiff finally succeeded in convincing theDEUDORS to settle with defendants amicably. Thus, onMarch16,1953,a Compromise Agreement was entered intoby and between the DEUDORS and the defendantcompanies; and on April 11, 1953, this agreement wasapprovedbythisHonorableCourt;That in order to comply with his other obligations underhis agreement with defendant companies, plaintiff had toconferwiththeoccupantsoftheproperty,exposinghimselfto physical harm, convincing said occupants to leave thepremises and to refrain from resorting to physical violenceinresistingdefendantsdemandstovacate;

Thatplaintiff furtherassisted defendants employees in the actualdemolition and transferofallthehouseswithintheperimeterofthe20 quinones until the end of 1955, when said area was totallycleared and the houses transferred to another area designated bythedefendantsasCapt.CruzBlockin

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Masambong,QuezonCity.(Pars.12,13and14.Complaint;ItalicsOurs).

Fromtheforegoing,itisclearthenthattheagreementbetweenthepartiesmentionedinparagraph12(supra)ofthecomplainthasalready been fully EXECUTED ON ONE PART, namely by theplaintiff. Regarding the applicability of the statute of frauds (Art.1403, Civil Code), it has been uniformly held that the statute offrauds IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY CONTRACTSBUT NOT WHERE THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN PARTLYEXECUTED:

SAME ACTION TO ENFORCE.The statute of frauds has beenuniformly interpreted to be applicable to executory and not to completedor executed contracts. Performance of the contract takes it out of the

operationofthestatute.xxxx.The statute of frauds is not applicable to contracts which are either

totally or partially performed,onthetheorythatthereisawidefieldforthe commission of frauds in executory contracts which can only bepreventedbyrequiringthemtobeinwriting,afactwhichisreducedtoaminimum in executed contracts because the intention of the partiesbecomes apparent by their execution and execution, in most cases,concludestherightoftheparties.xxx.Thepartial performance may beproved by either documentary or oral evidence. (At pp. 564565,TolentinosCivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.IV,1962Ed.;ItalicsOurs).

Authoritiesinsupportoftheforegoingrulearelegion.Thus,Mr.Justice Moran in his Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III,1974Ed.,atp.167,states:

2. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS APPLICABLE ONLY TOEXECUTORY CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EITHERTOTALLY OR PARTIALLY PERFORMED ARE WITHOUT THESTATUTE. The statute of frauds is applicable only to executorycontracts.Itisneitherapplicabletoexecutedcontractsnor to contractspartially performed.Thereasonissimple.Inexecutorycontractsthereis awide field for fraud because unless they be inwriting there is nopalpable evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. Thestatute has been enacted to prevent fraud. On the other hand thecommissionof fraud inexecutedcontracts isreducedtoaminimuminexecuted contracts because (1) the intention of the parties is madeapparent by the execution and (2) execution concludes, inmost cases,therightsoftheparties.(ItalicsOurs)

Underparagraphs13and14of thecomplaint (supra)onecanreadilyseethattheplaintiffhasfulfilledALLhisobligationsunder

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VOL.76,APRIL29,1977 553Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co.,Inc.

the agreement betweenhimand defendants concerning the 3,000sq. ms. over which the latter had agreed to execute the properdocumentsoftransfer.Thisfactisfurtherprojectedinparagraph15ofthecomplaintwhereplaintiffstates;

15).Thatinoraboutthemiddleof1963,after all the conditions statedin paragraph 12 hereof had been fulfilled and fully complied with,plaintiff demanded of said defendants that they execute the Deed ofConveyance in his favor and deliver the title certificate in his name,overthe3,000sq.ms.butdefendantsfailedandrefusedandcontinuetofailandrefusetoheedhisdemands.(Par.15,Complaint;ItalicsOurs).

In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that thisHonorable Court erred in holding that the statute of frauds isapplicable to plaintiffs claim over the 3,000 sq.ms. There havingbeen full performance of the contract on plaintiffs part, the sametakesthiscaseoutofthecontextofsaidstatute.

Plaintiffs Cause ofAction has NOT Prescribed:

With all due respect to this Honorable Court, we also submitthat the Court committed error in holding that this action has

prescribed:

ORDER

xxxxxx

On the issue of the statute of limitations, the Court holds that theplaintiffsactionhasprescribed. It isalleged inpar. IIof thecomplaintthat, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff toprevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement inCivilCaseNo.Q135andalliedcases.Furthermore,pars.13and14ofthecomplaintallegedthatplaintiffactedasemissaryofbothparties inconveying their respective proposals and counterproposals until thefinal settlement was effected onMarch 16, 1953 and approved by theCourtonApril11,1953.Inthepresentaction,whichwasinstitutedonJanuary 24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposedagreemententeredintobetweenhimandthedefendantsin1952,whichhasalreadyprescribed.(atp.3,Order).

The present action has not prescribed, especially when weconsidercarefullythetermsoftheagreementbetweenplaintiffand

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554 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDCruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co.,Inc.

thedefendants.First,wemustdrawtheattentionofthisHonorableCourt to the fact that this is an action to compel defendants toexecuteaDeedofConveyanceoverthe3,000sq.ms.subjectoftheiragreement. In paragraph 12 of the complaint, the terms andconditions of the contract between the parties are spelled out.Paragraph12(b)ofthecomplaintstates:

(b)Thatasofdate of signing the compromise agreement,plaintiffshallbetheownerofthe3,000sq.ms.butthedocumentsevidencinghistitleover this property shall be executed and delivered by defendants toplaintiff within ten (l0) years from and after date of signing of thecompromise agreement.(ItalicsOurs).

The compromise agreement between defendants and theDeudorswhichwas concluded through the efforts ofplaintiff,wassignedon16March1953.Therefore, thedefendantshad ten (10)years from said date within which to execute the deed ofconveyanceinfavorofplaintiffoverthe3,000sq.ms.As long as the10 years period has not expired, plaintiff had no right to compeldefendants to execute the document and the latter were under noobligation to do so.Now,this10yearperiodelapsedonMarch16,1963. THEN and ONLY THEN does plaintiffs cause of actionagainst defendants accrue. Therefore, the period of prescriptionbegan to run against plaintiff only on March 17, 1963.Thus,underparagraph15ofthecomplaint(supra)plaintiffmadedemandsupondefendantsfortheexecutionofthedeed inoraboutthemiddleof1963.

Sincethecontractnowsoughttobeenforcedwasnotreducedtowriting,plaintiffscauseofactionexpiresonMarch16,1969orsixyears from March 16, 1963 WHEN THE CAUSE OP ACTIONACCRUED(Art.1145,CivilCode).

In this posture, we again respectfully submit that thisHonorable Court erred in holding that plaintiffs action has

I.

II.

III.

prescribed.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this HonorableCourt reconsider its Order dated August 13, 1964; and issueanother order denying the motions to dismiss of defendants G.Araneta,Inc.andJ.M.TuasonCo.Inc.forlackofmerit.(Pp.7085,RecordonAppeal.)

Defendantsfiledanoppositiononthemaingroundthattheargumentsadducedbytheplaintiffaremerelyreiterationsof his arguments contained inhisRejoinder toReply andOpposition,whichhavenotonlybeenrefutedinherein

555


defendantsMotiontoDismissandReplybutalreadypasseduponbythisHonorableCourt.

OnSeptember7,1964,thetrialcourtdeniedthemotionforreconsiderationsthus:

After considering the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration ofAugust20,1964and itappearingthatthegroundsreliedupon insaid motion are mere repetition of those already resolved anddiscussedbythisCourtintheorderofAugust13,1964,theinstantmotionisherebydeniedandthefindingsandconclusionsarrivedatbytheCourt in itsorderofAugust13,1964areherebyreiteratedandaffirmed.

SOORDERED.(Page90,Rec.onAppeal.)

UnderdateofSeptember24,1964,plaintifffiledhisrecordonappeal.

Inhisbrief,appellantposesanddiscussesthefollowingassignmentsoferror:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSINGTHE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THATAPPELLANTS CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. ISALLEGEDLYUNENFORCEABLEUNDERTHESTATUTEOPFRAUDS;THAT THE COURT A QUO FURTHER COMMITTEDERRORINDISMISSINGAPPELLANTSCOMPLAINTONTHEGROUNDTHATHISCLAIMOVERTHE3,000SQ.MS. IS ALLEGEDLY BARRED BY THE STATUTE OFLIMITATIONS;andTHAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSINGTHE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSEOF ACTION IN SO FAR AS APPELLANTS CLAIM FORREIMBURSEMENTOFEXPENSESANDFORSERVICESRENDEREDINTHEIMPROVEMENTOFTHEFIFTY(50)QUINONES,ISCONCERNED.

We agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds waserroneouslyappliedbythetrialcourt.ItiselementarythattheStatutereferstospecifickindsoftransactionsandthatit

(1)

(2)

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(3)

cannotapplytoanythatisnotenumeratedtherein.Andtheonly agreements or contracts covered thereby are thefollowing:

Thoseenteredintointhenameofanotherpersonbyone who has been given no authority or legalrepresentation,orwhohasactedbeyondhispowers;ThosedonotcomplywiththeStatuteofFraudsasset forth in thisnumber. In the following casesanagreementhereaftermadeshallbeunenforceablebyaction,unlessthesame,orsomenoteor

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memorandumthereof,beinwriting,andsubscribedby the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,therefore, of the agreement cannot be receivedwithout thewriting, or a secondary evidence of itscontents:

An agreement that by its terms is not to beperformedwithinayearfromthemakingthereof;Aspecialpromisetoanswerforthedebt,default,ormiscarriageofanother;An agreement made in consideration of marriage,otherthanamutualpromisetomarry;An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels orthings in action, at a price not less than fivehundredpesos,unlessthebuyeracceptandreceivepartofsuchgoodsandchattels,ortheevidences,orsomeofthem,ofsuchthingsinaction,orpayatthetimesomepartofthepurchasemoney;butwhenasale ismade by auction and entry ismade by theauctioneerinhissalesbook,atthetimeofthesale,of the amount and kind of property sold, terms ofsale,price,namesof thepurchasersandpersononwhose account the sale is made, it is a sufficientmemorandum:An agreement for the leasing for a longer periodthanoneyear,orforthesaleofrealpropertyorofaninteresttherein:arepresentationastothecreditofathirdperson.

Those where both parties are incapable of givingconsenttoacontract.(Art.1403,civilCode.)

Intheinstantcase,whatappellantistryingtoenforceisthedelivery to him of 3,000 square meters of land which heclaims defendants promised to do in consideration of hisservices as mediator or intermediary in effecting acompromiseofthecivilaction,CivilCaseNo.135,betweenthe defendants and the Deudors. In no sense may suchalleged contract be considered as being a sale of realpropertyorofanyinteresttherein.Indeed,notalldealings

involvinginterestinrealpropertycomeundertheStatute.Moreover, appellants complaint clearly alleges that he

hasalreadyfulfilledhispartofthebargainsto inducetheDeudorstoamicablysettletheirdifferenceswithdefendantsas, in fact, on March 16, 1963, through his efforts, acompromiseagreementbetweenthesepartieswasapprovedbythecourt.Inotherwords,theagreementinquestionhasalready been partially consummated, and is no longermerelyexecutory.AnditislikewiseafundamentalprinciplegoverningtheapplicationoftheStatutethatthecontractindisputeshouldbepurely

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executoryonthepartofbothpartiesthereto.We cannot, however, escape taking judicial notice, in

relation to the compromise agreement relied upon byappellant,thatinseveralcasesWehavedecided,Wehavedeclared the same rescinded and of no effect. In J. M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.vs.BienvenidoSanvictores,4SCRA123,theCourtheld:

ItisalsoworthyofnotethatthecompromisebetweenDeudorsandTuason,uponwhichSanvictorespredicateshisrighttobuythelotheoccupies,hasbeenvalidlyrescindedandsetaside,asrecognizedby this Court in its decision in G.R. No. L13768, Deudor vs.Tuason,promulgatedonMay30,1961.

WerepeatedthisobservationinJ.M.Tuason&Co.,Inc.vs.Teodosio Macalindong, 6 SCRA 938. Thus, viewed fromwhatwouldbe theultimate conclusionofappellants case,We entertain grave doubts as to whether or not he cansuccessfully maintain his alleged cause of action againstdefendants, considering that the compromise agreementthatheinvokesdidnotactuallymaterializeanddefendantshave not benefited therefrom, not to mention theundisputedfactthat,aspointedoutbyappellees,appellantsotherattempt to secure the same3,000 squaremetersviathe judicial enforcement of the compromise agreement inwhich they were supposed to be reserved for him hasalready been repudiated by the courts. (pp. 57. Brief ofAppelleeGregorioAraneta,Inc.)

Asregardsappellantsthirdassignmentoferror,Weholdthat the allegations in his complaint do not sufficientlyconstitute a cause of action against defendantsappellees.Appellants reliance on Article 2142 of Civil Code ismisplaced.Saidarticleprovides:

Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to thejuridical relation of quasicontract to the end that no one shall beunjustlyenrichedorbenefitedattheexpenseofanother.

Fromtheverylanguageofthisprovision,itisobviousthatapresumed quasicontract cannot emerge as against onepartywhenthesubjectmatterthereofisalreadycoveredbyanexistingcontractwithanotherparty.Predicatedonthe

principle thatnooneshouldbeallowedtounjustlyenrichhimselfattheexpenseofanother,Article2142createsthelegal fiction of a quasicontract precisely because of theabsence of any actual agreement between the partiesconcerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims havingenrichedsomebodyhas

558


donesopursuanttoacontractwithathirdparty,hiscauseofactionshouldbeagainst the latter,who in turnmay, ifthereisanygroundtherefore,seekreliefagainstthepartybenefited.Itisessentialthattheactbywhichthedefendantisbenefitedmusthavebeenvoluntaryandunilateralonthepart of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it,Theactisvoluntary,becausetheactorinquasicontractsisnot bound by any preexisting obligation to act. It isunilateral,because itarises fromthesolewill of theactorwho isnotpreviouslyboundbyanyreciprocalorbilateralagreement. The reason why the law created a juridicalrelations and imposes certain obligation is to prevent asituationwhereapersonisabletobenefitortakeadvantageofsuchlawful,voluntaryandunilateralactsattheexpenseofsaidactor.(AmbrosioPadilla,CivilLaw,Vol.VI,p.748,1969ed.) In the caseatbar, sinceappellanthasa clearerandmoredirectrecourseagainsttheDeudorswithwhomhehadenteredintoanagreementregardingtheimprovementsandexpendituresmadebyhimonthelandofappellees, itcannotbesaid, in thesense contemplated inArticle2142,that appellees have been enriched at the expense ofappellant.

In the ultimate, therefore, Our holding above thatappellants first two assignments of error are well takencannotsavethedayforhim.Asidefromhishavingnocauseof action against appellees, there is one plain error ofomissionWehavefoundintheorderofthetrialcourtwhichis as gooda groundasany other forUs to terminate thiscase favorably to appellees. In said order whichWe havequoted in full earlier in this opinion, the trial court ruledthat the grounds relied upon in said motion are mererepetitionsof thosealreadyresolvedanddiscussedby thisCourt in the order of August 13, 1964, an observationwhich We fully share. Virtually, therefore, appellantssmotionforreconsiderationwasruledtobeproforma.Indeed,a cursory reading of the record on appeal reveals thatappellants motion for reconsideration abovequotedcontained exactly the same arguments and manner ofdiscussionashisFebruary6,1964OppositiontoMotiontoDismiss of defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. ((pp. 1725,Rec. on Appeal) as well as his February 17, 1964OppositiontoMotiontoDismissofDefendantJ.M.Tuason& Co. (pp. 3345, Rec. on Appeal) and his February 29,1964RejoindertoReplyofDefendantJ.M.Tuason&Co.,(pp.5264,Rec.onAppeal)

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Wecannotseeanythinginsaidmotionforreconsiderationthat is substantially different from the above oppositionsand rejoinderhehadpreviously submitted andwhich thetrialcourthadalreadyconsideredwhenitrendereditsmainorder of dismissal. Consequently, appellants motion forreconsideration did not suspend his period for appeal.(Estradavs.Sto.Domingo,28SCRA890,9056.)Andasthispoint was covered by appellees Opposition toMotion forReconsideration(pp.8689),hence,withintheframeoftheissuesbelow,itiswithintheambitofOurauthorityastheSupremeCourt to consider thesamehereeven if it isnotdiscussed in the briefs of the parties. (Insular LifeAssurance Co:, Ltd. Employees AssociationNATU vs.Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [Resolution en banc ofMarch10,1977inG.R.No.L25291).

Now,theimpugnedmainorderwasissuedonAugust13,1964,whiletheappealwasmadeonSeptember24,1964or42 days later. Clearly, this is beyond the 30dayreglementaryperiodforappeal.Hence,thesubjectorderofdismissalwasalready finalandexecutorywhenappellantfiledhisappeal.

WHEREFORE,theappealofFaustinoCruzinthiscaseisdismissed.Nocosts.

Fernando (Chairman),Antonio,AquinoandMartin,JJ.,concur.

Concepcion Jr.,JJ.,didnottakepart. Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second

Division.

Case dismissed.

Notes.Theprimordialaimofthelawinlayingdowntherequisites regarding the application of the Statute ofFraudsistopreventfraudandperjuryintheenforcementof obligations depending for their evidence upon theunassisted memory of witnesses (Showemaker vs. LaTondena,68Phil.24).Fortheachievementofthispurpose,however, itdoesnotattempttomake,orhavetheeffectofmaking,contractsinvalidwhichhavenotbeenexecutedinwriting.Itsimplyprovidesfortheformormethodbywhichcontracts coming within its terms may be proved. Suchcontracts,iftheironlyeffectisthattheyarenotintheformrequired by the Statute of Frauds, are valid, the onlyconsequencebeingthatnoactioncanbeprovedunlesstherequirementiscompliedwith.Inotherwords,theform

560

560 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDQuizon vs. Baltazar

required by the statute is for evidentiary purposes only.

Thus,ifthepartiespermitacontracttobeproved,withoutobjectionastotheformofproof,itisthenjustasbindingasifthestatutehadbeencompliedwith.(Conlu vs. Araneta,15Phil.387;Gallemit vs. Tabiliran,20 Phil. 241;Kuenzle vs.Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 SCRA 487;Magalona vs. Parayco,59Phil.543).

TheStatuteofFrauds isnotapplicabletowills (Quintovs. Morata,54Phil.481) or to renunciationorpartitionofinheritance, these transactions not being contracts ofconveyance (Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 53O.G. 373). It hasalso been held to have no application to an innominatecontract as where an interpreter rendered services for aninconsiderable number of times (Perez vs. Pomar, 2 Phil.682); to employment of an attorney or an authority toemployanattorney(Tan Lua vs. OBrien,55Phil.53;ortoacondition upon which a deed is delivered in escrow (OngChua vs. Carr,53Phil.957).

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